Daf ditty Yevamot 15: Chumra

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfFyBqN8kW8

‫ואמר רב תחלת הוראה דהאי צורבא מרבנן לקלקולא אי אמרת בשלמא לקולא קאמר היינו קלקולא אלא אי‬
‫אמרת לחומרא מאי קלקולא איכא כיון דמקלקלי בה רבים היינו קלקולא‬

(in the context of a chumra)

Rav Tachlis says: This young rabbi's ruling is problematic. The gemara asks "if
it were unnecessarily lenient I would understand why that's a problem, but it's
stringent, so what could go wrong?

[Answer] Because people will violate it (due to its stringency) that is a problem in
and of itself

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2
§ The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said:
When I studied Torah with Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani, who was a disciple of Beit Shammai,
I saw that he would eat dry bread in salt in years of drought. I went and informed my father
of his meager meal, and he said to me: Take olives for him, and I took for him some olives.
Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that they were moist with the liquid that oozes from olives, which renders
them susceptible to ritual impurity. Concerned that they had already become ritually impure, he
said to me: I do not eat olives. He spoke politely and stated that he did not eat olives because he
did not wish to embarrass his benefactor by disclosing that he feared they had become ritually
impure.

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok continued his account. I went and informed my father. He said to me:
Go and say to him that the barrel containing the olives was perforated, but it was clogged by
sediments in the oil and therefore some moisture remained inside. However, due to the presence
of the hole, the olives were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. And we learned this in a
mishna: With regard to a barrel of preserved olives, Beit Shammai say it does not need to be
perforated, as the juice issuing from the olives does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity.

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And Beit Hillel say that it does need to be perforated, as they maintain that the juice of olives is
considered oil and it therefore renders the olives susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel
concede that if the barrel was perforated and subsequently clogged by sediments it is ritually
pure, despite the moisture on the olives. Since liquids render food susceptible to ritual impurity
only if they were placed on them intentionally, the hole in the barrel clearly shows that one did not
intend for the juice to be there. By boring a hole in the barrel he has rendered it obvious that he
did not desire the presence of the olive juices, and therefore it does not matter that the hole became
blocked.

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The baraita adds: And although Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani was a disciple of Shammai, he
always acted only in accordance with the statements of Beit Hillel. The Gemara infers:
Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is Rabbi
Yoḥanan the Ḥorani’s greatness, i.e., he is praised for acting in accordance with the opinion of
Beit Hillel. However, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own
rulings, what is the greatness and uniqueness of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani? From here it can be
inferred that Beit Shammai generally did act in accordance with their opinions.

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§ The Gemara adds: Come and hear a different proof. They asked Rabbi Yehoshua: What is
the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said to them: It is a matter of dispute
between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They continued to ask him: And in accordance with
whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: Why are you inserting my head between
two great mountains, i.e., between two great disputing opinions, between Beit Shammai and
Beit Hillel? I fear lest these two mountains break my skull.

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However, I shall testify to you about two great families that were in Jerusalem, the Beit
Tzevo’im family who came from the town of Ben Akhmai, and the Beit Kofai family from the
town of Ben Mekoshesh: They were the descendants of rival wives who married others, in
accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and from them came High Priests who served on the
altar.

Accordingly, I can testify that this was the accepted halakhic practice throughout the generations.

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8
Summary

Tzorot (Rival Wives), Chalitza and Mamzerim1

Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that tzarot, rival wives are not obligated in yibum, but they
hold different opinions as to why and thus the consequences of such unions. The rabbis agreed
that future tzarot should be required to perform chalitza and avoid the question of
yibum. However, today's daf focuses on the actions of past tzarot: were their children mamzerim
(of flawed lineage based on forbidden sexual relationships other than nidda) with karet as a
possibility in their futures or were they simply of flawed lineage with no harsh consequence?

When the rabbis discuss their options, they note twice that we must keep in mind Proverbs
3:17: Dracheicha darchei noam v'chol netivotecha shalom, "Her ways are ways of pleasantness,
and all her paths are peace". When facing competing halachot, we should always choose the option
that results in the least amount of conflict. Men would be upset with their wives if they learned
after the fact that their wives had not performed chalitza and thus their marriages were in
question. Thus we cannot put families in that position.

The rabbis walk us through a number of examples from their lives and circumstances. Each story
teaches us both about the lives of the rabbis and about the intentions of Beit Hillel and Beit
Shammai. It seems that the rabbis are looking for times when the houses of the great Sages were
able to put aside their differences and bend their preferred rulings based upon a desire for a
cohesive community.

The end of our daf focuses more specifically on tzorot, widows, mamzerim and the
priesthood. The High Priest is of such status that only the ‘purest’ lineage can be a marriage
partner. However, even ordinary priests - although they are of very high status as well - are said
to have married women with somewhat questionable lineage.

1
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/10/

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It is heartening to learn that beyond the ideals of our rabbis, real life was understood and taken
into consideration. People marry people, people have affairs, people make mistakes in their ritual
practice sand in their life choices. If only we could treat each other with respect today when we
learn about flawed lineage - or its equivalent sins - today.

"SHOKES YEHU" -- THE TROUGH OF YEHU

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

The Gemara relates that there was a Shokes, or trough, in Yerushalayim that was used for
immersing vessels to be used with Taharos, known as "the Trough of Yehu." The trough was filled
with water and was connected to a Mikvah by way of a hole which had the diameter of a
"Shefoferes ha'Nod."

RASHI (DH Shokes) explains that the trough was a hollowed-out stone situated beneath a pipe
which brought water to the hollow stone from the mountains. He explains (DH Na'asim Al Gabah)
that the trough did not contain forty Se'ah of water, but it was connected to an adjacent "Mikvah
Shalem" (a complete Mikvah with forty Se'ah). Rashi then writes, "and [the water] of the spring
the Shokes (sic) mixed by way of the hole that was like a Shefoferes ha'Nod."

Rashi's words are unclear. What does Rashi mean when he mentions a "spring" ("Ma'ayan")? Does
he mean the Mikvah next to the Shokes, and his intention is to say that the Mikvah's source was a
natural spring ("The water of the spring [adjacent to the Shokes] and the [water in the] Shokes
mixed...")? If this is Rashi's intention, why does Rashi (and the Gemara) call it a "Mikvah Shalem"
with forty Se'ah? A natural spring is valid for the immersion of utensils with any amount of water,
and it is not called a "Mikvah." Moreover, how does Rashi know that the water next to the Shokes
came from a spring? (ARUCH LA'NER)

If, on the other hand, Rashi refers to the water inside the trough when he mentions a "spring" and
he means that the water in the trough came from a spring in the mountain and not from a flow of
rainwater ("The water of the spring in the Shokes mixed [with the adjacent Mikvah]..."), the same
questions arise. If the water in the trough came from a spring, then the trough was valid for Tevilah
even without forty Se'ah of water, but Rashi writes that it was invalid for Tevilah because it held
only twenty Se'ah. Moreover, how does Rashi know that the water in the trough came from a
spring? (YASHRESH YAKOV)

The Gemara continues and says that when two Mikva'os are attached to each other by a hole with
the width of a Shefoferes ha'Nod, they are considered to join together to be one Mikvah. Rashi
(DH Eiruv Mikva'os) explains that this Halachah refers to a Mikvah which lacks the minimum
Shi'ur of a Mikvah, which is situated next to a Mikvah which contains the proper Shi'ur (forty

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yevamos/insites/ye-dt-015.htm

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Se'ah) of water. When the waters mix, the Mikvah with less than forty Se'ah becomes a complete
Mikvah by virtue of its connection to the complete Mikvah next to it.

Why does Rashi explain the case of two Mikva'os connected to each other as a case in which one
Mikvah has a full Shi'ur of forty Se'ah and the other lacks the full Shi'ur? Even if both Mikva'os
lack the minimum Shi'ur and contain only twenty Se'ah each, the hole joins them to form a
complete Shi'ur of a Mikvah! (ARUCH LA'NER)
(a) The RITVA understands that Rashi means to say that the water in the Mikvah next to the
trough was the water of a natural spring (like the first interpretation mentioned above). The Ritva,
however, disagrees with Rashi's explanation because of the reasons mentioned above. The Ritva
adds that in order to connect the water of a trough (Mikvah) to spring water (Ma'ayan), the hole
between the two must be larger than the size of a Shefoferes ha'Nod. (The opinion of the Ritva is
based on the Yerushalmi.)

(b) Perhaps Rashi refers to the water inside the trough when he mentions a "spring" (like the
second interpretation mentioned above). The Mishnah in the end of the fourth chapter of Mikva'os
discusses the Trough of Yehu. The first Mishnah in the following chapter begins, "A spring which
was directed to the trough is not valid for Tevilah. If the spring flowed over the edge of the trough,
it becomes valid for Tevilah...." Rashi apparently understands that the Mishnah in chapter five
refers to the same trough as the one mentioned in the previous Mishnah (which ascribes no name
to it, but which the Gemara here calls "the Trough of Yehu"). The Mishnah there is the source for
Rashi's assertion that the water in the Trough of Yehu came from a spring.

Even though its water was springwater, the trough was not valid for Tevilah with less than forty
Se'ah because the springwater did not flow into the trough at all times. In order for a trough to be
joined to a spring, the water must flow into it constantly. If the water does not flow into the trough
constantly, it is considered cut off from the spring and has the status of an ordinary Mikvah. In the
case of the Trough of Yehu, the water stopped flowing on occasion, and therefore it was valid only
if it contained forty Se'ah.

Perhaps Rashi mentions that the springwater flowed from a "pipe" from the mountains to teach
that there was a second reason to invalidate the trough for Tevilah had it not been connected to
another Mikvah. The reason is that the water inside the trough is "Mayim She'uvin" (water drawn
to the Mikvah via a Kli such as a pipe, which is invalid water for a Mikvah). Rashi says that the
water came to the trough through a pipe because the Mishnah in Mikva'os (end of chapter four)
implies that the trough contained "Mayim She'uvin" (as the ME'IRI here writes).

(Rashi could have given another explanation for how the water inside the trough was "Mayim
She'uvin": When a trough is not a hollowed-out stone but a vessel that was attached to the
ground after it was formed into a usable vessel, any water inside that vessel is considered "Mayim
She'uvin," as the Mishnah in Mikva'os teaches (ibid.). Perhaps Rashi does not give this explanation
because the Mishnayos in Mikva'os in the beginning of chapter five (which Rashi understands to
refer to the Trough of Yehu) imply that the trough was not a vessel but a hollow stone.)

This approach explains why Rashi (DH Eiruv Mikva'os) writes that a hole connects two Mikva'os
when one of the Mikva'os contains a full forty Se'ah of water and the other lacks that minimum

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amount. In the case of the Trough of Yehu, the water in the trough was "Mayim She'uvin." As
such, it was invalid for Tevilah and could not join with another incomplete Mikvah (of twenty
Se'ah) to make a total of forty Se'ah. "Mayim She'uvin" may be added to a complete Mikvah which
already contains forty Se'ah, but it cannot supplement the Shi'ur of a Mikvah which lacks forty
Se'ah. Rashi gives as an example an invalid Mikvah which is joined to one which contains forty
Se'ah, because that case parallels the case of the trough discussed in the Mishnah. (M. Kornfeld)

REBBI TZADOK'S OLIVES AND REBBI YOCHANAN HA'CHORANI'S

CAUTION

Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok related that his father once sent olives with him to Rebbi Yochanan
ha'Chorani. Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani did not want to eat them because he was afraid they were
Tamei (and he had the practice of eating Chulin Al Taharas ha'Kodesh). Rebbi Elazar's father
assured him that the olives were not Tamei, even though they were wet and looked as though they
had become fit to become Tamei (Huchshar l'Kabel Tum'ah). He said that they were wet only
because the drainage hole of the barrel of olives, through which the unwanted secretion of the
olives usually flowed out, became blocked. Since he had punctured the barrel to show that he did
not want the olives to become wet, the juice was not able to make them Huchshar l'Kabel Tum'ah.
Why did Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani think that the olives were Tamei in the first place? It was the
fact that the olives were wet and were apparently Huchshar l'Kabel Tum'ah.

RASHI (DH she'Hen Lachin) explains that Rebbi Yochanan feared that an Am ha'Aretz may have
touched the outside of the barrel of olives and thereby rendered the olives inside Tamei
mid'Rabanan.

Rashi's words are difficult to understand. What does he mean that the fear was that an Am ha'Aretz
might have made the olives Tamei by touching the outside of the barrel? An earthenware vessel
(or its contents) does not become Tamei when an object of Tum'ah touches the outer side of its
wall, as the Mishnah (Kelim 2:1) explicitly states. Why does Rashi explain that Rebbi Yosi
ha'Chorani was concerned that an Am ha'Aretz may have touched the outside of the barrel, if such
contact does not render the barrel or its contents Tamei? (RITVA, RASHASH)

Moreover, why does Rashi not explain simply that Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani feared that an Am
ha'Aretz touched the olives themselves and made them Tamei? Alternatively, since Rebbi
Yochanan ha'Chorani suspected that Rebbi Tzadok sent him olives that were Tamei and that Rebbi
Tzadok was not meticulous about guarding fruit from Tum'ah, perhaps he feared that Rebbi
Tzadok himself made them Tamei (by touching them while he was Tamei)! Why does Rashi
explain that Rebbi Yochanan was concerned specifically that an Am ha'Aretz touched the barrel
of olives? (TOSFOS DH Amar Li)

The ARUCH LA'NER proposes the following explanation for the words of Rashi.
The Aruch la'Ner points out a more fundamental question on the words of the Gemara. Why did
Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani suspect Rebbi Tzadok of sending Tamei fruit to him? Rebbi Tzadok
was a Kohen who ate Terumah all the time, and he was certainly meticulous to eat Chulin while
Tahor. Why, then, did Rebbi Yochanan suspect him of sending something that could become
Tamei?

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The Rishonim suggest different answers to this question. TOSFOS cites the RI who answers that
Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani knew beyond a doubt that an Am ha'Aretz had handled the olives.
Since the olives were wet, he saw no way that they could be Tahor. He did not suspect Rebbi
Tzadok of being careless with their Taharah; he just did not understand how the olives could
possibly be Tahor. Rebbi Tzadok explained to him that the olives were not Tamei, and their
wetness was not a sign that they had become fit to become Tamei. They were wet merely because
the drainage hole in the barrel became blocked. (This appears to be the intention of the ME'IRI as
well.)

TOSFOS, however, understands Rashi differently. Tosfos writes that according to Rashi, Rebbi
Yochanan ha'Chorani did suspect that Rebbi Tzadok had let the olives become Tamei, but not
because Rebbi Tzadok was careless with their Taharah. Rather, he assumed that Rebbi Tzadok
conducted himself according to the rulings of Beis Shamai (as he was a Talmid of Beis Shamai),
and that Rebbi Tzadok treated the barrel of olives as Tahor even though it had no drainage hole in
it. Beis Shamai maintains that the juice of olives never makes the olives fit to become Tamei, and
thus it is not necessary to make a hole in the barrel to drain out the juice. Accordingly, Rebbi
Yochanan ha'Chorani understood that Rebbi Tzadok considered the olives Tahor. Rebbi Yochanan
ha'Chorani, however, followed the view of Beis Hillel who maintains that the juice of
olives does render the olives fit to become Tamei.

