CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DOCTRINES

Submitted By:

AGUILLON, DEO

BATION, GRACE

BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

FABRE, KARL

FLORES, MONICA

PEPINO, ERWIN

ROJAS, JANELLE

YULO, ANDRIEL
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. JURISDICTION

1.) GR NO. 131283

2.) GR NO. 97805
3.) GR NO. L-27343
4.) GR NO. L- 3448
5.) GR NO. L-18692
6.) GR NO. 170375
7.) GR NO. 155179
8.) GR NO. 149554
9.) GR NO. 180321
10.) GR NO. 123215
11.) GR NO. 173915

II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION

1.) GR NO. 17299

IN PERSONAM; IN REM

1.) GR NO. 120587

2.) GR NO. L-67451
3.) GR NO. 158407

III. SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION

1.) GR NO. L-41423

2.) GR NO. L-13159
3.) GR NO. 74730

IV. JOINDER

1.) GR NO. 155736

2.) GR NO. 153829

V. MISJOINDER

1.) GR NO. 182435

VI. PARTIES TO AN ACTION

1.) GR NO. 53820

2.) GR NO. 77356

INDISPENSABLE PARTY

1.) GR NO. 160347

2.) GR NO. 5963
3.) GR NO. 98467
4.) GR NO. 102900

PERMISSIBLE JOINDER OF PARTIES

1.) GR NO. 110015

2.) GR NO. 98467
3.) GR NO. 159121

VII. CLASS SUIT

1.) GR NO. 7309

VIII. RULE 3, SECTION 16 AND 17

1.) GR NO. 140954

2.) GR NO. 141834
3.) GR NO. L-33949
4.) GR NO. 134100

PERSONAL ACTION

1.) GR NO. L-17699

2.) GR NO. L-29791
3.) GR NO. 130991

STIPULATION ON VENUE

1.) GR NO. 111077

2.) GR NO. L-27033
3.) GR NO. 144169
SUBSTITUTIONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS

1.) GR NO. 139283

2.) GR NO. 170943
3.) GR NO. 147369
4.) GR NO. 108538

PERMISSIVE COUNTER CLAIM

1.) GR NO. 139018

2.) GR NO. L-21266
3.) GR NO. 132264
4.) GR NO. 146019
5.) GR NO. 152576

REPLY

1.) GR NO. 116813

PARTS OF PLEADINGS
FORUM – SHOPPING

1.) GR NO. 93924

2.) GR NO. 136100
3.) GR NO. 135945
4.) GR NO. 139337

VERIFICATION VS NON – FORUM SHOPPING

1.) GR NO. 146364

2.) GR NO. 175512

ULTIMATE FACTS

1.) GR NO. 89114

ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT

1.) GR NO. 86568

FAILURE TO FILE AN ANSWER

1.) GR NO. 185922

2.) GR NO. 133240
3.) GR NO. 144568
4.) GR NO. 150768
REMEDIES OF A PARTS DECLARED IN DEFENSE IF

1.) GR NO. 148019

RULE 10

1.) Campus v. Bautista

2.) Gaspar v. Durado
3.) Swagman v. CA
4.) GR NO. L- 72566
 I. JURISDICTION

OSCAR FERNANDEZ VS.THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK

G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999

DOCTRINES:

Jurisdiction of the court, how determined? – AGUILLON, DEO

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in

the complaint, not by the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.

Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess of P200,000 and
thus outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. This argument has no
legal and factual basis. The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners,
as shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the collection of the sum of
P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although
the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded
P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case.
After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage that had been
used to secure petitioners' loan. In any case, private respondents are entitled only to
the amount owed them.

Objection as to Venue, when made?

Objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any

responsive pleading is filed.

Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper
venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. 1 The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over
the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction.

Objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any

responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative
relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which,
although mandatory, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be
seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived. In the present case,
petitioners' objection to the venue of the case was raised for the first time in the
Answer itself. Not having been raised on time, their objection is therefore deemed
waived.1
1
Rule 14, Section 4 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, provided that "[w]hen improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." Petitioners' Answer invoking improper
venue was filed on January 9, 1997, and the MTC denied it its February 20, 1997 Order.
RAYMUNDO vs CA

WRIT OF MANDATORY INJUCTION - BATION, GRACE

A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional

because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the
main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.2

A court has no power to interfere with the judgments or decrees of a court of

concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction. – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

The rule which prohibits a Judge from intertering with the actuations of the
Judge of another branch of the same court is not infringed when the Judge who
modifies or annuls the order isued by the other Judge acts in the same case and
belongs to the same court (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193. But the rule is
infringed when the Judge of a branch of the court issues a writ of preliminary
injunction in a case to enjoint the sheriff from carrying out an order by execution
issued in another case by the Judge of another branch of the same court. (Cabigao
and Izquierdo vs. Del Rosario et al., 44 Phil. 182). 3

JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE OF PEACE OF COURT AND HOW IT IS

DETERMINED– DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

In the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), we find the following pertinent
provisions:.

"SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:

"(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than two thousand pesos;"

SEC. 86. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of
chartered cities. — The jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts of chartered cities shall consist.

"(b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their respective municipalities, and
not exclusively cognizable by the Courts of First Instance."

2
Raymundo VS CA GR No. 97805; September 2 1992
3
[G.R. No. L-27343. February 28, 1979.] MANUEL G. SINGSON, JOSE BELZUNCE, AGUSTIN E. TONSAY, JOSE L.
ESPINOS, BACOLOD SOUTHERN LUMBER YARD, and OPPEN, ESTEBAN, INC., plaintiff-appellees, vs. ISABELA
SAWMILL, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO LEON GARIBAY, TIMOTEO
TUBUNGBANUA, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendants, MARGARITA G.
SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO, defendants-appellants.
"SEC. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. — In all civil actions, including those
mentioned in rules 59 and 62 of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city,
and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the justice of the
peace and the judge of a municipal court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter or amount of the demand
does not exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs. It is clear
from the above provisions that the case in question comes within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal court or justice of the peace court. 4

Venue of real actions – FABRE, KARL

The action must be commenced in the province where the property is situated
pursuant to Section 3 (now Section 1), Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies. 5

Republic vs. Mangotara

GR 170375
July 7, 2010

DOCTRINE: Hierarchy of Courts. – FLORES, MONICA

The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

According to Rule 41, Section 2(c)6 of the Rules of Court, a decision or order
of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law 7.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
4
MANUEL CRUZ, petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Rizal City
Branch, and TELESFORA YAMBAO, respondents. (Cruz v. Tan, G.R. No. L-3448, [November 27, 1950], 87 PHIL
627-631)
5
MANUEL B. RUIZ vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL. (G.R. No. L-18692; January 31, 1963)

6
Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 2.  Modes of appeal. –
xxxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
7
Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
 Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether
Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable
parties and for forum shopping.

