Paulo Gabriel D.

Loquinario
PSC 1201 Sec. 3
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
In May 1936, the respondent Director of Posts, announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, in fulfilment of what he considers to be civil duty, requested Vicente Sotto Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the issue to the President.
As the head of the Philippine Independent Church, petitioner Gregorio Aglipay assailed the
constitutionality of the government mandated act of designing and selling of postage stamps in
commemoration of the event. In the case at bar, the respondent’s issuance of the stamps in
question are under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The petitioner contends the constitutionality of the act of designing and selling of postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress as it alleged to be
disruptive of the separation between Church and State. Thus a petition for writ of prohibition was
filed.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions.
The respondent also alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the
writ prayed for is granted.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was violative of the Constitution. (NO)
RULING:
The Supreme Court caught wind of an initial design of the stamps in question—that featured a
Catholic chalice which was later rejected in favor of a map of the Philippines that had the caption
”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937.” Therefore stripping the
religious article of significance in the stamp and replacing it with Manila—to be acknowledged
further as the seat of that congress. The stamps were in no way indicative of any sense favoring
any delegation. The officials in question, however, only deemed the internationally acclaimed
occurrence to be advantageous to the Philippines.
Upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, The SC has come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional
infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if it was to be
assumed that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.

BORJA v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
The case is an instance of a certiorari proceeding. Petitioner Manuel Borja was accused of slight
physical injuries in The City court in Cebu without arraignment. Respondent Judge Senining,
promulgated the decision on August 18, 1976 that found him guilty of the offense thus
sentencing him to imprisonment in a period of 20 days of arresto menor. Thereafter, an appeal
was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza.
It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 affirming
the judgment of the City Court.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
With the failure to arraign him, the petitioner contends that it was violative of his constitutional
right to due process—specifically: of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and his right to be heard by himself and counsel. Thus a call for the grant
of of the writ of certiorari was prayed for.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondent Judge Senining held petitioner Borja’s prosecution in absentia which was allowed
for in the present Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused’s constitutional rights with regards to due process were violated in
light of his non-arraignment. (YES)
Whether respondent Judge Senining’s decision and sentencing followed by the affirmation of
respondent Judge Mendoza were justified with the non-arraignment of the accused taken into
account. (NO)

RULING:
The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds
support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such
a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had
before respondent Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of
petitioner, he was convicted. As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the
leading case of Abriol v. Homeres "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his
defense before sentence is pronounced on him.” He added further that such "constitutional right
is inviolate." There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver,
whether express or implied.
Additionally, the provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is
unavailing. It does not justify Respondent Judge Senining’s action. The indispensable requisite
for trial in absentia is that it should come after arraignment. The explicit stressing for the said
requisite brings emphasis in its importance in the legal procedure of giving due process to the
accused. Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the
applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard
by himself and counsel.
The appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Mendoza did not possess
any curative aspect either. Hence, the decisions of both respondents Judge Senining and Judge
Mendoza dating December 28, 1973 and November 16, 1976 respectively are nullified and set
aside. The case is thus remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of
slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court,
starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE X
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2, September 17, 1971
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner of the case: Municipal mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental Ricardo De la Camara
was arrested on ovember 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador
Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. On November 25, 1968,
the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple
frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against him and two other co-accused. On 14
January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court, premised
on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August
1968.
Respondent Judge Enage started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing of the petition, the defense had not
presented its evidence. Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting
petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to
prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail
bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00 the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then
came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon
being informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent Judge stating that the bond required
"is excessive" and suggesting that a P40, 000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable.
There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge
however remained adamant. De La Camara, then files a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court and later on despairing the situation he is in, fled the provincial jail wherein he was
detained.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner contended that the excessive amount of bail to be posted appropriated by respondent
Judge Enage was unjust.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
There was an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized as follows: (1) ability of the
accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under
bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive
consideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the Judge had appropriated the bail excessively. (YES)

RULING:
As the Constitution commands, with the existence of bail, it should not be nugatory by requiring
a sum that is excessive. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. Fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by
petitioner is clearly violative of the constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there
being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder.
The SC then dismissed the case for being moot and academic due to the petitioner’s escape from
provincial jail—wherein no ruling can be held on his plea to negate the order of the Judge,
 BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984
ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS:
2 search warrants were filed by respondent Judge Ermani Cruz-Pano that resulted in the raiding
of the business addresses of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers. Wherein all
equipment used for the production and distribution of wares alleged to be in the possession of
petitioner Jose Burgos J.R. were seized.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioners brought forth several dissenting reasons explaining why the filed search warrants
against them should be invalidated. They alleged that:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses
as mandated by the Constitution, as well as Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The two search warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct
locations: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. The petitioners contended that only one place
was pinpointed (No. 20- 82[b]).
3. Although the search warrants were directed to Jose Burgos Jr. alone, articles belonging to
his co-petitioners were also seized.
4. Objects bolted into the ground which the petitioners asserted to be immovable, real
properties were also seized.
5. The joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango—members of the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla—which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982 did not provide sufficient basis for a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondents urge the dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Stress is given to the fact that
petitioners filed a motion to impugn warrants in question only after 6 months of their issuance.
(December 7, 1982 - June 16, 1983)
The respondents also justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885.

