The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana

Author(s): Ivelaw L. Griffith

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 1991),
pp. 141-173
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165833 .
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 THE MiiITARY AND
THE POLITICSOF CHANGE
IN GUYANA
by IVELAW L. GRIFFITH

THE DEATH OF FORBESBURNHAMin August 1985 and the

passing of power to Hugh Desmond Hoyte have produced drama-
tic changes in Guyana, South America's only English-speaking
republic. Some of these have involved: (1) privatization of the
public sector, (2) abolition of overseas voting, (3) negotiations
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (4) rapprochement
with the United States, plus (5) an agreement that observers -
including former PresidentJimmy Carterand representatives from
the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat- are being invited
to oversee the upcoming elections scheduled for either August or
September 1991.
Precipitated by domestic and international pressures, these
changes have taken place within the context of a change in
regimes as well, in which one dominant leader, Forbes Burnham,
has been succeeded by another equally dominant, Desmond
Hoyte. Nevertheless, Guyana's institutional power center has
remained unchanged. The People's National Congress (PNC) is
still the dominant political force despite erosion of its popular
support over the years, and it is still dedicated to maintaining its
political hegemony. Because the militaryfunctioned as a central

Ivelaw L. Griffithis AssistantProfessor of Political Science at Lehman

College, New York City. He is editor of STRATEGYAND SECURITYIN
THE CARIBBEAN(Praeger, 1991) and author of THE QUEST FOR
SECURITYIN THE CARIBBEAN(M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming 1992). A
different version of this article appears in STRATEGY AND SECURITYIN
THE CARIBBEANwhich was published September 1990.

141
142 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

element in the exercise of PNC - and Burnham's - political

power, it is both relevant and appropriate to examine what role
the military has since played in Guyana's politics in the years
following Burnham's death.
The "military" is used here in its collective sense, as referring
to all those military and paramilitary institutions which combine
to make up the security mechanism(s) of the country and its ruling
elites. These fall under the umbrella agency known as the Disci-
plined Services of Guyana, whose key elements are the Guyana
Defense Force (GDF), the Guyana People's Militia (GPM), the
Guyana National Service (GNS), and the Guyana Police Force
(GPF); in addition, the Disciplined Services also include the
Guyana Prisons Service and the National Guard Service. These
agencies vary in their official missions. For example, the primary
missions of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) are to defend the
national territory from foreign aggression and to help maintain
internal order. The Guyana Police Force (GPF) maintains internal
security; the Guyana People's Militia (GPM) is in charge of civil
defense and also serves to complement the GDF, if necessary, in
military defense. The Guyana National Service (GNS) was in-
tended to serve several functions: to build "a new political con-
sciousness," to aid economic self-reliance programs, and to serve
as an auxiliary to both the GDF and the GPM in military defense
(for more on military roles, see Danns, 1982: chapters 3 and 5;
Granger, 1975, 1985; Garcia Mufiiz, 1988: 131-61).
Guyana does not have a praetorian situation, in which military
officers also play a major political role by virtue of their actual (or
threatened) use of force. However, Guyana does fit Eric
Nordlinger's "penetration model" of civilian control of the military
under which
Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by
penetrating the armed forces with political ideas (if not
fully developed ideologies) and political personnel.
Throughout their careers, officers (and enlisted men) are
intensively imbued with the civilian governors' political
ideas. In the military academies, training centers, and
mass-indoctrination meetings, and in the frequent discus-
sions that take place within the smallest military units -
at these times and places intensive efforts are made to
shape the political beliefs of the military ... Along with the
downward dissemination of political ideas, civilian
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 143

supremacyis maintainedby the extensiveuse of controls,

surveillance, and punishment ... Political penetration
therebyturnsthe armyinto an officiallyrecognizedorgan
of the single rulingparty(Nordlinger,1977:15, 17).
There has been both continuity and change in civilian-military
relations between 1985 and 1991. One way to appreciate this is to
look at some of the functions carried out by the militaryover the
past 20 years. It has been used as an instrument of security in four
main areas: (1) to ensure political security for the regime; (2) to
defend the nation militarily;(3) to maintain economic security;
and (4) to preserve diplomatic security. But in order to appreciate
the context in which these role-areas have developed, it is impor-
tant to make a preliminarycomment on Burnham era politics.

BURNHAM ERA POLITICS

BURNHAM ERAPOLITICSbegan in 1964 when Forbes Burnham,

as leader of the People's National Congress party,became Premier
in a coalition government, along with Peter D'Aguilar and the
United Force (UF). Bumham's rise to power was occasioned by a
combination of domestic and international factors.
Domestically, Guyana was in the throes of nationalist change,
in which the two main political actors - Burnham himself and
Cheddie Jagan of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) - advo-
cated radicallydifferent political prescriptions. Both leaders prac-
ticed racialpolitics, their partiesbeing polarized along ethnic lines,
with people of Indian descent supporting Jagan and those of
African descent supporting Burnham.
Racial politics contributed to an anomaly in electoral repre-
sentation. For instance, during the 1961 general elections (when
Great Britainstill functioned as colonial power), the PNCreceived
41% of the popular vote but secured only 11 legislative seats. At
the same time, the People's Progressive Party, which received
42.6%of the vote, just a fraction more, secured 20 seats. The third
party, the United Front, took 16.4%of the vote to secure a mere 4
seats. As a result, Burnham called for a change from the first-past-
the-post voting system to one in which a party'srepresentation in
the legislature would more closely reflect its popular support. The
British,still in control, acquiesced and subsequently changed to a
144 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

system of proportional representation. Although its ostensible

purpose was to further representative justice, it also served to
accommodate Burnham.
On the international side, both the United States and Britain
considered Burnham the lesser of two evils, with Jagan as the
other evil. An avowed Marxist with a dogmatic pro-Moscow stand,
Jagan had served as Premier in 1953 (for 135 days) and again from
1957-1964. His then unorthodox sociopolitical prescriptions made
both countries wary that his Marxist commitment could lead an
independent Guyana into the communist camp, and thus to a
"second Cuba." Consequently, the British Guiana (Constitution)
Order in Council was adopted (23 June 1964), which changed the
nature and composition of the legislature and the system of voting,
paving the way for Burnham's accession to power later that same
year (December 1964). Four years later, having led the country to
independence in 1966, Burnham and the PNC consolidated their
power by winning the general elections in 1968. The coalition with
the UF was dissolved, and the PNC began a conscious policy of
transforming Guyana's political landscape (Despres, 1967; Jagan,
1966; Burnham, 1970; Hintzen, 1989).
In 1970 Guyana was declared a cooperative socialist republic
(for evaluation of cooperative socialism, see Singh, 1972; Mars,
1978; Thomas, 1984). In what was billed as the beginning of "a
peaceful revolution," the ruling political elites launched several
major policy initiatives. The first was the nationalization of
foreign-owned property, in pursuit of what Burnham called "con-
trol of the commanding heights of the economy." By 1976, US,
Canadian, and European control over the sugar and bauxite
industries, banking, drug manufacturing, imports, local trade,
communications, as well as other areas, had all been transferred
to the state. Former owners were compensated and agreements
negotiated with them that provided for post-nationalization tech-
nology and licensing, among other things (See Shahabuddeen,
1981; Thomas, 1982 and 1988: 251-65).
A second initiative was designed to develop a cooperative
sector of the economy and to ensure that this sector would
dominate the state and private sectors in a tri-sectoral economic
structure. Burnham explained what he had in mind:
Ours is not the first or only government in the developing
world to place major emphasis on the use and develop-
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 145

