Daf Ditty Yevamot 17: “When brothers live together”

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MISHNA: Each of the women enumerated in the first chapter causes exemption from levirate
marriage and ḥalitza for her rival wives. This is due to the close family relationship she has with
her brother-in-law, making her forbidden to him. The single exception is the case explained in this

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mishna. What is the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? For example:
If there were two brothers, and one of them died childless, and subsequently a brother of theirs
was born, after which the second brother, the elder, took his deceased brother’s wife in
levirate marriage, and then died as well. Consequently, two women require levirate marriage:
The widow of the first brother who had been taken in levirate marriage by the second brother, and
the widow of the second brother, the first widow’s rival wife.

The first widow, who had been the wife of the first brother to die, goes out without any obligation
to be taken in levirate marriage by the youngest brother who was born later, since she is the wife
of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The first deceased brother never lived at the same
time as the newly born brother. The second widow, who had been married to the second brother,
is exempt due to her rival wife.

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GEMARA: Rav Naḥman said: He who taught the version of the mishna which reads: The first
widow goes out, is not mistaken in his version, and he who taught a variant version of the mishna
which reads: The second widow goes out, is not mistaken either, since it is possible to understand
the mishna both ways. Both versions of the text can refer to the same woman, i.e., the wife of the
first brother, by different titles. The Gemara explains that he who taught:

The first, is not mistaken, as what is the meaning of first? It means the first to fall before her
yavam for levirate marriage. And he who taught referring to her as the second is not mistaken
either, as what is the meaning of second? It means the second to enter marriage. Since the
second deceased brother was already married to one woman, this yevama whom he took in levirate
marriage was his second wife.

The Gemara wonders: Is this the necessary order of events? Are we not also dealing with a
scenario in which the second brother took the wife of the first brother in levirate marriage and
then later took another wife? Would such a situation not merit the same ruling? Rather, what is
the meaning of calling the wife of the first brother the second?

It means she who had been married for a second time. She had already been married twice,
whereas the wife of the second brother had been married only once.

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§ The Gemara turns from a review of the language used in the mishna to a discussion of the
halakhot of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist. Where is it written that the mitzva
of levirate marriage does not apply in the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not
coexist? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The verse states

‫ וֵּמת ַאַחד‬,‫ֵיְשׁבוּ ַאִחים ַיְחָדּו‬-‫ה ִכּי‬ 5 If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have
-‫שׁת‬ֶ ‫ִתְהֶיה ֵא‬-‫ל ֹא‬--‫לוֹ‬-‫ֵמֶהם וֵּבן ֵאין‬ no child, the wife of the dead shall not be married abroad
‫ ְיָבָמהּ‬:‫ ְלִאישׁ ָזר‬,‫ַהֵמּת ַהחוָּצה‬ unto one not of his kin; her husband's brother shall go in

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 ‫שּׁה‬ָ ‫ וְּלָקָחהּ לוֹ ְלִא‬,‫ָיב ֹא ָﬠֶליָה‬ unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty
.‫ְו ִיְבָּמהּ‬ of a husband's brother unto her.
Deut 25:5

“If brothers dwell together and one of them dies” meaning that they had a common dwelling
together in the world. This excludes the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.
Furthermore, it is derived: “Together” means that they were united together in an inheritance;
i.e., they are united in that they inherit together.

In other words, since property is inherited by sons from their father, it can be inferred that the verse
is speaking specifically of brothers from the same father. This excludes his maternal half-
brother, with whom he is not united by inheritance, since only brothers who share the same father
inherit from each other.

Tosafos

‫תוספות ד"ה אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו היכא כתיבא‬

Tosfos explains the Hava Amina that we do not need "Yachdav"

‫וא"ת תיפוק ליה מדכתיב )משלי ג( דרכיה דרכי נועם‬

We should know this from "Deracheha Darchei No'am!"

(:‫ומהאי טעמא עבדינן מתים כחיים לענין יבום בפ' יש מותרות )לקמן פז‬

This is the reason why we consider the dead as if they were alive regarding Yibum
(below 87b. If a man died with children, the widow does not become Zekukah
l'Yibum after his children die.)
‫אע"ג דאיצטריך למילי אחריני כדאמר בפרקין גבי מצוה בגדול לייבם א"כ אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולם דכתב‬
‫רחמנא ל"ל‬

(Why is Tosfos' question difficult?) We need [Yachdav] for other matters, like we
say below (24a) "if so, why did the Torah write Eshes Achiv she'Lo Hayah b'Olamo"!

‫( נמי דייקינן מיני' דקטן זוקק ליבום‬:‫ובפרק ב"ש )לקמן קיא‬

Also, we derive from it (111b) that a minor is Zokek l'Yibum!

‫מ"מ משמע דעיקריה לגופיה איצטריך‬

The Gemara connotes that we need the verse for the law itself.

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‫ואר"י דאיצטריך להיכא דחמותה של יבמה מעוברת דהוי שפיר דרכי נועם ותמתין שמא תלד זכר ותהא זקוקה‬
.‫לו‬

We need it for when the Yevamah's mother-in-law is pregnant. It is [not a contradiction

to] Darchei No'am if she would need to wait to see if she gives birth to a boy, and she
will be Zekukah to him.

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Rabba said: One learns the ruling that levirate marriage applies only to brothers from the same
father by the verbal analogy between the term brotherhood used in the context of levirate
marriage and the term brotherhood from the children of Jacob. Just as there, with regard to the
children of Jacob, they are all brothers from the father and not from the mother, since they were
from four different mothers, so too, here, in the case of levirate marriage, it is referring specifically
to brothers from the father and not from the mother.

RASHI

Tosafos

TOSFOS DH ACHVAH ACHVAH MI'BNEI YAKOV

‫תוספות ד"ה אחוה אחוה מבני יעקב‬

Tosfos explains why we do not learn from here that they must have lived together

‫לענין אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו אין סברא למילף מבני יעקב דלא מיקרי אחים אא"כ הם בעולם אחד כבני‬
‫יעקב‬

Regarding Eshes Achiv she'Lo Hayah b'Olamo, why can't we learn from Bnei Yakov
that they are called brothers only if they were alive at the same time?
.‫דפשיטא דמיקרי אחין ואי לאו דמיעט קרא בהדיא לא הוה שייך למילף מבני יעקב לענין הך מילתא‬

It is obvious that they are called brothers [even if they were not alive at the same time].
Had the Torah not explicitly excluded [Eshes Achiv she'Lo Hayah b'Olamo], we could
not have learned this from Bnei Yakov.

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Summary

Introduction1

This mishnah explains how “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” exempts her
rival wife from yibbum. This category of women was mentioned in the first mishnah of chapter
one (there it was the 14th category).

What is the case of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”? If there were two
brothers, and one of them died, and then a third brother was born, and then the second
brother had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife and then died himself, the first woman is
exempt as the wife of his brother who died before he was born, and the second wife [is

1
https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.17a.11?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-
_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&p2=Mishnah_Yevamot.2.1&ven2=William_Davidson_Edition_-
_English&vhe2=Torat_Emet_357&lang2=bi&w2=English%20Explanation%20of%20Mishnah&lang3=en

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exempt] because she is her rival wife. If he had ma’amar with her and died, the second wife,
must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum.

Reuven and Shimon are brothers and Shimon dies. Afterwards, Levi is born. Reuven then takes
Shimon’s widow in yibbum. Afterwards Reuven also dies without children. This same widow,
who was originally Shimon’s wife and then became Reuven’s wife, now technically should
become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Levi, the third brother. However, since Levi was
not yet born when Shimon died, she is not liable for yibbum with Levi. Since she is exempt, all of
her rival wives are exempt as well.

In order to understand this section, we must remind ourselves that ma’amar is the giving of money
from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in regular
marriages. As I explained in the introduction, according to the Torah there is no marital process
for the widow who goes through yibbum. All that really happens is that he has relations with her,
and thus yibbum is performed.

However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her
betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these
laws in tractate Kiddushin). Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife.
The status of their marriage is only rabbinic.

This will have many important implications in future mishnayoth. In our mishnah, Reuven does
not have full yibbum with the woman, but only does ma’amar, and then dies. The woman,
therefore, is not biblically liable to have yibbum with Levi, the third brother, but only rabbinically
liable. Since she is only rabbinically liable, her rival wife is not truly exempt, and according to
biblical law she could have yibbum. However, since Reuven did perform ma’amar with the other
wife, the rival wife can only have halitzah.

Matrilineal Jewish Continuity; Who is a Brother?2

We learn that when Jewish women lived in certain towns, they were likely partnered with Gentile
men and thus their children were rendered mamzerim; the women themselves were deemed ritually
impure. Other towns were thought of as places of refuge for Jewish women, and their lineage was
not questioned. Today's text is where the rabbis agree that women and not men determine whether
or not their child is Jewish. And here is where we learn that of the ten tribes of Israel, all of the
women are said to have become barren (due to trauma or their own crafty refusal of male attention),
resulting in no Jewish descendants.

Perek II begins with a Mishna that examines the definition of 'brother' in yibum. The rabbis share
their arguments. What are the differences between the obligations - and restrictions - on a paternal
half-brother versus a maternal half-brother? Why is there a betrothal between the death of the
yevama's husband and when she has intercourse with her yibum, formalizing the marriage? Is the

2
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/10/

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yibum ever allowed to marry the yivama's mother? What if the yivama dies during the
betrothal? How long must a yevama wait for another yibum to be born?

The rabbis discuss the zikka, the bond of levirate marriage. Sometimes that bond is substantial
and sometimes it is weaker.

Our daf somehow feels more grounded in reality. What about if Miriam does not want to wait
around for her mother-in-law to have a baby who will grow up to become her husband? Often the
rabbis' arguments seem theoretical; today they discuss problems with the Mishanyot.

We can easily note the lasting effect of our rabbis' interpretations. Even today, many Jewish
communities do not recognize paternal Jewish lineage. Clearly there are pros and cons to that
understanding of the text. We have to remember that even our rabbis were lenient regarding some
of their interpretations and their uses of halacha.

When law does not serve the larger good of the community, will it last? Should it last? If halacha
is harming our community, will it last? Should it last?

"MEYUCHADIN B'NACHALAH" -- BROTHERS WHO SHARE AN

INHERITANCE

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara discusses the source for the Halachah that Yibum is practiced only by a brother who
shares the same father as the deceased. The Gemara cites two sources. The first is the verse of
Yibum which says, "When brothers dwell together (Yachdav)" (Devarim 25:5), which teaches that
they must be "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" -- "together in the inheritance." The second source is the
the verse of Yibum which says, "When brothers (Achim) dwell together" (ibid.), from which a
Gezeirah Shavah to the word "Achim" mentioned with regard to the sons of Yakov (Bereishis
42:13) is derived: just as the sons of Yakov had the same father but different mothers, so, too, the
obligation of Yibum applies only to brothers who have the same father.

RASHI explains that "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" means that the brothers must be able to inherit
each other if the other dies.

However, at the end of the Sugya the Gemara says that had the Torah taught only the word
"Achim," one would have thought that the obligation of Yibum applies even to an uncle and a
nephew (for example, when the uncle dies childless, the nephew is obligated to do Yibum with his
uncle's wife), because they, too, are referred to as "Achim," as Avraham told Lot, "... for we are

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yevamos/insites/ye-dt-017.htm

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brothers (Achim)" (Bereishis 13:8). Hence, the verse adds the word "Yachdav" to teach that
only actual brothers are obligated in Yibum. Only brothers are "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah," and not
an uncle and a nephew.

Rashi there explains that "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" means that they share the inheritance when
their father dies. This definition of "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" clearly differs from the definition
which Rashi gives earlier. Why does Rashi change his explanation? (RASHBA)

The RITVA answers that "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" means that they share an inheritance
in all ways; they divide an inheritance that they receive from someone else, and they are able to
inherit each other.

The Riva explains that both meanings of the verse are implicit in the Sugya; Rashi gives the two
different explanations because he follows the train of thought of the Gemara. When the Gemara
first mentions that the brothers must be "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" in order to do Yibum, its
intention is to exclude brothers from the same mother (and from different fathers). Such
brothers do share an inheritance if their mother leaves behind possessions when she dies. However,
they do not inherit each other's property, because when one brother dies (with no children) his
property goes to his father and then to his father's heirs. Thus, "Meyuchadin b'Nachalah" means
that they must be able to inherit each other, and it excludes brothers who share the same mother
and not the same father.

In contrast, in the case of an uncle and a nephew (such as Avraham and Lot), they could inherit
each other if they have no other close relatives, and thus they qualify for the first definition of
"Meyuchadin b'Nachalah." The inheritance could go from the uncle to the nephew (via the
nephew's father, the uncle's brother), as well as from the nephew to the uncle.

However, an uncle and a nephew share no inheritance from any single person. (If the uncle's father
dies, the uncle splits the inheritance with his brother. Even if that brother is dead and the
inheritance goes to the nephew, he is not actually splitting it with his uncle, but rather
his father splits it with his uncle and then he inherits it from his father.)

AVRAHAM AND LOT WERE "ACHIM"

The Gemara discusses the sources for the law that Yibum is practiced only between brothers who
share the same father. One of the sources is the verse, "When brothers (Achim) dwell together"
(Devarim 25:5), from which a Gezeirah Shavah to the word "Achim" mentioned with regard to the
sons of Yakov (Bereishis 42:13) is derived: just as the sons of Yakov had the same father but
different mothers, so, too, the obligation of Yibum applies only to brothers who have the same
father.

