CAN THE U.S. SUCCEED IN IRAQ?

AN IRAQI
VIEWPOINT

By

Hamid S. Atiyyah, Ph.D.*

hsatiyyah@hotmail.com

The explosion in Najaf resulting in scores of causalities including the death of a

prominent moderate Shia religious leader came few days after a the terrorist attack on
the UN mission in Iraq with similar tragic losses. In the meantime, more American
soldiers were killed or wounded by Iraqi militants opposed to the U.S. presence and
its objectives in Iraq. Local hostile elements have also been effective in impeding
efforts to restore security, and basic services and the repair of the country’s devastated
infrastructure. The Iraqi majority that has so far remained silent and moderately
hopeful of an American success in turning around their country is now showing
unmistakable signs of impatience and disapproval. News of the serious difficulties
hampering the U.S. efforts to pacify and reconstruct Iraq have disappointed the
American public which has been previously led to believe that the American plan for
the post-Sadam era would meet enthusiastic support and little opposition. In spite of
the growing number of pessimists and alarmists the U.S. administration remains
optimistic of achieving success in the end. Is this optimism realistic? If not, what are
the possible scenarios? And is there a more effective strategy that needs to be
considered?

What has been achieved so far?

The Bush administration has repeatedly made it clear that its objectives go beyond the
removal of Sadam’s regime. Other objectives include locating and destroying
weapons of mass destruction, preventing a potentially serious threat from an alliance
between Sadam’s regime and terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, establishing a
democratic system that would serve as a model for all Middle Eastern countries, and
facilitating the reconstruction of the country. It is definitely premature and unfair to
render final evaluation of the U.S. effectiveness in achieving these objectives. There
are, however, ample and strong evidence indicating that success may be far from
certain and the cost involved unacceptably high.
Iraqis, with the exception of the ousted regime’s officials and henchmen, were
happy to see the end of a regime whose policies of waging wars on its neighbors and
oppressing its citizens threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
country, traumatized its population and virtually bankrupted its economy. The U.S.
forces defeated Sadam’s loyalists but most of them managed to escape death or
capture. In effect, the old regime was dispersed but not destroyed. These loyalists,
possibly with new recruits from the Iraqi army hastily disbanded by the Americans,
soon regrouped into new fighting units. A typical change of regime in Iraq such as the
coup d’etats of 1958 and 1963 involved gruesome bloodshed in which the main
figures and supporters of the old regime were summarily executed or massacred. Such
acts were also intended to discourage others from challenging the new leadership. In
contrast, the American measures against senior members of the old regime were seen
as surprisingly soft, lenient and thus, ineffective, to the extent that many Iraqis and
Arabs saw this as evidence of a secret bargain. These ineffective measures are also
believed to have encouraged and emboldened supporters of the defeated regime to
launch a violent campaign aimed at driving out the U.S. forces and paving the way for
their return to power. In effect, the U.S. has yet to finish the task of ridding Iraq of
remnants of Sadam’s regime and solve the security problem created by not
accomplishing that effectively and swiftly. On achieving this objective, the U.S.
scorecard must show low marks.
Destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and preventing their transfer to
terrorist groups were at the top of the list of objectives of the U.S.-led operation.
Much of the legitimacy of this operation, and also much of the support it received,
rested on the credibility of this potential threat. The failure to detect these weapons is
a major embarrassment diminishing the support desperately needed by both the Bush
administration and Blair’s cabinet to obtain further funding and troops for the
operation. As for weakening the terrorist threat, anyone following up recent official
statements cannot but conclude that the threat has strengthened rather than weakened.
The escalation of anti-American terrorist activities will probably attract additional
reinforcement from other Arab countries. The score on this objective is a provisional
naught.
With regard to the introduction of democracy in Iraq, the U.S. has obviously made
some progress in putting in place a transitional governing council and a cabinet. Both
were appointed by the American administrator, Mr. Bremer, who also retains final
authority regarding all their decisions. So far, their roles have been purely symbolic,
and the Iraqi public has not recognized their legitimacy as evidenced by the
continuation of hostilities and lawlessness.
Whether they can achieve any tangible progress depend entirely on the
Americans. The American failure to deliver soon on their promises would probably
result in their instant meltdown and the discredit of the moderate political forces
represented by them. This explains the frantic attempt by leading members of the
governing council to distance themselves from their American patrons. Al-Chalabi, a
staunch pro-U.S. politician, repeatedly expressed his dismay with the American
performance and Bahr Al-Uloum, a moderate religious figure, ‘suspended’ his
membership in the council after the explosion in Najaf. The same tragic incident
prompted another council member, a brother of the religious leader Al-Hakim who
died in the explosion, to call for the withdrawal of American troops. The unity of the
council will soon be tested when it begins its deliberations on the new constitution, a
process that is certain to expose the deep differences regarding the nature of the future
Iraqi government especially the role of Islam and federalism. In short, the Americans
are experiencing serious difficulties at nation-building in Iraq, and their score on this
objective is also below passing.
The American performance in the service and development sector has been
disappointing. The restoration of basic services such as water and electricity to pre-
war levels has been hampered by sabotage and theft. Hostile action has also stopped
the export of oil and the earning of royalties, much needed to finance services and
reconstruction. Even if the necessary funds are raised or approved by the American
Congress, fewer contractors are willing to take the enormous risk of hostilities or pay
the high premiums demanded by insurance companies. Many of the international and
local investors who set up temporary offices in Kuwait and other neighboring
countries have put their hopes of benefiting from the reconstruction effort on hold.
The patience of the Iraqi public with the American inability to provide them with
basic services and employment is eroding fast. Here again, the U.S. performance is
unsatisfactory.

