SECOND DIVISION history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we
are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of
the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in
Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the
vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in
the Philippines where he found employment
and eventually started his own business,
married a Filipina, with whom he had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he
filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the
disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law,
stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition
for citizenship under the provisions of Letter
of Instruction No. 270 with the Special
Committee on Naturalization, Office of the
Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted
upon owing to the fact that the said Special
Committee on Naturalization was not
reconstituted after the February, 1986
revolution such that processing of petitions for
naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to
his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that,
upon being asked by the court whether the
State intended to present any witness present
any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of
the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be
well-versed with the major portion of the
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason,
we do not wish to present any evidence to
counteract or refute the testimony of the
witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the
petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial
court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed all the names by which he
is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former placer of residence in violation of C.A.
No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of
§2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support
his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a
copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed
by petitioner with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in
which petitioner stated that in addition to his
name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been
known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong."
As petitioner, however, failed to state this
other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his
petition must fail.6 The state also annexed
income tax returns7 allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his
net income could hardly support himself and
his family. To prove that petitioner failed to
conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona
Villaruel had been married twice, once before
a judge in 1953, and then again in church in
1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1953
until they were married in 1977. It was alleged
that petitioner failed to present his 1953
marriage contract, if there be any. The State
also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract8 and a Joint-
9
Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife.
These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23,
1977, no marriage license had been required
in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code
because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since
1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that
when he started living with his wife in 1953,
they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
10
Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa
Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's
application for naturalization. It ruled that due
to the importance naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions
not presented in the lower court and brought
up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate
court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed
to state in this present petition for
naturalization his other name, "LORETO
CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of
Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms
must be stated in the petition for naturalization
and failure to include the same militates
against a decision in his favor. . . This is a
mandatory requirement to allow those persons
who know (petitioner) by those other names to
come forward and inform the authorities of
any legal objection which might adversely
affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in
his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and
"Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to
comply with it is fatal to the petition. As
explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government,
upon the publication of the petition, an
opportunity to be informed thereof and voice
their objections against the petitioner. By
failing to comply with this provision, the
petitioner is depriving the public and said
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating
the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and
sired four children out of wedlock. It has been
the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-
year cohabitation with his wife without the
benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from
being proper and irreproachable as required
by the Revised Naturalization Law", and
therefore disqualifies him from becoming a
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual
income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not
lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income
tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income
over expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work
and thus avoid one's becoming the object of
charity or public charge." . . . Now that they
are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and
his wife are living on the allowance given to
them by their children. The monthly pension
given by the elder children of the applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it
lucrative because like bonuses, commissions
and allowances, said pensions are contingent,
speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES,
THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT
FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS
BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME
NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND
FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE
MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the
appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed
by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the
basis of which, justified the reversal of the
trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued,
because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed
to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis
added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal
offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable
to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant
of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure
of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court,
he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due
process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission
of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their
16
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that
he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which
was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI
270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for
naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case
number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is
totally unreliable and should not be
considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged
discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the
part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case
No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to
the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which
was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no
evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these
documents — namely, the petition in SCN
Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him
and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns — are all public documents. As such,
they have been executed under oath. They are
thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err
in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would
have been enough to dispose of this case, but
to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly
discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to
include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in
his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No.
473. This address appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a
document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed
to mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is
allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved
by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to
check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding
any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one
time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. 22 As
noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization
shall set forth in the petition his present and
former places of residence. 23 This provision
and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
\SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NOS. 140538-39 : June 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GODOFRED
O B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR
III, Appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The quiescence of the fading day was
shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the
otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol,
Naga City.As the fusillade of shots ceased and
the wisp of smoke cleared, frolicking
promenaders stumbled upon Ompong Chavez
who was gasping his last, clutching his
intestines which had spewed out from his
bloodied stomach.He did not in fact reach the
hospital alive.A breath away, Abe Cuya lay
lifeless on the pavement.He died on the
spot.For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6)
of them, were haled to court.
In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado
Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo,
Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were
charged with the murder of Absalon Abe S.
Cuya III and Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez. The
Informations in Crim. Cases Nos.97-6815 and
97-6816 identically read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City
of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and the aid of armed men, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
ABSALON ABE CUYA III (RODOLFO
OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES3 for
Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms,
inflicting upon him multiple and mortal
gunshot wounds which caused his death, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors,
namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino
and Allan, were taken into custody. The two
(2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained
at large. Trial thus proceeded only against
Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan
who all pleaded not guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the
father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and
Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of
Allan. Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are
brothers.4
In its effort to secure the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution presented a total of
sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry
Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr.
Joel S. Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta
Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3
Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian,
Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli
Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan,
Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo,
PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya
Sr., Efren Chavez and Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it
appears that on March 10, 1997, at around
seven-thirty in the evening, while Mercy
Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11)
others were leisurely walking along Kilometer
11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10,
Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding
anniversary, they heard several gunshots.
Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali
who told them that Ompong Chavez had been
shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw
him already lying on the ground, about 1
meter away from a lighted electric post,
holding on to his intestines which were
starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and
asked him what had happened. Chavez
replied tinambangan kami na Ador (We were
ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he
be brought to the hospital as he was dying.
About eight (8) meters from where Chavez
was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead.5
Upon learning of the shooting incident
through their radio communication, SPO1
Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to
the crime scene to conduct an
investigation.SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and
SPO1 Wilfredo Fernandez, among others,
were already there.6 SPO1 Barbosa collected
some pieces of evidence, took some pictures
and made some sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez
on the other hand interviewed one
Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was
nearby, and when he heard people shout that
Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to
the hospital but the latter expired on the way.8
That same evening, upon being informed that
the Adors had a long-standing grudge against
the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of
then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to
accompany him to the residence of the Adors.
They arrived at the Adors at around ten
o’clock that evening and spoke with their
patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa
looked for the other male members of the
Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that
they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr.
nevertheless promised to present them the
following day.9
The following morning, March 11, 1997,
Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the
Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III,
Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to
SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central Police
Headquarters. The Adors were informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and
to choose their own counsel. They were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the
Provincial Headquarters and subjected to
paraffin tests.10 On the way to the crime
laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort
that he had been entrusted with a handgun
which he kept in his residence.11 The
information was relayed to Major Ernesto
Idian, then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga
City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I.
Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering
the gun because Godofredo said that he would
turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno.
Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and
some others accompanied Godofredo to the
latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence,
Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno,
went to their backyard, retrieved the gun from
under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to
the latter. Godofredo allegedly told the police
that he fired the said gun outside their house
on the night of March 10 after he heard several
gunshots.12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified the
gun as a caliber .38 paltik handgun which had
no serial number.13 PO3 Nepomuceno then
turned over the handgun to Major Idian14 who
likewise identified it as a .38 caliber revolver.
Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3
Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin
examination.15 Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno
placed his initials on the gun and put it in his
private locker while preparing the documents
for the examinations and the possible filing of
a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm.16
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr.
Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga
City, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of
Chavez and Cuya. Based on the autopsy
reports, Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya
sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died
from cardio-pulmonary arrest, massive intra-
thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and
digestive tract.17 Chavez on the other hand had
three (3) gunshot wounds and died from
traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds penetrating the right kidney and the
internal abdominal organs.18 Dr. Jurado
further testified that that he recovered a slug
from Cuyas head three (3) days after he
conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives
called his attention to a protruding mass in
Cuyas head. Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent
back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was
able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug
which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.19
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City,
testified that based on the ballistic
examination he conducted on the bullets
submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug
recovered from Cuyas head matched the three
(3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-
fired from the suspected firearm surrendered
by Godofredo. He however averred that the
.38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a
.357 Smith and Wesson Magnum homemade
revolver without serial number, and not from
a .38 caliber revolver.20
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were
also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services for examination and yielded the
presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus
(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive;
left hand, negative;
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive;
left hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;21
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.22
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III,
said that the killing of his son was driven by
the long-standing feud between the Adors and
his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had
earlier accused his other son Liberato of
frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him
(Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then, Adelina, a daughter of
Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with
multiple rape against him, Absalon III, Rayne
and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the
romantic relationship between Adelina and his
deceased son Absalon III turned sour.24 He
also presented official receipts of the funeral
and burial expenses which amounted
to P10,230.00.25
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez,
likewise spoke of the animosity between the
Chavez and the Ador families. He produced a
certification from the PNP Naga City Police
Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter
was entered in the Daily Record of Events
showing that deceased Chavez reported a
certain Ricardo Ador who while under the
influence of liquor caused him physical
injury.26 The witness likewise presented an
official receipt showing that the family
spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the
deceased Chavez.27 After presenting Chavez,
the prosecution rested its case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a
demurrer to evidence for utter lack of
evidence.28 On May 13, 1998, the trial court
dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr.,
Rosalino and Allan but denied the demurrer to
evidence against Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer
to evidence to be justified for the accused
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby
granted insofar as these accused are
concerned. Said accused therefore, namely:
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim.
Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.The
bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty
are hereby cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador
is concerned shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.29
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any
participation in the killings of Cuya and
Chavez. He said that on March 10, 1997, at
around seven o’clock in the evening, he heard
several gunshots while he was having dinner
with his wife and four (4) children in their
house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife
advised him not to go out anymore, he slept
after dinner. The following day, while he was
gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend
Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to
go down from the tree. Bautista wanted to
borrow money and on his way to see him,
found a gun by the footpath. Bautista gave the
gun to him. It was his first time to hold a gun.
He tried it out and fired three (3) times. After
firing the gun, he removed the empty shells
from its chambers and threw them away. He
then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it
under a coconut trunk. Bautista left when he
told him that he had no money. He then
continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian
and three (3) other policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were
being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya
the night before. Thus, they went to the
provincial headquarters, were subjected to
paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond
paper. After that, they went back to the central
police station. At the central police station,
Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia that
that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun
along the road and gave it to him. He hid the
gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia relayed the
information to Major Idian who directed PO3
Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the
gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to
where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed
it to the latter. They then returned to the police
headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted
that the gun presented in court is different
from the gun he surrendered to the police.30
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He
testified that he found the gun which
Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He
said that he was on his way to see Godofredo
to borrow money when he chanced upon the
handgun on the pathway. He gave the gun to
Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its
trigger. After firing the gun, Godofredo
removed the empty shells and threw them.
Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic
and hid it under a fallen coconut trunk.31
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on
October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani,
Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail
on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III
surrendered to the court and was committed to
the same city jail on November 22, 1998.On
November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and
Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against them
commenced and proceeded jointly with the
case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a
witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III.
Calsis testified that on March 10, 1997, at
around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the
house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he
fondly called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10,
Pacol, Naga City, before going home from
work. After asking permission from her to go
home and while about to urinate outside her
house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked
by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he
saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo
and another unidentified man run away.
Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while
Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.33 He saw
Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez
was about five (5) meters away from where he
stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away.
The place was illuminated by a bright light
from an electric post. There were no other
people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he
might be identified by the assailants. He heard
Chavez mumbling but shirked nevertheless.34
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he
saw only after about one (1) year and nine (9)
months. Fear struck him.35 He maintained that
he knew the assailants because he and his wife
lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got
married.36 Immense fear prevented him from
attending to Chavez, even while he heard him
murmuring, and from informing the families
of the victims of the incident that very same
night. He was about to tell the Chavez family
the following morning but was counseled by
his Lola Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising,
against getting involved in the case.37 Calsis
and his family left their residence in Pacol one
(1) month after the incident because he was
afraid the assailants might have identified
him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two
(2) months after the incident.39 It was only
after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that
the trial court dismissed the cases for lack of
evidence insofar as some of the original
accused were concerned that he took pity on
the respective families of the victims who
have failed to get justice for the death of their
loved ones.40
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on
March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City
working as a warehouseman and timekeeper
of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was
there the whole time from February 15, 1997,
until March 24, 1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-
worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the
latters testimony. He said that on February 15,
1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga
City, together to work in Consuelo
Construction in Marikina City. They were
with each other in Marikina City the whole
time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe)
went home to Naga City on March 22,
1997.While in Marikina City, they resided and
slept together in their barracks at the
construction site.42
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On
March 10, 1997, at around seven o’clock in
the evening, he was at their house at Zone 1,
Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his
parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when
they heard gunshots. They ignored the
gunshots, continued watching television and
slept at eight o’clock. The following day, at
around six o’clock in the morning, while he
was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived
at their house and talked to his father.
Thereafter, his father called him, his brother
Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan
and Reynaldo. The policemen then requested
all of them to go to the PNP Central Police
Headquarters for investigation regarding the
killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching
the police headquarters, they were
interviewed by the media and afterwards
brought to the provincial headquarters where
they were subjected to paraffin tests. They
were then brought back to the Central Police
Headquarters and later allowed to go back
home to Pacol.
Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father
was arrested by the police. Diosdado III was
at their residence when his father was picked
up. Only his father was taken by the police. He
continued to reside in their house until April,
1998, when he transferred to Sagurong, San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a
fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he
received a letter from his father telling him to
come home. Thus, he went home the
following day. On November 23, 1998, he
surrendered to the court.43
The defense also presented Barangay Captain
Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and
Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles.Perez testified
that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from
1982 until May, 1997.In 1996, Cresenciana
Mendoza left their barangay permanently to
live with her children in Manila because she
was sickly and alone in her house. He said that
Mendoza never came back. He does not know
any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have
talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997,
because at that time, Mendoza was not there
and her house was already
abandoned.44 Similarly, Bobiles confirmed
the testimony that Diosdado III worked as a
fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his
residence from May 1, 1998, until November
1998 when Diosdado III received a letter from
his father and had to go home.45
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness
SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed
Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of
March 10, 1997.46 After the rebuttal witness
was presented, the cases were finally
submitted for decision.47
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a
chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound
and logical conclusion that indeed the accused
(Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the
offense charged48 and as such rendered
judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
court finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador
and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
defined and penalized under the provisions of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby
sentences the said accused Godofredo B. Ador
and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal
Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION
PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6816, to
pay the heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya
III P25,000 each by way of actual damages
andP50,000 in each criminal case by way of
indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo
Ompong Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each
criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and
to pay the cost. For insufficiency of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim.
Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail
is hereby ordered to forthwith release from its
custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr.,
unless his further detention is warranted by
any other legal cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.49
Hence, this joint appeal interposed by
Disodado III and Godofredo. They maintain
that the trial court gravely erred in convicting
them of murder based on circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of prosecution
witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running
away from the scene of the crime was
concocted. The handgun turned in by
Godofredo was not the same gun presented by
the prosecution during the trial. The unusual
discovery of a slug from the head of the
deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was
conducted and after the cadaver was turned
over to the family of the victim - was quite
doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration
of the victim specifically pointed to neither
Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial
court erred in admitting in evidence those
taken against them in violation of their
constitutional rights to counsel during
custodial investigation.50
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely
on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt.51 It may be the basis of a
conviction so long as the combination of all
the circumstances proven produces a logical
conclusion which suffices to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.52 All the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
theory that all the accused are guilty of the
offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are
innocent and with every other possible,
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.53 The
evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis which may be consistent with their
innocence.54 Also, it should be acted on and
weighed with great caution.55 Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot
by itself be the basis of conviction.56
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice,
(1) there should be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.57 Like an ornate tapestry created out of
interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked
out and assayed a strand at a time apart from
the others, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.58 The test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record are sufficient to convict
the accused is that the series of the
circumstances proved must be consistent with
the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with
his innocence.59 Accordingly, we have set
guidelines in appreciating circumstantial
evidence:(1) it should be acted upon with
caution; (2) all the essential facts must be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the
facts must exclude every theory but that of
guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a
certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince
the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused is the one who committed the
offense.60
Measured against the guidelines set, we
cannot uphold the conviction of the accused
based on the circumstantial evidence
presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution
sought to prove is that the accused were
supposedly seen fleeing from the locus
criminis, armed with their respective
weapons. Thus, the trial court, gleaning from
the evidence presented, found that [w]hen
about to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador,
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador
III, and a person going to the direction of the
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters
away.61 In fact, prosecution witness Calsis
allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying a
long firearm but x x x could not determine
what kind of gun it was.62 However, the trial
court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly
so. For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying the
Adors notwithstanding his assertion that he
knew and saw them personally. We defer to
his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons
running, could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A.I could not tell his name but if I see him I
could identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if
they are present in court, please point them
out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of
a person inside the courtroom who answered
by the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who
answered by the name of Diosdado Ador
III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?
A. (Witness pointed to a man)
COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is
not on trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth
one inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able
to recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you
just tapped the shoulder?
x x xx x xx x x
A.I know these persons having lived in the
house of Lola Kising.
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you
said you saw them running, how far were you
from them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63
The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly
be used against Diosdado III whom he
miserably failed to positively identify during
trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by
the trial court renders the entire testimony of
Calsis in serious doubt. Calsis was presented
to positively identify the assailants who were
supposedly personally known to him and were
just ten (10) meters away from him. It puzzles
us no end why he cannot even identify the
Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado
Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court
doubted him and gave credence to the alibi of
Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka,
Marikina, when the killings took place. The
trial court favored the unbiased testimony of
Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a
timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the
Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina,
from February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997,
and went home to Pacol only on May 27,
1997.This ruling is strengthened by the fact
that on the morning following the killings, all
the male members of the Ador family were
brought to the police headquarters for paraffin
examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among
them.64 We thus respect the finding of the trial
court that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the
scene of the crime absent any indication that
the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter
the outcome of the case.65
entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be
predicated on the strength of the evidence for
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.71
The second circumstance is the handgun
turned in by Godofredo. But this was bungled
by the prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy Chief
of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to
whom the handgun was turned over after
Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a
caliber .38 revolver, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) :
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6
rounds ammunition.

While it is true that the courts are not bound to
accept or reject an entire testimony, and may
believe one part and disbelieve another,66 our
Constitution and the law mandate that all
doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Calsis committed an obvious blunder
in identifying the supposed assailants which
this Court cannot simply let go. On the
contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our
minds if Calcis really saw the persons he
allegedly saw or if he was even where he said
he was that evening. For, it is elementary that
the positive identification of the accused is
crucial in establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. That is wanting in the
instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the
outset, could no longer be used against
Godofredo since both the prosecution and the
defense have already rested and the case
against Godofredo was already submitted for
decision when Calsis was presented.67 Neither
can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who
was already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the
charges hurled against them. But, while it is
true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the
defenses as they can easily
fabricated,68 absent such clear and positive
identification, the doctrine that the defense of
denial cannot prevail over positive
identification of the accused must yield to the
constitutional presumption
69
innocence. Hence, while denial
concededly fragile and unstable, the
conviction of the accused cannot be based
thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly
Q. What is the caliber?
A..38 caliber.72
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had
been with the PNP for eight (8) years already
and to whom Godofredo turned in the
handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38,
thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.73
However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, testified that [t]he indorsement
coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x
x alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was
fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our
office found out that the firearm was not a .38
caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver.74
Could it be that the handgun was replaced
before it was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory? While the prosecution traced the
trail of police officers who at every stage held
the gun supposedly recovered from
be
Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy
which is quite glaring to ignore. It is difficult
to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and a
police officer of eight (8) years will both
mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber
of
handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm
is
Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know
the difference between the two (2) handguns.
Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to
clear up the variance and for this Court to
suggest an explanation would be to venture
into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture
and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious
disparity in the suspected firearm used in the
crime and that which was turned over by
Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun
presented in court was different from the gun
he gave to the police deserves serious, if not
sole consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance,
the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered
from the head of the victim three (3) days after
the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary
value as its source is now highly questionable.
It has become uncertain whether the deformed
slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver
turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber
handgun as attested to by the Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying
declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the
results of the paraffin tests to convict either
Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute
these, we need not go far and beyond the 13
May 1998 Order of the trial court partially
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the
prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria,
that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez say
tinambangan kami na Ador (We were
ambushed by the Adors) .Sad to say, no
specific name was ever mentioned by the
witness. Neither was she able to tell how many
(persons) Adors were involved. This
testimony if it will be given credence may
inculpate any person with the family name
Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore
was not able to establish with moral certainty
as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the
offense x x x x Paraffin tests are not
conclusive evidence that indeed a person has
fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested
positive of gunpowder nitrates does not
conclusively show that they fired the murder
weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such
forensic evidence should be taken only as an
indication of possibility or even of probability,
but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also
admittedly found in substances other than
gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No.
121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de
Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha,
240 SCRA 283)75
Thus, while a dying declaration may be
admissible in evidence, it must identify with
certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its
significance. Also, while a paraffin test could
establish the presence or absence of nitrates on
the hand, it cannot establish that the source of
the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a
person who tests positive may have handled
one or more substances with the same positive
reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,
tobacco and leguminous plants.76 In People v.
Melchor, 77 this Court acquitted the accused
despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on
his hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the
result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
While it can establish the presence of nitrates
or nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites
were caused by the discharge of firearm. The
person tested may have handled one or more
of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites,
such as explosives, fireworks,
pharmaceuticals and leguminous plants such
as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances
are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites,
therefore, should be taken only as an
indication of a possibility but not of
infallibility that the person tested has fired a
gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to
Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including
the gun in question cannot be considered in
evidence against him without violating his
constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was
already under custodial investigation when he
made his admissions and surrendered the gun
to the police authorities. The police had
already begun to focus on the Adors and were
carrying out a process of interrogations that
was lending itself to eliciting incriminating
statements and evidence: the police went to
the Ador residence that same evening upon
being informed that the Adors had a long-
standing grudge against the Cuyas; the
following day, all the male members of the
Ador family were told to go to the police
station; the police was also informed of the
dying declaration of deceased Chavez
pointing to the Adors as the assailants; the
Adors were all subjected to paraffin
examination; and, there were no other
suspects as the police was not considering any
other person or group of persons. The
investigation thus was no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors
were already being held as suspects for the
killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under
custodial investigation, including the right to
counsel, have already attached to the Adors,
and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3),
1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights
should be in writing and undertaken with the
assistance of counsel. Admissions under
custodial investigation made without the
assistance of counsel are barred as
evidence.78 The records are bare of any
indication that the accused have waived their
right to counsel, hence, any of their
admissions are inadmissible in evidence
against them. As we have held, a suspects
confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,
when taken without the assistance of counsel
without a valid waiver of such assistance
regardless of the absence of such coercion, or
the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is
inadmissible in evidence, even if such
confession were gospel truth.79 Thus, in
Aballe v. People,80 the death weapon, a four-
inch kitchen knife, which was found after the
accused brought the police to his house and
pointed to them the pot where he had
concealed it, was barred from admission as it
was discovered as a consequence of an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the
prosecution likewise played up the feud
between the Adors on one hand and the
Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand,
and suggested that the Adors had an axe to
grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas. For
sure, motive is not sufficient to support a
conviction if there is no other reliable
evidence from which it may reasonably be
adduced that the accused was the
malefactor.81 Motive alone cannot take the
place of proof beyond reasonable doubt
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
innocence.82
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of
the trial court, we cannot rest easy in
convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the
said circumstantial evidence presented do not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that they are
guilty.83 The prosecution witness failed to
identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt
continues to hover over the gun used and the
slug recovered. The dying declaration and
paraffin examination remain unreliable.
Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as
evidence. And, the supposed motive of the
accused is simply insufficient. Plainly, the
facts from which the inference that the
accused committed the crime were not proven.
Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot
be established, more so to a moral certainty. It
is when evidence is purely circumstantial that
the prosecution is much more obligated to rely
on the strength of its own case and not on the
weakness of the defense, and that conviction
must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty.84
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has
been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions
and speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that
suspicions and speculations can never be the
basis of conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts
must ensure that the conviction of the accused
rests firmly on sufficient and competent
evidence, and not the results of passion and
prejudice.86 If the alleged inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two (2) or
more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused, and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence is not adequate to support
conviction.87 The court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is therefore
insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction.88 Conviction must rest on nothing
less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused.89 The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.90 It is thus apropos to
repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden.
Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated
August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of murder and imposing on them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado
B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is
hereby ORDERED unless they are being held
for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 140679 January 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of
marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant
Manny Domingcil was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch
16, for violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994,
in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, not authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried
marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in brick
form, wrapped with paper placed in a plastic
bag, a prohibited drug, weighing 800 grams,
to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation
conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City,
in violation of the aforesaid law.1
Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the
appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.2 The case
thereafter proceeded to trial.
The Case for the Prosecution
On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m.,
Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s
Upholstery Shop located in Barangay 2,
Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police
Station. He reported to Chief Investigator
SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went
to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana.
Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he
knew of someone who was interested and
ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to
bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store
located in front of the Divine Word College of
Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag
City at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day.3
Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
against the appellant. He assigned SPO1
Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and
SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2 Warlito
Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong,
SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie
Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation
Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-
up. The marked "buy-money" consisting of
one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745
was recorded in the police blotter in
accordance with standard operating
procedure.4
Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the
rest of the team left the precinct on board two
(2) owner-type jeeps and posted themselves
near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the
Divine Word College. Five minutes later,
SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General
Segundo Avenue.5 Oliver immediately
approached the appellant, who was then
standing between the Macmac Store and a
xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer
SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual
clothes and slippers: "Pare, daytoy tay
gumatangen" ("Friend, this is the buyer"). At
this point, the appellant who was carrying an
orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like
item wrapped in newspaper. He handed the
item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith
checked the same by making a small hole
through it. Convinced that the brick-like item
was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong
handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He
thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the
back-up men that the transaction had been
consummated.6 Momentarily, the back-up
officers, who had earlier positioned
themselves separately in different strategic
locations near the poseur-buyer, rushed to the
scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1
Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag
containing the suspected marijuana to SPO4
Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant
and recovered the buy-money from the latter’s
pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought
to the headquarters where he was booked, and
the incident was recorded in the police
blotter.7 The suspected marijuana was brought
to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph
Adaya, an accredited physician of the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who certified
that the item comprised of three genuine
mixture of marijuana leaves with seeds.8
On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a
letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Diego
Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting
for the examination of samples of the
suspected marijuana taken from the
appellant.9 On September 6, 1998, SPO1
Loreto Ancheta, evidence custodian of the
Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic
bag containing the suspected marijuana to the
PNP provincial crime laboratory service in
Camp Juan, Laoag City. The bag, together
with SPO4 Ventura’s letter-request, was
received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.10 On
September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos
forwarded the laboratory request and the
confiscated item, and were duly received by
SPO4 Tampos.11 The latter, in turn, handed
the item to Police Superintendent Theresa
Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime
Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego
Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union,
who conducted an examination of
representative samples extracted from the
suspected marijuana confiscated from the
appellant.12 On the basis of her examination,
Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report
No. D-074-94 with the following findings:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops weighing eight hundred grams (800)
wrapped with newspaper pages contained in
an orange plastic bag.
...
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY
EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of marijuana on the
above-mentioned specimen.