ment of the cooperative as an instrument of development

or in the thrust toward socialism. We, however, named
Guyana a cooperative Republic to highlight the fact that
the cooperative will be the principal institution for giving
the masses the control of our economy, to emphasize the
fact that we aim at making the cooperative sector the
dominant sector, and that the cooperative is, and will be,
the mechanism for making the little man a real man
(Burnham, 1974: 9).
A thirdkey policy initiative was the Doctrine of Paramountcy.
This doctrine, first announced at a special PNC congress in 1973,
made the ruling party superordinate to all other institutions and
organizations in the country: the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the government were all declared to be the "executive
arm" of the PNC. Burnham further clarified the doctrine in 1975:
It is the Party that formulates policy on the basis of its
ideology, strategy and tactics. It is the Partythat mobilizes,
educates and appeals to the people ... It is the Party that
then selects the members of the political government to
execute the former's policy ... (Burnham, 1975: 8).
Central to the pursuit of this doctrine was the creation of a
superagency called the Office of the General Secretary of the
People's National Congress and the Ministry of National Develop-
ment (OGS-PNC-MND or ND). It was formed, in 1974, by fusing
the PNC Secretariat with a government department and became
both the centerpiece of the party's reorganization (begun in 1973)
and the party's political nerve center. ND was responsible for a
variety of political functions: the political socialization of govern-
ment officials and the party's indoctrination program; for organiz-
ing mass rallies; for planning and implementation of the political
campaigns for government offices, both national and local; and
for PNC infiltration of all organizations, political, labor, and civic.
Included in these tasks was intimidation and harassment of critics
and the political opposition. Because the OGSPNCMND was also
responsible for the party's international relations, it was frequently
in conflict with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over
jurisdictional and operational matters. The latter resented the
undue politicization of the Ministry, as well as a situation in which
they could be dictated to by "party comrades," many of whom
were either novices, totally incompetent in international politics,
or both.
146 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

By Caribbean standards, Guyana has become increasingly

militarized over the past two decades. The criteria by which this
process can be measured include the number and size of the
military and paramilitary agencies, the overt and unapologetic use
of military agencies for political purposes, and the progressive
increases in military expenditures - at least until recently (Danns,
1978, 1982; Garcia Mufiiz, 1988). Economic adversity has forced
reductions in military spending and the size of some military
agencies over the last four years. Even so, a recent study indicates
that Guyana still claims one of Latin America's highest defense
burdens. Out of a list of the 23 largest defense spenders in the
region in 1988, Guyana spent 14.6% of its gross national product
(GNP) to support its military, making it second only to Nicaragua,
which allotted 17.2% of its GNP for that purpose. Though Guyana
was close to the bottom of the list in absolute amounts, still, as a
percentage of GNP, it ranked above Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela,
Panama, Venezuela, and Jamaica. Guyana also ranked fifth for
defense spending on a per capita basis [US$57.51, while Cuba
ranked first [US$125] (LAWR, 1991: 8).
This militarization was not solely to meet actual and/or poten-
tial threats to the nation. Guyana is one of those Third World
societies where political elites make little distinction between the
security of the nation and the security of their own political regime.
As one Indian scholar observed:
In most ThirdWorld countries ... hypothetical threats and
the responsibility to preserve law and order are only
convenient arguments for extravagant militarization.The
desire for prestige and the determination to stay in power
have been, more often than not, the true incentives of
many governments to build up armed forces and acquire
unnecessarily sophisticated military hardware (Mehta,
1985: 17).
Territorial claims by Venezuela and Suriname once led to
serious threats to the national security, especially in the mid-1960s
and the early 1980s. Consequently the PNC did not have to resort
to excuses to justify its military build-up; the justifications were
already there. Thus the role of the military in maintaining the
political security of the regime was derived from, and in the
context of, the Doctrine of Paramountcy mentioned above. The
political role of the military was evident in a variety of ways: the
 GRIFFITH: AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA
MILITARY 147

intimidation of political opponents; Forbes Burnham's donning of

military uniforms, and the use of the military to help subvert
elections.
The role of the military, particularly the Defense Force and the
Police Force, in undermining the electoral process at the behest
of the ruling elites is well-known. At the time of the 1980 elections,
a team of international observers strongly indicted the behavior
of the military in their subsequent report to the effect that
The militarypresence in some areas was intimidating.The
[ballot] boxes were collected by military personnel who
prevented accredited officials of the opposition, some-
times by force or the threat of force, from accompanying
or following the boxes ... Military personnel refused ac-
credited representatives of opposition parties access to the
count at gun point in some cases (LatinAmerican Bureau,
1984: 83).
The team concluded with a scathing commentary on
democratic choice in Guyana and on the lengths to which the
Burnham regime would go to further entrench itself.
We came to Guyana aware of the serious doubts ex-
pressed about the conduct of previous elections there, but
determined to judge these elections on their own merit
and hoping that we should be able to say that the result
was fair.
We deeply regret that, on the contrary, we were obliged
to conclude, on the basis of abundant and clear evidence,
that the election was rigged massively and flagrantly.
Fortunately, however, the scale of the fraud made it im-
possible to conceal it either from the Guyanese public or
the outside world. Far from legitimizing President
Burham's assumption of his office, the events we wit-
nessed confirm all the fears of Guyanese and foreign
observers about the state of democracy in that country
(LatinAmerican Bureau, 1984: 83).
Military personnel were also transported around cities to
provide audiences at mass rallies where Burnham and other top
PNC leaders spoke. This served several purposes. It allowed the
ruling party to pursue its political and doctrinal socialization of
members of the military, a classical stratagem of the penetration
model of militarized politics. As Nordlinger explains, "the result-
ing congruity between the political ideas of civilians and officers
148 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

frequently removes a potential source of conflict between them"

