Performance Anxiety 1

Computational Science Across the

Curriculum Project

Capital University

Performance Anxiety and an Introduction

to Catastrophe Theory

Module Author
Andrea M. Karkowski

akarkows@capital.edu
614-236-6449
(2003)

W. M. Keck Foundation
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the W. M. Keck Foundation
 Performance Anxiety 2

Prerequisites
Course(s): Calculus I

Description
Performance anxiety afflicts novices and experts alike and it appears before sporting events,
musical performances, oral presentations, and examinations. Catastrophe theory, and in
particular the cusp catastrophe model will be used to examine performance anxiety, and more
specifically, competitive state-anxiety, among athletes.

Problem Statement
Given the potentially serious consequences (financial, professional, and personal) of
performance anxiety, it is important to explore appropriate models of the phenomenon so that we
can better understand it and develop methods for alleviating it. The problem at hand, then, is to
develop a computational model of performance anxiety.

Background Information
McNally (2002) describes performance anxiety as “a pattern of subjective feelings of tension and
inadequacy, combined with heightened arousal of the autonomic nervous system” (NP).
Davidson and Schwartz (1976) indicate that performance anxiety has both cognitive and somatic
components. The cognitive component include cognitive anxiety, which is predominately a
concern with the consequences of failure (Humara, 1999) and self-efficacy, or the belief that one
can be effective in a given situation. The somatic component of performance anxiety is
physiological arousal. It is important to note that the cognitive and somatic components are not
discrete entities – they interact with each other to effect changes in one or both systems.

Humara (1999) provides definitions of some key concepts: Arousal is “a signal to the individual
that he or she has entered a stressful state and is characterized by physiological signs” (NP) such
as increased heart rate and sweating. Stress is a state in which an individual must engage in some
coping behavior in an attempt to attenuate demands placed upon the individual. While anxiety is
the result of an individual’s doubts about “his or her ability to cope with the situation that causes
him or her stress” (NP).

“When in stressful and anxiety-provoking circumstances, some athletes have been observed to
experience deficits in performance, even to the point of ‘choking’” (Craft, Magyar, Becker, &
Feltz, 2003, p. 44). These behavioral deficits are thought to arise from performance anxiety, or
competitive state-anxiety.
 Performance Anxiety 3

Anxiety can be of two types, state and trait. Trait-anxiety is not dependent on the situation, and is
typically enduring across different aspects of an individual’s life. As Humara (1999) defined it,
“trait anxiety can be thought of as a worldview that an individual uses when coping with
situations in his or her environment” (NP). Performance anxiety is considered to be state-anxiety,
which is to say that performance anxiety is specific to a situation. For the athlete, performer, or
test-taker, then, performance anxiety occurs only in the context of the performance situation
(e.g., the playing field, the stage, or the exam room just prior to and during the exam).

However, Hanton, Mellalieu, and Hall (2002) provide evidence that trait-anxiety acts as a
mediator of the competitive state-anxiety. “High trait anxious subjects who are state anxious are
therefore purported to selectively attend towards threatening information, whilst low trait
anxious subjects who experience state anxiety are proposed to show an attentional bias away
from such information” (Hanton et al., 2002, p. 1127). In other words, individuals who
experience high levels of trait anxiety are more likely than low trait-anxiety individuals to attend
to aspects of the situation that would provoke state-anxiety. Eys, Hardy, Carron, and Beauchamp
(2003) provide the following example of these two different experiences:

“Two participants may have highly intense somatic symptoms prior to a sport
competition (e.g., ‘My palms are sweaty’). For one competitor, the manifestations
of these symptoms may be interpreted in a negative way because they reflect
unease and uncertainty (e.g., ‘My anxiety reflects my unease’). This situation is
referred to as debilitative anxiety. For another, however, the symptoms may be
interpreted in a positive way because they reflect a degree of readiness necessary
for success (e.g., ‘I’m ready to begin competing’). This positive interpretation if
referred to as facilitative anxiety” (p. 67).