VICTORINO QUINAGORAN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
G.R. NO. 155179, August 24, 2007

TOPIC : JURISDICTION – PEPINO, ERWIN

DOCTRINE :
The jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. ( Laresma v. Abellana, G.R.
No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 172. )

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of , real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.(Emphasis supplied).

The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of
real property with an assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00 if outside Metro
Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. (
(Aliabo v. Carampatan, 407 Phil. 31, 36 (2001).8

What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. – ROJAS, JANELLE

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 9

EDITHA PADLAN  vs. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN –

YULO, ANDRIEL

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the

allegations contained in the complaint, nature of the action, and the character
of the relief(s) sought

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a

case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it,
is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 10

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein
and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 11

8
G.R. NO. 155179, August 24, 2007
9
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and
MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO G.R. No. 149554 (July 1, 2003)
10
City of Dumaguete vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 102, 119 .
11
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 180765, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 397,
404.
 Whereas, in this case and during the year 2013, the expanding of the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts through the amendment of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691 was herein discussed 12:

Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00),
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first

level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.

However, the provisions above have been amended by Republic Act No.
11576 on July 30, 2021, and is known as the: Act further expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980,” as amended.13

12
Effective April 15, 1994.
13
Republic Act No. 11576: Act further expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended.
 NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 123215 February 2, 1999

DOCTRINES:

Failure to acquire jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint due to non-

payment of the required filing fees? – AGUILLON, DEO

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as
well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. 2 The court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the
pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as
the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime.

It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the
complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees.
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the
trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable
time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3

If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely
raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. While the
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless,
the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the
very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction
because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. 4

JURISDOCTION OF THE RTC – BATION, GRACE

Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 17 as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, 18 states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as
amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first
adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from
P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the second
adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22,
2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator on May 13, 2004.

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the
complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCC's jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to
P300,000.00.

But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral
damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court
has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of
kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorney's
fees, etc., be used?

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 19 is instructive: AICDSa

xxx xxx xxx

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
(Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the
recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint
principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by
respondent by reason of petitioners' utterance while they were at a police station in
Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that respondent's main action is for damages. Hence,
the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences
of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. 14

II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION

The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there
is any written acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155) –
BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

The fact that summons was only served on defendant on July 2, 1957, which
incidentally and/or coincidentally was the end of the ten (10) year period, is of no
moment, since civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filing and
docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the
issuance and service of summons (Sotelo v. Dizon, et al., 67 Phil. 573). The
contention that the period was not interrupted, until after defendant received the
summons is, therefore, without legal basis.15

The established rule then, as it is the rule now, under the New Civil Code, is
that the commencement of the suit prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation
period, interrupts the running of the statute, as to all parties to the action. Since civil
actions are deemed commenced from the date of the filing and docketing of the
complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance and
service of summons, the contention that the period was not interrupted until after
defendant received the summons is, therefore, without legal basis. 16

IN REM; IN PERSONAM.

BARGO VS CA – DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object
to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it. 

There are two aspects of jurisdiction which are vital for disposition of this case
— jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, and jurisdiction over the
parties. Barco claims that the RTC failed to satisfy both aspects of jurisdiction. She
14
[G.R. No. 173915. February 22, 2010.] IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO
T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N.
KALASHIAN, respondents.

15
[G.R. No. L-17299. July 31, 1963.] JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS OMULON,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO T. TIANO, defendant-appellant.

16
Id.
opines that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the parties due to the failure to
implead her as a party to the petition for correction. On the other hand, the remaining
issues that she raises as errors put into question whether the RTC had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Nadina's petition. 17

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT –

FABRE, KARL

Quieting of Title is an action quasi in rem;

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.18

Filomena Domagas vs. Vivian Layno Jensen

GR 158407
January 17, 2005

DOCTRINE: Action in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem – FLORES, MONICA

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character19. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that
matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only 20. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against
the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant 21. Of this character
are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten
a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its
object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the
propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against
the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it
is an injunctive act in personam22.
17
Id.
18
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(Special Third Civil Cases Division), HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, and
COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION (G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987).
19
National Surety Co. v. Austin Machinery Corporation, 35 F.2d 842 (1929)
20
Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 (1948)
21
Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539 (1998)
22
Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in
which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
 On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut
off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding
only upon the parties who joined in the action.

III. SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION

TOPIC : SINGLE CLAUSE ACTION – PEPINO, ERWIN

DOCTRINE :
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission

committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true
that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person. 4
( I Moran, 1979 Ed., 129-130. )23

A contract embraces only one cause of action because it may be violated only
once even if it contains several stipulations. – ROJAS, JANELLE

Non-payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a single cause of

action. The creditor cannot split up this single cause of action into two separate
complaints, one for payment of the debt and another for the foreclosure of the
mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the second complaint.
In other words, the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall be
considered as a waiver of the right to foreclose the mortgage executed thereon. 24

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

HERBERT MANZANA
GR No. 74730, August 25, 1989 – YULO, ANDRIEL

23
LUIS JOSEPH vs. HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN,
ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA (G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989)
24
REMEDIOS QUIOGUE, ET AL. vs. JACINTO BAUTISTA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-13159 (February 28, 1962)
DOCTRINE: The splitting of a single cause of action is prohibited

The splitting of a single cause of action by applying for several reliefs is

prohibited under Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It warrants as a ground for
dismissal in fact, when there is a mere filing or a judgment on the case’s merits 25.