This answer is problematic in light of the subsequent words of the Gemara. The Beraisa ends by
saying that "even though he (Rebbi Tzadok) was a Talmid of Beis Shamai, he conducted himself
in all areas like Beis Hillel." The Gemara asks that if all of the Talmidim of Beis Shamai conducted
themselves in practice in accordance with Beis Hillel and not Beis Shamai, the Beraisa teaches
nothing new when it says that Rebbi Tzadok conducted himself in practice like Beis Hillel.
According to Tosfos' explanation, however, the Gemara should ask a stronger question on the
words of the Beraisa: if nobody followed the rulings of Beis Shamai in practice, why did Rebbi
Yochanan ha'Chorani suspect that Rebbi Tzadok's olives were Tamei? (TOSFOS MAHARAM)

The Aruch la'Ner explains that Rashi answers this question by suggesting a new understanding of
the incident. Rebbi Yochanan suspected Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok of following not the opinion of
Beis Shamai, but of following his own opinion. (When the Beraisa says that "he was the Talmid
of Beis Shamai," perhaps it refers not to Rebbi Tzadok but to Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani, a
Talmid of Beis Shamai who conducted himself like Beis Hillel (Sukah 28a, "Rebbi Yochanan ben
ha'Choranis").

In Chagigah (20a), the Tana'im disagree about the status of Chulin she'Na'asu Al Taharas
ha'Kodesh and whether such Chulin is treated like Kodesh, Terumah, or Chulin. Although the
Mishnah there implies that such Chulin is treated like Kodesh, Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok disagrees
and says that it is treated like Terumah.

Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani and Rebbi Tzadok undoubtedly treated their Chulin with the Taharah
of Kodesh, a common practice among the Tana'im (see Chagigah 18b). The Gemara in Chagigah
(22b) teaches that when a Tamei liquid touches the outside of a utensil, only the outside of the
utensil becomes Tamei and not the inside of the utensil. This is true, however, only for utensils

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which contain Chulin and Terumah. In the case of a utensil which contains Kodesh, whenever the
outside of the utensil becomes Tamei the inside also becomes Tamei.

Accordingly, Rashi's words may be understood as follows. When Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani
received the olives from Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok, he was concerned that Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok
may have allowed an Am ha'Aretz to touch the outside of the barrel while it was wet. He knew
that Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok maintained that Chulin she'Na'asu Al Taharas ha'Kodesh has the
status of Terumah for which contact with the outside of the utensil does not render the inside
Tamei, and thus the olives inside remain Tahor. Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani himself maintained
that Chulin she'Na'asu Al Taharas ha'Kodesh has the status of Kodesh; just as contact with the
outside of the barrel renders the inside of the barrel Tamei when the barrel contains Kodesh, it also
renders the inside of the barrel Tamei when the barrel contains Chulin she'Na'asu Al Taharas
ha'Kodesh (Chagigah 21b). Therefore, the olives inside the barrel, according to Rebbi Yochanan
ha'Chorani's own view, were Tamei.

This approach explains why Rashi writes that Rebbi Yochanan feared that an Am ha'Aretz had
touched the outside of the barrel and made it Tamei mid'Rabanan. He feared that an Am ha'Aretz
had touched a liquid on the outside of the barrel which is able to be Metamei a utensil (Shabbos
15b). The reason why Rashi does not write that Rebbi Yochanan was afraid that an Am ha'Aretz
had touched the inside of the barrel (and the olives themselves) is that he knew that Rebbi Elazar
bar Tzadok would not have permitted an Am ha'Aretz to touch the inside of the barrel; such contact
certainly would have rendered the olives Tamei. Similarly, Rebbi Yochanan ha'Chorani did not
suspect that Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok himself made the olives Tamei, because he certainly treated
them with Taharah.

(The Aruch la'Ner points out that if this indeed is the intent of Rashi, it emerges that Rashi follows
the opinion of the RAMBAM. Rashi here writes that the barrel in this case was a Kli Cheres, and
yet it was able to become Tamei from the outside. The Rambam (Hilchos Avos ha'Tum'ah 7:3)
rules that the outside of a Kli Cheres can become Tamei mid'Rabanan, like the outside of other
types of utensils (in contrast to the view of the Ra'avad there).)

Accepting While Disagreeing

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:3

As we learned on yesterday’s daf, Beit Hillel believes that the mitzva of yibum does not apply in a
case where a man was married to two women – one of whom was forbidden to marry his brother
– and he dies without children. In such a case, neither the erva (the woman who was forbidden),

3
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/yevamot15/

14
nor her rival wife (a tzarah in the language of the Mishna), will become yevamot (widows waiting
to be married or released by their brother-in-law).

According to Beit Shammai, however, the tzarah is treated independently and is subject to the
rules of yibum and/or halitza as if she had been the only wife of the deceased. The Mishna
comments that, their disagreement notwithstanding, the families of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel
continued to marry one another.

One suggestion raised in the Gemara’s attempt to explain why the families were willing to marry
one another is that, on a practical level, Beit Shammai accepted Beit Hillel’s rulings, even though
they disagreed on a theoretical level. One example presented by the Gemara to prove that Beit
Shammai insisted that their position was the correct one was the case of shoket Yehu –
Yehu’s trough, which was connected to a regulation-size mikveh via a small opening, and people
used it to immerse vessels that had become tameh (ritually defiled).

The Gemara relates that Beit Shammai arranged for the connection between the trough and
the mikveh to be widened, since their position is that to be considered a kosher mikveh there must
be a large opening between them; Beit Hillel believed that only a small opening – the size of
a shfoferet ha-node – was necessary.

The node of a shfoferet ha-node is a bag or bottle made of an entire skin removed from an animal.
These skins were used for a variety of purposes, but primarily to store small objects or food. When
one was used to store liquids (water, wine or oil, for example) the skin would be removed without
making any holes in it, and they would leave the skin of the legs attached, as well. When finished,
one of the legs would have a tube – usually a reed – inserted into it, and the liquids would be
poured in and out from that small tube.

Tosafos, Maharm and Tosafos Peretz all note that Shammai agrees that an infant who needs his
mother is exempt from the mitzvah of sukka, and the reason he arranged for the infant to be under
a kosher sukka was only due to a personal stringency (see Sukka 28b).4

If this was only a ‫ חומרא‬,what proof does our Gemara see here that Shammai conducted himself
according to his teaching? If his actions here did not reflect a legal ruling, it would then not be a
violation of ‫ תתגודדו לא‬,because this would not be an indication of “two Torahs.”

4
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yevamos%20015.pdf

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Tosafos answers that if Bais Shammai did not follow their own rulings, they would not have done
so even as a stringency, as even this has the appearance of two Torahs. Aruch LaNer asks how this
case indicates whether or not Bais Shammai conducted themselves according to their opinion.

When the Gemara earlier suggested that Bais Shammai must have followed the rulings of Bais
Hillel it was either because the Heavenly voice came and announced that Bais Hillel must be
followed, or due to the fact that Bais Hillel was the majority. These reasons both apply only to
Bais Hillel and Bais Shammai, who came later.

However, Shammai himself certainly followed his opinion, as he predated the Heavenly voice and
its instructions. Also, at that time Hillel and Shammai did not represent separate factions or legal
camps which confronted each other.

What did the Gemara expect to prove from this case and the actions of Shammai himself? Aruch
LaNer explains that even without the factors mentioned above, in consideration of ‫ תתגודדו לא‬,it
would still not have been appropriate for Shammai to publicly act in opposition to the accepted
halacha that an infant is exempt from sukka.

This is why the Gemara wonders how Shammai could have done such a thing. The Gemara
answers that an observer would be under the impression that he did not do so for the mitzvah, but
only to allow extra air to circulate. Therefore, the conduct of Shammai did not violate the
guidelines of .

The Gemara contrasts the Kohen Gadol who marries a widow where she and her children become
desecrated and may not marry kohanim or eat teruma, and the man who remarries his divorcée
(after she married another man in the meantime) where she and her children do not become
desecrated from marrying kohanim or eating teruma by means of this marriage.

Rashi (1) mentions that a yevama who marries a stranger without chalitza is the same as a man
who remarries his divorcée, both cases violate regular prohibitions, and the yevama does not
become desecrated by the relationship. The reason is that a woman becomes desecrated from
kehuna only if the man was always prohibited, in contrast to the case of the one who remarried his
divorcée, or the yevama who married a stranger, who becomes prohibited only after a particular
event.

Rambam (2) rules that a yevama who marries a stranger without chalitza is considered a ‫ זונה‬and
becomes prohibited to marry a kohen. This ruling is difficult in light of our Gemara that indicates
that a yevama who marries a stranger without chalitza does not become a ‫ זונה‬.

The Avnei Miluim (3) suggests that although a yevama who marries a stranger without chalitza is
categorized as a ‫זונה‬, as mentioned by Rambam, nevertheless, she does not become disqualified

16
from eating teruma. The reason is that disqualification is not dependant on whether a woman is
categorized as a ‫ ; זונה‬rather it is related to whether she cohabited with someone who was always
a stranger (i.e. prohibited) to her.

Accordingly, the discussion in our Gemara would be limited to the subject of teruma. The difficulty
with this explanation is that Rambam4 ruled that when a woman has relations that categorize her
as a ‫ זונה‬or ‫ חללה‬she becomes disqualified from eating teruma. Imrei Moshe5 explains that a woman
becomes a ‫ זונה‬only if she has relations intentionally and not if the relations occurred
unintentionally.
Consequently, if the co-wife of an ‫ ערוה‬married a stranger without chalitza, following the opinion
of Bais Hillel, she would not be categorized as a ‫ זונה‬even according to Bais Shammai because it
is seen as if the prohibited relations occurred unintentionally.

Therefore, Rambam’s ruling is not difficult from our Gemara since our Gemara addresses a unique
circumstance.

Our Gemara discusses the fact that we cannot have the women who may have required yibum do
chalitzah since it may mean that their husbands will despise them. There is a general principle at
work here: “The ways of Torah are pleasant, and all its paths are peace.”

Fulfillment of the mitzvos is meant to bring about greater mutual love among the Jewish people,
not less. Once, when Rav Shlomo Wolbe, zt”l, was in a certain town in Israel, he stayed at the
home of one of the Rabbonim of the town.

The Rav asked Rav Wolbe to accompany him to a din Torah. They arrived first, but when the other
local Rav arrived, Rav Wolbe’s host refused to stand for him. This seemed strange since the newly
arrived Rav was far older than Rav Wolbe’s host and common courtesy seemed to dictate that the
younger Rav stand or at least make some gesture of respect toward the senior talmid chacham. At
this point, a few of the members of the community called over Rav Wolbe and pleaded with him,
“Rabbi, please! Can’t you make peace between the two Rabbis of our town? They haven’t spoken
to each other in so long.”

When Rav Wolbe broached the subject with his host, the man expressed indignation and began to
heap abuse on the elder Rav. He began an impassioned litany of all his grievances against the other
Rav. “How could I consider making peace with someone who acted that way toward me!” When

17
Rav Wolbe’s host finished pouring out all his pent-up venom he concluded, “Only someone like
Rav Avrohom Grodzinsky zt”l could be a Rav in the same city as another great Rav like Rav Aizik
Sher, zt”l, and still treat him like a brother!”

Rav Wolbe retorted, “Don’t be so sure! I am certain that it was harder for them to live with each
other than for you two here. You must learn to be less judgmental and get along— ‫דרכי דרכיה‬

Sharon Weiss-Greenberg writes:5

Our daf is chock full of “what would you do?” moments — particularly when students of the
schools of Hillel and Shammai are placed in awkward situations because of their differing halakhic
views. One that struck a chord with me has to do with any Jew’s favorite topic: food.

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: When I studied Torah with Rabbi Yohanan the Horani (who was
a disciple of Beit Shammai) I saw that in years of drought he would eat dry bread dipped in salt.

Rabbi Yohanan the Horani was a student of Shammai, and by all accounts quite poor. In a year of
famine, he has nothing to eat but bread and salt. After consulting with his father, Rabbi Elazar bar
Tzadok resolves to bring over some olives to supplement his teacher’s rather tasteless famine diet.

He saw that they were moist. He said to me: I do not eat olives.

Rabbi Yohanan lays eyes on the olives — which are visibly wet — and fears they are impure.
Rather than saying so, however, he simply states that he is not an olive fan.

Food. We wax eloquent about how it unites us around a table. But, equally, food — and especially
dietary restrictions and rules of kashrut— can deeply and emotionally divide us. Rabbi Yohanan
is wise to use tact in refusing the olives graciously offered by his student Rabbi Elazar.

Rabbi Elazar, however, is not fooled by Rabbi Yohanan’s polite reply. He goes back to his father
and asks what to do, receiving this response:

Go and say to him that the barrel containing the olives was perforated, but it was clogged by
sediments.

The elder Rabbi Tzadok tells his son to go tell Rabbi Yohanan that there was an attempt to drain
the barrel of liquid (hence the perforations) but it didn’t work out (it was clogged by sediments).
What does this communicate? The school of Hillel required perforations in a preserved barrel of
olives to dry out the olives and ensure their purity; the school of Shammai did not. However, the
Talmud explains, even Beit Hillel agreed that if the perforations were subsequently clogged,
meaning the olives remained moist, the olives would be insusceptible to impurity.

5
Myjewishlearning.com

18
And now we understand something surprising: It turns out that the concern about these olives has
everything to do with the rulings of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai would have had no problem with
wet olives — and Rabbi Yohanan is a student of Beit Shammai! So why would he refuse them? The
Gemara explains:

Although Rabbi Yohanan the Horani was a disciple of Shammai, he always acted only in
accordance with the statements of Beit Hillel.

What made Rabbi Yohanan unusual, and great in the eyes of the Gemara, was that despite being a
student of Shammai, he followed the rulings of Hillel — for the sake of peaceful coexistence. So
committed was Rabbi Yohanan the Shammaite to Hillel’s rulings that he refused to eat damp olives
that any other student of Shammai would presumably have felt free to consume. And he is
indeed so committed to smooth social interactions, he declines the olives with tact, politely saying
that he does not care for them.

Rabbi Yohanan is a fascinating character in this sugya. He knows the halakhic differences,
understands them, is committed to them, and yet attunes his behavior not to what he thinks is the
“right” halakhic answer, but to what will preserve social unity, first by following Beit Hillel’s
strictures, and then by choosing to politely decline olives rather than malign them as impure.

Our daf offers us a model of thinking about potentially difficult social interactions that arise from
a conflict in observance. You may disagree with someone with every fiber of your being — you
may believe your friend’s food is not kosher, that your colleague is not properly observing Shabbat,
that your neighbor is not halakhically a Jew — but if we follow the wisdom of Rabbi Yohanan,
we should consider putting aside this judgment for the sake of community and unity, letting
harmony supersede intellectualism and halakhic certitude.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:

It is possible that you have an accent that clearly informs those who speak with you about the
location where you grew up. For example, those from Glasgow have a particular accent, as do
those from Liverpool, and in terms of the US the New York accent is very distinct, as is the accent
of those from Boston. However, there are people who live in one place but then move to others,
and as a result, they blend the accent of the location where they were raised with the accept that
they hav adopted in their new location. Admittedly these accents are harder to unpack and identify,
but what they convey is the possibility that someone can carry dual identities in the same manner
that someone can be a dual passport holder.