The Gemara asks that the verse also says "Achim" with regard to Avraham and Lot: "... for we are
brothers (Achim)" (Bereishis 13:8). Perhaps the obligation of Yibum applies even to an uncle and
a nephew (for example, when the uncle dies childless, the nephew is obligated to do Yibum with

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his uncle's wife), because they, too, are referred to as "Achim." The Gemara answers that the
Gezeirah Shavah refers only to the sons of Yakov; the word "Achim" there is Mufneh ("open" and
available to be used for a Derashah, and it is not used for any other teaching), while the word
"Achim" in the verse of Avraham and Lot is not Mufneh.

The Gemara at the end of the Sugya concludes that both the word "Achim" and the word
"Yachdav" (see previous Insight) in the verse of Yibum are necessary to teach that Yibum applies
only to brothers from the same father; the word "Achim" alone does not suffice. The Gemara says
that had the Torah not taught "Yachdav," one would have applied the Gezeirah Shavah of "Achim"
from Avraham and Lot, because the word "Achim" there is Mufneh since it should have said
"Re'im" instead of "Achim."

What does the Gemara mean? The Gemara just said that the word "Achim" in the verse of Lot
is not Mufneh. Why does the Gemara now say that it is Mufneh?
Moreover, if "Achim" in the verse of Lot indeed is Mufneh as the Gemara now says, the Gemara
should explain what is derived from that word, since "Yachdav" and "Achim" in the verse of the
sons of Yakov together teach that the obligation of Yibum applies only to brothers and not to an
uncle and a nephew. The word "Achim" in the verse of Lot remains Mufneh; what law does it
teach? (MAHARSHA)

(a) The RITVA answers that, in truth, the word "Achim" in the verse of Lot is not Mufneh, as the
Gemara originally asserts. The verse could not have used the word "Re'im" because Avraham's
intention was to express that he and Lot were more than just friends to each other; they were as
close as brothers. (The Maharsha explains that the verse uses the word "Achim" instead of "Re'im"
to teach that one's grandchildren are considered like his children.) When the Gemara says that
without the word "Yachdav" one would have thought that "Achim" of Lot is Mufneh, it means that
one would have mistakenly thought that it is Mufneh and that its purpose is to teach a Halachah in
the laws of Yibum. "Yachdav" teaches that "Achim" of Lot is not Mufneh and teaches nothing
about Yibum.

(b) The RAMBAN and RASHBA answer that even when the Gemara says that "Achim" in the
verse of Lot is Mufneh, it does not mean that it is actually Mufneh. The Gemara knows that the
word "Achim" is needed to teach that Avraham felt as close as a brother to Lot. Rather, when the
Gemara says that the word is Mufneh it means that when the Torah says "Achim" in the verse of
Yibum, its intention is to teach that these brothers should not be compared to any specific "Achim"
mentioned elsewhere in the verses, but rather that Yibum applies to any relatives to whom the
verse refers with the word "Achim." If the word "Achim" appears in reference to an uncle and
nephew, then it teaches that the word "Achim" in the verse of Yibum also includes that relationship
(of uncle and nephew) for Yibum (it is a "Giluy Milsa").

This is what the Gemara means when it says that the verse of Lot should have said "Re'im," which
is the intention of the verse. The fact that it instead says "Achim" teaches that the word "Achim"
in the verse of Yibum describes a relationship of uncle and nephew as well. "Yachdav" therefore
teaches that the word "Achim" in the verse of Yibum refers only to a specific type of Achim --
actual brothers who share the same father.

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 When Brothers Live Together

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

One of the women about whom the first Mishna (2a) taught that there is no mitzva of yibum is the
case of eishet ahiv she-lo hayah be-olamo – when there is a brother who was not born until after
the woman became a widow. In such a case, the severe prohibition of a person marrying his
brother’s wife remains in effect, and the woman does not have to wait until the newborn child is
old enough to perform yibum or halitza; she can get married immediately.

This halakha is mentioned as one of 15 cases in the first Mishna in the massekhet; the first Mishna
of the second perek- which begins on our daf– deals with it in some detail. The Gemara suggests
that the source for this halakha is the passage that opens the rules of yibum (see Devarim 25:5),
beginning with the condition “when brothers live together,” which implies that this is a law that
applies only when the brothers were alive at the same time.

Tosafot ask whether the rule of derakheha darkei no’am (see Mishlei 3:17) should be applied in
this case. Derakheha darkei no’am – the idea that the commandments of the Torah are pleasant
and considerate – is used in many circumstances in the Talmud to clarify that a given interpretation
cannot be considered because it would make fulfilling the Torah an unpleasant experience. In our
case, it should be fairly obvious that forcing the widow to wait and see whether a brother will be
born to her late husband would contradict the idea of derakheha darkei no’am.

The answer suggested by Tosafot is that the pasuk brought as a source by our Gemara includes
even a case when the late husband’s mother was pregnant, a situation that would not have been
covered by derakheha darkei no’am.

In truth, the Talmud Yerushalmi does make use of the idea of derakheha darkei no’am, albeit
without using that specific language, arguing that were the yevama (the widow) to be obligated to
wait for the possibility of a new brother, surely the Torah would have mentioned the role played
by her in-laws within these laws, since the possibility of their having more children impacts on the
status of the yevama.

The Gemara searches for the verse which is the source that yibum cannot be done by a brother
who is born only after the original married brother died.5

4
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/yevamot17/
5
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yevamos%20017.pdf

14
Tosafos wonders why a special verse is needed to teach us this halacha, when we would conclude
that yibum under these circumstances would be impossible for another reason. The rule is that the
ways of the Torah are pleasant .

For example, we learn later (87b) that if a man dies and leaves a son, his wife obviously does not
have to do yibum. If the son dies, and the woman now has no surviving child, we might suggest
that the woman should now have yibum done.

Yet the Gemara points out that this is not the case, because once this woman has been released
from the law of yibum, it would not be “the ways of pleasantness” to require her to be subject to
this restriction anew. In fact, if she was to get remarried after the death of her first husband, and
her son would then die, for the same reason we would not even require her to have chalitza done.
It would not be pleasant for her current husband to tolerate her being subject to chalitza.

Accordingly, says Tosafos, let us consider a woman whose husband dies childless. If he has no
brothers, there is no rule of yibum. It would be unreasonable to expect her to wait indefinitely to
see whether her father-in-law’s wife might have another son sometime in the future, and to
reinstate the law of yibum which was already dismissed. Therefore, asks Tosafos, why do we need
a verse to teach the exclusion of “a wife of a brother who was not in the world,” when it should be
excluded based upon simple logic?

Tosafos answers that the verse is only needed in the case where the father-in-law’s wife was
pregnant at the moment of the brother’s death. Here, it might not be unreasonable to expect the
widow to wait and see if the child will be a boy.

Nevertheless, the woman is exempt due to the verse of ‫ יחדו‬. Ramban and Ritva explain that the
concept of “the ways of the Torah are pleasant” only excludes the case where the widow had a son
who died. Here, if yibum would be reinstated, every woman would have to wait forever in case ” ‫ו‬
‫ ח‬her children might all die, and to possibly marry the brothers. This would be absurd, and
precludes such a situation.

It might be reasonable, however, to expect the woman to wait in the case of waiting to see if any
more sons might be born to the mother-inlaw, and when she dies the “yevama” could then be
released.

“Together” [teaches that the brothers must be] together in regard to inheritance

Rabbeinu Mordechai ben Hillel (1), the Mordechai, cites Gaonim who maintain that if the brother
is a mumar (heretic) the widow is permitted to marry and does not even require chalitza. Mordechai
explains that a mumar loses his status as a brother, like we find in the laws of usury.

15
Rav Aryeh Leib Hakohen, the Avnei Miluim (2), however, challenges this explanation. The
definition of brotherhood regarding usury and yibum are different. Concerning usury the term
brotherhood refers to the collective brotherhood of the Jewish People and a person who does not
behave like a Jew loses his status as a brother. Brotherhood for yibum is determined by the blood
relationship that brothers share and is not related to whether the brother is a mumar. Avnei Miluim
suggests an explanation that could justify this position.

There is an opinion in the Rishonim (3) that a mumar does not inherit his father’s property.
Consequently, one can assert that since a mumar does not inherit his father’s property he will also
not bind the widow to yibum. This connection between inheritance and yibum is taught in our
Gemara. The Gemara rules that the mitzvah of yibum does not apply to a maternal brother because
the Torah indicates that it only applies for those who “share” an inheritance. Rashi (4) explains
that they inherit one property and bequeath one to the other.

Rav Moshe Sofer (5), the Chasam Sofer, expresses astonishment at the resolution of Avnei Miluim.
Avnei Miluim’s explanation is built on his assertion that Rashi connects the issue of in heritance
from the father and yibum. In fact, Rashi did not mention inheriting from the father. The only issue
Rashi addressed regarding inheritances is the ability of the brothers to inherit and bequeath to one
another. Consequently, our Gemara cannot be cited as support for the opinion cited by Mordechai.

Shulchan Aruch(6) rules that a widow who falls to a yavam who is a mumar must receive chalitza
before she is permitted to remarry despite the existence of a differing opinion. Rema7 , however,
cites a dispute concerning a widow who remarried without chalitza, thinking that her husband did
not have any brothers and it was later discovered that there is a brother, but he is a mumar. One
opinion maintains that she does not have to leave her present marriage whereas others maintain
that chalitza is still required.

When the Beis Aharon of Karlin, zt”l, made a siyum on Masseches Yevamos, many of his
followers joined him for the festive meal.

After much lively singing, someone asked the Beis Aharon a question that related to one of the
matters discussed in the massechta. The chassid asked, “Why do we find that someone who marries
a yevama is called one who has done ma’amar instead of kiddushin? And what exactly does the
word ma’amar mean?”

16
The Beis Aharon responded, “We must first understand why marrying a woman is called
kiddushin. This is a language of hekdesh, consecration through separation, since as soon as she
accepts kiddushin she becomes prohibited to anyone else. However, in the case of the yevama, she
has been prohibited to anyone else all along from the time she was first married to the husband
who later died. From the time of his death, she has been prohibited to anyone else until she is either
bound through yibum or released through chalitza.

It is therefore inappropriate to call marriage to her kiddushin, since this act doesn’t make her any
more consecrated through separation from others than she already was!

The Beis Aharon continued, “Now we can try to understand the meaning of the word ‫ מאמר‬. The
reason why the sages chose this name is because the whole purpose of yibum is to perpetuate the
name of the deceased. So the act of yibum is really an aspect of resurrection for the dead brother.
We find that it is the ‫מאמר‬, the word, of Hashem that brings the dead back to life, as we see in the
phrase: . This is why such a marriage is called .

Rabbi Elliot Goldberg writes:6

The Gemara is prone to challenge the specific language used by a rabbi in order to sharpen our
understanding of the statement and its implications. Sometimes, the analysis reveals a need for
clarification and the statement is subsequently amended. Other times, it turns out the original
language is stronger than it first appears to be.

We see an example of the latter on our daf:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: A widow who is waiting for her yavam and then died before he
could take her in levirate marriage, the yavam is permitted to marry her mother.

When a man dies childless, a new status falls on his brother (the yavam) and his widow (the
yevama). The question raised by Rav’s teaching is this: How substantial is this new status? Is it
akin to an engagement, which in Jewish law is a substantial enough bond that it requires a formal
Jewish divorce to dissolve? Or is it something less than that?

Rav’s teaching suggests that he believes the pre-marital bond between a yavam and a yevama is
not a substantial one. What’s the logic here? Well, a man is prohibited from marrying both a
woman and her daughter — either simultaneously or even after one of the women has divorced or
died. If the connection between the yavam and yevama is a substantial one (i.e., akin to an
engagement), it would seem that the man would be forbidden from marrying the woman’s mother
if she does before the yibbum marriage is effectuated. But since Rav permits this, he must believe
that the relationship between a yavam and a yevama, prior to their marriage, is not a substantial
one.

6
Myjewishlearning.com

17
The Gemara raises an objection about this inference: If Rav truly thought the bond was not
substantial, why wouldn’t he have just said so?

The Gemara goes on to explain that if he had, his position in the case of a woman who dies before
her yibbum marriage can be performed would not have been clear. Why not? Because one could
argue that the yavam-yevama bond is insubstantial only in cases where there are two surviving
brothers. This is because when there are two remaining brothers, either could fulfill the obligation
to perform yibbum and so neither is certain to be the yavam.

But in a case when there is only one surviving brother, we know he is definitely going to be the
yavam, so we might think the link between him and his widowed sister-in-law is substantial. Had
Rav merely stated his position on the pre-marital bond, it would not have been clear that he
believed even a single surviving brother is permitted to marry the mother of his deceased brother’s
wife.

You can probably see where this is going now. The Gemara next wonders why Rava didn’t
say that explicitly — that the pre-marital levirate bond is insubstantial even in the case of one
brother. Turns out, that has problems of its own — namely, one might have then inferred that Rav
believes the bond is so insubstantial that the brother is permitted to marry his yevama’s mother
even while the yevama is still alive, potentially in a case where the brother chooses to marry the
widow’s mother in order to get out of performing yibbum with her daughter. But we know that’s
not allowed — the yibbum obligation cannot be canceled that way.

And so, the Gemara concludes, Rav’s initial language turns out to be stronger than we first thought.
By choosing to teach as he did, Rav embeds his full opinion in his statement, even though we need
to do a little logical legwork (with the Gemara’s help) to figure it out. In short, Rav’s position is
that the levirate bond is not substantial and that even a single surviving brother may marry his
sister-in-law’s mother — but only after she has died, and only in cases where yibbum has yet to
take place.