The purpose of which is to avoid the multiplicity of suits, harassment and the
unjust vexation to the defendant, 26 and its main goal being the unburdening of the
courts27.
As applied and held in the Bachrach case 28:
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the
recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his
action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the
debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt
and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the
former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists
only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure
of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we
will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

IV. JOINDER

SPOUSES DECENA vs. SPOUSES PIQUERO

G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005

25
Rule 2, Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action effect of. – If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filling of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others. (As amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
26
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 1988 ed., p. 43.
27
Chu vs. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, Sept. 12, 2011.
28
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., v Esteban, et al., G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939.
DOCTRINES:

If one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. – AGUILLON, DEO

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may, in one pleading,
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which
is Section 5(c) which reads:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – (c) Where the causes of action

are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein.29

Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial
Court, the action should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action
have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue.
Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties reside. 30
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other which causes the latter injury. The essential elements of a cause of
action are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff; (2) a
correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect one’s right; and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right. 31 A cause of action
should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is
to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is
the substance and not the form that is controlling. 32 A party may have two or more
causes of action against another party.
In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust
is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is present. Other
tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other, whether
the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate
actions could be maintained for separate relief; or whether more than one distinct
primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication. 33

GR NO 153829 – BATION, GRACE

Rules on joinder of causes of action –

29
Rules of Court, Section 5, Rule 2. Joinder of causes of action.

30
J. Feria & M.C. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. I, 219-220 (2001 ed.)
31
Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, 28 February 1989, 170 SCRA 800.

32
Baker v. Baker,  264 NW 116 (1935).
33
Mc Pherson v. Smith, 328 S.W. 2d. 849 (1959)
 Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special
rules. Such contention, however, is utterly bereft of merit and insufficient to show
that the CA erred in upholding the trial court’s decision. Section 6 of Rule 2
explicitly provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal
of an action.34

V. MISJOINDER

GR No 182435 Misjoinder of Causes of Action – BUNCOG,

JEFFERSON

The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single

action.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action
is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one
action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It
is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be
made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or
petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or
petition.

A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or

by the court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the court together
with the other causes of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a
party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately.

A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as

it has some relation to the original cause of action set forth in the
original complaint.
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions,
occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading
sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute
another cause of action.35

34
Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
35
[G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.] LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BAYLON, REMO BAYLON, JOSE
BAYLON, ERIC BAYLON, FLORENTINO BAYLON, and MA. RUBY BAYLON, petitioners, vs. FLORANTE BAYLON,
respondent.
 VI. PARTIES TO AN ACTION

PARTIES; SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP, NEITHER A NATURAL NOR A

JURIDICAL PERSON, HENCE, NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO BRING SUIT
IN COURT. — DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. In Juasing Hardware vs.
Mendoza, this Court held that a single proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a
juridical person under Article 44 of the Civil Code; it is not an entity authorized by law
to bring suit in court.36 "The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a
single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure
licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the
national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the
sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court." 37
Meaning of the term “real party-in-interest”; The party-in-interest is one who
prosecutes or defends and is benefited or injured – FABRE, KARL

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Rule
3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that "every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in- interest." The party-in-
interest is one who prosecutes or defends and is benefited or injured. The term
applies not only to the plaintiff but to the defendant, and the suit may be dismissed if
neither of them is a real party-in-interest. If the suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action.38

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

Spouses Carandang vs. Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman

GR 160347
November 29, 2006

DOCTRINE: Husband and wife may not be enjoined as indispensable parties if

an action is for recovery or protection of the spouses’ conjugal property. –
FLORES, MONICA

36
YAO KA SIN TRADING, owned and operated by YAO KA SIN , petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and PRIME WHITE CEMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President-Chairman, CONSTANCIO B.
MAGLANA, respondents. (GR No. 53820; June 15, 1992).
37
Id.
38
TRAVEL WIDE ASSOCIATED SALES (PHILS.), INC., and TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
DECISION SYSTEMS CORPORATION and MANUEL A. ALCUAZ, JR. (G.R. No. 77356; July 15, 1991).
 Before proceeding with the substantive aspects of the case, however, there is
still one more procedural issue to tackle, the fourth issue presented by the spouses
Carandang on the non-inclusion in the complaint of an indispensable party 39.

The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros de Guzman

from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of their conjugal property and
under both the Civil Code and the Family Code the husband alone may institute an
action for the recovery or protection of the spouses’ conjugal property.

Thus, in Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court held that "x
x x Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a
matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. x x x Under the Family
Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent
of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require
that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases
as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. x x x."

The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms

"real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit 40. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a
necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined
as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action 41.

The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that "if a suit is not brought in the
name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action." However, what dismissal on
this ground entails is an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in
such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions
concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning
real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as
real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment of the suit.

39
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants

40
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
41
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 8. Necessary party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
TOPIC : INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
DOCTRINE : A valid judgment cannot be rendered where there is a want of
necessary parties, and a court cannot properly adjudicate matters involved in
a suit when necessary and indispensable parties to the proceedings are not
before it. – PEPINO, ERWIN

"Indispensable parties are those without whom the action cannot be finally
determined.  In a case for recovery of real property, the defendant alleged in his
answer that he was occupying the property as a tenant of a third person.  This third
person is an indispensable party, for, without him, any judgment which the plaintiff
might obtain against the tenant would have no effectiveness, for it would not be
binding upon, and cannot be executed against, the defendant's landlord, against
whom the plaintiff has to file another action if he desires to recover the property
effectively.  In an action for partition of property, each co-owner is an indispensable
party, for without him no valid judgment for partition may be rendered."  (Moran,
Comments, 1952 ed. Vol. I, p. 56.)  (Italics supplied.)42

Joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory, and a complaint may be

dismissed if an indispensable party is not impleaded in the complaint. –
ROJAS, JANELLE

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder indispensable parties. — Parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.
Ordinarily, however, a reasonable opportunity to amend the pleading must be given,
and the action should not be dismissed, except when the plaintiff fails or refuses to
include said party, or the latter cannot be sued. 43

(GR NO. 102900)

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the Persons of Indispensable Parties – YULO,
ANDRIEL