I mention this as a preface to my thought on our daf (Yevamot 15b) because I am not only a dual
passport holder in terms of citizenship (UK & Israel), but also a dual minhag (custom) passport
holder. What I mean by this is that while I am sefardic by birth, and while I follow certain sefardic
traditions that I observed in my home, I grew up praying in an Ashkenazi shul and receiving
halachic guidance mostly reflective of Ashkenazic traditions, and as a result I blend these two

19
traditions in a similar way that someone who moved from Liverpool to New York might have a
blended accent. Both are part of me, and both are needed for me to be me.

At times, people are confused by what I have just said because they feel that a Jew can be ‘only’
one of the other. But while there are Bostonians who don’t leave Boston, and Glaswegians who
don’t leave Glasgow, there are people who move and who are therefore influenced by, and become
citizens of, more than one place.

Having explained all this I’d like to turn to our daf where we are taught about Rabbi Yochanan
HaChorani who was a disciple of Shammai, but who nevertheless performed all his deeds in
accordance with Beit Hillel. For some people this duality seems impossible - because how could
Rabbi Yochanan identify with one group, yet follow the laws of another? But the fact is that while
it may seem that Rabbi Yochanan is unique, there are – in fact – may people like him who are
comparable dual passport holders and who may more strongly identify with one group, but who
adhere to the laws and strictures of the other.

Sadly, most halachic handbooks are just written for those who hold only one minhag passport –
which make them imperfect resources for those who come from, and who identify with, multiple
traditions. And this is why I believe it is so important to acknowledge the many people in this
world like Rabbi Yochanan who – like those with a blended accent - have a blended minhag
identity.

Double portrait of a husband and wife by Wolfgang Heimbach

Did Beit Shammai do it?

20
Marl Kerzner writes:6

Earlier we learned that a marriage permitted according to Beit Shammai would lead, according to
Beit Hillel, to a serious consequence of a child being a mamzer and being forbidden to marry a
Jew. The question therefore is, did Beit Shammai actually follow their point of view in practice?

One attempt to decide this is by analyzing the story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who said, "How
are we do resolve it? Should we simply agree with Beit Shammai? But the child is mamzer
according to Beit Hillel! And if we simply agree with Beit Hillel - but the child of the marriage
they allow is not fit to marry a Kohen, and soon we will not have priests! Rather, let's do this: in
every such case let us do a chalitzhah, but not a yibum. Since we ban yibum, we will never come
into problem with Beit Hillel: even if they do halitzah, it is meaningless, and so no harm. And
according to Beit Shammai, this will also be acceptable, because they require either a yibum or
chalitzah." However, the Sages never got to vote and put this measure into practice.

Can we deduce from this that Beit Shammai actually acted according to their view? For otherwise,
what "previous cases" are we talking about?

Not necessarily! It could be that this measure was not flawless for a different reason. By previous
cases we mean the cases of Beit Hillel: the husbands who married their wives following the view
of Beit Hillel will now observe their wives getting chalitzah from another man, implying that the
husband's marriage was illegal until then! This cannot be, for "All the Torah's ways are
pleasantness, and all its paths are peace."

6
https://talmudilluminated.com/yevamot/yevamot15.html

21
Kenneth Cohen writes:7

The term, “Chumra” means stringency. It is used often in matters of Jewish Law. The original
definition of Chumra has taken on a different meaning in modern day Orthodox Judaism. At times
this interpretation can have positive results, while at other times, it can have very negative
detrimental effects.

Jewish Law, or “Halacha” as it’s known in Hebrew is a very complex system handed over to the
Rabbis from the time of Moses. The purpose of Halacha was to interpret and protect the Torah so
that it would continue to be observed throughout the generations. The Rabbis were also given the
license to make protective rabbinic laws that they believed necessary for Jewish survival. For
example, Moshe Rabbeinu himself decreed that the Torah be read every Shabbat.

There were instances where doubts arose in certain legal situations. The Rabbis formulated a
system where if the doubt was of a rabbinic nature, then one could be lenient. This leniency was

7
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/an-analysis-of-the-chumra/

22
known as a “Koola”, in Hebrew. If the doubt was of a Torah origin, then one needed to take the
stricter approach, or go L’ Chumra’ in Halachic jargon. This was the way a Chumra was originally
viewed.

If we go back fifty or sixty years in America, Orthodox Judaism was not that strong. It was a much
greater struggle to be observant at that time, than it is today. Kosher food was harder to come by
and not every community had a Mikva, ritual bath. Even burials according to Halacha was not a
given. Finding employers that were understanding of the Sabbath was also not so easy to find.

When I was ordained as a rabbi in the late seventies, in Skokie, Illinois, we were trained to help
the community deal with their challenges by attempting to remain within Halachic boundaries, but
also trying to find leniencies wherever possible.

Over the years, the Orthodox community made great advances in major cities across the United
States, where being religious was no longer that difficult. This was the beginning of the new
definition of Chumra.

On one level, which was of a positive nature, Jews could afford to be stricter. There were now
numerous Kosher establishments to choose from and compromises were not necessary. A Jew was
not embarrassed to display his Judaism in public and more and more Jewish men were seen with
Yarmulkes and married women wore head coverings.

If we go back in time to the period following the Six Day War, there was a huge wave of Religious
Zionism all across America. If you were an Orthodox Jew, it was a given that moving to Israel was
on your radar. People would never openly say that they were not moving but would say that they
hoped to move within a relatively short time. As America became more affluent and life in Israel
was clearly more difficult, the Zionist dream began to fade. The serious idealists had moved to
Israel, and the less idealistic stayed where it was more comfortable. Hence, the birth of the new
” Chumra”.

Religious Jews needed to have their consciences to be at peace. They began adopting stringencies,
or Chumras, that were more in line with the ultra-Orthodox, anti-Zionist communities. Such
Chumras included a stricter dress code, a higher standard in Kashrut supervision, and enrolling
their children in schools that were more extreme. Perhaps if they were really strict in certain areas
and if their new rabbis told them that they don’t really have to move to Israel, then their guilt for
not being true religious Zionists would subside.

Another phenomenon was the Baal Teshuva movement, where many unaffiliated Jews became
observant. From a positive perspective, these were very sincere individuals and they wanted to do
everything right. They felt good taking the stricter approach as they felt this would keep them
strong and they would not fall back to their old ways.

23
The sad part of this Chumra idea today is that it is not made clear what is the law and what is a
Chumra. Passover is the time of year when people are really into Chumras. It is understandable
that we be extra strict because Passover is only one week, but sometimes it can get ridiculous. One
year, a certain individual in a very religious neighborhood, covered the bumper of his car with
aluminum foil a few days before Pesach. He did this for a joke, but within an hour, a dozen cars
also covered their cars the same way!

The sadness of this Chumra infatuation is felt the most in Jewish education. Young students are
given restrictions that are only Chumras but are a major turn off. When they are told that everything
is forbidden without clarifying the basis of the prohibition, it makes the students want to run away
from Judaism. There are grey areas within Halacha, where depending on the situation, a “Koola”
would be much more beneficial. For example, one of my daughters was sent home from school
because her earrings were too long!

We must be aware that young people have many choices of lifestyles today. For them to remain
observant, things should make sense. We need to take more of a “Hillel” approach than a
“Shammai”, more Chumra approach. I grew up in Bnei Akiva were talking to girls was not a sin
and some of those girls even wore pants. It was not perfect Halachically, but it was a very
wholesome way for us to learn to love Judaism and love Israel. Clearly, there are times when
Chumras are necessary, but it’s equally clear that a badly placed Chumra could be very, very
harmful.

24
Rav Assaf Bednarsh writes:8

Chumra is defined as practicing Halakha in a fashion more stringent than absolutely necessary
based on the Halakha. Why would anyone act in a way that is more stringent than necessary? What
is the place of stringency in our halakhic practice? We find several justifications for chumra in the
teachings of Chazal.

Justification 1: Fear of Leading to a Transgression

8
https://etzion.org.il/en/philosophy/issues-jewish-thought/issues-mussar-and-faith/chumra

25
The first mishna in Massekhet Avot records the teaching of the Sages of the Great Assembly: "And
make a fence around the Torah." The mishna teaches us that one should forbid even permissible
actions in order to avoid situations prone to error or temptation, which might cause us to violate
the actual halakha. The gemara utilizes this principle in a number of contexts, using the alternative
formulation, "Go, go, we say to a nazir. Do not come close to the vineyard!"[1]

Thus, one possible justification for being more stringent than necessary is in order to avoid
violating the baseline halakha. If one knows that engaging in a certain activity creates a risk of
leading to a transgression, then one should certainly be machmir and avoid that activity.

Justification 2: Taking into Account a More Stringent Halachic Opinion

Most chumras practiced nowadays, however, are based not upon the aforementioned mishna, but
on a gemara in Massekhet Shabbat (61a):

As R. Yocḥanan said: Just as one dons phylacteries, so too, one puts on shoes. Just as phylacteries
are placed on the left arm, so too, when putting on shoes one begins with the left foot. An objection
[to R. Yochanan’s opinion based on a baraita]: When one puts on his shoes, he puts on the right
shoe first and afterward puts on the left shoe. R. Yosef said: Now that it was taught [in a baraita]
in this manner and R. Yochanan stated [the halakha] in that manner, one who acted this way acted
properly, and one who acted that way acted properly [as each custom has a basis]… R. Nachman
bar Yitzchak said: And one who fears Heaven fulfills both opinions. And who is this [God-fearing
person]? Mar son of Rabbana. How does he conduct himself? He puts on his right shoe and does
not tie the laces. And then he puts on his left shoe and ties it, and then afterward ties the laces of
his right shoe. R. Ashi said: I saw that R. Kahana was not particular with regard to the order in
which he put on his shoes.

Neither R. Kahana nor R. Yosef was particular about the order of putting on shoes. This follows
the standard halakhic methodology; either option fulfills one of the two opinions, and we are not
dealing with a severe transgression that might require us to rule strictly in cases of doubt.
Nonetheless, the God-fearing Mar son of Rabbana was strict with himself and took pains to ensure
that he was safe from any possibility of even the slightest transgression.

Similarly, the gemara in Massekhet Chullin (44b) derives from a verse in Yechezkel (4:14) that a
righteous person would not eat the meat of an animal if a doubt arose regarding its permissibility
and it was ruled kosher by the judgment of a rabbi. Although the rabbi ruled leniently and the meat
is therefore halakhically permissible, a righteous person would suspect that perhaps the rabbi's
ruling was in error, and therefore refrain from eating a food that carried with it even the slightest
possibility of transgression.

We see from these two sources that it is considered praiseworthy to be more stringent than
necessary as an expression of yirat shamayim, fear of Heaven. Although the halakha might rule
leniently in a doubtful case, chumra is encouraged in order to avoid even the possibility of sin.

26
Justification 3: Enhanced Fulfillment of a Commandment

A third justification for chumra is found in the mishna in Massekhet Sukka (26a-26b):

Mishna: One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the sukka… An incident
occurred in which they brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai for him to taste, and
to Rabban Gamliel they brought two dates and a bucket of water. And they each said: Take them
up to the sukka and we will eat them there. [In contrast,] when they gave R. Tzadok less than an
egg-bulk of food, he took the food in a cloth for cleanliness [he did not wash his hands, because in
his opinion, one is not required to wash his hands before eating less than an egg-bulk]. And he ate
it outside the sukka and did not recite a blessing after eating it.

GEMARA: [Is the mishna citing] an incident to contradict [the halakha cited in the
previous mishna that one may eat or drink in the context of a casual meal outside the sukka]? [The
incident involving Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai and Rabban Gamliel indicates that one may eat
nothing outside the sukka. The gemara answers:] The mishna is incomplete [as it is lacking a
significant element], and it teaches the following: If one seeks to impose a stringency upon himself
and eat nothing outside the sukka, he may be stringent, and there is no element of
presumptuousness [in adopting that stringency]. And there was also an incident supporting that
ruling: They brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai for him to taste, and to Rabban
Gamliel they brought two dates and a bucket of water, and they each said: Take them up to
the sukka and we will eat them there.

Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel acted strictly and entered the sukka even for a
small snack, and this is understood as granting universal legitimacy to the chumra of eating even
the smallest snack in the sukka. This chumra was undertaken not out of fear that eating outside of
the sukka might constitute a transgression, which it clearly does not, nor even out of fear that it
may lead to a transgression, but rather for a positive reason. Although one is not obligated to snack
in the sukka, doing do constitutes an additional fulfillment of the mitzva of living in the sukka.
These Rabbis were machmir in order to enhance their performance of the mitzva of sukka, out of
a desire to maximize their service of God.

Justification 4: Fulfillment of the Spirit of the Law

A fourth justification for chumra, somewhat similar to the third, is found as a general theme in the
commentary of Ramban to the Torah. Ramban points out in several places[2] that the Torah
includes both specific commandments and general directives, because specific technical
commandments and prohibitions can always be skirted while violating the spirit of the law. A
clever person could technically fulfill of all the interpersonal commandments, and yet be a cruel
and selfish person. He could keep all the laws of Shabbat, and yet make it a day of work, and he
could refrain from those actions that are ritually prohibited and nonetheless lead a hedonistic and
profane lifestyle. Therefore, the Torah commands us to be holy and not only refrain from ritually
prohibited activities, to be straight and good and not only refrain from theft and similar sins, and
to rest on Shabbat and not only refrain from the enumerated prohibited labors.

27
While the commandment to follow the spirit of the law is binding and not merely a chumra, the
implementation of these directives can be classified as chumra in a certain sense, for they require
each individual, based on his or her unique circumstance, to refrain from activities that might be
technically permissible, and even appropriate, in different circumstances.[3]

We can conclude, then, that the phenomenon of chumra is firmly rooted in the halakhic tradition.
It is appropriate to be machmir in order to avoid situations of temptation, in order to fulfill the
spirit of the law or enhance a mitzva, and to avoid a doubtful act that entails the possibly of
transgression, even if the halakhic process rules it permissible.

It is worth noting that even though chumra is viewed as righteous and praiseworthy, is not
necessarily required, even for great Torah sages, as R. Kahana was not strict regarding donning
his shoes and R. Tzadok was not strict regarding the observance of
the mitzva of sukka.[4] However, such chumras are certainly a valid and praiseworthy expression
of the fear and love of God when undertaken by one who feels inspired to do so.

Chumra: Foolish or Pious?

Now that we have established a firm basis for the practice of chumra, it is surprising to encounter
a ruling in the Shulchan Arukh that seems to delegitimize this very practice. The Shulchan
Arukh (Orach Chaim 639:7) rules that one who is exempt from the mitzva of sukka, and remains
in the sukka nonetheless, receives no heavenly reward for his chumra and is instead branded a fool.
The Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim 472:6) rules similarly with regard to one who is exempt from
the obligation to recline at the seder table and does so nonetheless, and points to the source of this
ruling in the Talmud Yerushalmi, which states that anyone who is exempt from something and
does it nonetheless is branded a fool.[5] The Magen Avraham points out, however, that this
statement cannot be taken literally, as we practice many chumrot that are considered appropriate
and even praiseworthy. The Talmud Yerushalmi must have been referring to a specific subset
of chumrot that are inappropriate and counterproductive. Unfortunately, the Magen Avraham does
not define the nature of those chumrot which are considered foolish as opposed to pious.

Several explanations have been offered for this perplexing ruling of the Talmud Yerushalmi.