The Gemara next turns its attention to Rav Yehuda, who takes the opposite position from Rav,
prohibiting the yavam from marrying his yevama’s mother if she dies before yibbum takes place.
Could he have made his position clearer by using different language? That’s the subject of
tomorrow’s daf.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:7

Our daf (Yevamot 17a) contains a brief teaching which, depending on how it is interpreted, has
radical implications.

The question posed by the Gemara is whether the children born of women from the ten exiled
tribes who then intermarried should be considered Jews, and by extension, whether Jewish status

7
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

18
should be accorded to those descendants of the ten exiled tribes whose ancestors, both male and
female, are presumed to have intermarried.

In response, Shmuel said to Rabbi Yehuda that: ‘[A Rabbinic conference was convened to discuss
this issue, and] they did not move from there until they made (i.e. took the decision to categorize)
them as complete idolaters [and gentiles]’, as it says, “they betrayed the Lord, for they begot
foreign children” (Hoshea 5:7)’.

Of course, and as noted by the Gemara itself, the child of a Jewish mother is Jewish. As such, if
we interpret the question discussed by the Rabbis as relating to the immediate children of Jewish
women of the ten exile tribes who intermarried, then it would seem from this text that Jewishness
is, in the rarest of circumstances, revocable. Others, however, interpret this text as relating to the
later generations of those who intermarried, and they therefore understand its message to mean
that over a period of generations these descendants became so dispersed and absorbed into their
idolatrous surroundings that a blanket presumption could be made that no halachic Jew remained
among them.

Clearly, the difference between these two interpretations is huge. One claims that a ‘psak’ was
rendered to revoke Jewishness of a dispersed group of exiled, intermarried and idolatrous Jews,
while the other claims that a ‘policy’ was adopted towards the descendants of those dispersed,
exiled, intermarried and idolatrous Jews.

However, whichever way you interpret this Gemara, what is clear is that the circumstances of this
decision were unique, and that while what is being discussed here relates to dispersed groups of
disassociated Jews whose locations were unknown, were incontrovertible evidence to be found to
establish the Jewish status of an individual Jew, then this would override the above-mentioned
decision.

Unfortunately, there are those today who – either intentionally or subconsciously – apply the
approach of those Rabbis then to our situation today when, sadly, so many Jews either no longer
identify as Jews, or they know little to nothing about their Jewish identity, or they have
intermarried and adopted a life that does not provide them with meaningful opportunities to
celebrate their Jewish roots.

However, our situation is different, and while it was then possible to be lost to the Jewish people,
our approach today – with the information and technological tools at our disposal - should not be
to adopt either a psak or a policy that categorizes a whole group of Jews as being no longer Jewish.
Instead, it is to do what we can to reach out and help those Jews – whatever their circumstances -
reconnect with their ancestry, their traditions, and their faith.

19
 Jacob Sending his Son Joseph to Look for his Brothers by Eustache Le Sueur

A very young brother

Mark Kerzner writes:8

The laws of yibum apply only when two brothers live at the same time, and one dies childless.
However, if the brother is not a contemporary, he cannot do a yibum. How do you mean?

Let us say there are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon, and Reuven dies childless. Shimon should
now marry Reuven's wife, but he waits. Meanwhile, a third brother, Levi is born. Now Shimon

8
https://talmudilluminated.com/yevamot/yevamot17.html

20
marries the widow. He has his own wife also, and now he dies - the two wives are looking at Levy.
However, Levy cannot marry the first one, because she is his brother's wife, and when Levi was
born, Reuven was already not alive. Thus, the first wife goes free and does not need either yibum
or chalitzah from Levi. The second wife goes free because of the first one. This is one of the fifteen
women of the basic rule, but here we treat it in more details.

How do we know that the above is true? - Because the Torah said, "If two brother live together (in
the world)" - which means that the two brothers should be contemporaries, and then the laws of
yibum apply. If not, the other brother's wife is always forbidden to the young brother.

Incidentally, this phrase also teaches us that it applies only to brothers of the same father - just like
the twelve brothers who were the sons of Jacob and are called brothers - so here too, "brothers"
should be from the same father.

Living Together

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:9

It is the Jewish woman who is privileged with bestowing Jewishness to her offspring. Yet while
the mother determines the Jewish status--or lack thereof--of her offspring, it is the father who
determines particular family status. Thus, whether one is Kohen, Levi, or Yisrael is determined by
the father.

9
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/yevamot-17-living-together

21
This distinction between the relationship created by the mother and that created by the father is
brought into focus as we study the opening Mishnah of the second chapter of Yevamot. The
opening Mishnah of the first chapter listed the fifteen relatives with whom one may not
perform yibum. The first fourteen of these are blood relatives of the brother or of the wife,
disqualifying them--and their co-wives--from yibum and thus, the need for chalitzah. The
discussion regarding the fifteenth relative, "the wife of one's brother who was not in his world", is
the subject of the opening Mishnah of the second chapter of Yevamot. While the other fourteen
cases are clear enough, the fifteenth case is not.
"How [do we understand] 'the wife of the brother who was not in the world?'" the Mishnah
asks (Yevamot 17a). The Mishnah explains that such a case involves "two brothers, and one of
them dies; and a [third] brother is then born". The second brother then does yibum with his
deceased brother's widow, and then he himself dies. As the third brother was never alive
simultaneously with his older brother (the first one)--"they were not in the world" together--there
is no obligation to do either yibum or chalitzah with the widow of this brother. Furthermore, there
is also no obligation of yibum or chalitzah with the other widows of the second brother, either--
the one who was alive at the same time as the third brother--as all fifteen women exempt all their
co-wives.
This exemption is exegetically derived by Rav, the third century Babylonian Sage, from biblical
terminology used in describing the mitzvah of yibum where the Torah states, "when brothers
dwell yachdav, together, and one of them dies" (Devarim 25:5). The Sages understood the word
"together" to mean that the brothers had to be alive together, i.e. at the same time, for the obligation
of yibum to be operative. The Gemara further derives from the word yachdav that the obligation
of yibum only applies when the brothers are "designated [together] in inheritance". As inheritance
passes from the father to his sons, only paternal brothers share in the inheritance[1] and thus only
paternal brothers are obligated in yibum. Rava, however, derives the law that yibum only applies
to paternal brothers from a different source--from the first encounter between Yosef and his
unknowing brothers. Accused of being spies, they responded, "Twelve brother are we, the sons of
one man" (Breisheet 42:13).
If we are basing these teachings on the use of the term "brother," why not, asks the Gemara, derive
the definition of brotherhood from that of prohibited sexual unions? "The nakedness of your
brother's wife you shall not uncover" (Vayikra 18:16). As "your brother" in this case included a
half-brother on one's mother's side, why not apply yibum to both maternal and paternal brothers?
The Gemara gives a technical answer basing such on the specific wording of the verse. It then
asks, why not derive the laws of yibum from the verse (which we will read this Shabbat), "And
Abram said to Lot: 'Let there be no strife between us...for we are brothers'" (Breisheet 13:8). As
Abraham and Lot were actually uncle and nephew, why not derive that yibum also applies to one's
aunt? The Gemara offers another technical response.
Biblical exegesis and technical legal arguments reflect important ideas and ideals. "When two
brothers sit together, and one of them dies". Underpinning the mitzvah of yibum is respect and love
for one's brother and concern for his legacy. How odd it sounds to us moderns that one would
marry one's brother's widow! Yet that is what the Torah expects, and what concern for one's family
means.

22
Such an idea cannot be derived from Lot, who epitomizes the breaking up of families. He owed so
much to his uncle, including his very life, yet Lot left him to go get a high-paying job in the thriving
and decadent city of Sedom. Deriving the laws of yibum from the laws of sexual immorality might
imply that there is something unseemly in marrying one's sister-in-law, a notion from which the
Torah wants to disabuse us.
Rather, it is the story of Yosef that serves as our model. Yes, there was much brotherly hatred, and
awful things were done. But ultimately, the brothers reunited and formed the Jewish nation--not
much different, if perhaps more extreme, than many of our relationships. Even the context of the
verse used is telling, describing the accusation that the brothers were spies. It was through the
brother's reaction to this accusation that they demonstrated their concern for their brother
Binyamin, thereby demonstrating that they had repented from their treatment of Yosef.
How we learn something is often as important, if not more so, than what we learn.
[1] When a woman passes away, her husband generally inherits her estate. This is not the place for a discussion of the philosophy
and laws of inheritance. For now, it will suffice to note that, in theory, all money in the family is under the domain of the man, who
then has responsibility for the family. Please G-d, we will discuss this further when we get to the eighth chapter of Bava Batra.

Dr. Yael Ziegler writes:10

10
https://etzion.org.il/en/tanakh/ketuvim/megillat-ruth/perpetuating-name-levirate-marriage

23
Land Purchase and Marriage

And Boaz said, “On the day that you purchase the field from the hands of Naomi
and from Ruth the Moavite, you hereby purchase the deceased’s wife to establish
the name of the deceased upon his inheritance.” (Ruth 4:5)

This verse is syntactically awkward. While my translation smoothed out some of the
bumpiness of this passage, the direct object of the second appearance of the verb “kanita,” “you
hereby purchase,” [1] is not at all clear. Is it the deceased wife who has been purchased or the
field? [2] And from whom is the field purchased? Is it from Naomi or from Naomi and Ruth the
Moavite? Are they joint owners? [3] It certainly complicates matters to suggest that Ruth the
Moavite is a partial legal owner of the field! [4]

The translation that I have adopted requires there to be a comma after the words, “Ruth the
Moavite,” and does indeed suggest that Ruth is considered a partial legal owner of the
field. [5] However, according to the cantillation marks (used also as punctuation), the major break
in the sentence (the etnachta) is placed after the word, “Naomi,” thereby dividing between Naomi
and Ruth. No matter how you understand this, this makes the sentence read awkwardly. The word
“from” (me’et) is also particularly difficult. If this word were not present, Boaz’s speech would
simply state that on the day that the go’el buys the field from the hand of Naomi, he has also
purchased the responsibility to marry Ruth, the wife of the deceased.

Whichever way we read this convoluted sentence; Boaz’s intent seems clear.
The go’el cannot agree to purchase the land without assuming the responsibility to marry Ruth the
Moavite. This reading is borne out by the events that ensue in this chapter: the go’el’s panicked
refusal, the transfer of the go’el’s rights to Boaz, and Boaz’s purchase of the field alongside his
marriage to Ruth. But what are the legal grounds for linking these two separate issues? Perhaps
the clumsy syntax reflects the flimsy basis for interweaving these separate matters and the
awkwardness of connecting them.

Are there, in fact, any grounds for fusing together the familial obligation to purchase the
ancestral inheritance (geula) along with the responsibility to care for (and marry) the widow of the
dead brother (quasi-yibbum)? [6]

One possibility is that Boaz links these matters artificially in order to deter the go’el from
marrying Ruth. This would imply that Boaz himself wishes to marry Ruth, an idea I have
consistently avoided. I have instead maintained that Boaz agrees to marry Ruth for purely selfless

24
reasons, having nothing personal to gain. Nevertheless, it is possible that, having encountered
Ruth’s exemplary character, Boaz changes course and aspires to marry Ruth himself.

This may be indicated by two factors. One is that Boaz also refers to Ruth as a Moavite
here. Perhaps Boaz intends to remind the go’el of the complications of marrying Ruth so that
the go’el will be dissuaded from marrying her. Second, there is an interesting keri u-ketiv in
Boaz’s proclamation. While he uses the second person to inform the go’el that it is his duty to
purchase Ruth (kanita), the consonants of the word are written to reflect the first-person pronoun
(kaniti). Traditional exegesis tends to regard the keri as the simple meaning of the text and
the ketiv as a device that allows for a deeper meaning. [7] Perhaps buried at the core of Boaz’s offer
is a personal ambition to marry Ruth himself.

Even if there are no compelling legal grounds for linking these two obligations, Boaz’s
stipulation that the go’el must also agree to marry Ruth is accepted without resistance by the elders
and those present (including the go’el himself). While this may be due partly to Boaz’s
authoritative status, it seems likely that the fusion of these duties made sense to the people
of Bethlehem. What is the idea that underlies the connection of these separate familial
responsibilities?

Part of the answer to this question is related to the manner in which this marriage to Ruth
is associated with levirate marriage (yibbum). We will explore this topic more fully in our
next shiur. For the present, I will note that the most obvious connection between the events of
chapter four and the mitzva of yibbum is the stated goal of marrying Ruth: “To uphold the name of
the deceased upon his inheritance.” This phrase, which occurs twice during the course of the legal
proceedings in Ruth 4 (verses 5 and 10), echoes the goal of the levirate marriage:

When brothers dwell together and one of them dies and has no child, the wife of
the deceased shall not be married outside to a stranger. Her husband’s brother
(yevamah) should come to her and take her as a wife and do yibbum with her (ve-
yibema). And the eldest son who shall be born [8] will be established in the name of
the deceased brother and his name shall not be erased from Israel. If the man does
not desire to take his sister-in-law (yevimto), his sister-in-law shall go up to the
elders in the gate and say, “My brother-in-law (yevami) refuses to establish for his
brother a name in Israel; he does not want to perform yibbum with
me. (Devarim 25:5-7)

The goal of the levirate marriage is to preserve the name of the deceased man. Because the
deceased did not produce an heir, his name is threatened with extinction. [9] In what way
does yibbum maintain the name of the dead brother? [10] It may be assumed that the child who is

25
the product of the levirate marriage is simply named for the deceased. Nevertheless, rabbinic
exegesis of this passage suggests otherwise. [11] Chazal assume that the goal of the marriage is to
provide an heir for the land of the deceased. [12]

The idea that the preservation of a person’s name is linked to the maintenance of his
inheritance is evident in the story of the daughters of Tzelafchad. [13] In petitioning for inheritance
of their father’s land in spite of the fact that they are women, they proffer the following argument:
“Why should the name of our father be lost from his clan because he has no son? Give us a portion
in the midst of our father’s kinsmen!” (Bamidbar 27:4).

