Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988

JOCELYN RULONA-AL AWADHI, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court
and NABIL AL-AWADHI, respondents.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.

Talib Umpar for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi, assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia Judicial
District Court of Marawi City which denied her motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi, Petitioner, vs.
Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for custody and guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5 years old, Adare Nabil, 3
years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil, 6 months old.

The petitioner and the private respondent were married in Kuwait on August 1, 1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and a Roman Catholic.
Her husband, the private respondent is a Kuwaiti student. The petitioner resides with her children in Sta. Cruz, Calape, Bohol, while the
private respondent resides at 49-7 Pamaong Street, Tagbiliran City.

On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an action for support and guardianship of her three (3) minor children (who are in her custody) in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in Tagbilaran City (Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi Petitioner, vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi
Defendant"). Upon her motion, she was appointed the children's guardian by order of the court dated August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20,
Rollo). The defendant, her husband filed in the same court a motion to be allowed to exercise joint parental authority over their children
(Annex C, p. 21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for custody
and guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It was docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. 011-87.

After having been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject of the petition, nor over the parties, least of all, herself; (2) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and (3) improper venue (Annex B, p. 45, Rollo).

In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District Court denied her motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its order was based on
Section 13 of the Special Rules of Procedure in the Sharia Courts which provides:

Section 13. Pleadings and Motions Disallowed. — The court shall not allow the filing of the following pleadings,
petitions or motions, to wit:

(a) Motion to dismiss or to quash;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or any other paper;

(d) Motion to declare defendant in default;

 (e) Reply, third party complaints, or intervention;

(f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;

(g) Petition for relief from judgment;

(h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of trial; and

(i) Any dilatory motion for postponement.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p. 24, Rollo) was also denied by the court on January 12, 1988. Hence, this
petition for review raising only the legal issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia District Court over the parties and the
subject matter of the case. Only the Sharia District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private respondent did not.

Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD 1083) provides:

BOOK TWO

TITLE II

Chapter One

APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

Art. 13. Application (1) — The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim, and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.

(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage,
divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall
be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of the following admitted facts:

(1) That the plaintiff husband in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a Philippine Muslim but a Kuwaiti national;

(2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, not in Marawi City where the Sharia court sits;

(3) That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a Filipino citizen and a non- Muslim (a Roman Catholic Christian);

(4) That their Muslim marriage was not solemnized in any part of the Philippines, for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2, p. 40,
Rollo); and

(5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia District, embracing the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the cities of
Iligan and Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No. 1083), for both of them reside in the province of Bohol; it should have been self-evident to the Fourth
Sharia District Court that it had no jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over the custody and guardianship of their children (Art.
143, P.D. No. 1083).

The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which had assumed jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support and
guardianship of her children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo), may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the parties (the husband having
voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by filing a motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi
City by the husband's filing therein three (3) months later his own petition for custody and guardianship of his children (p.10, Rollo). The rule
is that once a court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its jurisdiction shall continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from its
jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20; Denila vs. Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and People
vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218).
Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly provides:

Art. 3. Conflict of provisions —...

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to
the prejudice of a Non-Muslim.

The application of the Muslim Code to the Christian wife will be prejudicial to her.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in
their communities" (Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23, 1974). Those communities are found in the ten (10) Mindanao provinces and six (6) cities
comprised within the five (5) Sharia judicial districts which were created under Article 138 of the Muslim Code. As neither the petitioner nor
the private respondent and their children live in or are members of those communities, they do not come within the ambit of the Sharia
courts' jurisdiction.

Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and
promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary
rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional
infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be
challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32
SCRA 54; Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 97
SCRA 856).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the proceedings in special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia District Court
at Marawi City are annulled and the petition therein is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 92557 September 27, 1990

SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMADSUAL and HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUAL, petitioners,

vs
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, SPOUSES KAGUI ABDULA MACARAPAN and KAGUI
RAKMA MACARAPAN and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF COTABATO respondents.

Lanang S. Ali for petitioners.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction to civil cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue
in this petition.

On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents for "Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of
Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District
Court, 5th Shari'a District at Cotabato City. Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city was impleaded as a nominal party.

Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1, 1988.

The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held on March 14, 1989 whereby Presiding Judge Hon. Corocoy D. Moson issued
a pre-trial order defining the issues and directing the parties to submit statements (shudhud) of at least two (2) competent witnesses on the
issues defined at the pre-trial conference and other evidence (bayyina) setting forth the facts and the law relied upon within ten (10) days
from notice.

Petitioners filed the required sworn statements on April 17, 1989 but private respondents failed to do so.

The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the instance of private respondents. Other settings were
postponed for one reason or another. However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of
Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial
court issued an order on November 7, 1989 dismissing the complaint in this manner:

Before this Court, is a motion filed by defendants, through their counsel, for amplification of affirmative or special
defenses with prayer for dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiffs have no title to the
property which is the subject of this suit, hence, their action to quiet title thereto is not proper; (2) that plaintiffs, are not
the proper parties to ask for the annulment or cancellation of the certificates of title of the defendants and (3) that the
action, being based on an implied trust, has already prescribed and could not therefore be maintained.

Plaintiffs, through their counsel, vigorously opposed the motion, and in a nutshell, their opposition may be stated as
follows: (1) On the issue of no title to the property which is the subject-matter of the case, plaintiffs contended that the
title referred to by them in the complaint means the legal title or ownership or dominion over the land in dispute
acquired by them from their ancestors by operation of the law on succession; (2) On the question of proper parties to
ask for annulment, plaintiffs contended that they are real party in interest because they will be benefited by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit in their own right, independent of any other interest, but with the authority of
the law; and (3) on the question of prescription, plaintiffs contended that since they are in possession of the land, an
action to quiet title does not prescribe.
 Perusing the case from all angles, and without losing track of the brilliant arguments presented by both parties during
the legal skirmishes the court finds that in order that an action for quieting of title shall prosper, it is necessary that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property which is the subject-matter of the action. On this score, the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

"The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property." (Art. 477, Civil Code of the Philippines).

In the case at bar, plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the land in question. Legal title means registered
ownership and equitable title meant beneficial ownership. Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the
parcels of land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon.
The voice of judicial conscience calls for the dismissal of the instant action.

Dwelling on the second question, even assuming for a moment that the action is for annulment of the certificates of
title, the court finds that the plaintiffs are not the proper parties to bring the action, but rather the Solicitor General. And
even assuming further that the plaintiffs are the proper parties, the action has already prescribed because the action
partakes of the nature of reconveyance which prescribes after ten years. The argument that the action has not
prescribed because plaintiffs are in possession of the property does not merit the consideration of the court. That
argument holds true only if plaintiffs have the legal or equitable title to the property.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction and cause of action. 1

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners of said order was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 29, 1990 that reads as
follows:

Submitted for resolution by this Court is the Motion by plaintiffs seeking reconsideration of the Order rendered on
November 7, 1989, which order dismissed this case "for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action."

The motion asserts that the aforementioned order "has no legal basis on the following grounds:

a) That the Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the (case) on the merits;

b) That the complaint has sufficient cause of action; and

c) That the dismissal of the complaint is illegal."

The first ground implies that this court is without alternative except to hear the case on the merits. This assertion has
no legal leg to stand on, it being well-settled that the courts have the power to dismiss cases before them upon a
finding that they have no jurisdiction over them or have lost the same, and that the act of dismissing the cases on that
basis is a valid exercise of jurisdiction. Despite the lack or loss of jurisdiction the order of dismissal is nevertheless
valid.

On the second ground, the best test of the sufficiency of the cause of action is the allegation in the complaint. The title
over the land is registered in the names of the defendants, and the annulment or cancellation thereof is legally possible
only through an action for reversion by the state. If the case would be treated as one for reconveyance of title, the
period within which the same could be brought had already prescribed.

As regards the third ground, the defendants, in their opposition to the Motion, cited the case of Heirs of Olivas vs.
Judge Flor, G.R. 78343, decided on May 21, 1988, in which the Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss filed after
the answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period is not the pleading prohibited by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, and what the Rule proscribes is a motion to dismiss which would stop the running of the period to
file an answer and cause undue delay. As observed by the defendants, Section 13 of the Ijra-at-al Mahakim Al Sharia's
is lifted from the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

WHEREFORE, finding no cogent and compelling reason to reconsider the Order of November 7, 1989, this Court
hereby affirms the same and further denies plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED. 2

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein petitioners allege the following assignment of errors committed by the trial court:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
 I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, SUCH ORDER
HAVING DEPARTED FROM THE SPECIAL RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE SHARI'A COURTS (IJRA-
AT AL MAHAKIM AL SHARI'A);

II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE COMPLAINT
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PROPER PARTIES TO BRING THE ACTION AND/OR
THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED; AND

III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION. 3

Petitioners allege that the lower court should not have considered private respondents' pleading which was in effect, a motion to dismiss, as
it is a pleading disallowed under Section 13 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a.

However, under Section 16 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a, it is specifically provided that the "Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
manner" in civil cases. Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.

From the foregoing, it is clear the trial court properly set the case for hearing on the affirmative defenses seeking dismissal of the complaint
raised by the private respondents in their answer. What the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a proscribes is the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu
of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay. The prohibition is intended to put a stop to
the filing of dilatory pleadings with the end in view of expediting proceedings before Shari'a courts.

The case of Heirs of Ricardo Olivas vs. Flor 4 involves the application of the Rules of Summary Procedure in special cases before the
Metropolitan and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said Rules disallow the filing of motions to dismiss, wherein this Court held:

In the guise of a position paper, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. While this is, indeed, a prohibited
pleading (Section 15(1), Rule on Summary Proceeding) it should be noted that the motion was filed after an Answer
had already been submitted within the reglementary period. In essence, therefore, it is not the pleading prohibited by
the Rules on Summary Procedure. What the rule proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the
period to file an Answer and cause undue delay.

Nevertheless, the Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit.

The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action had prescribed. The said court also observed that inasmuch as it is
one for reversion to the state of the property, the same should be brought by the Solicitor General and not by the petitioners.

The Court disagrees. A reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for quieting title. Therein, it is alleged that petitioners are in "actual,
continuous, and adverse possession" of the land in question "since time immemorial" in the concept of owners. 5

An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. 6 In Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, 7 this Court held:

. . . it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil
Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47;
Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some
adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land,
claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his favor to
ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor.
He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the
rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another
must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period. (44 Am. Jur. p. 47)

In the same complaint, petitioners allege that recently private respondents have disturbed their possession of the property by surreptitiously
constructing dikes. 8 The rule is that the petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take
steps to vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in
possession of the petitioners.
The trial court held that in an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must" have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. 9 It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to mean beneficial ownership.

It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in question.

In Chacon, 10 this Court considered the action to be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession
since time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a
certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.

Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner thereof. 11 Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to
quiet title under the law. 12

Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property whereby petitioners claim to have acquired title to the same by prescription, the
property was thereby effectively withdrawn from the public domain and became property of private ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial
court that the action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute the same has no cogent basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990 are hereby
reversed and set aside, and the records of the case are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Pages 16 to 18, Rollo.

2 Pages 32 to 33, Rollo.

3 Page 6, Rollo.

4 161 SCRA 393 (1988).

5 Paragraph 14, Complaint; Annex F to the Petition.

6 Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 (1977); and Heirs of Segundo Uberas vs. CFI of Negros Occidental; 86
SCRA 144 (1978).

7 103 Phil. 683 (1958).

8 Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784 (1983); Faja vs. Court of Appeals, supra; and Sapto, et al.
vs. Fabiana, supra.

9 Citing Article 477 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

10 Supra.

11 Articles 540, 541, 1117 and 1130 of the Civil Code.

12 Article 477, supra.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95574               August 16, 1991

HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.

Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding
are herein raised.

Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31
December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23)
children. He had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao,
Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa,
are among those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the
three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.

On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and
Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato
City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province
of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.

The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left
various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61
hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also
prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and
ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.

Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also
claim to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA
with the decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and
that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the
Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.

Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the
Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.

All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners,
through counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in
the interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the
following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao;
RIZAL. for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in
Davao del Sul.

However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for
Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son
in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.

Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation

of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally
married to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a
conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked
that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration instead.

In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the
decedent was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were
presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on
the Joint Petition were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.

On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular

Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration.

In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating
the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the
Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular
Administratrix was maintained.

On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss,"
raising once again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court
over the real properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao
Oriental.

Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22
August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court
seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court,
Fifth Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."

Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for
lack of jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.

We rule against Petitioners.

Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:

Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.—The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).

Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact,
involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District.

In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating
that:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73).
(Emphasis supplied).

It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in
Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly
laid in Davao City before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts
therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of
jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the
intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).

To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao
City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent
alternately stated his place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence
of ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v.
Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be
at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for the
provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition
and settlement of estates of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).

But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over
by respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the
provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:

Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.—Five special judicial districts, each to have one
Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan
Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.

Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a
District.1âwphi1 In fact, those provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the
Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to
function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).

Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;

(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction
over controversies involving real property outside the area of autonomy. (Art. IX, Section
17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)

Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the
decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in
that province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in
different provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious
settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237
[1988]). Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.

When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue may
be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of said provinces, and the judgment rendered
therein may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated
(National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310
[1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil.
712 [1932]).

The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73,
sec. 1). There should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply
suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the
provisions of the latter statute (Article 187 of said Code).

And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition
considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial
system, has been challenged.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to
the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82077               August 16, 1991

MIDSAPAK TAMPAR, MAISALAM TAMPAR, HEIRS OF GAMPONG TAMPAR,

represented by HADJI MUSTAPHA GAMPONG and HEIRS OF PAGAYAWAN TAMPAR,
represented by SUMAPI TAMPAR, petitioners,
vs.
ESMAEL USMAN, MOHAMAD DATUMANONG, HADJI SALIK NUR AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF COTABATO, respondents.

Miguel M. Litigating for petitioners.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This petition for certiorari involves a dispute over the correct application of the unique Islamic
rule of procedure known as the oath ("yamin").

The record of the case shows that petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for
"Annulment of Sale in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale and
Delivery of Certificates of Title and Damages" before the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a
District, Cotabato City.1

Petitioners allege ownership over a parcel of land located in Kalanganan Cotabato (now Bagua
Cotabato City), claiming that they inherited the property from their ancestor, Tuan Kali Dimalen,
who left his property to his two daughters, namely Remoreng Dimalen and Dominga Dimalen
Tampar. The latter in turn divided the property equally between them.2 They also allege that
their ownership of the land was covered by OCT No. T-RP-478(548) issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cotabato City. But they added that due to the loss of the aforementioned title, TCT No.
(T-893)217 was issued on October 26, 1950 by the Register of Deeds of Cotabato City in the
names of herein petitioners Remoreng Dimalen and the heirs of Dominga Dimalen, the latter
having died in the interim.3

The "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale" sought to be annulled was
purportedly executed on June 11, 1947 between petitioners and respondent Esmael Usman,
whereby ownership of the land was conveyed to the latter for the sum of P1,000.00. The land
was subsequently sold by respondent Usman to his co-respondents Mohammad Datumanong and
Hadji Salik Nur.4
Petitioners denied that they never entered into such an agreement with respondent Usman, and
claimed that their signatures in the document of sale were forged, and that the transaction is null
and void for not having been approved by the Provincial Governor, as required by law.

Respondents, on the other hand, denied having forged the signatures of the petitioners, and
controverted all the other claims made by petitioners.

The pre-trial conference failed to result in an amicable settlement between the parties.
Consequently, the Court proceeded to clarify and define the issues of the case, to wit:

1. Whether or not defendant (respondent) Usman forged the Extrajudicial Settlement of

Estate with Simultaneous Sale.

2. Whether or not defendants (respondents) Mohammad Datumanong and Hadji Salik

Nur are purchasers in good faith and for value.5

The Court thereafter directed the parties to submit the statements ("shuhud") of at least two
witnesses to prove their claims. The sole witness of petitioners withdrew, prompting them to
manifest to the Court that they have no witnesses. Consequently, they challenged respondent
Usman to take an oath ("yamin") declaring that there is no truth to the claim of forgery brought
against him. The challenge was grounded on Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure in
Shari'a Courts (ljra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari'a) which provides as follows:

The plaintiff (mudda'i) has the burden of proof, and the taking of an oath ("yamin") rests
upon the defendant (mudda'aalai). If the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the Court.
Should the defendant refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall affirm his claim under oath
in which case, judgment shall be rendered in his favor. Should the plaintiff refuse to
affirm his claim under oath, the case shall be dismissed.

Respondent Usman opposed the challenge of petitioners, arguing that before he may be required
to take the oath, petitioners, as the mudda-i should first take the oath, since they have no
witnesses at all.6 He contended that the plaintiffs should be required to present some basis for
their claim against him, in accordance with the elementary rules of evidence.

The Court overruled the opposition of respondent Usman, stating in its resolution dated June 25,
1986 that the "yamin" is sanctioned by the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, and that
"in classical Islamic legal theory, an individual cannot be a witness in favor of his own case, and
the only legal remedy for him is to demand an oath from the defendant." Having thus ruled, the
Court directed respondent Usman to take the oath, which the latter eventually complied with,
after his motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution was denied.

Respondent Usman took the oath in the following form:

I, Esmael Usman, swear in the name of Allah Most Gracious, most Merciful and upon the
Holy Quran that I bought the land in question from the plaintiffs; that I have not forged or
 falsified the signatures of the plaintiffs; and that God will curse me if I am not telling the
truth.7

Having taken the oath as demanded by petitioners, judgment was rendered in favor of
respondents, and the complaint against them was dismissed.

Petitioners now assail the decision of the Shari'a court as having been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion. They contend that the cognizance by the court of the "yamin" of respondent Usman
is not only "unprocedural," but likewise amounts to a deprivation of their constitutional right to
be heard.

The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the Shari'a court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioners by virtue of the "yamin" taken by
the defendant, namely, respondent Usman.

Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.1âwphi1 which may apply in
a suppletory manner in this case,8 each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. When
the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) failed to adduce any evidence to support the complaint, then the
complaint must be dismissed. On this basis, the dismissal of the complaint by the Shari'a court in
this case should be upheld, but not because of the "yamin" taken by the respondent Usman.

The Court shares the concern of petitioners in the use of the yamin in this proceeding, and for
that matter, before Philippine Shari'a courts. Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure
prescribed for Shari'a courts aforecited provides that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his
claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the Court.
On the other hand, should defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff may affirm his claim under
oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in his favor.

Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional right to due process. It denies a
party his right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them.9 It should have
no place even in the Special Rules of Procedure of the Shari'a courts of the country.

The possible deletion of this provision from the said rules should be considered. For this
purpose, a committee should be constituted by the Court to review the said special rules,
including the above discussed provision, so that appropriate amendments thereof may be
undertaken by the Court thereafter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Sarmiento, Paras, JJ., concur in the
result.
Footnotes

1 Page 8, Rollo.

2 Pages 8-9, Ibid.

3 Page 9, Ibid.

4 Page 10, Ibid.

5 Page 77, Original Record.

6 Page 68, Ibid.

7 Page 11, Rollo.

8 Section 16, Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a courts promulgated by the Supreme
Court on September 20, 1983.

9 Section 6, Rule 132, Rules of Court of the Philippines.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998]

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge,

RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO
and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss
as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.

On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his
death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano
(Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita
on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the
entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita
was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous
marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance
with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only
a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other
spouse,i[1] hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was
vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was
properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in
accordance with PD No. 1083ii[2] or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this
Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the
RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995
order denying reconsideration thereof.

In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a
motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But
in places where there are no sharia courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could
properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia court and
not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the
action.

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,iii[3] Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. iv[4]
Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage,
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.v[5] There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
made by the plaintiff in this case.vi[6] In the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano
were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it
mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083.
Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws
was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss,
or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. vii[7]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs causes of action.viii[8]

Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to
Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083,ix[9] which provides -
 Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines
shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential
requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation,
guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for
customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization
and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between
husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between
husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim
laws.

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in
the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married
under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of
their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions x x x x

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br.
89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings until terminated.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

i[1] Motion to Dismiss, p. 3; Rollo, p. 52.

ii[2] Order, p. 2; Records, p. 20.

iii[3] Sec. 19, BP 129 as amended.

iv[4] Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

v[5] Sec. 2, Rule 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

vi[6] Sandel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117250, 19 September 1996, 262 SCRA 109.

vii[7] Id., p. 110.

viii[8] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120730, 28 October 1996, 263 SCRA 660.

ix[9] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. SDC-98-3. December 16, 1998]

ERLINDA ALONTO-FRAYNA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, 2nd Sharia

District Court, Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Respondent Abdulmajid J. Astih is the presiding judge of the 2 Sharia District Court in Bongao, Tawi-
nd

Tawi. The complainant, Ms. Erlinda A. Frayna, instituted the present complaint against the respondent
judge for the latters utter failure to render a decision as mandated by law, within the required period.

In her sworn letter complaint, complainant charged respondent judge with delay in the resolution of
Civil Case No. 01 entitled Erlinda Alonto Frayna, et al. vs. Juhura Frayna, et. al.,[1] for Partition,
which was filed on June 23, 1992 and submitted for resolution on April 7, 1994.

October 3, 1994, Ms. Frayna requested the assistance of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for the speedy resolution of her case. The OCA directed the respondent judge to comment on the letter
of Frayna. However, Judge Astih never complied with the directive.

On December 19, 1994,[2] Ms. Frayna wrote another letter to the OCA complaining that her case still
remained unresolved. On January 27, 1995, the OCA again referred the letter to Judge Astih for
comment and/or to take appropriate action on the same. Again, respondent judge completely ignored
the directive of the OCA.

Several months later, Atty. Mario Alegado, counsel of Ms. Frayna, wrote a letter[3] to the Court
Administrator that despite the lapse of considerable amount of time, the case of Ms. Frayna remained
undecided. Atty. Alegado importuned that appropriate action be undertaken by the OCA to ensure the
proper operation of the Sharia District Court and Sharia Circuit Court, both in the Province of Tawi-
Tawi. The OCA, for the third time, referred the letter of Atty. Alegado to Judge Astih. The referral was
again ignored by respondent judge.

Due to respondents continued inaction, the OCA brought the matter to the attention of this Court. On
July 3, 1996, this Court issued a resolution requiring Judge Astih to comment within ten (10) days on
the complaint of Ms. Frayna and to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for his
deliberate refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA.[4] Despite the resolution, no compliance
was ever received from the respondent judge. Thus, on October 23, 1996, another resolution was issued
requiring respondent to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure and to comply with the aforesaid directives requiring said comment and
explanation, both within ten (10) days from notice.[5]

On December 4, 1996, the OCA received an URGENT MOTION from the respondent judge requesting
that he be given an extension of seven (7) days within which to file his explanation/comment, citing as
reason for his failure to comply with the resolution of this Court was due to abdominal pain brought
about by bleeding peptic ulcers and hypertension. In addition to the above-mentioned ailments,
respondent judge said he has been undergoing medical treatment for bronchial asthma/asthmatic
bronchitis and rheumatism since November 23, 1996.[6] This court granted the motion. However,
despite the additional time given, no comment and/or explanation was ever filed by Judge Astih.

In a memorandum[7] dated December 1, 1997 addressed to the Chief Justice, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo Suarez recommended that Judge Astih be dismissed from service for his
contumacious and willful disregard of the directives of this Court and the Office of the Court
Administrator.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA.

The respondent judge, in his failure to comply with the mandates of this Court, neither offered any
reason nor raised any defense. Nothing was heard from the respondent judge except when he filed his
Urgent Motion on December 4, 1996, requesting for an extension of one week within which to file his
comment. He suggests in his motion that he was suffering from certain ailments, which prevented him
from complying with our directives. However, despite respondent judge having been given more than
ample time to abide with the order of this Court, he failed to do so.

A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court
is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.[8] It is gross misconduct and even outright
disrespect for this court for the respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him
to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.[9]

It should be borne in mind that a resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a
mere request from the Court, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.[10]

Thus, this Court in the case of Parane vs. Reloza[11] ruled that:

This contumacious conduct and his disregard of the Courts mandate should merit no further
compassion. Respondents continued refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court can mean
no less than his own utter lack of interest to remain with, if not his contempt of, the system to which he
has all along pretended to belong.

Significantly, a Judicial Audit Team was sent to Tawi-Tawi on March 4-8, 1998, to inspect the dockets
of the Sharia District Court of Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, in accordance with the resolution issued by this
Court dated February 4, 1997.[12] The Audit Team reported that SDC Case No. 01 entitled Erlinda
Alonto-Frayna, et al. vs. Juhura Frayna, et al., was submitted for resolution as early as April 7, 1994 or
barely two (2) years after the case was filed. Yet, it still remained undecided as of audit date.

Respondent judge, as well as all other judges must be reminded that a case should be decided within 90
days from its submission, otherwise, the judge would be guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of
duty.[13] Failure to render a decision beyond the ninety (90)-day period from its submission constitutes
serious misconduct to the detriment of the honor and integrity of his office and in derogation of a
speedy administration of justice.[14] The decision was long overdue and the period to decide the case
under the solemn mandate of Sec. 15 (1), Article VIII[15] of the 1987 Constitution had long expired.
[16]

Respondent judge cannot just sit on the case without deciding it, specially since the parties are
considered indigents. This fact was certified by the Municipal Treasurer[17] and the Social Welfare
Officer[18] of Bongao, Tawi-Tawi. Thus, the immediate resolution of the case is of utmost importance
to the complainant and her children. If a judge requires more time to resolve cases, he should ask for
more time from this Court, giving justification therefor.[19] This Court has always been consistent in
its stand that the very purpose of its existence is to the accomplishment of the ends of justice.[20]

In sum, the respondent judge has been remiss in the performance of his official duties exacerbated by
his audacious stance in defying this Courts orders. We can not tolerate the attitude of the respondent
judge in defying this Courts authority and undermining its integrity.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DISMISS respondent Judge ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH from the
service with FORFEITURE of his retirement benefits, except accrued in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the OCA and spread in his personal records in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. C.J. (Chairman), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134622. October 22, 1999]

AMININ L. ABUBAKAR, petitioner vs. AURORA A. ABUBAKAR, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Petitioner Aminin L. Abubakar (hereafter AMININ) and respondent Aurora A. Abubakar (hereafter
AURORA) were married in Jolo, Sulu, on 1 May 1978 in accordance with Islamic law.

Sometime in February 1996, AURORA filed before the 1st Shariah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan
Province (hereafter referred to as the CIRCUIT COURT), a complaint against AMININ for Divorce
with Prayer for Support and Damages. Docketed as Case No. 537, the complaint was mainly premised
on the alleged failure of AMININ to secure AURORAs consent before contracting a subsequent
marriage, in violation of Articles 27 and 162 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

In its pre-trial order[1] dated 21 March 1997, the CIRCUIT COURT limited the issue to be resolved at
the trial to a determination of the rights or the respective shares of the (parties) with respect to the
property subject of partition after divorce. Identified as the realty to be divided were: (a) a half unit of a
duplex standing on a lot at Tumaga Por Centro, Zamboanga City[2] covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-86, 898. [The other half is owned and occupied by a certain JACKARIA M.
MOHAMMAD and his wife].2; (b) a 550-square meter lot adjacent to the one previously
mentioned[3]; and (c) a house and lot at Block 2, (Lot 44), Kasanyangan Village, Jolo, Sulu,[4]
(hereafter collectively known as the PROPERTIES).

On 29 August 1997, Judge Kaudri L. Jainul issued an order[5] dissolving the marriage of AURORA
and AMININ, distributing the PROPERTIES equally between them as co-owners, and ordering
AMININ to pay her the amount of P10,000 as support during the three-month idda (waiting period).

AURORA duly filed a notice of appeal from this decision but only as far as it involves the issue of
partition of property, and not to the grant of divorce and damages it being in her favor.[6] Actually,
both parties were concerned only with the conclusion of the CIRCUIT COURT that the PROPERTIES
were conjugal.

In his 20 May 1998 decision,[7] Judge Bensaudi I. Arabani, Sr., presiding over the 3rd Shariah Judicial
District Court of Zamboanga City (hereafter referred to as the DISTRICT COURT), affirmed the
CIRCUIT COURTs 29 August 1997 order with some modifications, thus:

WHEREFORE, appreciating the evidence submitted to the Court by both parties in their respective
pleadings and memoranda, and the pertinent laws applicable to the case, judgment is hereby rendered
modifying the order of the court of origin as follows:

(a) Affirming the grant of DIVORCE by faskh (decree of court) between the parties;

(b) Affirming the order of the trial Court, as follows:

The following properties is (sic) hereby awarded and distributed equally between herein plaintiff and
defendant being considered as co-owners and as such, they will have equal share in the partition of
their properties, to wit:

1. House and lot situated at Tumaga Por Centro, Zamboanga City, consisting of a half
duplex unit on Lot No. 1845-B-2 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-86, 898. (The
other half duplex is owned and occupied by JACKARIA M. MOHAMMAD and his wife);

2. A 550 square meters (sic) lot adjacent to the house and lot described under item No. 1,
identified as Lot No. 1845-B-3 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86, 899;

3. House and lot at Block 2, Lot 44, Kasanyangan Village, Jolo, Sulu under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1820 containing an area of 240 square meters;

And, in addition, to be included as part of their common property and (to) be partitioned and divided
equally:

1. The real estate at Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.

(c) Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of one hundred ten thousand
(P110,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency as support in arrears from . . . February 14, 1996, when
plaintiff-appellant demanded for it in her complaint, and up to the expiration of her idda (waiting
period) on December 16, 1997, or (a) duration of twenty two (22) months, and in the amount of five (5)
thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, monthly, or a total amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand (P110,000.00)
pesos, Philippine Currency, plus legal interest thereon from the time this judgment becomes final and
executory until the said amount is satisfied in full;

(d) Ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND

(P50,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency as moral damages, plus legal interest thereon from the time
this judgment becomes final and executory until the said amount is satisfied in full.

SO ORDERED. [Modifications in italics]

Aggrieved by these changes, AMININ filed a motion for reconsideration[8] thereof on the following
grounds:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING THE AWARD OF MORAL

DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF, THE GRANT TO HER OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS AND THE
PARTITION OF LAND IN ALICIA, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR CONSIDERING THAT THESE
ISSUES WERE NEVER RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN HER APPEAL.

2. THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES BY THE HONORABLE COURT IS NOT IN ACCORD

WITH LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATED GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF

ISLAMIC LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

On 15 July 1998, the DISTRICT COURT issued an order,[9] denying said motion for lack of merit.

AMININ is now before this Court, praying that the assailed 20 May 1998 decision be reversed and set
aside insofar as it pertains to the award of moral damages to the respondent, the grant to her of support
in arrears, and the partition of the agricultural lot situated in Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.[10]

We find merit in the instant petition.

At the heart of this action lies the time-tested policy of this Court regarding a litigants voluntary
limitation of issues vis--vis the courts exercise of its judicial prerogative. Specifically, the petition seeks
confirmation regarding the effects of a pre-trial order and the finality of matters not appealed by an
appellant.

That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in
Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled
and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of
contention for the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution
according every person the right to a speedy disposition of their cases.[11] If the parties can agree on
certain facts prior to trial hence, the prefix pre the court can later concentrate on those which are
seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of
the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.[12] The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which
legally binds the parties to honor the same.[13]

In the case at bar, AMININ and AURORA agreed on the divorce, the idda, and the limitation of
partition of assets to the PROPERTIES. The pre-trial order of 21 March 1997 whose content and
validity were never questioned by either party stated the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this
wise: What are the rights or the respective shares of the herein plaintiff and defendant with respect to
the property subject of partition after divorce? This is precisely the question answered by the CIRCUIT
COURT in its order of 29 August 1997. The marriage was dissolved, the PROPERTIES awarded and
evenly distributed to the parties as co-owners, and support in the nominal amount of P10,000 during the
three-month idda or waiting period was awarded to AURORA. Such final order was, therefore,
consistent with the pre-trial order.

Notwithstanding the absence of any irregularity or legal infirmity in the CIRCUIT COURTs order,
AURORA still questioned its wisdom insofar only as the issue of partition of their property was
concerned; the grant of divorce and damages being in her favor,[14] she saw no need to pursue the
same. Consequently, the DISTRICT COURT, acting as an appellate court, was not bound to go beyond
what the appellant was asking for, as articulated in Rule 51, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, viz.:

Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. [Emphasis
supplied]

The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the
court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.[15] A
case in point is Bella v. Court of Appeals,[16] where the Court applied Rule 51 in regarding a matter
not questioned on appeal by the appellant to be final and beyond the appellate courts power of review.
It was concluded that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in altering the trial courts award
even when the appellant did not raise that issue in his appeal. Thus:

Since the size of the award is an issue which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter, nor a plain or clerical error, respondent appellate court did not have the power to resolve it.[17]

From the inception of the divorce proceedings, AURORA lent the impression that she only wanted the
court to determine how the PROPERTIES should be distributed between her and AMININ. When the
DISTRICT COURT decreed the equal division of the lot at Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur, increased the
decree of support eleven-fold, and granted P50,000 in moral damages, not only did it defeat the intent
and content of the pre-trial order but it also went beyond the sphere of its authority as delineated in the
notice of appeal. These modifications certainly had no bearing on its jurisdiction; neither do they
constitute clerical errors.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision of 20 May 1998 and
order dated 15 July 1998 of the 3rd Shariah Judicial District Court of Zamboanga City in Appeal Case
No. 01-97 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new ruling is hereby entered REVERTING to the 29
August 1997 order of the 1st Shariah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan Province, in Case No. 537.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, and Ynares_Santiago, JJ., on official leave.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. SCC-00-5. November 29, 2000]

SALAMA S. ANSA, complainant, vs. JUDGE SALIH MUSA, Sharia Circuit Court, Buluan,
Maguindanao, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint dated December 27, 1996, complainant Salama S. Ansa charged
respondent Judge Salih Musa of the Sharia Circuit Court, Buluan, Maguindanao, with Gross
Immorality.

Complainant is a court stenographer assigned at the Sharias Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. In

her affidavit-complaint she alleged that prior to her present assignment, she was assigned at
the Sharias Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She was under the supervision of respondent
who was then the Clerk of Court and at the same time an ULAMA. Sometime in June 1994,
respondent made amorous advances towards her. Finding the behavior of respondent
disgraceful and immoral since he was a married man, she took courage in telling him, Hindi
kita maaring patulan, sir, nirerespeto kita, hindi lamang na dahil Boss kita kundi sa iyong
pagkaulama, mahiya ka naman sa akin at lalo na sa mga tao. [1] Respondent ignored her and
persisted in his amorous advances. He told her that he knew the law, and there were no legal
impediments to their marrying so she should not worry that the affair was immoral. As time
went by, she succumbed and gradually gave in to respondents insistence culminating in their
trysts in hotels, lodges, and theaters. Their affair continued until respondent was appointed as
Sharia judge. Since respondent did not try to right things by marrying her and making her one
of his wives, she decided to end the relationship, but she was appeased by respondent. Their
affair continued but she realized he had no intention of rectifying the situation he had put her
in. She realized she was just going to be the other woman. Deeply disappointed she sought
the help of a mediator but instead respondent insulted her. She filed the complaint against
respondent, charging him with gross immorality. She asked the Court to punish respondent
accordingly.

In his Comment dated May 28, 1997,[2] respondent judge strongly and vehemently denied the
charges. He averred that he did not and had never taken advantage of his public position and
moral influence, nor made amorous, disgraceful and immoral advances on complainant. He
did not write any note, memo or letter to complainant inviting her to hotels, lodges and
theaters to tryst with her. He did not cajole her to become his so-called other woman. He
claimed that the accusations were the product of her sick mind and the notes and letters all
fabricated and forged.
On July 20, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to Executive Judge Santos Adiong,
Regional Trial Court, Marawi City, Branch 8, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report dated June 1, 2000, the investigating Judge reported that:

Despite all the opportunities and time accorded, respondent Musa did not present any
evidence to refute complainants allegations. He only appeared once before the investigating
judge. However, in his comment dated May 28, 1997, the respondent judge strongly and
vehemently denied the imputations against him but failed to offer any evidence to support
such denial.

Complainants testimony, though uncorroborated, appears to be credible and is supported by

substantial evidence.

Complainant would not have publicly disclosed their immoral affair with the respondent and in
the process risk undergoing all the troubles and humiliations attendant thereto if her motive
was not to bring to justice the man who brings dishonor to her and her family. It would be
highly improbable for her to fabricate her charge for no reason at all.