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as

parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. 44
42
THE LEYTE-SAMAR SALES CO., and RAYMUNDO TOMASSI vs. SULPICIO V. CEA, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte and OLEGARIO LASTRILLA (GR 5963)
43
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. and AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, LTD., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN AND COMPANY, INC., TRANSWORLD INVESTMENT CORP.,
FIRST INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CO., INC., FAR EAST PETROLEUM AND MINERAL CORP., and
PHILCONTRUST INTERNATIONAL CORP. G.R. No. 98467 (July 10, 1992)

44
Rule 3, Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants . (as amended by A.M.
 …Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in
cases involving jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties which a court
must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the
service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary
appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such
defendant is null and void.45 A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law and, hence, it
can never become final and executory. 46
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with
reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of
all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.47 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court
(that) the action should be dismissed." 48 The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 49
Service wide Specialists, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals50 held that no final
determination of a case could be made if an indispensable party is not impleaded:
. . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence
as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be
a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable.
Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed
within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded. 51

PERMISSIBLE JOINDER OF PARTIES

QUESTION OF LAW; DISTINGUISHED FROM QUESTION OF FACT. — DE SAN

MIGUEL, DAVE

What a question of law or a question of fact is has been consistently defined

by the Court in this wise:" For a question to be one of law it must involve no
No. 19-10-20-SC).
45
 Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 51 Phil 980, 987, April 2, 1927.
46
 Plana vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 3 SCRA 395, 398, October 31, 1961.
47
Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil 345, 347, Jan. 28, 1925.
48
People et al. vs. Hon. Rodriguez, et al. 106 Phil 325, 327, September 30, 1959, per Bengzon, J.
49
Lim Tanbu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425, 448, August 29, 1975; Director of Land vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
238, 248, September 25, 1979; and Alabang Development vs. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA, 277, Aug. 30, 1982.
50
 251 SCRA 70, 75, December 8, 1995 per Vitug, J.
51
Arcelona, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or the falsehood of alleged facts." 52

Here, petitioner has made it very clear that it is not disputing respondent Court
of Appeals' and the trial court's findings vis-a-vis its failure to designate private
respondents as beneficiaries in the insurance policies it procured on the leased
building at the inception of the lease contract. And from the arguments raised herein
by petitioner, this Court is indeed not called upon to re-examine and appreciate anew
any evidence presented below, (e.g., the insurance policies, other documents and
oral testimony, etc.), and thereafter arrive at a contrary finding. What petitioner is
challenging is solely the respondent Court of Appeals' conclusion drawn from these
undisputed facts, i.e., that petitioner's omission to designate private respondents as
beneficiaries constituted a breach of paragraph 22 of the lease contract. This Court
in the early case of "Cunanan vs. Lazatin" (74 Phil. 719) has ruled that: "There is no
question of facts here because the facts are admittedly proven. Whether or not the
conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals from those facts is correct, is a question of
law which this Court is authorized to pass upon." 53

"Dauan vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources" (19 SCRA 223)
likewise held that: " it is a rule now settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is
a conclusion of law which the courts may review." And in the relatively recent case of
"Binalay vs. Manalo" (195 SCRA 374 1991), the Court, speaking thru Justice
Feliciano, reiterated the rule: "Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. But whether a conclusion drawn from
such findings of fact is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court." 54

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 98467, July 10, 1992

DOCTRINES:

52
MANILA BAY CLUB CORPORATION , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MODESTA SABENIANO and
MIRIAM SABENIANO, JUDITH SABENIANO, JOY DENNIS SABENIANO, et. al., respondents. (GR. No. 110015; July
11, 1995).
53
Id.
54
Id.
Joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and a complaint may be
dismissed if an indispensable party is not impleaded in the complaint. –
AGUILLON, DEO

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder indispensable parties. — Parties in interest

without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. 55

When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed.56 Ordinarily, however, a reasonable opportunity to amend the pleading
must be given, and the action should not be dismissed, except when the plaintiff fails
or refuses to include said party, or the latter cannot be sued. 57

NON - JOINDER OF PARTIES – BATION, GRACE

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of

an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply
with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents to implead the Pamplona
Plantation Leisure Corporation as respondent; instead, the Commission summarily
dismissed the Complaints.

In any event, there is no need to implead the leisure corporation because,

insofar as respondents are concerned, the leisure corporation and petitioner-
company are one and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of Appeals has held that
this Court has "full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to
amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as
party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest."58

VII. CLASS SUIT

GR No 7309 - Section 114 - Parties to Actions. – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

55
Rules of Court. Section 7, Rule 3. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
56
People vs. Hon. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325 [1959].
57
Cortez vs. Avila, 101 Phil. 205 [1957].
58
PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. and/or JOSE LUIS BONDOC, petitioners,
vs. RODEL TINGHIL, et. Al. (G.R. No. 159121; February 3, 2005).
NUMEROUS PARTIES. — The provisions of section 118 of the Code of Civil
Procedure refers to the case where a considerable number of persons have a
common and general interest in a certain thing and it would be impossible to have all
of them appear at the hearing.

Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. But
in the case of an assignment of a right of action by the assignee shall be without
prejudice to any set-off or other defense existing at the time of or before notice of the
assignment; but this last provision shall not apply to a negotiable promissory note, or
a draft or a bill of exchange, transferred in good faith and upon good consideration
before maturity. And an executor or administrator or legal representative of a
deceased person, or a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized
by law so to do, or a lawfully appointed guardian of a person of unsound mind, or of
a minor, may sue or be sued without joining with him the person for whose benefit
the action is prosecuted or defended.

Otherwise than as provided in this section, all persons having an interest in

the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs.
Any person should be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the
controversy or the subject-matter thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a
necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved
therein.