F I N D I N G S:
Qualitative examination conducted on the
above-mentioned specimen prove POSITIVE
result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited
drug.13
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant interposed the twin defenses of
denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in
the first week of August 1994, he and Ernesto
Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass
the price for the repair of the upholstery of a
passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they
befriended a certain Belrey Oliver who was an
employee of the Ferd’s Upholstery Shop. In
the course of their conversation, Oliver asked
the appellant where he came from and what
his occupation was. Upon being told that he
helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan,
Oliver immediately offered refreshments to
Gamiao and the appellant. While taking their
snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted
to back up the promotion of certain policemen
who, in the future, might be able to return the
favor to them. When the appellant asked in
what way they could extend help, Oliver
suggested that they look for somebody in
Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1)
kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Oliver’s
suggestion. The latter handed to him the
amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of
the marijuana. The appellant immediately
went to the terminal bound for Cagayan to
look for somebody from that province who
could be of help. When he could not find
anyone, he decided to personally take the trip.
He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to
Vintar and inform his mother that he was
going to Cagayan.
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he
was able to buy one kilo of marijuana
for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City
on August 12, 1994, he went to Ferd’s
Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform
Oliver that he had procured the order. After
seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to
take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the
same day in front of the Divine Word College
where they would hand over the marijuana to
the policemen they intended to help.
At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at
Macmac’s Store and took his merienda.
Momentarily, Oliver arrived alone on a
tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they
walked southward, away from the Macmac’s
Store, looking for the policemen to whom they
would deliver the marijuana. They walked
back northward, at which point they
encountered an owner-type jeep which
suddenly stopped. He was nonplussed when
Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his
knapsack containing the marijuana, and
pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to
sit beside the driver with another policeman,
while Oliver seated himself at the back seat
with another policeman. The jeep they were
riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed
at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver
four times, "Why is it that this is now
happening to me(?)," but Oliver did not
respond. At the police station, he was
immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4
Ventura and SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by
Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscal’s
Office. He was later brought to the provincial
hospital where he was subjected to a physical
check-up. That was the last time he saw or
heard of Oliver.14
On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered
judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which
reads :
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused Manny Domingcil is
GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of
marijuana involved is more than 750 grams;
hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty
provided for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The
accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to
pay the costs.
Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant submits the following
assignment of errors:
1. The lower Court erred in finding that the
accused was not instigated in looking for
marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.
2. The lower Court erred in finding that the
accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO
bill, despite his denial that he received the
same and that his denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of the police officers
who are presumed to be regularly performing
their official duties, there being no improper
motive attributed to them.
3. The lower Court erred in convicting the
accused.16
The appellant contends that contrary to the
collective testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, Oliver instigated him to buy
marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving
credence and probative weight to his
testimony and in considering the testimonies
of the witnesses of the prosecution.
The appeal has no merit.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
evaluation by the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. The reason for this rule
is that the trial court is in a better position to
decide thereon, having personally heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.17 After a
thorough and careful review of the records of
this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant
was sufficiently established by the evidence,
and the trial court’s judgment is well-
supported by law and jurisprudence.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.18 In this case, the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to
poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the
entrapment operation.
Q How has the case involving drug or
marijuana involving the accused brought to
your attention or to your office, for that
matter?
A Our informant by the name of Belrey
Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along
Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he
ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.
Q Who ordered from whom?
A Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.
Q By the way, who was the chief of the
Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at
that time?
A SPO4 Ventura, sir.
Q Was he present when the informant Belrey
Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of that information from
Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4
Ventura do?
A SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan
purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.
Q Where will the operation take place?
A In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in
front of the Divine Word College of Laoag,
sir.
Q And did you have any participation in that
operation?
A Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).
Q At what time was the operation scheduled
to be executed?
A 1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.
Q For the said operation, what preparations,
if any, did your group take?
A Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.
Q What was the plan?
A To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.
Q And you said that you were to act as poseur
buyer, anything was given to you in
connection with your specific participation?
A I was given the buy-bust money in the
amount of P500.00, sir.
Q And what will you do with that P500.00?
A The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura
directed me to reflect the serial number of the
money in the police blotter, the P500.00 to be
used as marked money.
Q And after the serial number was entered in
the police blotter, what next did you do?
A Before we went out of the station, the team
or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead
to the place where the transaction will take
place, sir.
Q And who were the companions of SPO4
Ventura who went ahead?
A Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos
and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and
myself were the ones who went together.
Q Who went ahead to the place where the
sale will take place?
A The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.
Q And did you reach the place where the
transaction will take place?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you started to the place where the
transaction will take place in front of the
Divine Word College of Laoag, did you know
then the face of Manny Domingcil?
A No, sir.
Q How did you know his face then?
A Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me
that the person is Manny Domingcil.
Q So, what you are saying is: when you
arrived at the scene where the transaction
would take place, Manny Domingcil was
already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed
him to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that, what did you do with Belrey
Oliver?
A We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
Q And after or as soon as you were near him,
what happened next?
A Belrey Oliver introduced Manny
Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.
Q What did Oliver say?
A "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen", (which
when translated into english[sic] means):
"Pare, this is the buyer."
Q And so, what was the reaction of Manny
Domingcil?
A Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he
has the stuff that was ordered.
Q And what did he say?
A Manny Domingcil said: "There is, Pare."
Q By the way, who ordered the stuff from
Manny Domingcil?
A Belrey Oliver, sir.
Q Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that
from Manny Domingcil?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue,
sir.
Q That was what Oliver told you when he
ordered the stuff?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Manny Domingcil said: "There is,
pare," what transpired next, if any?
A I told him: "Can I look at it" and he brought
out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.
Q And after he had brought out the said thing,
what did you do with it?
A I checked the contents if it is real
marijuana, sir.
Q You said the thing was wrapped with
newspaper and you said you checked its
contents?
A Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making
a small hole at the side.
Q And what was the result of your
inspection?
A I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
Q And, so what did you do then?
A After I found out that it was marijuana I
handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso
bill, sir.
Q And as soon as you have handed the
P500.00 bill, what did you do next?
A I gave the signal to my companions, sir.
Q And what did your companions do when
you gave the signal?
A They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
Q What was your signal?
A I scratched my head, sir.
Q And, what was your attire at that time you
bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny
Domingcil?
A Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.
Q And all the time during your transaction
with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey
Oliver?
A At my side, sir.
Q And during the transaction, did Belrey
Oliver say anything?
A None, sir.
Q And after giving your signal to your
companion police officers who were nearby
and they rushed to your place where you were,
what happened?
A They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
Q And what about the marijuana which you
said Manny Domingcil sold to you?
A I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.
Q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you
know what happened to it?
A SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500
peso bill from the pocket of Manny
Domingcil.
Q And after arresting Manny Domingcil
where did your group go?
A To the police station, sir.
Q Do you know if any records were made to
your police station when you returned or
arrived there?
A Yes, sir.
Q What for example?
A They made a request ... we reflected in the
police blotter the apprehension of Manny
Domingcil, the confiscation of the marijuana
and the recovery of the marked money in the
amount of P500.00.
Q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you
recovered from the pocket of Manny
Domingcil recorded?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you know what happened to the
stuff later on after you returned to the police
station?
A They made a request to Dr. Adaya to
conduct an initial examination on the
confiscated marijuana, sir.19
The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando
Dalusong was corroborated on material points
by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the
Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City
who organized and conducted the operation
and was part of the buy-bust team
itself.20 SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast and
unwavering on cross-examination despite
intense grilling by the defense counsel.21
Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the
Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union,
confirmed22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial
finding23 that the substance seized from the
appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited
drug.
It was also fairly established by SPO3
Diosdado Mamotos24 and SPO1 Loreto
Ancheta25 that the confiscated marijuana was
the same substance examined by the forensic
chemist and later presented as evidence in
court.
The testimonies of the principal prosecution
witnesses complement each other, giving a
complete picture of how the appellant’s illegal
sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how
the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante
delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond
doubt that dangerous drugs were in the
possession of the appellant who had no
authority to possess or sell the same. More
importantly, all the persons who obtained and
received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired
by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the
buy-bust operation deserve full faith and
credit.26
The appellant’s bare denial of the crime
charged and his barefaced claim that he was
merely instigated by Oliver into procuring the
marijuana cannot prevail over the
straightforward and positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It is incredible that the
appellant, who had just met Belrey Oliver in
the course of his canvass for the upholstery of
his brother’s jeepney, would readily leave his
errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him
into buying a prohibited drug, a known
criminal activity for which he could be
prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. All this he was willing
to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of
alleged future favors from another who was
also unknown to the appellant. The appellant
supposedly traveled to and spent almost three
days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able
to accommodate a newly found acquaintance,
who handed the appellant the meager sum
of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The
Court cannot give credence to such a
preposterous stance as advanced by the
appellant and confirmed by his supposed
corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to
be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must also be
credible in itself such that common experience
and observation of mankind lead to the
inference of its probability under the
circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the
court is always guided by evidence that is
tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the
usual course of human experience and not by
mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies
that do not adhere to this standard are
necessarily accorded little weight or
credence.27 Besides, instigation, or the
appellant’s claim of a frame-up, is a defense
that has been invariably viewed by this Court
with disfavor because the same can easily be
concocted and is a common standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.28 Thus, in People vs.
Bongalon,29 the Court held:
As we have earlier stated, the appellant’s
denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We
are not unaware of the perception that, in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice
of planting evidence to extract information or
even to harass civilians. However, like alibi,
frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by
the Court with disfavor as it can easily be,
concocted, hence, commonly used as a
standard line of defense in most prosecutions
arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous
consequences on the enforcement of law and
order, not to mention the well-being of
society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
policemen’s alleged rotten reputation, accept
in every instance this form of defense which
can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for
this reason that the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed
exists.
The failure of the prosecution to present
Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble
the case for the prosecution. Informants are
almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Their
testimony or identity may be dispensed with
inasmuch as his or her narration would be
merely corroborative, especially so in this
case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified
on the sale of the illegal drug.30
The appellant’s claim that the prosecution
offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of
the P500.00 buy money and did not account
for its failure to adduce in evidence the
original copy thereof is not supported by the
records. The records show that the original,
and not merely a xerox copy of the marked
money, was in fact offered in evidence by the
prosecution.31 The appellant would surely
have objected if the prosecution had offered in
evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The
appellant did not do so. The only ground for
his objection to the admission of the marked
money was that it was self-serving.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was
erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial
court, the absence of the original of the
marked money is inconsequential. The
marked money used in the buy-bust operation
is not indispensable in drug cases;32 it is
merely corroborative evidence. Moreover, the
appellant was charged not only for the sale of
marijuana but also for the delivery thereof,
which is committed by the mere delivery or
transfer of the prohibited drug. The
consideration for the transaction is of no
moment.33
The law defines deliver as "a person’s act of
knowingly passing a dangerous drug to
another with or without
consideration."34 Considering that the
appellant was charged with the sale and
the delivery of prohibited drugs, the
consummation of the crime of delivery of
marijuana may be sufficiently established
even in the absence of the marked money. The
erasures and alterations in the Joint Affidavit
of the policemen involved in the buy-bust
operation did not debilitate the case of the
prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the
policemen was not admitted in evidence for
any party. Second. The investigator who
prepared the "Joint Affidavit" erroneously
stated that the two P500.00 bills were used by
the policemen who conducted the buy-bust
operation bearing Serial Numbers AA823675
and G242745. As shown by the prosecution’s
evidence the policemen used only the P500.00
bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the
purchase of the drug. Hence, the "Joint
Affidavit" of the policemen had to be
corrected to reflect the truth.
All told, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty is, in this case,
uncontradicted by evidence to the contrary
and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the
fact that the prosecution’s evidence fully
shows and confirms such regularity.
Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial
court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, in
Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005
BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*,
CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT.
JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L.
LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C
ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E.
LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D.
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE
GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO,
SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO
S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO,
SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C
FELIZARDO TARAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With
Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were
convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 for the double
murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.1
Petitioners were members of the military who
acted as Senator Aquino’s security detail upon
his arrival in Manila from his three-year
sojourn in the United States. They were
charged, together with several other members
of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for
the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally
shot as he was coming down from the aircraft
of China Airlines at the Manila International
Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the
killing of Rolando Galman who was also
gunned down at the airport tarmac.
On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010-10011 acquitting all the accused,
which include the petitioners. However, the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were
later found by this Court to be a sham trial.
The Court thus nullified said proceedings, as
well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered
a re-trial of the cases.2
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.
In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other
accused, found the petitioners guilty as
principals of the crime of murder in both
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. It
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua in each
case.3 The judgment became final after this
Court denied petitioners’ petition for review
of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to
show reversible error in the questioned
decision,4 as well as their subsequent motion
for reconsideration.5
In August 2004, petitioners sought legal
assistance from the Chief Public Attorney
who, in turn, requested the Independent
Forensic Group of the University of the
Philippines to make a thorough review of the
forensic evidence in the double murder case.
The petitioners, assisted by the Public
Attorney’s Office, now want to present the
findings of the forensic group to this Court
and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of
the cases and the holding of a third trial to
determine the circumstances surrounding the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and
Rolando Galman.
Petitioners invoke the following grounds for
the re-opening of the case:
I
Existence of newly discovered pieces of
evidence that were not available during the
second trial of the above-entitled cases which
could have altered the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan, specifically:
A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering
the false forensic claims that led to the unjust
conviction of the petitioners-movants.
B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual
killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.
II
There was a grave violation of due process by
reason of:
A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;
B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;
C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were
under duress;
D) Willful suppression of evidence;
E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to
the unjust conviction of the petitioners-
movants.
III
There was serious misapprehension of facts
on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on
false forensic evidence, which entitles
petitioners-movants to a re-trial.6
Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the
findings of the forensic group composed of
Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic
anthropologist from the University of the
Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a
medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino,
M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights
and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N.
Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry
consultant. Their report essentially concludes
that it was not possible, based on the forensic
study of the evidence in the double murder
case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at
Senator Aquino as they descended the service
stairway from the aircraft. They posit that
Senator Aquino was shot while he was
walking on the airport tarmac toward the
waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed
to transport him from the airport to Fort
Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of
the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it
was C1C Moreno, the security escort
positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot
the latter. The report also suggests that the
physical evidence in these cases may have
been misinterpreted and manipulated to
mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that
the September 28, 1990 decision of the
Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was
based on false forensic evidence. Petitioners
submit that the review by the forensic group
of the physical evidence in the double murder
case constitutes newly discovered
evidence which would entitle them to a new
trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report
of the forensic group, petitioners seek to
present the testimony of an alleged
eyewitness, the driver of the waiting
AVSECOM van, SPO4 Ruben M.
Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this
Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw
a man in blue uniform similar to that of the
Philippine Airlines maintenance crew,
suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter
was about to board the van. The man in blue
was later identified as Rolando Galman.
Petitioners pray that the Court issue a
resolution:
1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable
Court’s Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and
September 10, 1991;
2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of
the Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated
September 28, 1990 in People vs. Custodio, et
al., Case No. 10010-10011[;]
3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]
4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the
reception of additional defense evidence/re-
trial in the above entitled cases.7
The issue now is whether petitioners are
entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. —
At any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may, on motion of the
accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court
shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has
been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
xxx
Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration. — The effects of granting a
new trial or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground
of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all the proceedings and
evidence affected thereby shall be set aside
and taken anew. The court may, in the interest
of justice, allow the introduction of additional
evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-
discovered and such other evidence as the
court may, in the interest of justice, allow to
be introduced shall be taken and considered
together with the evidence already in the
record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial
or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment
rendered accordingly. (emphasis supplied)
In line with the objective of the Rules of Court
to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice,
but without shackling the hands that dispense
it, the remedy of new trial has been described
as "a new invention to temper the severity of
a judgment or prevent the failure of
justice."8 Thus, the Rules allow the courts to
grant a new trial when there are errors of law
or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused committed during the
trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the
errors of law or irregularities are expunged
from the record or new evidence is introduced.
Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated
and a new one is rendered.9
Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime
may avail of the remedy of new trial before the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
Petitioners admit that the decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011 became final and executory upon
denial of their petition for review filed before
this Court and their motion for
reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact
been made on September 30,
1991.10 Nonetheless, they maintain that
equitable considerations exist in this case to
justify the relaxation of the Rules and re-open
the case to accord petitioners the opportunity
to present evidence that will exonerate them
from the charges against them. We do not find
merit in their submission.
Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground
of newly discovered evidence. Courts are
generally reluctant in granting motions for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence for it is presumed that the moving
party has had ample opportunity to prepare his
case carefully and to secure all the necessary
evidence before the trial. Such motions
are treated with great caution due to the
danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of
allowing a party to allege that which may be
the consequence of his own neglect to defeat
an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party
is often required to rebut a presumption that
the judgment is correct and that there has been
a lack of due diligence, and to establish other
facts essential to warrant the granting of a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.11 This Court has repeatedly held
that before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must
be shown (1) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. If
the alleged newly discovered evidence could
have been very well presented during the trial
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
same cannot be considered newly
discovered.12
These standards, also known as the "Berry"
rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case
of Berry vs. State of Georgia13 where the
Supreme Court of Georgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly
discovered evidence, are not favored by the
Courts. x x x Upon the following points there
seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party
who asks for a new trial, on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the
Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his
knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not
owing to the want of due diligence that it did
not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that
it would produce a different verdict, if the new
trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative
only — viz; speaking to facts, in relation to
which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That
the affidavit of the witness himself should be
produced, or its absence accounted for. And
6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only
object of the testimony is to impeach the
character or credit of a witness. (citations
omitted)
These guidelines have since been followed by
our courts in determining the propriety of
motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for
new trial has the burden of showing that the
new evidence he seeks to present has
complied with the requisites to justify the
holding of a new trial.
The threshold question in resolving a motion
for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is whether the proferred evidence is
in fact a "newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered by due
diligence." The question of whether
evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the
evidence discovered, and a predictive
one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the
requirement of due diligence has
14
relevance. We have held that in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as newly discovered to justify new
trial, what is essential is not so much the time
when the evidence offered first sprang into
existence nor the time when it first came to the
knowledge of the party now submitting it;
what is essential is that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but
had nonetheless failed to secure it.15
The Rules do not give an exact definition of
due diligence, and whether the movant has
exercised due diligence depends upon the
particular circumstances of each
16
case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that
the phrase is often equated with "reasonable
promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and
a good faith component. The movant for a
new trial must not only act in a timely fashion
in gathering evidence in support of the
motion; he must act reasonably and in good
faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that
the defendant acts reasonably and in good
faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the facts
known to him.17
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that
petitioners’ purported evidence does not
qualify as newly discovered evidence that
would justify the re-opening of the case and
the holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be
considered as newly discovered evidence as
petitioners failed to show that it was
impossible for them to secure an independent
forensic study of the physical evidence during
the trial of the double murder case. It appears
from their report that the forensic group
used the same physical and testimonial
evidence proferred during the trial, but
made their own analysis and interpretation
of said evidence. They cited the materials and
methods that they used for their study, viz:
MATERIALS AND METHODS
MATERIALS:
a. Court records of the case, especially
photographs of: a) the stairway where the late
Sen. Aquino and his escorts descended; b) the
part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of
the late Sen. Aquino and Galman fell; and c)
the autopsy conducted by the NBI Medico-
legal team headed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz; and the
autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno
Aquino[,] Jr. signed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz and Dr.
Solis;
b. The gun and live ammunitions collected at
the crime scene;
c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays
of the same to demonstrate wound location
and bullet trajectory;
d. The reports of interviews and statements by
the convicted military escorts, and other
witnesses;
e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino
based on the military escorts[’] version, by the
military escorts themselves in the Bilibid
Prison and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;
f. Various books and articles on forensic and
the medico-legal field[;]
g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted
in relation to the case.
METHODS:
a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in
the court;
b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic
review;
c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and
ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;
d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based
on the military’s accounts, both in the Bilibid
Prison where the convicts are confined and the
MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac;
e. Conduct of ocular inspection and
measurements on the actual crime scene
(stairway and tarmac) at the old Manila
International Airport (now NAIA);
f. Retracing the slug’s trajectory based on the
autopsy reports and experts’ testimonies using
an actual human skull;
g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced
trajectory based on the autopsy report and
experts’ testimonies;
h. Evaluation of the presented facts and
opinions of local experts in relation to
accepted forensic findings in international
publications on forensic science, particularly
on guns and [gunshot] wound injuries;
i. Forensic experiments and simulations of
events in relation to this case.18
These materials were available to the parties
during the trial and there was nothing that
prevented the petitioners from using them at
the time to support their theory that it was not
the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed
Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present
motion, failed to present any new forensic
evidence that could not have been obtained by
the defense at the time of the trial even with
the exercise of due diligence. If they really
wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other
forensic experts at the time regarding the
physical evidence gathered at the scene of the
crime, there was ample opportunity for them
to do so before the case was finally submitted
and decided.19
A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision
dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough
study by the court of the forensic evidence
presented during the trial, viz:
COURT FINDINGS
As to the physical
evidence
Great significance has to be accorded the
trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated
the head and caused the death of Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to
trajectory ought to be the findings during the
autopsy. The prosector in the autopsy, Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz, NBI Medico-Legal
Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No.
N-83-22-36, that the trajectory of the gunshot,
the wound of entrance having been located at
the mastoid region, left, below the external
auditory meatus, and the exit wound having
been at the anterior portion of the mandible,
was "forward, downward and medially."
(Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, Exhibit
"NNNN-2-t-2")
A controversy as to this trajectory came about
when, upon being cross-examined by counsel
for the defense, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz made
a significant turn-about by stating that the
correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was
"upward, downward, and medially." The
present position of Dr. Muñoz is premised
upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous
bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal
bullet. He concluded, in view of this finding,
that the fatal bullet must have gone upward
from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal
bullet exited at the mandible, it is his belief
that the petrous bone deflected the trajectory
of the bullet and, thus, the bullet proceeded
downwards from the petrous bone to the
mandible.
This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz in this
regard notwithstanding, We hold that the
trajectory of the fatal bullet which killed Sen.
Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, "forward,
downward and medially." For the reason that
the wound of entrance was at a higher
elevation than the wound of exit, there can be
no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast
rate of speed takes a straight path from the
wound of entrance to the wound of exit. It is
unthinkable that the bullet, while projected
upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof
of the head, go down to the mandible because
it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone
which though hard is in fact a mere spongy
protuberance, akin to a cartilage.
Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of
the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and
Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the immediate
superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz,
manifested before the Court, that, since the
wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there
is what is known as a contusion collar which
was widest at the superior portion, indicating
an acute angle of approach, a downward
trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This
phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the
fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the
point of entry of the fatal bullet.
There was no showing as to whether a probe
could have been made from the wound of
entrance to the petrous bone. Out of curiosity,
Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from
the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He
was unsuccessful notwithstanding four or five
attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of
Dr. Muñoz that the trajectory was upward,
downward and medially. On the other hand,
Dr. Juanito Billote and photographer
Alexander Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr.
Muñoz’[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier,
had successfully made a probe from the
wound of entrance directly towards the wound
of exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with
excitement upon his success and Alexander
Loinaz promptly photographed this event with
Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end
of the probe at the mandible. (Exhibit
"XXXXX-39-A")
To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous
bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would
have been decimated or obliterated. The fact
that the main bullet was of such force, power
and speed that it was able to bore a hole into
the mandible and crack it, is an indication that
it could not have been stopped or deflected by
a mere petrous bone. By its power and force,
it must have been propelled by a powerful
gun. It would have been impossible for the
main bullet to have been deflected form an
upward course by a mere spongy
protuberance. Granting that it was so
deflected, however, it could not have
maintained the same power and force as when
it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as
to crack the mandible and make its exit there.
But what caused the fracture of the petrous
bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other
than that the bullet had hit it? Dr. Pedro Solis,
maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory
of the bullet was downward, gave the
following alternative explanations for the
fracture of the petrous bone:
First, the petrous bone could have been hit by
a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that
which was found at the temporal region; and,
Second, the fracture must have been caused by
the kinetic force applied to the point of
entrance at the mastoid region which had the
tendency of being radiated towards the
petrous bone.
Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the
temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr.
Pedro Solis pointed out, had been caused by
the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is
applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr.
Pedro Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces
is distributed all over the cranial back,
including, although not limited to, the parietal
bone. The skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-
like structure. The moment you apply pressure
on the portion, a distortion, tension or some
other mechanical defect is caused. This
radiation of forces produces what is known as
the "spider web linear fracture" which goes to
different parts of the body. The so-called
fracturing of the petrous portion of the left
temporal bone is one of the consequences of
the kinetic force forcefully applied to the
mastoid region.
The fact that there was found a fracture of the
petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of
the theory that the main bullet passed through
the petrous bone.
Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to
whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz to have been found by him
inside the skull or at the wound of exit were
really parts of the main bullet which killed the
Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined
these fragments, he found that two (2) of the
fragments were larger in size, and were of
such shapes, that they could not have gone out
of the wound of exit considering the size and
shape of the exit wound.
Finding of a downward
trajectory of the
fatal bullet fatal
to the credibility
of defense witnesses.
The finding that the fatal bullet which killed
Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed
downwards sustains the allegation of
prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that
Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a
military soldier at the bridge stairs while he
was being brought down from the plane.
Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot
by the military man who was directly behind
the Senator while the Senator and he were
descending the stairs. Rebecca Quijano’s
testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie
Barcelona, Ramon Balang, Olivia Antimano,
and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this
Court finds likewise as credible.
The downward trajectory of the bullet having
been established, it stands to reason that the
gun used in shooting the Senator was fired
from an elevation higher than that of the
wound of entrance at the back of the head of
the Senator. This is consistent with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses to the
effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot
as he stood at the upper step of the stairs, the
second or third behind Senator Aquino, while
Senator Aquino and the military soldiers
bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is
likewise consistent with the statement of
Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of
Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator
was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion
derived from the fact that the fatal shot was
fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino
crossed the service door and was led down the
bridge stairs.
It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi
Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of
the footsteps of Senator Aquino, as the
Senator went down the bridge stairs, the
shooting of the Senator occurred while the
Senator had stepped on the 11th step from the
top.
At the ocular inspection conducted by this
Court, with the prosecution and the defense in
attendance, it should be noted that the
following facts were established as regards the
bridge stairs:
"Observations:
The length of one block covering the tarmac –
19’6";
The width of one block covering the tarmac –
10’;
The distance from the base of the staircase
leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
marker at the tarmac – 12’6";
There are 20 steps in the staircase including
the landing;
The distance from the first rung of the
stairway up to the 20th rung which is the
landing of stairs – 20’8";
Distance from the first rung of the stairway up
to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door
– 23’11";
Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door
– 21’;
Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door
– 19’11";
Length of one rung including railpost – 3’4";
Space between two rungs of stairway – 9";
Width of each rung – 11-1/2";
Length of each rung (end to end) – 2’9":
Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing
– 2’5".