(Nordlinger, 1977: 15). It also provided the party with a captive
human pool with which to demonstrate an alleged mass support
of the party and its policies. Further, it was a self-deception ploy
used within the party.Partyofficials flaunted it as evidence of their
ability to "mobilize the masses" and to maintain the fiction of
personal support and loyalty to the predominant leader.
Within this context, the loyalty of the military was not just to
the constitution, to the office of president, and to the ideals of
sovereignty and territorialintegrity but was given primarilyto the
paramount party and its predominant leader. While this was
demanded by the party, it was also willingly granted by the
military leadership. For example, in 1977 the then Chief-of-Staff
of the Guyana Defense Force, speaking at the Second Biennial
Congress of the PNC, on behalf of the Disciplined Services of
Guyana, offered this pledge:
Comrade Leader, you have shown us the way. It is now
for all of us who are interested in the revolution to show
this in a tangible manner. We fulfill our security duties
faithfully, because in doing so we are assured of the
cooperation of the working class. We know that the road
mapped out by the party and government is our road -
the road the Disciplined Services will follow (cited in
Danns, 1982: 175).
Thus, Burnham-era politics witnessed the transformation of
Guyana's political profile. In the quest for political power and the
pursuit of "socialist transformation," the PNC harassed critics,
intimidated the opposition, and eliminated any major political
threats [of which the best-known case is that of the murder of
WalterRodney, of the Working People's Alliance (WPA), in 1980].
Under Burnham, the electoral process was subverted, freedoms
of speech and the press were curtailed, and the human rights
situation deteriorated. The regime became progressively
authoritarianas the predominance of Burnham became increas-
ingly patent.1 It is against this backdrop that we can best assess
the continuity and change in Guyana's civil-military relations
since 1985.
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 149

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE UNDER HOYTE

Regime Change
BURNHAM DIED in Georgetown, on 6 August 1985, shortly after
having undergone minor throat surgery performed by a team of
Cuban and Guyanese doctors, led by Dr. Delfina Amaro Trapaga
of Cuba. Several people observed the operation, including
Burnham's wife, Viola, his daughter, Dr. Annabelle Bumham-
Pollard, and Dr. Richard Van-West Charles, his Cuban-trained
son-in-law and then Minister of Health, now a consultant with the
Pan American Health Organization. Prime Minister and First Vice-
President Hugh Desmond Hoyte, a member of the PNC's Central
Committee was named as Burnham's successor at a joint meeting
of the PNC Central Committee and the Cabinet within two hours
of the president's death. Thus Hoyte became, simultaneously,
leader of the PNC and president of the republic, passing over the
aging Ptolemy Reid, PNC Deputy Leader and former Prime Minis-
ter, as well as Ranji Chandisingh, the General Secretary.
According to the constitution, elections were due within seven
months of Hoyte's accession to the presidency. The new presi-
dent, therefore, took the opportunity to "renew" the PNC man-
date, under his stewardship, at elections held on 9 December
1985. In essence, those elections witnessed Guyana going
through the motions of legitimacy without any real correlation
between popular choice and political empowerment. Perry Mars
put it this way:
Guyana's post-independence elections are increasingly
less about choice or change of government than what
appears to be a kind of national ritualin which contending
parties dramatize their particular mobilization strategies.
The ruling party demonstrates its peculiar style of "never
losing," if not necessarily "winning," popular elections;
opposition parties invariably experiment with different
combination tactics aimed at least at demonstrating their
popular appeal based on voter turnout at campaign meet-
ings, rather than at the usually controversial polls. In this
situation, the campaign is the thing, the elections a pre-
dictable anticlimax (Mars, 1987: 29).
150 STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS
JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

Under Guyana's electoral system, political parties compete for

power under a system of proportional representation. Presidential
and parliamentaryelections are combined, and the leader of the
party with the largest parliamentary representation becomes
president. Elections for regional representatives in the National
Assembly are held at the same time (Guyana, Constitution, 1980:
Articles 60-80, pp. 160-62 and 177; James and Lutchman, 1984:
75-87). The 1985 elections were contested by 7 parties: the
People's National Congress (PNC), the People's Progressive Party
(PPP), the Working People's Alliance (WPA), the United Force
(UF), the National Democratic Front (NDF), the People's
Democratic Movement (PDM), and the Democratic LaborMove-
ment (DLM). According to the declaration of the Elections Com-
mission, the agency established under the constitution to
supervise national elections, the PNC won 42 of the 53 National
Assembly seats; the PPP, 8; the UF, 2; and the WPA, 1. The PNC
was thus "returned"to power.
The failure of so many of the Burnham prescriptions and
initiatives have presented the Hoyte government with strong
demands for change. Generally, the demands have been for
democratization of the polity, renewal of confidence in the
general society, arrest and reversal of the economic decline, and
foreign policy conduct commensurate with these and cognizant
of the new climate of internationalpolitics. The Hoyte government
has been engaged in a challenging, often dangerous, balancing
act as it strives to accommodate internal and foreign pressures,
hoping, in the process, to salvage some "gains" made earlier.
Hoyte entered this "politics of preservative adaptation"more out
of practicalnecessity than as a matterof conscious choice (Griffith,
1991b).
Initially,Hoyte appeared interested in continuing the Burnham
program. He declared to the party congress, held a few weeks
after Burnham's death, that:
His work was not completed when he died, but he left us
precise guidelines for the continuation of that work. It
must be the Party'smission, now and in the years ahead,
to deepen the process and accelerate the pace of our
development along the lines so clearly drawn by him. The
leadership of the Party is pledged to continue his work.
Our ultimate goal must be the same as his - creation of
 AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA
GRIFFITH:MILITARY 151

a socialist society in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana.

We must reaffirm our commitment and rededicate our-
selves to the pursuit of this objective (Hoyte, 1985: 7).
However, once Hoyte was in complete control of the ship of
state, it took him relatively little time to realize that the course set
by Burnham, to which he had been a principal adviser, was a
disastrous one (Hoyte, 1979).2 As a result, though Hoyte has
continued some of the previous programs and practices, there
have been significant changes as well.

Regime PoliticalSecurity
There has been continuity as well as change in the area of
regime political security. The military is still central to the
brokerage of power. It would have been unrealistic to expect that
the military would alter its protection of the regime in power in
any fundamental way following Burnham's death. However, a
progressive decline in the economy in recent years has led to a
certain tenuousness of the country's political fabric. Although the
relative economic deprivation has not translated into dramatic
mass violence, which is, to some extent, a tribute to PNC control
of the instruments of coercion, there has been an alarming in-
cidence of politically-organized, socially-driven protest. Strikes in
the bauxite and sugar industries have led to violent demonstra-
tions and arrests. There have been protests over stringent
budgetary measures, and arson and vandalism in the sugar in-
dustry and in state-run commercial enterprises. Without the
military, the political power-brokers would have had cause to fear
for the security of the regime. Nevertheless, while the Burnham-
era mission of preserving the political security of the regime
continues, there have been changes within the military and in the
politics of the country.
Over the years since 1964, the PNC has enjoyed considerable
success in broadening the racial composition of both the party and
the government. People of Indian descent were placed in influen-
tial, or high-profile, positions. Some of them, like former PNC
General-Secretary and Vice-President Ranji Chandisingh, now
Ambassador to Moscow, had defected from the PPP. Others -
like Sase Narain, Speaker of the National Assembly, and Mohamed
152 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