Eys et al. (2003) are quick to point out that the term “facilitative anxiety” may not be the best
way to describe the second athlete in the example above because the term “anxiety” is commonly
thought to be aversive. The second athlete above is likely not labeling her current state as
aversive; she may be interpreting her state as excitement or some other positive emotion.
Research indicates that approximately half of elite athletes interpret the somatic symptoms in a
positive light (Jones & Hanton, 1996). Given that the term “facilitative anxiety” is used in the
literature, that is what will be used here.

Respond to conceptual question 1.

Hammermeister and Burton (2001) examined the antecedents of competitive state-anxiety among
endurance athletes and found:

• As perceived threat increases, so does performance anxiety. Threats can include

environmental factors, outcome-related factors (e.g., inconsistency in performance), and
strategic factors (e.g., loss of focus).
• Perceived control over the situation is inversely related to performance anxiety. Variables
that can affect perceived control include weather, unknown aspects of the playing field
(e.g., speed of the greens in golf), and lack of knowledge about the competition.
“Specifically, when an athlete is unsure about his or her ability to obtain the desired
 Performance Anxiety 4

outcome and the outcome is important to the athlete, his or her level of state anxiety can
increase… that lack of certainty about the outcome may include not only uncertainty
about winning and losing but also such things as ability to endure or to avoid injury”
(Craft et al., 2003, p. 57).
• Athletes who seek social support, increase their effort and resolve, or use problem-
focused coping are less likely to experience the negative effects of performance anxiety.

Respond to conceptual question 2.

In part, an athlete’s focus (i.e., either goal directed or behavior directed) will affect how he or she
interprets the physiological arousal that occurs before a performance event. A goal directed
focus, or telic state, leads an athlete to interpret arousal as anxiety while a behavior directed
focus, or paratelic state, results in the athlete interpreting arousal as excitement (Humara, 1999).

Respond to conceptual question 3.

Competitive state-anxiety has also been associated with degree of role ambiguity (Beauchamp,
Bray, Eys, & Carron, 2003). Role-ambiguity occurs within team sports and refers to the degree
of clear information available to the individual about his or her role on the team (i.e., scope of
responsibility, role behaviors, role evaluation, and role consequences; Beauchamp et al., 2003).
When role ambiguity is high, according to Beauchamp et al., the athlete will be more likely to
experience competitive state-anxiety while when role ambiguity is low the probability of
competitive state-anxiety occurring before an event decreases. These findings speak to the
importance of having clearly defined roles on the team. We could also predict from these
findings that when a team looses a key player before an event, if the team and replacement player
have not had adequate experience with each other in the required roles, then the likelihood of
competitive state-anxiety will increase.

Respond to conceptual question 4.

This also speaks to the degree of team cohesion. That is, “improving the dynamics of the team
could enhance the psychological state of the individual” (Prapavessis & Carron, 1996, p. 72).
Eys et al. (2003) define group cohesion as “the tendency for a group to stick together and remain
united in the pursuit of its instrumental objectives and/or for the satisfaction of member affective
needs” (p. 66). The relationship between group cohesion and competitive state-anxiety appears to
be a dynamic one in which both variable influence each other (Eys et al., 2003). Athletes who are
already experience high levels of group cohesion will interpret their somatic symptoms
positively (e.g., ‘The team is ready for this game.’), which then contributes to greater feelings of
group cohesion. On the other hand, an individual who does not feel high level of group cohesion
will interpret somatic symptoms negatively (e.g., ‘The team is not prepared for this game.’),
which then leads to even lower feeling of group cohesion, and the individual’s debilitative
anxiety increases.

The benefits of group cohesion go beyond the degree of competitive state-anxiety. Eys et al.
(2003) indicate that participating in a cohesive group leads to better mood, higher self-esteem,
increased group-efficacy, and higher diffusion of responsibility among group members.
 Performance Anxiety 5

Additionally, individuals who participate in a group sport are less likely to experience
competitive state-anxiety, in general (Craft et al., 2003). Also, individual athletes who participate
in a contact sport tend to report more competitive state-anxiety than individuals who participate
in a non-contact sport (Humara, 1999). As Martin and Hall (1997) point out, it is unclear whether
this difference between sports is due to the sports themselves or due to the sports attracting
individuals with different characteristics.