Complainants determination and courage in coming and appearing before the undersigned all
the way from far away Midsayap, Cotabato (a days travel by land) taking all the risks and
dangers along the Narciso Ramos Highway passing through rebel infested and lawless
elements areas cannot just be ignored. She appeared no less than three (3) times while
respondent appeared only once. She also incurred so much expenses in so appearing.

Respondents love letters or love notes to complainant (Exhibits C to O inclusive) are more
than sufficient to prove that there exists a mutual love affair between then and that
respondent, a married man, took advantage of his official position and used his influence and
moral ascendancy over the complainant as her subordinate, in attaining his amorous
advances towards her to the extent of making her fall in love with him.

Considered likewise is Exhibit P which is respondents letter to Judge Kambal informing the
latter on his side to complainants report dated November 1, 1996 and that complainant even
sought the amicable settlement of her problem by asking Judge Kambal to negotiate the
respondent to answer the wrong he had done by marrying complainant. [3]

Judge Adiong concluded that there was sufficient evidence to hold respondent liable for gross
immorality. He recommended that Judge Salih Musa be suspended from the service for a
period of three (3) months.

Indeed, there is sufficient basis for Judge Adiongs conclusion. We have gone over the
testimonies as well as the notes and letters on record and find them convincing proof of his
offensive conduct. Respondents bare denials and unproven allegations of forgery cannot
prevail over the positive evidence submitted by complainant. We agree with the investigating
Judge that respondent is guilty. However, we are unable to agree that respondent be meted
only the penalty of three (3) months suspension from office, for his offense is serious and
deserves a graver penalty.
Respondents conduct, in our view, violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Not only did he
transgress the norms of decency expected of every person but he failed to live up to the high
moral standard expected of a member of the Judiciary. As well said in Junio vs. Rivera, Jr.:[4]

All judges in all levels of the judiciary hierarchy, from this Court down to the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts, are bound to observe the above exacting standards. There is,
however, a special reason for requiring compliance with those standards from those who, like
respondent Judge Rivera, are Municipal or Metropolitan judges and are accordingly frontliners
of the judicial department. As such, a Municipal (or Metropolitan) Judge is the most visible
living representation of the countrys legal and judicial system. He is the judicial officer who on
a day-to-day basis deals with the disputes arising among simple, rural people who comprise
the great bulk of our population. He is the judicial officer who comes into closest and most
frequent contact with our people. The judiciary as a whole and its ability to dispense justice
are inevitably measured in terms of the public and private acts of judges in the grass roots
level, like respondent Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. It is essential, therefore, if the judiciary is to
engage and retain the respect and confidence of our nation, that this Court insist that
municipal judges and all other judges live up to the high standards demanded by our case law
and the Code of Judicial Conduct and by our polity.

Noteworthy, what aggrevates respondents offense is that he was the immediate superior of
the complainant. Instead of acting with appropriate regard toward his female employee, he
took advantage of his position to prey on her innocence and weakness. Then he refused to
right the wrong he has done, but instead added insult to the injury of complainant. This
conduct of a superior officer in relation to a subordinate employee mocks the trust and
confidence she has placed on him in the concept of one in loco parentis.

In Dawa vs. De Asa,[5] we dismissed a judge for making sexual advances on three of his
subordinates. In Simbajon vs. Esteban,[6] we dismissed a judge for making sexual advances
on one of his female subordinates. Respondents conduct is not less reprehensible than those
involved in said cases. As borne by the records respondent, despite being rejected twice by
the complainant, persisted in his lustful quest until her complete surrender to him, thereby
going far beyond the bounds of decency and morality expected of a judge. But his
unscrupulous conduct did not end there: he dashed her hopes of an honorable marriage.
Thus he has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and the place of honor reserved for
the guardian of justice in a civilized community.

WHEREFORE, we find JUDGE SALIH MUSA guilty of Gross Immorality. He is hereby

DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any other branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. Upon his reciept hereof, he is enjoined to
cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to his office immediately.

SO ORDERED

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140817. December 7, 2001]

SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner, vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I.
ARABANI, SR., in his capacity as presiding judge of the 3rd Sharia District Court, Sharia Judicial
District, Zamboanga City, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to
Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her
fitness to be the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.

The Facts

Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February
3, 1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites.[1] On October 21, 1987, or four (4)
months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was
not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,[2] and
Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990.[3] The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian
woman whom he later divorced.

After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondents family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties
migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.

Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrinas mother in 145 Tanguile Street,
Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court.
Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City.

On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians[4] and their names changed
from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina
Artadi.

Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in
Manila,[5] and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.[6] Such clothing
are detestable under Islamic law on customs.

Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40.00 after the
children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school,[7] the children would be happy
to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home
from school.

The Case

On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the Sharia District Court, Marawi City,
an action[8] to obtain custody of his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and Amouaje, 9.

On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed her answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties since both parties were residents of Manila and for lack of
cause of action. Petitioner likewise moved to transfer the venue to Zamboanga, which was more
accessible by plane.
On June 18, 1996, the Sharia District Court granted petitioners motion to transfer the venue to
Zamboanga.[9]

On June 27, 1996, respondent filed a reply[10] and motion for a temporary restraining order against
petitioner.[11] He moved that petitioner desist from preventing him from exercising parental authority
over his minor children.

On July 12, 1996, the court granted the motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction.[12]

On August 12, 1996, the court ordered the parties to submit their memoranda on the issue of
jurisdiction.

On October 30, 1996, the court granted petitioners motion to withdraw motion to dismiss on the issue
of jurisdiction and set the proceedings for pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996.

On November 14, 1996, respondent filed a motion to drop Joyce Artadi as defendant in the case and the
trial court issued an order:

During the pre-trial conference held this morning, the parties made their respective offer and counter
proposals for amicable settlement. The plaintiff proposed (1) solidarity of the family, and (2) alternate
custody. The defendant advanced the proposal of reasonable visitation of the father at their residence,
for which the court will possibly fix the period or time and schedule of visitations.

With these proposals, both parties agreed to continue the pre-trial conference on December 9, 1996.

WHEREFORE, let the pre-trial conference be again held on December 9, 1996, at 9:00 oclock in the
morning.[13]

Meantime, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City[14] an action
for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further
orders from said court.[15]

On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss[16] on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3,
1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case,
both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.

On March 29, 1999, the court denied the motion to dismiss since P.D. No. 1083 had jurisdiction over
all cases of Muslims involving custody.[17]

On April 23, 1999, Sabrina filed a motion to reconsider the order of March 29, 1999 denying the
motion to dismiss.[18]

On June 22, 1999, the court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Thus-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant-
movant is hereby ordered DENIED; Defendant is further ordered to comply with the order of this Court
dated July 12, 1996, to allow plaintiff to exercise his right of parental authority over their minor
children with that of the defendant in accordance with article 71, of P.D. 1083, the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.

Let the continuation of this case be set on July 15, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning.[19]

On July 15, 1999, the trial court decided to move forward to the next stage of the case and allowed
respondent Fouzi to present evidence ex-parte.

On August 18, 1999, the court issued an order[20] giving respondent fifteen (15) days to submit his
formal offer of evidence and fifteen (15) days from receipt of transcript of stenographic notes to submit
memorandum.

The Sharia District Courts Decision

On November 16, 1999, the Sharia Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Awarding the custody of the minors Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje Artadi Bondagjy
in favor of their natural father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and for this purpose ordering the
respondent Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person having the care of said minors in her stead or behalf,
to turn over, relinguish and surrender the custody of said minors to their natural father, the petitioner in
this case Fouzi Ali Bondagjy;

(b) Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy to ensure that the said minors are provided with
reasonable support according to his means and in keeping with the standard of his family, and, a
suitable home conducive to their physical,

(c) mental and moral development; and, with his knowledge and under reasonable circumstances
allow the respondent and natural mother of the said minors Mrs. Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy to visit her
minor children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouje Artadi Bondagjy.[21]

Hence, this petition.[22]

The Courts Ruling

The Sharia District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this
case because the spouses were not yet divorced.

However, the Sharia District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus -

A married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the community in which
she lives considers morally upright, and in a manner that her growing minor children will not be
socially and morally affected and prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has failed to observe that
which is expected of a married woman and a mother by the society in which she lives. xxx The
evidence of this case shows the extent of the moral depravity of the respondent, and the kind of concern
for the welfare of her minor children which on the basis thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with
the custody of her minor children.

xxx Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally disentitled to the
custody of her minor children by reason of wickedness when such wickedness is injurious to the mind
of the child, such as when she engages in zina (illicit sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a
mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be trusted with the custody of the child who is continually going
out and leaving the child hungry. (A. Baillie, Muhammadan Law, p. 435; citing Dar-ul-Muktar, p. 280).
[23]

On the other hand, the Sharia Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.[24]

When he was asked during the direct examination the question that, if ever this Honorable Court will
grant you custody of your children will you be able to house and give support to your children? He
answered, Of course, even up to now I am giving support to my children; And my comment is that the
father should give everything the needs of the family and now whatever the children needs even in
school, considering the past, I have to love them, I have to care for my children. In school, even when
they see something they love and like, I buy it for them. Or sometime (sic) I send my staff and bring
something for them in their house. It is very hard, in school in front of other parents my son would still
climb on my shoulder. I want to see them happy. I have pictures of my children with me, taken only
last week.[25]

As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon the parties.[26] The Court is
not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.[27] However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review or reverse
the factual findings of the lower courts if we find that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
[28]

In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of
the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Fitness as a Mother

The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her children.
We find that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness
according to Muslim law or the Family Code.
In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April 20, 2001, G.R. No. 114923), we said that in the
hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear
and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order.[30]

The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws.
The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she
is not a Muslim.

Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social
and moral welfare of the children,[31] and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as
physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the parents.

The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of her
children. The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition
paid by petitioner according to the schools certification.[32]

Parental Authority and Custody

The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue.[33]

In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the children, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations.[34]

Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children.

Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father
and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.

In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals,[35] we stated:

xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses.[36] As regards parental authority, there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor.[37]

xxx

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company.[38]

We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children, such that they both want to
have them in their custody.
Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where both
parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into consideration the
circumstances that would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the children. Although
we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more
capacity and time to see to the childrens needs. Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that
he go abroad or be in different places most of the time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor
children, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the mother.[39]

However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority. In the
case of Silva v. Court of Appeals,[40] we said that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be
unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged
and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably
remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any
real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.

Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his Constitutionally protected natural and primary
right.[41]

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby
SET ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors Abdulaziz,
and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach majority age. Both spouses shall have joint
responsibility over all expenses of rearing the children.

The father, FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may take the
children out only with the written consent of the mother.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144095. April 12, 2005]

SPOUSES HAYMATON S. GARINGAN AND JAYYARI PAWAKI, petitioners, vs. HADJI MUNIB
SAUPI GARINGAN, HADJA TERO SAUPI GARINGAN, and HADJA JEHADA SAUPI
GARINGAN, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review[1] to reverse the Decision[2] dated 19 June 2000 and the
Order[3] dated 19 July 2000 of the Sharia District Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga City
in Civil Case No. 13-3. The Sharia District Court cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
2592 in the name of Djayari or Jayyari Moro. The Sharia District Court also ordered the partition of the
land in dispute, and the issuance of new TCTs in the names of Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja
Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 February 1993, Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan and Hadja Jehada
Saupi Garingan (Hadji Munib, et al.) filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against their sister Haymaton Saupi Garingan[4] (Haymaton) and her husband
Jayyari Pawaki (Pawaki), also known as Djayari Moro. Hadji Munib, et al. alleged that their
grandfather Saupi Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully planted with coconut and other fruit bearing
trees, containing an area of 11.3365 hectares. The land is situated in Sitio Tinebbasan, Barangay Semut,
Municipality of Lamitan, Basilan Province. Saupi Moro acquired the land through purchase from Gani
Moro. Saupi Moro donated the land to his daughter Insih Saupi (Insih), mother of Hadji Munib, et al.
and Haymaton. After the donation, Insih predeceased her father and her interest over the land passed to
her children Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan,
and Haymaton Garingan.

After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954,[5] Haymaton and Pawaki took over the administration of the
land. Later, Haymaton and Pawaki declared the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675. Haymaton and Pawaki refused to share with Hadji Munib, et
al. the income from the sale of fruits from the land.
Haymaton and Pawaki, on the other hand, claimed that on 22 September 1969, Pawaki bought the land
from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin (Jikirum). TCT No. T-2592 was issued in the name of Djayari Moro.
Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of an owner in the same year. He declared the land
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675.

The Decision of the Sharia District Court

The Sharia District Court found that Saupi Moro acquired the land in dispute from Gani Moro. Insih
Saupi, during her lifetime, accepted the land by way of donation from her father. Upon the death of
Insih and her husband, their children succeeded to the rights of their parents over the property. The
Sharia District Court ruled:

From the foregoing evidence of the plaintiffs it appears that the property in question was given by
Saupi Moro during his lifetime to his daughter Insih Saupi, who thereafter, stayed in the land and
introduced improvements consisting of coconut trees with her husband Garingan until they died,
predeceasing Saupi Moro, which shows that the property given by Saupi Moro to his daughter Insih
Saupi Garingan during the formers lifetime, was accepted by the latter during her lifetime.

The herein plaintiffs in this case, including their sister and defendant, Haymaton Garingan Jayyari,
being the children of Insih Saupi and Garingan, steps (sic) into whatever rights or properties left by
their deceased parents.

On the basis of the evidence of the case, the herein property in question was acquired by their
grandfather Saupi Moro from Gani Moro before World War II or sometime during the Japanese
occupation. (See Exhibit A-1, p. 297, Record). During their grandfathers lifetime he donated it to his
daughter plaintiffs (sic) mother Insih Garingan who together with her husband Garingan occupied and
planted said property; After plaintiffs mother Insih Saupi Garingan died, the property was left to
plaintiffs sister now defendant Haymaton Garingan Jayyari; And, after the latter also died, her husband
and co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki took over the property. There is therefore, an implied trust relation
established between the heirs of Insih Saupi Garingan plaintiffs herein and their sister defendant
Haymaton Garingan and the latter husband Jayyari Pawaki over the said property. In a case, it was
held, that the Torrens System was never calculated to forment (sic) betrayal in the performance of a
trust. (Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86). Thus, through the continuous possession of the property
beginning from the plaintiffs grandparent Saupi Moro sometime in 1941, until the latter died sometime
in 1954 up to the time it was held in trust by plaintiffs co-heir, defendant Haymaton Garingan, and the
latter husband and co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki, who after Haymaton Garingans death continued to
hold the land claiming to have acquired it by purchase from Adjaluddin Moro, tacking the periods,
more than thirty years had elapsed which gives the herein plaintiffs the right over the said property,
though the donation made in favor of their mother Insih Garingan by their grandfather Saupi Moro was
not in a public instrument, but merely verbal. In a case the Court held, That while donation of
immovable property not made in a public instrument, such as verbal one, is not effective as a transfer of
title, yet it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession
of the intended donee, and such possession may ripen into ownership by prescription. (Pensader vs.
Pensader, 47 Phil. 959; Apilado vs. Apilado (C.A.) 34 O.G. p. 144; Macabasco vs. Macabasco (C.A.)
45 O.G. 2532; Espique vs. Espique (S.C.) 53 O.G. 4079; Cabacutan vs. Serrano (C.S.) 59 O.G. 292;
Cited on p. 523, A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1987 ed.).
Plaintiffs herein, namely (1) Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, (2) Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, (3) Hadja
Jehada Saupi Garingan, together with their sister, and defendant (4) Haymaton Garingan-Jayyari are
the children of Insih Saupi and Garingan. Upon the death of their parents Insih Saupi and Garingan,
they succeeded to whatever hereditary rights over the estates of their deceased parents. The evidence
shows that plaintiffs mother Insih Saupi Garingan predeceased her father Saupi Garingan. x x x.

In Civil Case No. 41 entitled Janjalawi Moro, et. al., plaintiffs vs. Andaang Moro, et. al., defendants
that was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Basilan City is dated July 16, 1956 on
paragraph 3 of the said Civil complaint states, that Saupi Moro died intestate in 1954 (sic); Thus, Insih
Saupi and Imam Garingan, the plaintiffs parents, who both predeceased Saupi Moro, their death
occurred sometime before the death of Saupi Moro in 1954. Such being the case, the law then
governing the successional rights of Filipino Muslims was still the Civil Code of the Philippines, R.A.
No. 386 which became effective on August 30, 1950. (Ilejay vs. Ilejay, et. al., (S.C.) 49 O.G. 4903).
And, under Article 90 of the present Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, The
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. This provision is an
adoption of Article 77 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent; which has been interpreted
that the succession is opened by the death of the person from whom the inheritance comes. (A.
Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 13, Vol. III, 1979 ed.; Cited 3 Navarro Amandi 82). Considering the
applicable laws on this regard, since Insih Saupi Garingan and Imam Garingan who were plaintiffs
parents, predeceased Saupi Moro who died in 1954, the law then applicable to successional rights of
Filipino Muslims was the prevailing law at that time which was still the Civil Code of the Philippines.
This rule is recognized by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, under
Article 186, which provides:

Art. 186. Effect of Code on Past Acts. (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at that time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.

And, the applicable provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on this regard are as follows, to
quote:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages; And,

Art. 980. The Children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) That the following described real property, viz: A parcel of agricultural land located in
Semut, Lamitan, Basilan City, Philippines, identified as Bureau of Lands Plan H-V-18368
bounded on N., by seashore, 20 m. wide; on the SE., by property of Turavin Moro; on the
S., by property of Hatib Hiya; and on the W., by property of Husin Moro, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY
FIVE (113,365) SQUARE METERS more or less is ordered partitioned among the
following in EQUAL SHARES, to wit: Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi
 Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan, and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari, shall get
entitled to ONE FOURTH (1/4) SHARE EACH of the aforesaid property;

(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2592 covering said property in the name of Djayari or
Jayyari Moro married to Haymaton Mora of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan
City is hereby ordered annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Basilan City is ordered to issue a New Certificate of Title in the
names of the owners mentioned in the preceding paragraph 1, and in the proportion given
therein;

(3) Ordering the defendant and anyone acting for the defendants to peacefully, and voluntarily
surrender the afore-mentioned parcel of land together with the improvements existing
thereon to the plaintiffs, their heirs or legal representatives, and restore them in the
occupation and enjoyment thereof.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In an Order dated 19 July 2000, the Sharia District Court denied the motion for reconsideration of
Haymaton and Pawaki.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issues

In their memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:

Whether the Sharia District Court erred in ordering the partition of the subject property and annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2592 on the basis alone of respondents claim that Saupi Moro,
their predecessor-in-interest, was the one who owned the said parcel of land during his lifetime, thereby
disregarding the protection accorded to persons dealing with property registered under the Torrens
system.

Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in not ruling that respondents right to seek a
reconveyance of the subject property had already prescribed or is barred by laches.

Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in not ruling that respondents have no cause of action
against the petitioners in an action for partition as they are not co-owners of the subject property,
petitioners being the sole owners of the property.[7]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition, and the action will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the property in dispute.[8] In this case, Hadji Munib, et
al. failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.
The Derivative Title of Jayyari Pawaki

The land in dispute was originally registered in the name of Andaang Gani (Andaang) under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-793[9] issued on 6 December 1955. OCT No. P-793 was issued upon
the approval of Andaangs homestead application and the issuance on 17 February 1955 of Letters of
Patent No. V-41831.

Andaang died intestate on 29 August 1959. On 13 April 1960, Andaangs widow and sole heir, Cristeta
Santiago vda. de Gani (Cristeta), executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale[10] adjudicating to
herself the land in dispute and at the same time selling it to Jikirum. On 31 August 1967 or seven years
after the sale, Cristeta caused the cancellation of OCT No. P-793 and the issuance in her name of TCT
No. T-1940.[11] On the same date, TCT No. T-1940 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1941[12] was issued
in the name of Jikirum.

On 22 September 1969, Jikirum executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] in favor of Djayari Moro. On 10
June 1971, TCT No. T-1941 was cancelled and TCT No. T-2592[14] was issued in the name of Djayari
Moro also known as Jayyari Pawaki.

The Claim of Hadji Munib, et al.

Hadji Munib, et al. claim that before or during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Saupi Moro
acquired the land in dispute through sale from Gani Moro. After Gani Moros death, his heirs, which
included Andaang, offered to repurchase the land from Saupi Moro. Saupi Moro refused. The heirs of
Gani Moro[15] instituted Civil Case No. 31 for Illegal Detainer[16] against Saupi Moro.[17] Although the
Municipal Trial Court of Basilan City[18] declared Saupi Moro in default for non-appearance, it
dismissed the complaint in a Decision dated 24 September 1951, as follows:

Does an action lie against the defendant for Illegal Detainer: Rule 72, pp. 247-248, Morans Rules of
Court, provides, that there are two (2) kinds of Detainer: (1) that by a tenant, and (2) that by a vendee
or vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any land of building (sic). In the
present case, the cause of action is based only on a verbal contract that took place year ago, one of the
principal parties is now dead. The court believes that the right of the plaintiffs to recover possession has
not been clearly established. In their complaint, they stated that the alleged contract took place before
World War II, while in open court they stated that it took place during the Japanese occupation. The
plaintiffs likewise failed to explain in Court, why Gani Moro during his lifetime failed to redeem the
property, although the amount involved is a pittant (sic). Gani Moro has all the time in the world and
the means to repay said amount of seventy (P70.00), before his death on May, 1949, and if said
contract really existed, he would not have hesitated to redeem said property knowing that his children
stands (sic) to be deprived of their inheritance of a substantial parcel of land with improvements.

Although, the allegations of the plaintiffs stands unrefuted (defendant being in default) yet the Court in
the interest of justice, has to sift and analyze the evidence of the plaintiffs in order that justice could be
meted to the parties.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court is of the opinion and so hold, that
the plaintiff has failed to prove its case, and judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above
complaint, without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[19]

Despite the decision, Andaang applied for a homestead patent over the disputed land. Andaangs
application was approved and on 17 February 1955, he was issued Letters of Patent No. V-41831. On 6
December 1955, OCT No. P-793 was issued in Andaangs name.

In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro,[20] claiming to be his heirs,[21] filed Civil Case No.
41 for Annulment of Certificate of Title to a Parcel of Land and Damages against Andaang and the
Register of Deeds of Basilan before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Basilan City.[22] However,
the case did not prosper. In a certification dated 18 September 1994, Clerk of Court Selso M.
Manzanaris of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan declared that the building housing the sala
of the CFI of Basilan City was burned in 1975. The records of Civil Case No. 41 were destroyed. The
plaintiffs did not revive the case which was considered abandoned.[23]

The Homestead Application of Andaang Gani

Under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141),[24] as amended, agricultural lands may be acquired by
homestead, as follows:

SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who
does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of
any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the
Philippines by the United States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain.

SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds that the
application should be approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession of the land
upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the
date of the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead, otherwise he
shall lose his prior right to the land.

SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least one-fifth of
the land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall
not be less than one nor more than five years, from and after the date of the approval of the application.
The applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to
acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director
of Lands, that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is
located, or in the municipality adjacent to the same and has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land
continuously since the approval of the application, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has
been alienated or encumbered, and that he has complied with all the requirements of this Act, then,
upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.

CA 141 requires the applicant to enter in possession of, improve and cultivate the land.

Andaang was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 31 for illegal detainer against Saupi Moro.[25] In
that case, the plaintiffs prayed that they be allowed to redeem the land in dispute which Gani Moro
verbally mortgaged to Saupi Moro during the Japanese occupation. The plaintiffs also prayed that the
trial court order Saupi Moro to vacate the land and to restitute the premises to the plaintiffs. The
trial court dismissed the complaint.

There is no evidence on record that shows that the heirs of Gani Moro subsequently reacquired the
land. Nothing shows that Andaang Gani was the occupant of the land when he applied for homestead
patent, or that he occupied the land and introduced improvements thereon in the interim before the
approval of his application. Hence, Hadji Munib, et al. insist that Andaang did not comply with the
requirements of CA 141.

Review of Certificate of Title on Ground of Fraud

Section 122 of Act No. 496 (Act 496),[26] provides:

SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the (United
States or to the Government of the) Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act
and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of
alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its
delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to
be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in
other cases of registered land, and an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant,
or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall
be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be
made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for registration
shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and owners duplicate,
such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act.

Upon its registration, the land in dispute falls under the operation of Act 496 and becomes registered
land. A homestead patent, once registered, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title.[27]

A person deprived of the land, estate, or interest therein by virtue of a decree of registration may avail
of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496. Thus:

Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall
be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description To whom it may concern. Such decree shall
not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees: subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition
for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of
title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser,
the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject
only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of
title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved
by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any
other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value. (Emphasis supplied)

The fraud contemplated in Section 38 of Act 496 refers to extrinsic or collateral fraud. In Libudan v.
Gil,[28] the Court explained the scope of extrinsic or collateral fraud as follows:

x x x (T)he action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud
be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. But intrinsic fraud
takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or
perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in applying for and obtaining
adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been allotted
to him in the partition; or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector to
include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are
no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to
oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the
applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these examples the overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court.

xxx

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud
goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Thus we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the
presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing
the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of
the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case.

The fraud being attributed to Andaang is not extrinsic and collateral. In Libudan, the Court ruled that
the allegation that neither the applicant nor his alleged successor-in-interest has ever been in actual
possession of the property in question since time immemorial does not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and collateral fraud, Hadji Munib, et al. failed to avail of
the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period.

In Nelayan, et al. v. Nelayan, et al.,[29] this Court ruled that in the case of public land grants (patents),
the one-year period under Section 38 is counted from the issuance of the patent by the government.

The Letters of Patent was issued on 17 February 1955. The brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed
Civil Case No. 41 for annulment of title only in July 1956, more than a year after the issuance of the
Letters of Patent. There is no evidence that Saupi Moros children, who are his compulsory heirs,
intervened in the case. Insihs children who claim to have succeeded to the rights of their mother also
failed to intervene in the case. Hadji Munib, et al. did not do anything to protect their interest, not even
after the records of Civil Case No. 41 were burned. Instead of availing of the remedy under Section 38
of Act 496, Hadji Munib, et al. filed an action for partition on 23 February 1993, which must fail
because a Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral attack. Thus:

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that once a public land has been brought under the Land Registration Act,
the Torrens title issued thereto is indefeasible. It is entitled to the same regard as one issued in a judicial
proceeding. The Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral attack. The decree (or order of the Director
of Lands for the issuance of the patent in the case of a homestead) may be reviewed under Sec. 38 of
the Land Registration Act by filing the appropriate petition within one year from the issuance of the
said decree or from the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Or an appeal may be taken
to the appellate court within the reglementary period from the decision of the Court; and in the case of
the homestead, the administrative remedies may be pursued. These are the methods of direct attack.[30]

The Proper Party to Bring the Action

In any event, Hadji Munib, et al. are not the proper parties to file an action for reconveyance of the land
in dispute.

Even in Civil Case No. 41, the plaintiffs there did not claim that the land was privately owned and thus
not proper subject for homestead application. They only alleged continuous possession of the land.
Even in their Memorandum filed before this Court, Hadji Munib, et al. only alleged that Andaang Gani
violated the provisions of CA 141 and that he was never in actual possession and occupation of the land
in dispute. Hadji Munib, et al. also acknowledged that Civil Case No. 31 only confirmed Saupi Moros
physical possession of the land. Indeed, Civil Case No. 31, being a case for illegal detainer, did not
settle the issue of ownership of the land. The trial court dismissed the complaint in that case only
because the plaintiffs failed to establish their right to recover possession of the land. Any determination
of ownership made in the illegal detainer case is not conclusive.

Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro from whom Saupi Moro acquired it. The
land in dispute was part of the public domain before the issuance of OCT No. P-793. If it were
otherwise, there would be no need for Gani Moros son, Andaang, to file a homestead application.

The rule on this matter is clear:

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest.[31]

Hadji Munib, et al.s action for partition effectively seeks to cancel the homestead patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. However, even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title are
cancelled, Hadji Munib, et al. will not acquire the land in the concept of an owner. The land will revert
to the government and will again form part of the public domain.

Section 101 of CA 141 provides that actions for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded must be
instituted by the Solicitor General and in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.[32] Thus:

A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued
in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the
public domain and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year from issuance. x x x. The
only instance when a certificate of title covering a tract of land, formerly a part of the patrimonial
property of the State, could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the
conditions imposed by law, and in such case the proper party to bring the action would be the
Government to which the property would revert.[33]

Considering the foregoing, Hadji Munib, et al. have no personality to file an action to recover
possession of the land in dispute. Further, they failed to timely avail of whatever remedy available to
them to protect whatever interest they had over the land.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sharia District Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City in Civil Case No. 13-3, is SET ASIDE, and another one is entered DISMISSING the complaint in
Civil Case No. 13-3.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Bensaudi I. Arabani, Sr. Rollo, pp. 20-38.

[3] Ibid., p. 40.

Later substituted by her heirs, Ammad, Jain, Hadja Huda, Hadja Murwa, Totoh, Jarah, Talib and
[4]
Mad Jayyari, represented by their father Jayyari Pawaki. Records, p. 168.

The year is 1954 in the Decision of the Sharia District Court, (Rollo, p. 21) while 1945 in the
[5]
Complaint, (Records, p. 2).
[6] Rollo, pp. 34-38.

[7] Ibid., pp. 86-87 (p. 87 is marked in the Rollo as p. 88).

[8] See Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 150707, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 545.

[9] Rollo, p. 110.

[10] Ibid., p. 112.

[11] Records, p. 83.

[12] Rollo, p. 114.

[13] Ibid., p. 115.

[14] Ibid., p. 116.

[15] Andaang Gani, Porencia Gani and Maning Gani.

[16] Now Unlawful Detainer.

[17] Referred to in that case as Saupe Moro.

[18] Through Municipal Judge Doroteo De Guzman.

[19] Records, pp. 75-76.

[20] Janjalawi Moro, Haddi Moro, Sauti Moro, Amina Mora and Hatija Mora.

[21] Despite the supposed donation of the land to Insih Garingan.

[22] Records, p. 301.

[23] Ibid., p. 308.

[24] The Public Land Act.

[25] Supra note 15.

[26] The Land Registration Act.

[27] Republic of the Philippines v. Abacite, et al., 111 Phil. 703 (1961).

[28] 150-A Phil. 362 (1972).

[29] 109 Phil. 183 (1960), citing Dawaling Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et
al., 96 Phil. 946 (1955).

[30] Lopez v. Padilla, 150-A Phil. 391(1972).

[31] Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 (1946); Nelayan, et al. v. Nelayan, et al., supra note 29.

[32] The Director of Lands v. De Luna, et al., 110 Phil 28 (1960).

[33] Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157 (1957).

 FIRST DIVISION

MOCARAL MACAWIAG, G.R. No. 159210

Petitioner,

Present:

-versus- PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

JUDGE RASAD BALINDONG CALLEJO, SR., and

and SORAIDA A. MACAWIAG, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Respondents.

Promulgated:

September 20, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

 
 
DECISION
 

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court for the nullification
of the Decision[1] of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City and its

Order[2] denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The assailed decision reversed

the Decision[3] of the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Iligan City,
declaring that the house and lot with an area of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City is
not a part of the fixed dower given to Soraida Macawiag, herein private respondent, and directing her
to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P40,000.00.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Soraida Macawiag and Pangampong Macawiag contracted marriage on May
27, 1987, solemnized by Imam Macmod Ganzo. Private respondent claims that before the celebration
of their marriage, the representatives of the bride and bridegroom agreed and the solemnizing officer
announced, that the customary dower (mahr)[4] was P20,000.00 in cash, one head of live carabao, and
house and lot consisting of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-28, 147(a.f.). However, despite the oral and written declaration that
the subject house and lot was a mahr, Mocaral M. Macawiag, herein petitioner, and her children,
refused to recognize it as such, without valid and lawful ground.

 
 Hence, on October 27, 1998, private respondent filed an action (dawa)[5] against Mocaral M.
Macawiag and her children, for claim, declaration, change of name, and issuance of new duplicate
certificate of title of mahr with damages and attorneys fees, before the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court,
Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Iligan City. Private respondent prayed that:

1. The said house and lot is Mahr property and absolutely owned by and both possession
and name be transferred to the Moddai (plaintiff) and her children;
 
2. The name appeared (sic) in the certificate of title of said house and lot be
changed from Sarimanoc Macawiag to the Moddais name and her children;
 
3. The Register of Deeds of Iligan City be ordered to issue duplicate certificate
of title while still in the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag, and new Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of the new owner, the Moddai and her children;
 
4. That the Moddaalai (defendant) shall be ordered to pay moral damages of
P5,000.00, exemplary damages of P5,000.00, attorneys fee of P20,000.00, plus P500.00
per appearances (sic) in the court in the total amount of at least P30,500.00 and
compensatory damages as maybe (sic) proved in the course of the trial plus cost;
 
And such other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable on the premises.[6]

Prior to the filing of the dawa, Pangampong Macawiag executed an affidavit of loss of the title
covering the subject house and lot. The Register of Deeds of Iligan City thereafter issued a new
duplicate certificate of title.

In their Answer,[7] petitioner and her children admitted the fact of marriage between private
respondent and Pangampong Macawiag. However, they denied that the mahr consists of P20,000.00
cash, one head of live carabao and the house and lot subject matter of the present controversy. They
alleged instead that the dowry in consideration of their marriage was cash in the amount of P5,000.00.
They, likewise, averred that the title to the house and lot had not been lost; rather, it was in the
possession of Antonio Camama, having been used as collateral for a loan of P500,000.00. Moreover,
out of the P500,000.00 loan, P400,000.00 was given to Pangampong Macawiag which he used to buy a
vehicle and merchandise and subject to the condition that the amortization would be paid. Since
Pangampong Macawiag failed to pay, petitioner took possession of the vehicle.

During the hearing before the Sharia Circuit Court, private respondent presented the following
witnesses: Imam Mahmod Ganzo, who testified that before he solemnized the marriage, he asked the
representatives of the parties if the mahr had been agreed upon, and the mother of the bride and the
bridegroom said that per agreement, the mahr consists of the P20,000.00 cash, the head of a live
carabao, and the subject house and lot;[8] Pangampong Macawiag, who confirmed the above
testimony and further testified that his marriage to private respondent was duly registered with the
Office of the Sharia Circuit Court Registrar which also specified the amount of mahr under Registry
No. 98-137, and that his father Sarimanoc Macawiag specified in writing that the house and lot had
been set aside as his mahr;[9] Diora Dimacaling, the mother of the private respondent who witnessed
the celebration of the marriage between Pangampong Macawiag and private respondent, and
corroborated the testimonies of the two witnesses;[10] and private respondent herself who likewise

confirmed the testimonies of the first three witnesses.[11]

When she testified, petitioner denied that it was announced during the celebration of the
marriage that the mahr included the subject house and lot, and that it was mortgaged to Antonio
Camama who now possessed the title to the property.[12] Antonio Camama testified that the subject
house and lot was mortgaged to him, subject to the condition that if Sarimanoc Macawiag and
petitioner could not comply with the agreement, the mortgage would be considered as a sale. In view of
the non-fulfillment of the agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Sarimanoc Macawiag
in his (Antonios) favor. He stated that Pangampong Macawiag knew of such transaction, and that the
transfer certificate of title covering the subject house and lot was in his possession.[13] Tocod
Macawiag, Papiel Macawiag, Disimban Didato, and Tadmera Gandamato testified that there was no
house and lot mentioned as part of the dowry.[14]

 
 On April 13, 2000, the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court rendered a decision[15] in favor of
petitioner and her children. The fallo of the decision reads:

 
WHEREFORE, the house and lot with an area of 300 square meters located at
Mahayahay, Iligan City, registered in the name of the deceased Sarimanok Macawiag
under Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. T-28, 147 (a.f.) is not a part of the fixed
dower (mahr musama) given to Soraida A. Macawiag, herein plaintiff, in connection
with her marriage to Pangampong Macawiag.
 
Plaintiff is hereby directed to pay defendants P40,000.00 in attorneys fees and
the cost of this proceedings.
 
