I T H ' Supreme C of India: N HE ON BLE Ourt

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA
APPEAL No.___/2009
[UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]
AKHILESH
… APPELLANT
V.
UNION OF INDIA
… RESPONDENT
_____________________________________________________________
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT
3rd ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2009

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram
MEMORIAL FROM THE SIDE OF APPELANT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
1. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
2. ABBREVIATIONS USED
3. SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
4. ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1
A. CAN THE MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT, 1971 BE

CHALLENGED ON THE GROUNDS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY?
ISSUE 2
B. WHETHER FOETUS IS A PERSON AND IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE

UNDER ART. 21 EXTENDED TO AN UNBORN CHILD?
B.1 Whether an unborn person has right to born?
ISSUE 3
C. CAN THE MTP ACT, 1971 BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14?
ISSUE 4
D. WHETHER SEC 3(2) OF THE MTP ACT 1971 INFRINGES THE BASIS
OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
D.1 It hampers morality and reputation of the women.
2
3 ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2009
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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5. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
6. BODY OF ARGUMENTS
7. PRAYER
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
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I N D E X O F A U T H O R I T I E S
I. BOOKS REFERED
1. Indian Constitutional Law, M.P Jain , 5th Edt. Wadhwa & waddhwa , Nagpur
2. Modi’s medical jurisprudence, 21st Edn., pp 429, 430; Taylor’s medical
jurisprudence, 13th Edn. , p. 322
II. D I C T I O N A R Y U S E D
1. ADVANCED LAW LEXICON,

2. BROOM’S LEGAL MAXIMS ,Tenth Edition ,Universal Law Publishing Co.
3. OXFORD DICTIONARY & THESAURUS.
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
III. C A S E S
1. ‘X’ v. ‘Z’ , AIR 1999 SC 495 (501)

2. Bodhisattva Gautam v. Miss. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922 (926-
927)
3. Centre for Enquiry Into Health & Allied Themes (Cehat) and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors
4. Cf. Hunter v Southan , (1984) 2 SCR 145 ( 158 – 89)
5. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
6. Francis Corralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746
7. G. Krishnan v. G. Rajan alias Madipur Rajan, (1994) 1 LW (cri) 16 Mad
(DB)
8. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378
9. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378
10. Griswold v. Connecticut ,(1965) 381 US 479
11. Jane roe v Henry wade ,(1973) 410 US 113
12. Jane Roe v. Henry Wade, (1973) 410 US 113 : (1973) 35 Law Ed 147.
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13. Khuswant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58 (67

14. Malak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 760
15. Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs Union of India (UOI) through the
Ministry of Law and Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
AIR2008Bom29
16. Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs Union of India (UOI) through the
Ministry of Law and Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
AIR2008Bom29
17. Munn v Illinois 94, US 113
18. Munn v. Illinois ,(1877) 94 US 113 : (1877) 24 Law Ed 77.
19. Nand Kishore Sharma and Ors. Vs Union of India (UOI) and Anr.
AIR2006Raj166, 2006WLC(Raj)UC411
20. Neera Mathur ( Mrs.) v. Life Insurance Corporation of India , AIR 1992 SC
392 (395)
21. Olga v Bombay corpn., A.1985 SC 180 ( Para. 44)
22. Phoolan Devi v. Shekar Kapur ,(1995) 57 DLT 154,
23. Queen Empress V Ademmia ,(1886) ILR 9 Mad 360
24. R V. Sullivan (1988) 43 CCC 3d 65
25. R V. Tait, (1989)3 WLR 89
26. Ref. under Art. 143, A. 1965 SC 745 ( Para. 42)
27. Sylvia v. gobeille, 220-A 2d 222 (R.I. 1960).
28. T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah.,AIR 1983 AP 356
29. Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. Ananthi Ammal and Ors . MANU/SC/0416/1995
30. Vishakha V. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 301}
31. William L. Webster et al V. reproductive health services at el (1989) 492 US
490
32. William v marison rapid transit inc., 152 ohio 114: (1949) 87 N.E. 2d 334;
33. Wolf v. Colorado. (1948) 338 US 25
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
IV. ARTICLES USED
1. Art. 14 of Indian constitution
2. Art -21 of Indian constitution
V. STATUTES USED
1. MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT , 1971
VI. JOURNALS USED
1. AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 at p. 117,118

2. AIR 1996 Journal Section , 136(140).
3. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of human Rights, 1948; Article 3 of the
international Covenant on civil and political rights,1966; Article 10 of the
convention on the elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
expressly speak of equally between men and women. These convention are
binding upon India as per the ‘doctrine of incorporation’
4. Bardhan, P., Little girls and dealth in india, economic and political weekly,
September 4, 1982.
5. Cri LJ 2001, Journal Section, 273(275).
6. Dasgupta, M., selective discrimination against female children, in rural
Punjab, india, population and development review 13(1); 90-95, 1987.
7. Dixon Mueller, R., Abortion policy and women’s health in developing
countries, international journal of health services 20 (2) : 297-314, 1990
8. Edward shills : “ privacy : Its constitution and vicissitudes” , 31 Law and
Contemporary Problems (1996) 282.
9. Incorporated in place of lunatic by the 2002 amendment
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10. Karkal, M ., Differentials in mortality by sex , economic and political weekly,

