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Tata Sons: Case Overview
Tata Sons: Case Overview
Case overview
On 24 October, 2016, Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (Mistry), then Chairman of Tata Group
and its holding company Tata Sons, was abruptly removed from his positions. He
was subsequently removed from the boards of some Tata Group companies and
thereafter resigned from the remaining boards. The day after his removal, Mistry
released a letter claiming that he had been nothing more than a “lame duck”
Chairman. He questioned the influence of Tata Trusts, Tata Sons’ controlling
shareholder, and that of Ratan Tata, his predecessor. Issues relating to fraudulent
transactions were also alleged by Mistry, which were refuted by Tata Sons. The
objective of the case is to allow a discussion of issues such as corporate governance
in family-owned companies; the powers of controlling shareholders; the role of
independent directors; the appointment and removal of key e x e c u t i v e s
f r o m management; governance of company groups and the role of regulatory
bodies.
The Mistry family first became connected to Tata Sons in 1935 when Mistry’s
grandfather purchased a company with a 12.5% stake in Tata Sons. As of October
2016, the Shapoorji Pallonji Group was the single largest individual Tata Sons
shareholder with a stake of 18.5%. Mistry denied allegations that his family’s ownership
of a substantial equity stake equated to a special position in Tata Sons. The remaining
shares are controlled by Tata Trusts, Tata Group companies and members of the
Tata family. The ties between the Mistry and Tata families were further cemented by
the marriage of Mistry’s sister, Aloo, to Ratan Tata’s half- brother, Noel.
In 2006, Mistry joined the board of Tata Sons and was appointed as director in
several other Tata Group companies. In 2010, he was placed on a five-member
selection committee to search for the successor to Tata Group Chairman Ratan
Tata, who was due to retire in December 2012. While the search was ongoing, the
committee successfully proposed to lower the retirement age of Tata Sons’ non-
executive directors, including the Chairman, to 70 years from the current 75 years.
This was not the first time the Group had adjusted its mandatory retirement age
policy to influence retention and renewal policies.
However, this decision was not representative of Mistry’s approval throughout the
Group. In a 204-page affidavit issued later, Tata Sons detailed “disturbing facts”
which had contributed to Mistry’s ouster. Notably, it was said that Mistry was
reluctant to apply the terms laid out in Tata Sons’ Articles of Association. Mistry
had allegedly reduced the representation of Tata Sons’ directors on the boards of
other Tata Group companies and structured directorships in the various
companies such that he was the only director who sat on the boards of Tata Sons
and the Tata Group companies. Other issues highlighted revolved around Mistry’s
failure to distance himself from his own family business.
As soon as the board meeting began, a resolution was moved to remove Mistry as
the Chairman of Tata Sons. Six of the nine board members supported the removal
of Mistry, including the three newly-inducted directors brought in by Ratan Tata.
Two members abstained and Mistry, who could not vote, was ousted. At the
meeting, Ratan Tata was also appointed as the interim Chairman of Tata Sons.
Conflicting clues
On 25 October, 2016 - one day after his losing his Chairman position on Tata
Sons’ board - Mistry wrote a letter to Tata Group stating his views about his
ousting. Mistry felt that “it was his duty to place before the stakeholders a full
perspective of facts and factors that were in play”.
In his letter, Mistry highlighted a number of main points. He raised the issue of
‘legacy hotspots’, which were legacy companies he had inherited from Ratan
Tata’s era that were dragging down the Group’s economic performance. Mistry
also labelled himself as a “lame duck” Chairman as he was unaware of Tata
Group’s venture into the airlines industry, with approval having been sought from
Ratan Tata instead of him. Mistry claimed that, moving forward, the sustainability of
Tata Group would depend on a governance reform to conform with company law
and global best practices. Most importantly, he called for shareholders’
independence to bring about the reforms that he sought.
The leaked letter, which was sent by email to the board, took the Tata boardroom
struggles public. As a result, the market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board
of India (SEBI), sought detailed explanations from the listed Tata Group
companies regarding the allegations contained in Mistry’s letter. In response, the
companies denied the allegations and claimed no wrongdoing. SEBI and the stock
exchanges also monitored the price movements and trading activities of the listed
companies of Tata Group.
As stock prices plunged, Ratan Tata issued a letter to employees to explain that
Mistry’s removal was ‘absolutely necessary’ for Tata’s future success, to reassure
them of the conglomerate’s stability and to prevent any further reputational damage.
He emphasized that Tata’s culture and values will hold strong during turbulent times
and advised employees to look towards the future rather than the past.
Fruitless struggle
Two months after being removed as Chairman, Mistry still retained his directorship
on the board of Tata Sons. However, an EGM had been proposed on 6 February,
2017 to remove him from the board of Tata Sons. In an attempt to prevent this,
Mistry petitioned the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). He sought interim
relief on three counts. Firstly, Tata would not dilute his family current holding of
18.5% by issuing new shares. Secondly, Mistry himself would not be removed
from the board of Tata Sons. Thirdly, the Articles of Association of the company
would not be altered without the consent of the NCLT.
Unfortunately for Mistry, the NCLT refused to grant him interim relief. His troubles
worsened when Tata Sons subsequently sued him for breach of confidentiality. The
conglomerate asserted that he had used confidential information and documents
in his petition.
A new beginning
A month later, on 6 February, 2017, Mistry’s reign came to an end at the EGM
when he was removed as a director of Tata Sons. At the EGM, 80% of the
shareholders voted in favour of his removal. Mistry’s ousting came after his
predecessor, Ratan Tata, lost confidence in him. As Ratan Tata remained as
Chairman of the Tata Trusts, which owned a 65% controlling stake in Tata Sons,
the outcome of the shareholder vote was not unexpected.
After the highly tumultuous period for the Indian conglomerate, Ratan Tata returned
to take charge as the interim Chairman for four months before a successor was
identified. However, some analysts had criticised the move as it potentially implied
Ratan Tata’s unwillingness to let go of the reins of the company.
A new puppet?
On 21 February, 2017, Natarajan Chandrasekaran became the new Chairman of
Tata Sons and was the third non-Tata family member to do so.
Chandrasekaran now faces the challenge of dealing with the reputational carnage
left behind in the wake of Mistry’s ouster. His software programming background
has raised concerns about his ability to run a diversified multinational conglomerate.
However, a Trustee of Tata Trusts highlighted that as a veteran, Chandrasekaran
would be able to bring to the table his numerous years of experience in Tata and
put to use the benefits of his established association with Ratan Tata.
Meanwhile, Ratan Tata continues to be Chairman of the two powerful Trusts that
collectively own two-thirds of Tata Sons and has no plans to step down in the
foreseeable future. On the day of his appointment, Tata Sons passed a resolution to
ensure Chandrasekaran would automatically cease to be a director of the
company and its affiliates when he ceases to hold office as the Chairman.
Discussion questions
1. Comment on the challenges of family-owned companies and discuss how
this might have contributed to the corporate governance upheaval at Tata
Sons.
2. Discuss the role of Tata Trusts in the corporate governance of Tata Sons.
3. Mistry was the Chairman-cum-CEO at Tata Sons. What concerns does this
raise? Does the strong presence of the controlling shareholders mitigate
these concerns?
5. In light of the leaked email surfacing Tata’s struggles to the public, do you
think the Tata Group handled the crisis well? What could the Tata Group have
done to avoid loss of shareholder confidence?