SO ORDERED.[16]

In finding that the subject house and lot was not part of private respondents mahr, the Circuit
Court ruled that, in the first place, she never acted as owner of the house and lot allegedly given to her
as dowry. Even if there was a fixed dowry, it never included the house and lot under litigation, which
happens to be registered under the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag. Moreover, the Circuit Court
observed that private respondents claim that the subject house and lot was part of her fixed dowry had
not been annotated on the title to the property despite the lapse of considerable length of time.[17]

Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the Sharia District Court, which, on March 14, 2003,
reversed the decision of the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court. The fallo reads:

 
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is REVERSED and another one entered:
 
(1) DECLARING plaintiff Soraida Abbas Macawiag the exclusive owner of the
house and lot, situated at Bo. Mahayahay, Iligan City, with an area of 300 square meters,
more or less covered by TCT No. T-28,147 (a.f.) which is still in the name of the late
Sarimanoc Macawiag, being her mahr;
 
(2) ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff (1) P25,000.00 as
attorneys fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs of suit.
 
 SO ORDERED.[18]
 

The Sharia District Court ruled that one of the essential requisites of a marriage contract is the
stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. It is both an
inalienable and imprescriptible right which the wife can demand from her husband. It is inalienable in
the sense that even if not expressly stated in the contract of marriage, is nevertheless due to the wife
and is not lost through prescription.[19] It further held that the positive testimonies of the witnesses for
private respondent should prevail over the negative testimonies of petitioner and her children. The
court gave credence to the testimony of the Imam, belonging as he does to the group of the learned (the
ulama). Lastly, the district court found that even if the property was used as collateral for a loan by the
late Sarimanoc Macawiag, private respondent can still recover the same since the transaction involving
her property is null and void (insofar as the private respondent is concerned).[20]

Petitioner now comes before this Court in this special civil action for certiorari, on the sole
ground of whether

 
JUDGE BALINDONG ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR EXCESS IN THE EXERCISE
THEREOF WHEN HE REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE SHARIA CIRCUIT
COURT AND DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[21]
 
 

Petitioner insists that the ruling of the Court in People v. Bundang[22] is not applicable in this
case, since as against the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the statements of the
accused, the former ordinarily deserves more credence than the latter. In such case, mere
preponderance of evidence will suffice.[23]

Petitioner alleges that the Sharia Circuit Court already weighed the testimonial and
documentary evidence, and found preponderance of evidence in favor of petitioner; as such, this ruling
should have been respected and upheld by the Sharia District Court. Petitioner questions the credibility
of the testimonies of Pangampong Macawiag and private respondent, as their testimonies are false.[24]
Petitioner likewise questions the authenticity of the Deed of Donation signed by Sarimanoc Macawiag
involving the subject house and lot[25] and the two (2) sets of Certificates of Marriage and Municipal
Forms (Nos. 97-31 and 98-131) registered with the Civil Registrar. Petitioner, likewise, questions the
findings of the Sharia District Court on the credibility of Imam Ganzo.[26]

In her Comment,[27] private respondent contends that the petition was filed out of time; it,
likewise, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts since it should have been filed before the CA.
[28] Moreover, private respondent points out that petitioner is not assailing the very jurisdiction of the
Sharia District Court, but only its findings of facts; this is a ground for an appeal and not a petition for
certiorari.[29] Lastly, private respondent claims that petitioner is trying to mislead the Court by
including in her petition annexes/documents which were not appreciated and passed upon by the Sharia
Circuit Court.[30]

Petitioner counters that the petition was timely filed because she received the order denying her
motion for reconsideration on May 29, 2003; thus, she had sixty (60) days therefrom or until July 29,
2003. Before the period expired, she filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or until August
13, 2003 within which to file the petition. Having filed the petition on August 12, 2003, it is within the
requested period of extension, and thus filed on time. Petitioner, likewise, claims that the rule on
hierarchy of courts was not violated, in view of the rule on finality of decision set forth in P.D. No.
1083.[31] As to the questioned documents presented before this Court, petitioner admits that they were

not presented during the hearing before the Sharia Circuit Court.[32]

The parties submitted their respective Memoranda where they reiterated their earlier arguments.

The petition is dismissed.

The decision sought to be reviewed was rendered by the Sharia District Court which is thus
governed primarily by special laws. Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 6734, An Act Providing for the
Organic Act For the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9054 or
the New Organic Law for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, provides:

The Sharia Appellate Court shall:

xxxx

b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Sharia
District Courts as established by law.[33]

While the Supreme Court en banc authorized the creation of the Sharia Appellate Court, it has
not yet been organized; in any case, it should begin with the appointments of the Presiding Justice and
two Associate Justices. Consequently, aggrieved parties can come up only to this Court in view of the
rule set forth in Article 145 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, viz:

Article 145. Finality of decisions. The decisions of the Sharia District Courts
whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein
contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in the Constitution.
 

The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution is
not altered. Specifically, this refers to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[34] It likewise refers to the
power of the Supreme Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue[35] and all cases in which only an error or question of

law is involved.[36]

In fine, the decisions of the Sharia District Courts may reach the Supreme Court by way of
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if there is a question of jurisdiction, or petition
for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45.
 From the circumstances surrounding the present case, as well as the allegations set forth in the
petition, the remedy available to petitioner is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Indeed, when a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter
of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a
special civil action for certiorari.[37]

The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of
appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-
exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal
are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are
mutually exclusive.[38] Consequently, when petitioner filed her petition in this Court, the decision of
the Sharia District Court was already final and executory.

In view of the foregoing, as much as we want to review the merits of the petition, we are
constrained by the procedural lapse which this Court cannot ignore. When a decision becomes final and
executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the
power to review a judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation
and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
[39] Moreover, the complaint filed before the Sharia Circuit Court included as defendants the children
of Mocaral Macawiag, who are the heirs of the late Sarimanoc Macawiag. On the other hand, the
present petition was filed only by Mocaral Macawiag without the inclusion of the other parties.
Considering that the other heirs of Sarimanoc are indispensable parties who had not been impleaded
below, the Court is further prevented from previewing the merits of the case.
 Admittedly, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of justice, this Court has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45,[40] but not when the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for

review and without offering any reason therefor.[41]

The Court ruled in Sebastian v. Morales[42] that:

Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal

construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or
disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale
in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as
often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in

accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and
justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when
for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to
a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.[43]
 

The fact that petitioner used the Rule 65 modality as a substitute for a lost appeal is made plain
by the following:

First. While the petition was filed within the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, it
was nevertheless filed beyond the 15-day period for filing a petition for review. As earlier stated,
petitioner received the order denying her motion for reconsideration on May 29, 2003. She thus had
until June 13, 2003 within which to file the petition, but instead of doing so, filed on July 24, 2003, a
motion for extension of time[44] to file petition for certiorari. The Court granted the motion in a
Resolution dated September 1, 2003. Thus, on August 12, 2003, which is within the extension period,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
 Second. The petition makes specious allegations of grave abuse of discretion but questions the
credibility of witnesses and the authenticity of documents that were either presented during the trial of
the case before the Sharia Circuit Court or submitted for the first time before this Court. In short,
petitioner seeks the review of the factual findings of the courts below. Admittedly, the Court has, in
previous cases, reviewed the factual findings of the Sharia District Court.[45] However, the petitioners
in these cases came before this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an
original action for certiorari as in the present case.

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited
to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond
its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-
judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; an error of jurisdiction is one where the
acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.[46] Indeed, judicial review does
not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof.[47] An examination of these issues would require the elevation of the records below, which
cannot be done in the present case.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
 Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

 
 

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION
  

FOUZIY* ALI BONDAGJY, G.R. No. 170406

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CORONA,***
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

SABRINA ARTADI,**

Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

This is not the first time that the parties, Fouziy Ali Bondagjy (petitioner) and his
wife Sabrina Artadi (respondent), resort to this Court to resolve yet another controversy
between them,[1] one which calls for the resolution of a seeming procedural stalemate
over the dissolution of their connubial bond.

Petitioner and respondent were married in accordance with Islamic Law on

February 4, 1988 at the Manila Hotel.[2] After a few years, the marital union soured.
Respondent soon filed in or about March 1996 a complaint for divorce by faskh[3]
before the Third Sharia Circuit Court at Isabela, Basilan[4] where it was docketed as
SCC Case No. 541, alleging as ground therefor petitioners neglect or failure to provide
support since October 1994.

After what the Third Sharia Circuit Court described as a careful evaluation of the
pleadings of the parties consisting of respondents Petition, petitioners Answer to
Affirmative Defenses, and the Reply of petitioner, said court, by Order[5] of June 24,
1996, dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:

[T]he grounds relied upon by herein plaintiff in her petition for divorce against
herein defendant does [sic] not exist as of the moment and not to mentioned [sic] the
fact that herein plaintiff is not actually a resident of Zamboanga City. Nonetheless, it is
very clear that herein defendant could have not provided support and
companionship to herein plaintiff and their children. The fact that herein defendant
brought his wife to Saudi Arabia wherein she operated a fashion shop with the help of
herein defendant and that their children was born in Saudi Arabia is a clear
manifestation that herein defendant cared for his wife and their children and could have
not neglected them in Saudi Arabia in his own place and not to mentioned [sic] the fact
that herein defendant belongs to a respectable family in Saudi Arabia and herein
defendant being an arab muslim knows very well that it is a great sin not to provide
support and companionship to his wife and children as head of the family.
 
The grounds for the petition for divorce as alleged in the complaint of herein
plaintiff are mere allegations without evidences to support them. (Emphasis and
 underscoring supplied)
 

Respondents motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied.[6] The
dismissal order became final and executory, respondent not having appealed the same.

Close to two years thereafter or on March 20, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, custody and support before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City. The petition was, by Order of January 28, 1999,
[7] dismissed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties, they
being Muslims at the time of the marriage, and res judicata in view of the above-said
dismissal order of the Third Sharia Circuit Court.[8]

Six years later or on February 7, 2005, respondent filed another petition[9] for
divorce by faskh before the Second Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2005-111, on the grounds of neglect and failure of petitioner
to provide support and to perform his marital obligations.[10]

Petitioner raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata, lack of jurisdiction over
the person of respondent, and forum-shopping.[11]

Finding the affirmative defenses, except lack of jurisdiction, persuasive, and after
considering the respective memoranda of the parties, the Second Sharia Circuit Court
dismissed respondents petition by Order of June 22, 2005[12] on the ground of res
judicata and failure to comply with the rule on forum shopping.

Respondent appealed to the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court at Marawi City
which, by the present challenged Decision of October 17, 2005, ruled that res judicata
does not apply in the case at bar since respondent may have new evidence to prove that
she is indeed entitled to divorce. Brushing aside the Second Sharia Circuit Courts
finding that respondent failed to comply with the rule on forum-shopping, the Fourth
Sharias Judicial District Court held:

xxxx
 
Under oath, [petitioner] has substantially complied with Section 5, Rule 7, Rules
of Court. In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that while the required certificate of non-
forum shopping is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional. (Robern Development Corporation
v. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150)
 
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
 

The Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court accordingly overturned the dismissal
order of, and remanded the case, to the Second Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on the
merits. Hence, the present petition raising the issue of

WHETHER . . . THE [FOURTH] SHARIA DISTRICT COURT OF MARAWI

CITY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE SECOND SHARIA
CIRCUIT COURT OF MARAWI CITY THAT A) CIVIL CASE [NO.] 2005-111 IS
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT [OR] RES JUDICATA IN CIVIL CASE [NO.] 541
WHICH WAS DECIDED WITH FINALITY ON MARCH 5, 1996 [sic], INVOLVING
THE SAME PARTIES AND ISSUES, AND B) NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULE ON CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
  

Petitioner contends that the Fourth Sharia District Court erred in remanding the
case to the Second Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on the merits, the former not having
even found in the pleadings any new evidence to support respondents petition for
divorce by faskh. And he asserts that, as it was respondent who refused to cohabit with
him, he cannot be faulted for failing to support her and their children.[13]

Petitioner further asserts that respondents petition filed before the Second Sharia
Circuit Court did not contain the required certification of non-forum shopping, and if
there was one, it failed to disclose the priorly filed civil case for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage which was dismissed by Branch 256 of the RTC of Muntinlupa for
lack of jurisdiction and res judicata.[14]

The petition fails.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment
or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be, as between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
[15]

 
 The presence of the first three requisites is not disputed. The Third Sharia Circuit
Court had jurisdiction over the first complaint-SCC Case No. 541, for divorce by faskh.
And it had rendered a decision on the merits, which decision had become final.

It is with respect to the presence of the fourth requisite that there is identity of
causes of action in SCC Case No. 541 and Civil Case No. 2005-111 that the decision of
the present petition hinges. The Court finds no such identity of causes of action.

The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of
action.[16] If the same evidence would sustain both actions, they are considered the
same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent
action.

Under P.D. No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the court may decree
a divorce by faskh, upon petition of the wife, on any of the following grounds:

(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at
least six consecutive months;
 
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment
for at least one year;
 
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable
cause his marital obligation in accordance with this code;
  
(d) Impotency of the husband;
 
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would
make the continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;
 
(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article;
or
 
(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage
by faskh either at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.[17] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 

The material allegations in respondents petition in SCC Case No. 541 are:

xxxx
 
9. As a matter of fact, it was only her income from this business in Jeddah that
was used by the plaintiff to support her and family [sic] and sometimes even the mother
of the defendant;
 
10. Plaintiff has begged many times the defendant to attend to his family and
perform his function and role as a father and husband but was never fulfilled by the
defendant;
 
11. On account of the continued absences and complete disregard of the
defendant of his obligation to the plaintiff and their children, plaintiff decided to
come back to the Philippines after six (6) years of their married life with their
children sometime in October 1993 and stayed with plaintiffs mother;
 
xxxx
 
13. On the other hand, despite the fact that defendant refused to perform a
divorce by thalaq to the plaintiff, defendant also continuously failed and refused to
give financial support, companionship as well as love and affection to the plaintiff
and her children even up to the present time[.][18]
 
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
  

The material allegations in respondents petition in Civil Case No. 2005-111

subject of the present case are:

xxxx

10. That while Petitioners earlier attempts in seeking divorce failed, the
Respondent harassed and coerced her by filing unfounded cases which added to the
Petitioners worries and anxieties;
 
11. That the Petitioner is willing to narrate before this Honorable Court the
untold sufferings and pain that she had incurred during her years of marriage with the
Respondent, which would justify the issuance of a Divorce by Faskh as provided for in
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws;
 
12. That since then, the Respondent has failed and continuously failed to
perform his legal, moral and religious obligations to support the Petitioner and her
children for a period of more than ten (10) years;[19]
 
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 

From the foregoing material allegations in the two petitions, the Court finds that
the causes of action are based on different periods during which petitioner allegedly
neglected or failed to support his family and perform his marital obligations.

 
 SCC Case No. 541 which was dismissed on June 24, 1996 covered the period
prior to March 1996 (the date of its filing), while Civil Case No. 2005-111 subject of the
present petition which was filed on February 7, 2005 covered the period in the interim.
In other words, in the first case, petitioners alleged negligence and/or failure to support
and perform his marital obligations occurred at least six months before March 1996.
Whereas in the second case, similar grounds-bases of the cause of the action occurred at
least six months before February 7, 2005. The causes of action in the two cases are thus
independent of each other, the circumstances relating to non-support and non-
performance of marital obligations being disparate.

Respondent would thus have to present evidence to support her petition in Civil
Case No. 2005-111 filed on February 7, 2005 that petitioner had, after the dismissal of
SCC Case No. 541 on June 24, 1996 and for at least six months prior to February 7,
2005, continuously failed to perform his . . . obligations to support [her] and her
children, independently of any evidence which may have been appreciated by the judge
in SCC Case No. 541. It bears emphasis at this juncture that the Third Sharia Circuit
Court, in dismissing SCC Case No. 541, merely evaluated the pleadings submitted by
the parties, following which it concluded that the grounds relied upon by herein
[respondent] . . . does [sic] not exist as of the moment and not to mentioned [sic] the fact
that [she] is not actually a resident of Zamboanga City. (Underscoring supplied). In so
doing, the said court applied the third paragraph of Section 6 of the Special Rules of
Procedure in Sharia Courts[20] reading:

SEC. 6. PRE-TRIAL. (1) x x x.

xxxx
 
 (3) SHOULD THE COURT FIND, UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE
PLEADINGS, EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDA, THAT A JUDGMENT MAY BE
RENDERED WITHOUT NEED OF A FORMAL HEARING, THE COURT MAY
DO SO WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE CASE
FOR DECISION.
 
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 

To reiterate, the Third Sharia Circuit Court decided SCC Case No. 541 merely on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties.

In a similar vein, the Second Sharia Circuit Court denied respondents petition in
Civil Case No. 2005-111 only after conducting a hearing of the affirmative defenses and
a consideration of the memoranda submitted by the parties in connection therewith. In
other words, the two courts did not conduct a formal hearing of respondents petitions.

The findings of the Second Sharia Circuit Court were at best superficial, however,
given the distinctiveness of Sharia Court procedures. Thus, under Muslim Procedural
Law, the Sharia court is mandated to adhere to sources of Muslim Law relating to the
number, status or quality of witnesses, and evidence required to prove any fact, and to
apply the Rules of Court only suppletorily.[21]

By and large, jurisprudence on Muslim Law recognizes three kinds of evidence:

first, shahadah or testimonial evidence; second, igrar or admission; and third, yamin or
oath.[22] Documentary evidence is considered outside the mode of proofs (i.e.,
testimony, admission and oath), but at times accepted as substitute for oral testimony.
[23]

Muslim Law thus places a premium on testimonial evidence as mode of proof.

This unique legal precept a fortiori applies in the case at bar. For neglect or failure to
provide support and to perform ones marital obligations requires proof by substantial
evidence, not by inference as what the judge of the Third Sharia Circuit Court did as
reflected in the earlier-quoted portions of his June 24, 1996 Order. Not infrequently, the
testimonies and contra-declarations of the parties, the children or their witnesses are
secured to prove their respective allegations and defenses.

Petitioners contention that respondent failed to adduce documentary evidence to

prove her claim does not thus lie.