Shahabuddeen, former Vice-President and Attorney-General,

now World Court judge - had long been supporters of the PNC.
Yet, until recently, the one area where the PNC did not reach out
meaningfully to Guyanese of Indian descent was the military. The
military agencies long were dominated by people of African
descent, which situation was an important factor in the regime's
security.
For many Afro-Guyanese, their role in the empowerment of
the PNC was part of a larger duty "to their people," to ensure that
the PNC exerted political control over a society whose economic
power rested largely in the hands of the Indians. Changes were
made after Burnham's demise however. In a move initiated by
Hoyte, in 1988 Balram Raghubir became the first Police Commis-
sioner of Indian descent; when his tenure ended (in July 1990),
he was given a diplomatic appointment.3 When Major-General
Norman McLean retired in February 1990, Colonel Joseph Singh,
Director-General of the Guyana National Service for 8 years,
became acting Chief-of-Staff of the Guyana Defense Forces with
the rank of Brigadier-General, making him the first professional
head of the armed forces of Indian descent.4
In 1990, President Hoyte made another significant appoint-
ment when he appointed (on 15 November) Commander-
Brigadier David Granger to the newly created position of National
Security Adviser to the President. In this post, Granger chairs the
Central Intelligence Committee, which includes the GDF Chief-
of-Staff, the Police Commissioner, and the GNS Director-General.
He also sits on several security-related bodies, including the
National Defense Board, chaired by the President in his position
as Commander-in-Chief. Granger is a graduate (1990) of the
University of Guyana, where he shared the coveted President's
Medal (highest award to a graduating senior) and won 5 other
awards, including the Elsa Gouveia Medal of Excellence (best
graduating senior in history) and the Guy L. DeWeever Prize
(best student of Guyanese history).
One Guyanese observer has described the contemporary
political situation as "the politics of permanent fear" (Brotherson,
1988). However, few would deny that the Burnham-era situation
of permanent fear has changed under Hoyte. David de Caires,
staunch critic of the PNC and editor-in-chief of the independent
newspaper Stabroek News, has acknowledged that
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 153

The atmosphere of repression has lightened perceptibly

and the style and language of politics were noticeably
more responsive and less threatening ... Hoyte abolished
overseas voting and the provisions for widespread proxy
and postal voting ... Rabbi Washington, a notorious
henchman of the Burnham regime, was prosecuted for
murder. An independent newspaper has been permitted
to open, and there has been no interference with it.
Political harassment has virtually ended (de Caires, 1988:
194-95).
Human rights concerns in Guyana have centered mainly on
political intimidation, police brutality, and electoral fraud. Military
agencies have been involved in violations in all of these areas.
One gets some idea of changes by comparing assessments of the
country's human rights profile during one of the Burnham years
with a more recent time.
The US State Department survey for 1984 provides a marked
contrast with that for 1989. Although there were no politically
motivated killings in either year, in 1984 there were well-supported
allegations that the police killed 16 individuals. As a result of
political and interest group pressure, manslaughter charges were
brought against 2 policemen and an indictment of intentional
murder was secured against another. While police harassment of
regime opponents is not entirely a thing of the past, the incidence
and outlandish nature of this kind of harassment have changed.
Among the 1984 cases was the arrest, detention without charges,
and interrogation of 5 persons alleged to have been involved in a
plot to overthrow Burnham. One political leader, Paul Tennassee,
of the Democratic Labor Movement, was given what had become
standard treatment in the harassment department: detention at the
airport following a "tip" about an alleged infraction. Tennassee
was held for 5 days, during which he was questioned about an
assassination plot against Burnham. He was later charged with
failing to list Guyana$40 on his currency declaration.
Two positive developments in 1989 were passage of the Police
Complaints Authority Act and repeal of the 1966 National Security
Act. The Police Complaints Authority Act came into being after
years of repeated allegations of police brutality by the Guyana
Human Rights Association, Caribbean Rights, and other groups. It
provides for the supervision of investigations into allegations of
154 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

misconduct by, or illegality in, the police force. In 1990, the Police
Complaints Authority, established under this Act, publicly con-
demned police improprieties and completed investigations of 68,
out of 256, complaints of police brutality.That same year, 5 police
officers were charged with manslaughter in the death, some time
earlier,of a suspect being held in custody (US-DOS, 1985: 558-67;
1990: 611-19; 1991: 646-54).
The National SecurityAct, while in force, permitted the deten-
tion, without charges and up to 3 months, of any person deemed
to be acting "in any manner prejudicial to public safety or public
order or the defense of Guyana." Though the National Security
Act had never been applied, local groups demanded it be rescind-
ed on grounds it provided legal justificationfor political vendettas.
President Hoyte was also concerned to see it repealed since it cast
a cloud over the country, damaging to its political reputation,
which he was anxious to remove.
Opposition parties scored a political victory in April 1990 when
the National Assembly proposed the Local Authorities (Elections)
(Amendment) Bill. A key feature of this legislation, firstproposed
by the Working People's Alliance (WPA), is that it provides for a
nonpartisan commission to supervise local government elections.
Before 1990, the law assigned a government minister to supervise
these elections, an arrangement the PNC had used to control local
government positions. Another boon to the opposition - one
applauded both locally and internationally- was legislation that
sanctioned the use of international observers to oversee the na-
tional elections.
In May 1990, Prime MinisterHamilton Green placed before the
National Assembly "TheGeneral Elections (Observers) Bill 1990."
This legislation empowers the president to invite foreigners "for
the purpose of observing the democratic process of the State as
enshrined in the Constitution and, more specifically, the conduct
of any election." While welcoming this development, opposition
leaders criticized the power given to the president to name the
observers. They also objected to provisions that make "uninvited
observers" subject to arrest and imprisonment if convicted. The
new law does something which would have been anathema to
Burnham:it allows observers to examine the list of electors, enter
polling places and ballot counting centers, interview the chairman
of the Elections Commissions and other elections officials, and it
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 155