(underlining supplied) 20
The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively
analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence
in its resolution dated November 15, 1990
denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by the convicted accused. The court held:
The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit
"NNNN-2-t-2" indicated a downward
trajectory of the fatal bullet when it stated that
the fatal bullet was "forward, downward, and
medially . . ."
xxx
II
The wound of entrance having been at a higher
elevation than the wound of exit, there can be
no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum
revolver or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at
a fast rate of speed and it stands to reason that
it took a straight path from the wound of
entrance to the wound of exit. A hole
indicating this straight path was proven to
have existed. If, as contended on cross-
examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, that
the bullet was projected upwards, it ought to
have exited at the roof of the head. The theory
that the fatal bullet was deflected by a mere
petrous bone is inconceivable.
III
Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid
and there is what is known as a contusion
collar which was widest at the superior
portion, indicating an acute angle of approach,
a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is
conclusively indicated. This phenomenon
indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was
at a level higher than that of the point of entry
of the fatal bullet.
IV
There was no hole from the petrous bone to
the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited
and, thus, there is no support to the theory of
Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz that the fatal bullet had
hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory
and had been deflected by the petrous bone
towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote’s
testimony in this regard had amplified the
matter with clarity.
xxx
These physical facts, notwithstanding the
arguments and protestations of counsel for the
defense as now and heretofore avowed,
compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1)
that the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit
and killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was
"forward, downward and medially"; (2) that
the Senator was shot by a person who stood at
a higher elevation than he; and (3) that the
Senator was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio
Moreno on the bridge stairs and not on the
tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the
accused convicted herein.21
This Court affirmed said findings of the
Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for
review in its resolution of July 25, 1991. The
Court ruled:
The Court has carefully considered and
deliberated upon all the contentions of the
petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation
that the respondent Sandiganbayan has
gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.
The attempt to place a constitutional
dimension in the petition is a labor in vain.
Basically, only questions of fact are raised.
Not only is it axiomatic that the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan are final unless
they fall within specifically recognized
exceptions to the rule but from the petition and
its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the
respondent Court correctly resolved the
factual issues.
xxx
The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or
not the victim was descending the stairway or
was on the tarmac when shot, the
circumstances showing conspiracy, the
participants in the conspiracy, the individual
roles of the accused and their respective parts
in the conspiracy, the absence of evidence
against thirteen accused and their co-accused
Col. Vicente B. Tigas, Jr., the lack of
credibility of the witnesses against former
Minister Jose D. Aspiras, Director Jesus Z.
Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo
Gosuico, Major General Prospero Olivas, and
the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual
matters w[h]ich the respondent court
discussed with fairness and at length. The
petitioners’ insistence that a few witnesses in
their favor should be believed while that of
some witnesses against them should be
discredited goes into the question of
credibility of witnesses, a matter which under
the records of this petition is best left to the
judgment of the Sandiganbayan.22
The report of the forensic group essentially
reiterates the theory presented by the
defense during the trial of the double
murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly
discovered, but rather recently sought, which
is not allowed by the Rules.23 If at all, it only
serves to discredit the version of the
prosecution which had already been weighed
and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
The same is true with the statement of the
alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His
narration merely corroborates the testimonies
of other defense witnesses during the trial that
they saw Senator Aquino already walking on
the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van
when a man in blue-gray uniform darted from
behind and fired at the back of the Senator’s
head.24 The Sandiganbayan, however, did not
give weight to their account as it found the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses
Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more
credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that
they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on
the stairway aim and fire a gun on the latter’s
nape. As earlier quoted, the Sandiganbayan
found their testimonies to be more consistent
with the physical evidence. SPO4
Cantimbuhan’s testimony will not in any way
alter the court’s decision in view of the
eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona,
taken together with the physical evidence
presented during the trial. Certainly, a new
trial will only be allowed if the new
evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if
admitted.25 Also, new trial will not be
granted if the new evidence is merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
As additional support to their motion for new
trial, petitioners also claim that they were
denied due process because they were
deprived of adequate legal assistance by
counsel. We are not persuaded. The records
will bear out that petitioners were ably
represented by Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez
during the trial and when the case was
elevated to this Court. An experienced lawyer
in criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez vigorously
defended the petitioners’ cause throughout the
entire proceedings. The records show that the
defense presented a substantial number of
witnesses and exhibits during the trial. After
the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty.
Jimenez filed a petition for review with this
Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to
acquit the petitioners. When the Court denied
the petition for review, he again filed a motion
for reconsideration exhausting his deep
reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find
petitioners’ claim to be unblushingly
unsubstantiated. We note that they did not
allege any specific facts in their present
motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had been
remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are
therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the
case. The general rule is that the client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of his case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might
have been different had his counsel proceeded
differently.26 We held in People vs. Umali:27
In criminal as well as civil cases, it has
frequently been held that the fact that blunders
and mistakes may have been made in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court,
as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or
incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a
ground for a new trial.
If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons
for reopening cases, there would never be an
end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent, or experienced, or learned.
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys
as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or
immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof are not proper
grounds for a new trial; and in general the
client is bound by the action of his counsel in
the conduct of his case, and can not be heard
to complain that the result of the litigation
might have been different had counsel
proceeded differently. (citations omitted)
Finally, we are not moved by petitioners’
assertion that the forensic evidence may have
been manipulated and misinterpreted during
the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not
allege concrete facts to support their crass
claim. Hence, we find the same to be
unfounded and purely speculative.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174472 June 19, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee,
vs.
BENIGNO FETALINO y
GABALDON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 31 May 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02162 entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Benigno Fetalino y
Gabaldon," affirming, with modification, the
Judgment2 dated 29 July 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
213, in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445,
MC- 99-1446, MC-99-1447-H, MC 99-1448-
H, and MC-99-1449-H.
Appellant stood charged with two counts of
acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape
allegedly committed against the person of his
own daughter, AAA.3 The Informations, all
signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Carlos A.
Valenzuela, state:
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445
That on or about the 21st day of March 1999,
in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter AAA, a girl
sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to
sexual abuse, by inserting his finger into her
vagina against her will and consent.4
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1999,
in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter, AAA, a girl
sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to
sexual abuse, by inserting his finger into her
vagina against her will and consent.5
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999,
in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place
[within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his]
daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and
subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.6
In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1448-H
That on or about the 24th day of March 1999,
in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place
[within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his]
daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and
subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.7
In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1449-H
That on or about the 25th day of March 1999,
in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place
[within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his]
daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age and
subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.8
On 20 April 1999, the arraignment for
Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99
99-1446 was held at which time appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charges of acts of
lasciviousness.9 On 10 February 2000, he
entered a similar plea to the three counts of
rape in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1447-H,
MC-99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.10 Joint
trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with
the prosecution presenting five witnesses,
namely: AAA, the private complainant; BBB,
AAA’s mother and appellant’s live-in partner;
Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan), Medico-Legal
Officer of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City; SPO4 Julieta Espiritu (SPO4
Espiritu), Chief of the Women’s Desk of the
PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada
(POS Tejada).
AAA was called to the witness stand as a
hostile witness by the prosecution. The reason
behind this unusual move was explained by
the prosecutor during the offer of AAA’s
testimony:
Before we proceed your honor, may we
manifest that we are presenting this witness as
our hostile witness in view of her declaration
before this representation that she is no longer
interested in prosecuting this case against the
accused your honor, and in view likewise, of
the manifestation given before this honorable
court by the counsel for the accused that the
victim and the mother of the victim came to
see him to ask her (sic) to desist.11
AAA testified that appellant raped her on
three separate instances in March 1999. She
recalled that the events transpired in their
house which was then undergoing
renovation.12 Appellant allegedly undressed
her and inserted his private organ into her
vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She
claimed that she tried to resist appellant’s
bestial attack and that she struggled with him
by trying to remove his hands. She could not
shout for help as appellant threatened her with
harm. After satisfying his lust, appellant told
her not to report the incident to anybody or
else he would kill her and her mother. She,
however, finally revealed her sad experiences
to her mother sometime in 1999. Thereafter,
she was brought to the crime laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City for a medical
examination. The physical examination was
conducted by Dr. Tan whose test confirmed
that AAA was already in a non-virgin state
physically. The pertinent portion of Dr. Tan’s
medico-legal report states:
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora
are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish
brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic,
fleshy-type hymen with deep healed
lacerations at 7 and 9 o’clock and shallow
healed laceration at 6 o’clock positions.
External vaginal orifice offers strong
resistance to the introduction of the examining
index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugorsities. Cervix is firm and
closed.13
Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the
medical examination on the person of AAA.
According to him, their office received a
request from the XXX Police Station for the
conduct of a "medico-legal/physical
examination" on AAA who was a victim of an
"alleged sexual abuse/molestation perpetrated
by her biological father."14 AAA and BBB
were then subjected to a brief interview after
which they both signed the consent form for
the said examination.15 Dr. Tan likewise
explained that the most common cause of a
hymenal laceration is the insertion into the
vagina of an erect male genitalia or any other
object of the same consistency.16
BBB, AAA’s mother, stated that she and
appellant were engaged in a common law
relationship and together they begot five
children17 including AAA. On the evening of
25 March 1999, BBB came home from
Divisoria where she earned a living as a
vendor. When she reached their house, a
certain Paul Quiambao, a carpenter she hired
to do some minor repairs in their abode, came
to see her and informed her that he saw
appellant on top of AAA. In the vernacular,
Paul allegedly told BBB that AAA was
"ginagalaw" by appellant. Immediately after
Paul left, BBB talked to AAA to confirm the
harrowing news that she had just received.
AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her
mother that her predicament in the hands of
her own father started on 22 March 1999 and
it occurred everyday thereafter until 25 March
1999. She and AAA then proceeded to the
barangay hall to report the misdeeds of
appellant. After this, their barangay captain
and members of the police came to their house
to look for appellant who allegedly tried to
flee after seeing the authorities. He was
eventually arrested and taken to the police
station. The barangay officials then instructed
her and AAA to go to the police station in
order for them to file a complaint against
appellant.
In the police station, she and AAA gave their
respective sworn statements to the
investigating officer.18
SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the
investigator assigned to the case. During her
investigation, AAA complained that in the
afternoon of 21 March 1999, when the latter
arrived home from school, appellant entered
her room and, at knife point, embraced and
kissed her. Unsatisfied with these initial
condemnable acts, appellant thereafter
inserted his finger into AAA’s vagina. This
incident would be repeated the following day,
22 March 1999.
Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would
even take a turn for the worse for on 23 March
1999, appellant apparently became more
emboldened and could no longer contain his
bestial desires; thus, he proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of AAA. AAA had to suffer
such abuse on two more separate instances
which occurred on 24 and 25 March 1999.
The prosecution presented, as its last witness,
POS Tejada, who was a member of the team
which responded to the complaint of AAA and
BBB on 26 March 1999. His turn at the
witness stand was brief, as appellant’s counsel
admitted the substance of POS Tejada’s
would-be testimony which pertained mainly
to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of
appellant.
For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed
defense of denial to refute the charges brought
against him. Appellant narrated that he and
BBB had been live-in lovers for almost 25
years. He admitted that AAA was indeed one
of their children.19 In 1977, he was imprisoned
for murder and was ordered released from
detention on 23 February 1996. From the time
he regained freedom, he allegedly stayed in
the house of one of his legitimate children
located somewhere in Paco, Manila. During
the time material to the case, however, he was
at the house he used to share with BBB and
their children located at No. XXX St., XXX
Drive, XXX City. Said house was undergoing
renovation at that time.
Appellant claimed that the present criminal
charges were brought against him in
retaliation for the physical injuries he inflicted
upon BBB during one of their heated
arguments which became frequent as he
wanted BBB and her new live-in partner to
move out of their house in XXX St. In fact,
according to appellant, BBB even charged
him with physical injuries which was raffled
off to a different branch of the court.
To bolster appellant’s claim of innocence, the
defense presented CCC, another one of his
children with BBB. In CCC’s recollection, at
the time the criminal acts complained of took
place, she was in their house together with
AAA, their brother DDD, and appellant. She,
however, insisted that nothing unusual
happened during those dates. She remembered
that although appellant was in their house, he
spent most of his time inside his room fixing
his belongings.
As for its last witness, the defense recalled
BBB to the witness stand in order to prove that
the only reason she executed her sworn
statement before the police was because she
was angry with appellant for having stabbed
her during one of their fights.
After trial, the court a quo found appellant
guilty as charged in all the cases filed against
him. The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s judgment states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment
is hereby rendered in Criminal Case Nos. MC-
99-1445 and MC-99-1446, finding the
accused BENIGNO FETALINO Y
GABALDON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and
penalized under Article III, Section 5[b] of
Republic Act 7610, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer for each of the two (2)
charges, the penalty of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as minimum and maximum,
respectively.
Decision is also hereby rendered in Criminal
Cases Nos. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H
and MC-99-1449-H finding the accused,
BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of RAPE defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by the Republic Act 7659 and R.A.
8353. Finding the victim to be under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime, and that the offender is the father,
this court imposes upon same BENIGNO
FETALINO Y GABALDON, for EACH
charge, the supreme penalty of DEATH
through lethal injection, as provided for in
R.A. 8177, amending Section 24, of R.A.
7659 in the manner and procedure therein
provided.
Moreover, pursuant to [A]rticle 100 in relation
to Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
governing civil indemnity, accused is
furthermore ordered to indemnify the minor
victim, AAA, the amount of Php50,000.00, by
way of moral damages in line with the reward
made under the case of People vs. Bonday
(222 SCRA 216) and another Php25,000.00
for exemplary damages to deter other sexual
perverts or two legged-beast from sexually
assaulting or molesting hapless and innocent
girls.
As the penalty imposed is [TRIPLE] DEATH, THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE
the City Jail Warden is directed to PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
immediately commit the person of BENIGNO
III
FETALINO Y GABALDON to the National
Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.20 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-
In view of the death penalty imposed by the
APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY
trial court, the cases were automatically
OF DEATH AS THE AGE OF THE
elevated to this Court for review. However, in
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT
our Resolution dated 13 December 2005,21 we
BEEN SUFFICIENTYLY PROVED.24
ordered the remand of these cases to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to our holding in People The appeal is partly meritorious.
v. Mateo.22
At the outset, we would like to impart our
In its assailed Decision, the appellate court observation as regards the proper charge that
modified the decision of the trial court by should have been filed against appellant for
acquitting appellant of the two charges of rape the incidents that transpired on 21 and 22
and by downgrading the penalty imposed in March 1999, during which he inserted his
Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H from death finger into the vagina of AAA. For these acts,
to reclusion perpetua – which spawned Criminal Cases No. MC-99-
1445 and MC-99-1446, appellant was indicted
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional
merely for two counts of acts of lasciviousness
Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City
when the appropriate charges should have
convicting accused-appellant Benigno
been two separate counts of rape under Article
Fetalino of the crime of two (2) counts of acts
266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It must
of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. MC-
be remembered that Articles 266-A and 266-
99-1445 and MC-99-1446 and for rape in
B are the amendments introduced to the
Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H
Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No.
is AFFIRMED with
8353 or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997,"
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death
which took effect on 22 October 1997. With
imposed by the trial court for the crime of rape
these amendments, rape was reclassified as a
should be reduced to reclusion
crime against person and not merely a crime
perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay
against chastity. Article 266-A of the Revised
complainant AAA the following amounts:
Penal Code states:
1. the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How
damages;
Committed. – Rape is committed:
2. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
1) By a man who [shall] have carnal
3. ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
As regards Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1448-
H and MC-99-1449-H, accused is hereby a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
b) When the offended party is deprived of
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23
reason or otherwise unconscious;
Once again, appellant’s case is before us for
c) By means of fraudulent machination or
our consideration raising the following errors:
grave abuse of authority; and
I
d) When the offended party is under twelve
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED (12) years of age or is demented, even though
IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE none of the circumstances mentioned above
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE be present.
[CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN
2) By any person who, under any of the
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
DOUBT.
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
II by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
object into the genital or anal orifice of constitutionally guaranteed right to be
another person. informed of the charges against him.
Certainly, we cannot allow ourselves to be the
The first paragraph of Article 266-A refers to
ones to perpetrate the denial of appellant’s
the traditional concept of rape; that is, having
right to due process. He cannot be punished
sexual intercourse with a woman against her
for an offense graver than that with which he
will. The second paragraph, on the other hand,
was charged.29
is categorized as rape by sexual assault.25
In his Brief, appellant invokes the settled rule
In the case of People v. Soriano,26 appellant
that under our jurisdiction, an accused is
therein was charged with 13 counts of rape by
presumed innocent until proven guilty and to
sexual assault for having inserted his finger
overcome this presumption, the prosecution
inside the private organ of his minor daughter.
must establish the guilt of an accused beyond
After reviewing the records of said case, we
reasonable doubt. He contends that in this
adjudged appellant therein guilty of 12 counts
case, the fact that the prosecution presented
rape by sexual assault, bearing in mind the
AAA as a hostile witness casts doubt as to the
expanded definition of rape under Republic
culpability of appellant. He also insists that
Act No. 8353.
the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and
Subsequently, in People v. Palma,27 appellant vague and points to the following portions of
therein was charged with six counts of her statement in the witness stand:
qualified rape committed between the second
Q. Who was raped by Benigno Fetalino?
week of October 1997 and the first week of
November 1997. This case was brought before A. Me, ma’am.
us on automatic appeal in view of the death
Q. When was (sic) you raped by Benigno
sentence imposed by the trial court. It must be
Fetalino?
noted that two of the charges arose from
appellant’s acts of inserting his finger into the A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.
vagina of his victim. The first of such
incidents happened during the second week of Q. Could it be in the year 1999?
October 1997 when appellant inserted his A. Yes, ma’am.
thumb into the victim’s vaginal orifice. Then,
sometime during the first week of November Q. Could it be in the month of March?
1997, appellant inserted his middle finger into
A. Yes, ma’am.
the vagina of the private complainant. In
disposing said case, we declared – Q. Where did the alleged raping incident took
place?
x x x In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first
incident of insertion of appellant’s finger into A. In our house.
the victim’s vagina during the second week of
October 1997 could only render appellant Q. Where is your house located?
guilty of an act of lasciviousness. The second A. XXX Street, XXX City.
incident of the insertion of appellant’s middle
finger, however, during the first week of Q. How many times were you raped in March
November 1997, constituted consummated 1999?
rape through sexual assault under Republic
A. Three (3) times.
Act No. 8353 or the "The Anti-Rape Law of
1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997 Q. Is it on the same date or on different dates
x x x."28 of March 1999?
With these precedents, it is clear that the A. Same dates, ma’am.
insertion of one’s finger into the genital or
anal orifice of another person constitutes rape Q. Are you sure of that?
by sexual assault and not merely an act of A. Yes, ma’am.
lasciviousness like what was erroneously
charged in this case. Much as we want to PROS. SILAO:
punish appellant for his appalling acts toward I would like to remind you again Madam
AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1445 Witness that you are under oath and you can
and MC-99-1446, we are enjoined by our be held liable for telling a lie.
primordial duty to observe appellant’s
Q. What time was the first rape committed?
A. It was then in the afternoon after my mother
arrived.
Q. What time did your mother arrived on that
afternoon?
A. 5:00 p.m.
Q. What about the second rape, what time was
it?
A. I cannot recall the time anymore.
Q. What about the third rape?
A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.
Q. But all in the year 1999 of March?
A. Yes, ma’am.30
The seeming reluctance of AAA, as
punctuated by appellant, is precisely one of
the principal motivations which propelled our
legislature to reclassify the crime of rape as a
crime against person. As explained by
Congresswoman Luz Reyes Bakunawa during
her sponsorship speech of the House Bill No.
6265 which eventually became Republic Act
No. 8353 –
This reclassification is necessary because
under the existing law, only the victim can file
a complaint, if she wishes, or her parents, or
grandparents in that order, which is very
restrictive. The bill now prescribes that any
citizen can file a complaint, even if the
complainant may not be the victim, or close
relative of the victim. This is the significance
of the change that intends to bring the criminal
to the bar of justice even if the victim may not
decide to complain due to fear, shame, or for
other reasons. 31
Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA
in pursuing the charges against appellant, the
choice of whether the cases would prosper
was no longer hers alone. Besides, at the time
AAA was presented as a witness, almost three
years had already lapsed. Events must have
taken place or influence might have been
exerted upon her that could have weakened
her resolve to seek justice for what was done
to her. However, the fact remains that AAA
never categorically denied in open court the
charges she hurled at appellant. On the
contrary, when AAA was subjected to cross-
examination, she affirmed that appellant had
indeed raped her, thus:
COURT:
Q. Do you know why you were (sic) here,
Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because we have a hearing.
Q. Do you know for a fact that you filed a rape
case against the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us the reason why you filed this case?
A. Because he raped me.
Q. Did anyone forced (sic) you to file a case
against the accused herein?
A. None, sir.
Q. In what part of your house were you raped?
A. Inside my father’s bedroom.
Q. How many bedrooms do you have in your
house?
A. Two only, sir.
Q. So, at the time you were rape you were
inside your father’s bedroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will agree with me that the door of the
room has a lock, Madam Witness?
A. None sir, it was open because our house
was under renovation then.
Q. When the accused inserted his penis into
your vagina, you did not resisted (sic)?
A. I resisted.
Q. How did you resisted (sic), Madam
Witness?
A. I struggled.
Q. In what way?
A. I remove (sic) his hands.
Q. Did the accused likewise, undress himself?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was totally naked then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have a neighbor, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It happened at about 1:00 to 2:00 in the
afternoon, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not shout for help, Madam
Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. I was afraid because he threatened me.
Q. How did he threaten you?
A. He told me not to report the matter to
anybody.
Q. When did you finally decide to disclose
what happened to you to anyone, Madam
Witness?
A. It was on (sic) 1999, to my mother, but I
cannot recall the date.
Q. Why did you disclose the same to your
mother?
A. I was afraid of my father.
Q. When you stated in your statement that a
certain Paul witnessed the incident, when was
that?
A. March 1999.
Q. While your father was raping you?
A. He saw the incident because he was then
working at our house.
Q. You stated in your affidavit that your father
was on top of you when Paul see (sic) you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But at the time when Paul saw your father
on top of you, his penis was not yet inserted in
to your vagina?
A. Not yet, sir.32
Complementary to AAA’s oral testimony, she
confirmed the sworn statement which she
executed before SPO4 Espiritu on 26 March
1999 upon redirect examination by the
prosecutor. As we had elucidated in the case
of People v. Servano,33 the evidence which
should be considered by the court in criminal
cases need not be limited to the statements
made in open court; rather, it should include
all documents, affidavits or sworn statements
of the witnesses, and other supporting
evidence. We explained –
x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been
formally offered as evidence, it forms an
integral part of the prosecution evidence
which should not be ignored for it
complements and completes the testimony on
the witness stand. A sworn statement is a
written declaration of facts to which the
declarant has sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests
credibility and trustworthiness on the
document. The fact that a witness fails to
reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn
statement should not affect his credibility and
render the sworn statement useless and
insignificant, as long as it is presented as
evidence in open court. This is not to say,
however, that the sworn statement should be
given more probative value than the actual
testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and
the open court declarations must be evaluated
and examined together in toto so that a full and
thorough determination of the merits of the
case may be achieved. Giving weight to a
witness’ oral testimony during the trial should
not mean being oblivious to the other pieces
of available evidence such as the sworn
statement. In like manner, the court cannot
give probative value to the sworn statement to
the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every
case, the court should review, assess and
weigh the totality of the evidence presented by
the parties. x x x.34
In this case, AAA’s sworn statement which
forms part of the records of this case supplied
the details of the incidents she experienced
during those fateful days in March 1999, thus:
T : Ano ang dahilan at narito ka ngayon sa
aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malayang salaysay?
S : Para po isumbong at ipakulong ang tatay
ko na tatlong beses akong ni-rape at dalawang
beses na ipinasok and daliri niya sa ari ko.
T : Sino ba ang tatay mo na sinasabi mo na
nag-rape sa iyo ng tatlong beses?
S : Siya po si Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon,
62 taong gulang, walang trabaho at nakatira
din po sa XXX St., XXX City.
T : Kailan, saan at anong oras nangyari ang
sinasabi mong pangre-rape na ginawa sa iyo
ng tatay mo?
S : Noon pong March 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 1999,
lahat po ay mga ala-una hanggang alas dos ng
hapon, sa mismo pong bahay namin sa XXX
St., XXX City.
T : Tunay mo bang ama ang sinasasabi mong
tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng maraming
beses?
S : Opo.
T : Maari mo bang ituro sa akin ang sinasabi
mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo?
S : Siya po. (Affiant pointing to ne Benigno
Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 years old, jobless of
XXX St., XXX City.)
T : Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong
pangyayari?
S : Noon nga pong March 21, 1999, pagdating
ko po galing sa eskwela at nasa loob ako ng
kwarto at gumagawa po ako ng assignment ng
bigla pong pumasok ang tatay ko at agad
akong tinutukan ng balisong at sinabing
huwag akong maingay, niyakap po ako at
hinalikan, tapos po ay ipinasok ang kamay
niya sa loob ng short ko at ipinasok ang daliri
niya sa ari ko, umiiyak po ako at nakikiusap
ng huwag niyang gawin, pero ang sabi lang po
niya "HUWAG KANG MAINGAY,
PAPATAYIN KITA" at pagkatapos po ay
sinabihan din niya ako ng "HUWAG KANG
MAGSUSUMBONG, PAPATAYIN KITA,
PATI NA ANG NANAY MO." Noon pong
March 22, 1999, pagdating ko po uli galing
eskwela, ay ganon po ulit ang ginawa niya,
ipinasok po uli ang daliri niya sa ari ko,
natatakot po ako kaya hindi po ako sumisigaw
at hindi rin po ako nagsusumbong, kasi baka
nga patayin niya kaming lahat. Ng pangatlong
araw po, March 23, 1999 ay ganon po uli ang
ginawa niya, pinasok po niya ako sa kwarto at
tinutukan ng balisong, pero hinubad na po
niya ang short ko at inihiga ako sa papag at
naghubad din po siya at pumatong sa akin at
ipinasok ang ari niya sa ari ko, hindi po ako
pumapalag dahil natatakot po ako dahil may
hawak siyang balisong habang gumagalaw
siya sa ibabaw ko. Wala po akong nagawa
kundi ang umiyak, hindi po ako
makapagsumbong dahil sa pananakot niya na
papatayin kami. Tapos po ng March 24, 1999
uli ng hapon ay pinasok ulit niya ako at ganon
po ulit, inalis niya ang short ko at pumatong
sa akin, ng nakapatong po siya ay biglang
pumasok si Kuya Pol, iyon po yong karpintero
na gumagawa ng bahay naming at nakita
kami, kaya po biglang tumigil ang tatay ko, at
lumabas na siya pero sinabihan ako ulit na
huwag magsusumbong dahil papatayin kami.