Can the situation get worse?

Psychologists maintain that when a need is satisfied it ceases to motivate. Most
Iraqis express profound gratitude to the Americans for removing Sadam’s regime
from power but their attention has shifted to other urgent needs such as security,
employment and services. If the Iraqis judge the U.S. administration to be incapable
of providing for these needs and launching the democratic process in Iraq soon, they
may decide to take things into their hands. There is already a significant opposition to
the American presence and the longer the U.S troops stay in Iraq, the more Iraqis will
regard them as an occupation rather than a liberation force.
Forces opposed to the U.S. can probably maintain the current level of hostilities
for several years to come. This is bad enough for the Bush administration which needs
to show undisputed achievements before the onset of the presidential election
campaign next year. And it could even get worse. The worse case scenario is a civil-
ethnic war. Long-term animosities between Sunni and Shia Muslims and between
Kurds and Arabs threaten to plunge the country into the abyss of civil war. The U.S.
forces, immensely outnumbered and unable to control the situation, would have no
option but to leave the country. A retreat to fortress America would signal the end of
the global order and possibly lead to worldwide instability and a deep recession.
Americans as well as their international critics such as Russia, France, Germany and
some Arab countries have an interest in halting the nightmarish descent into civil war
and international uncertainty. It may already be too late. Inter-sectarian and ethnic
violence have already begun on a limited scale. There was a major disturbance
between Kurds and Turkomans who are also divided along sectarian lines in Kirkuk.
Unknown Shia groups or individuals have secretly carried out a campaign of revenge
killing against pro-Sadam elements who are mostly Sunnis. Whether the Najaf
explosion was a counter measure to these ‘executions’ or a deliberate attempt to
escalate intermittent civil hostilities into outright civil war remains to be seen.

What can the U.S. do to improve its performance?