requires elections officials to cooperate with international ob-

servers and comply with "anyreasonable request"made by them.
The law goes further. It confers diplomatic privileges and im-
munities on observers and makes it an offense - punishable by
a G$5,000 fine and an 18-month jail term - to interfere with, or
impersonate, international observers.
Two months after the bill was proposed, President Hoyte
announced that the Commonwealth Secretary-Generalhad been
invited to name a team of observers for the next general elections
(Sunday Guardian, 1990;Gibson, 1990a; 1990b). He subsequently
agreed to allow a team of observers from the United States, led by
former President Jimmy Carter,from the CarterCenter at Emory
Universityin Atlanta(Georgia). Carterand other officials paid their
firstvisit to Guyana in mid-October 1990, during which time Carter
was able to extract from Hoyte an agreement for preliminaryballot
counts at the polling places, something opposition parties had
sought for several years (New York CaribNews, 1990).
Since that first occasion, CarterCenter officials have returned
to Guyana on other visits, one of which included Prime Minister
George Price, of Belize, as a representative of the Council of Freely
Elected Heads of Government, a CarterCenter affiliate. Leadersof
the local opposition have lobbied for observers from the Carib-
bean Community and Common Market(CARICOM)as well; and
officials from the CaribbeanConference of Churches have sought
to mount a separate team. So far both efforts have been futile.
Hoyte argues that he had already encouraged the Common-
wealth Secretary-General to include "a significant Caribbean
representation" in his team of observers, and, indeed, monitor-
ing teams from both the CarterCenter and the Commonwealth
Secretariat have included West Indians. Belize Prime Minister
George Price and Dennis Smith, Chief Electoral Officer of Bar-
bados, formed part of the CarterCenter team that visited in April
1991; and Noel Lee, Jamaica's Director of Elections, and
Joycelyn Lucas, Trinidad's elections chief, were part of a visiting
Commonwealth team the same month (New York Carib News,
1991; Khan, 1991a; Persaud, 1991).
Although one estimate maintains that 1,800 observers will be
needed to monitor the elections, 300 seems a more realisticfigure.
Despite Hoyte's reluctance to entertain teams other than those
from the Carter Center and Commonwealth Secretariat,several
156 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

international groups plan to send contingents. Among them are

the Caribbean Conference of Churches, Americas Watch, and the
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, an affiliate
of the United States Democratic Party. On its April 1991 visit, the
Commonwealth monitoring team, headed by David Peterson,
former Premier of Ontario (Canada), found "widespread criticism
and cynicism" regarding past elections,5 but "no evidence of any
wholesale attempt to pervert the elections results or manipulate
the electoral system." Rather, they found "a genuine desire and
attempt to make the system fully free, fair and transparent" (Khan,
1991b). Undoubtedly, the government's willingness to make con-
cessions concerning the controversial Elections Commission con-
tributed to the more positive atmosphere. Not only was the
composition of the Commission expanded from 5 members to 7,
in order to permit more participation by the opposition, but Hoyte
also replaced Commission chairman Sir Harold Bollers after he
had adamantly refused to do so the previous month. The new
chairman is Rudy Collins, former Guyanese diplomat and
CARICOM official, the nominee of an opposition alliance called
the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy.

MilitaryDefense
The premier national defense agency is the Guyana Defense
Force (GDF), organized in 1966 to defend Guyana's territory
against claims which Venezuela and Suriname had been advanc-
ing since long before the country's independence.6 The GDF grew
out of the Special Services Unit, a paramilitary group that had been
part of the pre-independence British Guiana Police Force. The
Guyana Defense Force grew from an estimated 750, in 1966, to
about 5,000 at present writing. Basically, it functions as a ground
force with air and maritime operations, all of which fall under an
integrated command headed by a chief-of-staff. During the
Burnham years, the troop strength and operational structure ex-
panded; since the advent of the Hoyte regime, the Force has been
cut back due to economic constraints. Because there is no in-
digenous arms manufacture, weapons come from outside the
country. Originally, a large amount was donated by Great Britain
and the United States, but, over the years, as Guyana adopted
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 157

socialist and non-aligned postures, weapons, equipment, and

trainingwere provided by Cuba, North Korea, EastGermany, and
from such Commonwealth countries as India. In turn, Guyana has
provided military training to several Commonwealth Caribbean
countries.
Although the Defense Force is the centerpiece of the military
defense establishment, the Guyana People's Militia(GPM)and the
Guyana National Service (GNS) play important complementary
roles. The GPMwas established in 1976 to mobilize the population
against US destabilization efforts and intimidation by Venezuela.
It was given the mission - more politically hopeful than logisti-
cally feasible - of making "every citizen a soldier" by training
cross-sections of the nation in paramilitaryskills and using the
trainees as a GDF reserve for civil defense purposes. Financial
difficulties, combined with improved relations with the United
States and Venezuela since 1985, have led to a reduction in the
size of the People's Militiafrom about 7,000 in 1977 to about 2,500
today.
The Guyana National Service (GNS), on the other hand, was
created in 1973 to serve the twin goals of both defense and
development and organized into several corps. The first of these
corps, the Young Brigade, enrolls school children in the 8-14 age
bracket and exposes them to agriculture,creative arts, and physi-
cal education on weekends and during long school holidays. The
National Cadet Corps is made up of students of 12-18 years, from
secondary, technical, and vocational schools, who are given
similar, but more intensive, training. The third entity, the New
Opportunity Corps, targets children in reform schools. The fourth
and "most important branch of the GNS" is the Pioneer Corps,
which enlists young citizens between the ages of 18 and 25 for
one year of training in paramilitary skills, agriculture, and the
creative arts. Though enlistment in the Pioneer Corps is generally
voluntary, it is a pre-requisite for admission to the University of
Guyana and to specialized schools, such as the School of Agricul-
ture, where education is free.7
The Special Service Corps was designed to allow professionals
and people with special skills to undertake assignments, from 1-2
months, at other GNS agencies, but at full pay from their regular
employers, whether in the public or private sector. At one time, a
158 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

National Reserve Corps was also contemplated. As the Parliamen-

tary Paper on the subject explained
This will be the last Corps to come into operation. It is
envisaged that all groups of the Pioneer Corps will be
given an opportunity to sign up as reservists to be on call
for work in any area vital to the stability, security or
productivity of the country. (Guyana. Parliament,
1973: 11).
Thus, the military defense role of the GNS was intended to be
filled primarily by the Pioneer Corps and the National Reserve
Corps together, only the latter never really materialized.
Various changes in both Guyana and Venezuela - changes in
leadership, changes in their mutual economic interests, and a
climate encouraging peaceful settlement of disputes - have
contributed to a new and productive cordiality between them
during the past six years. Nevertheless, the territorial dispute is yet
to be settled.8 Venezuela still harbors advocates of the "military
solution," and the dispute might still function as a lightning rod to
deflect Venezuelan attention from pressing domestic crises. There
is no doubt that Guyana's military is no match for the Venezuelan
military, nor that Guyana's security capability pales by com-
parison. Guyana is a much smaller country: it encompasses only
214,969 square kilometers compared to the 912,050 of Venezuela.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the
total armed forces of Guyana number only 8,950 while those of
Venezuela number 71,000 (IISS, 1990). The disparity carries
through on every level: Guyana's population is 815,000 compared
to Venezuela's 19 million; and in 1988, Guyana's GNP per capita
was US$380 as opposed to US$3,230 for Venezuela. Moreover,
Venezuela - unlike Guyana - has an army with light and
medium tanks, a navy with submarines and frigates, and an air
force with US-made F-16 fighter planes and French-made Mirage
combat aircraft (Europa World Yearbook, 1989).
Failure to resolve the territorial dispute plus the disparities in
security capability between the two countries in and of themselves
provide ample justification for Guyana's security forces to con-
tinue their pursuit of a military defense role. Altering or abandon-
ing this role would be both politically suicidal for any regime,
whether PNC or other, and psychologically demoralizing for the
nation at large. It should also be remembered that Guyana still has
 AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA
GRIFFITH:MILITARY 159