august 8: 1344-1443, 1987; Krishnaji, N., Poverty and sex ratio; Some data
and speculation, Economic and political weekly, 22(23) : 892-895, 1987.
11. See Clark , A., Social demography of excess female mortality in india: New
directions, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, April 25: 12-14-
1987;Dandekar, k., why has the proportion of of women in india’s population
be declining? Economic and Political weekly, October 18: 1663-1667, 1975
12. Vide jane E.S. Fortin, lecturer in king’s college, London, published in the
modern law review, January 1988, vol 51, p. 547, referred in G. Krishnan v
G. Rajan (1994) 1 LW (Cri) 16 Mad (DB)
13. Vide Jane E.S. Fortin, Lecturer in law , King’s college , London, published in
the modern law review, January 1988, Vol. 51, p. 547, referred in G.
Krishnan v. G. Rajan alias Madipur Rajan, (1994) 1 LW (cri) 16 Mad (DB)
VII. WEBSITE USED
1. www.manupatra.com
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ABBREVIATIONS USED
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A B B R E V I A T I O N S U S E D
A …………………………………………………………………………………..Appeals
AIR …………………………………………………………………...All India Reporter
Bom. ……………………………………………………………………………...Bombay
Del. …………………………………………………………………………………...Delhi
Ed. ……………………………………………….………………………………Edition
i.e. ………………………………………………………………………………….That is
Ltd. ………………………………………….…………………………………….Limited
Mad. ………………………………………………………………………………Madras
p. ...……………………………………………...………………………………..Page No.
SC ………………………………………………………………………...Supreme Court
Sec. ………………………………………………………………………………...Section
Vol. ………………………………………………………………………………..Volume
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STATEMENT OF JURRISDICTION
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE APPELLANT HAS HONOUR TO SUBMIT THIS MEMORANDUM UNDER
ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
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SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
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S Y N O P S I S O F F A C T S
BACKGROUND
Himasthan is a State in the Indian Union. Akhilesh is a lawyer practicing in the High
Court of Himasthan. In 2002 Akhilesh married Sunila, who is an IT professional working
in Dharmaprastha, the capital of Himasthan. In 2003 though Sunila became pregnant, on
a unanimous decision of the spouses Sunila underwent medical termination of pregnancy
(MTP).In 2005 Sunila again became pregnant. Though Sunila preferred MTP, Akhilesh
wanted the child. However he yielded to the pressure of Sunila.
CASE BEFORE HIGH COURT OF DHARMAPRASTHA
In the last week of October 2008 Sunila informed Akhilesh that she was pregnant and she
wanted to abort the foetus. Akhilesh strongly opposed it and there was a quarrel between
them. On 4th November 2008 Akhilesh filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of
Himasthan challenging the validity of Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971(MTP
Act) on the ground of violation of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of the Constitution and the
provisions of International Covenants dealing with social economic and cultural rights.
HIGH COURT’S DECISION
The High Court dismissed the petition on 9th December2008.On 11th December 2008
Sunila approached the General Hospital Dharmaprastha for abortion.
DOCTORS REFUSED THE ABORTION OF SUNILA
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Since the case of Sunila was covered by sub section 2 of Section 3 the opinion of two
doctors were sought. The doctors unanimously held that the “continuance of the
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
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pregnancy would not involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury
to her physical or mental health; or there is a no substantial risk that if the child were
born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously
handicapped”. So the hospital authorities rejected the request for abortion.
SUNILA CHALLLENGIG THE VALIDITY OF MTP ACT IN HIGH COURT
On 12th December 2008 Sunila filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Himasthan
challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3 (2) of the MTP Act on the ground of
arbitrariness and violation of right to privacy. It was further contended that since one of
the doctors who had given opinion was the brother of Akhilesh the Court may order to
seek the opinion of two other doctors. The High Court dismissed the petition on 15th
December 2008.
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
On 22nd December2008 Sunila filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court
under Art 136 of the Constitution seeking leave to file appeal against the decision of the
High Court dated 15th December2008 .On the basis of the Special Leave petition filed by
Akhilesh leave to file appeal against the decision of the High Court dated 9th December
was granted. The Court decided to hear both the Special Leave petitions together.
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ISSUES RAISED
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I S S U E S R A I S E D
ISSUE 1

ISSUE 2

ISSUE 3

ISSUE 4
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T S
ISSUE 1

As life begins at or near conception and the obligation of the state to protect such life
begins from the moment of conception under article 21, the state cannot permit the
deprivation or destruction of such ‘life’ without the authority of law and without
following just, fair and reasonable procedure under such law. Foetus is a separate and
distinct legal entity existing in the womb of the pregnant mother and its destruction
without following the provisions of article 21 under a law like MTPA, 1971 would tend
to make such law unconstitutional, invalid, illegal and null and void. The medical
termination of pregnancy act, 1971 provides the substantive aspect for the deprivation of
‘life’ which exists in foetus, but it fails to provide procedural aspect required under article
21 for such deprivation of life.
ISSUE 2

There should be no doubt that a foetus or a child in mother’s womb is not a natural
person. But there should be equally no doubt that it is a ‘juristic’ or ‘juridical’ person. In
all jurisprudential jurisdictions, a child en ventre sa mere is recognized as a legal person
capable of inheriting or otherwise acquiring and holding property and also other legal
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rights. And there should be no doubt that only a person, whether natural or juristic, is
capable of acquiring those rights.
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The madras high court considered some important views on the subject quoting an article
‘legal protection for the unborn child’ in the following words:
“The fact that the unborn child is physically dependent on its mother prior to birth need
not lead to the assumption that it has no relevant separate existence nor to the assumption
that it has no legal or moral significance.”
Amongst others, the rights of a child en ventre sa mere in the family property and
inheritance are very well recognized. “A child in the womb” of the mother is for most
purposes regarded in English law as being already born, but in Hindu law a child in his
mother’s womb is equal in many respects to a child actually in existence.
ISSUE 3

