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Prelude: Rise in Tensions (March 2021-February 2022)
Prelude: Rise in Tensions (March 2021-February 2022)
2010 Ukrainian
presidential election,[82] which he subsequently won.[83] In November 2013, a wave of large, pro-
EU protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine
Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic
Union. The Verkhovna Rada had overwhelmingly supported the agreement with the EU. [84] Russia
had put pressure on Ukraine to reject it.[85]
The scope of the protests widened, with protesters opposing widespread government
corruption, police brutality, and repressive anti-protest laws.[86] In February 2014, clashes in Kyiv
between protesters and Berkut special police resulted in the deaths of 100 protesters and 13
policemen; most of the victims were shot by police snipers.[87] On 21 February 2014, Yanukovych
and parliamentary opposition leaders signed an agreement calling for an interim government and
early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled Kyiv and later Ukraine;[88] the Ukrainian
parliament subsequently voted to remove him from office. [89][90][91] Leaders in Russian-
speaking eastern Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych,[92] leading to pro-Russian
unrest.[93] Russian state-controlled media portrayed the crisis as having been instigated by the
post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government, and represented Euromaidan as being controlled by
"ultranationalist", "fascist",[94][95] "neo-Nazi",[96] and "anti-Semitic" groups.[97]
The unrest was followed by the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 and the war
in Donbas, which started in April 2014 with the formation of two Russia-backed separatist quasi-
states: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.[98][99] Russian troops
were involved in the conflict.[100][101][102] The Minsk agreements were signed in September 2014 and
February 2015 in a bid to stop the fighting, although ceasefires repeatedly failed. [103] A dispute
emerged over the role of Russia: Normandy Format members France, Germany, and Ukraine
understood Minsk as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, whereas Russia insisted its
role was that of a neutral mediator, pressing Ukraine to negotiate directly with representatives of
the two separatist republics.[104][105] In 2021, Putin refused offers from Ukrainian
president Volodymyr Zelenskyy for high-level talks, and the Russian government subsequently
endorsed an article by former president Dmitry Medvedev arguing it was pointless to deal with
Ukraine while it remained a "vassal" of the US.[106]
The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with large parts of the
Russian neo-imperial movement aspiring to annex more land from Ukraine, including the
unrecognised Novorossiya.[107] Analyst Vladimir Socor argued that Putin's 2014 speech after the
annexation of Crimea was a de facto "manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism".[108] In July 2021,
Putin published an essay titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, in which he
reaffirmed his view that Russians and Ukrainians were "one people".[109] American
historian Timothy D. Snyder described Putin's ideas as imperialism,[110] while British
journalist Edward Lucas called it historical revisionism.[111] Other observers regarded the Russian
leadership as having a distorted view of modern Ukraine and its history. [112][113][114] Ukraine and other
European countries neighbouring Russia accused Putin of irredentism and of pursuing
aggressive militaristic policies.[115][116][117]
Prelude
Main article: Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting
tensions, Russophobia, and the repression of Russian speakers in Ukraine. They also made
multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the EU. These actions
were described by commentators and Western officials as attempts to justify war. [123][124] On 9
December 2021 Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide".[125][126] Putin's
claims were dismissed by the international community, [127] and Russian claims of genocide have
been widely rejected as baseless.[128][129][130] Ukrainian president Zelenskyy declared that 16
February, a speculated date for the invasion, would be a "Day of Unity". Ukrainians were
encouraged to "hang our national flags, put on blue and yellow ribbons, and show our unity to the
whole world", as well as to sing the national anthem in public spaces at 10:00 EET (UTC+2).[131][132]
In a 21 February speech,[133] Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating an
inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood". [134] He incorrectly
described the country as having been created by Soviet Russia.[38] To justify an invasion, Putin
falsely accused Ukrainian society and government of being dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking
the history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II,[40][135] and echoing
an antisemitic conspiracy theory which casts Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the true
victims of Nazi Germany.[51][127] While Ukraine has a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi Azov
Battalion and Right Sector,[136][137] analysts have described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerating
the influence of far-right groups within Ukraine; there is no widespread support for the ideology in
the government, military, or electorate.[40][123] Ukrainian president Zelenskyy, who is Jewish,
rebuked Putin's allegations, stating that his grandfather had served in the Soviet army fighting
against the Nazis.[138] The US Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem condemned the
abuse of Holocaust history and the use of comparisons with Nazi ideology for propagandist
purposes.[139][140]
During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, including a legally
binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of
multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states. [142] Russia threatened
an unspecified military response if NATO continued to follow an "aggressive line". [143] These
demands were widely interpreted as being non-viable; new NATO members in Central and
Eastern Europe had joined the alliance because their populations broadly preferred to move
towards the safety and economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their
governments sought protection from Russian irredentism. [144] The demand for a formal treaty
preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was also seen as unviable by Western officials as it would
contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, although NATO showed no desire to accede to
Ukraine's requests to join.[145]