Not only does the outcome of the competitive state anxiety depend on the way that the individual
interprets the situation (i.e., as facilitative or debilitative), but it also depends on the type of skill
(i.e., open or closed) that is targeted in the sport. Open skills are those in which the athlete is
“performing in an interactive ever-changing environment” (Craft et al., 2003, p. 46); these are
the skills that are represented in volleyball and tennis. Closed skills are used in known and stable
environments, such as golf and gymnastics. Competitive state-anxiety appears more frequently in
sports that tend to rely on open skills rather than on closed skills (Terry & Youngs, 1996).

Respond to conceptual question 5.

Initially, the relationship between arousal and performance was hypothesized as curvilinear –
peak performance resulted from a moderate amount of arousal, while too much arousal or too
little arousal was detrimental to performance. This curvilinear relationship (see figure 1), known
as an inverted-U was first proposed by Yerkes and Dodson (Craft et al., 2003; McNally, 2002).
Figure 1: Relationship between Performance and Arousal
According to Hanton et al.
(2002), “high levels of
cognitive state anxiety, 3

combined with high levels of

physiological arousal, are
Performance Level.

2.5
proposed to lead to
catastrophic decrements in
performance” (p. 1133). 2

Thus, the smooth decrease in

performance proposed by the 1.5
inverted-U appears to be
incorrect; another type of
model is necessary to 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
account for the observed Level of Physiological Arousal
discontinuity in performance
decline at higher levels of anxiety.

McNally (2002) describes a multidimensional theory of anxiety that also related to athletics. In
this multidimensional theory, the cognitive and somatic components of competitive state-anxiety
are separate and distinct, unlike the inverted-U model, which either ignores the cognitive
component or incorporates it into the somatic component. In the multidimensional model, the
somatic component remains as an inverted-U while the cognitive component has a negative
linear relationship with performance (Martens et al., 1990; McNally, 2003; Parfitt & Hardy,
1987). Figure 2 depicts this hypothesized relationship.
 Performance Anxiety 6

The primary draw back to Figure 2: Relationship between Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety
this model is that in its and Performance
simplicity it neglects the
interaction between the
3
cognitive and somatic
components, a dynamic that

Performance Level
2.5
is clearly depicted in the
research findings.
2

Model 1.5

As stated earlier, the two

1
components of performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

anxiety are cognitive and Level of Anxiety

somatic and these Somatic Component Cognitive Component
components interact with
each other. According to Humara (1999) the cusp catastrophe model can account for this
interaction in ways that the original inverted-U model could not. First, let’s explore catastrophe
theory in general and then we will examine what the cusp catastrophe model has to offer to
competitive state-anxiety.

“The central proposition of catastrophe theory is the classification theorem, which

states (with qualifications) that given a maximum of four control parameters, all
discontinuous changes of events can be modeled by one of seven elementary
topological forms. The forms are hierarchical and vary in complexity of the
behavioral spectrum they encompass. That is, these catastrophe models range
from simple to complex depending on the number of observable factors and
behavioral dimensions that are related together in the model. Each of these
general models describes how the ‘regression surface’ or ‘plane’ in the linear
view is ‘folded’ into contoured shapes or structures (cusps) that can be described
by mathematical equations that make the data orderly, structured, and
‘predictable’” (Lanza, 2000, p. 60).

Similar to regression models of behavior, catastrophe theory defines the relationship between
independent variables (called control variables) and dependent variables (called behavioral
variables) (Lanza, 2000). Catastrophe theory goes beyond regression analysis by providing for
sudden transitions in the behavioral variables in an otherwise stable nonlinear system. Consider,
again, the inverted-U model for the relationship between performance and physiological arousal.
With regular increases in physiological arousal there were regular increases or decreases in
performance. However in a catastrophe model, there are discontinuities in the system – with
regular increases in one variable, there are discontinuous jumps or drops in the second variable.
Or, as Koene and Vossen (1994) state:

“[S]mooth changes in stimulus parameters do not always give rise to smooth,

quantitative changes in behavior, but often cause qualitative behavioral changes.
A low intensity stimulus may elicit approach behavior, but the same stimulus with
 Performance Anxiety 7

a higher intensity may produce flight behavior. Aggressive behavior can change
into fear at the moment the organism which is the target of the aggression seems
to be too strong for the aggressor” (p. 31).