Under the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex

Selection) Act, 1994, a woman having children of the same sex is not allowed to use the
prenatal diagnostic techniques to have children of the opposite sex. Whereas MTP Act
allows abortion in case a child is conceived on account of any failure of device used by
the couple for the purpose of limiting the number of children on the ground that anguish
caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental
health of the pregnant woman. While enacting the said Act the legislature has not
considered what anguish would be caused to a prospective mother who conceives a
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female child or a male child for the second or third time. The legislature has not
appreciated that such anguish must also be termed as grave injury to the mental health of
the prospective mother. Thus, there is discrimination between
_____________________________________________________________________
foetus (child) situated in similar position. The said Act, therefore, violates Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
ISSUE 4
The first contention which the council would like to raise is that it has not arrived in the
court with the plea of striking down the whole act, but one of the sections of the act on
the ground of infringement of Right to privacy. A direct case on privacy came before the
Andhra Pradesh High court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah where the court held
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. Justice Choudhary extended the protection of
privacy to inhuman and degrading treatment of forcible sexual cohabition. The freedom
to choose partner for sexual act was included into enjoyment of life. The freedom to
choose partner for sexual act was included into enjoyment of life. The court extended this
concept of sexual autonomy of Hindu wife and struck down section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, which provided for restitution of conjugal rights. The court observed that
by this matrimonial remedy ‘during a moment’s duration the entire life style would be
altered and even destroyed’ without her consent. This situation was treated as a violation
of individual dignity and right to privacy. The privacy right was again treated as a part of
Article 21 of the constitution.
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The whole section 3(2) of the MTP act raises a question which can be derogatory for any
woman’s honour and reputation. Section 3(2) of the MTP Act says that:
Abortion can be followed under two conditions:
1) Where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by
rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a
grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.
2) Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used
by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of
children, the anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to
constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the woman.
Now, dealing with the first provision of section 3 (2) which deals, with when can
abortions be performed, the council wants to cite a very landmark case of Phoolan Devi
v. Shekar Kapur, which has very elaborately discussed about right to privacy when any
woman is doomed to undergo the stress of such an inhuman trauma as rape.
Now, the second condition in which Abortion can be performed is that where any
pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married
woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children, the anguish
caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the
mental health of the woman. A direct case on privacy came before the Andhra Pradesh
High court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah. The court held the right to privacy as a
fundamental right.
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BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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B O D Y O F A R G U M E N T S
ISSUE 1
It is well settled that when a law is challenged, the first duty of the court is to examine the
purpose and the policy of the Act and then to discover whether the classification made by
the law has a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to obtain. The
purpose or object of the Act is to be ascertained from an examination of it's title,
preamble and provisions.
In order to understand the basis on which the MTP Act is premised, it is necessary to
identify the two main driving forces behind the Act, those being:
1) Those who were proponents of family planning and population control and saw
the legalization of abortion as a potential way of lowering the birth rate.
2) Those who were concerned with abortions being conducted by non-qualified,
untrained and ill-equipped medical practitioners under unhygienic conditions and
therefore were concerned with the health factor.1
Hence female foeticide at that point of time was, not considered an issue at all, which
justifies the fact that not a single section in the entire act deals specifically and expressly
with the problem. The objective of the act, as given at the onset of the act itself, is
essentially confined to dealing with the termination of certain pregnancies by registered
practitioners and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto and does not extend
beyond this. Section 3 of this act, which talks about when pregnancies may be terminated
1 See Sudha, supra 5, Dixon Mueller, R., Abortion policy and women’s health in developing countries,
international journal of health services 20 (2) : 297-314, 1990
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by registered medical practitioner, may be summed up as follows- pregnancies can be

terminated by registered medical practitioners where the pregnancy is not more than
twelve weeks or where the pregnancy is more than twelve weeks but less than twenty
weeks, at least two medical practitioners are of the opinion formed in good faith, that the
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or
grave injury to her physical or mental health. Pregnancy of any woman who has not
attained the age of eighteen or who is eighteen but is mentally ill 2, shall be carried out
after obtaining the consent of her guardian in writing. 3 However, all these clauses may be
misutilized by doctors or the parent’s as it is important to note that the section mentions
that the registered medical practitioner must act in good faith. In a country like India,
where citizens abide or do not abide by laws as per their wishes, where authorities
expected to maintain law and order may be bribed, most doctors do not realize that their
patient’s well-being is their top priority and that whatever they do is to be done for the
maximum benefit of his patients, often do not act in good faith.4
Secondly it is to be kept in mind, that rape is an evil, women have suffered not only in the
hands of outsiders and unknown people, but also in the hands of family members and
near relatives. However very few cases dealing with the second category have been
reported so far, because it tarnishes the family name. Such circumstances are usually
hushed up and the girl is taken to shady hospital, using unhygienic condition to abort the
foetus. Looking at the clause from another angle, a particular family may frame up such
an incident in order to get a female foetus aborted 5. And the doctor understanding the
gravity of the situation would do this work as secretively as possible in order to guard the
2 Incorporated in place of lunatic by the 2002 amendment