another unsettled territorial dispute: with Suriname over territory

in the New River Triangle, in Guyana's eastern region (Guyana
Ministry of External Affairs, 1969; Pollard, 1977). Here, the
countries are more evenly matched. Guyana's security capability
compares well with that of Suriname. The latter is smaller than
Guyana in every way: its area is only 163,265 square kilometers;
its population is 395,000; and its armed forces number 3,000. Only
Suriname's per capita GNP - US$2,360 - is larger (Europa World
Yearbook, 1989; IISS, 1990). Finally, the GDF and the GPF
demonstrated their superior capability over the Surinamese forces
in 1966 and 1967, following clashes along the Guyana-Suriname
border.
Third World nations like Guyana do not maintain military
defense agencies only because they may have hegemonic designs
or to provide a credible defense. These forces also carry a symbolic
value. Guyana's military will continue to have a military defense
role, even in the absence of specific threats, because the political
elites are highly aware of the symbols of sovereignty. Guyana's
military forces - the GDF, the GPM, and the GNS - are important
symbols of the national will to defend the country's sovereignty,
even in the face of severe limitations of capability and powerful
antagonists. What may change is the operational use of this role:
the manner in which force deployments are made, the sources of
arms and military assistance, and with whom joint military exer-
cises are held. To some extent, this has already begun, especially
in relations with the United States.

Economic and Diplomatic Security

Another role-area assigned to Guyana's military is that of
economic security. Designating the Guyana Defense Force "the
people's army" was intended, in part, to indicate that the army
would play multiple roles. Forbes Burnham made it clear to the
GDF, in 1970, that "while standing ready to carry out the two
primary tasks of assisting civilian authorities and defending the
borders, [the GDF] must be an army ... identified, and identifiable,
with the community." Part of this identification was to be through
the practical application of manpower, as well as technical and
160 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

organizational skills, to the areas of economic development and

community-building.
To this end, military agencies constructed roads, schools,
airstrips and parks, and developed and maintained agricultural
projects. Building economic security often assumed an explicitly
political form. The GDF and the GNS, in particular,have been used
as scab labor during industrialdisputes. This was both to shore up
the economic position of the industries and to bolster the political
position of the government. There is, however, another aspect of
the link between the economic and the political missions in that
the government uses the military to help fulfill political promises
of economic improvement in a cost-efficient manner, allowing it
to deploy resources elsewhere.
Burnham-era politics and international factors beyond
Guyana's control created the foundations for the economic
decline that has become precipitous in recent years. For example,
in 1980, rice production in 1980 was 256 thousand tons; in 1985,
236 thousand tons; and in 1988, 225 thousand tons. In 1980, sugar
output was 3,831 thousand tons; in 1985,3,270 thousand tons; and
in 1988, it was down to 2,870 thousand tons. The 1980 bauxite
production was 3,052 thousand tons; by 1985, this had plunged
to only 2,206 thousand tons. However, it climbed slightly to 2,785
thousand tons in 1988. These figures help to explain Guyana's
huge foreign debt: in 1980, this was only US$448 million; which
grew, in 1986, to US$1,477 million; and, finally, grew still more -
to US$1,700 million - by 1988. In the 1982-89 time period,
Guyana was able to record growth in its annual per capita GDP
only once, and that was in 1984 - with 0.3%.From 1980 to 1989,
the cumulative variation of per capita GDP stood at -33.1%
(ECLAC,1989).
Guyana, now the second poorest country in the Hemisphere
after Haiti, presently finds itself in dire economic straitsby admis-
sion of its own political and technical managers. In presenting the
1991 Budget, on 20 February 1991, Finance Minister Carl
Greenidge stated:
ComradeSpeaker,we had set ourselvescertainspecific
goals and targets in 1990. Real GDP was expected to grow
by some 3.1%,as a result of increasedagriculturaland
mining production ... In reality, bauxite production was
very disappointing. The industry produced 15%less than
 AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA
GRIFFITH:MILITARY 161

its target and generated 22%less revenue than forecast ...

Sugar output fell to 130,000 tons, a mere 76% of the
original target. This represented an all-time low ... Rice
production, the lowest in 14 years, also fell some 400/o
below the target and 34% below the output achieved in
1989 ... There was a 30%/decline in the output of livestock,
reflecting decreased production of poultry and eggs ... As
a result of all these factors, GDP, instead of rising, actually
fell by some 3.5%(Guyana. Parliament, 1991: 8-10).
Economic decline made for political volatility as citizens
responded to economic deprivation with demonstrations, strikes,
arson, and vandalism, both as individuals and in organized groups.
For example, in the sugar industry alone, a total of 224,417 man-
hours were lost in 1990 as a result of industrial and political actions
(Guyana. Parliament, 1991: 10). Such a situation impels resort to
every potentially useful stratagem to help keep the economy afloat.
The military, especially the GDF and the GNS, are prime candidates
in the search for such measures. Indeed, in 1977 and 1978, they
were used to good effect as scabs to break politically-motivated
strikes in the sugar industry. Using the military in the interest of
economic security therefore comes as no surprise.
Post-Burnham elites seem to have found a new role for the
military: that of diplomatic security. This purpose is suggested by
the consistency with which detachments from the GDF and the
GPF have recently been used as instruments of foreign policy. In
September 1988, a contingent of 30 soldiers with special skills
were sent, along with aircraft and supplies, to Jamaica to aid in
the devastation left in the wake of Hurricane Gilbert; in 1989, a
joint-services detachment, with GDF, GPM and GNS personnel,
was sent to the Eastern Caribbean following the destructive trail
of Hurricane Hugo; and, from June 1989 to April 1990, a 30-man
detachment from the GPF was dispatched to Namibia as part of
the United Nations Special Monitoring Force.
Further, a 31-member Joint Services Relief Task Force, com-
posed of servicemen from the GDF, the GPM, and the GNS, was
sent to Montserrat, from February-April 1990, to build 32 houses
and repair a school, in a follow-up to a previous mission in 1989.
In August 1990, a 40-member contingent from the GDF's First
Infantry Battalion, and led by Captain Andrew Pompey, spent two
weeks in Trinidad in the wake of an attempted coup d'etat which
162 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