Halakha maintains that the brother who performs yibbum then becomes the heir of the
estate of the deceased. [14] Nevertheless, this approach is difficult textually and logically. Textually,
the simple meaning of Devarim 25:6 is that the one who will establish the name of the deceased is
the child born to the union between the brother and the widow of the deceased. Logically, the idea
that the living brother can maintain the name of his deceased brother by receiving his land is
problematic. After all, the brother would receive this portion whether he performs yibbum or not.
More to the point, it does not seem that provisions are made for the brother to demarcate his
brother’s land separately or to maintain any remnant of his brother’s distinct portion. [15] If the
brother simply absorbs his brother’s land into his own, how would this preserve the name of the
deceased brother?

Logically, it seems that the best way to preserve the name of the deceased upon his land is
by giving the land of the deceased brother to the eldest child born to the levirate marriage. [16] This
child can maintain the distinct and separate defined portion of land (rather than allowing it to be
swallowed into the ancestral portion of the brother). [17] Textual evidence as well as common sense
point to the child born of the yibbum relationship as the significant party who is designated to
maintain the name of the deceased. Although this is not the halakhic ruling with regard to yibbum,
it is certainly possible that this is the practice with regard to the yibbum-like custom of geula which
is implemented in Megillat Ruth.

Boaz’s goal is to ensure that the name of the deceased does not vanish. It is therefore not
sufficient for a relative simply to marry Ruth, nor is it enough merely to redeem Elimelekh’s
property. Rather, in the spirit of the above reading, an heir must be produced who will be given
the rights to Elimelekh’s land, thereby assuring that it is not integrated and conflated into another
person’s ancestral portion. [18] By maintaining the land’s distinctive identity, the name of
Elimelekh remains for eternity. It may be for this reason that Boaz links together two separate
ideas: purchasing the land and marrying Ruth. [19] Only if these two actions are performed by the
same person will either of these actions be capable of accomplishing their ultimate aim.

26
 This may deepen our understanding of why the go’el categorically refuses to marry Ruth
after he has so eagerly agreed to redeem the land. As noted, redemption of the land was an
economically sound venture. However, by linking it to the attempt to produce an heir to whom that
land will be given, it loses all economic advantage for the go’el and his descendants. Instead, this
land will never be subsumed within the go’el’s ancestral portion. The child who is born will
assume complete ownership of the estate of the deceased. The go’el will have extra mouths to feed
and will not have gained anything for his investment. [20] Indeed, the go’el’s negative reply is not
long in coming.

Marriage to Ruth is not a simple prospect. Her Moavite background, compounded by the
presumed economic drawbacks in performing this yibbum-like marriage with no discernable
monetary advantage, renders it unlikely that anyone would agree to marry Ruth. Boaz’s stalwart
willingness to marry Ruth is extraordinary and another indication of his admirable character.

What’s in a Name?

The ultimate goal of the Megilla is to restore the name to those whose name is threatened
with erasure. We have noted quite often the significance of names in this story. Midrashim abound
which direct us to seek the meaning underlying the names in this story. [21] More significantly, I
have frequently illustrated that the potential loss of the name is a major theme in the Megilla. The
narrative opens with the deaths of Machlon and Khilyon, whose names signify their inevitable
erasure and destruction.

This is followed by Naomi’s bitter declaration of the loss of her own name (Ruth 1:20), [22] Ruth’s
initial anonymity in Bethlehem (e.g. Ruth 2:5-6), [23] and the go’el’s purposeful namelessness, in
which the text refers to him as “Peloni Almoni,” or “no-name.” [24]

Boaz, the champion of the story, restores names in the narrative. This is due in part to the
fact that Boaz himself has an inheritance (Ruth 2:3) and, consequently, a name (Ruth 2:1). Perhaps
for this reason, it is the mere mention of Boaz’s name which initially restores Naomi’s hope in her
future (Ruth 2:19): “And [Ruth] said, ‘The name of the man with whom I worked today
is Boaz.’” [25] Boaz provides Ruth with the means to pronounce her own
name (Ruth 3:9). [26] Moreover, Boaz’s initiative to restore the names of the dead (Ruth 4:5, 10)
should not surprise us in the least. In the final analysis, Boaz facilitates the rehabilitation of Ruth’s
name as well as the names of Naomi and the deceased members of her family. Significantly, Boaz’s
official proclamation of purchase of the land explicitly mentions the names of each member of
Elimelekh’s family, including the sons, who have not been mentioned since their deaths
in Ruth 1:5:

27
 And Boaz said to the elders and the entire nation, “You are witnesses today that I
hereby purchase all that belongs to Elimelekh and all that belongs
to Khilyon and Machlon from the hands of Naomi. And also Ruth the Moavite,
the wife of Machlon, I hereby purchase as a wife to establish the name of the
deceased upon his inheritance and the name of the deceased will not be cut off from
his brethren and from the gates of his place. You are witnesses today.” (Ruth 4:9-
10)

The word “name” (shem) is, in fact, one of the key words of chapter four, appearing a
pivotal seven times. The blessing of the union of Boaz and Ruth contains the cryptic wish, “And
call a name in Bethlehem” (Ruth 4:11). The phrase is obscure: Who is meant to call a name
in Bethlehem? Is it Boaz? The house built by Boaz and Ruth? Is it the product of their union? It is
also unclear what, precisely, is meant by calling a name in Bethlehem. Does it mean to achieve
fame? Perhaps the idea is that they should build their reputations in Bethlehem. [27] I believe the
phrase should be read in a literal manner: this union should succeed in restoring names. After all,
the vital concept of name-giving has been at stake throughout the narrative. This phrase suggests
that the solution for the loss of names so prevalent in this narrative will begin with the union of
Boaz and Ruth.

The women’s public blessing of Naomi after the birth of Ruth’s child also refers to name-
giving. They confer the elliptical blessing upon Naomi, “And his name shall be called
in Israel” (Ruth 4:14). This phrase is unusual, as it would seem to require a direct object and
thereby precede the naming of the child. [28] In a parallel phrase with regard to the brother who
refuses to perform yibbum, the phrase is followed by a new appellation: “And his name shall be
called in Israel, ‘The House of the One who Removed his Shoe’” (Devarim 25:10). Nevertheless,
in the Megilla, this phrase is independent and not followed by the name of the child. In fact, the
naming of the child does not occur until verse 17! How can we understand this fragmentary phrase?

Some scholars have suggested that the intent is that the child’s name will be
famous, [29] while others similarly suggest that it means that the child’s name will be
celebrated. [30] Nevertheless, once again it seems to me that the implication is that the very act of
naming the child is itself the goal. It matters not what the name is; the purpose of the narrative is
to ensure that the child will have a name, an identity, and a destiny. Thus, the women excitedly
bless Naomi: “The child will be given a name in Israel!”

The final appearance of the key word “shem” is the actual naming of the child (Ruth 4:17).
This child, born to restore the name of the family whose name is threatened with extinction, is
given a name by the neighbors, by general society. In this way, Megillat Ruth ends with society’s
acknowledgement of the importance of each individual acquiring a name. The act of naming the
child is followed by a genealogical list, extending back ten generations all the way to Yehuda’s

28
son Peretz. This impressive list of names suggests that the birth of this child has restored the link
between the generations, rejuvenating a chain that consists of individuals with names, identities,
and a shared destiny.

Finally, in keeping with the broader context of Megillat Ruth, we must recall that the book
of Shofetim concludes with an abundance of unnamed individuals. I have frequently suggested that
the prevailing anonymity which characterizes this period depicts a society where individuals have
lost their name along with their destiny. [31] In this vein, the act of establishing a name
in Megillat Ruth is especially significant. Boaz’s ability to facilitate the reacquisition of one’s
name paves the way towards restoration of names in society at large, thereby repairing society and
enabling the nation to reacquire its destiny. [32] When people have no name, they forget their
fundamental objectives, personal and national. [33] The restoration of names and identity for the
Israelite nation can enable them to realize their true national destiny: promulgating God’s name.

Boaz does not merely make it possible to reacquire names during his era. He also produces
David from Bethlehem, [34] a man with a name (e.g. I Shemuel 18:30; II Shemuel 8:13), and the
Davidic dynasty, which is also designated to establish names for generations to come. [35] In the
chapter which delineates the ideal state of this dynasty (II Shemuel 7), the word “shem” modifies
three different parties: the king (David), God, and the nation. First, God promises David a great
name (II Shemuel 7:9). The primary aim of the Davidic dynasty is also noted: to build a house for
the purpose of disseminating God’s name (II Samuel 7:13). [36] To round out the picture, this same
chapter depicts God bestowing a name upon the nation (II Shemuel 7:23). [37] This in turn will lead
to the acknowledgement of the greatness of God’s name (II Shemuel 7:26). The intertwining of the
parties which receive a name in this chapter suggests that they are interdependent. If individuals
have names, identity and destiny, then the nation (and their king) will have a name, identity, and
destiny. If the king has a name, then it is likely that he will be successful in conferring a name
upon his people. Only when the nation has a name, an identity, and an awareness of its unique
destiny, will God’s name be promulgated in the world. The establishment of the name
in Megillat Ruth offers hope for an idyllic national situation which looms hopefully ahead with the
birth of the Davidic dynasty.

[1]
Like the word makhera (which appears in Ruth 4:3; see shiur #29), the word kanita should probably be understood not as a past
tense verb (“you purchased”), but as a formal (perhaps legal) instantaneous perfect (“you hereby purchase”).
[2]
If the referent is the field, the verse would require a comma dividing the sentence after the words “Ruth the Moavite, the wife
of the deceased.” It would then read, “On the day that you purchase the field from the hands of Naomi and from Ruth the Moavite,
the wife of the deceased, you have purchased it.” In this reading, the word kanita (“you have purchased it”) stands alone, with the
meaning that the go’el has bought the land. This reading seems unlikely because then there is no clear connection between buying
the land and marrying Ruth. Moreover, the verse becomes almost tautological: “On the day that you purchase the field… you have
purchased it.” Finally, if this is simply referring to the buying of the field, what causes the go’el to panic and hastily renege on his
previous agreement?
[3]
The use of different prepositions with regard to the purchase of the field from the hand (mi-yad) of Naomi and from (me’et)
Ruth suggests that they are not equal custodians over the field. On the basis of this textual anomaly, some scholars suggest that
Naomi is the actual owner of the field while Ruth has a “legal interest” in the transaction. See Murray D. Gow, “Ruth Quoque – A