3 The explanation in the section specify that in a pregnancy caused by rape or failure of any device or
method used by the woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children,, the anguish
caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the pregnant woman. In
determining whether the continuance of the pregnancy would involve the above-mentioned risk, account
may be taken of the woman’s actual reasonable foreseeable environment.
4 See Bardhan, P., Little girls and dealth in india, economic and political weekly, September 4, 1982.
5 See Clark , A., Social demography of excess female mortality in india: New directions, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, April 25: 12-14-1987;Dandekar, k., why has the proportion of of women in
india’s population be declining? Economic and Political weekly, October 18: 1663-1667, 1975
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privacy of his patient and thus the whole incident would be away from the eyes of police
and law.
In other case where a couple has taken certain precaution to avoid future pregnancies and
already have children, but still have conceived, they are allowed to have an abortion
done. However , a close study of the clause will show that where a couple already have a
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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girl child and the woman has conceived another female foetus, they may use this clause
to get foetus aborted as it is exclusively their decision whether to increase their family or
not6. There are about 20000 registered ultrasound clinics in the country and several
hundred unregistered ones, especially in rural areas which can guarantee about the sex of
their foetus and help them out.7
In Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs. Union of India (UOI) through the
Ministry of Law and Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 8, the court says
that foeticide of girl child is a sin; such tendency offends dignity of women. It
undermines their importance. It violates woman's right to life. It violates Article 39(e) 9 of
the Constitution which states the principle of state policy that the health and strength of
women is not to be abused. It ignores Article 51A (e) 10 of the Constitution which states
that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to renounce practices derogatory to the
dignity of women. The architects of the MTPA, 1971, have not taken into consideration
the fundamental rights of the foetus to be born. It is submitted that ‘life’ exists in the
foetus while in the womb of the mother in this context article 21 of the constitution of
India is applicable to unborn person as well. thus it can be considered as the greatest
argument for validating the MTP act as unconstitutional.
6 Dasgupta, M., selective discrimination against female children, in rural Punjab, india, population and
development review 13(1); 90-95, 1987.
7 See Karkal, M ., Differentials in mortality by sex , economic and political weekly, august 8: 1344-1443,
1987; Krishnaji, N., Poverty and sex ratio; Some data and speculation, Economic and political weekly,
22(23) : 892-895, 1987.
8Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs Union of India (UOI) through the Ministry of Law and
Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare AIR2008Bom29
9 Constitution of India
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As life begins at or near conception and the obligation of the state to protect such life
begins from the moment of conception under article 21, the state cannot permit the
deprivation or destruction of such ‘life’ without the authority of law and without
following just, fair and reasonable procedure under such law. Foetus is a separate and
distinct legal entity existing in the womb of the pregnant mother and its destruction
without following the provisions of article 21 under a law like MTPA, 1971 would tend
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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to make such law unconstitutional, invalid, illegal and null and void. The medical
termination of pregnancy act, 1971 provides the substantive aspect for the deprivation of
‘life’ which exists in foetus, but it fails to provide procedural aspect required under article
21 for such deprivation of life.
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BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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The right to life which is the most fundamental of all is also the most difficult to define.
Certainly it cannot be confined to a guarantee against the taking away of life; it must have
a wider application. By the term something more is meant than mere animal existence.
The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which
life is enjoyed.11
In case William L. Webster et al V. reproductive health services at el, 12
the supreme
court upheld a Missouri statute which declared that “the life of each human being begins
at conception” , and that ‘unborn children have protectable interest in life, health and
well-being’.
There should be no doubt that a foetus or a child in mother’s womb is not a natural
person. But there should be equally no doubt that it is a ‘juristic’ or ‘juridical’ person. In
all jurisprudential jurisdictions, a child en ventre sa mere is recognized as a legal person
capable of inheriting or otherwise acquiring and holding property and also other legal
rights. And there should be no doubt that only a person, whether natural or juristic, is
capable of acquiring those rights.
In America, the law of torts abounds in decision where a child has been allowed to
maintain action for injury sustained before its birth at any time during the entire period of
gestation and it is now firmly established that any injury caused to the foetus is to be
11 Munn v Illinois 94, US 113

12William L. Webster et al V. reproductive health services at el (1989) 492 US 490
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regarded as personal injury to the child. In India under the Hindu law, a son is entitled to
have reopened the partition of the ancestral property taking place while he was in the
mother’s womb without keeping any share reserved for him. In the law of wills, both in
India and in England, a child in the mother’s womb is considered to be in existence and
section 99(1) of the Indian succession act 1925, clearly provides that “all words
expressive of relationship apply to a child in the womb who is afterwards born alive”.
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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The madras high court in a decision as early as in 1886 in Queen Empress V Ademmia13
pointed out that lexically as well as logically; an unborn child is a person having life.
Life before birth in a mother’s womb is a physiological phenomenon. The American
Supreme Court in Jane roe v Henry wade,14 has no doubt denied a foetus to have natural
personality; but the court did not, as it could not, deny the existence of life in it. Even
though the court ruled that the state’s interest in the foetus becomes compelling only
when it becomes viable, it was not ruled that life in a foetus begins only from the stage of
its viability.
It has been accepted that life in a foetus does not commence from the stage of viability
only, but that it comes into existence even when it is in rudimentary or embryonic stage
and from time to time of, or at any rate, within seven to fourteen days of fertilization. It
has now been accepted by the medical and physiological scientists that the foetus starts to
have spontaneous growth and development from the very beginning which are the surest
and universally accepted criteria of life.15
If the life is supposed to exist from the moment of conception, the right to birth must
also commence from that stage only. Article 21 of the Indian constitution may be
13 Queen Empress V Ademmia ,(1886) ILR 9 Mad 360

