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Richard J. Ponzio
This study examines the leadership role of the United Nations, from 2001
to 2005, in helping the government and people of Afghanistan to build
democratic institutions and practices at national and local levels. The UN,
seeking a better form of governance that could also politically unite non
Taliban factions, pursued with Afghan elites a risky strategy of democra
tization with a "light footprint" during a low-intensity insurgency. From
interim to transitional to elected authorities, UN-facilitated political devel
opment activities have, in effect, initiated a transformation in the notion
and sources of authority among Afghans?from rule by religious scholars,
tribal elders, and warlords to a hybrid model of governance involving
democratically elected leaders. By helping Afghans reconcile the inherent
tensions between these competing forms of authority, international peace
builders contributed to improved conditions of governance and a reduction
in intrastate political violence. The case of Afghanistan affirms the bene
fits of democratization after war that seeks to bridge the gap in concep
tions between old and new authority types. Drawing on these findings,
policy recommendations are advanced to further strengthen the UN sys
tem's democratic peacebuilding work in facilitating the political (recon
struction of war-shattered societies. Keywords: peacebuilding, democra
tization, conflict management, governance, Afghanistan, authority.
In a growing number of instances after the Cold War, the United Nations
and other international actors have sought to rebuild or establish new
political institutions in states or territories recovering from violent con
flict. From Afghanistan, Iraq, and the western Balkans to less prominent
wars in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central America, and the South Pacific,
the international community's response involves extensive intrusions into
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Extending beyond the narrow man
dates of traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, these
interventions aspire to restructure local political authority within a demo
cratic framework.
In support of the Bonn Agreement1 of 5 December 2001, UN Security
Council Resolutions 1383 and 1401 established an integrated, international
255
Afghanistan
Mazar-e Sharif
Kabul
Jalalabad j
AFGHANISTAN
Kandahar
aid without either the executive functions or the mentality associated with
international administration. On an annual per-capita assistance basis after
the first two years of foreign intervention, the United States and its allies
spent far more in reconstructing Bosnia ($679), East Timor ($233), Iraq
($206), and other postconflict settings than in Afghanistan ($57);13 and the
total budget for UN AM A alone, from April 2002 to December 2005, was a
meager $193 million.14 The political success achieved to date is thus as much
a reflection of Afghan resilience, war-weariness, and widespread desire for
change as it is skillful?yet underresourced?democratic development sup
port of the UN system.
rule of law, human rights, and legitimate civil institutions. . . . Yes, maybe
the Bonn calendar was too short. But we [in the UN who proposed the
timetable] questioned the staying commitment of the international commu
nity and felt that many things needed to be done at once."18 Toward aiding
the Afghanistan Interim and Transitional Authorities in reaching each of the
Bonn Agreement political milestones, the UN Security Council vested con
siderable responsibility?read: de facto, rather than de jure, authority?in
the integrated UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, including the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Office for Project Services
(UNOPS).
2005.37 Although the estimated voter turnout for the September 2005 wolesi
jirga (lower house) and Provincial Council elections dropped by 20 percent
compared to the October 2004 presidential elections, both achieved re
spectable voter turnout rates, with 50 percent and 70 percent of registered
voters, respectively (43 percent in 2005 and 41 percent in 2004 were female
voters).38 In November 2005, meshrano jirga (upper house) elections, in
volving recently elected provincial councilors, were organized by the JEMB.
The rushed preparations for the elections concerned many observers and
practitioners. "With only six months to prepare a parliamentary election that
normally takes twelve months, there was no time for effective capacity
building of national staff," explained Peter Erben, the JEMB chief inter
national electoral officer.39 Besides international recognition of both elections
as "free and fair" and peaceful, it is noteworthy that women hold 27 percent
of the wolesi jirga and 17 percent of the meshrano jirga seats. In addition,
thirty-four candidates were disqualified prior to the September 2005 elec
tions due to their alleged links with illegally armed groups.40 In terms of
long-term capacity development for the new institutions, UNDP and UN AM A
initiated both a $15 million parliamentary strengthening program in early
2005 and a $10.5 million support initiative for the new Independent Electoral
Commission in early 2006; they are currently planning training and civic
education activities for Provincial Councils and their constituents.