ISSUE:
Whether the search warrants issued were guided by probable cause. (NO)

RULING:
The SC found impressed with merit the petitioners’ thesis regarding the lack of probable cause.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when
the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not
suffice.
The search warrants are in the form of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas16 the
search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party
in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise"
have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of
any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. The descriptions presented in the affidavit supervised by Col. Abadilla of the
articles seized from the newspaper companies fit the standard the same. Also, it is not the policy
of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
Lastly, on the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. The search warrants are declared null and void and
are set aside; the articles sequestered are then released to the petitioners.

PEOPLE v. CAGADAS X
G.R. No. 88044, January 23, 1991
 GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
On June 6, 1973, at around 6:30 A.M. Rex Ballena and his sister, Lucia Ballena-Tabo, left their
residences at Longganapan, San Vicente, Davao, bound for the capital town of Tagum, to
withdraw some money with which to pay their farm laborers. While inside the jeepney, Members
of the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force (ICHDF), including the accused, approached them
and asked where they were bound for and why. Upon reaching Tagum, Rex went on home the
same day—leaving without his sister. The following day, Lucia returned home to find out that
her brother never arrived home and was missing. On June 10, 1983, the decomposed body of
Rex Ballena was found with his mouth gagged with a handkerchief and hands bound with
boracan vines. His money was gone but his Savings Account passbook was found beside the
decaying corpse. Without waiting for the Municipal Health Officer's post-mortem necropsy
examination or the Municipal judge's Inquest Report, his remains were laid to rest the next day.
The accused was arrested and convicted by the RTC for the crime of murder.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
On November 8, 1984, more than a year later, an Information for murder was filed against the
armed ICHDF members, namely: Miguel Daub, the ICHDF team leader, Martin Cagadas, Jr.,
Macario Barbers, Romy Tulio, Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong, Jose "Roberto" Cultura and
Saturnino "Tator" Salvador, who had been seen by eyewitnesses leading Rex, with hands hogtied
behind his back and his mouth gagged by a red handkerchief, towards the deep gully where his
decomposing body was found.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The defendants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on them. They allege that
the lower court erred: 1. In convicting them of murder despite the prosecution's failure to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; 2. In giving credence to the improbable and ill-motivated
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ramos and Jose Magunot; 3. In convicting the appellants of
the crime charged based on purely circumstantial evidence; 4. In disregarding their defense of
alibi; 5. In convicting Roberto Cultura even if he was not one of the charged in the information;
and 6. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of public position,
(b) superior strength, (c) evident premeditation, and (d) treachery were present in the
commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court was erroneous in conviction of the accused. (NO)

RULING:
Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura for he was not one
of those indicted in the information but "Jose" Cultura (his father's name), has no merit. It was
clearly proven that the accused, Roberto Cultura, was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and
killed the victim. He did not even raise the question of his identity during the arraignment
process. As seen in People vs. Maravilla & People vs. Torres, Appellant’s acceptance to be tried
under the name “Jose” is to be recognized as waiver on his part to raise the question on his
identity as one of the accused.

GIMENEZ v. NAZARENO
G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio
Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of
murder. They were arraigned on August 22, 1973—they all pleaded not guilty to the crime. All
the arraigned were notified of the hearing set by respondent judge Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno on
September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Private respondent de Vega Jr. escaped
from his detention center which resulted to his failure to attend the court hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes
from the custody of the law. (NO)
Whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been
duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and
cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. (NO)
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioners contended that the hearing should proceed and a judgement be rendered impartially
with all the evidence accumulated against the accused—since the private respondent has been
duly notified despite his escape.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The respondent judge contended that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable.

RULING:
A court does not lose jurisdiction over the person of the accused halfway. Jurisdiction held by
the court among parties will be held until the termination of the case at hand.
As for the next issue, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said
arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on
September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the
lower Court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent
escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the
scheduled hearings was given. The acts enumerated all comply with the Constitution’s provision
on trials in absentia. It cannot be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his
rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the
trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights.