took place at the end of July and beginning of August. Officers

from Guyana's Defense Force joined with security detachments
from Jamaica and member countries of the Regional Security
System (RSS) to establish security in Trinidad at that troubling time
(Barbados Advocate, 1988; Guyana Chronicle, 1989, 1990b; New
Nation, 1990).
Guyana has pursued an active foreign policy only the past 20
years, particularly within CARICOM, the Non-Aligned Movement,
the Commonwealth, and in certain avenues of the United Nations
(Gill, 1977; Jackson, 1981; Griffith 1981b; Fauriol, 1984; Brother-
son, 1989; Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). It could be argued that
Guyana's participation in the Namibia Monitoring Force was a
logical and natural continuation of its work in the United Nations
Council for Namibia, of which it was once president. One might
also contend that the security assistance to other Caribbean
countries only reflects Guyana's well-known commitment to
regionalism. However, military assistance was never central to the
country's foreign policy in the past. This is not to suggest that
military assistance has never been offered, or given, to other
countries. For instance, Trinidad was offered - but declined
military assistance in 1970, during its time of military crisis. The
Bishop government was given military and technical assistance,
and Dominica received military assistance during the tenure of
Patrick John. These were, however, different in scope and ap-
parent intent than the present pattern.
The current pattern is part of larger foreign policy shifts that
have taken place since the death of Burnham (Hoyte, 1986).9
There has been a rapprochement with the United States, with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and with the World Bank. The
number and frequency of Hoyte's visits to the United States since
1985 stands in marked contrast to Burnham's disdain of that
country, as evidenced by his refusal even to transit there during
trips abroad. There has been a marked improvement in relations
with contiguous states: Brazil, Surinam and Venezuela. In striking
contrast to the Guyana-Venezuela hostility of the 1960s and early
1980s was Guyana's sponsorship, in 1989, of Venezuelan mem-
bership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), affording a
dramatic change from its previous obstruction (with good reason)
of such a move. Venezuela later reciprocated by sponsoring
Guyana for full membership in the Organization of American
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 163

States (OAS), which was granted 8 January 1991. There has been
a renewal of harmonious relations with CARICOMstates, begin-
ning with Desmond Hoyte's meeting (in 1986) with other Carib-
bean leaders in Mustique, just off St. Vincent.
Guyana's relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba have
cooled. President Hoyte waited two years before acting upon
Fidel Castro's 1987 invitation to visit Cuba, finally making a
stopover (26-30January 1989) while en route to Venezuela for the
inauguration of Carlos Andres Perez. The two leaders used the
occasion to smooth some of the rough edges in the relations
between their countries, and, in a gesture of good will, Hoyte was
invested with the Jose Marti Award. Prime Minister Hamilton
Green had more extensive talks with Castro and other Cuban
officials during a two-week visit to Cuba in late November, early
December, of 1990. Curiously enough, the Soviets made a radical
departure from their previous posture on the country's domestic
politics. In November 1990, for the firsttime, they publicly called
for free and fair elections in Guyana while endorsing electoral
reforms introduced by Hoyte.'o This obviously reflects their own
political and economic "new thinking."
Another innovation is giving military officials diplomatic as-
signments. In April 1990, Colonel CarlMorgan, the Commandant
of the Guyana People's Militia,was named Ambassador to Suri-
name. The following month (May), Police Commissioner Balram
Raghubirwas named High Commissioner to India, effective July
1990. Employing the military to pursue an altered foreign policy
agenda allows the regime to emphasize cooperative relations in a
way that reflects well on its own image. At one and the same time,
it develops (or strengthens) the bonds of friendship between
Guyana and other nations, secures commendation for Guyana as
a nation that offers humanitarian assistance to others despite its
own difficulties, and makes a positive political gesture to the
Caribbean and the international community." This is precisely
what the Chief-of-Staffofthe Guyana Defense Force hoped would
happen. When BrigadierJoe Singh addressed the troops at Camp
Stephenson (3 August 1990) shortly before their departure for
Port-of-Spainon the Trinidadmission, he emphasized, among the
things, the need for them not only "to be good ambassadors of
Guyana, but also of the GDF."
164 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

The Caribbean is a critical target area because CARICOM can

provide the much-desired political support Guyana needs in
dealing with the Suriname and Venezuela claims, among other
things. In addition, CARICOM states - especially Barbados, St.
Vincent, and Trinidad - have recently become vital to Guyana's
efforts at maintaining economic viability. On 30 November 1990,
St. Vincent made a major US$7 million investment in Guyana's rice
industry through CARICOM Rice Mills Limited. For two consecu-
tive years, CARICOM protected Guyana's EEC (European Econ-
omic Community) sugar quota, which had been jeopardized by
shortfalls in production.
During his speech on the budget (28 March 1990), Finance
Minister Carl Greenidge gave another example of CARICOM
support.
Complementary assistance was also to be provided by
way of rescheduled interest relief on debt. In this regard,
the contribution of Trinidad and Tobago is worthy of
special mention for, as Guyana's largest creditor and a
developing country, the Government of Trinidad and
Tobago led the way, literally and figuratively, in January
1989, by agreeing to extend to Guyana very favorable
terms, worth some US$53.1 million. The contribution of
Trinidad and Tobago was supported by that of other
members of the CARICOMMultilateralClearing Facility
(CMCF).The value of their assistance was roughly US$7.8
million (Guyana. Parliament, 1990: 7-8).
The United States also occupies a critical position as a source
of potential investment and aid. Guyana's privatization has al-
ready attracted the interest of several US companies. The Virginia-
based Reynolds Metals Company, which had left Guyana after
nationalization in the 1970s, resumed operations in the bauxite
industry following a deal with the government in May 1989.
Atlantic Tele Network, of the US Virgin Islands, acquired an 80%
interest in the state-owned Guyana Telecommunications Corpora-
tion in December 1990. And negotiations are underway with the
California-based Leucadia Power Company for a 600/oholding in
the Guyana Electricity Corporation. While US imports from
Guyana declined between 1986 and 1988, largely due to declines
in production, exports to Guyana increased during that time: from
US$47 million in 1986; to US$60 million in 1987; and, finally, to
US$67 million in 1988.
 AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA
GRIFFITH:MILITARY 165