Hindi pa rin po ako nagsumbong, kaya
kahapon po, March 25, 1999 ay inulit na
naman niya ang ginagawa niyang pangre-rape
sa akin. Tapos kagabi nga po ng wala ang tatay
ko ay nagpunta sa amin si Kuya Pol at
kinausap ang nanay ko at narinig ko ng
sabihin niya sa nanay ko na nakita niya ang
tatay ko na nakapatong sa akin sa kwarto. Pag-
alis po ni Kuya Pol ay agad akong kinausap ng
nanay ko at tinanong, kaya po sinabi ko na sa
kanya, pero ang sinabi ko po ay daliri lang ang
ginagamit ng tatay ko, natatakot po kasi ako
na baka patayin kami ng tatay ko. Agad pong
pumunta ang nanay ko sa Barangay at
nagsumbong, kaya po hinuli siya ng Barangay
at dinala kami dito sa pulis.35
Against the categorical statements of AAA,
appellant could only offer the defense of
denial and point to BBB as the brains behind
the institution of these criminal charges
against him. Such bare-faced defense is
obviously insufficient to overcome AAA’s
categorical claim of being raped and sexually
molested by appellant. The rule is settled that
against the positive identification by the
private complainant, the mere denials of an
accused cannot prevail to overcome
conviction by the trial court.36
Indeed, appellant could not offer any plausible
reason which could have impelled AAA to
bring these serious charges against him. All he
could muster was to claim in the trial court
that BBB was furious at him and that the two
of them engaged in frequent fights. To our
mind, such contention is unavailing. Although
BBB admitted that she was mad at appellant
for the physical injuries he inflicted upon her,
still, she stated that what drove her to issue her
sworn statement on 26 March 1999 was
appellant’s rape of AAA. Furthermore, a
mother like BBB certainly would not expose
her own daughter to the ignominy of a rape
trial simply to retaliate against her husband for
the transgressions, knowing fully well the life-
long stigma and scars that such a public trial
could bring.37 Such selfish motive on the part
of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct
to protect her offspring from all kinds of harm
and to safeguard the latter’s well-being.
We, however, sustain the appellate court’s
acquittal of appellant in Criminal Cases No.
MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H. It must
be remembered that each and every charge of
rape is a separate and distinct crime so that
each of the other rape charges should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.38 Thus, it is
incumbent on the prosecution to present the
quantum of proof necessary for the conviction
of an accused.
In this case, we have gone over the testimony
of AAA and her sworn statement and cannot
agree in the trial court’s conclusion that
appellant’s guilt had been sufficiently
established. AAA’s testimony pertaining to
the second and third incidents of rape merely
consists of the following:
Q. What about the second rape, what did he do
to you?
A. The same.
Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted
his private organ to your private organ?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. What about the third rape, how did he did
(sic) it to you?
A. The same procedure, ma’am.39
Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to
the prosecutor’s queries are grossly
inadequate to sustain appellant’s conviction.
Her answers during the prosecutor’s
examination are utterly lacking in material
details that would warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.40 As we have held
in the case of People v. Marahay –
When prodded to specify the acts done to her,
she stated that her father "used her." No other
detail was evoked from her to show the
attendant elements that constitute rape, the
crime charged. Such bare statements cannot
suffice to establish accused-appellant’s guilt
with the required quantum of evidence.41
In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the
need for the prosecution to ask the necessary
probing questions in order to elicit from a
witness crucial details to establish the
elements of the crime charged.
Likewise, AAA’s sworn statement cannot be
the basis for appellant’s conviction for the
second and third incidents of rape. To recall,
AAA declared in said statement that the rape
which allegedly occurred on 24 March 1999
was the one witnessed by their carpenter
Quiambao. However, on the witness stand,
she declared that when Quiambao saw
appellant on top of her, appellant had not yet
inserted his penis into her vagina. In fact, her
testimony does not even state whether
appellant’s penis even touched her vagina at
all. In the absence of a statement that
appellant’s penis touched even just her labia
majora, we have to acquit him for the 24
March 1999 incident.
As regards the rape purportedly committed on
25 March 1999, AAA’s sworn statement, like
her testimony, contained a mere conclusion
that she was raped by appellant on that day
which we find insufficient to support a finding
of appellant’s guilt.
We now turn to the appropriate penalties that
should be imposed upon appellant for the two
counts of acts of lasciviousness and one count
of rape. Appellant contends, and the Court of
Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor
General agree with him, that the trial court
erred in appreciating AAA’s minority in
determining the imposable penalties on him.
We find merit in this contention.
While it is alleged in the Informations that
AAA was only 16 years old at the time the
crimes charged were committed, nevertheless,
the prosecution failed to substantiate said
allegation. In establishing the minority of the
alleged victim, the courts are to be guided by
our pronouncement in the case of People v.
Pruna,42 to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under
the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him. 43
In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on
BBB’s unsubstantiated claim with regard to
AAA’s age, particularly since the loss of her
birth certificate was not sufficiently
established. We cannot overemphasize the
importance of fixing with exactitude AAA’s
age, for under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, rape by sexual intercourse is
punishable by the supreme penalty of death in
case "the victim is under 18 years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim." The severity, permanence and
irreversible nature of the penalty prescribed
by law makes the decision-making process in
capital offenses, such as qualified rape,
subject to the most exacting rules of procedure
and evidence.44
On the other hand, the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code should be
considered against appellant since in crimes
against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness,
relationship is considered aggravating.45 In
this case, as it was clearly mentioned in the
Informations and admitted by appellant that
AAA is his daughter, their relationship
aggravated the two charges of acts of
lasciviousness.
Acts of lasciviousness is punished under the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, appellant should
be made to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition,
appellant is to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00
as moral damages for each count of acts of
lasciviousness.46
With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-
1447-H, because of the prosecution’s failure
to establish with certainty that AAA was still
a minor at the time the incestuous rape was
committed by appellant, the appropriate
penalty should only be reclusion perpetua in
accordance with the first sentence of Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code which states
that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A,
or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua. In addition to
this, and consistent with the prevailing
jurisprudence,47 appellant is also held liable to
AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated 31 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
A. Appellant Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon is
hereby found GUILTY:
1. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445, of acts
of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate prison term of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correccional, as maximum
and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty
Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446, of acts
of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate prison term of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to
six (6) years of prision correccional, as
maximum and to pay AAA the amount of
Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) pesos as moral
damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H, of
rape through sexual intercourse, and he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of fifty
thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos as civil
indemnity, fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos
as moral damages, and twenty-five thousand
(₱25,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
B. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charges
in MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents
and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of
private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for
recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive
owner of the properties described in paragraph
3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia
Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives
were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the
documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and
papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they
were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner,
without his knowledge and consent. For that
reason, the trial court declared the documents
and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them
to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground
is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix,
Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and
papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of
respondent's comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their
use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did
not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct, For this reason it is contended
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court instead of
dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case
against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed
malpractice or gross misconduct because of
the injunctive order of the trial court. In
dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be
"impressed with merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross
misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.],
he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for
legal separation before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of
the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting
Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-
1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on
a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
restraining order on aforesaid date which infidelity) who is the party against whom the
order temporarily set aside the order of the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of only exception to the prohibition in the
this Court's order, respondent's request for Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
petitioner to admit the genuineness and a] court or when public safety or order
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be requires otherwise, as prescribed by
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, law."4 Any violation of this provision renders
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At purpose in any proceeding." 5
that point in time, would it have been
The intimacies between husband and wife do
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's
not justify any one of them in breaking the
admission as evidence against him in the legal
drawers and cabinets of the other and in
separation case pending in the Regional Trial
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
malpractice.
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done right to privacy as an individual and the
not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself constitutional protection is ever available to
under oath, Such verified admission him or to her.
constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
The law insures absolute freedom of
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner
communication between the spouses by
became bound by his admission. For Cecilia
making it privileged. Neither husband nor
to avail herself of her husband's admission and
wife may testify for or against the other
use the same in her action for legal separation
without the consent of the affected spouse
cannot be treated as malpractice.
while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the examined without the consent of the other as
administrative case amounts to no more than a to any communication received in confidence
declaration that his use of the documents and by one from the other during the marriage,
papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is
admission as to their genuiness and freedom of communication; quite another is a
authenticity did not constitute a violation of compulsion for each one to share what one
the injunctive order of the trial court. By no knows with the other. And this has nothing to
means does the decision in that case establish do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the admissibility of the documents and papers the other.
in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. DENIED for lack of merit.
Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
SO ORDERED.
violating the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was
temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO
issued by this Court was eventually lifted as
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against the trial court's order was dismissed
and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers
became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question

are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel
Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim,
Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages
in the amount of P186,410.00, or total
damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs
of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with
Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30,
1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, in order to have carnal
knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D.
UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal
injuries resulting in the death of the victim,
and on the occasion or by reason thereof,
accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 arrived home and found that the lights in her
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a
and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the
house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were
talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz
Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar,
through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan.
Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier
that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her
husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for
their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers
away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she
intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event
she would not be able to leave, she would just
stay home and wash her clothes or go to the
house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn
was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen
year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house
of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of
the house. They went inside the house through
the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of
water. Anita asked appellant what he was
doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way
home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant
descend the ladder from the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards
the back of the house.6 She later noticed
appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with
collar and black pants, pacing back and forth
at the back of the house. She did not find this
unusual as appellant and his wife used to live
in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant
when he called her near her house. This time,
he was wearing a black shirt without collar
and blue pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting the lumber he had
stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She
noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish
and sharp." Appellant asked her where her
husband was as he had something important to
tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and
appellant immediately left and went towards
the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang
house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the
ground floor was open. She noticed that the
water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up
earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder to the second floor of the house to
see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that
the door was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and
rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire
body. She found out that it was the naked body
of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for
help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel
was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused
the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the
floor naked, with her intestines protruding out
of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had
arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of
Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa
received a report that a dead woman was
found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together
with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to
the house and found the naked body of
Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police
officers that appellant was seen going down
the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at
approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties,
brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside
her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime,
and they found a dirty white shirt splattered
with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities,
appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed
under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police
officers if he could relieve himself. Police
Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the
toilet around seven to ten meters away from
the police station. They suddenly heard
someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police
Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the
gate of the Police Station and saw appellant
running away. Appellant was approximately
70 meters away from the station when Police
Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he
was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the
crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the
following errors:
I time of death may be approximated from
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which
has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the
trial court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal unless
cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the
same; the reason being that the former is in a
better and unique position of hearing first
hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent
any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect
the result of the case, the trial judge’s
assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where
there is nothing to show that the witnesses for
the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence
must be appreciated in light of the well-settled
rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available,
as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total
of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen
and back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor
mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete
when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00
a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the
between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to
the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other
words, the estimated time of death was
sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on
June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe
within which the lone presence of appellant
lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was
testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the
Postmortem Report by the attending
physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates
that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or
hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in
the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the
introduction of semen into the vaginal canal
could only be done through sexual intercourse
with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent
from the pictures submitted by the prosecution
that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in
her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that
the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim
was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms.23 A
person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it
does not change throughout a person’s
lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has
been advanced as a uniquely effective means
to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a
wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is
a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely
in effecting a more accurate account of the
crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal
of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene
can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving
sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen,
blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and
fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the
victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic
DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there
was physical contact between an assailant and
a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute
(NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in
this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem
Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny
amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be
copied exponentially within hours. Thus,
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has
become much easier since it became possible
to reliably amplify small samples using the
PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado
de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print
or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de
Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the
gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from
the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are
identical with semen taken from the victim’s
vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate leading to the second floor of the house of
these advances in science and technology in Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
the Philippine criminal justice system, so we victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of
must be cautious as we traverse these blood with her intestines protruding from her
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we body on the second floor of the house of Isabel
can benefit from the wealth of persuasive Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
jurisprudence that has developed in other underwear and shoes scattered along the
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing periphery; (10) Laboratory examination
doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit
"H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that
shirt found in the crime scene was found to be
pertinent evidence based on scientifically
positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide,
valid principles could be used as long as it was
Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA
relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert,
profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
were allowed greater discretion over which
Appellant escaped two days after he was
testimony they would allow at trial, including
detained but was subsequently apprehended,
the introduction of new kinds of scientific
such flight being indicative of guilt.35
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure. Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to
warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion
induce belief in its existence or non-
of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To
existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the
determine whether there is sufficient
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
through PCR testing and utilizing STR
concur: (1) there is more than one
analysis, and which was appreciated by the
circumstance; (2) facts on which the
court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
reasonably based on scientifically valid
combination of all the circumstances is such
principles of human genetics and molecular
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
biology.
doubt.36
Independently of the physical evidence of
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence,
appellant’s semen found in the victim’s
the appellant contends that the blood sample
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
following circumstantial evidence as being
conducted in violation of his right to remain
sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
silent as well as his right against self-
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
of the Constitution.