If any person having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining
the relief demanded, refuses to join as plaintiff with those having a like interest, he
may be made a defendant, the fact of his interest and refusal to join being stated in
the complaint.59

VIII. RULE 3, SECTION 16 AND 17

COURT JURISDICTION – DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

59
[G.R. No. 7309. October 10, 1913.] MIGUEL BERSES and 318 others, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIANO P.
VILLANUEVA, defendant-appelle.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated in People vs.
Cuaresma:60

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is

shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy.
It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. 61

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 62

Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify
the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held
present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens' right to bear
arms; (b)Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on
government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters'
registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence of
a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of
the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-
industrial area.63

60
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG, petitioners, vs. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO
BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE, respondents. (G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005.)
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
Death or separation of a party who is a public officer; Failure to make a
substitution, a ground for the dismissal of an action; Requisites for valid
substitution – FABRE, KARL

Well-settled is the rule that failure to make a substitution pursuant to Section

17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a ground for the dismissal of an action. For the
valid substitution of a public officer who has sued or has been sued in his or her
official capacity, the following requisites must be satisfied:

1. satisfactory proof by any party that there is substantial need for continuing or
maintaining the action;

2. the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the acts of his
or her predecessor;

3. the substitution must be effected within 30 days after the successor assumes
office or within the time granted by the court; and,

4. notice of the application to the other party. 64

Spouses Valmonte vs CA
GR 108538
January 22, 1996

64
Rule 3, Section 17 Rules of Court / COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ and ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
ALAN ROULLO YAP of the Bureau of Immigration vs. SAMUEL A. JARDIN (G.R. No. 141834; July 30, 2007).
DOCTRINE: Substitutional service of summons, when applicable . – FLORES,
MONICA
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served 65, substituted service66, as provided in
Rule 14, is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If
defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but
otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be
made by publication67. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned
either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14 or by publication 68.

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the

Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction
over his person is essential to make a binding decision.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is
not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance
with Rule 14, Section 17, which provides:

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not

reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
65
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 5. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and informing the defendant that he or she
is being served, or, if he or she refuses to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons within the view and in
the presence of the defendant.

66
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 6. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be effected:
(a) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a person at least eighteen (18)
years of age and of sufficient discretion residing therein;
(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. A competent person includes, but not limited to, one who
customarily receives correspondences for the defendant;
(c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon making his or her authority and purpose
known, with any of the officers of the homeowners' association or condominium corporation, or its chief
security officer in charge of the community or the building where the defendant may be found; and
(d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's electronic mail address, if allowed by the court.

67
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 18. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding Section. 
68
See Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968)
 the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which
shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.69

In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who
is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.

Service of summons in the manner provided in Section 17 is not for the

purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which
he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded 70.

Dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the
pendency of the case. – PEPINO, ERWIN

DOCTRINE :

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.

This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with dismissals of
collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the
case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of
claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted,
Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The issue to
be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against
petitioner.

69
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 17. Extraterritorial service of Summons.
70
Banco Español-Filipino Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918); Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 (1939); Sahagun v. Court
of Appeals 198 SCRA 44 (1991)
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the
sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the
law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. When
petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in
accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

Moreover, 1207 of the Civil Code provides:

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or
that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation.
There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. 71

PERSONAL ACTION

The venue of actions in rem shall be in the province where the property is
located. – ROJAS, JANELLE

Where a party commenced an action involving title to a real properly located

in Bacolod in the CFI of Rizal, venue was improperly laid and the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, should have granted the motion to dismiss
filed by the petitioner.72

DOCTRINE: Courts have no Jurisdiction to Render Judgement on a Bank

under Liquidation – YULO, ANDRIEL

The fact the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business, that its assets are turn
over to the Superintendent of Banks, as a receiver, for conversation into cash, and
that its liquidation is undertaken with judicial intervention means that, as far as lawful
and practicable, all claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
should be filed in the liquidation proceeding.

71
PURITA ALIPIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON
G. JARING (G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000)
72
DR. ANTONIO A. LIZARES, INC. vs. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, and FLAVIANO CACNIO G.R. No. L-17699 (March 30, 1962)
 The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the
insolvent bank. The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience only one
court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that
the liquidation court should assist the Superintended of Banks and control his
operations.

In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a full-
dress hearing would be required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Hence,
it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a Court of First Instance should
assist and supervise the liquidation and should act umpire and arbitrator in the
allowance and disallowance of claims.

The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due

process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of
litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness.

Thus, in the liquidation before the war of the insolvent Mercantile Bank of
china, various claims were adjudicated by the liquidation Court, which was the court
of First Instance of Manila, pursuant to section 1639 of the Revised Administrative
Code, from which section 29 of the Central Bank Law was taken. (See In
re Liquidation of Mercantile Bank of China: Tan Tiong Tick vs. American
Apothecaries Co., 65 Phil. 414; Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. vs Chinese Grocers
Association, 65 Phil. 375; Fletcher American National Bank vs. Ang cheng Lian, 65
Phil. 385; Pacific Commercial Co. vs. American Apothecaries Co., 65 Phil. 429;
Gopoco Grocery vs. Pacific Coast Biscuit co., 65 Phil. 443; Chinese Grocers'
Association vs. American Apothecaries Co., 65 Phil. 395; and Yu Ping Kun, 65 Phil.
410).

There is a ruling that, although the taking over of a bank by state officials for
liquidation does not dissolve the bank, a court has no jurisdiction (after such
takeover) to entertain an action or to render a judgment against the bank (9 C.J.S.
852, note 38 citing Bushnell vs. F.W. Woolworth co., 241 Pac. 738. 112 Okl. 297;
State vs. Quigley, 220 Pac. 918, 93 Okl. 296).

It has been held that an insolvent bank, which was under the control of the
finance commissioner for liquidation, was without power or capacity to sue or be
sued, prosecute or defend or otherwise function except through the finance
commissioner or liquidator (Wauer vs. Bank of Pendleton, 65 S.W. 2nd 167 228 Mo.
App. 1150).

Suits brought against a bank after the issuance of a notice that the finance
commissioner has taken possession of the bank should be dismissed or are barred
for want of jurisdiction (Rouse vs. Bank of Darlington, 41 S.W. 2nd 159; Bartlett vs.
Mc Callister, 289 S.W. 814, 316 Mo. 129).

This Court has already held that after a savings bank was declared insolvent
by the Monetary Board, a depositor could not bring a separate action against it for
the recovery of his time deposit. His remedy is to intervene in the liquidation
proceeding (Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63
SCRA 144).73

"Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made
in the complaint, - BATION, GRACE

irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the
claim asserted therein – a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial."

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.74

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

"SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real

property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.