29
Coquette? (Ruth IV 5),” The Bible Translator (1990), p. 309. Interestingly, the Targum translates the verse using the identical
prepositional phrase (“min yada, from the hand”) with regard to both women.
[4]
This is precisely what the Malbim (Ruth 4:5) claims with regard to this verse. He maintains that both Naomi and Ruth received
one portion of Elimelekh’s field as part of their ketuva. While Naomi’s portion is available for conventional purchase, Ruth’s
portion is only acquired through a yibbum-like act of marriage. It is this which proves difficult for the go’el, as Ruth’s portion was
designated to perpetuate the name of the deceased and would not be associated with the go’el’s name. The Malbim does not fully
elaborate on what he means by this last idea.
[5]
The Greek translation seems to read the word “kanita” as containing the hidden third person direct object, as in, “you hereby
purchase her.” While this is not indicated in the keri of the word, it yields a meaning similar to that of my translation.
[6]
As noted in shiur #25, Rashi (Ruth 3:9) suggested that Ruth had already linked these two issues in chapter three: “‘For you are
a redeemer’ – To redeem the inheritance of my husband, as it says (Vayikra 25:25): ‘The nearest redeemer shall come and
redeem…’ And I and my mother-in-law need to sell our inheritance. And now it is upon you to buy; buy also me along with [the
inheritance] so that the name of the deceased will be recalled upon his inheritance, for when I come to the fields, [people] will say,
‘This is the wife of Machlon!’” See also Rashi, Ruth 4:10.
[7]
We have previously discussed this phenomenon, in which Massoretic tradition has indicated that a word is read differently than
the manner in which it is written (see shiur #21). This phenomenon is often treated by medieval exegetes as an exegetical device
that maintains both a surface meaning (keri) and a deeper meaning (ketiv). See, for example, the Abravanel’s introduction to the
book of Yirmiyahu, which contains a lengthy excurses on this phenomenon. Academic scholarship assumes that there is only one
original reading and therefore concentrates its efforts on ascertaining the “correct” reading. For a thorough scholarly treatment of
the keri and ketiv in our verse, which also contains a survey of different academic approaches, see Frederic W.
Bush, Ruth, Esther (1996), pp. 216-229.
[8]
I have chosen to translate the verse according to its plain meaning (peshuto shel mikra). Although Chazal offer a different
reading of this verse, which contains significantly different halakhic implications, they are the first to admit that their reading of
the verse deviates from its plain meaning (see Yevamot 24a).
[9]
See II Shemuel 18:18; Yeshayahu 56:5.
[10]
Rashi offers an interesting suggestion in his comment on Ruth 3:9 (see footnote #6 above).
[11]
See the discussion of this assumption in Yevamot 24a. Rashbam and Ibn Caspi (Devarim 25:6) maintain that this is the simple
meaning of the verse. Ramban (Bereishit 38:8; Devarim 25:6) disagrees. As proof, he cites the fact that the name of the son born
to Ruth and Boaz is Oved, and not Machlon. To support his contention, Ibn Caspi claims that Ruth actually named her son Machlon,
but the neighbors called him Oved!
[12]
The centrality of the inheritance for the maintenance of the name is not evident in the passage in Devarim. It is, however, quite
clearly linked in Megillat Ruth, in which Boaz twice states that the goal is “to uphold the name of the deceased upon his
inheritance” (Ruth 4:5, 10). Rashi on Devarim 25:6 offers the following explanation: “‘He shall be established in the name of the
[deceased] brother’ – The one who performs yibbum with his wife shall take the inheritance of the deceased along with the estate
of his father.” See also Targum Yonatan on Devarim 25:5-6. In this vein, Yevamot 17b maintains that only brothers who share in
their father’s ancestral inheritance are considered brothers for the purpose of levirate marriage.
[13]
Yevamot 24a does not reference the story of the daughters of Tzelafchad, but instead adduces Bereishit 48:6 as a proof text for
this connection.
[14]
Mishna Yevamot 4:7; Yevamot 24a; Rambam, Hilkhot Nachalot 3:7.
[15]
Interestingly, in Bava Batra 12b, there is an argument regarding whether the yavam is meant to receive both pieces of land
contiguously (like the bekhor). The conclusion is that it is not in his rights to demand this. In other words, the yavam inherits two
distinct pieces of land, in contrast to a bekhor who receives a double portion. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the brother is
charged with maintaining the distinctive land of the deceased. I am grateful to Rabbi Dr. Judah Goldberg for this source and for
discussing this issue with me. I thank also Rabbi Danny Wolf for discussing the complexities of this topic with me.
[16]
R. Yaakov Medan, Hope from the Depths: A Study in Megillat Ruth (Heb.) (2007), p. 83, indeed suggests that the peshat of the
verse is that if there is a son born from the yibbum union, that child receives the entire inheritance of the deceased (after the death
of the grandfather). Although this is not the conclusion of the Halakha, Rav Medan explained to me that his intention is to expound
the plain meaning of the verse, whose internal logic is compelling.
[17]
While this is not the halakha in regard to the mitzva of yibbum, the peshat of Devarim 25:6 suggests that his idea may underlie
the original concept of yibbum. Given that our scenario is at best an echo of the mitzva of yibbum, it is certainly conceivable that
the inheritance of Machlon will be given to the son of Ruth’s forthcoming marriage, in keeping with the peshat of Devarim 25:6.
See R. Yaakov Medan, Hope from the Depths: A Study in Megillat Ruth [Heb.] (2007), pp. 84-85, 91.
[18]
Because the marriage to Ruth is not actual yibbum, as we will prove in the next shiur, the land of Machlon would not
automatically go to a child who is born to Ruth. Therefore, the land must be purchased by the man she marries and given to the
child in acknowledgement of the aim of maintaining the name of the deceased upon his inheritance.
[19]
These passages (Ruth 4:5, 10) are the only places in the Tanakh where the verb “kana,” “to purchase,” is used to refer to the
taking of a wife. This seems designed to create a further link between the purchase of the land and the marriage to Ruth. Later in
the chapter, when Boaz actually marries Ruth, the more common word, “lakach,” is used (Ruth 4:13).

30
[20]
R. Yaakov Medan, Hope from the Depths: A Study in Megillat Ruth (Heb.) (2007), pp. 83-84, takes this one step further. He
suggests that the reason that the Torah frowns upon chalitza (the alternative to yibbum) is because underlying it is the untoward
desire to possess his brother’s land by inheriting it himself, instead of producing an heir for his brother.
[21]
Shiur # 7 developed this topic at length.
[22]
Naomi’s declaration that she has lost her name seems to derive from two correlative losses: that of her land and that of her
children. From the economic perspective, Naomi’s sale of her inheritance means that she has lost her identity alongside her ability
to support herself. Moreover, the death of Naomi’s children and the termination of her continuity also mean the loss of her name.
This explains the goals of chapter four, which involve the restoration of Naomi’s land and progeny, thereby restoring her name and
that of her family.
[23]
See shiurim # 13, 18.
[24]
This is ostensibly as punishment for refusing to uphold the name of the deceased. See shiur # 28.
[25]
In response to Ruth’s mention of Boaz’s name, Naomi declares for the first time her acknowledgement that someone may
redeem her: “The man is close to us; he is of our redeemers” (Ruth 2:20). See shiur #19.
[26]
See shiurim # 18, 24.
[27]
Rashi says that it means that Boaz’s name will be great.
[28]
Indeed, in many congregations, the naming of a child is preceded precisely by this phrase, “va-yikarei shemo be-Yisrael.”
[29]
See e.g. Robert L. Hubbard, The Book of Ruth (1988), p. 271.
[30]
See Edward F. Campbell Jr., Ruth (Anchor Bible, 1975), p. 163. The phrase which generally connotes celebration of a name is
usually preceded by the preposition “be” and generally used with respect to God (as in to call in God’s name, “kara be-shem
Hashem”). See e.g. Bereishit 12:8; Shemot 34:5. Nevertheless, sometimes the phrase appears without a preposition, with the
meaning to celebrate (e.g. Devarim 32:3; Tehillim 99:6). Campbell suggests the possibility that God is the subject of the phrase,
although he concludes that it is more likely that the phrase refers to the child’s name. See also Frederic W.
Bush, Ruth, Esther (1996), p. 256.
[31]
See shiurim # 2, 3, 13, 24.
[32]
In shiur #19, I suggested that Naomi’s ability to regard Ruth as a subject who has both a name and an identity is triggered by
Boaz, who models this behavior. The people of Bethlehem will likewise take Boaz’s cue and regard Ruth as an individual with a
name. In this way, Boaz guides the nation to regard each other as people and reinstates their identity and name.
[33]
The intertwining of the themes of people’s names and God’s name is especially prominent in the Exodus narrative. There too
the text indicates that without one’s own name, one cannot truly know God’s name. It transpires that one cannot fulfill one’s duty
to promulgate God’s name if one does not know one’s own name.
[34]
Perhaps this is the reason that the witnesses bless the union of Boaz and Ruth with the words, “And call a name
in Bethlehem” (Ruth 4:11).
[35]
The Tanakh highlights the greatness of the name of David’s son, Shelomo (I Melakhim 1:47; 5:11). Significantly, Shelomo’s
name is said to be great in order to make God’s name great (I Melakhim 10:1).
[36]
See also e.g. I Melakhim 5:19; 8:16-20. David is aware of the obligation to promote God’s name from the very beginning. This
is his primary aim during his battle with Golyat (I Shemuel 17:45). We also see this in David’s concern with the ark, which is said
to bear God’s name (II Shemuel 6:2). See also II Shemuel 6:18; 22:50.
[37]
While the simple meaning of this rather convoluted verse may be that God establishes the nation to establish for Himself a
name (e.g. Radak ad loc.), another reading of the verse yields the possibility that God has conferred a name upon His nation.

31
SOURCES: “When Brothers dwell together”

Deut 25:5

32
Rashi

‫ כי ישבו אחים יחדו‬..IF BRETHREN ABIDE TOGETHER, [AND ONE OF THEM DIE … THE
WIFE OF THE DEAD SHALL NOT MARRY ABROAD] —

This does not mean that they abide in one city but that they have one “abiding” in the world (that
they were living at the same time) thus excluding from the operation of this law the wife of one’s
brother who never was in his “world” (i.e. a woman may not marry her brother-in-law who was
born after her husband’s death) (Sifrei Devarim 288:2; Yevamot 17b).

SIFRE 288:1

(Devarim 25:5) "When brothers dwell together and one of them dies, and he has no son, the
wife of the dead one shall not be outside to a strange man. Her levir (her husband's brother)
shall come upon her and he shall take her for himself as a wife, and he shall have her in levirate
marriage (yibum)."

33
"When brothers dwell together": to exclude a brother who was not in his world (i.e., who
was not concurrently alive). From here they ruled: If there were two brothers and one of them died
and another one was born, after which the second brother performed yibum with the wife of the
first, after which he died, then the first wife (i.e., the wife of the brother who died first) is exempt
(from yibum) by reason of her being "the wife of his brother who was not in his world," and the
second wife (i.e., the wife of the second brother) by reason of her being her (the first wife's) tzarah
(co-wife). "together": in inheritance — to exclude maternal brothers. Because we find in arayoth
(illicit relations) that a maternal brother is equated with a paternal brother, I might think that here,
too, this is so. It is, therefore, written "together" (in inheritance), to exclude his maternal brother.

IBN EZRA

IF BRETHREN19Hebrew, achim (brothers). DWELL TOGETHER.

The deniers also say that these brethren20The brothers spoken of in our verse. are not actual
brothers,21For Scripture explicitly prohibits a man from marrying his sister-inlaw. See Lev. 18:6.
but are relatives. They brought proof from Boaz.22Boaz married Ruth, who was the wife of his
deceased relative, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance (Ruth 4:5).

However, they contribute nothing, for there is no mention of levirate marriage,23In the Book of
Ruth. only of redemption.24Boaz married Ruth so that her husband’s field would not pass into the
hands of a stranger. He thus “redeemed” the said field. See Ruth 4:1-6. Why mention the word
together?25In our verse. Does it matter if they were in one state or in one courtyard, or if they loved
each other?26According to the Rabbinic tradition the word brethren mean brothers and together
means alive at the same time.

However, if we accept the Karaitic interpretation then we do not know what Scripture means by
the word together. They say,27So Vat. Ebr. 38. Mikra’ot Gedolot reads: He says. look, the verse

34
says ve-yibbemah (and shall perform the duty of a husband’s brother unto her).28The word yavam
means a brother-in-law. This shows that he is her brother-in-law in name only.29The Karaites
interpret ve-yibbemah as and be a brother-in-law to her. Now if the true brother-in-law was being
addressed Scripture would not say and be a brother-in-law to her. Hence we must interpret ve-
yibbemah as meaning “act as a brother-in-law to her.” The upshot of all this is that a true brother-
in-law is not being addressed. It is like thy sister-in-law (yevimtekh)30Yevimtekh is the word
yevamah (sister-in-law) plus the second person personal pronoun. Orpah was the wife of Ruth’s
brother-in-law (yavam).

She is referred to as a yevamah because she took her husband’s place. We thus see that the term
yavam in its various forms can refer to one who acts like one’s brother-in-law. is gone back (Ruth
1:15). Now observe that they have become foolish and stupid, for Scripture states, with regard to
the sons of Judah, and perform the duty of a husband’s brother (ve-yabbem) unto her31Tamar, the
widow of Er the son of Judah. (Gen. 38:8).32Judah told his son Onan to go and perform the duty
of a husband’s brother unto your sister-in-law Tamar. Now he33Onan the brother of Er. was
her34Tamar’s. brother-in-law.35It is thus clear that levirate marriage was performed by the actual
brother-in-law. Also, the term yevimtekh (thy sister-in-law) (Ruth 1:15) was used because they
were married to two brothers.36In other words, the term yevamah was not employed figuratively in
Ruth.

All intelligent people know that the negative commandments given to Moses37Excluding the
Noahide laws, which were given to Adam and Noah (see Meijler). we’re not previously
prohibited.38There was thus no prohibition before the revelation at Sinai against a man to
marrying his sister-in-law. However, it would not have been evil in the eyes of God if someone
abstained from them39That is, from those negative commandments from which reason tells us to
abstain. before the law was given to Moses.40

In other words, God would have been pleased with a person who abstained from practices which
He would later prohibit. If the law prohibiting intercourse with a sister-in-law was based on
reason, i.e., it was an abomination, then Scripture would not have condemned Onan for not
wanting to impregnate his sister-in-law.

The fact that Scripture states, for all these abominations have the men of the land done, that were
before you (Lev. 18:27), shows that this is certainly the case. We do not find a prophet who warned
them.41From engaging in the practices that Lev. 18:27 refers to, for Scripture believes that one
ought to know not to engage in these practices by employing one’s rationality. See Yesod Mora 5:
“The fundamental commandments are those precepts that are implanted in the heart. They…were
known by reason before the Torah was given through the agency of Moses”

Look, Scripture says of Onan, who did not give seed to his brother, the thing which he did was evil
in the sight of God (Gen. 38:10).42God thus wants a brother to marry the childless widow of his
biological brother. We will therefore rely on the tradition that they are actual brothers.

35
Seforno

‫ כי ישבו אחים יחדו‬,“when brothers live together, etc.”

the word: “together” here is not to be understood in terms of space but in terms of time, i.e. both
are alive at the same time. They share time on earth. In addition, only brothers who share the same
father are referred to in the legislation about to be revealed here.11

That there are distinctions between brothers from the father and brothers from the mother, we
know from when Joseph’s brothers on their arrival in Egypt described themselves by saying that
they were all the sons of one father. (Genesis 42,11).

Likutei Halachot EVEN HAEZER Hil Get 4.8.1

11
We are familiar with the basic principle about the levirate marriage from Tamar and the sons of Yehudah in Genesis chapter 38,
long before the Torah was given to the Jewish people.

36
37
 Medical Issues, Sonograms and Kohanim's Wives
A Halachic Stringency Imposed by Technology?

Rabbi Chaim Jachter writes:12

Usually, technology improves our lives in both mundane and halachic matters. For example, the
problem of agunot (women unable to remarry because it is not known if their husbands are dead
or alive) has been dramatically ameliorated in our generation due to vastly improved
communication technologies and DNA evidence.13

However, the emergence of ultrasound testing of pregnant women as a standard procedure might
impose some restrictions upon the wives of kohanim if it reveals to them that they are carrying a
male child.

A few points need to be clarified before we begin our discussion. The Torah (Vayikra 21:1) forbids
kohanim to come in contact with the dead. This restriction, however, applies only to male kohanim
(Sotah 23b, cited by Rashi to Vayikra 21:1). Contact with the dead includes being in the same
building as a dead body (Bemidbar 19:14). 2For a summary of whether this rule prohibits kohanim
from entering hospitals, see Nishmat Avraham (2:209-210). For further discussion of this issue,
see Techumin (19:323-334). Although children are not personally obligated to observe this

12
https://www.koltorah.org/halachah/sonograms-and-kohanims-wives-part-one-by-rabbi-chaim-jachter?rq=sonogram
13
See Gray Matter 2 pp.114-138 and our section about the admissibility of DNA evidence in beit din.

38
restriction, adults cannot deliberately cause even the youngest of kohanim (even an infant) to come
in contact with a dead body (Mishnah Berurah 343:3 and Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 373:1).

Thus, a pregnant wife of a kohen who discovers that her child is male might be prohibited from
even entering a funeral home or any other building containing a dead body, because she thereby
causes her unborn male child to come in contact with the dead. In this chapter, we shall outline
both the lenient and strict approaches to this issue, about which the poskim remain divided. Our
discussion is based on essays by Rav J. David Bleich, (Tradition 39:2:90-96) and Rav Zalman
Nechemia Goldberg (Ateret Shlomo pp. 33-39) and on a conversation with Rav Hershel Schachter.
The discussion of this issue among the poskim is extraordinarily rich, touching on many
fundamental principles and disputes regarding various aspects of the halachic process.

The S’feik S’feika Argument – the Rokei’ach

Traditionally, pregnant wives of kohanim did not have to be concerned about the possibility that
they might be carrying a boy. The Rokei’ach (366) articulates a leniency based on the rule of s’feik
s’feika (double doubt). Although normally one must rule strictly if there is a doubt regarding a
Torah-level prohibition, one may be lenient if two aspects of the situation are uncertain. We have
such a double uncertainty, argues the Rokei’ach, in the case of the kohen’s wife: first, the child
might be a female, and second, even if the child is a male, it might be a neifel (a non-viable child),
to whom the restrictions on contact with the dead do not apply. The Shach (Y.D. 371:1) cites the
Rokei’ach as normative Halachah.3The Shulchan Aruch, Rama, and Aruch Hashulchan do not
raise the question of a fetus coming in contact with the dead. We shall deal with this omission later
in our discussion.

Accordingly, many question whether the Rokei’ach’s leniency still applies today, when women
are able to discover the gender of their unborn children at their routine sonograms. Resolving the
gender of the fetus might break the first prong of the s’feik s’feika. The applicability of the
Rokei’ach’s explanation is the focus of much of the debate concerning this issue.

The Strict Approach – Rav J. David Bleich

Rav Bleich focuses on a debate amongst the poskim as to whether a s’feik s’feika remains in effect
if the doubt can be resolved. The Rama (Y.D. 110:9) rules leniently, but the Shach (Y.D. 110
Klalei S’feik S’feika 35:66) notes that some are strict.4This question seems to hinge upon how one
understands the role of s’feik s’feika. See Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik’s analysis cited by Rav
Schachter in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 9:158. If one believes that we treat
a case of s’feik s’feika as if the leniency is conclusively correct with no safeik at all, there is no
need to investigate further about either safeik. If, however, a s’feik s’feika is treated as a doubt
that is resolved leniently, there might be reason to investigate one or both of the doubts, if possible.
The Shach concludes that one should be strict in a case in which it is easy for one to check and
there is no expense involved in resolving the doubt. Thus, since it is easy (and involves no extra
cost) for a pregnant wife of a kohen to inquire as to the gender of the fetus when she undergoes
her routine sonogram, it would seem that she is obligated to make this inquiry and then to avoid
contact with the dead if she finds that the fetus is male.

39
Nonetheless, the Teshuvot Noda Biy’hudah (Y.D. 43, cited in Pitchei Teshuvah Y.D. 110:35)
writes that even the strict opinion would be lenient in a case where only one prong of the double
doubt can be clarified. The Pitchei Teshuvah records that Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot Rav Akiva
Eiger 77) and the Maharshal (cited in Teshuvot Beit Yaakov 84) agree with this approach, and he
cites no dissenting opinions.

Accordingly, since only one of the prongs of the Rokei’ach’s s’feik s’feika – the fetus’ gender –
can be resolved by a sonogram, the s’feik s’feika remains in effect. Hence, the wives of kohanim
should not inquire as to the gender of their unborn children, thus preserving the s’feik s’feika and
obviating the need to avoid contact with the dead.

Rav Bleich notes, however, that some Acharonim, including the Pri Megadim (O.C. Eishel
Avraham 343:2) and Gilyon Maharsha (Y.D. 371:1), challenge the validity of the s’feik s’feika
presented by the Rokei’ach. They note that Tosafot (Ketubot 9a s.v. Ve’iba’it Eima)5Tosafot’s view
is cited as normative by the Shach (Y.D. 110 Klalei S’feik s’feika 33) and the Aruch Hashulchan
(Y.D. 110:115). rule that a doubt can be utilized to create a legitimate s’feik s’feika only if each
side is a safeik hashakul (at least a fifty percent chance of occurrence). Accordingly, while the
safeik as to the gender of the fetus is a safeik hashakul, since at least fifty percent of babies are
female, the safeik as to whether the baby is a neifel is not, since nefalim comprise only a very small
percentage of babies.

This leads the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot Chatam Sofer Y.D. 354, referenced in Pitchei Teshuvah
Y.D. 371:1) to reinterpret the reasoning of the Rokei’ach. The principle that permits pregnant
wives of kohanim to come in contact with the dead, according to the Chatam Sofer’s reading, is
not s’feik s’feika. Rather, it is rov (majority): since about fifty percent of fetuses will be girls and
several more will be nefalim, there is no concern for contact with the dead regarding the majority
of unborn children.

Rav Bleich notes that basing this lenient ruling on rov rather than on s’feik s’feika has major
repercussions. Unlike a s’feik s’feika, which remains intact even if one of the prongs can be readily
resolved, one cannot rely on rov to resolve a doubt if the doubt is readily resolved upon
inspection.6Investigation is not necessary in cases of s’feik s’feika, even where it would be for rov,
because s’feik s’feika is a more potent tool for resolving doubt (though there is much discussion
of this point, summarized by the Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 110:96-98). In a situation in which there
is a very significant minority (mi’ut hamatzui) of cases that differ from the rov, rabbinic law
requires one to investigate the situation if it is possible to do so (see Rashi to Chullin 12a s.v.
Pesach and Ramban, Milchamot Hashem to Chullin 4a in the pages in the Rif). Though there is
some dispute as to what constitutes a mi’ut hamatzui, it is generally accepted that more than ten
percent is considered a mi’ut hamatzui. 7See Teshuvot Mishkenot Yaakov 1 Y.D. 17, Teshuvot
Minchat Shlomo 2:61:1, and Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (cited in Nefesh Harav p. 228). Rav
J.David Bleich (Tradition 41:1:56) notes that ten percent is the most widely accepted standard for
this matter, though he cites alternative views. Rav Mordechai Willig also mentioned ten percent
in a shiur delivered to the Rabbinical Council of America.

For example, Rav Hershel Schachter told me that if most suit jackets do not contain sha’atnez (a
forbidden wool and linen mixture), but more than ten percent do,8Rav Schachter noted that this

40
percentage varies based on the price of the suit and the country in which it is manufactured. one
would be required, on a rabbinic level, to inspect a suit jacket he has purchased to see if it contains
sha’atnez.9Also see the last paragraph of Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:72. In our case, Rav Bleich
rules that since viable males constitute a very significant minority of unborn children, a kohen’s
wife would be required by rabbinic law to inquire at her sonogram whether the fetus is male. If it
is, she would be required to avoid contact with the dead.10Included in this requirement is avoiding
awnings of a funeral home that hang over a sidewalk, trees that overhang from a cemetery onto a
sidewalk or street, and museums that house dead bodies.

Rav Bleich does, however, permit the wife to give birth in a hospital (despite the possible presence
of dead bodies) because of concern for pikuach nefesh (life-threatening danger). Rav Bleich notes
that Halachah always regards childbirth as a situation that constitutes such a danger (see Shabbat
128b-129a), and he marshals many recent medical studies to prove that the danger is lessened
when the birth takes place in a hospital. Although there are some studies that indicate that home
births with a certified professional midwife might be as safe as hospital deliveries, every individual
has the halachic right to choose which health care provider and service is the better option for him
or her (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchatah 32:38). Accordingly, even if the sonogram indicates that the
fetus is a boy, the kohen’s wife may choose to give birth in a hospital if she believes that it is safer
to do so there.

The Lenient View – Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg

There are, however, many reasons to adopt a lenient approach to our issue. First, it is possible to
defend the integrity of the s’feik s’feika from the question of the Pri Megadim and Gilyon
Maharsha. Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg notes that the Gemara (Yevamot 119a) constructs a
similar s’feik s’feika, although it does not specifically mention the term, in the context of the
halachot of yibum and chalitzah.

Some background is necessary to understand the Gemara’s case. If a man dies childless, the Torah
(Devarim 25:4-11) obligates the brother of the deceased either to marry the widow (yibum) or
participate in a ceremony in which he officially declines to marry her (chalitzah). If the deceased
left offspring, however, there is no obligation for his brother to perform either yibum or chalitzah.
The Mishnah (Yevamot 16:1) discusses a case where a woman’s husband died childless and the
deceased husband did not have a brother, thus avoiding the requirement for yibum or chalitzah.
However, the deceased husband’s mother remains alive in a distant land where the wife could not
communicate with her. The Mishnah teaches that the wife need not be concerned that the mother
gave birth to a male child who would be required to perform yibum or chalitzah because of what
may be construed as a s’feik s’feika: “Perhaps she miscarried and perhaps she gave birth to a
female.” It thus appears that such a s’feik s’feika is valid.11Alternatively, the Gemara’s case could
be understood as employing the principle of rov, as we noted earlier from the Chatam Sofer. Rav
Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, however, understands s’feik s’feika to be merely a more potent form
of rov, and thus one cannot distinguish between the two, since they are identical concepts. For
further discussion of this issue, see Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 110:96-98.

Rav Zalman Nechemia also points out that the Rivash (372, cited by the Shev Shemateta 1:18)
cites this passage as a contradiction to the aforementioned Tosafot in Ketubot. The Rivash

41
distinguishes between the two cases, explaining that a safeik pertaining to a naturally occurring
event can be marshaled to construct a s’feik s’feika even if it is not a safeik hashakul. Tosafot, on
the other hand, address a case in which the s’feik s’feika is based on doubts regarding how a
particular person behaved. Such a doubt, according to the Rivash, can be used to create a s’feik
s’feika only if it is a safeik hashakul.

Accordingly, concludes Rav Zalman Nechemia, the s’feik s’feika of the Rokei’ach is legitimate,
since both doubts relate to which naturally occurring event happened, even though one prong is
not a safeik hashakul. Since the Rokei’ach’s s’feik s’feika stands, a kohen’s wife may rely on the
opinions that one need not resolve a s’feik s’feika, and thus she need not ask about her child’s
gender at her sonogram.

Rabbinic Philosophies and the Scientific Method

Jeremy Brown writes:14

LAST TIME ON TALMUDOLOGY

Although permitted by Jewish law, in Victorian Britain it was illegal for a man to marry his dead
wife’s sister – though many did. There were attempts to change the law and permit this kind of
marriage, but many in the Church of England remained opposed. Writing in 1887 in The British
Medical Journal, an anonymous surgeon claimed that science could provide support for the
permissive movement. But we now know that the science he offered (that all future children of a
woman, regardless of the father, carry the traits of the man who first impregnated her) is wrong.
This shows that science changes. But if science changes, what should we do when it seems to
challenge Jewish tradition?

WHAT IS STUFF MADE OF?

Several years ago, I had the pleasure of studying science with my then 13-year-old daughter
Ayelet. She was preparing for a test, and the subject was “Atomic Structure.”

14
http://www.talmudology.com/

42
WHY DON'T KIDS REJECT SCIENCE?

Now here is a fascinating thing. My daughter had no existential breakdown when she realized that
the way scientists understand the world changes over time. She did not once say to me “Scientists
are useless. They change their minds all the time. They must have no idea what they are talking
about. I’m done with learning science…” Not even close (though, by the end, she was most
certainly done with studying for her science test). Let's compare this attitude towards the changing
nature of scientific knowledge with that of some Jewish thinkers, past and present.

REUVEN LANDAU & FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM

Let’s start with someone who is not well known (unless you read the book). Reuven Landau (d.
1883?) wrote strongly against the Copernican model of the solar system in which the sun is
stationary, and the earth revolves around it. But in 1851 Foucault demonstrated with his
pendulum that the earth really was revolving, (though it didn’t prove that it revolved around the
sun). What to do with this evidence? Landau had no doubt. Science was fickle and changed all the
time, so don’t worry about it.

