Beltran vs secretary of health

Facts: This case is Primarily about the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7719.

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks

It was further found that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more
likely to have blood transfusion transmissible diseases such as malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and
AIDS.

On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial
blood banks took effect and On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.

Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the
freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should
be outside the domain of State intervention.

Issue: whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power.

Held: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the
people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety. The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s
police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is
both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the
National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules
and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.

Tupas vs CA

Facts: the petitioners in this case received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City and the motion for reconsideration was filed fourteen days later. The order of May 3, 1989,
denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period,
that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition
was therefore clearly tardy.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can claim that they have been denied due process.
Held: No. The petitioners' argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their
counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law is not acceptable.
The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith
or excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients
should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes. The petitioners' submission that
their counsel's failure to appeal on time should be regarded as excusable neglect or honest error is
not compatible with his impressive credentials. The procedural mistake might have been
understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not in the case of the petitioners' former counsel. they
waited to move for reconsideration until the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion was denied,
filed the petition for review only when it was already too late. Under these circumstances, equity
cannot be extended to them to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe. It is clear
that the respondent court did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the petitioners' appeal on
the ground of tardiness.

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan

Facts: This Petition is a sequel of the case where the court held that Jimenez was deprived of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC
the Petition alleging that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. But before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez
filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that the application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing.
In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed
to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The court issued its Order, directing the issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. Jimenez was granted provisional liberty after he had surrendered
his passport and posted the required cash bond. Hence, this petition.

Issues: 1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued

2.Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending

Held: No.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination — under oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system

2. No.

Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The constitutional right to bail “flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.”It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The respondent’s detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. The essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, this doctrine does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case
— call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Corona v. United Harbor Pilot’s Association of the Philippines

Facts: PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92  on July 15, 1992, whose
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avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users
through the improvement of pilotage services." This was implemented by providing therein that "all
existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs
or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor
pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of
effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation
of performance."

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-
92,

However Secretary Corona concluded that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the
exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area.

After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is
convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. Hence the petition.

Issue: WON Administrative Order No.04-92 is constitutional

Held: NO Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the
Constitution, viz.:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is readily
apparent that the said administrative order unduly restricts the right of harbour pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement.

Jardeleza v. Sereno

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announced an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he
was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ
Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in
question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence,
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the
list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him,
despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases
where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding
being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.

When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to
protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the
body from making an unsound assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to
strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same,
to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test
that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

The Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation
by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

i. Judicial Proceedings

El Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca

FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt
which was more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracio's property. However, Engracio left for China and eventually died there. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was
necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send a copy of the
summons to the defendant's last known address but it was not shown whether the Clerk complied with
this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator
of the estate of Engracio, wherein he requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. On the ground that the order of
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant. or the subject of the action

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject of the action.

HELD: Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses to appear
or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction is limited to the mortgaged
property, with respect to which jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the property is
located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law applicable in such cases is
vested with the power to subject property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.

Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage of Ampatuan Cases

FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed on
their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the
cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists
of the Philippines (NUJP), ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims,
individual journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a petition before
this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed,
recording devices be permitted inside the court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage. Petitioners state that the trial of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the
crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. Hence, the present
petitions which assert the exercise of right to a fair and public trial and the lifting of the absolute ban on
live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre
should be allowed

Facts: Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS- ‐CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various
media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices
be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines
be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the
exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right
to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to
courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence,
this petition docketed as AM No. 10-‐11-‐5-‐SC.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre
should be allowed
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the impossibility of
holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested
parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the
right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution
to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent,
open and public trial.”

ii. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

Ang Tibay v. CIR

Facts: Ang Tibay contends that it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor
Union due to the shortage of leather soles. According to the Union, this was merely a scheme to
systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of leather is unsupported.
NLU filed a motion for new trial to prove its averments. Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new
trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: Should the motion be granted?

Ruling: Yes. CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and CA No. 103 requires it
to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact,
however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative case.

Shu v. Dee

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the
respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to Metrobank. Both deeds
of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other
was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees
of Metrobank. After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging
the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. The respondents argued
in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process during the NBI investigation
because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of
the petitioner for comparison.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied of their right to due process during the NBI
investigation.

HELD: NO. The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may
require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or
detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. Since the NBI’s findings were merely
recommendatory, the Court found that no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken
place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for
purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. The respondents were not likewise denied their
right to due process when the NBI issued the questioned documents report. There was no categorical
finding in the questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report,
too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s request for assistance
in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent
the respondents from securing a separate documents examination by handwriting experts based on
their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s questioned documents report does not directly point to the
respondents’ involvement in the crime charged.

Sibayan v. Alda

FACTS: The respondent, Elizabeth Alda sent a letter-complaint to the Office of Special Investigation of
Bangko Sentral (OSI-BSP), charging Norlina Sibayan, the assistant manager of Banco De Oro, with
unauthorized deduction of her Savings account, as well as for failure to post certain check deposits to
such account. The complaint alleged that while Elizabeth did not make any withdrawals from her BDO
savings account from 2008-2009, its balance ₱1,071,561.73 as of July 2008 was reduced to only ₱334.47
by October 2008. Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks, to wit: 1) UCPB Check in
the amount of 2,743,346 issued by Ferdinand Oriente and BPI Check ₱2,237,341, issued by Jovelyn
Oriente were not posted on her BDO savings account despite the fact that the said checks were
deposited. As for Norlina's defense, she argued that the charges were only meant to harass her and BDO
as the latter previously filed a criminal case against Elizabeth, her cohorts, for theft, estafa, and violation
of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devise Regulation. The said case proceeded
from the acts of Elizabeth and her codefendants therein of withdrawing and laundering various amounts
erroneously credited by BDO to Elizabeth’s daughter, Ruby Visa Electron Fast Card Account (Fastcard)
which Elizabeth opened for and in the name of Ruby. BDO, however, discovered that from November
2007 to September 2008, Ruby was able to withdraw the total amount of ₱64,229,297.50 despite
Elizabeth only having remitted the amount of ₱1,645,48.00 BDO conducted an investigation and
discovered that Ruby learned of the erroneous crediting of funds as early as November 2007 and utilized
BDO's system error to successfully launder money by transferring funds withdrawn from Ruby's Fastcard
Account to various bank accounts in the Philippines under the names of Elizabeth, Ruby and their friends
and relatives After the parties' submission of their respective pleadings, the OSI-BSP issued a Resolution
finding a prima facie case against Norlina for Conducting Business in an Unsafe or Unsound Manner
under Section 56.2 of the "The General Banking Law. Meanwhile, Norlina filed a Motion for Production
of Documents praying that UCPB and BPI be ordered to produce and allow the inspection and copying of
the Statements of Account pertaining to UCPB and BPI Accounts, alleging that Ruby is the legal and
beneficial owner of both accounts. However, her motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, Norlina Sibayan is entitled for the production of Bank Documents.

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the denial of the motion for production of bank documents
pertaining to UCPB and BPI is justified as the bank accounts sought to be examined are privileged.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit, provides
that: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Clearly then, the Requests to Answer Written
Interrogatories and Motion for Production of Documents were both unnecessary and improper.

Fabella v. Court of Appeals

Facts : On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September
to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances
and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases
against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents,
through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they
were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied
access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their
innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and
appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing
the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding
the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

Held: YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division
as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization
and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA
4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied
with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is
no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee
was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee.
Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a
previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize
them.

Govt. of Hong Kong v. Olalia

Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued
and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that
there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court
to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. Petitioner filed a
motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right
to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. On the other hand, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee;
and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. In this case,
the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo
GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the
individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held
that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Govt. of Hong Kong v. Munoz

FACTS: The case is the third in the trilogy of cases that started with the 2000 case of Cuevas v. Muñoz,
which dealt with respondent Juan Antonio Munoz's provisional arrest as an extraditee, and the 2007
case of Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., which resolved the
question of Muñoz's right to bail as a potential extraditee. Both rulings dealt with and resolved incidents
arising during the process of having Munoz extradited to Hong Kong under and pursuant to the
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of Hong
Kong for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons (RP-HK Agreement). Petitioner HKSAR posits
that respondent Muñoz must be extradited for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent on the
basis of the ruling in B. v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption the
term agent in Section 9 of the HKSAR’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POB) also covered public
servants in another jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Antonio Muñoz could be extradited to and tried by the HKSAR for the
crime of accepting an advantage as an agent?

RULING: The petition was denied. Respondent cannot be extradited to the jurisdiction of HKSAR. The
extradition treaty creates the reciprocal obligation to surrender persons from the requested state's
jurisdiction charged or convicted of certain crimes committed within the requesting state's territory, and
is of the same level as a law passed by the Legislatures of the respective parties.

The RP-HK Agreement is still in full force and effect as an extradition treaty. The procedures therein
delineated regulate the rights and obligations of the Republic of the Philippines and the HKSAR under
the treaty in the handling of extradition requests.

For purposes of the extradition of Munoz, the HKSAR as the requesting state must establish the
following six elements, namely: (1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the HKSAR and
the Philippines; (2) the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against the person to be
extradited; (3) the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are extraditable within the
terms of the treaty; (4) the individual before the court is the same person charged in the HKSAR; (5) the
evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe that the person to be extradited committed
the offenses charged; and (6) the offenses are criminal in both the HKSAR and the Philippines (double
criminality rule).

Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of both the
requesting and the requested states". This simply means that the requested state comes under no
obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request for
extradition as criminal.

Transactions were entered into in behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines, an instrumentality of the
Philippine Government, Munoz should be charged for the offenses not as a regular agent or one
representing a private entity but as a public servant or employee of the Philippine Government. Yet,
because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against him in the HKSAR is one that
deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for the application of the double criminality rule are
obviously not met. Accordingly, the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent must be dropped from
the request for extradition.

RCBC v. Banco de Oro

Facts: RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB),
George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of
226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of Bankard. RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling
shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of valuation
of accounts amounting to P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty. RCBC commenced
arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in accordance with Section 10 of the SPA. ICC asked them to
advance cost of $350K. RCBC paid. But respondent did not pay assailing disproportionate share because
RCBC has way greater claim. RCBC paid the share of BDO in the cost. RCBC filed an Application for
Reimbursement of Advance on Costs Paid, praying for the issuance of a partial award directing the
Respondents to reimburse its payment in the amount of US$290,000 representing Respondents’ share
in the Advance on Costs and to consider Respondents’ counterclaim for actual damages in the amount
of US$300,000, and moral and exemplary damages as withdrawn for their failure to pay their equal
share in the advance on costs. BDO Opposed on the ground that the Arbitration Tribunal has lost its
objectivity in an unnecessary litigation over the payment of Respondents’ share in the advance costs.
They pointed out that RCBC’s letter merely asked that Respondents be declared as in default for their
failure to pay advance costs as that RCBC had no intention of litigating for the advance costs.
Respondents reiterated their position that Article 30(3) envisions a situation whereby a party would
refuse to pay its share on the advance on costs and provides a remedy therefor – the other party "shall
be free to pay the whole of the advance on costs." Such party’s reimbursement for payments of the
defaulting party’s share depends on the final arbitral award where the party liable for costs would be
determined. This is the only remedy provided by the ICC Rules Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second
Partial Award. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award and RCBC filed in the same court a
Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award. Makati City RTC confirmed the Second Partial Award and
denied EPCIB’s motion to vacate the same. EPCIB appealed to CA. Acting on a petition for certiorari, the
Court of Appeals reversed the order of the lower court and set aside the second partial award.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL GROUND TO VACATE THE SECOND PARTIAL AWARD?

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling that in treating the letter of the
claimant as an application for a partial award and in furnishing the parties with a copy of Secomb's
article - which favoured the claimant by advancing its cause - the chairman acted with partiality. “SEC.
41. Vacation Award. – A party to a domestic arbitration may question the arbitral award with the
appropriate regional trial court in accordance with the rules of procedure to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 876. Any other
ground raised against a domestic arbitral award shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.”