Problem 1: Inventing a New Religion

R. Menachem Ha-Meiri explains that the Yerushalmi is referring to a case of one who
is machmir in a fashion that does not entail any spiritual accomplishment, as the chumra does not
entail fulfillment of any mitzva, nor does it spur intellectual or ethical development.[6] One who
invents an unnecessary act of worship that brings no halakhic or ethical benefit certainly deserves
to be branded a fool. While his intention may be sincere, he is inventing a new religion instead of
enhancing his performance of Judaism.

Problem 2: Violation of Another Halakha

28
While the Meiri interpreted the criticism of the Yerushalmi as directed against one
whose chumra has no positive substance, most commentators understand that the Yerushalmi is
criticizing one whose chumra might contain positive content but also has negative ramifications
that outweigh its benefit. The Shevut Yaakov[7] suggests that this principle is quoted by Shulchan
Arukh specifically with regard to one who sits in the sukka in the rain because although such a
person is enhancing his fulfillment of the mitzva of sukka, he is violating the positive
commandment of rejoicing on the holiday, as well as the Torah principle of “its ways are ways of
pleasantness.”[8] Additionally, the Shevut Yaakov quotes the mishna that compares rainfall on
Sukkot to a servant who prepared a cup for the king and the king threw it back in his face. When
God brings rain on Sukkot, this constitutes an explicit rejection of our mitzva of sitting in
the sukka, and therefore one who continues to sit in the sukka in defiance of this clear message is
showing disrespect to the King of kings.

The principle of the matter, according to the Shevut Yaakov, is easily generalizable. Whenever
acting stringently regarding one halakha entails a violation of another halakha, such a chumra is
clearly counterproductive, and we can justifiably attribute foolishness to one who practices it.

Problem 3: Arrogance

If we examine this quotation in its original context in the Talmud Yerushalmi, we find that the
Yerushalmi is indeed criticizing one whose chumra constitutes a violation of some other halakhic
value. However, the competing halakhic value lies not in the realm of bein adam la-
makom, mitzvot between man and God, but rather in the realm of bein adam le-chaveiro, between
man and his fellow man.

The Yerushalmi introduces this principle towards the end of an intricate discussion of the
prohibition of showing off one's religiosity. The Yerushalmi analyzes a dispute regarding the
permissibility of being machmir in a way that publicizes one's extraordinary piety, distinguishing
between chumra that involves self-sacrifice and that which merely garners praise, and between an
established sage or communal leader and an average citizen. In the course of this discussion, the
Yerushalmi records a story:

Said R. Zeira: [A disciple of the sages may follow a course of action that will entail for him pain]
only if he does not cause others ridicule. [The following story illustrates this:] Once R. Meyasha
[var: Yasa] and R. Shmuel bar R. Yitzchak were sitting and eating in one of the upstairs
synagogues, and it came time to pray. R. Shmuel bar R. Yitzchak got up and prayed [interrupting
his meal]. R. Meyasha said to him: Did not Rabbi teach, “If they started [eating], they do not
interrupt [to pray]”? And [did not] Chezekiah teach: |Anyone who is exempt from an obligation
and performs it is called a simpleton?”[9]

R. Meyasha's criticism of R. Shmuel bar R. Yitzchak was not merely that he engaged in practice
of chumra, but that he did so in a way that could be taken as insulting to his colleagues and could
be misunderstood as an expression of arrogance and religious superiority.

29
The Talmud Bavli likewise views it as axiomatic that it is forbidden to engage in the practice
of chumra if such practice would give the appearance of arrogance, although the details of this
prohibition are subject to debate. In two places in the Mishna, Rabban Shimon Gamliel and the
Sages debate whether it is permitted to practice a particular chumra. They argue
in Massekhet Berakhot (16b) about the permissibility of a bridegroom, who is exempt from the
obligation of reciting the Shema, following the practice of Rabban Gamliel, who recited
the Shema on his wedding night. In Massekhet Pesachim (54b), they argue about the permissibility
of an unlearned Jew taking off from work on Tisha B'Av, as was the custom of Torah scholars.

The gemara concludes that fundamentally, everyone agrees that one may not engage
in chumra that could appear to be an expression of arrogance. The debates relate only the details
of such a prohibition. At a wedding, if all of the guests recite the Shema and the bridegroom recites
with them, he may seem arrogant because he is reciting the Shema in circumstances in which other
bridegrooms did not, but perhaps he does not appear arrogant, because he is acting like everyone
else at the wedding. With regard to Tisha B'Av, perhaps it is arrogant for an unlearned Jew to
abandon his work and act as if he is capable of spending an entire day contemplating the loss of
the Temple. On the other hand, perhaps the viewer would assume that it was a slow day at the
office, and he took off because there was no work available.

It is clear, though, that Chazal were very concerned that one does not abuse the concept
of chumra in order to demonstrate religious superiority. Not only that, but even a sincere person
may not act in a way that could be misunderstood as an expression of arrogance, and thus cause
social discord or engender cynicism about religious practice.

Other Potential Problems

We find other contexts as well in which Chazal were sensitive to the bein adam le-
chaveiro dangers that could arise from the practice of chumra. A trivial example is found in
the gemara in Massekhet Sota (21a). The mishna there states that a “foolish pietist” causes
destruction of the world. The gemara illustrates the meaning of a foolish pietist by portraying a
man who sees a woman drowning in the river but refrains from saving her because it is improper
to look at women. This is an obvious example of chumra gone wrong.

A more subtle application is found in the Tosefta (Ta'anit 2:12), which states that one is not
permitted to afflict himself with excessive fasting, lest he ruin his health and be unable to work,
and thus become a burden on the community. We learn from here that chumra is encouraged at
the cost of one's own financial resources, but not if it would lead to taxing the resources of others.

In fact, from the very beginning of Judaism, we are taught that one should not engage in chumra at
the expense of others. Avraham Avinu, after conquering the four kings and thus acquiring all the
booty they had taken from the five kings in accordance with contemporary laws of warfare, decided
to be machmir:

Then the king of Sodom said to Avraham, “Give me the persons, and take the possessions for
yourself.” But Avraham said to the king of Sodom, “I swear to the Lord, God Most High, Creator

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of heaven and earth: I will not take so much as a thread or a sandal strap of what is yours; you shall
not say, ‘It is I who made Avraham rich.’ For me, nothing but what my servants have used up; as
for the share of the men who went with me—Aner, Eshkol, and Mamre—let them take their
share.” (Bereishit 14:21-24)

Avraham was stringent and refused to keep the booty of Sodom. But he knew that
his chumra would exert social pressure on his gentile allies, who had every right to their share in
the spoils of war and would be pressured to give up their shares in order not to appear less upright
than Avraham. Avraham was unwilling to exert pressure on others to be stringent if they did not
sincerely want to do so of their own volition, and he therefore explicitly stipulated that he was
stringent only on his own behalf, but not for others. This established a precedent of pious Jews
being machmir at their own expense but being careful not to thereby cause harm or inconvenience
to others.

We have seen several criticisms of the inappropriate practice of chumra. Meiri

criticized chumra devoid of halakhic significance or ethical improvement. Shevut Yaakov
criticized chumra at the expense of our respect for God, for His mitzvot, or for general Torah
principles. And many sources criticized chumra that comes at the expense of others, whether it
impinges on their lives, their livelihood, or their feelings. Clearly the practice of chumra, while
praiseworthy, requires intelligence and judgment, in order to ensure that its benefit is not
outweighed by insensitivity to other Torah values.

[1] Shabbat 14a, Pesachim 40b, Yevamot 46a, Bava Metzia 92a, Avoda Zara 17a, 58b-59a. A nazir is forbidden by Torah law to
consume grapes, and thus must distance himself from the vineyard in order to avoid temptation.
[2] Commentary to Vayikra 19:2, Vayikra 23:24, Devarim 6:18.
[3] Additionally, it is likely that within these mitzvot, according to Ramban, is included both an absolute obligation to keep the
spirit of the law and encouragement to be machmir and live up to more idealized version of the spirit of the law, which the Ramban
calls perishut. R. Lichtenstein discusses this issue in Leaves of Faith, vol. 2, pp. 38-52. See also R. Daniel Schreiber’s analysis of
this issue in Tradition 44:1 (http://traditionarchive.org/news/_pdfs/0031-0052.pdf ).
[4] It seems from the passage in Massekhet Chullin, however, that every sage is expected to be machmir and avoid doubtful items
that were permitted solely by the subjective judgment of the local Rabbi.
[5] Talmud Yerushalmi Berakhot 2:5, Shabbat 1:2.
[6] Beit Ha-Bechira, Bava Kama 87a. He quotes the passage from the Talmud Yerushalmi in the name of the midrash.
[7] Responsa Shevut Yaakov 3:45, quoted in Shaarei Teshuva to Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 639:5.
[8] Mishlei 3:17. See Sukka 32a, Yevamot 15a, Yevamot 87b.
[9] Talmud Yerushalmi, Berakhot 2:5 and Shabbat 1:2. See further in this passage for R. Shmuel bar R. Yitzchak’s defense of his
practice.

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 The Risks and Dangers of Chumras: A Guide to the Sources

Hershey H. Friedman, Ph.D writes:9

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file:///Users/julian/Downloads/SSRN-id3092766.pdf

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Chumra Wars! A Case Against Religious Stringency

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Shmuly Yanklowitz writes:10

Pesach cleaning marathons, tznius contests, & kashrus competitions: an outsider looking in might
feel very confused trying to understand our priorities.

When we perform a prescribed religious action as designed, we can most accurately tap into the
meaning for that practice. When we add on layers of stringency, we risk losing the potential
transformation that was hidden within the spiritual practice. Today, there is a tendency
toward chumra that is very spiritually dangerous, as it perverts the very essence behind our
tradition. While some argue that by creating “fences” we protect the essence of the law, this
approach suggests that individuals in the community are not capable of making their own choices
or of honoring the boundaries. The goal of Jewish law is not chumra (following the strictest path),
but about fulfilling the letter of the law and actualizing the purpose of the moral and spiritual
tradition.
When chumra becomes the norm and is referenced tautologically, people often just observe it like
it is the halacha without making the effort for halacha to provide a unique connection to G-d. The
spiritual practice risks becoming another part of social conformity devoid of religious meaning.
Instead, individuals should take on unique chumras that bring them closer to G-d and help them
to grow as human beings. One should only conscientiously choose a stringency if it adds more
personal meaning, connection, and growth.

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef z’l, the preeminent 20th-century Sephardic posek, was a major proponent of
ruling toward leniency for the sake of honesty and accessibility:

10
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/chumra-wars-a-case-against-religious-stringency/

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Others reinforce the concept that we should not use our religion to be boastful or to feel superior.
The rabbis taught that being strict to demonstrate religious piety is religiously
improper (Hullin 44a). One also should not confuse what the real mitzvah is; as Rambam teaches
that blessings may not be recited when performing customs (Megilah v’Chanukah 3:7).

The Mishnah is already clear in providing a limited list of mitzvot that can be performed beyond
a prescribed measure: food for the poor, gratitude to G-d for food, visiting G-d’s holy site, acts of
kindness, and studying Torah (Peah 1:1). Other mitzvot are not to be done to an extreme. The
Sages taught that it is better to perform a mitzvah that is required than one that is not
required (Avodah Zara 3a) and there is a prohibition against adding or subtracting from the
Torah (Deuteronomy 13:4, Rosh Hashanah 28b). We are not to become confused about our
priorities.

Being religiously strict in private when done to feel closer to the Divine is virtuous but doing it
publicly to come off more pious or to conform is spiritually destructive. This is a specific
prohibition against religious arrogance (yohara) taught by the
Sages (Berachot 17b, Pesachim 54b-55a). Furthermore, developing a generally
excessive approach to communal norms is financially detrimental as well. Some began to create
such lavish celebrations that rabbis have recently tried once again to impose legal limits on the
number of guests, the size of the band, and the expenses. A wedding or bris is not holier if more
money is spent in the name of religious honor as modesty is the key virtue.

When one becomes too strict (in kashrut, for example), it can create communal divisions, that the
very institution of kashrut was designed to prevent. When stringencies are placed upon family

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purity laws, it can harm a marriage and cause infertility challenges. While cultural and religious
differences need to be respected, chumra can be taken to extreme lengths, and can lead to notoriety
rather than spiritual enrichment.

Beit Shemesh, a community shared by the ultra-Orthodox, modern Orthodox, and secular Jews,
became a worldwide story in December 2011 when ultra-Orthodox Jewish men harassed and spat
at an 8-year-old modestly dressed Orthodox girl as she attempted to walk to her religious school.
Reporters were also harassed, had rocks thrown at them, and parents had to run a gauntlet of abuse
as they walked their own children to school. In response, thousands of Israelis, endorsed by
political leaders of the major parties, rallied to protest what amounted to the ill-treatment of a child
by men. What possible religious good is accomplished by humiliating a child? Why are men adding
on new layers of requirements for women to dress more modestly? Why aren’t those of financial
means more cognizant that when they make religious life another place to be financially excessive
that this can exclude those with financial burdens from participating or from holding their heads
up high in the religious community.

To be sure, taking on higher ethical standards is praiseworthy (giving more charity, volunteering
more, paying higher wages, being kinder at home, etc.). But adding ritual stringencies that continue
to confuse the tradition, raise collective standards that demand conformity, and exclude others
destroys the transcendent meaning of Judaism.

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Jonathan Muskat writes:11

Within the modern orthodox community, discussions of chumra, or stringency, and its place in
Judaism are often met with a certain aversion. We cringe a bit. The word alone conjures up stories
of women being pressured to move their seats on airplanes so that certain men who are strict will
not sit next to them, and images of newspapers devoid of pictures of women out of a strict concern
for modesty on the part of some advertisers or publishers. Chumra may evoke memories of Pesach,
when we were asked to change our entire menu when we invited someone who decided to be strict
and only eat non-gebrokts even though that is not his family’s custom. In other words, our modern
orthodox community often associates chumra with extremism, and undue burdens being placed
upon us much to our great displeasure.

11
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-value-and-challenge-of-chumra-stringency/

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And, in fact, taking chumrot upon oneself does have real drawbacks. Dr. Haym Soloveitchik has
noted that sometimes more external chumrot are taken on to replace real religious experiences.
Similarly, Rav Amital, zt”l, has warned that if one is too stringent, it threatens to drain the joy out
of religiosity and replace it with fear. Additionally, we have seen some confuse stringency with
halacha and we have seen some cast aspersions on those who are not stringent. That being said,
are all chumrot created equal?

I believe that there are at least three legitimate motivations for taking additional chumrot upon
oneself. Those are, (1) a sense of Kavod haRav & deference to a minority position in halacha, (2)
a recognition of our own weaknesses and a desire to place a fence around ourselves to prevent us
from sinning, and (3) a desire to passionately elevate ourselves to come even closer to God.

Rav Herschel Schacter explained how one might use chumrot as a means of demonstrating Kavod
haRav, respecting Rabbinic authority. One example of such a chumra is deciding not to carry on
Shabbat even though there is an eruv in town. In this instance, there is a bona fide halachic debate
whether we can build eruvin in communities even if 600,000 people don’t travel on any public
road in the city on any given day. Someone who is strict and opts not to use an eruv on Shabbat
is doing so based on a desire to fulfill each mitzvah and each halacha as fully as possible, being
mindful of all well-respected opinions on the subject.

Sometimes, what motivates being strict is concern that we may sin. An example of this is the Nazir
who abstains from wine, haircuts and dead bodies, despite it being perfectly legitimate according
to every halachic authority to drink wine, get a haircut and visit a cemetery. So why does the Nazir
take these additional obligations upon himself? According to our Sages, the individual who
witnesses the sotah ritual is repulsed by the possibility of marital infidelity and is worried about
his own human weaknesses. Therefore, he creates a set of chumrot to help protect him from
succumbing to sin in the future.