Gorman (1976) describes the cusp catastrophe model as “a single sheet, with what appears to be
a pleat in it… the important parts of the graph are the regions in which the catasrtophe manifold
folds over, forming a surface with more than one layer” (p. 18). Figure 3 (from Molenaar, 1994)
depicts this situation.

To understand this, we first need to

understand the terminology that is
used (from Koene & Vossen, 1994;
Lanza, 2000; Molenaar, 1994).

• Behavioral surface: Predicted

behavior or level of performance.
• Bifurcation: Qualitative changes
in the dynamics of a system.
• Bimodality: Behavioral surface is
folded in such a way that two
behavioral states are possible.
• Control (normal) factor: First of Figure 3: Cusp Catastrophe Model
two independent variables used to (Molenaar, 1994)
predict the dependent variable.
• Control plane (surface): Plane representing the values of the two variables used to predict
the behavior.
• Cusp: Shape of the behavioral surface upon the control surface.
• Divergence: Gradual increase in the splitting factor causing an increasing difference in
behavior when the cusp is entered.
• Hystersis: Phenomena in which the transition from point A to point B is not identical to the
transition from point B to point A.
• Inaccessibility: Behavior is unstable between the upper and lower surface.
• Splitting factor: Second of two independent variables used to predict the dependent variable.
• Sudden transitions: Gradual increase of a control parameter can cause a sudden change in
behavior; a catastrophic jump from one surface to the other may occur.

Gorman (1976) indicates that:

“Catastrophe manifolds like the cusp are essentially solutions to equations called
energy functions which describe physical systems that tend toward states of
minimum potential energy. The minimums are points at which the system is in
equilibrium. They are shown as points on the surface of the manifold. The fold,
which shows the discontinuity, indicates how the system may jump from one
energy minimum – or stable state – to a new energy minimum” (p. 19; italics in
original).
 Performance Anxiety 8

We can start building a cusp catastrophe model with a saddle-node bifurcation (or turning point
bifurcation. The saddle-node bifurcation is represented by:

x& = r + x 2

which we can graph for: r < 0, r = 0, and r > 0 in order to demonstrate the movement of the
fixed points as r changes. Treating x& as y and using MAPLE we obtain the following plots.

> restart;
>
> r:=-1;
r := -1
> plot(r+x^2,x=-2..2);

> r:=0;
r := 0
> plot(r+x^2,x=-2..2);

> r:=1;
r := 1
> plot(r+x^2,x=-2..2);
 Performance Anxiety 9

>

We can extend the saddle-node bifurcation by creating a transcritical bifurcation, which is

represented by:

x& = rx − x 2

Again, we can graph this for: r < 0, r = 0, and r > 0 in order to demonstrate the movement of the
fixed points as r changes. Treating x& as y and using MAPLE we obtain the following plots.

> restart;
>
> r:=-1;
r := -1
> plot(r*x-x^2,x=-2..2);

> r:=0;
r := 0
> plot(r*x-x^2,x=-2..2);
 Performance Anxiety 10

> r:=1;
r := 1
> plot(r*x-x^2,x=-2..2);

>

The transcritical bifurcation can be further extended into a pitchfork bifurcation as follows:

x& = rx − x 3 and x& = rx + x 3

Again, we can graph this for: r < 0, r = 0, and r > 0 in order to demonstrate the movement of the
fixed points as r changes. Treating x& as y and using MAPLE we obtain the following plots.

> restart;
>
> r:=-1;
r := -1
> plot(r*x-x^3,x=-2..2);
 Performance Anxiety 11

> r:=0;
r := 0
> plot(r*x-x^3,x=-2..2);

> r:=1;
r := 1
> plot(r*x-x^3,x=-1.5..1.5);

>
> restart;
>
> r:=-1;
r := -1
> plot(r*x+x^3,x=-1.5..1.5);
 Performance Anxiety 12

> r:=0;
r := 0
> plot(r*x+x^3,x=-2..2);

> r:=1;
r := 1
> plot(r*x+x^3,x=-2..2);

>

By drawing upon the previous formula, we can create the catastrophe model as represented by:

x& = h + rx − x 3

However, now we have two independent parameters to worry about (h and r) so analyzing this
will be more difficult.
 Performance Anxiety 13

We will find the fixed points of the above equation using MAPLE.