14 Jane roe v Henry wade ,(1973) 410 US 113.
15 Modi’s medical jurisprudence, 21st Edn., pp 429, 430; Taylor’s medical jurisprudence, 13th Edn. , p.
322.
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interpreted to mean that the word ‘person’ applies to all human beings including the
unborn offspring at every state of gestation. The state cannot discriminate against persons
who are fetuses by offering them less or no protection than other persons. Therefore, the
state is under obligation under article 21 not only to protect the life of the unborn child
from arbitrary and unjust destruction but also not to deny it equal protection under article
14 of the Indian constitution.16
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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The madras high court considered some important views on the subject quoting an article
‘legal protection for the unborn child’ in the following words:
“The fact that the unborn child is physically dependent on its mother prior to birth need
not lead to the assumption that it has no relevant separate existence nor to the assumption
that it has no legal or moral significance.”17
Amongst others, the rights of a child en ventre sa mere in the family property and
inheritance are very well recognized. “A child in the womb” of the mother is for most
purposes regarded in English law as being already born, but in Hindu law a child in his
mother’s womb is equal in many respects to a child actually in existence.
16 See AIR 1996 Journal section, 136(140)

17 Vide jane E.S. Fortin, lecturer in king’s college, London, published in the modern law review, January
1988, vol 51, p. 547, referred in G. Krishnan v G. Rajan (1994) 1 LW (Cri) 16 Mad (DB)
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BODY OF ARGUMENTS
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The Objects and Reasons of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1997 (for short,
"MTP Act") read with Section 3(2)(i) thereof permit termination of pregnancy of a
woman by a registered medical practitioner if the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
of the pregnant woman or grave injury to her physical or mental health. Explanation II to
Section 3 states that where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any devise or
method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the
number of children, anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to
constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. However, under the
Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act,
1994, a woman having children of the same sex is not allowed to use the prenatal
diagnostic techniques to have children of the opposite sex. The legislature has not taken
into consideration the fact that having a child of the same sex as that of the existing
child/children also causes grave mental injury to a woman. Whereas MTP Act allows
abortion in case a child is conceived on account of any failure of device used by the
couple for the purpose of limiting the number of children on the ground that anguish
caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental
health of the pregnant woman, while enacting the said Act the legislature has not
considered what anguish would be caused to a prospective mother who conceives a
female child or a male child for the second or third time. The legislature has not
24
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appreciated that such anguish must also be termed as grave injury to the mental health of
the prospective mother. Thus, there is discrimination between foetus (child) situated in
similar position. The said Act, therefore, violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The MTP Act and the said Act are Central Acts. If by one statute certain rights are
conferred upon a prospective person, the same cannot be denied to a prospective person
by another statute originating from the same source. It should be kept in mind that the
destruction of the female foetus does not uphold the equality principle enshrined in the
constitution of India as held by the supreme court of India in Air India V. Nargesh
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
_____________________________________________________________________
mirza(1981)18 For this proposition, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. V. Ananthi Ammal and Ors19.
It is well settled that when a law is challenged as offending against the guarantee
enshrined in Article 14, the first duty of the court is to examine the purpose and the
policy of the Act and then to discover whether the classification made by the law has a
reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to obtain. The purpose or
object of the Act is to be ascertained from an examination of it's title, preamble and
provisions.
In Centre for Enquiry Into Health & Allied Themes (Cehat) and Ors. V. Union of India
and Ors.20, a grievance was made by a Non Governmental organization that the
provisions of the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex
Selection) Act, 1994 are not properly implemented. After considering this grievance, the
Supreme Court has noted that it has already issued directions to secure compliance of the
provisions of the said Act. The Supreme Court has issued further directions to the Central
Government, State Government and Union Territories to ensure compliance of its earlier
18 See also Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of human Rights, 1948; Article 3 of the international
Covenant on civil and political rights,1966; Article 10 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women expressly speak of equally between men and women. These convention are
binding upon India as per the ‘doctrine of incorporation’ See Vishakha V. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC
301}
19 Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. Ananthi Ammal and Ors . MANU/SC/0416/1995
20 Centre for Enquiry Into Health & Allied Themes (Cehat) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors
MANU/SC/0700/2003
25
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directions. If the said action could be done in the above – mentioned act, then why can’t
it be done in MTP Act.
In Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs. Union of India (UOI) through the
Ministry of Law and Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 21, the court says
that foeticide of girl child is a sin; such tendency offends dignity of women. It
undermines their importance. It violates woman's right to life. It violates Article 39(e)22 of
the Constitution which states the principle of state policy that the health and strength
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
_____________________________________________________________________
of women is not to be abused. It ignores Article 51A (e) 23 of the Constitution which states
that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to renounce practices derogatory to the
dignity of women. Sex selection is therefore against the spirit of the Constitution. It
insults and humiliates womanhood. This is perhaps the greatest argument in favour of
total ban on sex selection. The court thus keeps the things in a dilemma as at one stage it
is saying that there should be a total ban on sex selection whereas on the other hand it is
keeping the doors open for the people through MTP Act. If things should be made right,
then court has to look at the other aspect too. Court says that MTP Act can’t be
challenged as, “The object of the Act being to save the life of the pregnant woman or
relieve her of any injury to her physical and mental health, and no other thing, it would
appear the Act is rather in consonance with Article 21 of the Constitution of India than in
conflict with it.24” This act does not heed any importance to the foetus which is in the
womb, saying that it can’t be said as a person. Whereas in an English case R V. Tait,25 the
court of appeal quashed the conviction of a burglar on the ground that ‘threat to kill a
foetus’ is not an offence directed against the another person. In another case R V.
Sullivan,26 midwives who attended the delivery of a foetus that failed to survive birth
21Mr. Vijay Sharma and Mrs. Kirti Sharma vs Union of India (UOI) through the Ministry of Law and
Justice and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare AIR2008Bom29
22 Constitution of india
24 Nand Kishore Sharma and Ors. Vs Union of India (UOI) and Anr. AIR2006Raj166,
2006WLC(Raj)UC411
25R V. Tait, (1989)3 WLR 891
26R V. Sullivan (1988) 43 CCC 3d 65
26
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were charged with the offence of criminal negligence of causing death to another person
(foetus). The unborn child need not reach the stage of viability to maintain an action for
recovery of damages under the law of torts27. Thus the unborn child to whom live birth
never comes is held to be a person who can be the subject of an action for damages for
his death. The law of succession also for many purposes treated a child in the womb
equal to a person in existence.28 The fact that the unborn child is physically dependant on
its mother prior to birth need not lead to the assumption that it has no separate existence
nor to the assumption that it has no moral or legal significance. 29 Therefore, the state is
under obligation under Article 21 not only to protect the life of the unborn child from
arbitrary and unjust destruction but also not to deny it equal protection under article 14 of
the Indian constitution.30
27 William v marison rapid transit inc., 152 ohio 114: (1949) 87 N.E. 2d 334; Sylvia v. gobeille, 220-A 2d
222 (R.I. 1960).
28 See AIR 1996 Journal Section , 136(140).
29 Vide Jane E.S. Fortin, Lecturer in law , King’s college , London, published in the modern law review,
January 1988, Vol. 51, p. 547, referred in G. Krishnan v. G. Rajan alias Madipur Rajan, (1994) 1 LW (cri)
16 Mad (DB)
30 See AIR 1996 Journal Section , 136(140).
27
rd