SECTION 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." 75

STIPULATION ON VENUE

POLYTRADE CORPORATION vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO

G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969

DOCTRINES:

Venue may be stipulated by written agreement. – AGUILLON, DEO

Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by
courts of first instance — and this is one — provides that such "actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may

73
Hernandez and Atienza v Rural Bank of Lucena, G.R. No. L-29791 January 10, 1978
74
(G.R. No. 130991; March 11, 2004); DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND LUZ M. DIZON, petitioners,
vs. LEONARDO P. DIMACULANGAN, respondent.
75
RULE 4, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff."76

Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that venue may
be stipulated by written agreement 77 — "By written agreement of the parties the
venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another."

REQUISITES OF ACCION PULIANA - BATION, GRACE

• Alias execution nis a second writ of execution issued in the same cause, to
enforce a judgment not fully satisfied by the original writ.

• (New Civil Code) Article 1389. The action to claim rescission must be
commenced within four years.

• (New Civil Code) Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,
when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from
the day they may be brought.

• (New Civil Code) Article 1383. An action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot
be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to
obtain reparation for the same.

• Requisites of accion pauliana

1. Plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although
demandable later.

2. Debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a

third persons.

3. Creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would benefit by
rescission of the conveyance to the person.

4. Act being impugned is fraudulent.

5. The third parsons who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title, has
been an accomplice in the fraud.

• Accion pauliana presupposes the following:

1. A judgment;

2. Issuance by the trial court of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the
judgement; and

76
Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 4. Venue of personal actions
77
Rules of Court. Section 3, Rule 4.
3. The failure of the sheriff to enforce and satisfy the judgement of the court.

4. It requires that the creditor has exhausted the property of the debtor.

• Successive measures must be taken by a creditor

1. Exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and

execution upon all the property of the debtor; except such as are exempt from
execution;

2. Exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save those personal to him
(accion subrogatoria);

3. Seek rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights
(accion pauliana).

SUBSTITUTIONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Gr No 139283 - SEC. 7. Substituted service – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 78

PROPRIETY OF SERVICE BY PUBLICATION – DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In
any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are

unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of

court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and
in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts
to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
78
[G.R. No. 139283. November 15, 2000.] ALLEN LEROY HAMILTON, petitioner, vs. DAVID LEVY and FE
QUITANGON, respondents.
effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. 79

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his

foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant's last
known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing
the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office,
postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known
address."

Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective,

the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary
appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court states:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the

action shall be equivalent to

service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside

from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer". 14 This was equivalent to service
of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. 80

Service of summons; Substituted service is preferred only if the personal

service of summons cannot be made – FABRE, KARL

In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service.

Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service only if the former

cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the
proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business, of the defendant.7 It is likewise required that the pertinent
facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s

79
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, respondent. (G.R. No. 170943.
September 23, 2008)
80
Id.
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing
requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. 81

Spouses Valmonte vs CA
GR 108538
January 22, 1996

DOCTRINE: Substitutional service of summons, when applicable. – FLORES,

MONICA
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served 82, substituted service83, as provided in
Rule 14, is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If
defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but
otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be
made by publication84. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned
either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14 or by publication 85.

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the

Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction
over his person is essential to make a binding decision.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is
not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance
with Rule 14, Section 17, which provides:

81
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON
(G.R. No. 147369; October 23, 2003).
82
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 5. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and informing the defendant that he or she
is being served, or, if he or she refuses to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons within the view and in
the presence of the defendant.
83
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 6. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be effected:
(a) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a person at least eighteen (18)
years of age and of sufficient discretion residing therein;
(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. A competent person includes, but not limited to, one who
customarily receives correspondences for the defendant;
(c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon making his or her authority and purpose
known, with any of the officers of the homeowners' association or condominium corporation, or its chief
security officer in charge of the community or the building where the defendant may be found; and
(d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's electronic mail address, if allowed by the court.

84
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 18. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding Section. 
85
See Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968)
 Section 17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which
shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.86

In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who
is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.

Service of summons in the manner provided in Section 17 is not for the

purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which
he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded 87.

PERMISSIVE COUNTER CLAIM

TOPIC : PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM (PLEADINGS RULE 6 ) – PEPINO,

ERWIN

DOCTRINE :
It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the
inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may
exceptionally be allowed.

The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy against
interlocutory orders such as those assailed in these proceedings; i.e., an order
denying a motion to quash the information, and one declaring the accused to have
waived his right to present evidence and considering the case submitted for decision.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (citing Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181
86
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 17. Extraterritorial service of Summons.
87
Banco Español-Filipino Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918); Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 (1939); Sahagun v. Court
of Appeals 198 SCRA 44 (1991)
SCRA 1 [1990], and Acharon v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309; People v. Madaluyo,
1 SCRA 990), the established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order
is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where there are
special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. The
Court has been cited to no such special circumstances in the cases at bar. 88

Where the issues raised in the counterclaim were inseparable from those
posed in the complaint, it is not absolutely necessary for petitioner to file an
answer to the counterclaim. – ROJAS, JANELLE

In the present case, the issues of the counterclaim are the very issues raised
in the complaint and in the answer, and said counterclaim is based on the very
defenses pleaded in the answer. To answer such counterclaim would require
plaintiffs to replead the same facts already alleged in their complaint. But in any
event that the issues of the counterclaim are so inseparable from those of the
complaint and the answer that such counterclaim partakes of the nature of a special
defense which, even if not specifically challenged by plaintiffs in a reply, is deemed
controverted.89

Gr No 146019 - SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular

courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as
to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of
the amount.
The alleged malicious filing of estafa against petitioner is necessarily connected with
the non-payment of the value of steel bars delivered to petitioner. The resolution of
the latter issue does not require the presence of third parties of whom the court a
quo cannot acquire jurisdiction. Therefore, the counterclaims raised by private
respondents are clearly compulsory in nature. Thus, non-payment of docket fees
does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to rule thereon. 90

88
PABLO G. QUIÑON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 13908, April 18, 1997
89
FELICISIMA BALLECER and JOSE S. AGAWIN vs. JOSE BERNARDO, The Hon. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge,
Branch XIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the Sheriff of Manila G.R. No. L-21766 (September 30,
1966)
90
[G.R. No. 146019. June 8, 2004.] ARMANDO M. LASCANO, petitioner, vs. UNIVERSAL STEEL SMELTING CO.,
INC., REYNALDO U. LIM and HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
DOCTRINE: Grounds for the Dismissal of an Appeal - YULO, ANDRIEL

Rule 50, Section 1(c) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: An appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds: (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and
other lawful fees as provided in Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of Rule 41; 91

It has consistently been held that payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory.92 As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas vs.
Commission on Elections,93 such payment is an essential requirement before the
court could acquire jurisdiction over a case:
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step
for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v.
Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306
(1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which
the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with,
the provision of the law.