Another way to view the Nazir’s behavior is that his chumrot can also be seen as being motivated
by a desire to be different, to be holy like a Kohen. After all, both the Nazir and the Kohen cannot
come into contact with a corpse and just like the Nazir cannot drink wine, a Kohen cannot do so
while he performs the sacrificial service in the Mikdash. Moreover, the long hair of the Nazir is
similar to the Tzitz, the headplate of the Kohen Gadol, which is referred as “Nezer” haKodesh, the
holy crown. The Nazir is someone who wasn’t born a Kohen, but he wants to live a passionate
Kohen-type life. Wanting to elevate ourselves to come even closer to God and to become like a
Kohen is another legitimate motivation for stringency.

On the other hand, there are illegitimate motivations for adopting chumrot, as well. For example,
some people may adopt a stringency just for the sake of creating the perception that they are pious.
Additionally, whenever we adopt a chumra, we must balance the value of the chumra against other
factors like the impact it has on others and the fear of blurring the line between halacha and
chumra. Before taking chumrot upon oneself, an individual should reflect on exactly why he is

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engaging in these chumrot. He should ask himself and honestly consider whether these chumrot
actually achieve the ideals and values that he is trying to inculcate through observance of them.

As to many of us in the modern orthodox community who do not engage in chumrot, who perhaps
are too concerned with the chumra pitfalls that we enumerated, it’s important not to paint everyone
who practices a chumra with the same broad brush. And just as those who are stringent should
reflect honestly on their choices, so too should the rest of us. We too should ask ourselves if our
choices and practices are instilling the values that others are trying to inculcate through chumra in
our daily lives.

First, Kavod haRav: Maybe we don’t have to be strict to accommodate all halachic views. Maybe
we don’t have to rule like a daat yachid, a singular opinion, but do we have to have enough Kavod
haRav? Do we respect Gedolim even if they may not fully align with our hashkafa? I remember
once being part of a public Q & A session. Someone asked me what I thought about a certain Rosh
Yeshiva being that on a particular issue he did not align with our general religious worldview. My
response was that I may not identify with him on one or a few particular issues, but that doesn’t
mean that we shouldn’t study his Torah and try to learn from him with respect to all the other
Torah that he teaches.

Second, fear of sin: Maybe we will not engage in chumrot, but do we place ourselves in situations
where we are more likely to fail spiritually? For example, do we sometimes spend time with a
group of people knowing full well that the conversation in the group will be filled with lashon hara
and nivul peh?

Third, passion: Maybe we don’t become a Nazir, but where’s our passion for Judaism? Do we
constantly feel that a fire is lit inside of us to grow in Torah study and in feeling connected to God?

The next time that we see someone engage in a chumra, let us appreciate not only the dangers of
the chumra, the extremism, the confusion of halacha and chumra, and the impact that it may have
on others, but let us also consider the underlying values that motivate someone to engage in chumra
– the Kavod haRav, the fear of sin and the passion and yearning for real growth. Let’s ensure that
whether or not we engage in chumra, we are fully engaged in these very legitimate values.

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 Rabbi Karlinsky: “Can Chumros Be Bad For Your Neshamah?”
Can Chumros Be Bad For Your Neshamah?

Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky writes:12

In his recent post on the “disappearing woman”, Rabbi Adlerstein highlighted two important
points in the discussion that have ramifications well beyond the specific topic of eliminating
pictures of the female half of our community from most charedi publications. I would like to
elaborate on the Torah sources to support Rabbi Adlerstein’s critique, as well as the negative
impact on the fibre of our authentic quest for spiritual growth caused by this unfolding culture.

1. Another argument that I completely reject asks rhetorically, “What does it hurt to
bemachmir?” This is a negation of so much that we know to be true from
our mussar literature, that to hear the words is painful.
2. … arguing that it is too difficult to make distinctions between pictures, so all should be
banned, is the single most distasteful element of this discussion. It represents capitulation
to the most dangerous thinking in our community today – our disbelief in our own common
sense.
The issue of chumrot – knowing when to take a more stringent approach in halakha — breeds
much confusion as well as communal conflict. An examination of that topic will show the
connection it has to what Rabbi Adlerstein terms “common sense”.

Rav Shlomo Wolbe, zt”l, in Alei Shur, Vol.2 in a chapter entitled “Frumkeit” (page 152), raises a
number of points that serve as the basis for an informed discussion. A summary is presented below.

12
https://darchenoam.org/rabbi-karlinskys-article-can-chumros-be-bad-for-your-neshamah/

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Frumkeit and Da’at

Rav Wolbe writes that “Frumkeit” (a Yiddish word implying a high level of religiosity) reflects an
instinctive drive to relate to the Almighty Creator. It is found in every living creature, even among
animals (see Tehilim 104:21, 147:9). Instincts flow from a self-centered drive for self-perservation
and are rooted in egocentrism. Instinctual acts strive to attain a perceived personal benefit. Even
when the desired benefits are very laudable ones, an act rooted in instinct is motivated by a quest
for one’s personal welfare.

This egocentric quest, writes Rav Wolbe, cannot be the foundation for proper “bein adam
l’chaveiro” (interpersonal mitzvot) nor for authentic “lishma,” doing the Mitzvah its own sake and
for a transcendent purpose.

Our culture has perfected the attitude of always looking for the payoff: “What’s in it for
me.” Sometimes the payoff can be more money, sometimes it can be prestige, sometimes power
or fame. And we, as Torah Jews, recognize (hopefully) that there can be even bigger and better
payoffs. Better than winning the lottery or some worldly indulgence, there is Olam HaBah, with
all the images we have absorbed of the absolutely most fantastic and pleasurable experience
imaginable. But if we are doing what we do – our mitzvot – motivated by the quest for the payoff,
it is tainted by a dimension of egocentrism. After all is said and done, we are still looking out for
number one. Although we have a more elevated picture of what serves as a payoff compared to
society at large, the ultimate motivation is self-centered, to attain that payoff.

True “lishma” means we are doing a mitzvah to serve the Creator, in fulfilment of the mission for
which we were created, or at least in appreciation of what He has given us. Actions which are
truly lishma are done for the Almighty, motivated from within by the drive to fulfil His will, to
fulfil the responsibilities for which He created us. The reward, Olam Habah, is a reality, and being
aware of reality is always crucial (and frequently very difficult in our media-saturated culture of
illusion), but it is not supposed to be the motivating factor.

This is exactly what the Rambam writes in Chapter 10, Hilchos Teshuva, Halacha 1-2. “A person
should not say I am doing the Torah’s mitzvoth in order to receive the blessings written in the
Torah, or to merit Olam HaBah, and I will avoid the Torah’s prohibitions to be saved from the
curses or from being cut off from Olam HaBah…This is service out of fear… A person serving
out of love involves himself in Torah and Mitzvoth… for no other reason than pursuing truth for
its own sake, with the reward a natural consequence.” The

Rav Wolbe continues: Proper service of G-d has to be built on “da’at” – an accurate, deep
intelligent understanding of what G-d wants from us, acquired through clear thinking and a deep
analysis of Torah. The Talmud (T.B. Sotah 21b; Talmud Yerushalmi Sotah 3:4) illustrates the
concept of “chasid shoteh” (a pious fool) with two examples. (It is truly ironic that one of them is
an extreme example of what seems to be taking place in front of our eyes, no pun intended.) A
woman is drowning, and a man with the ability to save her says to himself that it is not proper to
look at women and does not save her. A child is drowning and a person delays saving him until he
removes his tefillin (since jumping into the water while wearing tefillin is disrespectful for them).
By the time he has removed the tefillin, the baby has drowned. The common denominator of these

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examples, explains Rav Wolbe, is following a spiritual instinct without da’at, that clear and
intelligent analysis and understanding of what is required of a person in every specific
situation. The result of actions rooted in instinct rather than da’at can be the source of distancing
one from G-d, rather than bringing one closer to Him. Becoming closer to G-d must be based on
a deep understanding of the process of connection to Him, rather than imaginary notions of
spiritual accomplishments. This requires clarity about what G-d demands of a person in every
situation, having our feet planted firmly on the ground, operating in reality rather than in some
self-generated fantasy world. A true relationship with G-d is rooted in proper actions in the real,
physical world. The drive and excessive focus on “getting closer to G-d” (especially in our quick-
fix, microwave society) emanates from “frumkeit,” that instinctual desire to reach spiritual heights,
with the yetzer hara seducing us to find ways to get there without the requisite time and effort
necessary.

Egocentric motivations based on the drive to be “frum” can be especially misleading and
destructive. Rav Wolbe quotes the famous story of Reb Yisrael Salanter who didn’t show up one
Yom Kippur night for Kol Nidrei. On the way home, the people found him in a house rocking a
crying baby – whose mother had gone to Kol Nidrei, rather than staying home to take care of her
infant. She was in search of her personal feelings of spiritual elevation, rather than focusing on
doing what G-d wanted her to do at that moment and under those circumstances. Reb Yisrael
couldn’t pass by the crying baby, even to go to Kol Nidrei. He was sending a message to the
mother that our spiritual priorities are determined by responsibilities of service – which is
a mitzvah – rather than by what makes us “feel frum” – which can very well be an aveirah.

True closeness to G-d is attained by honest submission and deference to the will of G-d, based on
a clarity and deep understanding of his Torah and its priorities.

What are our motivations?

This is the gist of the chapter in Alei Shur. I would add a couple of personal insights.

If the goal of chumrot is viewed as a way to earn more reward, then it isn’t really service, but
becomes another way for me to fulfil my personal goals, as lofty as they may be. One of the ways
I heard used to explain the value of chumrot to children is that while a certain activity or stringency
isn’t required, and people who don’t fulfil it are not transgressing anything, “G-d will like us better
if we do it this way.” This attitude contains an undertone of being motivated by personal gain,
making myself a more likeable person, and trying to overcome my own insecurities. A superior
presentation would be “G-d expects this level of observance/service from us.”

If we adopt a chumra in order to provide G-d with the highest level of service we can give, we
must ask ourselves why He would only expect that premium level of service in our chalav
Yisrael milk, glatt Kosher meat, or erasing women’s faces from our magazines, and not expect
the same level of premium service in our level of charitable giving, true love and support of other
Jews (even those with views that differ from ours), meticulous care to go beyond the letter of the
law in our business dealings and monetary interactions, critical standards in determining what are
necessities and what are luxuries, or in the commitment to the quantity and quality of our Torah
study.

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Honest examination of our motives is necessary. Why do we want to avoid relying on (possibly
lenient) opinions that served the Jewish community well for decades? Is it because we want to be
“frummer” than our neighbors? Are we looking for social acceptance? Or is it because we realize
that G-d has given us more resources with which to serve Him than He gave our grandparents, and
as such the level of our ability and responsibility to serve Him has also increased? If it is truly the
latter (as I would like to hope) then how hard are we working to identify, to clarify, to understand
the scope of those responsibilities. How careful are we about discharging all of them, not just the
relatively easy or highly visible ones? Is there a consistency in our level of chumrot? Rav Wolbe
makes the point very sharply: Chumrot, stringencies, are not a “risk free” endeavor. A chumra in
one area of our observance has the very strong potential to enable us to rationalize laxity in another
area.

Many people are of the opinion that increasing chumrot is an easy way to avoid the need to really
know and understand Halacha — “When in doubt, do without.” The combination of a community
keeping many chumrot along with pervasive ignorance of Halacha and an intelleigent
understanding of Torah would lend credence to this observation. But it would not be very
encouraging in assessing the true spiritual level of our communities. Besides making us vulnerable
to rationalizations described by Rav Wolbe, being stringent in one area of Halacha while being lax
in another area indicates confusion about how to properly apply Torah in man’s fulfilment of his
responsibilities in serving G-d.

In Halacha we have a concept of “yesh al mi lismoch,” valid opinions which can serve as a basis
for following a lenient approach. There is a concept of “hefsed merubeh,” great loss, which can
be grounds to follow certain Halachic leniencies. Why is the embarrassment or discomfort of
another Jew (which is a serious violation in one area of Halacha) considered so dispensable in
order to follow a strict opinion in another area? While this doesn’t suggest eating something which
is not Kosher simply to avoid embarrassing someone, finding a way to avoid the embarrassment
has to be as high on our agenda as avoiding the un-Kosher food. Da’at is necessary to know how
to adjudicate between these conflicting values implement this balance. If there are accepted
opinions on the lenient side of an issue, then “da’at,” a deep and proper understanding of the
Halacha and the tradeoffs, may require relying on the more lenient opinion in those circumstances.
This is not a psak for any situation, and not every novice is qualified to render decisions which can
be “beyond their pay-grade.” But a decision based on “consumer demand” is certainly not
applying da’at or Halacha.

This leads us to a related issue. Chumrot that cause one-upmanship, strife, and social discomfort
are likely being performed with a feeling of superiority. This takes us in the opposite direction of
the road that brings us closer to G-d. Why do some people need to broadcast their
own chumrot while constantly investigating those of their neighbors?

There are two motivations for serving G-d, to which the Rambam cited above is
referring: Yira’ah (fear) and ahavah (love). One can serve G-d out fear, afraid of the negative
consequences of violating His will and seeking to obtain personal benefits. Or one can serve G-d
motivated by pure love, with the simple desire to do the will of the Creator, thereby drawing closer
to him, rather than any personal benefit from this service. Fear is always inwardly directed, while
love is always outwardly directed.

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In Netivot Olam, Netiv Ahavat Hashem, at the end of Ch. 2, the Maharal quotes the Gemara in
Avoda Zara (19a) and the Mishna from Ch. 1 of Pirkei Avot “Don’t be like servants who serve in
order to get reward but be like servants who serve with no intention of getting reward.” Why are
we admonished not to serve with the intention of getting reward? Isn’t the natural motivation of
anyone who works for someone else to get some kind of benefit or compensation? Yes, says the
Maharal, this is the normal way of a service relationship between human beings. But one who
serves in order to get reward is not committed to truly serving another; rather he is doing work for
someone else in order to get a payoff for himself. This is legitimate when serving a human
“master” says the Maharal, because no human servant is created for the purpose of serving his
owner, and he has no inherent responsibility for service to any other person. Man, however, was
created for the purpose of serving G-d, and as such, his service should reflect pure service, being
performed for no other reason than a fulfilment of this intrinsic purpose (“avodah b’etzem” is the
language used by the Maharal). So the service, in order to conform with the concept of pure service,
should be with no intention of receiving any “payoff.”

This is true “avodah m’ahava,” service out of love. It emanates completely from within us and is
independent of anything outside of us. It is up to us, and depends on our attitude, as well as our
sense and recognition of responsibility. Love is built on the motivation to give, to share our
resources, to imitate the Almighty, as the purpose of our existence. This attitude manifests itself
in our marriages and interpersonal relationships as well. Being a loving person, committed to
giving and serving resides within each of us, and is independent of any individual recipient. True
giving starts by making oneself a loving, giving person. Then one can love others and will give to
them as a result of recognizing the giving as part of the proper service of G-d for one was created.

Should chumras emanate from the motivation of love or the motivation of fear? “What does it hurt
to be machmir” certainly sounds like it is motivated by fear, and if we are honest, we will find that
this is motivation for many of our chumras. This isn’t the way it should be.