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In
June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house This contention is untenable. The kernel of the
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) right is not against all compulsion, but against
Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn testimonial compulsion.37 The right against
Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the self- incrimination is simply against the legal
early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant process of extracting from the lips of the
was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly accused an admission of guilt. It does not
Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near apply where the evidence sought to be
the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white object evidence.
shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although
appellant going down the ladder of the house
accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to
shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing
the National Bureau of Investigation for
a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when
forensic examination, the hair samples may be
the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
admitted in evidence against him, for what is
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw
proscribed is the use of testimonial
appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down
compulsion or any evidence communicative
the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day
Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door
in nature acquired from the accused under
duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit
to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of
the accused without the presence of counsel,
we ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. The accused
may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in
an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case
submitted himself for blood sampling which
was conducted in open court on March 30,
2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests
conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort
thereto is tantamount to the application of
an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post
facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily
to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight
of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi
cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding
the eyewitness accounts of his presence at
Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when
the crime was committed, undeniably link him
to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did
not demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence an impossibility to be in two places
at the same time, especially in this case where
the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred
(100) meter radius from the scene of the
crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to
reach one house from the other. This fact
severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error,
appellant asserts that the court a
quo committed reversible error in convicting
him of the crime charged. He alleges that he
should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and
rely upon duly established evidence and never
on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal
relevancy of evidence denotes "something
more than a minimum of probative value,"
suggesting that such evidentiary relevance
must contain a "plus value."41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from
being satisfied by matters of slight value,
capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and
hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not
legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to balance the probative
value of such evidence against the likely harm
that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld
only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral
certainty of guilt in order to sustain a
conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of
certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond
reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on
the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the
accused, and no one else, committed the
offense charged.43 In view of the totality of
evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the
purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential
for conviction when there is doubt as to the
identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-
a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she
last saw the victim alive in the morning of
June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant
running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and
proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few days
before the victim was raped and killed, the
latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came from the
school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the
incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her
five days before her naked and violated body
was found dead in her grandmother’s house on does not disprove sexual abuse especially
June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also when the victim is of tender age.56
testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of
Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her
the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than
husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his
family."49 According to Judilyn, who was
wife separated, appellant lived in the house of
personally present during an argument
his mother-in-law, together with the victim
between her aunt and the appellant, the exact
and his wife. After the separation, appellant
words uttered by appellant to his wife in the
moved to the house of his parents,
Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will
approximately one hundred (100) meters from
kill all your family and your relatives x x
his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by
x."50 These statements were not contradicted
affinity within the third civil degree, he is
by appellant.
deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault ascendancy over the victim.
and kill the victim was evident in the instant
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive,
Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by
being a state of mind, is established by the
reason or on the occasion of the rape,
testimony of witnesses on the acts or
homicide is committed. Although three (3)
statements of the accused before or
Justices of this Court maintain their position
immediately after the commission of the
that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
offense, deeds or words that may express it or
prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless
from which his motive or reason for
submit to the ruling of the majority that the
committing it may be inferred.51
law is not unconstitutional, and that the death
Accordingly, we are convinced that the penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bar.
the special complex crime of rape with
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of
homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted
P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by
Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
the family of the victim that have been proved
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his
at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and
lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s
moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be
lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby
awarded in the light of prevailing law and
causing her untimely demise.
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be
The following are the elements constitutive of awarded as part of the civil liability since the
rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had crime was not committed with one or more
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal aggravating circumstances.60
knowledge of a woman was achieved by
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3)
Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-
knowledge by means of force, threat or
98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias
intimidation, appellant killed the
52 "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
woman. However, in rape committed by
crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED
close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-
with the MODIFICATION that he be
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of
ORDERED to pay the family of the victim
her mother, it is not necessary that actual force
Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the
or intimidation be employed.53 Moral
amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual
influence or ascendancy takes the place of
damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages.
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the
The award of exemplary damages is
victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a
DELETED.
finding that rape was committed as mere entry
by the penis into the lips of the female genital Upon the finality of this Decision and in
organ, even without rupture or laceration of accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
the hymen, suffices for conviction of Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No.
rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith
hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as forwarded to the President of the Philippines
to stretch without laceration during for the possible exercise of the pardoning
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations power.
G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA,
JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE,
VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and
JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF
DOES NOT ELIMINATE POSSIBILITY
THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN
AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Although
We agree with their opinion that a positive
finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, We cannot sustain their theory
that from the negative findings in the
fingerprint examination conducted in the
course of the investigation in the instant case,
it must be concluded that they could not have
been at the scene of the crime. Negative
findings do not at all times lead to a valid
conclusion for there may be logical
explanations for the absence of identifiable
latent prints other than their not being present
at the scene of the crime. Only latent
fingerprints found on smooth surface are
useful for purposes of comparison in a crime
laboratory because prints left on rough
surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines
instead of complete and continuous lines.
Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon
in a fingerprint examination. The latent
fingerprints are actually oily substance
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come
in contact with the fingers. By their very
nature, oily substances easily spread such that
when the fingers slide against the surface they
touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only
smudges instead. Not all police investigators
are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints
so as to be guided accordingly in deciding
which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting
and examination. Noting the interplay of
many circumstances involved in the
successful lifting and identification of proper
latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene,
the absence of one does not immediately
eliminate the possibility that the accused-
appellants could have been at the scene of the
crime. They may be there yet they had not left
any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in
the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are
involved. The findings in this particular
fingerprint examination are not sufficient to
case even just a reasonable doubt in their
finding of guilt for the crime charged.
2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT
REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROPER
IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY
MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE
LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. —
Whether or not there was a previous police
line-up, the fact is that they were positively
identified at the trial. There is no law requiring
a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. The complainant's recognition
of the accused-appellants as her attackers
cannot be doubted for she had during the
carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces
of the men who ravaged her. It is the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime was committed. Most often
the face of the assailant and body movement
thereof, create a lasting impression which
cannot easily be erased from their memory.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF
INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They
claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and
Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they
had all the opportunities to do so, prove their
innocence. When they were allowed to go
home after Vilma failed to identify them
during the first confrontation at the police
station, they stayed home and did not flee until
they were again required to appear at the
police station for the second time. The
accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight
is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the
decision not to flee, having the opportunity to
do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree.
Although it is settled that unexplained flight
indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow
that absence thereof proves innocence,
specially so when there is overwhelming
evidence to establish their guilt.
4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST
RESPECT; EXCEPTION. — this Court finds
no reversible error having been committed by
the trial court in convicting the three accused-
appellants for the crime of robbery with
multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of
fact which are firmly grounded on the
evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate
our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew
that this Court has long been committed to the
principle that the determination by a trial
judge who could weigh and appraise the
testimony as to the facts fully proved is
entitled to the highest respect, unless it could
be shown that he ignored or disregarded
circumstances of weight or influence
sufficient to call for a different finding."
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF
PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST
CHASTITY; INDEMNITY TO VICTIM
FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY
CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED SOLIDARILY
LIABLE THEREFOR. — With regard to the
indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of
conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all,
each must be liable for all the three rapes
committed, they must be held solidarily liable
for said indemnity which the trial court fixed
at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of
P90,000.00.
6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED
NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE
OFFSPRING. — This Court cannot uphold
the trial court's ruling ordering each of the
accused to "recognize the offspring if there by
any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required
to recognized the offspring of the offended
woman. In a case where three persons, one
after another, raped a woman, neither of the
accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring
simply because it was impossible to determine
the paternity thereof.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna
convicted all three accused-appellants in its
decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the
accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy
Bascoña (sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana
y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals of the crime of Robbery With
Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; there
being two aggravating circumstances without
any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, hereby sentences each of the said
accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with the accessories provided for by
the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to
indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen
the sum of P30,000.00, and each of them shall
recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to
return the personal properties stolen or pay its
equivalent amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio
de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1
The facts of the case may be summarized as
follows:
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while
Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his
sister Vilma de Belen were sleeping in their
house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant
broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at
him. They tied up his hands and made him lie
flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his
cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his
companions, he reluctantly told them where
the key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard
whispers (kaluskos) but simply played
possum. When the three saw her on the bed,
they approached her. One covered her mouth
as another poked a knife at her neck. They
threatened to kill her if she should make an
outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her
underwear. They tied both her hands so that
she could offer no resistance. She was at such
a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy
Bascuña went on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, while Vicente Sta.
Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally
inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied
his bestial desire. After Jimmy was over,
Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the
three of them had successfully deflowered
Vilma, they left, carrying with them the
money and other personal belongings of the de
Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his
hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from
the bed and switched the lights on and called
to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile,
had lost consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law
who lives right next to his house responded to
his cry for help. She went to their house and
untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper
body naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma
with a blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-
law also arrived. They reported the incident to
the Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A.
Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital
at about 10:00 that same morning. He
conducted external and internal examinations.
His external examination showed no physical
injuries except that he noted several abrasions
at the genital area. His internal examination
showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at 9:00
and 4:00 positions. The vagina admitted two
fingers with ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error
is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED
TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS
INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of
ignoring the fingerprint examination report
submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the
PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none
of the specimen latent fingerprints were found
to be positive. It is their contention that since
their fingerprints were not found in the objects
found in the scene of the crime they cannot be
held guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a
positive finding of matching fingerprints has
great significance, We cannot sustain their
theory that from the negative findings in the
fingerprint examination conducted in the
course of the investigation in the instant case,
it must be concluded that they could not have
been at the scene of the crime. Negative
findings do not at all times lead to a valid
conclusion for there may be logical
explanations for the absence of identifiable
latent prints other than their not being present
at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth
surface are useful for purposes of comparison
in a crime laboratory because prints left on
rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken
lines instead of complete and continuous lines.
Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon
in a fingerprint examination. The latent
fingerprints are actually oily substances
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come
in contact with the fingers. By their very
nature, oily substances easily spread such that
when the fingers slide against the surface they
touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only
smudges instead. Not all police investigators
are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints
so as to be guided accordingly in deciding
which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting
and examination. Noting the interplay of
many circumstances involved in the
successful lifting and identification of proper
latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene,
the absence of one does not immediately
eliminate the possibility that the accused-
appellants could have been at the scene of the
crime. They may be there yet they had not left
any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in
the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are
involved. The findings in this particular
fingerprint examination are not sufficient to
cast even just a reasonable doubt in their
finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that
the police line-up had been irregularly
conducted revealing suggestibility to their
prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of
coaching complainant Vilma de Belen when
she identified her three assailants. They claim
that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they were not
allowed to select their positions at the line-up;
that they were not placed in line under a
numeral against a wall marked to indicate
their respective height in feet and inches; that
there was no record made of their descriptions
and physical characteristics; that the
witness/victim was not out of view of the three
(3) accused lined-up for identification
purposes." 2
We find these claims of irregularities of little
if not, of no significance at all when
considered in the light of the natural desire in
the victim to seek retribution not simply from
anybody who may be put before her but from
the very same offenders who actually did
violence against her. It would be most
illogical for an outraged victim to direct her
anger against anyone other than her three
offenders. We cannot accept the accused-
appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes'
suggestion that the victim pointed to the
accused-appellants as her assailants. No
amount of coaching will be sufficient to
counter the natural outrage of a rape victim
against her abuser when said abuser is
presented before her in a police line-up. The
outrage displayed by the rape victim was a
spontaneous reaction. She identified her
assailants because of no other reason except to
let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police
line-up, the fact is that they were positively
identified at the trial. There is no law requiring
a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. 3 The complainant's
recognition of the accused-appellants as her
attackers cannot be doubted for she had during
the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the
faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the
most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime was committed. Most often
the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, create a lasting impression which
cannot easily be erased from their memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the
Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez
concludes that the alleged victim of rape,
Vilma de Belen must have had sexual
experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) days before
the alleged incident happened on July 2, 1988
at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". 5 There
is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no
categorical or positive assertion on the part of
Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with
Vilma was committed on the very date when
the alleged "robbery with rape" took place on
July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of
Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination
testified as follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the
first and when was the last intercourse as per
your examination?
FISCAL
Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of
hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic)
recent not more than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week,
could it be 6 or 5 days?
A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim
could have experienced sexual intercourse 6
to 5 days that was indicated in your
examination marked as Exh. A, can you
determine as per your finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal
laceration because laceration will determine
whether it is fresh or old because of the
characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in
your medical opinion it could have been 5 or
6 days had elapsed?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
to seek clarification in witness' testimony
proceeded as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that
there was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
— and on the lower opening of the vagina on
the right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that
portion there is no other injury which you
found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your
medicolegal certificate that there was fresh
hymenal laceration noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on
the face of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in
your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet
healed?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q From that finding of yours regarding the convicting the three accused-appellants for the
existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said crime of robbery with multiple rape under
that it least one or 2 days had elapsed before Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
you have conducted the physical We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly
examination? grounded on the evidence presented at the
trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
A Yes, your Honor.
"There is need to stress anew that this Court
Q In other words from one to 5 days?
has long been committed to the principle that
A Yes, your Honor. the determination by a trial judge who could
weigh and appraise the testimony as to the
COURT: facts duly proved is entitled to the highest
Q But it is possible that it could be more than respect, unless it could be shown that he
one or two days?. ignored or disregarded circumstances of
weight or influence sufficient to call for a
WITNESS: different finding." 8
A Yes, your Honor." 7 We are for the affirmance of the conviction of
the three accused-appellants. With regard to
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never
the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
categorically concluded that the sexual
rape, there having been evidence of
intercourse causing the fresh hymenal
conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all,
lacerations took place five to six days before
each must be liable for all the three rapes
the date of her examination. The accused-
committed, they must be held solidarily liable
appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse
9 for said indemnity which the trial court fixed
took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is
at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of
conjectural and without factual basis.
P90,000.00. 10
The claim of the accused-appellants that the
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial
prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence
court's ruling ordering each of the accused to
to refute the averments of Joel Sartagoda that
"recognize the offspring if there be any". In
they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the
multiple rape, not one maybe required to
charge against him and to implicate his two
recognized the offspring of the offended
(2) co-accused did not deserve the attention of
woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one
the trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being
after another, raped a woman, neither of the
per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the
accused was ordered to recognize the
light of human experience.
offspring simply because it was impossible to
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente determine the paternity thereof.
Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
even when they had all the opportunities to do
appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
so, prove their innocence. When they were
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants
allowed to go home after Vilma failed to
are held jointly and severally liable to
identify them during the first confrontation at
indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in
the police station, they stayed home and did
the amount of P90,000.00, and that none of the
not flee until they were again required to
accused is required to recognize the offspring.
appear at the police station for the second
time. The accused-appellants in effect posit SO ORDERED.
that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight
or the decision not to flee, having the
opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
We do not agree. Although it is settled that
unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not
necessarily follow that absence thereof proves
innocence, specially so when there is
overwhelming evidence to establish their
guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having
been committed by the trial court in