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_____________________________________________________________________
A law to be valid must confirm with the constitutional norms. The unconstitutionality of
a statute arises from various constitutional violations31. e.g.
i. Violation of the scheme of distribution of powers between the
centre and the states.
ii. Infringement of fundamental rights.
iii. Violations of other constitutional restrictions/ limitations.
The fundamental rights being entrenched by the constitution can’t be violated by the
legislature.32 It follows that a court which is empowered to apply and enforce the supreme
law would be bound to strike down33 the ordinary law which violates any fundamental
rights and to that no legal consequences may ensure from such void law. But it would be
only in that condition when it violates any of the fundamental right. Also it does not
come into any of the criteria as mentioned above. Since the function to determine
whether a law made by the legislature is inconsistent is a judicial function 34, hence the
appellant has come in the esteemed court for justice.
31Indian Constitutional Law, M.P Jain , 5th Edt. Wadhwa & waddhwa , Nagpur
32 Cf. Hunter v Southan , (1984) 2 SCR 145 ( 158 – 89)
33 Olga v Bombay corpn., A.1985 SC 180 ( Para. 44)
34 Ref. under Art. 143, A. 1965 SC 745 ( Para. 42)
28
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Well, the first contention which the council would like to raise is that it has not arrived in
the court with the plea of striking down the whole act, but one of the sections of the act
on the ground of infringement of Right to privacy. A direct case on privacy came before
the Andhra Pradesh High court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah.35 The court held
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. Justice Choudhary extended the protection of
privacy to inhuman and degrading treatment of forcible sexual cohabition. The freedom
to choose partner for sexual act was included into enjoyment of life. The freedom to
choose partner for sexual act was included into enjoyment of life. The court extended this
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
_____________________________________________________________________
concept of sexual autonomy of Hindu wife and struck down section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, which provided for restitution of conjugal rights. The court observed that
by this matrimonial remedy ‘during a moment’s duration the entire life style would be
altered and even destroyed’ without her consent. This situation was treated as a violation
of individual dignity and right to privacy. The privacy right was again treated as a part of
Article 21 of the constitution.36
Under the Indian Constitution, the presumption gives rise to rules of divide or shifting
onus in view of the provisions in the Cls. (2) – (6) of the Art. 19, that a restriction on any
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Cls. (1) shall be valid only if two conditions are
satisfied:-
a. The restriction has been imposed on any of the permissible grounds, e.g.,
public order or other interests of the general public.
b. That such restriction is reasonable.
For any statute to be constitutionally valid both the above conditions are to be fulfilled. If
any of the condition is not fulfilled then that statute passed by the legislature will become
void and ineffective.
35 T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah.,AIR 1983 AP 356 : (1983) 2 Andh LT 47 : (1983) 2 DMC