Rule 11.4 of the Special ADR Rules sets forth the grounds for vacating an arbitral award:

Rule 11.4. Grounds.—(A) To vacate an arbitral award. – The arbitral award may be vacated on the
following grounds:

a. The arbitral award was procured through corruption, fraud or other undue means;

b. There was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of its members;

c. The arbitral tribunal was guilty of misconduct or any form of misbehavior that has materially
prejudiced the rights of any party such as refusing to postpone a hearing upon sufficient cause shown or
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;

d. One or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under the law and willfully refrained
from disclosing such disqualification; or

e. The arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed them, such that a complete,
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

The award may also be vacated on any or all of the following grounds:

a. The arbitration agreement did not exist, or is invalid for any ground for the revocation of a contract or
is otherwise unenforceable; or

b. A party to arbitration is a minor or a person judicially declared to be incompetent.

In deciding the petition to vacate the arbitral award, the court shall disregard any other ground than
those enumerated above. (Emphasis supplied)

Evident partiality in its common definition thus implies "the existence of signs and indications that must
lead to an identification or inference" of partiality

Although RCBC had repeatedly asked for reimbursement and the withdrawal of BDO’s counterclaims
prior to Chairman Barker’s December 18, 2007 letter, it is baffling why it is only in the said letter that
RCBC’s prayer was given a complexion of being an application for a partial award. To the Court, the said
letter signaled a preconceived course of action that the relief prayed for by RCBC will be granted.

That there was an action to be taken beforehand is confirmed by Chairman Barker’s furnishing the
parties with a copy of the Secomb article. This article ultimately favored RCBC by advancing its cause.
Chairman Barker makes it appear that he intended good to be done in doing so but due process dictates
the cold neutrality of impartiality.

iii. Academic Discipline

ADMU v. Capulong

Facts: On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted
its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was
hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board
formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven
students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate
the said students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.

HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had
validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim a venerable institution such as
Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on students
currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the
school which includes:

a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;

c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;

d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran

FACTS: Kim Go was named among several high school students involved and present at a hazing rite of
Tau Gamma held on October 3, 2001 in the house of one Dulce, in Tondo, Manila.  Kim’s mother, Mrs.
Angelita Go, was then informed at the Parents- Teacher conference by Mr. Rosarda of her son’s
participation as a fraternity member  The fourth year students involved were to be allowed to graduate
from Letran, whereas those who weren’t were allowed to finish their current school year but were to be
barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran.  Mrs. Go later on submitted a request for the deferment
of Kim’s suspension so that he could take a previously scheduled exam.  Several conferences
addressing the students involved in the fraternity were gone unattended by the spouses Go despite
consistent notification.  The respondents proposed that the students and their parents sign a proforma
agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension to which Mr. and Mrs. Go didn’t sign,
refusing to accept the findings that Kim was a fraternity member, and that there was a lack of due
process in the findings.  Petitioners filed a complaint for damages claiming that respondents had
unlawfully dismissed Kim, and for the compensation for “business opportunity losses” they have
suffered while personally attending to Kim’s disciplinary case.

ISSUE: 1. WON petitioners were denied due process in the opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary
case 2. WON there was bad faith, malice, fraud, or any improper and willful motive or conduct on the
part of the respondents to justify the award of damages

HELD: • Mrs. Go’s letter specifically requested that Kim’s “suspension” be deferred proving that they
were well aware that is was not a “dismissal”. The request to allow Kim to take his examination further
supports the conclusion that Kim had not been dismissed.

• Order No. 20, s. 1991 (“Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary and Secondary
Schools”) of the then Dept. of Education, Culture, & Sports is clear that the intent of the department is
to apply prohibition against fraternity membership for all elementary and high school students,
regardless of their school of enrollment.

• Letran’s rule against high school students joining fraternities is reasonable because of the adult
oriented activities often associated when most, if not all, high school students are minors. This is a rule
clearly stated in its enrollment contracts and student handbooks notably acknowledged by the signature
of Mrs. Go on the contract.

• Guzman v. National University: Due process in student disciplinary cases does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. They may be
summary, and cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. The viewing and examining of written
statements is admissible in due process.