Respecting the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Courts challenged conclusion that
respondent had substantially complied with the requirement of Section 5 of Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, the fourth paragraph of respondents Verification of her petition in Civil
Case No. 2005-111 which reads:

xxxx
 
4. That except for the earlier petition for divorce which was dismissed, there
is no other similar case now pending with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or
before any other court or tribunal; that should I discover that there is such of similar
nature and character, I will promptly inform this Honorable Court.[24]
 
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
  

bears it out. The sworn certification need not be in a separate segment. Thus, Section 5
of Rule 7 provides:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party

shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

As for the omission by respondent to include in the certification the dismissal of

the annulment case she filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, it is not fatal. An
omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be prevented by the
said certification are not present.[25]

As priorly discussed, the order dismissing SCC Case No. 541 does not constitute
res judicata on Civil Case No. 2005-111 subject of the present case. Nor does the order
dismissing Civil Case No. 98-070, an action for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. For the grounds for nullity of marriage
under the Family Code are dissimilar to the grounds for divorce by faskh under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws. Besides, Civil Case No. 98-070 was, in the main, dismissed
by the RTC of Muntinlupa for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and of
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.

The October 17, 2005 Decision of the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court at Marawi
City is AFFIRMED.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, the Second
Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City, which is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 2005-
111 in its docket and to conduct further proceedings thereon with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
 

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
 Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

 
 LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO G.R. No. 174975
MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-
BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN,

Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CORONA,
SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING AZCUNA, and
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Respondents.

Promulgated:

JANUARY 20, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:
 

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court,

Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006 [1] and September 21, 2006.[2]

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr.

at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. [3] Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth

Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children. [4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro

Montaer, Sr. died.[5]

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District

Court.[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates
and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho

Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05. [7] In the said
complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died;
(2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling
Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent;

and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. [8] Private
respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the

estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. [9]

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia
District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman
Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents
complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and

the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. [10]

On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The
district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the

settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. [11]

 On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [12] On December 28,
2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for

reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. [13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied

petitioners opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice of hearing,
the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading,

and it took cognizance of the said motion. [15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion

for reconsideration.[16]

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of

dismissal dated November 22, 2005. [17] The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further

evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the

continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. [19]

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS
WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A
NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE
FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
 IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF
PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS
LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A NOTICE OF
HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR
TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must
be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to

determine whether it has jurisdiction. [20]

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of

fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that

there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that

the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however,

set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the

Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement

of the estate of deceased Muslims:

 ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the

relief sought in the complaint or petition. [21] The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not
necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or

defective caption, courts are guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings. [22]

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a
Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for

the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as
well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs
prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of

the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent;
and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have

jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is

not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon

the defenses set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend

almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings
unduly delayed by simple stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a

question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction. [29]

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. [30] In the case at bar, the Sharia

District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that

the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to

determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim.

If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district

court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia
District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia
District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the

rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow

them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. [32]
Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party

defendant in a civil action [33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a

right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong [34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the

plaintiff or defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a

status, right, or a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a
status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the
estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the

settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, [37] pay its liabilities,[38]

and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same. [39]

Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is

untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which

contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private

respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)

whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the

correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court

with jurisdiction over the subject matter. [40] If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount

for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making

a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. [41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will

not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient

assessment of the docket fees.[42] As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer

charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party

filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment. [43] However, the party

concerned will be required to pay the deficiency. [44]

 In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover,

the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents

correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia
District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present
case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing

by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. [45] The Rules also provide that

no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. [46]
However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing

a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [47] Moreover, this Court has
upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained

therein.[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on

technicalities.[49]

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to
be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the
law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will
result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because
the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of

hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected. [50] The purpose for the

notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process, [51] for the court to determine whether the adverse
party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or

opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. [53] In the case at bar, as evident from the
Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for
reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in
the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said
motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of
hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in

relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. [54] The court, in its

capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. [55] In the case at
bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of
whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22,
2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 
WE CONCUR:

 
 

 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC
 

 
SULTAN YAHYA JERRY M. G.R. No. 182434

TOMAWIS,

Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA BRION,

A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A.
PERALTA,*
MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A.
MUSOR, BERSAMIN,

Respondents. DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to
nullify the Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 issued
by respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Sharia District Court (SDC), Fourth
Judicial District in Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A. Pumbaya, et
al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al.

The Facts

Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A.

Musor are the daughters of the late Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private
respondents filed with the SDC an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located
in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda
Radia. In their complaint, styled as Petition[1] and docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97,
private respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged the following:
 

(1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the
legal heirs of Acraman Radia, who had always been in peaceful, continuous, and
adverse possession of the property; (2) Tomawis assumed ownership of the said
property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn,
claimed that he inherited it from his late father; (3) in 1996, they were informed that
their land [was] leveled and the small houses [built] thereon with their permission
were removed upon the orders of Tomawis; and (4) they had been unlawfully deprived
of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their
title.

In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters claim of ownership and raised, as
one of his affirmative defenses treated by the court as a motion to dismiss, SDCs lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.[2] As argued, the regular civil court, not
SDC, had such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.[3]

Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge Rasad

Balindong, by Order of April 1, 2003, denied the motion. Apropos the jurisdiction
aspect of the motion, respondent judge asserted the SDCs original jurisdiction over the
case, concurrently with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article 143,
paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines.

On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to
Correct the Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya Jerry M. Tomawis & Mangoda
M. Radia.[4] In it, he alleged that title to or possession of real property or interest in it
was clearly the subject matter of the complaint which, thus, brought it within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts in consonance with existing law. [5]
On July 13, 2005, the SDC denied this motion to dismiss.

Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with

Prayer to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the
Pending Incident.[6] Per Order[7] dated September 6, 2005, the SDC denied Tomawis
urgent motion for reconsideration and ordered the continuation of trial.

Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, on

a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify, on
jurisdictional grounds, the aforesaid SDC July 13, 2005 and September 6, 2005 Orders.

By Resolution[8] of February 8, 2006, the appellate court dismissed the petition

on the ground that the CA was not empowered to resolve decisions, orders or final
judgments of the [SDCs]. Justifying its disposition, the CA held that, pursuant to Art.
145[9] of PD 1083, in relation to Art. VIII, Section 9[10] of Republic Act No. (RA) 9054,
[11] the new organic law of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, final
decisions of the SDC are reviewable by the yet to be established Sharia Appellate Court.
Pending the reorganization of the Sharia Appellate Court, the CA ruled that such
intermediate appellate jurisdiction rests with the Supreme Court.

Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis interposed, on

January 29, 2008, before the SDC another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as
his previous motions to dismiss. The motion was rejected by respondent Judge
Balindong per his order of February 6, 2008, denying the motion with finality.

Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS.
 
 
 

Simply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 102-97.

 
 
 
 
  
 

The Courts Ruling

Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in
1989 of the law[12] creating the Sharia Appellate Court and after the Court, per
Resolution of June 8, 1999,[13] authorized its creation, the Sharia Appellate Court has
yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate
Justices. Until such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have been organized,
however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the
CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations
preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.

For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.

To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved
petitions and cases emanating from Sharia courts. Among these was one involving the
issue of whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of a motion to
implement a writ of execution.[14] Still another involved the Sharia courts jurisdiction
in custody and guardianship proceedings,[15] nullity of marriage and divorce when the
parties were both married in civil and Muslim rites,[16] and settlement of estate
proceedings where the deceased was alleged to be not a Muslim,[17] or where the
estate covered properties situated in different provinces.[18]

The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the
SDC over a complaint for quieting of title, was properly instituted before the Court.

Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as

amendedby vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs or Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs), as the case may be, over civil actions that involve the title to, or possession of,
real propertyeffectively removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC
under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art. 143 of PD 1083,
insofar as it granted the SDC concurrent jurisdiction over certain real actions, was
repealed by the BP 129 provisions adverted to.

Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion of the

implied repeal petitioner espouses, arguing that PD 1083, being a special, albeit a prior,
law, has not been repealed by BP 129. Putting private respondents contention in a
narrower perspective, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific applicability and, hence,
cannot, under the rules of legal hermeneutics, be superseded by laws of general
application, absent an express repeal.

 
 Petitioners claim has no basis.

The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the

elimination of the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership[19] on the subject land, are
within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant.

A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted on June 17,
1948. It vested the Courts of First Instance with original jurisdiction:

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible
entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this
Act upon city and municipal courts.[20] x x x

Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Sharia courts, i.e.,
the SDC and the Sharia Circuit Court, both of limited jurisdiction. In Republic v.
Asuncion,[21] the Court, citing the Administrative Code of 1987,[22] classified Sharia
courts as regular courts, meaning they are part of the judicial department.

Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original
jurisdiction and with concurrent original jurisdiction over certain causes of action. As
far as relevant, Art. 143 reads as follows:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Sharia District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they
have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and

xxxx

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Sharia District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis
added.)

On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later amended by
RA 7691,[23] defining the jurisdiction of the RTCs, provides:

 
 Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)

As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of
PD 1083, original jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal
and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties
involved were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is
founded on privity of contracts between the parties;[24] and in which the plaintiff
usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or
recovery of damages.[25] Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored on the privity
of real estate,[26] where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of
real property or interest in it.[27]

On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial
court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or
possession of real property, or any interest in it, and the value of the property subject
of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within
the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v. Orbeta[28]
differentiated personal action from real action in the following wise:

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and
tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are personal and may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is
basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property
which, under BP 129, as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC
or MTC. In an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are
two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to
the disputed land, namely: (1) that the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has
possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2) that the defendant has illegally
dispossessed the plaintiff of the land.[29] A cursory perusal of private respondents
complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met: they alleged
absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and they were illegally dispossessed
of their land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an
action for reconveyance.

 
 Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the
jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC.

Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original
jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts
over, among others:

 
All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x x

Petitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must
bear in mind that even if Sharia courts are considered regular courts, these are courts
of limited jurisdiction. As we have observed in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih,[30] the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws creating said courts was promulgated to fulfill the aspiration
of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities. It is
a special law intended for Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:

ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of

the Philippines, which provides that The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs
and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state
policies, this Code:

(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of
the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions more effective;
  

(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and

(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws
among Muslims.

A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the
former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not
repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Sharia
courts.

A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were not included
in the reorganization of courts that were formerly organized under RA 296. The
pertinent provision in BP 129 states:

SECTION 2.    Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the
Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts,
the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Courts. 

As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment,[31] BP 129

was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application
to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.

 
 We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are
statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with
a view to giving effect to both.[32] In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia
specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law
will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.
[33] We must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083
as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the
legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-
settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.[34] Implied repeals will
not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be
passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a
former law relating to the same subject matter.[35]

In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.[36] Jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.[37] In the instant case, private respondents
petition[38] in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the SDC.
  

While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with
respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over
all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims[39] to the exclusion of the
RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art.
143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim,[40] who may be the opposing
party against a Muslim.

Given petitioners flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent court did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there
is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; or
a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking from
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross for the act to be held as one
made with grave abuse of discretion.[41] We find respondent courts issuance of the
assailed orders justified and with no abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the provisions
of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and unassailable.

We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of
law, but also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner
Tomawis counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss, each predicated on the sole
issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion
was something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis
petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to
review judgments or orders of the SDC. The CA stated the observation, however, that
Tomawis and his counsel may repair to this Court while the Sharia Appellate Court has
yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the CA issued its denial before
filing what virtually turned out to be his second motion to dismiss, coming finally to this
Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must express disapproval of the
cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt to prolong
the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor,[42] almost a century-old
decision, the Court has left no doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The
rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time, even
on appeal, provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of
fair play.[43] Petitioners action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless
taken upon counsels advice, is less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct.
Lawyers and litigants must be brought to account for their improper conduct, which
trenches on the efficient dispensation of justice.

 
  

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner Yahya Jerry
Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A. Masorong are ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in
activities tending to frustrate the orderly and speedy administration of justice, with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the imposition of a
more severe sanction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

 
 

 
 

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
 

THIRD DIVISION

 
 ROSEMARIE SALMA G.R. No. 169627
ARAGONCILLO-MOLOK,

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
SITY AISA BARANGAI MOLOK,

Respondent. Promulgated:

April 6, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Sity Aisa Barangai Molok (respondent) and Col. Agakhan M. Molok, both
residents of Matina, Davao City, contracted marriage[1] on June 29, 1992, solemnized
by Judge Virginia Hofilena-Europa at the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Ecoland,
Matina, Davao City. The marriage was registered at the Local Civil Registrar of Davao
City under Registry No. 1495 on July 3, 1992.

On November 20, 2003, Agakhan Molok, then a member of the Philippine Army,
died in General Santos City.

When respondent went to the Philippine Army office to claim the death benefits
of her late husband, she discovered that there was another claimant, Rosemarie Salma
Aragoncillo-Molok (petitioner), a resident of Poblacion, Pikit, Cotabato, who declared
herself as the wife of Agakhan Molok by virtue of a Certificate of Marriage[2] executed
on May 20, 1999 in Taguig, Metro Manila. The marriage, which was purportedly
solemnized by Imam Ustadz Moha-imen Ulama under Muslim rites carried out at the
Manila Golden Mosque and Cultural Center, Globo de Oro St., Quiapo, Manila,[3] was
registered before the Sharia District Court Muslim Civil Registrar of Zamboanga City
under Registry No. 25901 on June 14, 2004.[4]

Upon inquiry, respondent found out that there was no record of the second
marriage, per Certification[5] dated August 14, 2004 by Manila Golden Mosque and
Cultural Center Administrator Rakman T. Ali, Al Haj. She also discovered that the
solemnizing officer, Ustadz Moha-imen Ulama, never solemnized the supposed
marriage of petitioner and Agakhan Molok, as stated in his Affidavit[6] dated May 4,
2004.

 
 Respondent thus filed on October 17, 2004 a verified petition[7] for cancellation
of registration of the alleged marriage of petitioner and Agakhan Molok before the Third
Sharia District Court of Zamboanga City, docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 01-04. The
petition, which was later amended[8] by impleading the Sharia District Court Registrar
of Zamboanga City and OIC Civil Registrar Duraida A. Abdulbakie, prayed that, after
notice and hearing:

1. the registration of the alleged marriage between COL. AGAKHAN M.

MOLOK and the Respondent, ROSEMARIE SALMA ARAGONCILLO, be
cancelled and rendered of no effect, such being done to deceive the government of
partaking of the claims of the heirs of COL. AGAKHAN M. MOLOK, aside from
being registered seven (7) months after the latters death;
 
2. the public respondents be ordered to rectify the records of the registry of
marriages by canceling the registry of the marriage between COL. MOLOK and the
private respondent;
 
3. the [private] Respondent be made to pay for the costs of this suit, attorneys
fees incurred by the Petitioner in the filing of this case in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, and appearance fees;
 
Such other relief and remedies as are just and equitable under the premises are
also prayed for.
 
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court, by
Order[9] of January 24, 2005, (1) set the hearing of the petition on March 28, 2005 at
8:30 in the morning at the Third Floor, Hall of Justice, Sta. Barbara, Zamboanga City;
(2) ordered all persons who oppose it to appear and show cause why the petition shall
not be granted; and (3) ordered the publication of the Order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga City, at the
expense of respondent, and the posting of copies of said Order in three conspicuous
public places for the information of all concerned.

After notices of the January 24, 2005 Order were sent to the parties,[10] petitioner
sent a letter[11] dated February 18, 2005 addressed to the Clerk of Court, Sharia District
Court, Zamboanga City, wherein she manifested her opposition to the grant of
respondents petition.

Petitioner later filed before the trial court a Manifestation (With prayer for
reconsideration of the January 25 [should be 24], 2005 Order)[12] dated March 16, 2005
which reads:

xxxx
 
Respondent alleges that:
 
She has not received any copy of the petition and the summons requiring her to
submit an Answer thereto;
 
Unless she is furnished with the copy of the petition and its exhibits,
respondent could not file a responsive pleading in accordance with the Rules;
 
It is only upon the filing of an Answer that the issues can be joined.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that an Order issue:
 
a. Directing the Clerk of Court to furnish the respondent with the copy of
the Petition together with its exhibits;
 
b. Setting aside the January 24, 2005 Order of the Court and require the
respondent [to] file responsive pleading and/or comments so that issues
can be joined;
 
 c.       Other relief.

Respectfully submitted.
 
x x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 

The trial court, however, did not act on petitioners Manifestation (With prayer for
reconsideration of the January 2[4], 2005 Order).

During the scheduled hearing of the petition on March 28, 2005, only respondent
and her counsel Atty. Hamid A. Barra appeared. Evidence showing compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of publication of the January 24, 2005 Order[13] and posting
of notices[14] was thereupon presented and respondent took the witness stand in support
of her petition.

By Decision[15] of June 28, 2005, the trial court found for respondent. It noted
that petitioner has not filed any formal opposition to petitioners petition pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 108 which provides:

Section 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last day of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
 

 
 Thus, the Sharia District Court disposed:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered the Muslim marriage between the

respondent Rosemarie Salma Aragoncillo and the late Col. Agakhan M. Molok covered
by Certificate of Marriage issued by the Third Sharia District Court Muslim Civil
Registrar of Zamboanga City under Registry No. 25901, dated June 14, 2004, is hereby
DECLARED as NULL and VOID, inexistent and without any legal effect whatsoever.
The Third Sharia District Court Muslim Civil Registrar of Zamboanga City is hereby
ORDERED to CANCEL from its registration book of marriage certificate Marriage
Registry No. 25901, dated June 14, 2004, by and between Rosemarie Salma Aragoncillo
and Agakhan M. Molok.
 
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis supplied)
 

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[17] which the trial court, by Order of
August 1, 2005, set for hearing on September 1, 2005.[18] No hearing was held on that
date, however, as it was a non-working Muslim holiday. The clerk of the trial court then
advised petitioner to wait for a notice of resetting of the hearing.[19]

It appears that no notice of resetting of petitioners motion for reconsideration was

issued. It turned out that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by Order of July 25, 2005[20] or before the originally scheduled hearing thereof
on September 1, 2005.

Hence, this direct recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari,
contending that, among other things, the trial court, in rendering its decision solely on
the basis of respondents petition, violated her constitutional right to due process.
  

Respondent, in her Comment, counters that petitioner was afforded due process
since she was notified of the hearing on the petition as she, in fact, prayed for a
reconsideration of the January 24, 2005 Order setting the petition for hearing, and had
manifested her opposition thereto. Her failure to file her opposition, respondent
concludes, was thus unwarranted.

The Court finds that petitioner was indeed denied her right to due process.

Petitioner was merely notified of the hearing of respondents petition on March 28,
2005 by Order of January 24, 2005. Neither respondent nor the trial court furnished
petitioner with a copy of respondents petition and its annexes, despite her plea therefor.