Some analysts argue that the formal completion of the Bonn process
with the swearing in of the new National Assembly, on 19 December 2005,
offers Afghans a second democratic opportunity, following their country's
failed attempt at parliamentary democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Through thousands of village-level jirgas (local conflict resolution coun
cils) and national loya jirgas, the fiercely independent Afghan people have
practiced indigenous forms of consultative governance for hundreds of
years. However, history also reveals the repercussions of moving too
swiftly with far-reaching changes without full buy-in from the political
establishment. Failing to reconcile their political reforms with the interests
of traditional Afghan authorities, King Amanullah Khan in the 1920s and
the communists in the 1980s and early 1990s both met violent ends. The
current modernization project could meet a similar fate if Afghan elites, UN
personnel, and their foreign backers ignore the traditional power brokers.
scant experience with pluralism and the rule of law, the UN and its associ
ated agencies display a high degree of political adeptness, cultural sensitiv
ity, and technical competence on matters related to the institutionalization
and expansion of democratic authority. Viewed by most Afghans as a neu
tral mediator that respected their traditional institutions and norms of gov
ernance, the UN helped to forge political consensus on Bonn-related mile
stones by widely consulting the various factions and acknowledging what
was feasible given the cultural and political context in which it worked. In
so doing, the UN helped create the conditions for capable governing insti
tutions legitimized through democratic authority to emerge; these institu
tions, as an expression of their ability to provide public goods, reduced vio
lence as a means for resolving intrastate political disputes.
However, the United Nations exhibited several handicaps during the
Bonn process, including slow bureaucratic operational procedures, mixed
success in coordination with external and UN actors, and a perceived ced
ing of control to powerful countries the option of engaging the Taliban
politically. In at least four key areas, greater UN resources, expertise, and
risk taking?prior to inevitable donor fatigue?would benefit democratic
peacebuilding in Afghanistan and elsewhere:
Pakistan, violent extremism will fester. This will remain a threat for the
West too, where Islamic extremism is in ideological opposition to Western
forms of democracy. With the completion of the Bonn era, it is time for the
UN to reengage visibly all peace efforts in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
Notes
15. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Col
lapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. x.
16. See, for example, Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghan
istan: Fantasy Versus Reality" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna
tional Peace, 12 January 2002).
17. Bonn Agreement, p. 2.
18. Interview, 1 May 2006. After leading UNSMA (2000-2001) and playing a
central role in drafting the Bonn Agreement, Vendrell assumed, in July 2002, the
position of EU representative to Afghanistan.
19. Interview with Noorullah Delawari, governor and president of Da
Afghanistan Bank (the Central Bank of Afghanistan), on 20 March 2005.
20. Besides power sharing among the various factions, two other major issues
included the governance role of the former king and whether and how to demobilize
militia groups while establishing a new national army.
21. Interview with Ercan Murat, former UN Development Programme country
director in Afghanistan (2002-2004), on 19 March 2005.
22. Dobbins further noted that the United States encouraged a large political
role for the UN because "the US did not want to make a major commitment.
Afghanistan was isolated and of no interest to the US, except for terrorism. Fol
lowing Bosnia and Kosovo, the US was critical of nation-building activities. The
intervention in Afghanistan was viewed in Washington as only the first in the 'War
on Terror' campaign, and another concern [about getting too involved] was that
Afghans have a history of resisting external actors." Interview, 13 May 2005.
23. Interview, 23 December 2005.
24. Chesterman, "Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan," p. 5.
25. Bonn Agreement, p. 2.
26. Interview with Eckart Schiewek, UNAMA political adviser, 3 June 2006.
27. See, for example, Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The
Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 165-166.
28. For instance, rather than rock the boat in response to acknowledged irreg
ularities in the ELJ, the UN under-secretary-general for political affairs chose to call
on the Afghan authorities to "address instances where democratic rights have been
abused by those who still equated power with violence and force"?many of whom,
arguably, were serving in positions of official authority. United Nations press
release SC/7429 (2002).
29. Barnett Rubin, "Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan," Journal of De
mocracy 15, no. 3 (2004): 10.