As the culture of our community has moved in the direction of increased stringencies in the ritual
aspects of Halacha, it is time to step back and examine whether this move is being driven by our
instincts for spiritual inspiration – or by the true da’at Rav Wolbe writes is necessary for authentic
spiritual growth.13

13
Originally published on www.cross-currents.com

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 Anatomy of a Chumra Society
DORON BECKERMAN WRITES:14

I owe a large debt of gratitude to Rabbi Karlinsky. The Karlinskys were my Shadchanim some
twenty years ago, and it has worked out most satisfactorily. Consider that full disclosure preceding
my unvarnished praise for Rabbi Karlinsky’s well-written piece, which indeed needs to be read
and taken to heart as a necessary yardstick for judging when personal undertaking of chumros is
appropriate.

I believe, however, that a vital ingredient must be added to the equation. Not so much in
disagreement as to guidelines (though I do take some issue with Yiras Cheit being an unacceptable
motivation), but in its practical application. I begin with the following anecdote, recounted by R’
Yitzchak Yerucham Borodiansky – a son-in-law of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. One of the
boys in Kol Torah had a certain issue with his Tefillin. and he approached R’ Auerbach with it.
Rav Auerbach said: “Kosher Lechatchilah!” After a few moments, he added, “And it is proper to
be machmir.” The youth was rather astounded – If it is kosher lechatchilah, why be machmir!?
Rav Auerbach answered: “Someone who wishes to be a Gadol BaTorah should be machmir”
(Chiko Mamtakim, Vol. 1, pg. 163). Generally, during Rav Auerbach’s time there was certainly a

14
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sizeable group that one might call “Tzibbur Hamachmirim,” and Rav Auerbach would become
quite infuriated over catching any hint of disdain toward that community (ibid., pg. 162, note 46).

This outlook should underpin some of the discussion of this issue. It is beyond question that the
Yeshivish/Charedi society, in general, places great emphasis on striving for Torah greatness. Very
many of its members are, in fact, not only bnei aliyah, but bnei daas, who properly assess the
appropriateness of accepting a particular chumra, as well as situations in which it ought to be
waived for a greater good. It would be utterly wrong, in my view, to cast a jaundiced eye on those
who, for example, generally refrain from opening plastic bottle caps on Shabbos due to concern
for the view of Rav Elyashiv (and others) that this is a Biblical-level violation of the melachah of
mechateich, despite R’ Auerbach’s lenient position in this regard. There is sound halachic basis
for avoiding it even at the expense of having to drink water rather than the desired Sprite for the
Shabbos meals. Similar instances abound.

The problem, though, is twofold: (1) There are numerous matters other than Chumros that a person
striving for Torah greatness must undertake. Being machmir on certain things while being less
than meticulous about basic halachah in others, not to mention interpersonal relationships, creates
an unbalanced and unsightly character portrait. That is indeed indicative of the frumkeit (spiritual
instinct of kirvas Hashem run wild) that is the centrepiece of Rabbi Karlinsky’s essay. (2) Not all
those culturally or sociologically affiliated with Charedi society are actually on that page. They
are, in fact, not truly striving for Torah greatness. Nevertheless, as far as externalities go, one
cannot give the impression of not having such aspirations, so being lenient does not “look good.”
And so they follow along.

Let us examine one element of the “Disappearing Woman” subject with the above in mind:
publications featuring women’s pictures. I imagine myself putting together a newspaper for the
Gedolim and Tzaddikim in Eretz Yisrael. Many, if not all of them, would not look at a publication
featuring women’s pictures, head-shots or otherwise. Is this inappropriate for them? I submit –
not at all. R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was once approached by a group of Avreichim seeking
guidance in spiritual growth. Where to begin? Rav Auerbach responded – “What do you need
chumros for? There is no need for them. The main thing is to undertake to fulfill halachah in a
lechatchilah manner, not bedieved.” The Avreichim agreed but did not leave the matter at that.
They insisted on further meticulousness and growth. Rav Auerbach responded: “All the chumros
and hiddurim cannot compare to one small hiddur in tzenius. In matters of sanctity and tzenius,

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every small hiddur has immeasurable meaning. It elevates, sanctifies, and brings a person closer
to his Creator… A person who thirsts for spirituality, the core and the beginning are tzenius and
sanctity” (ibid., Vol. 2, pg. 121).

[I’m not going to get into an analysis of the halachic parameters of looking at women’s faces or
pictures, but I would direct the interested reader to look up Mishnah Berurah 75:7 regarding an
Adam Chashuv; Igros Moshe OC I:40 s.v. Al Kol Panim; and the Otzar Haposkim to Shulchan
Aruch Even Ha’ezer 21:1. Are there times or occupations that make it necessary to look at a
woman’s face? Probably. But it might not be inappropriate for many people in that situation to
privately say a fervent kapitel Tehillim before such interactions so as not be nichshal in crossing
the line into forbidden histaklus territory.]

Is there a sizeable group of true Bnei Torah who would not read such publications – for all the
right reasons? Unquestionably. Are some caught up in this for purposes of one-upmanship? Surely.
Are there some in the same cultural group who are far from such madreigos? Undoubtedly. Still,
if a publisher wishes to present his product as the go-to option for Bnei Torah, he will
understandably choose to omit women’s pictures.

What about the affront to women? First, let me say that in a society where women are offended by
having their pictures omitted, it is indeed the men’s burden to bear. Keep the pictures in. But in
many subsets of Charedi society – particularly among the tzaddikim – it is not only the tzenius of
the women that makes them apathetic or actually opposed to having their pictures in the papers,
but even the innate tzenius of the men makes them cringe at having their own pictures on public
display. (See also Teshuvos Divrei Malkiel, Vol.3, end of simman 58.) There is no apparent
interpersonal price to pay within that group (see below for a big caveat) – and the publications are
geared to them.

The key question each and every individual must ask himself is what his personal avodah in this
regard demands. Those suffering from frumkeit issues should honestly assess their spiritual
cravings. The culturally affiliated must ask themselves if they are in the right program, and what
they want to get out of life. And for those on the outside looking in – there is much to be done. See
an unfamiliar black-hat fellow engaged in a chumra? Judge him favourably (it’s a mitzvah!) – he
is likely as not doing so for all the right reasons. Notice a fellow who lacks balance in this regard?
Judge him favourably; you, too, may have acted out with deficient daas in spiritual or material

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matters. If, as the Baal Shem Tov says, noticing a fault in others is a reflection of similar problems
within oneself, ask – might I, too, be guilty of frumkeit?

Maybe even in reacting to all chumras as frumkeit? (It is quite good for the neshamah to be
machmir in judging favorably and in introspection.) Furthermore, here is a person acting out of an
instinct – albeit with a faulty navigation system – to grow close to Hashem. Am I utilizing that
same instinct properly? At all? Do I work on my kavanah in Tefillah? On improving the quality
and quantity of my Torah study. On myriad other areas that need improvement.

On a final note, I suspect some of the concern – consternation, actually – pertains to something
Rabbis Adlerstein and Karlinsky have in common. Since both are involved in kiruv, they are –
rightly so – exquisitely sensitive to others judging Judaism by its marketability. And as Rabbi
Adlerstein so eloquently noted, a machmir society is, to many on the outside (and some on the
inside), uninviting. What to do about that is both beyond the confines of this post and considerably
above my pay grade, but this likely stems from the conflicting views expressed by Rabbis Dessler
and Schwab long ago with regard to the intended product of the Charedi Yeshiva world. It seems
that the hachraah in Eretz Yisrael on such issues has come down on Rav Dessler’s side, with tacit
accommodative adjustments made out of plain view.

72
 CHUMRAH ON PESACH AND BEYOND A META-HALACHIC
ANALYSIS
Rabbi Manning writes:15

15
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75
76
77
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79
80
 WHEN RAV KOOK WAS THE KANA’I (ZEALOT) AND HIS
OPPONENT THE MELITS YOSHER (ADVOCATE)

When Rav Kook Was the Kana’i (Zealot) and His Opponent the Melits
Yosher (Advocate)[1]

Rav Bezalel Naor writes:16

In 1891, there appeared in Warsaw an anonymous work[2] entitled Hevesh Pe’er,[3] whose sole
objective was to clarify for the masses the proper place on the head to don the tefillah shel rosh or
head-phylactery. According to halakhah, the tefillah must be placed no lower than the hairline and
no higher than the soft spot on a baby’s head (i.e. the anterior fontanelle).[4] In ancient times, there
were sectarian Jews who deliberately placed the tefillah on the forehead, as attested to by the
Mishnah: “If one placed it [i.e. the tefillah] on his forehead, or on his hand, this is the way of
sectarianism (minut).”[5] These Jews interpreted literally the verse, “You shall bind them for a
sign upon your hand, and they shall be for frontlets between your eyes.”[6] Adherents to Rabbinic
Judaism are punctilious about placing the hand-phylactery on the biceps of the forearm opposite
the heart,[7] and the head-phylactery above the hairline. East European Jews who placed their
phylacteries on the forehead did so not out of conviction, as the Sadducees of old, but rather out
of sheer ignorance of the law. The slim book (all of 24 leaves or 48 pages) was thus an elaborate
educational vehicle to educate the masses how to properly observe the law.[8]

According to the approbation to Hevesh Pe’er by Rabbi Elijah David Rabinowitz-Te’omim

(ADeReT) of Ponevezh, the book was published [but not authored] by his former son-in-law
(presently his brother’s son-in-law), Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook of Zeimel.[9]

Wares in hand, the young rabbi of Zeimel (aged twenty-six) assumed the role of an itinerant
bookseller, travelling from town to town in Lithuania. Wherever he went, he preached concerning
the importance of fulfilling the commandment of tefillin. Historically, there was precedent for a
rabbi promoting that specific mitsvah. In the thirteenth century, Rabbi Jacob of Coucy (author

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of Sefer Mitsvot Gadol or SeMaG), circulating in the communities of France and Spain, was able
to turn the tide and convince Jews, hitherto lax in their observance of the commandment, to
don tefillin.[10] As for an author posing as an itinerant bookseller, Rav Kook’s older
contemporary, Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan of Radin, had done exactly that, thus earning himself the
sobriquet Hafets Hayyim, after the book by that name that he peddled. (Hafets Hayyim tackles the
problem, halakhic and otherwise, of malicious gossip.)

It is recorded that Rav Kook’s sermons had such a positive influence upon his audience that the
Rebbe of Slonim, Rabbi Shmuel Weinberg, offered to support him if he would devote himself
fulltime to acting as a maggid or peripatetic preacher.[11]

One would never have imagined that this halakhic work would meet with any rabbinic
opposition.[12] The point it makes that wearing the head-phylactery below the hairline on the
forehead invalidates the performance of the commandment, seems rather clear-cut in the sources.
(In fact, but a few years earlier, in 1884, Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan in his work Mishnah
Berurah had advised wearing the phylactery higher on the head, at a remove from the hairline, just
to be on the safe side.)[13]

However, five years later, Rabbi Ze’ev Wolf Turbowitz of Kraz (Lithuanian, Kražiai; Yiddish,
Krozh)[14] devoted the very first of his collected responsa to pummeling the anonymous
work Hevesh Pe’er.[15] Rabbi Turbowitz prefaces his remarks by saying: “The intention of this
author [i.e. the author of Hevesh Pe’er] is for [the sake of] heaven, but nonetheless he has spoken
shabbily of the people of the Lord. May the Lord forgive him. For Israel, ‘if they are not prophets,
they are the children of prophets.’”[16] Rabbi Turbowitz goes on to argue that the commandment
is invalidated only if the majority of the phylactery is placed below the hairline. If, on the other
hand, the majority is situated above the hairline and only a minority below, then the halakhic
principle of “rubo ke-khulo” (“the majority as the whole”) applies, and the commandment is
fulfilled.[17] One of the rabbi’s supposed proofs is that one must recite the blessing once again
only in a case where the entire phylactery or the majority thereof has slipped down, but if only a
minority of the phylactery has been displaced, with the majority still within the prescribed area,
one does not recite another blessing upon readjusting the phylactery.[18]

82
Rav Kook (now outed as the author of Hevesh Pe’er) responded to the onslaught of Tif’eret Ziv.
His lengthy rejoinder, entitled “Kelil Tif’eret,” appeared in the periodical Torah mi-
Zion (Jerusalem, 1900).

Rav Kook dismantles Rabbi Turbowitz’s supposed proof from the fact that another blessing is
unwarranted as long as the majority of the phylactery is still in its proper place. Rav Kook reasons
that we must distinguish between the essential commandment (“‘etsem ha-mitsvah”) and the
action of the commandment (“ma‘aseh ha-mitsvah”). The fact that one does not recite an
additional blessing does not necessarily mean that the commandment (“‘etsem ha-mitsvah”) is
still being fulfilled. What it does imply, is that the action of the commandment (“ma‘aseh ha-
mitsvah”) is ongoing. The blessing addresses renewed action (“ma‘aseh ha-mitsvah”). In a case
where only a minority of the phylactery has been displaced, the action required to readjust it does
not warrant a blessing. “And the Turei Zahav[19] holds that since in the entire Torah, ‘rubo ke-
khulo,’[20] once most of the action has been nullified, the action as a whole is nullified, but if most
of the action remains, even though the commandment has been nullified, still the action
exists…”[21]

As is typical for Rav Kook, he signs himself, “Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook, servant to the
servants of the Lord…Bausk.”[22]

Evidently, Rabbi Turbowitz was not one to take something lying down. He came back at Rav Kook
with a stinging reply, integrated into Ziv Mishneh, his commentary to Maimonides’ Mishneh
Torah.[23] There, in Hilkhot Tefillin (4:1), he maintains that since “rubo ke-khulo is a universal
principle in the entire Torah”[24]—this applies to tefillin as well. He reiterates once again his proof
from the TaZ, who ruled that the blessing is recited once again only in a scenario where
the tefillin are totally displaced. He mentions the opinion of “one wise man” (“hakham
ehad”) who wrote that even the slightest deviation disqualifies the mitsvah and disagrees.
According to Rabbi Turbowitz, lekhathilah (to begin with), the entire phylactery should be above
the hairline with none of it extending down to the forehead, but be-di‘avad (ex post facto), if a
minority of the phylactery is below the hairline, one has nonetheless fulfilled the commandment.
And therefore, the anonymous sage was wrong to badmouth the masses, who are remiss in this
respect, and their spiritual leaders, who look the other way and do not protest. “He spoke shabbily

83
of the people of the Lord and will in the future be called to judgment!” After summing up rather
concisely the position he took earlier in Tif’eret Ziv, Rabbi Turbowitz now lambastes Rav Kook
for what he wrote in Torah mi-Zion (Jerusalem, 1900), no. 4, chap. 4, accusing Rav Kook of
deliberately misquoting him.