There may still be an opportunity to bring Iraq back from the brink of self-
destruction and offer the Bush administration a face-saving solution. First, they have
to admit that they are facing a problem and with the exception of Mr. Rumsfeld and
like-minded politicians this has already happened. There is also a consensus on what
the most urgent need of the country, i.e. restoring law and order. Giving the Iraqis a
major responsibility in this process is the right policy, and involving the U.N. and
other world leaders like Russia, France and Germany would bestow more legitimacy
on the operation. But these steps may just help to contain the violence and delay
further deterioration. In addition to treating the symptoms, the U.S. administration in
Iraq has a moral obligation to at least attempt to cure the malaise. For over three
decades, the Ba’th regime has used the old British colonial policy of divide-and-rule
to hinder the formation of a formidable nation-wide opposition. In flagrant violation
of their nationalistic and pan-Arab ideology, they rekindled long-dormant sectarian
and ethnic hatred. In order to ensure their absolute and total hold on power, they
subjected the majority Shia and ethnic Kurds to a systematic program of suppression,
mass slaughter and deportation. This was also intended to convince the minority Arab
Sunnis who constitute their traditional power base that they have no choice but to
continue supporting them, or face the wrath of the Shia and Kurds. To understand the
Machiavellian machination of the Ba’th leadership, we must take into consideration
the essentially tribal nature of the Iraqi society. One of the basic unwritten tribal rules
in this society is that responsibility for a person’s misdeed is shared by all his family
or even his whole tribe. Thus, if he murders a member of another family and makes
no restitution, relatives of his victim may take their revenge on him or any of his close
relatives. The whole male population tribe may become legitimate targets if the victim
happens to be a member of another tribe. Fortunately, tribal customs include conflict-
resolution techniques for stopping the cycle of vendettas. By committing genocide
against the Shia and Kurds, Sadam who is widely seen as a sectarian leader implicated
all Iraqi Sunni Arabs in his guilt. This explains the revenge killing of a number of
Sunni tribal chiefs after Sadam’s defeat. In order to stop this vendetta from becoming
an outright civil war, a nation-wide reconciliation program must be immediately
initiated by traditional religious and other Iraqi leaders with full American and
international support. A similar program was highly successful in South Africa after
the end of the apartheid regime and the process could be successfully duplicated in
Iraq. The late Ayatollah Al-Hakim was the most suitable candidate to play the role of
Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa in bringing about closure to the deep rifts
created by Sadam’s policies and atrocities. In accordance with local tribal and
religious customs, an apology by Sunni leaders and an undertaking by the new Iraqi
leaders to compensate all those whose family members were killed, imprisoned or
deported by Sadam’s regime will go a long distance toward defusing tension. In
return, Sunni Arabs must be assured of their security and rightful share in the new
political system. The process of reconciliation and healing should have begun soon
after the arrival of the U.S. forces but hopefully the opportunity has not been
completely lost.
Failure to stop the slide toward civil war will have dire repercussions for U.S.
policies worldwide. After that, it will be difficult for the U.S. to exercise the same
impact on international politics as the world’s only superpower. Groups hostile to the
U.S. and its policies will be emboldened to increase their anti-U.S. activities. In the
Middle East, religious and sectarian tensions will put tremendous pressures on
neighboring countries where sectarian hatred is constantly fanned by Wahabi-Salafi
clerics. Political turmoil in the Gulf countries will have disastrous effects on the
economies and political instability of most Arab and Muslim countries. Needless to
say, the peaceful process between the Palestinians and Israelis would be shattered.
If the Bush administration refuses to listen to reason then they should consult a
fortuneteller. There are many of them in Iraq. In 1982 and just before I departed Iraq
to escape Sadam’s oppression, a popular fortuneteller predicted that the Iraq-Iran war
would last several years, and end in a stalemate. He also predicted that the Iraqis
would send their ‘large jets’ to Iran and Sadam did actually send his Russian-made
strategic bombers to Iran before the liberation of Kuwait. What was his prophecy for
the near future: “When the large ships (U.S. forces) leave the waters of the Gulf, the
Shia religious banners would be flying all over the country.” If the Americans fail to
act now, this prophecy may also become a reality.
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* This article was written in October 2003.