This skepticism about accepting the results of the famous pendulum experiment reflected
Landau's attitude towards science in general, which can be best summed up like this. Since all
scientific theories are in a state of constant flux, it's best not to pay too much attention to them.
When Jewish beliefs are challenged by science, take the long view; in doing so, tradition
will ultimately be vindicated. (His view was actually more nuanced than that, insofar as he was
willing to quote from the science when it supported his anti-Copernican position, but criticized the
same science as being fickle when it proved to be problematic.)

RAV KOOK

Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935), the first chief rabbi of Palestine, is thought to have welcomed
science as a tool to understudying God's universe. While this is generally correct, (he was famously
sympathetic to Darwin's theory, though in none of his writings does he mention Darwin by
name,) Rav Kook cautioned against accepting all scientific theories "...even those about which
there is general agreement, for they are like a fading flower (‫)כי הן כציץ נובל‬. Soon enough new
instruments will be developed, and people will mock these new theories . . . only the word of our
God will last forever." Because scientific theories come and go so quickly, Rav Kook felt it was
best not to get too attached to them.

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THE BEN ISH HAI

Joseph Hayyim (1834–1909) was born in Baghdad, where at the age of twenty-five, he succeeded
his father as leader of the Jewish community. He authored a work that is widely read by Sephardic
Jews to this day called Ben Ish Hai, but it was in another work that he advanced an example of
extreme rabbinic skepticism towards science.

Note the language the Ben Ish Hai uses here.

“When an objection to an earlier system arises, the entire system is destroyed, because when a
foundation is destroyed the whole house crumbles.

But is this a fair description of the scientific method? Did Bohr's atomic model (work for which
he won the Nobel prize in 1922) really destroy the entire edifice of physics, or did it nudge it closer
to the truth?

PINHAS HURWITZ & SEFER HABERIT

Sefer Haberit is probably the best selling Jewish book of science ever written. First published
anonymously in 1797, it remains in print to this day. Its author, Pinhas Hurwitz from Vilna, wrote
the book in two parts; the first was a scientific encyclopedia dealing with what he called human
wisdom, and the second part dealt with divine wisdom, (and was ostensibly focussed on explaining
a sixteenth century kabbalistic work by Hayyim Vital).

Hurwitz cautioned against ever accepting any particular scientific theory. His notion of the way
science changes is certainly not as extreme as that of the Ben Ish Hai, but it placed him in a rather
odd situation. Hurwitz didn't much like the new Copernican model of the universe with the earth
revolving around the sun, but neither could he go back to the old geocentric model. So in the spirit
of compromise he suggested following the model proposed by Tycho Brahe some two centuries
earlier, the details of which need not detain us. But Hurwitz knew that this model had been utterly
discredited in the scientific community. No problem, wrote Hurwitz, because science is always
changing its mind. Perhaps one day this old, discredited model will come back into favor, and
when it does, it will pose less of a problem for traditional Jewish belief than the current widely
accepted Copernican model.

44
So according to Hurwitz, it made sense to accept a discredited theory that supported his notion of
Jewish belief, because one day, perhaps, the scientists will go back to believing what they now
reject as false. It is as if today, we claimed that it's perfectly reasonable to believe the world is
flat, because that was once an accepted belief, and who knows, perhaps one day scientists will
return to the flat-earth theory and believe once again that it is a true description of the world.

THE MAHARAL OF PRAGUE

Another Jewish skeptic of science is the great Rabbi Judah Loew (d.1609), known by his acronym
Maharal. In a long essay he contrasted knowledge attained from observation of the universe and
knowledge obtained from Jewish tradition. The former is constantly changing, and inferior to the
unchanging wisdom received through divine revelation.

Note that the Maharal made an expansive claim (and one that was very popular circa 1580): all
true knowledge comes from religion - or more precisely - from the rabbis. He did not say that the
rabbis provided spiritual insights while "experts" (who we'd call "scientists" today) provided
insights into the physical universe. Rather he claimed that truth can only come from the "Sages of
Israel who received their information from Moses at Sinai". As a consequence, scientists really
have no seat at the table when we discuss knowledge.

RABBI MOSHE MEISELMAN

The last example we will look at is a contemporary figure, Rabbi Moshe Meiselman. His recent
book states that he "was trained by some of the great names in mathematics, philosophy and the
sciences at two of America's premier universities." Great! Rabbi Meiselman has studied outside of
the walls of the Jewish ghetto - something the Maharal could not do, even if he had wanted. So
we should expect a fresh and sophisticated approach from a rabbi who gets science, right? Wrong.

Rabbi Meiselman here has the same old understanding of science as the Ben Ish Hai. When a new
scientific theory replaces an older one, everything comes crashing down and we are left wandering

45
in search of something new to grab on to. Elsewhere though, he sounds more like the Maharal,
who objected to scientific hubris, and reminded us that science can make no truth claims, for these
are reserved for the rabbis.

[A]t every juncture, just as soon as the dust of the latest revolution has settled, one inevitably finds
scientists claiming that the ultimate secrets often universe have finally been unlocked and that
there are few surprises left in store...Absolute truth has been attained! (584)

Now in fairness to Rabbi Meisleman, elsewhere in his long book he shows a better understanding
of the scientific method.

Which is it then, Rabbi Meiselman? Do scientists claim to have attained the Truth (as he writes),
or rather are they engaged in a process that brings us ever closer to this goal without their having
arrived (as he also writes)? His is a a peculiar mix of positions.

Got a spare five minutes? Great, then we can go a little deeper, and see why these rabbinic
philosophies don't really reflect what science is all about. To do that, let's consider the truth claims
of the following pairs of scientific statements.

1. THE EARTH IS FLAT VS THE EARTH IS ROUND.

46
Both of these statements are incorrect. The earth is actually an oblate spheroid, that is, a globe
which is slightly flattened at the poles. But the statement "the earth is round" is much closer to
the truth than the claim that "the earth is flat."

2. ALL MATTER CONSISTS OF JUST FOUR ELEMENTS

VS ALL MATTER IS MADE UP OF JUST ELECTRONS
AND PROTONS.

Again, both are false, but the second statement is a lot less false than the first. Matter is certainly
not just made up of the four elements of earth, air, fire and water. But it's also not just made up of
electrons and protons; matter is now known to be made up of neutrinos and muons, and up quarks
and down quarks and charm quarks and who what knows other kinds of elementary particles still
waiting to be discovered.

The second statement is truer that the first, but physicists would not claim that it's the last word on
the subject.

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 3. VITAMINS PREVENT CANCER VS VITAMINS DON'T
PREVENT CANCER

Here are starts to get complicated. While some studies are pretty conclusive (no-one really suggests
that smoking doesn't cause lung cancer) other scientific claims seem to change over time. For
example, the relationship between vitamins (especially vitamin D) and cancer is one that we have
had different scientific answers to at different times. In 1999 the N-HANES study of over 5,000
women followed for twenty years reported that vitamin D was associated with a reduction in breast
cancer. Then in 2007 the Journal of the National Cancer Institute looked at a group of 36,000
women in the Women's Health Initiative. It reported that there was no effect of vitamin D on the
risk of breast cancer. Today, the official position of our National Cancer Institute is this: it still
isn't sure if there is any association.

And now a fourth scientific claim, this time from the field of mathematics

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 4. IN A RIGHT-ANGLED TRIANGLE, THE SQUARE OF
THE HYPOTENUSE IS EQUAL TO THE SUM OF THE
SQUARES OF THE OTHER TWO SIDES.

This theorem (like all mathematical theorems) is true in a special way. So long as we're talking
about two-dimensional geometry, then this theorem will be true in all possible places in the
universe; it was always true in the past, and it will always be true in the future. That's what makes
a mathematical theorem true in a different way from a medical truth, or a truth about the physical
universe. The latter two may be partially true, or true of the basis of the best equipment we have
available, but these are not true in the way that the Pythagorean theorem is true.

KINDS OF SCIENCE

So there are different kinds of scientific claims, some of which are truer than others. And scientific
progress advances in different ways depending on which area of knowledge we are
addressing. These differences were not noted by any of the rabbinic critics we've cited above, but
once understood, they allow us to appreciate that science can make different claims over time and
that some of these can change without the entire scientific enterprise being called into question.

One last thing- be careful of any appeal to relativism. It could be argued that each of the rabbis we
cited (well, other than Rabbi Meiselman) lived at a time when these subtleties were not
appreciated. As a result we should not be a harsh judge of their philosophies of science, which just
reflect the way people thought at that time. I am sympathetic to this claim, and I think it is a
perfectly reasonable explanation of how they may have arrived at their opinions. But if these rabbis
were just reflecting the way everyone thought when they lived, we are most certainly not bound to
consider these opinions as anything other than of historical interest. And since we now know
differently, we can ignore these rabbinic opinions as we forge our own Jewish
philosophies towards science. If, on the other hand, the claim is made that these rabbis were
reflecting a profound Jewish Truth that will remain so for ever, well, then we have a problem.
Because you are then forced to reject the science and end up arguing for all kinds of things we
know are simply not true.

One other last thing. This is not a claim that science is the only path to knowledge, happiness and
enlightenment. I am not suggesting anything like that. Steven Pinker argued for something along
these lines in the pages of The New Republic (ֹ ‫)ז'ל‬, and Leon Wieseltier wrote a
persuasive response, both of which are well worth reading. (I find myself more sympathetic to
the latter than the former.) But when it comes to scientific questions, well, that is where science
does, perhaps know best.

“Science confers no special authority, it confers no authority at all, for the attempt to answer a
nonscientific question.

— Leon Wieseltier

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WHERE WE'VE BEEN

We noted that 130 years ago the laws of Yibbum were explained with a scientific fact that today
we know is incorrect. This example raises the possibility that the scientific enterprise is only ever
tentative and should be best ignored when it seems to raise questions about Jewish teachings. But
that doesn’t really capture the way science progresses. We examined six rabbinic understandings
of the philosophy of science and noted that they do not capture the different meanings we have
when we way that something is a fact of science.

We need some new Jewish philosophies of science. They must consider these different meanings
and need to be more sophisticated than the rabbinic understandings that we examined. There have
been some really good efforts to address this area (like here and here and here), but more work
needs to be done. Who wants a shot?

Naming the First Son from Yibbum?

RABBI DR. ARI Z. ZIVOTOFSKY writes:15

The first son of a levirate1 marriage (yibbum) must be named after the deceased
husband/brother?

15
https://jewishaction.com/religion/jewish-law/whats-the-truth-about-naming-the-first-son-from-yibbum/

50
Fact: There is no such requirement, although whether it is allowed, discouraged or encouraged is
subject to debate. This misconception may have arisen due to a comment made by Rashi in
Bereishit.

Background:
Yibbum is the Biblical commandment that if a married man dies childless, his brother should marry
the widow, and their first-born son will, according to the pasuk, “yakum al shem achiv hamet—
succeed in the name of his dead brother” (Devarim 25:6). The literal translation of this Hebrew
phrase is often understood as: “[he] will perpetuate the name of the dead brother.”

The objective of this mitzvah is stated explicitly at the end of the pasuk: “v’lo yimacheh shemo
mi’Yisrael—his [the deceased brother’s] name will not be erased from Israel” (ibid.). This might
lead one to interpret the earlier part of the pasuk as instructing that the son should be named for
the deceased. This is such an obvious understanding that the Gemara (Yevamot 24a) quotes
a Baraita2 that queries: if the deceased was named Yosef, should the son be named Yosef, and if
the deceased was named Yochanan, should the son be called Yochanan? The Baraita rejects this
possibility by invoking a gezeirah shavah (an interpretive methodology in which a known rule is
applied to a new case based upon a similar word or phrase in both cases) from Bereishit 48:6.
When Yaakov used the phrase “al shem achei’hem yi’kar’u—they will be called after the name of
their brothers” regarding any future sons born to Yosef, the term shem (name) referred to
inheritance; thus in the context of yibbum, the term shem in Devarim 25:6 indicates that the one
performing yibbum3 receives his brother’s inheritance, not that the son is named after the deceased.

The gemara continues with Rava commenting that while in general the simple reading of a Biblical
text (peshat) is never ignored, this instance is the sole exception. Although the peshat is that the
son is named after his deceased uncle,4 the gezeirah shavah entirely removes the verse from its
plain meaning.5 Rashi and Ramban to Devarim 25:6 explain the phrase as the Gemara does, as
does Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (d. 1888; Devarim 25:6), who does so at great length.

Even absent a requirement to name after the deceased, Rashi (Rut 3:9, 4:10) poignantly explains
how the transfer of the inheritance serves to perpetuate the memory of the deceased. He says that
every time the widow or the yavam (brother who performed yibbum) enters the deceased’s field or
engages in commerce with his possessions, people will be reminded of the deceased and will
mention his name in connection with the estate.