MANOTOC v. CA
G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the defendant in civil case No. 63337.
Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda "Imee" R.
Marcos-Manotoc for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment.
Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment rendered on May 1,
1991 by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a
case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No.
86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence
officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
The trial court issued a Summons 3 on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue,
Pasig City. On July 15, 1993 the summons and a copy of the complaint was given to alleged
caretaker of petitioner, Macky de la Cruz. In light of petitioner’s failure to answer, the trial court
declared her in default with order dated October 13, 1993.
Before the trial court’s decision, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons. Which was supported by:
1. The address indicated in the complaint was not petitioner’s dwelling place, residence or
place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
2. Macky de la Cruz was neither a representative, employee nor resident of the place.
3. Prescribed procedure on Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was
ignored.
4. Petitioner was a resident of Singapore.
5. Whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s motion for dismissal on strength of
evidence presented by Trajano. On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotoc’s plea
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner, undaunted, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before respondent Court of
Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995 seeking to annul past orders of Trial court judge Aurelio C.
Trampe.dated October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
On March 17, 1997, respondent CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Respondent CA contended that the findings of the trial court that petitioner's residence was at
Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was
also the residence of her husband, as shown by the testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the
Returns of the registered mails sent to petitioner.
the CA also rejected petitioner's Philippine passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it
merely showed the dates of her departure from and arrival in the Philippines without presenting
the boilerplate's last two (2) inside pages where petitioner's residence was indicated. The CA
considered the withholding of those pages as suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the
CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted
service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court.
On April 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in
its Resolution dated October 8, 1997.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
After being denied the motion for reconsideration by respondent CA, petitioner comes to the
Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
The petitioner contended the following:
1. Respondent court of appeals committed a serious error in rendering the decision and
resolution in question in defiance of law and jurisprudence in ruling that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner through a substituted service of
summons in accordance with section 8, rule 14 of the revised rules of court.
2. Respondent court of appeals committed a serious error when it ruled that there was a
valid service of summons on an alleged caretaker of petitioner's residence in complete
defiance of the ruling in Castillo vs. CFI of Bulacan, br. IV, G.R. no. L-55869, February
20, 1984, 127 SCRA 632 which defines the propriety of such service upon mere
overseers of premises where a party supposedly resides.
3. Respondent court of appeals committed [a] serious error in concluding that the residence
of the husband is also the residence of his wife contrary to the ruling in the bank of the
Philippine islands vs. De Coster, G.R. no. 23181, March 16, 1925, 47 phil. 594.
4. Respondent court of appeals committed [a] serious error in failing to apply the rule on
extra-territorial service of summons under sections 17 and 18, rule 14 of the revised rules
of court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent CA erred in rendering the decision and resolution. (YES)
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner through a
substituted service of summons in accordance with section 8, rule 14 of the revised rules of
court. (NO)

RULING:
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to
the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, the decisions and
resolutions of any court shall be rendered null and void. Personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person.
If, for an excusable reason, the defendant cannot be issued a summons within reasonable period,
then the substitute service can be applied. Though substitute service of summons is still a very
extraordinary measure. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements
of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty. It reasons out that "The certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence
of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the
evidence must be clear and convincing.
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to
apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally
serve the summons and that said efforts failed. It must clearly show that the substituted service
must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of
defendant. The Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule
14, Section 8 on substituted service.
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it was held that "x x x the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case
where it is patent that the sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied)." While the Sheriff’s
Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the
summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or
attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v.
Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not mention any effort to accomplish
personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
EN BANC
FACTS:
Former president Ferdinand Marcos had died during exile at Honolulu, Hawaii. His family
petitioned to return to the Philippines but was dismissed by the SC which was followed by the
denial of then president Cory Aquino. The petitioners thus filed a Motion for reconsideration.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The petitioners contended and raised 3 main arguments:
The act of not permitting the family re-entry to the country strips them of the inherent right of
citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection that is guaranteed by the
Constitution for all Filipinos.
The president acted arbitrarily in the act of denial.
There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic. He
asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return' is
in substance, a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy
orchestrated efforts at destabilization.

ISSUE:
Whether the motion for reconsideration has compelling reason. (NO)
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the Marcoses, much more, Filipinos entrance
to the Philippines. (YES)

RULING:
The SC ruled that in all motions of reconsideration, the movants carry the burden of giving
compelling reason as to why the decision of the SC has to be reviewed. In light of this, the SC
did not find any compelling reasons.
The president has residual implied powers. Implied from the grant of executive power which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties. The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions
of the Constitution. The SC also subscribed to the idea that one of the duties of the President
under the Constitution is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Seeing to
it that in the return of the Marcoses, the Philippines will be plunged into national disarray.

PEOPLE v. REBOSE
G.R. No. 131104, June 17, 1999
ROMERO, J.

