With the aid of examples, discuss the socio-economic costs of armed

conflicts. (25)

Under the international plane, there is no consensus on the definition of what

constitutes armed conflict. This issue is intensively debated by experts in
international law. Example of armed conflicts includes, drone strikes against al-Qaida
and affiliates outside Afghanistan. However, there is one good definition developed
by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Wallensteen 1998; Heldt 1993), an armed
conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and or territory
where the use of armed forced between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar
year. Armed leads to death, and its consequences extend far beyond deaths in
battle. Armed conflict often leads to forced migration, long-term refugee problems,
and the destruction of infrastructure. Social, political, and economic institutions can
be permanently damaged. (Erik Melanda, 2015). The consequences or cost of war,
especially civil war, for development are profound. It is the duty of this assessment to
interrogate the social-economic costs of armed conflicts.

The social and economic costs of armed conflicts can be very excruciating. As would
be expected, the socio-economic implications of such conflicts are felt more in terms
of their tendencies to disrupt the functioning of the society by causing widespread
human, material or environmental losses that exceed the ability of the affected
society to cope using its own resources (Dunne and Mhone, 2003); to cause injuries
capable of rendering erstwhile productive population to a dependent population,
increase the population of refugees and displaced persons, and to lead to
widespread human rights abuses (Copson, 1994). By disrupting production, also,
armed conflicts induce scarcity, raise prices of basic goods and services and induce
a decline in the standard of living. It is also the imminent risks armed conflicts,
especially in Africa, that make them attractive for use by the perpetrators as
bargaining chips (Rustad, 2012; Herbst, 2000).

In furtherance of the above, it is trite to note that, accurately estimating the economic
cost of armed conflict is hard. The very existence of a conflict makes measurement
of economic activity difficult, and conflict can interact with the economy through
multiple, complex pathways. In addition to the immediate, direct effects of violence
on the economy, there are a number of indirect effects that may last long after the
violence has receded. Fragile states often struggle to maintain resilience to conflict
and other shocks; conflict, economic instability, poverty, and fragility tend to feed
each other in a negative cycle. Recurrence of violence is the largest threat to long-
term growth and development in conflict affected countries.

Fear resulting emanating from violence armed conflict and destruction can hinder
economic activity directly through an increase in transport costs, capital flight, or
postponing of investments. There can also be indirect effects like the breakdown of
political institutions and public services such as health and education, as well as
effects that spill over into other countries, such as refugee crises. Insecurity and
weak law enforcement can threaten property rights and suppress economic activity.
Particularly in contexts of weak institutions, countries can become trapped in
repeated cycles of violence that prevent economic development.

It is important to note that, violent armed conflicts which usually a long time, makes it
harder for a nation to recover from economic damage. For instance, in six years
after the end of the civil war, GDP per capita is still 15 percentage points lower on
average than it would be without the war. It is the severe decline combined with the
duration of the economic damage that makes an armed conflict such as a civil war
so costly. The intensity of violence also plays an important role in influencing how
much the economy is affected at the macro level.

Recent evidence emphasises the usefulness of measuring violence on a per capita

basis – rather than looking at total casualties at the country or state level – as the
share of the population affected locally is a crucial variable for understanding how
conflict affects the economy (Mueller, 2016). For example, a year of armed conflict
with an intensity of around 0.079 battle-deaths per a population of 1000, leads to a
decrease in the economic growth rate by about 3.5 percentage points. Violence
below an intensity of 0.047 has no discernible effect on the macro-economy.
However, for more intense conflicts the effect is quite dramatic. The highest intensity
civil wars lead to a drop in the yearly growth rate by between 5 and 10 percentage
points. Taking an example of Syria which has had armed conflict suffering for many
years, according to some estimates, Syria’s economy had lost 19–36% of its
productive capacity by 2016 due to conflict. In absolute terms, this means that the
Syrian economy produces 20–38 billion USD less in value added each year. Violent
conflict is a major cause of the reversals in economic growth that many developing
countries have experienced in recent decades.

In furtherance of the above averments, looking at the economic costs of armed

conflict more detail looking at GDP, employment and trade. The writer submits that
there is a large body of research that finds civil wars have large and significant
aggregate impacts on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and trade (e.g.
Collier, 1999; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Martin et al., 2008). More evidence
has emerged recently on the channels of this immediate disruption. Recent
microstudies have shown, for example, that the insecurity spread by violence can
create large increases in labour and transport costs. For instance, a study on the
2007 Kenyan presidential election found that electoral violence drove labour costs up
by 70% (Ksoll, Macchiavello, and Morjaria, 2009). Another study found that
insecurity caused by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean led to
an increase in shipping costs of about 10% (Besley, Fetzer and Mueller, 2012).

The social costs of armed conflict cannot be left out. These includes an increase in
the number of refugees and displacement. In addition to affecting trade, armed
conflicts can drive large scale human displacement, which in turn can have
destabilising regional and global impacts. In fact, the number of people running away
from civil war violence is far larger than the number of fatalities globally. During the
average civil war, 600,000 people leave their country. About 80% of these refugees
return within a year after the conflict ends, but 10% still have not yet returned even a
decade after peace (Mueller et al., 2016, based on UNHCR statistics). Countries that
neighbour states in civil conflict host about 11,000 refugees on average and
considerably more in some cases: Pakistan hosts more than 1.5 million Afghan
refugees, for example. According to UNHCR, over 50 million people are now either
refugees or internally displaced, with an estimated 93 billion USD in associated
costs. Refugee streams at this scale can destabilise whole countries or regions.

Moreover, in the same vein, armed conflict can have social cost in the health,
education, and human capital. Avoiding a humanitarian crisis can be considered
a long-term investment in human capital. Exposure to conflict during childhood or
adolescence in particular can have large, persistent effects on health, education, and
labour productivity outcomes for a generation. A study on the effects of Burundi’s
civil war on health found that an extra month of exposure to the conflict reduced child
height significantly (Akresh, Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2009). Similarly, a study on
the long term impacts of the 1967–70 civil war in Biafra, Nigeria, which killed 1–3
million people, estimates that exposure to violence led to height reductions – an
indication of poor health – in both children and adolescents (Akresh, Bhalotra, Lene
and Osili, 2012). These effects are estimated to have reduced the income of those
most affected by 1.5–3% per year of conflict exposure (Mueller, 2013, calculations
based on Case and Paxson, 2008). Like health, education also suffers during
conflict. A study of abducted child soldiers in Uganda found they completed nearly a
year less schooling than their peers on average (Annan and Blattman, 2010). The
loss was not made up for later and led to a significant drop in earnings. Reduced
education outcomes may translate into eventual impacts on wages similar to health
deterioration. A study on political violence during the 1980s and 1990s in Peru found
exposure to violence before school-age leads to about half a year less schooling per
year of exposure (Leon, 2012). This implies a decrease in wages by 1.08–1.52%.

In conclusion, from the above indication, it is self- evident that the socio-economic
effects of armed conflict are very adverse and if such violent armed conflict persist
for a long period, it might make it harder for a nation to recover from economic and
social damage.

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