In 1925, two disciples of Rav Kook, Rabbi Yitshak Arieli[25] and Rabbi Uri Segal
Hamburger,[26] reissued Hevesh Pe’er in Jerusalem with Rav Kook’s permission.[27] Appended
to the work was Rav Kook’s rebuttal “Kelil Tif’eret.” (In addition, this edition was graced by the
comments of Rav Kook’s deceased father-in-law, ADeReT, and of Rav Kook’s admirers in
Jerusalem: Rabbis Tsevi Pesah Frank, Ya‘akov Moshe Harlap, and Yehiel Mikhel Tukachinsky.
Finally, there are the substantial “Comments upon Comments” [“He‘arot le-He‘arot”] of the
editor, Rabbi Yitshak Arieli.)[28]

In 1939, Rabbi Yosef Avigdor Kesler of Rockaway (Arverne to be precise)[29] published a second
collection of his deceased father-in-law, Rabbi Ze’ev Turbowitz’s numerous responsa. Whereas
the first collection of Tif’eret Ziv covered only Orah Hayyim, this collection covered all four
sections of Shulhan ‘Arukh.[30] In addition, it contained a supplement (Kuntres Aharon)
entitled “Mele’im Ziv.” In the supplement, Rabbi Kesler published a letter from ADeReT to Rabbi
Turbowitz that turned up in the latter’s papers.

ADeReT’s letter is datelined “Monday, Vayyetse, 5657 [i.e. 1896].” In the letter, ADeReT
gratefully acknowledges receipt of the recently published book Tif’eret Ziv. Regretting that he is
unable to send monetary payment for the book because he is presently inundated with works of
various authors, ADeReT nonetheless wishes to at least offer some comment on the contents of
the book.[31]

Referring to the very first responsum in Tif’eret Ziv, ADeReT rejoices that Rabbi Turbowitz sought
to advocate on behalf of the Jewish People regarding the commandment of tefillin. He is especially
overjoyed that Rabbi Turbowicz was not cowed but dared to differ. ADeReT holds up as role
models Rabbi Zerahyah Halevi (Ba‘al ha-Ma’or) who critiqued Rabbi Isaac Alfasi (Rif), only to
be attacked himself by Rabad of Posquières; Rabad of Posquières who critiqued Maimonides; et
al. Since this is the “way of Torah” (darkah shel Torah), why should he harbor any resentment

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toward Rabbi Turbowitz for disagreeing with him?[32] (ADeReT, though not the author of Hevesh
Pe’er, had wholeheartedly endorsed it.)

The sterling character of ADeReT is best summed up in these lines:

In this vein of truth-seeking, ADeReT proceeds to explain why the argument presented in Tif’eret
Ziv failed to dissuade him from the position adopted both by him and the author of Hevesh Pe’er.
Since the shi’ur or measurement of the area on the head where the phylactery is to be placed
is Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai (a law to Moses from Sinai), the principle of “rubo ke-kulo” is of
no consequence in this regard.[35]

Realizing the historic importance of the contents of the letter, Rabbi Kesler provided a photograph
of the crucial passage in the letter, which reads as follows:

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ADeReT explains that if we show any leniency, it will prove a slippery slope. He reveals to Rabbi
Turbowitz his unusual experience with Hasidim in particular: “From this, there came about in
places where the Hasidim reside [the custom] to wear large tefillin.[37] Not one in a thousand
bears most of the tefillah within the hairline. In most cases, but a small fraction (mi‘uta de-mi‘uta)
[is within the hairline].

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I have seen with my own eyes the entirety upon the forehead. They laughed at my rebuke, saying:
‘Thus is the mitsvah.’ ‘So we saw our fathers doing.’ etc. etc.”[38]

The letter concludes with this salutation:

[1] These are the exact words of Rabbi Joseph Avigdor Kesler in the introduction to his father-in-law Rabbi Ze’ev Wolf Turbowitz’s

work of responsa, Tif’eret Ziv (Brooklyn: Moinester Publishing Company, 1939), p. 7, par. 5.

By the time of his passing in 1935, Rav Kook would be immortalized as a twentieth-century Rabbi Levi Isaac of Berdichev, the

great advocate of the Jewish People, forever defending their practices in the heavenly tribunal. Today, Rav Kook is famous for his

leniency concerning the Shemitah or Sabbatical year, the heter mekhirah, which allows sale of the land to a non-Jew for the

duration, whereby agriculture, or at least some forms thereof, may take place. The model for this contract is the prevalent mekhirat

hamets or sale of leaven to a non-Jew before Passover, so that it need not be removed from the home of the Jew.

However, in general, if one studies the teshuvot (responsa) of Rav Kook, he does not come across as extraordinarily lenient in

his pesakim or halakhic decisions. Par contre, someone whose work is chock-full of startling leniencies is Rabbi Aryeh Tsevi

Fromer of Kozhiglov (1884-1943), Rosh Yeshivah of Yeshivat Hakhmei Lublin and a disciple of Rabbi Abraham Bornstein (author

of responsa Avnei Nezer). Rabbi Fromer designed his work of responsa, Erets Tsevi (Lublin, 1938), to be melamed zekhut, to find

some halakhic justification (however farfetched) for certain otherwise anomalous practices within the Jewish community. This is

apparent from the very first responsum, where the author attempts to justify the prevalent practice of wearing a tallit katan that

fails to meet the prescribed shi‘ur or measurement.

[2] The title page credits as author: “KDY (Kohen Da‘ato Yafah).” The expression “kohen she-da‘ato yafah” comes out of the

Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah 2:5. Thus, the title alludes to the author being a Kohen or member of the priestly caste.

87
The thought occurs to this writer (BN) that “Yafah” might be an allusion to Rav Kook’s descent from Rabbi Mordechai Yaffe

(author of the Levush[im]). Rav Kook was immensely proud of his pedigree which reached back to the Levush. The pedigree to

the Levush was something that Rav Kook had in common with his father-in-law ADeReT. In the letter written by Rav Kook’s

paternal great-uncle, Rabbi Mordechai Gimpel Yaffe of Rozhinoy, to the Trisker Maggid, Rabbi Abraham Twersky, Rabbi Yaffe

mentions their remote common ancestor, the Levush.

[3] The title is taken from the verse in Ezekiel 24:17: “Pe’erkha havosh ‘alekha” (“Bind your head-tire upon you”). The Rabbis

interpreted the head-tire as a reference to the head-tefillah; see b. Mo‘ed Katan 15a.

[4] y. ‘Eruvin 10:1; b. Menahot 37a; Maimonides, MT, Hil. Tefillin 4:1; Rabbi Joseph Karo, Shulhan ‘Arukh, Orah Hayyim 27:9.

[5] m. Megillah 4:8.

[6] Deuteronomy 6:8.

[7] Shulhan ‘Arukh, Orah Hayyim 27:1.

[8] In Hevesh Pe’er, chap. 2, the author points out that there already appeared in print a small booklet with diagrams, “Tikkun

‘Olam ‘im tsiyurim,” but writes that the error persists depite that.

[9] Rav Kook’s first wife, Alta Batsheva, daughter of ADeReT, died at a young age, leaving him to raise their infant daughter,

Freida Hannah. ADeReT suggested to Rav Kook that he marry Reiza Rivkah, ADeReT’s niece, daughter of his deceased twin

brother, Tsevi Yehudah, Rabbi of Ragola. ADeReT had raised Reiza Rivkah in his home after her father’s death.

[10] Rabbi Jacob of Coucy, Sefer Mitsvot Gadol, positive commandment 3; Hevesh Pe’er, chap. 2. At the end of positive

commandment 3, Rabbi Jacob gives the exact year of his campaign in Spain: 4996 anno mundi or 1236 C.E.

Urbach writes that this role of the itinerant preacher, or darshan, is without precedent among the French Tosafists; he conjectures

that in this respect, Rabbi Moses of Coucy came under the influence of Hasidei Ashkenaz. See E.E. Urbach, Ba‘alei ha-

Tosafot (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1995), pp. 466-470. Concerning specifically French Jewry’s laxity when it came to observing

the commandment of tefillin, see ibid. p. 469, n. 13 (citing Tosafot, Shabbat 49a, s.v. ke-Elisha Ba‘al Kenafayim, and Rosh

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Hashanah 17a, s.v. karkafta de-lo manah tefillin). The SeMaG refutes Rabbenu Tam’s understanding of “karkafta de-lo manah

tefillin.”

[11] Rabbi Ya‘akov Moshe Harlap, quoted in Rabbi Moshe Tsevi Neriyah, Sihot ha-Rayah (Tel-Aviv, 1979), p. 191, and idem, Tal

ha-Re’iyah (Tel-Aviv, 1993), p. 116. According to Rabbi Harlap, the Slonimer Rebbe reached out to ADeReT, hoping that he could

prevail upon his former son-in-law (and present nephew by marriage) to accept this magnaminous offer.

[12] Rav Kook’s erstwhile mentor in the Volozhin Yeshivah, Rabbi Naphtali Tsevi Yehudah Berlin (NeTsIV), was so enamored

of Hevesh Pe’er that he kept it in his tallit bag. See the Introduction of Rabbis Yitshak Arieli and Rabbi Uri Segal Hamburger to

the Jerusalem 1925 edition of Hevesh Pe’er, p. 2.

[13] See Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan, Mishnah Berurah (Warsaw, 1884) to OH 27:9. In the Be’ur Halakhah, Rabbi Kagan sought

support for this prescription in the manuscript glosses of “the Gaon Rabbi El‘azar Harlap” to Ma‘aseh Rav (a collection of the

practices of the Vilna Gaon). If I am not mistaken, these notes would have been penned by the Gaon (and Mekubal) Rabbi Ephraim

Eliezer Tsevi Harlap of Mezritch.

[14] Rabbi Ze’ev Wolf Turbowitz was born Rosh Hodesh Iyar, 1840 in Baboina near Kletsk and was known in his youth as

the “Ilui of Baboina.” His first wife was from Izilian. After his marriage, he devoted himself exclusively to study of Torah, whereby

he was then known as the “Porush of Izilian.” At a tender age he began to study Kabbalah. (Among his writings was found a work

on Zohar.) In 1863, he was appointed as a rosh metivta in Minsk. In 1866, he received his first rabbinical position in Swislowitz.

In 1875, he assumed the rabbinate of Kletsk. Afterward, he served a stint in Wolpa. And finally in 1889, he was elected rabbi of

Kraz, where he served until his death on the 14th of Kislev, 5682 [i.e. 1921]. These biographical details were gleaned from his son-

in-law Rabbi Yosef Kesler’s introduction to the Brooklyn 1939 edition of Tif’eret Ziv, p. 4.

Rabbi Eitam Henkin hy”d wrote of the interface between Rabbi Turbowitz and Rabbi Eliyahu Goldberg, mentor of Rabbi Yehiel

Mikhel Epstein (author of ‘Arukh ha-Shulhan). Besides corresponding with Rabbi Goldberg in halakhic matters, Rabbi Turbowitz

delivered a moving hesped (eulogy) for Rabbi Goldberg in 1875 in the town of Kletsk, Rabbi Goldberg’s birthplace. See Rabbi

Eitam Henkin, Ta‘arokh Lefanai Shulhan (Israel: Maggid, 2018), pp. 359-360, 363.

[15] See Rabbi Ze’ev Wolf Turbowitz, Tif‘eret Ziv (Warsaw, 1896), no. 1. Ziv is an acronym for Ze’ev Yekhuneh Volf.

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The responsum is datelined “Wednesday, 16 Tamuz, 5651 [1891],” which means that it was penned the same year that Hevesh

Pe’er was published. Rabbi Turbowitz does not mention the book by name, referring to it as “a new book that has appeared” (“sefer

ehad hadash she-yatsa la-’or”).

By the same token, in responsum 12 of Tif’eret Ziv, where Rabbi Turbowitz engages with another early work of Rav Kook (in fact,

his first), ‘Ittur Soferim, he refers to that work obliquely as “sefer ehad katan” (“a small book”). Rabbi Abraham Joshua of Pokroi

had raised the question whether one who becomes bar mitsvah at night must recite once again the blessing for studying Torah

(birkat ha-Torah), though he already recited it that morning. The editor, Rav Kook, devoted a few pages to resolving this problem.

See ‘Ittur Soferim, Part Two (Vilna, 1888), 9a-10b. Rabbi Turbowitz made short shrift of the question. At the same time, he tackled

the Vilna dayan, Rabbi Shelomo Hakohen, who had also raised the question in his work, Binyan Shelomo. In the Brooklyn 1939

edition of Tif’eret Ziv, the first two responsa are to Rabbi Shelomo Hakohen, who had defended his position to Rabbi Turbowitz.

According to Rabbi Turbowitz’s son-in-law, Rabbi Yosef Avigdor Kesler, the famous “Gadol of Minsk” (i.e. Rabbi Yeruham

Yehudah Perlman) read Rabbi Turbowitz’s responsum concerning the placement of the head-phylactery before it went to print and

approved its contents. See the supplement to the Brooklyn 1939 edition of Tif’eret Ziv, Kuntres Aharon, “Mele’im Ziv,” 2d-3a,

footnote.

[16] Tif’eret Ziv, 6a. The quote is from b. Pesahim 66b: “Leave Israel alone! If they are not prophets, they are the children of

prophets.” Rabbi Turbowitz’s remark is quoted in Yehudah Mirsky, Rav Kook: Mystic in a Time of Revolution (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2014), p. 23.

[17] Tif’eret Ziv 1:3 (6c).

[18] Tif’eret Ziv 1:16-21 (8c-9b). See Rabbi David Halevi (TaZ), Magen David to OH 8:15; cited in Mishnah

Berurah to OH 25:12.

[19] See previous note.

[20] It may strike the reader as ironic that Rav Kook introduced at this point in the discussion the concept of rubo ke-khulo when

he had earlier rejected its application. But from Rav Kook’s standpoint (and that of his father-in-law Aderet, see below note 35),

that principle simply could not be applied to the area of the phylactery with its precise dimensions. “Shi‘urim halakhah le-Moshe

mi-Sinai,” “Measurements are a law to Moses from Sinai” (y. Pe’ah 1:1, Hagigah 1:2; b. ‘Eruvin 4a, Yoma 80a, Sukkah 5b).

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[21] Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook, “Kelil Tif’eret” in Hevesh Pe’er, ed. Rabbis Y. Arieli and Uri Segal-Hamburger

(Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1985), p. 46. Of course, the element of hesah ha-da‘at, i.e. whether one has “removed one’s

awareness,” plays a crucial part in determining whether one must recite the blessing on the tefillin once again. See ibid.

Rav Kook’s hiluk (differentiation) between “‘etsem ha-mitsvah” and “ma‘aseh ha-mitsvah” (especially the terminology) is

somewhat remarkable, issuing as it did from the pen of Rav Kook, who studiously avoided the school of Hasbarah with its abstract

constructs and neologisms, then in vogue in the Lithuanian yeshivah world. The most famous proponent of Hasbarah was Rabbi

Hayyim Soloveitchik (who would one day inherit his father Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik’s rabbinate in Brisk, whereupon he

would be known as “Reb Hayyim Brisker”). The latter’s methodology of Talmudic analysis came to be known as the “Brisker

derekh [ha-limud],” “the Brisker way.”

Rav Kook’s biographers have duly noted that his first mentor back in Dvinsk (since Rav Kook’s bar mitsvah), Rabbi Reuven Halevi

Levin (known as “Reb Ruvaleh Denaburger”) had, so to speak, “immunized” Rav Kook against the trend of “sevarot” or

newfangled “concepts.” Rabbi Reuven Levin was highly suspicious of sevarot that had not been enuciated already by the rishonim,

the medieval authorities. (See Rabbi Kesler’s introduction to Tiferet Ziv, Brooklyn 1939, p. 8, par. 9, quoting Rabbi Reuven Levin,

and ibid. sec. Hoshen Mishpat, responsum 46:6 [116c]: “It is not my way to say sevarot of my own cognizance.”)