FACTS:
Respondent was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 95-12116 before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, under an information dated April 25, 1995.
The accused, by means of intimidation, while armed with a gun, have had carnal knowledge of
Lorena B. Rizalte, 12 years of age.
The respondent pleaded not guilty on his arraignment dated June 6, 1995.
Appellant Rebose testified that he is a minister of a Born Again Charismatic group since 1992. In
1995, he established a congregation in Antipolo, Rizal, as a result of which he came to know the
Rizalte family. Who then became members thereof. He contended that a misunderstanding arose
between them when a Korean missionary donated $1,000.00 as seed money for building a
church. Instead of entrusting the said amount to the appellant as pastor of the sect, the same was
handed over to the Rizalte spouses as the lot upon which the church is to be built belongs to
them. During the construction of the church, however, appellant borrowed P3,000.00 from the
Rizaltes purportedly sourced from the amount donated but the latter allegedly made it appear that
he stole it from them. After confronting the Rizaltes concerning their malicious imputation, he
was charged with the crime of rape against their granddaughter Lorena Rizalte.
In a decision dated June 23, 1997, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
During the prosecution, the victim unmistakably and candidly identified appellant Rebose.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Appellant argued that the prosecution failed in overcoming his alibi of being in Bontoc,
Mountain Province at the time of the alleged rape.
Appellant also found fault in the trial court’s findings as contrary to the medical report of Dr.
Lebaquin. Regarding the hymenal laceration found in the victim.
Appellant also contended that the victim if indeed raped, could have escaped and her failure to
cry and scream for help on multiple occasions was fatal to the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not results of a medical examination is indispensable to the prosecution of rape at all
times. (NO)
Whether or not the presence of force and intimidation in the act of abuse would affect the
victim’s cognition. (YES)

RULING:
On the Medical Examination:
Citing People v. Topaguen, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the hymenal
laceration of the victim as evidence of rape but on the testimonies of complainants themselves
which standing alone and even without medical examination were sufficient to convict. Amd
regarding the strength that a medical examination presents before a prosecution of rape; People
v. Devilleres, states that a medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as
long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction for rape is proper.
The two elements that must be established to hold the accused guilty of statutory rape are: (1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve
years of age. If the prosecution fails to determine the age of the victim/s, the accused guilty
cannot be convicted of statutory rape. However, the accused could still be held liable for the
crime of rape under Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 335. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
On the presence of Force and Intimidation:
The prosecution amply established the use of force and intimidation in sexually abusing Lorena.
In People v. Quiamco, physical resistance does not need to be present when force or intimidation
is used by the rapist. In the case at bar, Lorena failed to make an outcry as she was faced with a
gun and the imminent loss of her life if she did not comply with the wants of Rebose. The SC, in
light of this, invokes the ruling of People v. Luzorata; the Court held that intimidation was
addressed to the mind of the victim and therefore subjective, and its presence could not be tested
by any hard-and-fast rule but must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at
the time of the crime. When a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, he/she cannot be
expected to think and act coherently, his/her failure to immediately take advantage of the early
opportunity to escape does not automatically vitiate the credibility of her account. Thus, where
accused was positively identified by the victim of the rape herself who harbored no ill motive
against the accused, the defense of alibi must fail.

PEOPLE v. FERRER
G.R. No. 139695, August 26, 2002
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
Guillermo Ferrer was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, of Morong, Rizal, for
the crime of rape.
On 20 February 1998, private complainant Leonisa Apolinario went to a certain marina to get
some plywood, as instructed by her aunt, Amelia Imbat. Private complainant was being followed
by accused Guillermo Ferrer with shirt wrapped on his face as mask--and consequentially raped
her at a grassy area near place called Peralta Farm. Her strong resistance and struggles proved to
be futile.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Private complainant Apolinario, undoubtedly recognized and pointed right away the respondent
Ferrer in an investigation.
Although after a second investigation conducted by SPO2 Anero, the private complainant
retracted her accusation of the appellant.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The accused testified that he had only attained first grade schooling. He claimed that on 20
February 1998, he was in his house at the Ilustre compound within Camp Capinpin. At nine
o'clock in the morning that day, he constructed a chicken house and then weeded the farm until
hours later when his brother, Teofilo, arrived to fetch him.
After being found guilty by the trial court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the respondent
interposed an appeal—finding error in the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has erred in finding the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt. (NO)

RULING:
The SC found the appeal to be lacking of merit. The SC stated that the trial court correctly
discarded Ferrer’s defense of alibi. The accused failed to state and establish clear that (a) he was
in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
Leonisa did not spare a minute in telling her aunt about the sexual assault and in later meeting
with the barangay officials to whom she readily gave the identity of her assailant.
It was found that the second investigation which resulted in the complainant’s redaction of the
accusation of Ferrer as the one who abused her was conducted under dubious circumstances. The
officer in question admitted in court that he did not follow standard procedures in the re-
investigation. In any case, complainant Leonisa did not make in any sense; a redaction of her
accusation toward Ferrer—stating that she only got confused as to how the questions were asked.