Over the years, US bilateral aid to Guyana - which stood at

US$0.9 million in 1985, the year of Burnham's death - has
increased: from US$3 million in 1986; to US$5 million in 1987; and
to US$8 million in 1988. In 1990, Guyana received US$6 million
under PL-480, the food assistance program (Guyana. Parliament,
1991: 84; Griffith,1991b: 24). Moreover, Guyana, which had been
excluded from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) ever since its
inception in 1982, was admitted as a beneficiary in 1988. The
United States is also part of the Guyana Support Group, which
helps Guyana obtain relief from its international debt and gain
access to economic assistance. Although US disbursements to
Guyana, as part of the Group, have been disappointing, all con-
cerned acknowledge the critical role that country plays. Guyana
can ill afford to invite any returnof that US hostility which proved
so politically and economically harmful in the 1970s.
Within the context of this altered foreign policy agenda, the
Guyana Defense Force has begun to collaborate with the US
military.This collaboration has involved reciprocal visits between
officials from both armed forces - General Fred Woerner (of the
US Southern Command in Panama) visited Guyana in July 1988;
Guyana's then Chief-of-Staff, Major General Norman McLean
visited US Southern Command Headquarters in October 1988,
among other visits by top GDF officials - and joint military
exercises, including one with the US Army 44th Medical Brigade
in March 1989 (Guyana Chronicle, 1988; New York Carib News,
1989).
Prior to 1988, there had been only minimal contact between
the GDF and the US military.For example, there were no military
sales to Guyana from 1982 to 1987. Between 1984 and 1988,
Guyana received no assistance under the US InternationalMilitary
Education and Training (IMET)program. Prior to 1989, the last
time Guyana had secured IMETassistance had been in 1983, and
then only for 10 places. This is compared with 22 for Barbados;
19 for Belize; 73 forJamaica;and 20 for the Organizationof Eastern
CaribbeanStates (OECS).The 1989 IMETassistance proposal was:
Guyana - 4; Bahamas - 17; Barbados - 13; Belize - 22; Jamaica - 56;
Trinidad and Tobago - 10; and OECS- 67 (US-DOD, 1988).
The United States hopes that the shift in Guyana's policies will
facilitate renewed contacts with the Guyana military,ultimately to
166 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

pursue its own security interests. This much is clear from Pentagon
submissions to Congress in 1988.
The IMET program tentatively proposed for Guyana
would improve the professional military skills of the
Guyana Defense Force (GDF) and enhance the GDF
awareness and observance of human rights. We would
like to restartthe program at the earliest opportunity. This
would give us important access to the GDF and enable us
to impart and reinforce shared values such as respect for
civilian rule and human rights. It would also discourage
the GDF from seeking military assistance and/or training
from the Soviet bloc (US-DOD, 1988: 176).

CONCLUSION

RECENT STUDIES on Third World military-political relations

have stressed disengagement by the military and democratization
of the polity - in some places as political desires, in others as
welcome accomplishments. Within the last decade, the military
has withdrawn from political control in Paraguay, Burma, Argen-
tina, Chile, and South Korea, to name just a few. In most of these
places, democratization has proceeded with relatively little politi-
cal fallout (Welch, 1987; Diamond, 1988). These twin concepts -
disengagement and democratization - are best analyzed in situa-
tions where military-political relations are praetorian in nature.
As was shown above, Guyana does not fit the praetorian
model. Thus, in Guyana, it becomes more appropriate to talk
about the need for "depoliticization" and democratization than
about "disengagement" and democratization. Because of
Guyana's circumstances, initiatives to depoliticize and
democratize have to come from the civilian political elites, not
from the military. Such initiatives have direct implications for some
of the role-areas discussed above. For one, the role of maintaining
the regime's political security would have to be abandoned.
However, such initiatives are not incompatible with the roles of
military defense and economic security.
Some of the ruling elites are aware that new initiatives are not
merely desirable but necessary for the country's economic
recovery and its political stability. It is partly this recognition that
accounts for the changes under Desmond Hoyte. Hoyte himself
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 167

acknowledged this in an interview marking his fifth anniversary

in power (Stabroek News, 1990a). Nevertheless, other members
of the ruling elite seem prepared to sacrifice these considerations
in their effort to maintain the political status quo. Guyana's new
direction offers hope that it will merely be a matter of time before
those interested in full depolitization of the military and
democratization of society win over those dedicated to Burnham's
agenda and initiatives, even in the unlikely event of a PNCvictory
in the forthcoming elections.

ACRONYMS
CARICOM .......... Caribbean Common Market
CMCF.................. CARICOMMultilateralClearing Facility
DLM.................... Democratic LaborMovement
EEC...................... European Economic Community
GDF..................... Guyana Defense Force
GNS .................. Guyana National Service
GPF ..................... Guyana Police Force
GPM .................... Guyana People's Militia
IMET....................(US) InternationalMilitaryand TrainingProgram
IMF........ ... International Monetary Fund
NDF ....... .. National Democratic Front
OGSPNCMND.....Office of the General Secretaryuof the People's
National Congress and the Ministryof Na-
tional Development (or ND = National
Development)
PDM .................... People's Democratic Movement
PNC ..................... People's National Congress
PPP...................... People's Progressive Party
UF........................ United Force
WPA..................... Working People's Alliance
168 JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

NOTES
1. For example, Bumham's birthdays became major national events.
Some employees of state agencies were obliged to contribute to the
purchase of birthdaygifts, and their attendance at rallies where he spoke
was often compulsory.
2. Hoyte was then a member of the CentralCommittee, Legal Adviser
to the General Secretary, and Minister of Economic Development and
Cooperatives.
3. His successor, LaurieLewis, of Africandescent, acted untilJanuary
1991 when he was confirmed in the post retroactive to 1 August 1990.
4. Generally, there was a perception in some quartersthat Hoyte was
partisan to people of Indian descent. This led him to be called "Desmond
Persaud,"since the surname Persaud is common among Indians.
5. For very cynical, critical reports on recent national elections, see
UK-PHRG(1981), UK-PHRG/AW(1985), and Americas Watch (1990).
6. Although the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) was legally created on
22 May 1966, its operational birthday- 1 November 1965 - is the one
traditionally observed. The GDF celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1990
with a week-long program of events.
7. The government plans to abandon free education from September
1991 onwards with the imposition of tuition at the University of Guyana
and other institutions of higher education.
8. In 1990, the Good Offices Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General held discussions with the Venezuelan Foreign Minis-
ter Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart and with Guyanese Foreign Minister
RashleighJackson. [The latterresigned on 26 November 1990, following
the indictment of his son, Martin,for possession of narcotics.] The UN
Representative is Alister McIntyre, a former Secretary-General of
CARICOMand a former Assistant Secretary-Generalof the UN and now
Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies. His role is to help
the parties decide upon a peaceful means for resolving the dispute (for
a discussion of the dispute, see Griffith, 1981a; and Braveboy-Wagner,
1984).
9. The winds of change blowing across parts of the world make
studies on changes in foreign policy both practically necessary and
theoretically challenging. For some useful theoretical analyses and case
studies, see Boyd and Hopple (1987). Hermann (1990) contributes to the
theoretical debate, and Griffith (1991b) provides a theoretically-based
study on Guyana.
10. Soviet Ambassador to Guyana Mikhail Sobolev made the state-
ment on 7 November 1990 while toasting the 73rd anniversary of the
 GRIFFITH:MILITARY
AND THE POLITICSOF CHANGEIN GUYANA 169

Soviet 1917 revolution at a reception in Georgetown, the capital of

Guyana (Stabroek News, 1990b).
11. See, for example, the Guyana Chronicle(1990a) where the GDF
in particular, and Guyana in general, are showered with praise by
Montserrat'sChief MinisterJohn Osborne and other top officials.

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