172 : (1983) 2 Civ LJ 158 : 1983 LS 185 (AP) : 1983 Hindu LR 658, referred in AIR 1991 journal Section,
113 at p. 117.
36 AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 at p. 117,118
29
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Different names have been given to the Right to privacy at different times, viz.,
privileged communications, withholding of documents, domestic affairs, matrimonial
rights, etc.37
The supreme court of India in some decisions has developed various rights, interest in all
cases similar to privacy, i.e., right of free enjoyment, right to sleep, right to human
dignity, right to have access to justice, etc. under the concept of personal liberty in article
21 of the constitution.38 But it does not cover at, one place, all the interests in the privacy
which need protection.39
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_____________________________________________________________________
Right of privacy would preclude embarrassing question to be put to female candidates as

modesty and self – respect may preclude the disclosure of personal problems.40
It is therefore established beyond doubt that there is a legal right of privacy. Privacy is of
so great and important value that its protection under the law of torts is a mistake. Article
21 has received its widest amplitude in recent years. In view of the expansive
interpretation of this Article it includes many aspects of privacy in relation to marriage,
sex and family under the garb of human dignity and enjoyment of life.41 Every individual
has a right to privacy as part of his or her overall right to live with dignity without being
interfered by any exercise of any fundamental freedom. Any unjustifiable interference
with his right to privacy has to necessary lead to legal consequences; if not, there will be
no meaning for individual right at all. 42 As one of the basic human rights, the right of
privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken
for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of
37 See AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 (116).

38 See Francis Corralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746: (1981) 2 SCR 516: (1981)
1 SCC 608 : 1981 Cr LJ 306: (1982) 52 Comp Cas 554 : 1981 CrLR (SC) 437: 1981 CAR 112 : 1981 CCC
(Cr) 212 : (1981) 1 Scale 9
39 See AIR 1991 Journal section, 113 (116,117).
40 Neera Mathur ( Mrs.) v. Life Insurance Corporation of India , AIR 1992 SC 392 (395): (1991) Supp 2
SCR 146 : (1992) 1 SCC 286: 1992 Lab IC 72 : (1991) 2 Scale 1139 : (1991) 4 JT 468 : (1992) 2
ATR 385: (1993) 66 FLR 859 : (1992) 1 LLN 373 : (1992) 19 ATC 31 : (1992) 1 SLJ 72 : (1992) 1 SLR
473 : (1992) 1 LLJ 322
41 See AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 at p. 117,118
42 See 2001 Cri LJ, Journal Section, 273(275).
30
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rights and freedom of others.43 Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right
in our Constitution but has been culled out of the provisions of Article 21 of the
constitution and other provisions of the constitution relating to the fundamental rights
read with the directive principles of state policy.44
A more elaborate appraisal of this right took place in a later decision of the Supreme
Court in Govind v. State of M.P.,45 where the supreme court traced the origin of the right
and also pointed out how the said right was dealt with by the United States Supreme
Court in a number of cases including Griswold v. Connecticut46, Jane Roe v. Henry
Wade47, Munn v. Illinois48 and Wolf v. Colorado49.
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_____________________________________________________________________

Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child bearing.50 A citizen has a right to
safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child
bearing and education amongst other matters.51
In fact, the affirmation of fundamental human rights by the universal declaration of
human rights (herein after referred as UDHR adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in December 1948, has motivated most independent states to guarantee
43 ‘X’ v. ‘Z’ , AIR 1999 SC 495 (501) : (1998) 8 SCC 296 : (1998) 7 JT 626 : (1998) 6 Scale 230 : (1998)
9 Supreme 220 : (1998) 9 SLT 418 : (1999) 1 SRJ 88
44 Supra above
45 AIR 1975 SC 1378 : (1975) 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2 SCC148 : 1975 CrLR (SC) 290 : 1975 CrLR (SC)
290 : 1975 Cr LJ : 1975 CAR 250 : 1975 SCC (Cr) 468.
46 Griswold v. Connecticut ,(1965) 381 US 479
47Jane Roe v. Henry Wade, (1973) 410 US 113 : (1973) 35 Law Ed 147.
48Munn v. Illinois ,(1877) 94 US 113 : (1877) 24 Law Ed 77.
49Wolf v. Colorado. (1948) 338 US 25 : 92 Law Ed 1782, referred in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 329 : (1964) 2 SCJ 107, see also Govind v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378: (1975) 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1875 CrLR (SC) 290 : 1975
Cr LJ 1111: 1975 CAR 250 : 1975 SCC (Cr) 468; Malak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 760 :
(1981) 2 SCR 311 : (1981) 1 SCC 420 : 1981 Cr LJ 320 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 169 : 1981 UJ 35.
50 Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378: (1975) 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1875
CrLR (SC) 290 : 1975 Cr LJ 1111: 1975 CAR 250 : 1975 SCC (Cr) 468
51 Khuswant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58 (67) : (2002) Del 58 (71) : (2002) 2 Civ LJ 606 :
(2001) 94 DLT 714 : (2002) 61 DRJ 15 : (2002) 1 Rec Civ R 496 (DB).
31
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fundamental human rights. The UDHR guaranteed the right to privacy. Article 12 of
UDHR reads:
No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
The whole section 3(2) of the MTP act raises a question which can be derogatory for any
woman’s honour and reputation. Section 3(2) of the MTP Act says that:
Abortion can be followed under two conditions:
1) Where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by
rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a
grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.
2) Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used
by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of
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children, the anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to

constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the woman.
Now, dealing with the first provision of section 3 (2) which deals, with when can
abortions be performed, the council wants to cite a very landmark case of Phoolan Devi
v. Shekar Kapur,52 in which the right of privacy was dealt with as under:
“As a matter of fact, Edward Shils maintains that privacy is a zero – relationship between
two persons or two groups or between a group and a person. It is a ‘Zero-relationship’ in
the sense that it is constituted by the absence of interaction or the communication or
perception within contexts in which such interaction, communication or perception is
practicable, such as a family , a working group and ultimately a whole society. Privacy
may be the privacy of a single individual, it may be the privacy of two individuals, or it
may be the privacy of three or numerous individuals. But it is always the privacy of those
persons, single or plural, vis-à-vis other persons.53 It is implicit in the right to privacy as
52 Phoolan Devi v. Shekar Kapur ,(1995) 57 DLT 154, referred in Khuswant Singh v. Maneka
Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58 (71) : (2002) 2 Civ LJ 606 : (2001) 94 DLT 714 : (2002) 61 DRJ 15 : (2002) 1
Rec Civ R 496 (DB)
53 Edward shills : “ privacy : Its constitution and vicissitudes” , 31 Law and Contemporary Problems
(1996) 282.
32
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to what extent her thoughts, sentiments, emotions, shall be communicated to others. In