> restart;
> solve(h+r*x-x^3=0,x);
( 1/3 )
1 2r
( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) + ( 1/3 )
,
6
( 108 h + 12 −12 r + 81 h ) 3 2

( 1/3 )
1 r
− ( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) − ( 1/3 )
12
( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 )
+ I 3 ⎛⎜ ( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) ⎞,
1 1 ( 1/3 ) 2r
− ⎟
2 ⎜6 ( 1/3 ) ⎟
⎜ ( 108 h + 12 −12 r + 81 h )
3 2 ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 ( 1 /3 ) r
− ( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) − ( 1/3 )
12
( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 )
− I 3 ⎛⎜ ( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) ⎞
( 1/3 )
1 1 2r
− ⎟
2 ⎜6 ( 1/3 ) ⎟
⎜ ( 108 h + 12 −12 r 3 + 81 h 2 ) ⎟
⎝ ⎠
These are the cubic equations – do they look messy? Thus we will invoke a graphical approach
by graphing y=rx-x 3 and y=-h on the same axis and look for intersections.
> restart;
> r:=-1;
r := -1
> plot({r*x-x^3,2},x=-2..2);

>
In the above graph we have chosen y=-(-2). The intersection signifies the fixed point of the
equation.

> restart;
> r:=10;
r := 10
> plot({r*x-x^3,5},x=-4..4);
 Performance Anxiety 14

>

In the above graph we have chosen y=-(-5). The intersection signifies the fixed point of the
equation.

Observe that if r > 0 there could be one or two or three intersection points depending on the
value of h.

The two bifurcation curves meet tangentially at (r, h) = (0, 0), which is called the cusp point
(Strogatz, 1994).

We can plot the function in three-dimensions as indicated by Strogatz (1994, p. 72).

“If we plot the fixed points x* above the (r, h) plane, we get a cusp catastrophe
surface… The surface folds over on itself in certain places. The projection of
these folds onto the (r, h) plane yields the bifurcation curves…”

As stated earlier, there are seven elementary catastrophe models. These seven models can be
divided into two categories: cuspoids and umbilics. Table 1 provides the characteristics
associated with these two groups.

Table 1: Characteristics of Catastrophe Models

CHARACTERISTIC CUSPOIDS UMBILICS
Number of dependent measures 1 2
Potential function dimensions 3-6 3-4
Response surface dimensions 2-5 5-6
Names Fold, cusp, swallowtail, Elliptical umbilic, hyperbolic
butterfly umbilic (wave crest),
parabolic umbilic (mushroom)

Examples of the elliptic, parabolic, and hyperbolic models are in figures 4, 5, and 6.
 Performance Anxiety 15

Figure 4: Parabolic Umbilic (Gorman, 1976)

Figure 5: Elliptic Umbilic (Gorman, 1976)

Figure 6: Hyperbolic Umbilic (Gorman, 1976)

 Performance Anxiety 16

Hardy and Fazy (1987, as cited in McNally, 2002) provide the following assumptions for their
model of competitive state anxiety:

• Physiological arousal is deleterious only in the presence of high cognitive anxiety.

• Hysteresis occurs when there is high cognitive anxiety, which leads to a bifurcation.
• Average performance is unlikely when cognitive anxiety is high.
• Empirical data can be used to validate the model.

Hardy and Fazey’s model is depicted in figure 7.

Figure 7: Cusp Catastrophe Model for Performance Anxiety (McNally, 2002)

What this model suggests is that as physiological arousal increases (in the absence of cognitive
anxiety), performance increases to a point and then decreases – this is the original inverted-U
hypothesis. However, as cognitive anxiety increases, the original smooth transition between
physiological arousal being facilitative and then being debilitative fractures. With each increase
in physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety there is an increasingly larger decrement in
performance. As related to figure 7, the performance in the absence of cognitive anxiety would
be the “distant” line on the performance surface. As cognitive anxiety increases, the figure
acquires the third dimension and the “closest” line on the performance surface becomes the
function of interest.

Respond to conceptual question 6.