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION vs. YVETTE CONTACTO

G.R. No. 152576, May 5, 2003

DOCTRINES:

A party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of, or is

necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit
but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not
thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation. – AGUILLON,
DEO

Rule 11, Sec. 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer.- A counterclaim or

a cross-claim which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his
pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim or a
cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgment. 94

91
Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of Rule 41
92
Gegare vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132264, October 8, 1998
93
245 SCRA 702, 705-706 (1995).
94
Rules of Court. Section 9, Rule 11.
Such a counterclaim or cross-claim is not, however, compulsory. 95 Thus, a party who
fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist or
mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing
such claim in a future litigation.96

REPLY

REPLY; PURPOSE. — BATION, GRACE

The purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in denial of new matters

alleged by way of defense in the answer. It is not the office or function of a reply to
set up or introduce a new cause of action or to amend or amplify the complaint. 97

PARTS OF PLEADINGS

FORUM SHOPPING

GR No 93924 - Forum Shopping – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

Forum shopping (is) an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned

as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that
tends to degrade the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11,
1983 in connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
specifically with the grant in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction to
the Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, etc., and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus,
the cited Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in the Intermediate
Appellate Court ‘if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Supreme Court’ and vice-versa. The Rule orders that ‘A violation of this rule shall
constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or
party concerned.’ The rule applies with equal force where the party having filed an
action in the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition and a
restraining order or injunction in the regional trial court. 98

95
Jose Y. Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended 42 (1997).
96
National Marketing Corporation vs. Federation of United Namarco Distributors, Inc.
97
[G.R. No. 116813. November 24, 1995] MAGNOLIA CORPORATION AND MR. NATHANIEL E. ORILLAZAREA,
SALES MANAGER, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MR. ROMEO A. VESTIL,
Respondents.
98
[G.R. No. 93924. January 23, 1991.] BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and members of its BOARD OF
DIRECTORS and BAGUIO-BENGUET COMMUNITY CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING; SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL. — DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

The lack of certification against forum shopping, on the other hand, is

generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.
Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the failure of petitioner to
submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.99

Certification against forum shopping – FABRE, KARL

The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal part seeking relief in the

complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in
such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a)
he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there
is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been
terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original
pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. 100

Ma. Carmina Roxas vs. CA

99
FELIPE G. UY, petitioner, vs. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (GR No. G.R. No. 136100. July
24, 2000.)

100
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., represented by its President RODRIGO S. MACARIO, SR.
vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, represented by its Commissioner, RUFINO V.
MIJARES; MARIO PADILAN, PONCIANO BASILAN, HIPOLITO ESLAVA, WILLIAM LUMPISA, PACITO MOISES,
DIONISIO ANAS, NOLI DANGLA, NAPOLEON BALESTEROS, ELSIE MOISES, SEBIO LACWASAN, BEN FLORES,
DOMINGO CANUTAB, MARCELINO GABRIANO, TINA TARNATE, ANDREW ABRAZADO, DANNY LEDDA,
FERNANDO DAYAO, JONATHAN DE LA PENA, JERRY PASSION, PETER AGUINSOD, and LOLITA DURAN
(G.R. No. 135945; March 7, 2001)
GR 139337
August 15, 2001

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping as a ground for dismissal, with prejudice or

without prejudice? -FLORES, MONICA

Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has

been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The
language of the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)101 distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to
cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is
the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs."

Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of

obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said
to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action
where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the
cases he has brought before the courts. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must
be present:
(1) a decision on the merits;
(2) by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the decision is final; and
(4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of
action.

VERIFICATION VS NON-FORUM SHOPPING

101
Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a
special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
TOPIC : VERIFICATION V NON-FORUM SHOPPING – PEPINO, ERWIN

PROCEDURAL ISSUE RAISED TOO LATE.

Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the
Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarra’s petition for review
because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarra’s counsel and not
Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping.

This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-
compliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed,
verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. In the interest of
substantial justice, strict observance of procedural rules may be dispensed with for
compelling reasons.

It appears that the issue on the validity of the verification and certification against
forum shopping was raised as an afterthought, as attention to the defect at the early
stage of the proceedings was not brought up. This procedural issue was raised too
late in the proceedings.

Indeed, verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement

intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and
correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
(Medado vs. Heirs of Consing, G.R. No. 186720, February 8, 2012.)

On the other hand, the certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this
practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. The submission of a
certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, though not
jurisdictional as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is conferred by
law.
( Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July
6, 2004 )102

Verification and certificate against forum shopping are different. – ROJAS,

JANELLE

102
COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA (G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004).
As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same. In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and
other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate against forum
shopping.
Verification is a formal not jurisdictional requirement and mainly intended to secure
an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. 103

ULTIMATE FACTS

DOCTRINE: The Two Kinds of Facts in a Pleading – YULO, ANDRIEL

“The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate
facts", and the second, the "evidentiary facts." 104

In the case of Remitere v Vda. de Yulo, 105 The term "ultimate facts" as used
in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . . . Ultimate facts are important and
substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or
which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term
does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which
these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate,
constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests.

ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT, WHAT IS?

IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86568 March 22, 1990
103
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. vs. JOCELYN CATUBIG G.R. NO. 175512 (MAY 30, 2011)
104
Tantuico, Jr., vs. Republic of the Philippines, GR No. 89114, Dec. 2, 1991.
105
Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, G.R. No. L-19751, Feburary 1966, 16 SCRA 251.
DOCTRINES:

If the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument, the same is deemed admitted. – AGUILLON, DEO

Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or

defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of
such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading.106

Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. — When an action or

defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. 107

No rule is more settled than that in an action based on a written instrument attached
to the complaint, if the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument, the same is deemed admitted. 108

Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is explicit in that there are two ways of
pleading an actionable document, namely:

(a) by alleging the substance of such written instrument in the pleading

and attaching a copy thereof to the pleading; and

(b) by copying the instrument in the pleading.

FAILURE TO FILE AN ANSWER

FAILURE TO FILE AN ANSWER – BATION, GRACE

106
Rules of Court. Section 7, Rule 8.
107
Rules of Court. Section 8, Rule 8.
108
Songco v. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254 (1917); and Phil. Com. & Industrial Bank v. ELRO Dev. Corp.,
29 SCRA 38 (1969).
Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides: Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with.

The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 thereofwhich specifically deals
with dismissal of the claim by the court motuproprio. It provides for only
four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litispendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d)
prescription of action.

Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been
made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. It is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. 109

GR No 133240 - Amendments as a matter of right. – BUNCOG, JEFFERSON

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid

multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the
trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial.110

The elements of a valid declaration of default are: - DE SAN MIGUEL, DAVE

1.) The court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party either by service of summons or voluntary appearance;

109
Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales; G.R. No. 185922 : JANUARY 15, 2014
110
[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000.] RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent.
 2.) The defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed therefor
and

3.) A motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by the
claiming party with notice to the defending party.

An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. It can be
properly issued against the defending party who failed to file the answer within the
prescribed period only if the claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to
the defending party. 111

In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party
in default. 112

Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the
defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court
to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of
the motion to declare him in default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the
defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of
Court.

The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the
defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period. The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a
defendant in default as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its
interests. The trial court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the
claiming party. 113

Failure to file an answer; Default – FABRE, KARL

If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of
such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as the pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. 114

111
GUILLERMA S. SABLAS, joined by her husband, PASCUAL LUMANAS, petitioners, vs. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS
and RODULFO S. SABLAS, respondents. (GR No. 144568; July 3, 2007)
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
HEIRS OF MAMERTO MANGUIAT, represented by GERARDO MANGUIAT; HEIRS OF FELIPE MARUDO,
represented by JOSE MARUDO; HEIRS OF JULIANA MAILON, represented by GAVINA MAILON MENDOZA;
HEIRS OF LEONCIA MERCADO, represented by ANIANA MANGUIAT; HEIRS OF VICENTE PEREZ, represented by
SOTERO PEREZ; HEIRS OF VICENTE GARCIA, represented by MACARIO GARCIA LUCIDO; and HEIRS OF
TRANQUILINA MENDOZA, represented by RUFINA MENDOZA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and J.A.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. No. 150768; August 20, 2008).
REMEDIES

Ma. Carmina Roxas vs. CA

GR 139337
August 15, 2001

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping as a ground for dismissal, with prejudice or

without prejudice? – FLORES, MONICA

Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has

been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The
language of the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)115 distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to
cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is
the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs."

Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of

obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said
to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action
where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the
cases he has brought before the courts. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must
be present:
(1) a decision on the merits;
(2) by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the decision is final; and
(4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of
action.
115
Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a
special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
RULE 10

When it appears from the very face of the complaint that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, amendment of the complaint
could not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction over the case in order to act
validly therein. – ROJAS, JANELLE

Whenever possible the amendment of a defective pleading should be allowed, but

that "when it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter, that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of
amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and
the nature of the action, then the court may refuse the amendment of the defective
pleading and order the dismissal of the case.
The rule is always in favor of liberality in construction so that the real matter in
dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the Court. Imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure should be disregarded unless substantial rights would
otherwise be prejudiced.116

DOCTRINE: A lack of cause is a defect that cannot be cured or remedied by

the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a
supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause
of action is not permissible. – YULO, ANDRIEL

It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be
cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. 117 Such an action is
prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed
by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying
reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public
tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature. As this Court eloquently said
in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris: 118

It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in

equity, that to recover at all there must be some cause of action at the
commencement of the suit. As observed by counsel for appellees, there are reasons
of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and
why people who are in no default and against whom there is yet no cause of action
should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are
groundless. We say groundless because if the action is immature, it should not be
entertained, and an action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.

116
ADOLFO GASPAR vs. LEOPOLDO DORADO, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio, C. N. HODGES, and
VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. L-17884 (November 29, 1965)
117
Limpangco v. Mercado, 10 Phil. 508 (1908).
118
68 Phil. 113, 121-122 (1939).
 It is true that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of
the originals which are thereby regarded as abandoned (Reynes v. CompañÃa
General de Tabacos [1912], 21 Phil. 416; Ruyman and Farris v. Director of Lands
[1916], 34 Phil., 428) and that "the complaint and answer having been superseded
by the amended complaint and answer thereto, and the answer to the original
complaint not having been presented in evidence as an exhibit, the trial court was
not authorized to take it into account." (Bastida v. Menzi & Co. [1933], 58 Phil., 188.)
But in none of these cases or in any other case have we held that if a right of action
did not exist when the original complaint was filed, one could be created by filing an
amended complaint. In some jurisdictions in the United States what was termed an
"imperfect cause of action" could be perfected by suitable amendment (Brown v.
Galena Mining & Smelting Co., 32 Kan., 528; Hooper v. City of Atlanta, 26 Ga. App.,
221) and this is virtually permitted in Banzon and Rosauro v. Sellner ([1933], 58
Phil., 453); Asiatic Potroleum [sic] Co. v. Veloso ([1935], 62 Phil., 683); and recently
in Ramos v. Gibbon (38 Off. Gaz., 241). That, however, which is no cause of action
whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a
cause of action: Nihil de re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jus accresceret habet.

We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a
valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is
pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-
accrued cause of action is not permissible. (Emphasis ours). 119

DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT
G.R. No. 72566 April 12, 1988

DOCTRINES: - AGUILLON, DEO

A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading — substitute for the

original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original
pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as
issues to be tried in the action.
While it is conceded that there is authority in support of a default judgment being
predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint, the same
cannot apply in this case. The reason is that although in the supplemental complaint,
the relief prayed for was altered from termination of the management contract to
judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of whether or not
petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract, remained. 120

119
Swagman v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005.
120
DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (G.R. No. 72566 April 12, 1988)