India, explicit display, graphic detail of being paraded nude, rape and gang-rape does not
only hurt the feelings, mutilate the soul, denigrate the person but reduces the victim to a
situation of emotional abandonment which is the very essence of personal freedom and
dignity.”
Rape is not only a crime against the person of woman (victim); it is a crime against the
whole society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep
emotional crisis. It is only by her sheer will power that she rehabilitates herself in the
society which, on coming to know of the rape, looks down upon her in derision and
contempt. Now enquiring about it by doctors under the power given through law, it is a
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crime against basic human rights and is also violative of the victim’s most cherished of
the fundamental rights, namely, the right to life contained in Article 21.54
Now, the second condition in which Abortion can be performed is that where any
pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married
woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children, the anguish
caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the
mental health of the woman. A direct case on privacy came before the Andhra Pradesh
High court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah.55 The court held the right to privacy as
a fundamental right. Justice Choudhary extended the protection of privacy to inhuman
and degrading treatment of forcible sexual cohabition. The freedom to choose partner for
sexual act was included into enjoyment of life. The freedom to choose partner for sexual
act was included into enjoyment of life. The court extended this concept of sexual
autonomy of Hindu wife and struck down section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which
54 Bodhisattva Gautam v. Miss. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922 (926-927) : (1996) 1 SCJ 338 :
(1996) 1 CCR 81
55 T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah ,AIR 1983 AP 356 : (1983) 2 Andh LT 47 : (1983) 2 DMC
172 : (1983) 2 Civ LJ 158 : 1983 LS 185 (AP) : 1983 Hindu LR 658, referred in AIR 1991 journal Section,
113 at p. 117.
33
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provided for restitution of conjugal rights. The court observed that by this matrimonial
remedy ‘during a moment’s duration the entire life style would be altered and even
destroyed’ without her consent. This situation was treated as a violation of individual
dignity and right to privacy. The privacy right was again treated as a part of Article 21 of
the constitution.56
In Eisenstadt v. Baird57 the United State’s Supreme Court expanded the right of privacy.
It is true that in Griswold the right to privacy in question is inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet a marital couple is not an independent equity with mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
make up. If the right of privacy means anything, It is the right of the individual, married
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or single to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so

fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.58
Hence, it is crystal clear that section 3(2) of the MTP Act, hampers the morality and
reputation of the women ultimately infringing the Right to privacy.
56 AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 at p. 117,118

57Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
58 Supra above 57
34
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PRAYER
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
P R A Y E R
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India may be pleased to adjudge, declare and hold that:
⮚ MTP Act is constitutionally void.
And order any other relief that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India may
deem fit in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience.
ALL OF WHICH IS SUBMITTED,
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

35
rd

I T H ' Supreme C of India: N HE ON BLE Ourt

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT

[UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT

3rd ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2009

A. CAN THE MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT, 1971 BE

B. WHETHER FOETUS IS A PERSON AND IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE

B.1 Whether an unborn person has right to born?

C. CAN THE MTP ACT, 1971 BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF

D.1 It hampers morality and reputation of the women.

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

1. ADVANCED LAW LEXICON,

1. ‘X’ v. ‘Z’ , AIR 1999 SC 495 (501)

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

13. Khuswant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58 (67

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

IV. ARTICLES USED

1. Art. 14 of Indian constitution

2. Art -21 of Indian constitution

1. MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT , 1971

VI. JOURNALS USED

1. AIR 1991 Journal Section, 113 at p. 117,118

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

10. Karkal, M ., Differentials in mortality by sex , economic and political weekly,

VII. WEBSITE USED

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

AIR …………………………………………………………………...All India Reporter

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

THE APPELLANT HAS HONOUR TO SUBMIT THIS MEMORANDUM UNDER

ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

CASE BEFORE HIGH COURT OF DHARMAPRASTHA

HIGH COURT’S DECISION

DOCTORS REFUSED THE ABORTION OF SUNILA

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

SUNILA CHALLLENGIG THE VALIDITY OF MTP ACT IN HIGH COURT

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

A. CAN THE MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT, 1971 BE

B. WHETHER FOETUS IS A PERSON AND IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE

B.1 Whether an unborn person has right to born?

C. CAN THE MTP ACT, 1971 BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF

D.1 It hampers morality and reputation of the women.

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

A. CAN THE MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT, 1971 BE

B. WHETHER FOETUS IS A PERSON AND IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

B.1 Whether an unborn person has right to born?

C. CAN THE MTP ACT, 1971 BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF

Under the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

D.1 It hampers morality and reputation of the women.

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

by registered medical practitioner, may be summed up as follows- pregnancies can be

2 Incorporated in place of lunatic by the 2002 amendment

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

Government College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram

B. WHETHER FOETUS IS A PERSON AND IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE