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ECA-00-PCS-PHI-0001 - Rev4-PROCESS MONITORING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY
ECA-00-PCS-PHI-0001 - Rev4-PROCESS MONITORING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY
ECA LNG
This document is subject to the terms and conditions of that certain Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract
No. PO45751054 relating to the Energia Costa Azul Phase 1 LNG Project dated February 27, 2020.
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Revision Description:
Section /
Revision Description
Page
Page 1 and
3 all Headers, Updated Project Number and EDSA
Footers
3 2 Removed Project Overview Section
3 3.2 Added abbreviations for CMPDS and FACP
3 4.1.3 Changed “latest issue in effect” to “according to contract Appendix A, Attachment A-1.”
Deleted “The EPC Contractor is to use the latest revision of the following applicable
3 4.2
documents:”
3 4.2 Delete reference to ISA 84. It has been replaced by IEC 61511, already reference
Added to clarify scope “The ICSS for this project will be integrated with the plant’s
3 5.4
existing ICSS and existing operator control room.”
Deleted Tank Gauging System and CEMS as they are out of the scope of the project.
3 5.4 Changed Vibration and Machinery Protection Systems to Machinery Monitoring
Systems and Asset management solution to Asset Management System.
3 5.5 Operator Displays are suitable to back up operations of any other console.
Removed “Detection and Protection” from section title for consistency in the system
3 5.7
name and revised section related to Building FGS adding reference to FACP.
LNG Leak Detection will be included as required for the Phase 1 LNG Project. Design
3 5.8
details will be specified during the EPC phase.
3 5.9 Changed HIPPS from implemented within Plant SIS to stand-alone SIS.
Removed reference to future consideration of HIPPS for Propane and MR
3 5.9
compressors
3 5.11 Revised section to clarify scope of the Machinery Control and Monitoring Systems.
3 5.15 Modified to clarify CCR is existing and will be modified to accept new control consoles.
Revised to read “The Tank Gauging System is existing, and no modification is
3 5.17
anticipated for this project.”
3 5.19 Revised to read “CEMS are excluded from the scope of this project.”
3 5.29 Added section for Asset Management System.
4 4.2 Clarified Engineering Codes and Standards Revision Requirements
4 4.3 Added ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0007 to list of Project Specifications.
4 5.1 CCR operator console to include turbine and compressor HMI
4 5.5 Printers are documented in ICSS Specification ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0001.
4 5.6 Deleted mechanical switch functionality from SIS logic input
4 5.7 Added gas detectors to building FACP
4 5.8 For details related to the Leak Detection System, refer to ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0007
4 5.10 HART protocol interface to plant’s AMS system per TD-INS-0014 response
4 5.11 Delete words Gas Turbine Control System from MCMS
4 5.11 Transmitters shall be furnished with 4-20 mA HART protocol
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Holds:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................ 6
2 SCOPE............................................................................................................................. 6
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5.11 Machinery Control and Monitoring Systems (MCMS) Basic Design ......................... 24
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1 Purpose
The intent of this document is to describe the Process Monitoring and Control Philosophy for
the Energía Costa Azul (ECA) Phase I LNG Project. This document establishes the philosophy
that will lead to the overall design of an integrated control and safety system (ICSS) which will
be comprised of a basic process control system (BPCS), safety instrumented system (SIS),
fire and gas detection system (FGS), and other systems that will interact and interface with the
above mentioned systems.
2 Scope
The control system philosophy shall include a high level of automation for the ECA Project.
Liquefaction and Pretreatment Plants for this project shall be considered as a “stand-alone”
units, meaning, each unit shall be able to operate independently of the other units. As a
minimum, each train shall have its own dedicated BPCS, SIS and FGS controllers/logic
solvers.
Considerations concerning project site conditions, major process equipment, design life,
operability, maintainability, sparing philosophy, material handling, availability, reliability, and
etc., will follow the guidelines set forth in the Project Design Basis, document no. ECA-00-
PMT-DEB-0001.
3.1 Definitions
Contractual Entities:
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Within the context of this process monitoring and control philosophy, the following words
shall mean:
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3.2 Acronyms
Within the context of this process monitoring and control philosophy, the following
abbreviations shall mean:
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4 Reference Documents
4.1 General
4.1.1 This philosophy is based on and incorporates (by direct reference and/or
inference) aspects pertinent to control systems engineering and design, including
but not limited to:
a. Industry codes, standards, and practices prepared and issued by, engineering
societies, industry associations, manufacturer's associations, and insurance
company groups according to contract Appendix A, Attachment A-1.
4.1.2 Any other codes, standards, or practices in addition to, or instead of, those listed
in this philosophy, that are required for the project will be referenced in the
appropriate project specification.
4.1.3 The applicable issue date, unless modified by written addendum, of each
referenced national, local, or industry code, standard, recommended practice, and
regulation is according to contract Appendix A, Attachment A-1.
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IEEE 1184 Guide for Batteries for Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems
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Mexico NOMS:
NOM-001-SECRE-
Natural gas quality requirements
2010
NOM-002-SECRE-
Natural gas utilization installations (Exploitation)
2010
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ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0031 Telecommunications
5.1 General
The overall control and monitoring functions of the plant, including the turbines and
compressors shall be performed from BPCS HMIs located in a Central Control Room
(CCR). All efforts shall be made to integrate the turbine and compressor data into the
primary BPCS HMI’s. In addition, the CCR operator console will include a turbine and
compressor HMI. The controllers, for the ICSS shall reside in a Remote Instrument
Enclosure (RIE), along with the turbine control and compressor control cabinets with their
HMIs. The I/O cabinets for the BPCS will be “Smart” I/O modules located remote in the
field with fiberoptic home run cables routed to the RIE. The I/O cabinets for the SIS and
FGS will be “Smart” I/O modules located in RIE.
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Media to achieve communication between the RIE and the CCR shall be via redundant
fiber optic cables routed using divergent paths.
In general, the BPCS shall be in charge of the basic process control for the plant. The SIS
shall be in charge of the safety shutdown of process units in abnormal conditions. The FGS
shall be in charge of any fire detected or abnormal gas release in each unit and initiate
action through its own I/O. If the FGS detects a situation where a facility shutdown is
required, this shutdown action will be requested of the SIS via hardwired signals between
the FGS and the SIS.
The project will provide hardware to operate the project (ECA Phase I LNG Project) from
the Main Control Building.
Critical service is defined as the equipment and/or control systems requiring emergency
power supply to guarantee system availability in case of normal power interruption. Critical
service applications shall be determined during project development activities, such as
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) reviews.
Critical service systems are BPCS, SIS, FGS and turbo machinery control systems.
Critical SIL rated functions shall not be performed by BPCS.
The ICSS for this project will be integrated with the plant’s existing ICSS and existing
operator control room. The ICSS shall be capable of performing all functions required by
the piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), the project documentation, and by the
physical layout of the facility.
Systems and subsystems of the ICSS include, but are not limited to:
LCD display
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The ICSS System shall interface with the following systems and subsystems:
Analyzer system
Intercommunication system
ICSS controllers (BPCS, SIS and FGS) shall reside in an RIE and shall be supervised by
operators at the CCR.
The field devices (such as transmitters) related to the unit shall be connected to the
appropriate system (BPCS, SIS, FGS) smart I/O modules that communicate to the
respective controller in the RIE.
A minimum of 20% installed spare I/O capacity and 20% rack vacancy shall be provided
for each system. ICSS controllers shall have a minimum of 40% spare processor memory.
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The control system (CPU, I/O cards) for the packaged equipment shall preferably be
installed in the RIE. However, if there are distance issues, those can be installed in a local
control panel (LCP) in the field, or where appropriate such as environmentally conditioned
equipment buildings. Weather and corrosion (NEMA 4X as minimum) protected outdoor
panels with an appropriate temperature controlled environment may be considered when
they are absolutely necessary.
Power for all ICSS equipment shall be designed to be reliable. Power shall be furnished to
ICSS equipment (system power supplies) from a dedicated uninterruptable power supply
(UPS) which shall include a redundant battery system of sufficient capacity and duration
for safe shutdown of the process unit with a minimum of two hours of supplied power. DC
power supplies in cabinets shall be redundant with alarming functions both locally and
remotely with independent single pole breakers to allow the capability to disconnect any
AC power and DC power supply independently. DC power supplies loading shall not
exceed 70% of the nominal capacity (each) taking into consideration all the electronics of
the ICSS and the full use of the installed I/O.
A single failure in any component, including networking, shall have no effect on the plant
safety and control functionality.
Time synchronization between systems shall be achieved by the use of a global positioning
systems (GPS) time server, which includes all ICSS equipment and packaged control
equipment on vendor packages.
The BPCS furnished shall have a level of security suitable for the requirements of the
process and the project documentation. This may range from "single loop integrity" to a full
or partial back up redundancy or automatic sparing system, as appropriate and effective.
The BPCS shall use 4-20 mA HART protocol as the platform to interface with field devices.
The BPCS controllers and communication hardware in the process network shall be fully
redundant. All process control and logic functions (except SIS safety and mitigation logic)
shall reside in the BPCS, except the control systems that are provided as part of packaged
equipment.
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Each operator display shall be a full function display capable of backing up the operations
required of any other operator display within the operations console.
A printer, or printers, shall be provided, linked to the system, to provide a hard copy of
alarm reports, other standard reports, graphics, trends, etc., and such additional
information as may be retrieved from the operating system without special programming
from all the workstations. For more information on printers, refer to the ICSS Specification
ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0001, Section 11.
All recording shall be done within the ICSS with the ability to print the required data.
No safety interlock function involving personnel safety shall be performed in the BPCS.
The ICSS system audible alarm shall be configurable for different audible ranges, priorities
and color management of alarms. Alarm shelving shall be provided following ISA-SP18
Alarm System Management and Design Guide (ANSI/ISA-18.2 Management of Alarm
System for the Process Industries).
The safety instrumented system shall be defined and implemented in accordance with IEC
61508 and 61511, Application of Safety Instrumentation Systems for the Process Industry.
To comply with the above standards, the project team shall first identify the project’s safety
target SIL level for the process. A HAZOP multi-discipline analysis team will be formed to
evaluate the hazardous events that pose a risk higher than the safety target level. A LOPA
analysis will determine the necessary safeguards and safety functions (SIFs) to be
implemented in the SIS, to bring the SIL level to the desired project target.
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A voting microprocessor based system shall be used. The level of voting and diagnostics
will depend on the SIL defined in accordance with IEC 61508 and 61511. The system shall
be Technischer Überwachungs-Verein (TÜV) – Safety Monitoring Agency approved for SIL
3 applications.
SIS applies when functional safety is achieved using one or more safety instrumented
functions for the protection of personnel, protection of the general public (community), or
protection of the environment. SIS may also be applied in non-safety applications such as
asset protection.
For safety instrumented functions, SIS inputs shall be 4-20mA with HART protocol for
process measurement variables. HART information shall be extracted from transmitter
input wiring and communicated to the Asset Management System.
Start-up and maintenance by-pass switches shall be software switches within the BPCS
with alarm indications during by-pass mode and shall not be reset or cancelled unless
process conditions are proven "NORMAL”. For details, refer to the ICSS HMI Graphics
Specification document No. ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0020.
All shutdown action signals, SIS and interlock resets, and critical process controller
functions (remote set point, process variable indication, controller output, and etc.)
interfaced from one system to another shall be hardwired, including packaged equipment.
Networked communication between the SIS, BPCS, and peripherals shall be via redundant
communications and any failure of this equipment shall not impact any of the SIFs.
System hardware will be allocated by process units, reducing the potential impact of any
hardware failures on production. Using this topology, each SIS can operate in a self-
contained mode, minimizing the potential impact of any communications loss.
All interlock functions involving personnel safety shall be performed in the SIS.
A centralized safety engineering workstation shall be located in the CCR. From this
location, personnel with rights (password protected) shall be able to view active logic,
review sequence of events logs and implement approved user software modifications. The
safety engineering workstation shall communicate with the SIS using a dedicated network
All SIS trip logic will be implemented as fail-safe logic, i.e. logic “1” is healthy state and “0”
is a trip/alarm state. All alarm bits generated by the SIS for annunciation by the BPCS will
be configured as logic “1” is healthy, and logic “0” is alarm.
Dedicated manual shutdown hardwired push buttons and pilot lights mounted in the
operator consoles shall be provided by the EPC Contractor and the SIS Vendor to allow
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the operator critical SIS manual shutdown capability. These switches shall be independent
of the BPCS system.
A FGS consists of components and circuits arranged to monitor and annunciate the status
of fire alarm, gas alarm, or supervisory signal-initiating devices, and to initiate the
appropriate response to those signals.
The FGS shall be a standalone type and meet NFPA 72 requirements (application,
installation, location, performance and maintenance of fire alarm systems and their
components). Secured flow of information from the FGS to the BPCS shall be provided via
a redundant communication link. There shall be no possibility of breaching the FGS
functionality by an inadvertent control action of the BPCS.
For process areas, the fire & gas initiating devices shall be hardwired individually to the
FGS I/O installed in each remote instrument enclosure (RIE). For additional details, refer
to the Specification for Fire and Gas System, Document No. ECA-00-PCS-SPE-0005.
For each building, the associated gas detectors, smoke detectors, heat detectors, pull
station(s), and annunciation devices shall be connected to a dedicated Fire Alarm Control
Panel mounted in a conspicuous location of the building. The devices may be wired in
signal line circuits also referred to as loops to the FACP. FACP also includes HVAC and
fire suppressant system integration where required. Each building FACP will have
hardwired signals to the FGS for Supervisory, Fire Detected, and Trouble Alarms. The
FACPs will also be networked to the ICSS. For additional details, refer to the Building Fire
Protection Specification, ECA-00-HSE-SPE-0001.
These systems shall be primarily intended to provide notification of fire alarm, supervisory,
and trouble conditions; to alert the occupants; to call for appropriate aid; and to control fire
safety functions.
Per NFPA 72, the time delay between the activation of an initiating device and the
automatic activation of a local fire safety function shall not exceed ten seconds.
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All controls provided specifically for the purpose of manually overriding any automatic fire
safety function shall provide visible indication of the status of the associated control circuits.
The equipment rack room and electrical substation shall be monitored by the FGS from the
CCR.
The preliminary design of the ECA facility includes a HIPPS to be implemented in a stand-
alone SIS for the natural gas feed line to the liquefaction train.
Packaged equipment controls shall be capable of accepting inputs from the plant’s BPCS
and SIS.
Packaged controls shall meet the project design requirements in terms of separation of
control and shutdown functions, pre-alarms, shutdown bypass testing, and removal for
maintenance in a manner that will maintain: safe operation of the process, annunciation,
and communications interfaces.
The package controls shall be interfaced with the BPCS. The package equipment control
system shall use HART protocol as the preferred platform to interface its field devices with
the plant’s Asset Management System (AMS).
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Alarms and monitoring indications to the BPCS shall be transmitted through soft
connections via the system network. Stop / start commands, valve commands, and all other
controls from the BPCS shall be transferred to packaged equipment via hardwired signals.
The package controls shall follow project SIS requirements for their shutdown functions.
Machinery control typical signals are speed, capacity control, anti-surge control, sequences
(start-stop), and etc.
Machinery Monitoring Systems (MMS) typical signals are vibration, axial displacement,
bearing temperature, and etc.
Machinery process protection typical signals are high level in compressor suction vessels,
process interlock, and etc.
Field transmitters measuring process variables shall be furnished with 4-20mA HART
Protocol to supplier MCMS. Devices measuring equipment parameters shall communicate
by signals appropriate for the variable being measured and sampling rate to the MMS.
Suppliers shall follow SIS requirements for their shutdown systems. MMS (Bentley Nevada
3500 or project approved supplier), shall include the functionality for performance and
alarm monitoring, transient data analyzer and recorders, equipment testing, shutdown, and
remote supervision.
MCMS shall be integrated into the BPCS using industry accepted communication
protocols, such as Modbus TCP/IP and etc.
MCMS shall be IEC 61511 compliant to provide the proper system function and availability,
and to reduce risk to be in line with the overall project target value. The MCMS shall allow
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remote process operation and monitoring as depicted on the P&IDs and other documents.
Automatic Operation may also be employed, if appropriate.
MMS in addition to communication to the BPCS shall be connected and accessible from a
Central Machine Performance and Diagnostic System for main rotating equipment (e.g.
BN-System 1 or approved equivalent). This connection shall be via Ethernet TCP/IP. The
MMS scope of supply shall include the required hardware and software configuration on
both ends to display and record all the MMS Data on the Central Performance and
Diagnostic System.
Turbo machinery integrated solutions are accepted. Details for this functionality shall be
provided once the supplier has been selected during the detail engineering phase of the
project.
Machinery auxiliary controls with SIS functionality shall be addressed with the third party
vendor during time of purchase. Plant wide emergency and process shutdown hardwired
signals (two) from SIS shall be implemented in package vendor PLC to all the auxiliary
equipment continue to operate during process shutdown (and not during an emergency
shutdown).
Machinery auxiliary controls and devices shall meet the proper SIL level.
The BPCS shall interface with the electrical motors for start/stop, run status, protection
device information, and other motor status signals as required, for all trains and offsite.
All electric motors will be capable of being controlled from the BPCS.
Signals for start, stop, and status of motors will be by redundant communication interface
between the BPCS and smart MCCs in the substation. Motor trip commands will be by
hardwire signals from the SIS to smart MCCs in the substation.
The electrical motor soft interface shall be further developed during detail engineering.
The communications network is based on data communications using single mode fiber
optic cables as the transmission medium. Phase I LNG Project communication protocol
shall be compatible with the existing LNG regasification terminal, to provide for a
functioning interface between units and convenience for operations and maintenance.
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The fiber optic communications network shall be based on a flexible network architecture
design to make network expansion easier. The small size of fiber optic cables allows it to
be placed in ducting that is too small for metallic cable. This allows room for substantial
growth in capacity if needed and at the same time it shall be secure, stable, and efficient.
Tampering with fiber optic with transmissions through fiber optic cable is very difficult to do.
Fiber optic cables are desirable for use in areas that might have spark or electrical hazard
restrictions.
The ECA Phase I LNG Project shall include dedicated fiber optic communication networks
to guarantee reliability and availability. Two separate fiber optic communication systems
shall be provided for the following services:
1. Process Network: BPCS, SIS, FGS, Operational Data Network, and CCTV (in
process units), shall be part of the same fiber optic cable, but each of them
shall use a separate set of strands (as many as required for each service).
2. Non-Process Network: Telecommunication Systems, Data, Voice, Surveillance,
and Security shall be part of the same fiber optic cable, but each of them shall
use a separate set of strands (as many as required for each service).
The control systems scope includes the design and layout of the equipment rack room that
shall be used to connect the field instrumentation via the RIEs, Power Houses, and
packaged systems with the CCR via a redundant configuration.
The medium to connect the RIEs and CCR will be fiber optic cables.
The medium to connect HMIs at local panels with the RIE will be fiber optic cables.
Individual control systems within the RIEs and equipment rack room shall be provided with
the necessary hardware to allow the system to be properly connected to communicate with
the field, LCPs, and CCR. Level 2 or 3 (as needed) optical switches, fiber optic patch
panels, and internal fiber optic patch cords shall be provided by the ICSS Supplier.
The project specification for cables and fiber optic cables will be developed by the EPC
Contractor during the detail engineering phase.
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Local control panels shall be used to support the startup and emergency shutdown of major
equipment such as heaters, compressors, and packaged equipment where required.
Local control panels shall contain passive devices such as push buttons, switch selectors,
lights, horns, beacons, HMI, monitoring, etc.
Local control panels shall include a FOPP to connect the HMI to the RIE.
The installation of local Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), CPUs and I/O cards in the
LCP should be avoided. Preferably, these should be installed in an RIE. However,
exceptions due to distance limitations can lead to the installation of these electronic devices
in the field. Providing UPS power and non-UPS power available at the local control panel
site location is required.
The CCR is in the Main Control Building and will be modified to accommodate the new
control consoles. The CCR will house all the BPCS/SIS operator control consoles, and the
security console for the facility.
The CCR has a computer floor. All communication cables between the CCR and the
equipment room will be routed under the computer floor and in cable tray.
The BPCS/SIS Vendor for the ECA LNG Project will be responsible to supply all the
necessary hardware and software to guarantee monitoring and control operation functions
from the CCR.
The BPCS/SIS Vendor will be responsible for integration and communication between RIEs
and the CCR.
Each BPCS operator console shall be provided with two sets of four - 24 inch LCD high
performance dual displays to allow operators overall unit visualization
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Project specifications for the operator console furniture will be developed by the EPC
Contractor and the ICSS Vendor for Owner’s approval during the detail engineering phase.
The Tank Gauging System is existing, and no modification is anticipated for this project.
Analyzer houses shall be considered in the design to house one or more analyzers.
Analyzers shall be connected to the BPCS via single mode fiber optic cabling, utilizing the
appropriate communications protocol such as Ethernet or Modbus TCP/IP.
The process control system shall be designed as a minimum with a reliable redundant
process communications network and a redundant system communications network.
Phase I LNG Project communication protocol shall be compatible with the existing LNG
regasification terminal, to provide for a functioning interface between units and
convenience for operations and maintenance.
The process network shall be used to transfer data between the system controllers and the
I/O nodes.
The system network shall be used to transfer data as a minimum between system
controllers and operator workstations, supervisor workstations, and engineering
workstations.
The process network shall be capable of covering long distances and still maintain
reliability. As previously mentioned, fiber optic cables are the recommended medium to
extend networks to remote I/O nodes and/or remote operator buildings.
The systems network communicates with all BPCS controllers, SIS, FGS, MCMS,
packaged equipment, etc. for control and monitoring from the CCR.
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The operational data network shall be used to facilitate maintenance activities. This
network shall allow remote access (from the CCR) on systems such as SIS, PLC,
analyzers, MMS racks etc., for configuration, troubleshooting and diagnostic purposes.
This network is for monitoring purposes only and no control is foreseen by using this
connectivity.
Safe operation of a plant generally includes voice communication between the power
houses and operators; voice, data, and e-mail communication between control rooms,
attached offices, laboratories, main offices, and etc.
The CCTV / intercommunication network is used to interconnect process unit cameras and
intercommunication systems with the CCR.
The Alarm Management System shall provide the capabilities for alarm management
including alarm shelving, following ANSI/ISA-18.2, Management of Alarm System for the
Process Industries.
It shall store information about alarm settings, criticality, time stamp, set points, alarm
system documentation, alarm analysis and rationalization, alarm primary causes, priority,
corrective actions and consequences in case corrective action is not applied.
It shall provide change management capabilities with the ability to detect disabled or
modified BPCS alarm settings and optionally enforces the rationalized value.
For more details, refer to the Alarm Management Philosophy, document no. ECA-00-PCS-
PHI-0003.
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EPC scope of work to include the database / historian server capable of synchronizing its
tag name database with the database / configuration servers. It shall store historical data
from all the process variables, with the use of servers being preferred. The historian
Servers shall be redundant. The historian should be capable to store at least 30 days of
data.
The database / historian server shall be the central repository for PIMS data.
The backup system shall store all BPCS, SIS, and FGS database and configuration
information and shall be able to restore it back to the system when lost, inadvertently
deleted, or corrupted.
The SOE server shall retrieve SOE information such as alarms and events from all facility
RIEs and SIS, including time stamping and storing the SOE data for future use.
The SOE server shall use the operational data network as the media interface to
communicate with SIS located in the equipment rack room.
The SOE system should use OPC-UA or OPC-A&E Explorer, if OPC-UA is not supported
by the SOE server and/or SIS vendor.
The Sequence of Events (SOE) project specification will be developed by the EPC
Contractor during the detail engineering phase.
A high fidelity OTS is used for training the operators on the operation parameters of the
plant. The OTS has dynamics very similar to the actual process, giving the operations
personnel a good overall feeling of how the process equipment, the basic process control
system (BPCS), and the safety instrumented system (SIS) interact with each other. The
OTS can also be used during the factory acceptance testing (FAT) to verify the BPCS
process controls and the SIS process safety system logic. The OTS specification, will be
developed by EPC contractor during the detail engineering phase.
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Asset Management System interfaces with the ICSS inputs and outputs to capture
diagnostic data and information from ‘smart’ field devices and make it available for
maintenance. The facility has an existing Asset Management System.
Third party package control systems should use HART enabled I/O modules to allow for
HART connectivity to the AMS through the ICSS network.
A factory acceptance test (FAT) shall be successfully completed before all control systems
can be allowed to ship to site. It shall include all BPCS, SIS, FGS, MMS and packaged
equipment, including fiber optic network, and network devices. The test shall include the
latest project application software, including graphics for the project.
A site acceptance test (SAT) shall be performed on site with all systems installed and ready
to operate.
The ICSS Vendor shall provide the required procedures in advance of the FAT/SAT
execution to allow for review and comment.
Confidential - Do Not Disclose Without Authorization Technip USA, Inc. TBPE Firm Reg. No. F-3030