Indeed, when the trial court ignored her plea, through her Manifestation (With
prayer for reconsideration of the January 2[4], 2005 Order) dated March 16, 2005, that
she be furnished with a copy of respondents petition and its annexes so that she could
file her opposition thereto, petitioner was denied her day in court. Why petitioners plea
was unheeded, no reason was proffered by the trial court. It need not be underlined that
her plea was meritorious, given the adversarial nature of the proceedings under Rule
108.

 
 In raising the issue of denial of due process in petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the decision, the trial court, by Order of July 25, 2005,[21] did not
specifically address the same. Oddly, said Order was issued on July 25, 2005, when
petitioners motion for reconsideration was set for hearing yet on September 1, 2005,
albeit no hearing was held since; as stated earlier, it was a non-working Muslim holiday,
and despite the Clerk of Courts assurance that petitioner would be advised of the date of
resetting of the hearing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order

dated June 28, 2005 and July 25, 2005, respectively, of the Third Sharia District Court in
Spl. Proc. No. 01-04 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to
said court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 
  

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

 
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
  

SECOND DIVISION

 
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,
G.R. No.
Petitioner, 193902

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., 193908
Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,

Petitioner,
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming
the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal
Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No.
194075.

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

 
 On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic
rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on
April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil
rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained
a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit
District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce
on June 18, 1992, as follows:

DECREE OF DIVORCE

This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the
wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq,
as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they
have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.

This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior
to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and
 between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of

Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the
marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de
Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.

Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.

(signed)

HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL

Presiding Judge[3]

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As
she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked,
under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in
order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their
marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City.
However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her
and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum
turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former,
with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases

against Zamoranos, to wit:

1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31,
2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage,
alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to
Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b)
Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by
Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums
marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and
(d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor
children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in
the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum
by testate or intestate succession.

2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
  

3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and

disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service,
respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due course.
However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs
dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution.

Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum
contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.[4]

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor,
through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005,
finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.[5] Consequently, on
February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]

Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2,

2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the
acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos
motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.[7]
  

Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005
resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15,
2005.[8] Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.[9]

In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006,

issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2,
2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.[10] Zamoranos immediately
filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for
Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in
Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and
February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.[11] Unfortunately for Zamoranos,
her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
2006.[12]

Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions,

was likewise denied.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of
Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the
time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines:

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of
[Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a
bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and
Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and
[Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce by
Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x
their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can
re-marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband
Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being
unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into
by them under PD 1083.

Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on

December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the
validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned
Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice
Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the
case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as
between the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and
unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and
her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.

Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

Application

 
 The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.

Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings
shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.

Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:

Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction over:

xxxx

2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims
or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating
to:

a)      Marriage;

b)      Divorce recognized under this Code;

xxxx

The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil
courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court
is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.

 
 Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which
were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.

In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold
that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of
marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive
original jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of
motion to dismiss is hereby granted.

The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[13]

On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the
Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.[14]

In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion
of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.[15]

 
 Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing
that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the
offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as
Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the
inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all,
Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16]

On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion
to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise
denied.[17]

Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and
reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously
adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a
petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:

A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such,
it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The
aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no
grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

 
 Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow
in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as
one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as
opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction.

xxxx

In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e
found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to
[Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the
issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in
upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the
denial of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18]

Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of
Zamoranos petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and
Pacasum.

We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two
counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the
same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate
confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R.
No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
 Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions
made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:

1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De

Guzman, under Islamic rites;

2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before

Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;

3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman

severed their marriage ties;

4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos]

and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the]
divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia
Circuit Court.

5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and

6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have
no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage
entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos
petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum
vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and
divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him,
likewise under Islamic rites.

We impale the foregoing issues into the following:

1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and

2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual
findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.

As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[19]

The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of
courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.[20]

The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an

interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.[21]
  

Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.  The
established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the
case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law.[22]

However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain

situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of
the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;[23]
(d) to promote public welfare and public policy;[24] and (e) when the cases have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof.[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this
instance.

Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed
an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion
to quash.
  

First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the

conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his
marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is
already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the
regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit
Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res
judicata. The provision reads:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in

respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration,
or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of
a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence
of the death of the testator or intestate.

 
 The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.[26]

The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case.
Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a
judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear
the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy,
should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman,
was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared
that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart
from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:

1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto,

who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites,
declaring under oath that:

1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to

solemnize the marriages among Muslims;

2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are
believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta
(Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;

3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam
Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan;
and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of
[C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;

4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with
Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;

5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed,
was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office
equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;

6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of
fact; and
  

7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may
serve.

2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which

confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.

3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former

Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De
Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent
part:

1.      I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;

2.      The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan
was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then
the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;

3.      The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol
Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;

4.      As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr.
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former
wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by
the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1083;

 
 5.      In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire
that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;

6.      This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom
are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses
penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it
declared that:

The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia
Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested
the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court
has jurisdiction over this case.[30]

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to
De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact
of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a
second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the
very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of

Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered
into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her
liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings
against her.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and
effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies.
 

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have
jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.

Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II.

CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.

(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or
laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing
herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

 
 In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of
Muslim personal laws expound thereon:

The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this
Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict
between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general
application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the
sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Muslim
Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision
refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another
special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the
provision of the Muslim Code.[31]

On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Chapter One

APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

 
 (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

xxxx

Chapter Two

MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.

xxxx

Section 3. Subsequent Marriages

xxxx

Article 29. By divorcee.

(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an idda of
three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the
time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.

xxxx

Chapter Three

DIVORCE (TALAQ)

Section 1. Nature and Form

 

Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond
in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of
reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

xxxx

Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his
wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal
relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one
repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed idda.

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have
the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation
without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall
become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).

xxxx

Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;

(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;

 
 (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of
this Code;

(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in
case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half
thereof if effected before its consummation;

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and

(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be

dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely
ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will
apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law,
that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when
the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]

 
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the
effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.[33]

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as

confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by
Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for
the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R.
No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-
MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

 
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

 
 

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., G.R. No. 191425

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,*

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA,** JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 7, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

 
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30
September 2009 as well as the Resolution 3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court
of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19
November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-
accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information
against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the crime of
Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one
JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and
still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO,
who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.
 

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea.
Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was
held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:

1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat
Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;

2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino
on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted

the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of

Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted
in her Counter-Affidavit.

The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the second
marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were
as follows:

 
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King
Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband
has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in
November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P.

Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of
the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P.
Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors
and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew
of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant)
was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila
and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in
the house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died
and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in
Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of
P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant
to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro
Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew
of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still
went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN,
 October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:

Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim
convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or
Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August
2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a
Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also
presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and
the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant
and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does
not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was
a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his
first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president,
he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He
alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini
(Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a
Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated
regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his
development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification
because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of
Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more
than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and
fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if
the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October
9, 2006, pages 2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P.
Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa
 Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is
the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter
since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first
marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and
the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic
prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her
husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in
accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married
to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8).5

The Trial Courts Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article
417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court
also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which
provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o
Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases.

In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:

 
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife
subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not
encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer
M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any
Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia
Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the
wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to
Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not
comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the
private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes,
that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There
is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented
by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private
complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig,
Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation.
From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be
reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that (E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be
taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to
acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment
imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.9

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10

The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial
courts decision.11

 
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-
Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the
Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of
Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.

The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial
court.

Elements of Bigamy
 

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on
6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the
ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora
and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

 
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968
from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of
Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE,

BULACAN

a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO

MANILA (2nd District)19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the
proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the
provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.

x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by
the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;

(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or

(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the
judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the
Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable
place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties
(mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof
has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by
the court according to the social standing of the parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation
is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according
to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single.
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability
for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by
these omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]

Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992.
However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?

[NOLLORA:]

A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place any
Catholic there.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract
with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in
the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr.
Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my
being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt
approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
 

Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]

Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic
when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?

xxx

[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.

xxx

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure
the permission of your first wife to get married?
 

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was
always very mad, maam.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23
February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his
indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

 

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

 
 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1074 dated 6 September 2011.

** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1066 dated 23 August 2011.

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo, pp. 21-37. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.

3 Id. at 38. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Marlene
Gonzales-Sison, concurring.

4 CA rollo, pp. 26-33. Penned by Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.

5 Rollo, pp. 22-27.

6 CA rollo, pp. 26-33.

7 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

8 Article 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a
person married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or, before its effectivity, under Muslim law.

9 CA rollo, pp. 31-33.

10 Id. at 52.

11 Rollo, pp. 21-37.

12 Id. at 38.

13 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law 907 (1998).

14 Exhibit A, Records, p. 117.

15 TSN, 30 January 2006, p. 4.

16 Exhibit B, Records, p. 118. Also Article 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 (1988).

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

17 Exhibit A, Records, p. 117.

18 Exhibit B, id. at 118.

19 Exhibit C, id. at 119.

20 Id. at 195-198, 201, 206-207. Nollora presented various proofs of his Muslim affiliation:

Exhibit 1 and submarkings - Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines Membership Application Form
accomplished in handwritten form, dated 10 January 1992;

Exhibit 2 and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam dated 2 October 2004 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar
Madueo, President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines;

Exhibit 3 and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam dated 17 December 2003 issued by Abdullah M. Al-Hamid,
Director General of the Riyadh branch of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia;

Exhibits 4, 12 and 13 - Certificate of Conversion to Islam dated 17 December 2003 issued by the Civil Registry of
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur; and

Exhibit 7 and submarkings Nolloras Pledge of Conversion dated 10 January 1992 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar
Madueo, President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines.

21 Supra note 8.

22 TSN, 30 January 2006, pp. 11-12.

23 TSN, 29 May 2006, pp. 6, 9-10.

24 467 Phil. 723, 744 (2004).

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. SCC-01-7. March 12, 2002]

HADJA THITTIE M. ARAP, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMIR MUSTAFA, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Judge Amir Mustafa, presiding judge of the First Sharia
Circuit Court of Jolo, Sulu, for gross neglect of duty, ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming a
judge.

In a letter-complaint received by the Office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on March 17,
2000, complainant Hadja Thittie M. Arap alleged that respondent judge committed gross neglect of
duty, ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming a judge for failure to resolve Criminal Case No.
96-01,[1] filed on April 15, 1996 and submitted for resolution in the same year, but which remains
unresolved despite the rarity of cases filed in his court.[2] The complaint was endorsed to the then Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for appropriate action.[3] The Court Administrator required the
respondent judge to file a Comment which was done on June 19, 2000.

In his Comment, the respondent judge denies the allegations in the Complaint. He explains that
Criminal Case No. 96-01 was filed on April 15, 1996, but after he evaluated its allegations and referred
to P.D. 1083 and Islamic Law sources, i.e., the Quran and the Hadith of the Holy Prophet, he found the
allegations to be self-defeating, and, motu proprio dismissed of the case on June 11, 1996.[4]
Complainant Hadja Arap filed an appeal with the Sharia District Court (SDC) of Jolo, Sulu, which, in
an Order dated November 14, 1996, remanded the case to the respondent judges court for preliminary
investigation in accordance with Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.[5] On August 4, 1997,
Sisali Arap was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.[6] Trial followed and both parties presented their
witnesses. The case was submitted for resolution in October 1998.

The respondent judge admits that he came up with a Decision on the case on January 25, 2000, and the
same was promulgated on March 1, 2000.[7] To justify the delay, the respondent judge explains that he
found it difficult to reconcile the provisions of P.D. 1083 and those of the Quran and the Hadith of the
Holy Prophet, viz:

xxx The issues raised by both parties in this case calls for a reconciliation of the provisions of PD 1083
as well as the express provisions of the primary sources of Islamic Law, the Quran and the Hadith of
the Holy Prophet. As a judge of the Sharia Circuit Court, I found it difficult to reconcile these two
conflicting sources of provisions viz--viz (sic) with (sic) my personal conviction and belief as a
religious follower of Quranic teachings. It took me a considerable period of time to reflect, ponder,
inquire and seek assistance from Ulama or religious leaders who adhere to the basic teachings of the
Holy Quran, on the one hand, and fellow judges of the Sharia Courts and regular courts who is (sic)
more incline (sic) to follow the dictates of PD 1083, on the other hand. Their advices (sic) all the more
confused me taking into consideration my conviction as a Muslim and adherence of the Quranic
injunctions.[8]

He emphasizes that the delay in rendering a decision is not meant to violate any Court Circular
mandating the disposition of cases within the prescribed reglementary period; neither is the same
caused by negligence nor by a criminal resolve to delay the dispensation of justice; lastly, the delay is
not an indication of a conduct unbecoming of a judge. He likewise stresses that there is no truth in the
allegation that cases are rarely filed with his court. On the contrary, his court has the highest number of
caseload among the three Sharia Circuit Courts, and has even more cases than the Sharia District Court.
In 1999 alone, his court had a total of 114 cases, 83 of which were terminated in the same year.[9]

The respondent judge further contends that the complainant has been harboring ire against him since
1996 when he dismissed the latters case. Such sentiment was allegedly aggravated when the Decision
was promulgated on March 1, 2000 when the complainant made the remark, Iyon lang pala and
desisyon, pinatagal pa.[10]

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report dated October 16, 2001, found that there was
undue delay in the rendering of the decision by the respondent judge, and recommended the imposition
of a fine of P5,000.00.[11]

We agree.

Lower courts are mandated by Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution[12] to resolve or decide
cases within three (3) months after they have been submitted for decision.[13] However, an extension of
the period may be granted by this Court upon request by the judge concerned on account of heavy
caseload or by other reasonable excuse. Without an extension granted by this Court, a delay in the
disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of the judge.

We held in the case of Sanchez v. Vestil[14] and reiterated in Bernardo v. Fabros[15] that:
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously,
for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide
cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against them.

In this case, the respondent judge failed to inform this Court of the alleged difficulty in deciding
Criminal Case No. 96-01 within the prescribed period. It is too late for him to justify such nonfeasance.
As pointed out by the Court Administrator:

The Court is mindful of and does realize the heavy case load that confronts most courts; it is for the
same reason precisely that it has been most sympathetic in acting on requests for extension of time
submitted by judges as in the instant case. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The Court must still be informed by the judge of his difficulty in meeting with (sic) the prescribed
deadlines and the necessity of having the periods thereof correspondingly extended. Almost invariably,
the Court responds favorably and grants a reasonable time for compliance with the rules but it would be
wrong for a judge, on his own, to disregard a duty incumbent upon him.[16]

Moreover, any delay in the resolution of cases by a judge is a contravention of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods.

Accordingly, we adopt the recommendation of the Court Administrator that the respondent judge be
sanctioned. Since this is his first offense during his almost nine (9) year service in the judiciary, the
imposition of fine in the amount of P5,000.00 is deemed sufficient.

Again, we remind judges of the importance of high sense of duty in the administration of justice.
Judges should dispose of the courts business within the prescribed period, as delay undermines peoples
faith in the judiciary and reinforces in their minds that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.[17]

WHEREFORE, Judge Amir Mustafa is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is hereby ordered to
PAY a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188832               April 23, 2014

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father
Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision1 dated June 11, 2008
and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.

The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in
Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name.3 At
the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4

By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land
Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5

On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P.
Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.6

To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings
before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to
settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel
of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving
him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
order Vivencio to vacate his property.8

Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed
to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order9
dated January 30, 2008.10

In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the
property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as moderate damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.

On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued the notice of writ of execution12
to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He received a
copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.13

On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155,
paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a
District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering
that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of
mistake.16

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to defend
himself."17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following: Roldan’s
motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11,
2008, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail
the decision via certiorari."18

According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law.
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the
jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights
were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20

Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s
petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ
of execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.

Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17,
2009.22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order with this court.23

In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without
jurisdiction in rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance
of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including the
decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25

In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s
petition for certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution against Vivencio.27

On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for certiorari. He allegedly filed
the action for recovery of possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy disposition
of the case would be obtained":29

1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was duly filed with the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court, Cotabato City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner
below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained when the
action is filed with the Shariah District Court than in the Regional Trial Courts considering the
voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial Courts[.]30

On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to decide
the action for recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that no
provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines prohibited non-Muslims
from participating in Shari’a court proceedings, especially in actions where the Shari’a court
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court validly took cognizance of his action:

2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim litigants. No provision in
the Code on Muslim Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to participate in the
proceedings in the Shariah Courts, especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the
Code on Muslim Personal Laws;

3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of title filed by a muslim
litigant since the nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon one’s
Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and
not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.]31

Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery
of possession, Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of
summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he "effectively waived his right to
participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]"32 and he cannot argue
that his rights were prejudiced:
 4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was properly served with
summons, notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 was filed and
heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below)
intentionally or without known reason, ignore the proceedings;

5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or not herein petitioner
(respondent below) has effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings below and
had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah
District Court has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a non-muslim;

6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired jurisdiction over the case
and that the same Court had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent) intentionally
waived his right to defend himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;

7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took cognizance of an action
under its concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied is not the
Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of
Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of herein petitioner (respondent below)
[.]33

In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment.
On February 3, 2012, Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer file a reply to
the comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for
certiorari]."35

The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real
action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

We also resolve the following issues:

1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of
the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and

2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a
Muslim against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.

We rule for petitioner Vivencio.

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District

Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may either be
the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a court hears, tries,
and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment
rendered, are void.39

To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.40

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary
contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims:

ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction
over:

xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved
are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and

xxxx

When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy
it.43 If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its
possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is real,45 such as land, the action to
recover it is a real action;46 otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such actions, the parties
involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.

In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is
a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim.

When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence
on record, the court shall dismiss the claim:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action
because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No.
07-200 are void.

Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of filing the action with the
regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid
argument had all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts
is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions
"is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong.50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular
courts.

The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim
Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District
Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws
of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court
taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.

However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void,
regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the
action.

True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-
Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions in
the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the
Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim
law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a
person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by
operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a
non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such
disqualification."56 In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57

Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case involves an
action for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only
take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are Muslims."58 Considering that one of
the parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real property. The judgment
against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a
court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is
that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60

In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as
charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction
over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite the fact that Figueroa objected to
the trial court’s jurisdiction only on appeal.

In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively participated
in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times,
it appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the case involved a
grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that the
issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.

