David Shein

Haniel Barazarte
Relativism

At the end of the day, the question is this: is a claim like ‘kitten-killing is wrong’ true-and-shup-up
(like ‘the earth is round’) or is it a matter of preference (like ‘pecan pie is tasty’) or social convention
(‘like ‘you should drive on the right side of the road’) or….? And however, you answer, how do you
deal with the consequences of that answer?

The following essay is going to explore issues of morality surrounding the question of

whether kitten-killing is right or wrong by classifying and engaging with the given options

offered by the essay question. These options are moral realism (kitten-killing is wrong and shut

up!) and the two relativist options of preference and social convention. Moral realism refers to

the idea that there is an unfiltered, independent, and objective reality that we can appeal to solve

moral predicaments. The most radical vein of moral realism is that which equates the

epistemological validity of questions of science (roundness of the Earth) and those of morality

(kitten-killing). In contrast, moral relativism affirms, as all forms of relativism do, that morality

is, in reality, a 2-place predicate rather than a 1-place predicate1. In this regard, a moral relativist

would assume that the morality of kitten-killing is relative to individual preferences or social

conventions and not because there is a moral reality outside of our agreements. This essay is

going to assume the relativist position concerning the morality of kitten-killing by embracing the

relational relativism presented by Gilbert Harman in his work Moral Relativism Defended and

by incorporating the notion of futility (in addition to oddity) in regards to Harman´s arguments.

Additionally, this essay is going to explore counter-arguments by exploring universalist concerns

regarding the consequences of relativism and responding with the anti-universalism of authors

such as Rorty or Carl Schmitt.

1
What Relativism Isn´t, William Max Knorpp Jr, 282.
 The first relativistic affirmation that Harman gives in his essay is the affirmation that

morality is relative to an agreement. In this regard, Harman states that "morality arises when a

group of people reaches an implicit agreement."2 Therefore, it adequates itself to the given

definition of relativism minimum as the idea that moral judgments are 2-place predicates.

According to Harman, an agreement is when "each number of people intends to adhere to some

schedule, plan, or set of principles, intending to do this on the understanding that the others

similarly intend."3 In this sense, morality is effectively a question of social convention and not of

an independent order outside of our implicit and social agreements. Then, Harman introduces the

notion of inner judgment relativism and affirms that his moral relativism refers precisely to an

internalist logic. Here, Harman is referring to the formalistic relation between the agent, the act,

and its posterior moral judgment. Inner judgment refers to the "judgment that it was right or

wrong of him to have done so."4 Harman then creates a conjunction between the definition of

inner judgment and that of morality as an agreement, as he states that:

We make inner judgments about a person only if we suppose that he is capable of being motivated by the

relevant moral considerations [agreements]. We make other sorts of judgment about those who we

suppose are not susceptible of such motivation. Inner judgments include judgments in which we say that

someone should or ought to have done something or that someone was right or wrong to have done

something.5

Therefore, moral judgments (both the negative and positive ought) are only possible if

you are inside the agreement of the agent or subject that effectuates an act. This notion follows

2
Moral Relativism Defended, Gilbert Harman, 35.
3
Harman, 35.
4
Harman, 36.
5
Harman, 36.
that it is not possible to make a moral judgment outside of social convention or agreement. To

illustrate this argument, Harman presents the example of aliens arriving at the Earth. These aliens

"without the slightest concern for human life and happiness"6 might "injure one of us."7 Yet, this

apparent immoral action "means nothing to them,"8 and that "fact by itself gives them no reason

to avoid the action."9 In this sense, to scream at the aliens that they are morally wrong because of

enslaving and exterminating our species seems rather "odd."10 It is then extravagant to assume

that two beings that are, ultimately, absolutely others to each other, with no common ground, are

going to achieve a conclusion through moral deliberation or judgment.

Similarly, there is no point in being morally inquisitive towards someone who is outside

an agreement in regards to the question of kitten-killing. It is, therefore, not possible to argue that

the agent is in the wrong for killing kittens since there is a distance between the two opposite

agreements. Such an irredeemable distance between two non-communicative and opposite

agreements signifies the futility of extra-social moral judgment since there is nothing - morally

speaking - outside of our social conventions. It is when presented with the inconvenient situation

of facing two opposite agreements that the transition between the dialectic of dialogue from that

of the arms occurs. Harmann introduces us to hyperbolic situations like that of aliens or nazis to

present us with circumstances of facing the absolute other since these figures are completely

outside of our moral schemes. Nevertheless, there are certain moments in which our culture

(western) clashes with that outside the agreement. Female genital mutilation, infanticide among

indigenous tribes, and the murderous nature of the Northern Sentinel tribes are examples of

facing that which is outside of the convention.

6
Harman, 36.
7
Harman, 36.
8
Harman, 36.
9
Harman, 36.
10
Harman, 36.
 Moreover, agent-based moral relativism avoids the accusation of dishonesty presented by

Betsy Postow in her essay Dishonest Relativism. According to Postow, relativism is

self-contradictory because it is irrational to accept a moral theory while simultaneously assuming

the contrary. In this sense, Postow claims that "it seems illegitimate for a person to accept a

normative theory while believing that a conflicting theory is equally well-grounded."11 For

example, Sophia is dishonest if she accuses José of being wrong due to his kitten-killing streaks

but simultaneously thinks that her opponents' considerations are well-grounded. Both Betsy and

Harman agree that morality has a polemical dimension embedded into it — the agreements of a

group, individual, or ideology are in constant opposition with others. Yet, the problem is that

Rostow ignores the mechanisms that are involved in the construction of moral judgment. The

defining factor behind inquisitive moral power is not that of an unfiltered moral reality but rather

the acceptance of a socially conveyed agreement. Claims of dishonesty are only acceptable

within the context of an agreement. Postow is correct in the sense that relativism is nonsensical

when making an intra-moral judgment. However, outside of the agreement, the capacity of moral

judgment is rather futile since the distance enables our ability for mutual comprehension, which

is a prerequisite for morality.