Assessment
Catastrophe modeling is not without detractors. The critiques of catastrophe theory, particularly
as it applies to the behavioral sciences, are as follows:
 Performance Anxiety 17

• “The word ‘catastrophe’ evokes, in the minds of the uninformed, images of earthquakes,
revolutions and explosions. The belief that the theory may have something to say about such
events has been fostered by its proponents and popularizers” (Sussmann & Zahler, 1977, p.
21).
• Catastrophe models provide purely qualitative descriptions that cannot accurately predict the
natural fluctuations in behavior. Conclusions drawn from these models are not accurate and
are often tautological.
• There are few actual applications for the theory, and the proposed applications that exist are
trivial (Sussman & Zahler, 1977). “Catastrophe theory has had limited application in the
social sciences because of the lack of an appropriate methodology that can accommodate
latent and multivariate aspects of such modeling” (Lanza, 2000, p. 64).
• The catastrophe models are really just close analogies of actual behavior, describing the
behavior but not illuminating the mechanism behind the behavior (Steen, 1977). More
specifically, the cusp catastrophe model described above does not explain “how the effects of
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal on performance occur” (McNally, 2002, NP).
• Catastrophe models are limited in scope to situations “where gradually changing forces lead
to abrupt changes in behavior” (Lanza, 2000, p. 62), unlike chaos theory.

Respond to conceptual question 7.

Conceptual Questions
1. In your own words, describe the difference and interaction between trait and state anxiety.
2. Develop a concept map of the interrelationships between the different forms of anxiety and
the antecedents of competitive state anxiety described thus far.
3. Describe in your own words how the telic and paratelic states will affect an athlete’s
performance. Provide examples from your own life of these concepts (you need not use
athletic examples).
4. Given the findings of the function of role-ambiguity on competitive state-anxiety, provide
additional predictions as to how a team would be affected (one example is already given).
5. Return to your concept map drawn for conceptual question 2, add to that concept map the
other variables discussed thus far.
6. According to Koene and Vossen (1994): “The future for catastrophe theory in the social
science depends on its power to describe behavior in practical applications. One of the most
promising areas in this respect is the field of abnormal behavior in which two behavioral
states and sudden jumps in behavior are common” (p. 51). Evaluate this statement and
indicate the degree to which you agree with it. Provide detailed examples potential avenues
where use of the catastrophe model in the behavioral science is plausible.
7. Identify one of the critiques of catastrophe theory from above. Explain the critique in more
detail and then provide a rebuttal for the critique.

Project
1) Read at least five articles from scholarly journals about some issue within the behavioral
sciences that is appropriate for modeling with a catastrophe model.
 Performance Anxiety 18

2) Your task, should you choose to accept it, is to develop a study to test whether or not a cusp
catastrophe model would fit the data related to your topic. You will present this study in an
A.P.A.-style paper (A.P.A. Publication Manual, 5th Ed.) using the following format:
a) Title page
b) Abstract: A summary of what is discussed in the paper, including:
i) A statement of the problem that you modeled
ii) Your rationale for addressing the problem
iii) A description of your model
iv) A statement of your conclusions
c) Introduction
i) A review of the literature that you read
ii) A paragraph about the problem you decided to address
iii) Your rationale for addressing the problem
d) Model (Method)
i) A step-by-step description of your study
e) Results
i) What you expect for the results of your study
ii) Supporting graphs and tables
f) Discussion
i) A description of how your model relates back to the research your read
ii) Implications of your findings
iii) Conclusions
iv) Areas for future research
g) References
3) Grading
a) 25% for language, which includes A.P.A.-style, spelling, grammar, etc.
b) 25% for content, which includes how well you addressed each of the sections indicated
above
c) 25% for clarity of the description of your study
d) 25% for the degree to which your study reflects the concept that you chose to model

References
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competitive state anxiety. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 25(1), 77 – 93.
Craft, L. L., Magyar, T. M., Becker, B. J., & Feltz, D. L. (2003). The relationship between the
competitive state anxiety inventory-2 and sport performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Sport &
Exercise Psychology, 25(1). 44-66.
Davidson, R.J., & Schwartz, G.E. (1976). The psychobiology of relaxation and related stress: A
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90.
 Performance Anxiety 19

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