And thus, when later Avraham Yitshak Kook arrived at Volozhin, “the mother of yeshivot,” he gravitated to the elder Rosh

Yeshivah, Rabbi Naphtali Tsevi Yehudah Berlin (NeTsIV), known as a pashtan, a champion of the simple understanding of the

text, rather than to his grandson-in-law, Rabbi Hayyim Soloveitchik, who was surrounded by budding scholars attracted to the

exciting new method of Talmudic analysis that he was developing.

Although Rav Kook was never so outspoken as Ridbaz Wilovsky (“Reb Yankel Dovid Slutsker”) who satirized the new method as

“chemistry,” Rav Kook was clearly on the other side of the great divide between Lithuanian Talmudists. This aversion of Rav Kook

to the method of “hasbarah” was given eloquent testimony in recently unearthed correspondence concerning the unsuccessful

attempt of Rabbi Shim‘on Shkop (a rosh yeshivah in Telz and later head of his own yeshivah in Grodna) to be accepted as Rosh

Yeshivah of Merkaz Harav in Jerusalem. Speaking in Rav Kook’s name, his devoted disciple Rabbi Ya‘akov Moshe Harlap

conveyed to Rabbi Hizkiyahu Yosef Mishkovski of Krinik (who had interceded on Rabbi Shim‘on Shkop’s behalf) the following

laconic response:

Regarding the proposal concerning the Gaon Rabbi Shim‘on Shkop, may he live, to accept him as Rosh Yeshivah of Merkaz Harav,

there is certainly nothing to discuss, for since the founding of the Yeshivah, this position is reserved for Maran [our master, i.e. Rav

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Kook], may he live, who plans to fill it himself. For Maran, may he live, wishes—and this is a strong desire—that the main method

of learning of the Yeshivah be according to the order and method of the Gra [i.e. the Gaon Rabbi Elijah of Vilna], of blessed

memory. Though he [i.e. Rav Kook] knows and feels also the great necessity of developing the methods

of “hasbarot” (conceptualizations) and “havanot hegyoniyot” (logical understandings), he wants the main spirit of the Yeshivah to

be based on his method, etc. Today I showed Maran, may he live, his honor’s letter, and what I wrote here is his response.

Rabbi Harlap’s letter is datelined “Monday, 2nd day of Rosh Hodesh Adar, 5686 [i.e. 1926], Jerusalem.” It was published in

a Festschrift for his grandson, Rabbi Zevulun Charlop, Zeved Tov, ed. Ari S. Zahtz (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2008),

p. 103.

Inter alia, “Z. Wein” mentioned in the letter from Rabbi Shkop to Rabbi Tobolsky, expressing his desire to settle in the Holy Land

(ibid. p. 101), is none other than [Rabbi] Ze’ev Wein a”h, father of Rabbi Berel Wein shelit”a. Rabbi Ze’ev Wein (1906-2004), a

disciple of Rabbi Shkop, went on to study in Rav Kook’s Merkaz Harav in Jerusalem. He served for many years as a distinguished

rabbi in Chicago.

Rabbi Shim‘on Shkop was famous for his method of “higayon” (logic), displayed in his magnum opus, Sha‘arei Yosher. (Rabbi

Hershel Shachter shelit”a revealed to this writer [BN] that his father-in-law, Rabbi Yeshayah Shapiro, a rosh yeshivah at Torah

Vodaath in Brooklyn, was instrumental in writing that work.)

This is not the place to discuss in any depth the differences between Rabbi Shim’on Shkop’s method and that of Rabbi Hayyim

Brisker and his heirs. Two anecdotes should suffice. The Briskers quipped that Rabbi Shim‘on “had looked at the world and created

the Torah” (“Istakel be-‘alma u-vara ’oraita”), a reversal of the Zohar’s adage, “[God] looked at the Torah and created the world”

(“istakel be-’oraita u-vara ‘alma”). On one occasion, Rabbi Yitshak Ze’ev Soloveitchik (“Reb Velvel,” known as the “Brisker

Rov,” for he inherited from his father Rabbi Hayyim the rabbinate of Brisk) met Rabbi Shim‘on Shkop and told him: “I removed

from your student Rabbi Leib Malin the last sinew (gid) left from your teaching.” (The imagery is that of deveining or nikkur. Reb

Velvel used the Yiddish verb, “treiberen.”) Both anecdotes were heard from Rabbi Shelomo Fisher shelit”a of Jerusalem.

[22] In 1895, Rav Kook left the town of Zeimel for the large city of Bausk, Latvia.

[23] Rabbi Ze’ev Wolf Turbowitz, Ziv Mishneh (Warsaw, 1904). The author has the rather unique distinction of viewing

Maimonides as a kabbalist and finding kabalistic “sources” for his rulings. (Similarly, the introduction to the Warsaw 1896 edition

of Tif’eret Ziv demonstrates the author’s proficiency in Lurianic kabbalah.) Though not unique in this respect, Rabbi Turbowitz is

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perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this peculiar methodology of studying Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. Another

Maimonidean commentator who occasionally resorts to this method of sourcing is Rabbi Joseph Rosen (the Rogatchover Gaon).

See his Tsafnat Pa‘neah, Hil. ‘Avodah Zarah 12:6. Nowadays, Rabbi Hayyim Kanievsky’s Kiryat Melekh is replete with references

to Zohar.

[24] b. Horayot 3b; and Rashi, Zevahim 26a, s.v. hikhnis rosho ve-rubo. Both are referenced by Rabbi Turbowitz.

[25] Rabbi Yitshak Arieli was one of the founders of Yeshivat Merkaz Harav and acted in the official capacity of “Mashgiah” of

the Yeshivah. He is most famous for his work on the Talmud, ‘Eynayim le-Mishpat. Recently, Aharon Ilan, a great-grandson of

Rabbi Yitshak Arieli, brought out his biography, ‘Eynei Yitshak (Jerusalem, 2018).

[26] Rabbi Uri Segal Hamburger was a descendant of Rabbi Moshe Yehudah Segal Hamburger of Novemeste (a disciple of

the Hatam Sofer) who came to Erets Yisrael in 1857. Rabbi Uri Segal Hamburger resided in the Old City of Jerusalem until its

conquest by the Jordanians in 1948. He penned a memoir of that tragic event, “Be-Tseiti mi-Yerushalayim.” One may find a short

biography and a photograph of Rabbi Hamburger in ‘Eynei Yitshak, pp. 136-137.

[27] Rav Kook’s biographer and disciple, Rabbi Moshe Tsevi Neriyah, records that Rav Kook wrote in his haskamah (letter of

approbation) to the publishers the following disclaimer: “In our holy land, which thank God, is full of Torah and fear of heaven,

the admonition (azharah) is not so necessary. Nevertheless, I have not prevented re-issuing the book, for the benefit of our brothers

in the diaspora, in areas where the matter is yet in need of correction” (Sihot ha-Rayah, pp. 189-190). This disclaimer does not

appear in the printed version of the haskamah. Where did Rabbi Neriyah obtain it? The mystery was cleared up in the new edition

of Sihot ha-Rayah (2015) published after Rabbi Neriyah’s passing. Rabbi Arieli’s son, Prof. Nahum Arieli, wrote to Rabbi Neriyah

that he has in his possession much material that went into the making of the Jerusalem edition of Hevesh Pe’er edited by his father,

including a “petek” (note) with those exact words. Rabbi Neriyah’s daughter, Tsilah Bar-Eli, granted Aharon Ilan permission to

include a facsimile of Nahum Arieli’s letter to her father (on stationery of Bar-Ilan University) in the biography of Rabbi

Arieli, ‘Eynei Yitshak, p. 139.

[28] Rabbi Arieli’s promised “Kuntres Aharon” was never published. Remnants of the manuscript are in the possession of his

heirs. Rabbi Neriyah speculated that financial considerations prevented its publication in Hevesh Pe’er. See ‘Eynei Yitshak, p. 138,

n. 102.

[29] On the inside of the book, Rabbi J. Kesler’s address is given as: “146 Beach 74th Street, A[r]verne, Long Island.”

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[30] It is important to note that the two collections do not overlap. The responsa on Orah Hayyim that appeared in the Warsaw

1896 edition of Tif’eret Ziv, were not included in the Brooklyn 1939 edition. In their stead, appear more recent responsa on Orah

Hayyim. In terms of sheer quantity, the second collection by far outstrips the first. The first Warsaw edition has 122 pages; the

second Brooklyn edition, 488 pages.

[31] “Mele’im Ziv,” 2a-b.

[32] “Mele’im Ziv,” 2b-2c.

[33] “Mele’im Ziv,” 2d.

[34] “Mele’im Ziv,” 3a.

[35] “Mele’im Ziv,” 3a-b.

[36] The facsimile occurs in Rabbi Kesler’s introduction to the book on p. 7. It is transcribed in “Mele’im Ziv,” 3b.

If not for the evidence of the facsimile, it would indeed be difficult to accept that Rav Kook once entertained even the remote

possibility of invoking the principle of rubo ke-khulo in this regard.

[37] To this day, Lubavitcher Hasidim wear very large tefillin.

[38] “Mele’im Ziv,” 3b-c.

[39] “Mele’im Ziv,” 3d.

In 1893, ADeReT left the community of Ponevezh to assume the rabbinate of Mir.

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 When Chumra Leads to a Chilul HaShem

Harry Maryles writes:17

One of the ideals of the Charedi Hashkafa is ‘being Choshesh for the Daas HaMachmir’ (stringent
view). In essence this explains their identity as Charedim being Chareid L’Dvar HaShem. People
that adhere to this Hashkafa. They ‘tremble’ at the word of God seeking to live their lives in ways
that will best fulfill His will. They want to get it right!

This is of course something we should all strive to do. Charedim have the distinct characteristic of
making sure that as much as possible - the most stringent interpretation of Halacha should be
followed when there is disagreement between Poskim.

Centrists obviously agree with following the will of God. But will often rely on the Daas HaMekil
(lenient view). Meaning that when a legitimate Posek permits something that another Posek
forbids, they will often rely on it. The best example I can think of at the moment is Chalav Yisroel.

To briefly explain this Halacha, there is a rabbinic decree that Jews only buy milk produced by an
observant Jew. The reason stated in the Gemarah is that we are afraid that milk from a non-Kosher
animal might be added to cow’s milk without informing the consumer.

In perhaps one of the most famous Teshuvos (responsa) ever written by R’ Moshe Feinstein he
permitted buying milk for dairy companies in America because of the FDA’s strict supervision
that prohibits dairy companies from mixing cow’s milk with milk from any other source. R’ Moshe

17
http://haemtza.blogspot.com/2018/06/when-chumra-leads-to-chilul-hashem.html

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held that this is tantamount to Jewish supervision and permitted buying milk from non-Jewish
dairy companies. Other Poskim disagreed with R’ Moshe and still forbade it.

Most Centrists rely on R’Moshe’s heter (permit). Most of the Charedi world does not and buys
only Chalav Yisroel - milk that is produced by observant Jews (or under a Jew’s supervison while
the cow is being milked). This is a bit of an oversimplification but pretty much describes one of
the main differences between Charedim and other observant Jews.

I am not here to disparage those who choose to be Machmir on Chalav Yisroel. They want to be
sure that they observe this Halacha even according to those that are Machmir – since they might
be right. There is certainly nothing wrong with that. No matter what Halacha we are talking about.
Unless it inconveniences others. When that happens your Chumra can end up as a Chilul
HaShem.

It is one thing to insist on not violating clear Halacha that no one disputes. Then we must stand up
for our principles and fight for them if necessary. Fighting for a Chumra is not such a circumstance.

I mention this in light of a continual Chilul HaShem on the part of some of the more extreme
segments of the Charedi world – usually done by the more extreme Chasidic sects. One that just
happened recently again on an El Al flight. Described by both Arutz Sheva and Ynet:

The planned takeoff time: Six in the evening. Everyone boards, sits down, waits. Then the
commotion starts. Four Haredim who boarded the flight refuse to sit next to women…
(O)ne of the Haredi men, "particularly zealot and ascetic, boarded the plane with his eyes shut
tight, led by the hand by his friend, and remained that way throughout the entire flight."

The Haredim were unwilling to speak with—or look at—the female flight attendants. All of the
men on the flight crew, apart from the captain, were now focused solely on this, instead of
preparing for takeoff and serving the passengers…

And then a prolonged diplomatic process began of moving female passengers from their seats to
clear a row of seats for the four Haredim.

"After a lot of twists and turns, shouting and maneuvering, two women (one American around 70
years old and the other a young Israeli woman) agreed—because of time constraints among other
things—to switch seats, and the crisis was resolved."

At the end of the ordeal, "the flight crew, which ran up and down the aisles for over an hour,
appeared exhausted even before takeoff, though I assume they're used to such scenes."

He also noted that "for there to be no doubt: The women were not upgraded to better seats, only
moved to different seats in economy. Not that it's relevant to the principle of the matter, of course."

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According to the passenger, other religious Jews aboard the plane "expressed surprise and disgust
at the Haredim's behavior."

The scene caused by the Haredi passengers delayed the flight by an hour and 15 minutes.

I understand the concern of a religious Jew not wanting to sit next to a woman on a long flight.
The fear is that there will be inadvertent physical contact. As well as the fear that sitting next to a
woman might cause ‘impure thoughts. Especially men from a community that goes out of its way
to separate the sexes in the extreme. I don’t see anything wrong with their having those kinds of
fears. For them, it is a real issue. Besides, it’s always a good idea to avoid situations that tempt
people to sin if possible. But not at the expense of others.

If they want to avoid any contact with women in their own communities, that’s fine with me – as
long as they don’t force their views on anyone else. But when outside of their community – all
bets are off. By insisting on their standards at the expense of everyone else, they have caused the
observant world great harm, Which is why I am in complete sympathy with the religious Jews on
board that were disgusted by this. Because I am too.

People like this who close their eyes when passing a woman in the street should not be flying
commercial airlines – unless they agree to be civilized. Which these four Charedi men and all those
others who in did this in the past - are not!

It is OK for them to ask if they can switch to a seat that is not not to a woman. If such a seat exists
and is available to them, God bells them. Give it to them.

But to do what these four ‘gentleman’ did is inexcusable’ in the extreme and created a huge Chilul
HaShem. It is not good enough for the rest of us to say that these people do not represent us. That
may be true. But that may be a distinction most non-Jews or nonobservant Jews is lost upon. What
it says is that the more observant one is, the more he is likely to behave like this. This chases people
away from observant Judaism. Who in their right mind wants to part of a religion whose most
observant segment behaves this way?

Observant Jews who do this kind of thing must be ignorant of the Poskim that permit sitting next
to a woman – which include the abovementioned R’ Moshe Feinstein. Perhaps they believe that
sitting next to woman is comparable to violating Shabbos or eating Treif! They may not even
realize that sitting next to a woman on a flight is not forbidden according to the strict letter of the
law.

Either that or they don’t care about anyone but themselves – let the entire rest of the world be
damned. Including other observant Jews.

The first explanation means that there is a major flaw in their Hashkafa which refuses to distinguish
between Chumra and Halacha. The second explanation is one that is the outcome of people that

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are over focused on being Choshesh for the Daas HaMachimr. Because in this case insisting on
that is by far the greater evil.

I only wish rabbinic leaders would storngly condemn such behavior and make that clear to the
leaders of those communities that it will not be tolerated by mainstream Charedim. They need to
be told in no uncertain terms that they have produced monsters by virtue of their Chinuch in this
regard.

Unfortunately, this will probably never happen. But it still needs to be said.

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