Screaming "you are wrong!" to a kitten-killer maniac is comparable to plowing in the sea.

This accusation of moral wrong-doing is closer to an internal designation of those who are

outside the agreement rather than an appeal to a shared morality. It seems odd to shout at the

kitten-killer and proscribed that he ought not to kill kittens. On the contrary, Harman states that

"we can only judge that he is a criminal, someone to be hunted down by the police, an enemy of

peace-loving citizens, and so forth."12 In this sense, Harmanian relativism escapes from the

11
On the Coherence of Moral Relativism, Betsy Postow, 125.
12
Harman, 36.
accusation of inaction or apathy that anti-relativist attribute to relativism (Postow). Quite the

opposite, action derives from the futility of moral judgment towards outsiders. Politics and

Policing, as two different moments of recognition of the Other, starts when morality ends.

Therefore, one can say, in a heterodox fashion, that Harman is a Schmittian in disguise. For Carl

Schmitt, the essence of the political is the "friend and enemy distinction."13 This enemy is just

"the other, the stranger, and to determine its essence is just enough for it to be existentially

distinct or alien in a particular intense sense."14 In Harmanian relativism, the space of the

Other/enemy is that which is outside of the agreement. Consequently, politics (action) are

effective because moral judgment fails to engage with that outside of the agreement.

Another argument that might present a problem to moral relativism is that of moral

universalism. It is possible to conclude that all human groups share a common morality but in

some cases circumstances forced them to make immoral acts. In his essay, The Challenge of

Cultural Relativism, James Rachels presents the case of infanticide among Eskimos. For

example, in Eskimo societies, the practice of infanticide is normalized, particularly towards girls.

Yet, when asked about their decision, the Eskimos would not say that "they have less affection

for their children or less respect for human life."15 Eskimos live under harsh conditions due to

their nomadic lifestyle, and infanticide is just a drastic measure. For Rachels, their values "are

not all that different from our values. It is only that life forces upon them choices that we do not

have to make."16 In this sense, it is possible to be inquisitive towards kitten-killers because there

is no such thing as an agreement that determines the limits of moral judgment. Yet, this

13
El Concepto de lo Político, Carl Schmitt, 59.
14
Schmitt, 59-60.
15
The Challenge of Cultural Relativism, James Rachels, 7.
16
Rachels, 8.
universalist notion seems trivial since it ignores the plurality of differences, which defines the

irremediable distance, and focuses on a universalism-minimum.

Furthermore, this form of universalism ignores the problem of indeterminacy of language

presented by Quine. According to Quine, each language implies an ontology, with its "general

and singular terms, identity, [and] quantification."17 Therefore, epistemology precedes ontology.

In this sense, every time a linguist translates a concept, term, or word of a newly discovered

culture to his language, the linguist in question is imposing his ontology. The idea of protecting

the integrity of children could have completely different definitions from one culture to another.

Rachels might be applying his western notion of human dignity to the moral considerations that

Eskimos have to the act of infanticide. In Harmanian logic, Rachels is using his agreement to

classify and define the agreement of Eskimo societies. Again, Rachels ignores his ethnocentric

(western) view on human dignity and wrongfully applies it to Eskimos. Additionally, it is

possible to think with Rachels and state that Eskimos, exactly like westerners do, believe in the

protection of the children. Yet, it is plausible that Eskimos think like this because they are

Christians, and therefore inside our agreement. In this regard, it is reasonable to judge Eskimos

since we can appeal to the shared value of human dignity, but this is not a result of moral

universalism but relativism. Conclusively, ethnocentrism is inevitable as Rorty states:

To be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into the people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and

the others. The first group-one's etlinos-comprises those who share enough of one's beliefs to make

fruitful conversation possible. In this sense, everybody is ethnocentric when engaged in actual debate, no

matter how much realist rhetoric about objectivity he produces in his study.18

17
Speaking of Objects, Quine, 4.
18
Solidarity or Objectivity?, Richard Rorty,
 Moral judgment and inquisitiveness against others outside of an agreement is, ultimately,

a futile endeavor. Morality is inscribed to circles or social conventions that determined the limits

of judgment. Yet, this form of relativism does not preclude action from happening. However, this

action does not correspond to the field of morality but to that of politics and policing. In this

sense, the act of kitten-killing can be morally judged within the confines of the agreement.

Outside of the agreement, it is simply not possible to reach an understanding. The kitten-killer is

simply going to be perplexed by accusations of wrong-doing since there is a radical moral

distance between the two different agreements. Then, the only possible alternatives to deal with

those outside of the agreement are the options of toleration, integration, or elimination, and the

different gradations in-between the three alternatives. In this sense, relativism, rather than being

an invitation for tolerant passivity, is the recognition of the limits of moral judgment.