In the pseudo-yibbum in which Boaz married Rut, the widow of Machlon, their son was not named
after the deceased. Rut 4:10 says “l’hakim shem hamet—to uphold the name of the deceased,” a
phrase reminiscent of that in Devarim 25:6, and concludes with “that the name of the dead be not
cut off from amongst his brothers,” again similar to yibbum of Devarim. The verse in Rut, unlike
in Devarim, includes “al nachalato—upon his inheritance” between those phrases, similar to how
Chazal understand the law regarding yibbum. The son was then named Oved (Rut 4:17), not
Machlon.6

In explaining a different Biblical example of yibbum, Rashi can be seen as contradicting the
universally agreed-upon halachah that there is no obligation to name the child after the deceased
brother. In Bereishit 38:8, Yehudah’s son Er dies childless, and Yehudah instructs his next son,

51
Onan, to do yibbum with Er’s widow, Tamar (“v’yabeim otah”) and bear a child, and thereby,
“v’hakem zera l’achicha—you shall establish offspring for your brother.” Rashi explains this to
mean that the son will be called by the name of the deceased. Some commentators, such as Gur
Aryeh and Siftei Chachamim (quoting Nachalat Yaakov), see no problem with this comment of
Rashi and understand Rashi to be saying that the child would be considered as if Er had fathered
him.7 Others, such as the Ramban and Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi (the fifteenth-century commentator
on Rashi, known as Re’em), think that Rashi was actually saying that the son would be named
after Er. Regarding that claim, Ramban states: “This is not true.” The Re’em, quoted approvingly
by Divrei David (Taz), defends Rashi and says that Rashi did not err. Rather, pre-Matan
Torah yibbum differed from the Torah’s rules in two ways: the child was named after the
deceased,8 and yibbum could be done by other relatives and not only the brother.9

The Shulchan Aruch rules like the Gemara that the yavam gains his deceased brother’s
inheritance (EH 163:1) and that there is no need to name the son after the deceased (EH 166:5).
“No need” might imply that it is permissible, although possibly not encouraged. The Sefer
HaTashbetz (Rabbi Shimon ben Zemah Duran, d. 1444; 4:25), in an approving postscript to a
responsa about whether to compel yibbum in a particular case, says that the couple eventually
did yibbum (and lived happily ever after) and their first child was a son whom they named after
the deceased. Similarly, Rabbi Rachamim Nissim Yitzchak Palagi (d. 1907), commenting on the
Shulchan Aruch (Yafeh Lalev, 6:EH:166, p. 86a) and basing himself on the Zohar, says
the pasuk should also be taken literally and the first son should be named after the first husband,
“and that is what is done.”

Rabbi David Zechut (d. 1865; Zecher David, ma’amar aleph, ch. 84 [p. 602-5 (modern edition) =
233b-4b (1837 edition)] also says that one may name the child after the deceased, but he suggests
that they should also add another name so that it is not exactly the same name, and he testifies that
he arranged such a naming for his granddaughter’s son. Rabbi Mordechai Forhand (d. 1945; Shu”t
Be’er Mordechai, EH 41:8 [p. 412]) infers from Rashi that the Gemara was merely saying that one
is not obligated to name the child after the deceased, but if they want to, they may. On the other
hand, Rabbi Yitzchak Schmelkes (d. 1906; Shu”t Beit Yitzchak, YD 2:163:3) says that the reason
Chazal did not suggest also fulfilling the peshat of the verse and naming the child after his
mother’s deceased first husband was because he died childless and thus has a “bad mazal”; it is
therefore not only “not required” to name after him, but not propitious and thus inadvisable. Rav
Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer 5:YD:21) suggests that sources like the Zohar that insist on not naming
after the deceased may be a reaction to the Tzedukim, who erroneously always followed the literal
meaning of the text.

The simple reading of the pasuk in Devarim seems to treat yibbum as a means of preserving the
name and memory of the deceased. The halachah, as understood from the Gemara, introduced the
idea of inheritance, lending yibbum a financial aspect. A third approach to yibbum adds a mystical,
kabbalistic element. The Ramban (Bereishit 38:8), after criticizing Rashi’s understanding of
the pasuk, reveals that yibbum contains a great “secret” [kabbalistic aspect] of the Torah. Referring
to gilgul, transmigration of souls,10

52
Ramban says that this aspect of yibbum was already known before the giving of the Torah11 and is
efficacious even with other relatives, and that is why Yehudah and others practiced yibbum.
Proponents of this approach, including Abarbanel (Devarim 25:5), who expounds on this idea at
length, explain that yibbum is a method for the soul of the departed to return to this world in the
child born from the union of the widow and the brother of the deceased (Rabbeinu
Bachya, Devarim 25:6, 9). Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz (author of Lecha Dodi, d. 1576; commentary
to Rut, Shoresh Yishai 79b [Jerusalem, 1979]) explains the mechanism of
how yibbum accomplishes this goal. In this view, the phrase “yakum al shem achiv hamet” refers
to the actual return of the brother’s soul. Maharam Schiff (to Gittin 43b) quotes from the Zohar
that the soul of the departed returns in the son, and uses this to explain a particular halachah.

If the widow and the brother of the deceased choose not to marry, they instead perform
the chalitzah ceremony which involves several oral declarations, the widow removing a special
shoe from the brother’s foot,12 and spitting on the floor. Until either yibbum or chalitzah is
performed, the widow may not marry. Chalitzah thus seems to be purely utilitarian as a means of
permitting the widow to remarry, and indeed that is how many authorities understand it. The
Chatam Sofer (Shu”t 2:85; cited in Pitchei Teshuvah, EH 165:7), while conceding that there is no
independent mitzvah to do chalitzah, suggests that it is a form of chesed to the deceased, similar
to the recitation of Kaddish. And while the widow is not obligated to do this chesed, he says that
when he had such a case and explained it that way to the widow, she acquiesced to do it.

Others, such as the Rashash (Sanhedrin 19b) and Netziv (Ha’amek She’eilah, Ki Tetzei, 154),
think it is an independent mitzvah, which, as a by-product, also frees the widow to
marry.13 According to the gilgul approach to yibbum, doing chalitzah instead of yibbum delays the
return to earth of the soul of the deceased, and Rabbeinu Bachya (Devarim 25:9) thus sees in the
removal of the shoes in the chalitzah ceremony an echo of the morning ritual.

It is clear that Biblically, yibbum is preferred over chalitzah, but already in the Talmudic period
there is a debate (Yevamot 39b) about which course of action is the preferred one, and in Ashkenaz
the custom developed to do chalitzah rather than yibbum. The Rema (EH 163:2, 165:4) records
that some communities even legislated a financial incentive for the brother to perform chalitzah.
Nonetheless, if need be, yibbum is done by Ashkenazim. Rabbi Hershel Schachter relates (Nefesh
Harav, 1994, p. 265) that it once happened that a yavam was not able to do chalitzah because of
an amputated leg and Rav Joseph Ber Soloveitchik instructed him to perform yibbum on the
condition that they then divorce, and that is what they did.

Among Sephardic communities, yibbum was more common, and this became a point of serious
tension within the Chief Rabbinate in the early years of the State of Israel. In 1950, the Chief
Rabbinate passed the “Jerusalem Ban” outlawing yibbum in Israel (Shu”t Heichal
Yitzchak 1:EH:5, p. 51). The following year, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, as chief rabbi of Tel Aviv,
challenged the ban, asserting that for Sephardim it should remain an option (Yabia Omer 6:EH:14;
8:EH:26).14

The mitzvah of yibbum usually arises following a tragedy, the death of a childless married man.
The Torah hereby provides a method to ensure that the widow is provided for and protected, and
a means to perpetuate the memory, if not the name, of the deceased.15 The Tur (Perush HaTur
Ha’Aruch, Devarim 25:6) suggests that the pasuk is not just a commandment, but also a promise

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from God that there will indeed be a continuation to the name of the deceased and that, despite the
tragedy, there is a promise of a future.

Notes
1. The English name for yibbum, levirate marriage, is derived from the Latin word levir which means “husband’s brother.”

2. Cf. Sifrei to Devarim 25:6. The Malbim offers several reasons why the Midrash’s conclusion is actually the only logical one.

3. Tosafot (Yevamot 24a, s.v. oh) assert that a literal reading of the text indicates it is the yavam (brother who performed yibbum),
and not the son, who inherits. Prisha (EH 166:9) and Aruch Hashulchan (EH 163:1) explain how the entire verse is read based on
the Gemara’s derashah and they similarly assert that the verse refers to the brother as inheriting. Rashbam and Ramban
(Hasagot to Sefer Hamitzvot, shoresh 2; cf. Shadal) understand the literal reading of the pasuk as referring to the son inheriting.

4. The Septuagint omits the word “achiv—his brother” from the translation of the verse. Furthermore, in the Brenton English
translation of the Septuagint it says that the child is named after the deceased. However, that is not clear in the original Greek.

Ibn Ezra (Devarim 25:6) says, “yikarei b’shem achiv—[the child] will be called in the name of his brother,” but he is likely not
contradicting the Gemara. Rather, he was saying that the child will be attributed to the deceased (i.e. “Look, there’s the yibbum child
of this deceased man.”) This is based on Ibn Ezra’s own comment to Bereishit 38:9 regarding Onan’s awareness that the child “lo
yikarei b’shmo—would not be called in his [Onan’s] name”; meaning, the child would not be “known as his [Onan’s] son,” rather
as the son of the deceased father.

5. Once the gezeirah shavah overrides the simple reading, the mention of “firstborn” at the beginning of the verse is taken to refer
to the oldest brother as the one who should preferably do yibbum (Yevamot 24a).

Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer Hamitzvot, shoresh 2) asserts that in general when Chazal give derashot they still hew to a certain extent
to the peshat; thus in this case, which Rava views as unique, it must be that the halachah is a total disconnect from peshat.

6. In an interesting comment, Rabbi Yosef Caspi (early fourteenth century; Kapot Kesef in Asarah Klei Kesef, p. 10 on Rut 4:17)
notes that according to the verse, the name Oved was given by the neighbors, and thus he suggests that Boaz and Rut actually
named the son Machlon “as commanded in the Torah.” He concedes that Ibn Ezra disagrees because in the subsequent
genealogy (Rut 4:18-22), the name Oved is the name used for Boaz’s son.

Earlier in the story (Rut 1:11), Naomi references a pseudo-yibbum, as pointed out by the Midrash Rabbah and by Rashi, when she
tells her widowed daughters-in-law that she has no more future sons to offer them.

7. That is similar to how Seforno (Devarim 25:6) understands the pasuk about the mitzvah of yibbum. He says that the child is
attributed to the deceased in the heavenly ledger, and it is as if the dead brother fulfilled the commandment to procreate.

8. Note that Yehudah (the father) later did “yibbum” with Tamar, but the resulting twins were not named after Er or Onan. It is
intriguing that in the two Biblical pseudo-yibbum stories—Yehudah and Tamar and Boaz and Rut—both involve a prior refusal
(Onan and Ploni Almoni), and that the Davidic line goes through the offspring of both of those unions as mentioned in King David’s
genealogy (Rut 4:18-22).

9. The Bechor Shor (Bereishit 38:13) justifies Tamar’s actions vis-à-vis Yehudah by noting that pre-Matan Torah, yibbum was
done by any relative, even the father of the deceased, and the Torah then limited it to paternal brothers. Nonetheless, he points out
that it continued to be done by additional relatives who are allowed to marry the widow, as Boaz did with Rut.

There are those who want to derive from Boaz’s action that “brothers” in the yibbum command in Devarim 25 is not literal and
means close relatives (as it does in other places in the Torah), but Ibn Ezra (Devarim 25:5) forcefully rejects that interpretation and
maintains that both peshat and tradition agree that Biblical yibbum is only with a paternal brother.

10. See Rabbi Yitzchak Blau, “Body and Soul: Tehiyyat ha-Metim and Gilgulim in Medieval and Modern Philosophy,” The Torah
U-Madda Journal 10 (2001): 1-19, in particular pp. 8-9.

11. It is interesting to note that forms of yibbum exist in many cultures, modern and ancient, including some ancient Near-Eastern
societies. For example, the twelfth-century bce tablets excavated at Ashur containing the Middle Assyrian Laws mention variants
of yibbum in sections 30, 33 and 43, and the Hittite Laws from around sixteenth-century-bce Turkey mention it in section 193 (see

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chapter 14 in Marten Stol, Women in the Ancient Near East [Germany, 2016], 296-299). Interestingly, while yibbum-type customs
are widespread, I have not come across any parallels to chalitzah.

12. Note that the shoe removal in Rut 4:7-8 was not related to chalitzah (despite Boaz’s later pseudo-yibbum with Rut) but rather,
as explained in the Yerushalmi (Kiddushin 1:5) and Rashi, this was how acquisitions were performed in those times, and thus it
was a transaction and not chalitzah. Rashi says it is similar to our kinyan chalipin/sudar (a “barter-type” halachic mechanism of
transferring ownership). See Bava Metziah 47a, where this pasuk is used to derive the rules of kinyan chalipin. The fact that the
Targum translates “na’al” in Rut 4:7-8 as “nartek yad—a glove” further makes it clear that this was a transaction and not chalitzah.
The Revid Hazahav (Rabbi Dov Ber ben Yehuda Leib Tribish, Shemot 3:5) notes that in three places in the Torah there are
instructions to remove a na’al from feet. If na’al meant only shoe, “from feet” would be superfluous. Hence, he says, the Targum
is correct that na’al can be on the hand or foot, referring to either a glove or a shoe.

13. For a summary of the various opinions regarding if it is a mitzvah or a matir, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, vol. 15, pp. 617-618.

14. For a full discussion of this fascinating halachic and historical/sociological topic, see: E. Westreich, “Levirate Marriage in the
State of Israel: Ethnic Encounter and the Challenge of a Jewish State,” Israel Law Review 37 (2003): 427-500.

15. A famous case of yibbum is that of Rav Yose ben Chalafta, a student of Rabbi Akiva. He married the widow of his brother, and
together they had five children, all luminaries of Torah: Yishmael, Eleazar, Menachem, Chalafta and Eudemus
(Yerushalmi, Yevamot 1:1; see Shabbat 118b).

Levirate Marriage in Beta Israel

Yosi Ziv writes:16

16
Brill: The Review of Rabbinic Judaism 22 (2019) 168–202

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