• The written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable
him to suitably prepare a defense. Kim had enough time to prepare his response. The essence of due
process, the opportunity to be heard, had been given.

• Records can confirm that respondents did not act with bad faith, malice, fraud, or improper or willful
motive or conduct in disciplining Kim. No actual damages either as Mr. Go’s testimony that he neglected
his business affairs to attend to Kim’s case is based on speculation.

Cudia v. Supt. of PMA

FACTS: Cadet 1CL Cudia is a student of the PMA. His 4th period class under Dr. Costales was from 1:30-
3:00pm while his 5th period class was from 3:05-4:05pm. Prof. Beron of the 5th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia because he was late for two minutes in his 5th period class. In
Cudia’s defense he came directly from his 4th period class. They were dismissed a bit late by the
instructor. Major Hindang meted Cudia the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Maj. Hindag
clarified with Cudai that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales,
who responded that she never dismissed her class late and followed the protocol to dismiss the calss 10-
15 minutes earlier than scheduled. Cudia sought a reconsideration of his punishment and addressed his
request for reconsideration to Ma. Benjamin L. Leander asserting that he was not in control of the
circumstances on why he was late. Maj. Leander asked Maj. Hindag to submit his reply. Maj. Hindag in
his reply that based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, the
penalty was sustained. Maj. Hindag reported Cudia to the HC for Violation of the Honor Code on the
basis of lying where Cudia states that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late in the
succeeding class. Cudia clarified the matter with Dr. Costales. Costales said that when Hindag had asked
her on whether or not she dismissed the class late, She and Hindag were not in the same time reference.
Cadet Cudia in his letter of explanation on the Honor Report averred that his understanding of the
“Class” covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students and in their case, some cadets were asked for queries
and he was given instruction by which were directly related to their class. Dr. Costales transaction and
communication with other classmates may have already ended but his and Dr. Costales extended for a
little bit. The PMA Honor Committee found Cudia guilty for violating the Honor Code. Cudia was placed
on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation by the
AFP barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify
for any entrance requirements to the PMA. CRAB (Cadet Review and Appeals Board) reviewed the case
of Cudia. Pending review, Special order No.1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cudia.
Cudia and his family engaged the services of the PAO. The CRAB Chariman informed Cudia that it could
not favourably consider his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video
footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate no the authorized body
to take action thereon. Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter complaint before the CHR-
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Major Garcia for alleged
violation of the human rights of Cudia. CRAB submitted a report to the AFP General Headquarters
upholding the dismissal of Cudia. The CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings recommending
that the PMA and the HC pronounce Cudia as not guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
Committee, to restore Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow him to
graduate. The AFP Chief of Staff affirmed CRAB’s denial of Cudia’s appeal. AFP Headquarters resolved to
deny the appeal for lack of merit. THE CHR moved to conclude and recommend that there existed
probable cause for Human Rights Violations against the officers and members of the PMA Honor
Committee and certain PMA officials for violations of the rights of Cudia to dignity, due process,
education, privacy of communication and good life. The CHR recommended that authorities should
investigate several PMA officials. The office of the president sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of
Staff and the CRAB. And that the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot
be adopted as basis that Cudia’s due process rights were violated.

ISSUE: Does the power of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate include the power to
adjudicate?

RULING: NO. The CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication. The findings of facts and the conclusions of law of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) are merely recommendatory and, therefore not binding to the
Supreme Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. Fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
ISSUE: Did Guzman entirely do away with the due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay? Is Cudia
guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the investigative
hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings?

RULING: YES. Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong already settled the issue as it held that although
both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is
more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of
students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De
San Juan De Letran. Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution
stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The
assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court held that “a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel
is not an absolute requirement.

ISSUE: Pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cudia’s appeal, should the Court decline jurisdiction for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING: NO. In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,
which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision by
military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before appealing to the
court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities
and to conserve judicial resources.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial
remedies if any of the following is present:

when there is a violation of due process;

when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

when there is irreparable injury;

when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;

when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA.
Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11,
2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief
and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the petition based
on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.