There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the
Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00.
At that time, the court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount
demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and municipal courts in
chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.

After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of
execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First
Instance denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the
Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for
the first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this court for resolution.

This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to object to the court’s jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties in
invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s jurisdiction
after failing to obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such inequitable and unfair
conduct.67

In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued
the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The
surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963 when the Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. This court said:

x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.

The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68

After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general rule
than the exception.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is
that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71

Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is because
jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties."74

In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;"76 otherwise,
the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77

x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely —
only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a
most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null
and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for
relief from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over
Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession.

Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court over the action for recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of Roldan’s action.

II

That respondent Fifth Shari’a

District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio

Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he failed
to file his answer and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court. Since Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that
his rights were prejudiced.

Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to subject the
parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory pleading.80 As
for the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary
appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82

Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s personal
liability.84 Since actions in personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded and duly heard or
given an opportunity to be heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly
served with summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the proceedings in personam,
including the judgment rendered, are void.87

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide
actions in rem.88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of a person and
seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in rem, the court trying
the case must have jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective."90 In actions in rem,
summons must still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements.91

Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."

In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore
to him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property.92
Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in personam. As this court explained in
Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a parcel of land
"is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment directing a party to
deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. It is binding only against the parties and
their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action."96

This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.

However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before
respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

III

The Shari’a Appellate Court and the

Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court’s decision. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District
Courts. He should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.

However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization
of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its own civil,
criminal, commercial, political, international, and religious laws98 – is part of the law of the land,99
and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100

Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines shall continue to discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts
shall be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and
executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.105
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate
Court shall have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of
Appeals] stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However,
considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on
August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A
Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or
"fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on
recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the
Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and
Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving disputes not
involving Muslim personal laws.

All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties involved are
Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a
Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the
judgment rendered, are void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-
200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action with the
proper court.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

2 Id. at 22-23.

3 Id. at 42.

4 Id. at 6.

5 Id. at 43.

6 Id. at 19.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 38-41.

9 Id. at 44.

10 Id. at 18.

11 Id. at 18-19.

12 Id. at 28.

13 Id. at 33.

14 Id. at 33-36.
15 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 155, par. (2) provides:

ART. 155. Jurisdiction. — The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:

(a) Marriage;

(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;

(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;

(d) Customary dower (mahr);

(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;

(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and

(g) Restitution of marital rights.

16 Rollo, p. 33.

17 Id. at 23.

18 Id. at 22.

19 Id. at 23.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 22-23.

22 Id. at 4.

23 Id. at 2-44.

24 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143, par. (2)(b) provides:

ART. 143. Original jurisdiction – x x x x

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:
 xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court.

25 Rollo, pp. 8-10.

26 Id. at 45-46.

27 Id. at 70-72.

28 Id. at 27-30.

29 Id. at 27.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 27-28.

32 Id. at 28.

33 Id. at 28-29.

34 Id. at 33-36.

35 Id. at 33.

36 Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941) [Per J. Moran, En Banc].

37 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407, 415 (2005) [Per Acting C.J. Panganiban,
Third Division].

38 Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 34-35 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].

39 Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 78 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Heirs of
Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No. 162890, November 22,
2005, 475 SCRA 743 [Per J. Callejo, Second Division].

40 Id.

41 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 175 provides:

ART. 175. How construed. – Any transaction whereby one person delivers to another
any real estate, plantation, orchard, or any fruit-bearing property by virtue of sanda,
sanla, arindao, or similar customary contract, shall be construed as a mortgage (rihan) in
accordance with Muslim law.
42 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143, par. 1(d) provides:

ART. 143. Original jurisdiction. – (1) The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if
they have not specified which law shall govern their relations[.]

xxxx

43 CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.

44 CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.

45 CIVIL CODE, Art. 415 provides:

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an
integral part of an immovable;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot
be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in
buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the
intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the

tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar
nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have
them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals
in these places are included;

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and
waters either running or stagnant;
 (9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object
to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;

(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable
property.

46 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 1 provides:

SEC. 1. Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial
court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.

47 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 2 provides:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

48 Rollo, p. 27.

49 Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 369 [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

50 G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

51   MUSLIM CODE, Art. 175.  

52 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 13, par. (1) provides:

ART. 13. Application. – (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.

53 B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL

LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (2011).

54 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 93 provides:

ART. 93. Disqualifications to succession. – The following shall be disqualified to

succeed:
 xxxx

(c) Those who are so situated that they cannot inherit under Islamic law.

55 Under Islamic law, a Muslim may not inherit from a non-Muslim, and a non-Muslim may
not inherit from a Muslim. This is based on the Hadith of Muhammad that "the people
belonging to two (different) faiths do not inherit from each other." See B. I. ARABANI, SR.,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES 608 (2011).

56 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 107 provides:

ART. 107. Bequest by operation of law. – Should the testator die without having made a
bequest in favor of any child of his son who predeceased him, or who simultaneously
dies with him, such child shall be entitled to one-third of the share that would have
pertained to the father if he were alive. The parent or spouse, who is otherwise
disqualified to inherit in view of Article 93(c), shall be entitled to one-third of what he
or she would have received without such disqualification.

57 MUSLIM CODE, Arts. 155 (2) and 143 (1)(b).

58 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143 (2)(b).

59 Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192289, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 129,
145 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc], citing Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158 [Per J. Sereno, Second Division]; Figueroa v.
People of the Philippines, 580 Phil. 58, 76 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Mangaliag
v. Catubig-Pastoral, 510 Phil. 637, 648 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division];
Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 35 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].

60 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407, 415 (2005) [Per Acting C.J. Panganiban,
Third Division].

61 580 Phil. 58, 76 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

62 503 Phil. 288 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

63 Id. at 294.

64 131 Phil. 556 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].

65 Id. at 563.

66 Id. at 564.

67 Id. at 563-564.
68 Id. at 565.

69 Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25, 35 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].

70 204 Phil. 25 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].

71 Id. at 34-35.

72 Id. at 34.

73 Id.

74 Id. at 34-35.

75 Figueroa v. People of the Philippines, 580 Phil. 58 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

76 Id. at 77.

77 Id.

78 Id at 77-78.

79 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].

80 Id. at 201.

81 RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 20.

82 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 201 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].

83 Id. at 198.

84 Id. at 199, citing Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 641 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division].

85 Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447, 451 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

86 Id. at 450, citing Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 393-394 (1907) [Per C.J. Arellano, En
Banc].

87 Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 645 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

88 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
89 Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447, 451 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc],
citing 1 C.J.S., 1148.

90 Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].

91 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].

92 Rollo, p. 40.

93 86 Phil. 447 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

94 Id. at 451.

95 G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344 [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].

96 Id. at 367.

97 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," as amended.

98 B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL

LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES 245 (2011).

99 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 2.

100 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 137.

101 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.

102 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 144 (1).

103 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Secs. 7 and 9.

104 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 9.

105 Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 10.

106 G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

107 Id. at 361.

108 Id.

109 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (1).

 110 The singular form is "fatwa".

111 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 166 (1).

112 MUSLIM CODE, Art. 166 (1).

113 B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL

LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES 855 (2011)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192463               July 13, 2015

OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, 4th Shari'a Judicial
District, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and AMBOG PANGANDAMUAN and SIMBANATAO
DIACA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of demolition seeking to
annul the Order1 dated November 9, 2009 of the Shari'a District Court (SDC), Fourth Shari'a Judicial
District, Marawi City, issued in Civil Case No. 055-91, denying petitioners' motion for the issuance of
a writ of demolition, and the Orders2 dated January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010 denying petitioners'
first and second motions for reconsideration, respectively.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City, a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and Simbanatao Diaca
(Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the owners by succession of a parcel of land located at
Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of about 800 sq. meters; that respondent Pangandamun
illegally entered and encroached 100 sq. meter of their land, while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq.
meters, as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" submitted as evidence. Respondents filed their Answer
arguing that they are the owners of the land alleged to be illegally occupied. Trial thereafter ensued.

On January 31, 2005, the SDC rendered a Decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. DECLARING plaintiffs owners of the 800 square meter land borrowed and turned over by
BPI and described in the complaint and Exhibits "A" and "K";

2. ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions or areas they illegally encroached as

indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to REMOVE whatever improvements thereat introduced;

3. ORDERING defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (C) ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs
of the suit.

SO ORDERED4

Respondents filed an appeal5 with us and petitioners were required to file their Comment thereto. In a
Resolution6 dated March 28, 2007, we dismissed the petition for failure of respondents to sufficiently
show that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the SDC as the decision was in accord with the
facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied
with finality on September 17, 2007.7 The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 became final and
executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of judgment8 was subsequently made.

Petitioners filed a motion9 for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of demolition.

On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the motion10 for a writ of execution and the writ was issued
with the following fallo:

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment. If
defendants do not vacate the premises and remove the improvements, you must secure a special order
of the court to destroy, demolish or remove the improvements on the property. The total amount
awarded to and demanded by the prevailing party is ₱150,000.00 (damages, attorney's fees and the
cost) which defendants must satisfy, pursuant to Section 8 (d) and (e), Rule 39, Rules of Court.11

The Sheriff then sent a demand letter12 to respondents for their compliance.

On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion13 for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to
implement the SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005. The motion was set for hearing.
On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order14 reading as follows:

The plaintiffs, the prevailing party, filed a Motion for Writ of Demolition and the motion was set for
hearing on February 16, 2009. On this date, the plaintiffs, without counsel, appeared. The defendants
failed to appear. Thus, the court issued an order submitting the motion for resolution. Resolution of the
motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance. First, defendant Ambog
Pangandamun has filed on February 6, 2009 an Urgent Manifestation praying deferment of the hearing
on the motion for writ of execution. Second, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro filed on February 13, 2009 a
Notice of Appearance with Motion to Postpone the hearing set on February 16, 2009 to study the
records of the case as the records are not yet in his possession. Third, the recent periodic report dated
January 26, 2009 of the Sheriff shows Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is negotiating the parties whereby
the defendant Ambog Pangandamun will be made to pay the five (5)-meter land of the plaintiffs
encroached by him and that what remains to be ironed out is the fixing of the amount.

WHEREFORE, the resolution on the Motion for Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE. The
Sheriff is DIRECTED to exert efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table seeing to it that
Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is involved in the negotiation. Atty. Saro is REQUIRED to file his
comment on the motion for writ of execution within fifteen (15) days from notice to guide the court in
resolving the incident in the event the negotiation fails.

SO ORDERED.15

On May 5, 2009, the SDC issued another Order16 which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion
for issuance of a writ of demolition and granted an ocular inspection or actual measurement of
petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land.

The SDC issued another Order17 dated May 14, 2009, which stated, among others, that: While the
decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are instances
when a Writ of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the
Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.

The defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of
Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the Court is the
supervening event, thus the order granting the request of Atty. Jimmy Saro, counsel for the defendants,
to conduct a survey to determine whether there is encroachment or not. Thus, the Order dated May 5,
2009.

WHEREFORE, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800 square
meters claimed by the plaintiffs. Said Eng. Balt is given a period of one (1) month from notice within
which to conduct the survey in the presence of the parties.18

On November 9, 2009, the SDC issued the assailed Order19 denying petitioners' motion for demolition.
The Order reads in full:

It was on February 3, 2009 that the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Demolition. The
defendants filed their comment thereto on March 24, 2009. They prayed that an ocular inspection
and/or actual measurement of the 800 square meter land of the plaintiffs be made which the court
granted, in the greater interest of justice, considering that defendants claimed to have complied with the
writ of execution, hence there is no more encroachment of plaintiffs’ land.

The intercession of concerned leaders to effect amicable settlement and the order to conduct a survey
justified the holding in abeyance of the resolution of the pending incident, motion for writ of
demolition.

After attempts for settlement failed and after the commissioned Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
needed survey asked for relief, plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. Defendants opposed the
grant of the motion, alleging compliance with the writ of execution, and prayed for appointment of
another Geodetic Engineer to conduct a survey and actual measurement of plaintiffs' 800 square meter
land.

At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order to destroy, demolish or remove defendants'
houses, considering their claim that they no longer encroach any portion of plaintiffs’ land.

Gleaned from Engineer Hakim Laut Balt's Narrative Report, he could have conducted the required
survey had not the plaintiffs dictated him where to start the survey.

WHERFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition is DENIED. A survey is still the best
way to find out if indeed defendants' houses are within plaintiffs' 800 square meter land. Parties are,
therefore, directed to choose and submit to the court their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
survey within ten (10) days from notice.20

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the SDC denied in an Order21 dated January 5,
2010 saying that the motion failed to state the timeliness of the filing of said motion and failed to
comply with the requirements of notice of hearing. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was
also denied in an Order22 dated February10, 2010. The SDC directed the parties to choose and submit
their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the survey within 15 days from notice.

Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing the
Orders issued by the SDC on November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010. In a
Resolution23 dated April 27, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, saying,
among others, that:

xxxx

In pursuing the creation of Shari'a Appellate Court, the Supreme Court En Banc even approved A.M.
No. 99-4-06, otherwise known as Resolution Authorizing the Organization of the Shari'a Appellate
Court.

However, the Shari'a Appellate Court has not yet been organized until the present. We, on our part,
therefore, cannot take cognizance of the instant case because it emanates from the Shari'a Courts,
which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of [Batas]
Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended over which We can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the instant
Petition should be filed directly with the Supreme Court.24 Petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari assailing the SDC Orders, invoking the following grounds:
RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION
AFTERTHE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD NOT BE
IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING IT

APPEAR THAT HE WAS IN COURT AT HIS SALA IN MARAWI CITY LAST JANUARY 28,
2010 WHEN THE PARTIES WERE PRESENT AND HE WAS NOT THERE.25

Preliminarily, we would deal with a procedural matter. Petitioners, after receipt of the SDC Order
denying their second motion for reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for the issuance of a
writ of demolition, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction in a Resolution dated April 27, 2010 saying that, under RA 9054, it is the Shari’a Appellate
Court (SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has
not yet been organized, it cannot take cognizance of the case as it emanates from the Shari’a Courts,
which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, "An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended", the Shari'a Appellate Court
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District
Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari’a District Court,26 we said:

x x x We call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal
system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and religious laws is
part of the law of the land, and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts.1avvphi1 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final
and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.27

and

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:

x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice
and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized,
however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be
referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim
CA Justices.29

Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April
27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA
has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow the Tomawis ruling. However, we need
not remand the case, as we have, on several occasions,30 passed upon and resolved petitions and cases
emanating from Shari’a courts.

Petitioners contend that their land was specific and shown by the areas drawn in Exhibits "A" and "K"
and by oral and documentary evidence on record showing that respondents have occupied portions of
their land, i.e., respondent Pangandamun's house encroached a 100 sq. meter portion, while respondent
Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters; and that the SDC had rendered a decision ordering respondents to
vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to
remove whatever improvements thereat introduced. Such decision had already attained finality and a
corresponding entry of judgment had been made and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners' claim
that the SDC's order for a conduct of a survey to determine whether respondents' land are within
petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land would, in effect, be amending a final and executory decision.

Only respondent Pangandamun filed his Comment, arguing that petitioners' motion for the issuance of
a writ of demolition has no factual and legal basis because his houses are clearly outside the 800-sq.-
meter land of petitioners; that his house had been constructed in 1964 within full view of the petitioners
but none of them ever questioned the same.

We find for the petitioners.

The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had
illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements
thereat introduced. Thus, petitioners had established that they are recovering possession of 100 sq.
meters of their land which was occupied by respondent Pangandamun's house as indicated in Exhibit
"K-1", and 200 sq. meter portion being occupied by Diaca as indicated in Exhibit "K-2". Such decision
had become final and executory after we affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was made. Such
decision can no longer be modified or amended. In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the
concept of a final and executory judgment, thus:

Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A final and executory
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of factor law and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This is the doctrine of
finality of judgment. It is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order
by settling justiciable controversies with finality.32

However, the SDC later found that while the decision has become final and executory and a writ of
execution has been issued, there are instances when a writ of execution cannot be enforced as when
there is a supervening event that prevents the sheriff to execute the writ of execution. It found that
respondents' claim that their buildings are not within the area claimed by petitioners is a supervening
event and ordered a survey of the land, hence, denied the motion for a writ of demolition.

We do not agree.
It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event.

In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a
matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render
the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire
after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the
judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may
properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to
modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party
who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by
competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a
final and immutable judgment.34 In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded
petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC
which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the
execution of a final and immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine
whether respondents' houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a decision which
had already attained finality.

We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for the
issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly be the
necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision.35 Section
10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —

xxxx

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - when the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court,
issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove
the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its execution has already been delayed for years now. It is
almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law.36 A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and
February 10, 2010, of the Shari'a District Court, Fourth Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City are
hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. The Shari'a District Court is hereby ORDERED to ISSUE a
writ of demolition to enforce its Decision dated January 31, 2005 in Civil Case No. 055-91.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for whatever
action he may undertake in light of our pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong case quoted
earlier on the creation of a Special Division to handle appeals or petitions from trial orders or decisions
of the Shari' a District Court.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special
Order No. 2095 dated July 1, 2015.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special
Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.

1 Rollo, pp. 65-66; Per Judge Rasad G. Balindong.

2 Id. at 69-A; 73.

3 Per Judge Rasad G. Balindong; id. at 15-21.

4 Id. at 21.

5 Docketed as G.R. No. 171022.

6 Rollo, p. 26.

7 Id. at 27.

8 Records, p. 554.

9 Rollo, pp. 47-49.

10 Id. at 50-51.

11 Id. at 53.

12 Id. at 54.

13 Id. at 55-57.

14 Id. at 60.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 61.

17 Id. at 62-63.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 65-66.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 69-A.

22 Id. at 73.
23 Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring; id. at 83-85.

24 Id. at 84-85.

25 Id. at 8.

26 G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 550.

27 Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari’a District Court, supra, at 577-578.

28 628 Phil. 252 (2010).

29 Tomawis v. Balindong, supra, at 258-259. (Emphasis omitted)

30 Id. at 259, citing Batugan v. Judge Balindong, 600 Phil. 518 (2009).

31 614 Phil. 216 (2009).

32 Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr., supra, at 220-221.

33 G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA 559.

34 Abrigo v. Flores, supra, at 571-572. (Italics in the original)

35 Id. at 572.

36 Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 629, 642.

37 Id., citing Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494, 505 (2006)