30. Author's interviews, as well as International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan:
The Constitutional Loya Jirga," (Kabul/Brussels: ICG, 2003), pp. 1-2.
31. Interview, 21 February 2006.
32. Interview with Michael Schoiswohl, UNAMA legal adviser, 25 December
2005.
33. However, as Jean Arnault, then UN deputy-SRSG for political affairs and
later SRSG, states, "While the UN facilitated the CLJ, we had no preferred system
[of democratic governance]. Our concern was that the interference of factional pow
ers might have adverse effects for stability." Interview, 25 January 2006.
34. UN secretary-general, "Report of the UN Secretary-General on Afghanistan,
Doc. A/59/58 l-S/2004/925" (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 11. UNAMA also
initiated a joint political rights verification campaign with the commission.
35. See Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme, latest update on ANBP/
DDR, available at www.undpanbp.org (accessed 31 May 2006).
50. The International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database
documents for Afghanistan more than 10,000 civilian- and military-related fatalities
in 2001 and around 4,000 in 2002; fatalities dropped to between 1,000 and 1,400
from 2003 to 2005 (www.acd.iiss.org/armed conflict, accessed 26 May 2006). How
ever, the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database has recorded, since January
2002, a steady increase in insurgent attacks and fatalities (www.rand.org/ise/projects/
terrorismdatabase, accessed 26 May 2006).
51. When surveyed on the question, "If you have a dispute over property stolen
from your house, would you feel more confident of fair treatment going to the formal
state courts or traditional village-level jugeas?" 38 percent of Afghan respondents cited
traditional village-level jirgas as opposed to only 31 percent for formal state courts.
52. In fact, while the 50 percent turnout rate in 2005 is not unacceptably low,
several interviewed suggested that the 20 percent drop from 2004 indicated a steady
decline of support for Karzai and Western-backed democratization.
53. Voting in the recent elections could reflect more a desire for peaceful
change than a preference for the often inefficient methods associated with democ
racy. Many media analysts already contend that the 29 May 2006 street violence in
Kabul, leaving fourteen dead and over 100 injured (triggered by a US military traf
fic accident), suggests growing resentment?beyond the insurgency?against the
Western-funded democratic state-building project. See for example, Rachel Morar
jee, "Where Does Karzai Go from Here?" Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2006,
available at www.csmonitor.com/2006/0602/p04s02-wosc.html; and Carlotta Gall,
"Anti-U.S. Rioting Erupts in Kabul; at Least 14 Dead," New York Times, 30 May
2006.
54. One comprehensive analysis of the 2005 wolesi jirga elections estimated
that 133 of 249 members fought in the jihad against the Soviets and approximately
113 belong to or are affiliated with conservative/fundamentalist or moderate/tradi
tional Islamic parties. Andrew Wilder, "A House Divided? Analysing the 2005
Afghan Elections" (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005), pp.
6-8.
55. "International peacebuilding mandates must take into account the charac
teristics of the factions. . . . The more hostile and numerous the factions, the more
difficult is the peace process, and the more international assistance/authority is
needed to establish peace," contend Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis in their
seminal study on peacebuilding. Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuild
ing," p. 781. Particularly with the continued insurgency, Afghanistan fits Doyle and
Sambanis's description above and warrants additional aid.
56. Established in May 2005 by President Karzai, the commission seeks to con
vince opponents of the government to lay down their arms, accept the Afghan con
stitution, and return to civilian life. To date, the commission claims a role in the suc
cessful return to Afghan civilian life of more than 2,000 antigovernment combatants.
57. As Lakdhar Brahimi reflects, "One of my own biggest mistakes was not to
speak to the Taliban in 2002 and 2003. It was not possible to get them in the tent at
the Bonn conference because of 9/11. . . . But immediately after that, we should've
spoken to those who were willing to speak to us." Quoted in Haroon Siddiqui,
"Expert Advice on Afghanistan," Toronto Star, 14 September 2006, available at
www. thestar.com/NAS App/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_
PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid-1158184237654&call_pageid=970599119419.
Besides the Strengthening Peace Commission, the UN should support politically
and operationally President Karzai's proposal, in October 2006, for a loya jirga of
Pashtun tribes from Pakistan and Afghanistan to end Taliban-associated violence.