Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1998, Vol. 74, No. 3, 590-605 0022-3514/98/S3.00

Terror Management and Aggression: Evidence That Mortality Salience

Motivates Aggression Against Worldview-Threatening Others
Holly A. McGregor Joel D. Lieberman
University of Rochester University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Jeff Greenberg Sheldon Solomon

University of Arizona Skidmore College

Jamie Arndt Linda Simon

University of Arizona University of Arizona

Tom Pyszczynski
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

The hypothesis that mortality salience (MS) motivates aggression against worldview-threatening
others was tested in 4 studies. In Study 1, the experimenters induced participants to write about
either their own death or a control topic, presented them with a target who either disparaged their
political views or did not, and gave them the opportunity to choose the amount of hot sauce the
target would have to consume. As predicted, MS participants allocated a particularly large amount
of hot sauce to the worldview-threatening target. In Studies 2 and 3, the authors found that following
MS induction, the opportunity to express a negative attitude toward the critical target eliminated
aggression and the opportunity to aggress against the target eliminated derogation. This suggests
that derogation and aggression are two alternative modes of responding to MS that serve the same
psychological function. Finally, Study 4 showed that MS did not encourage aggression against a
person who allocated unpleasant juice to the participant, supporting the specificity of MS-induced
aggression to worldview-threatening others.

Previous terror management research has shown that inducing
people to think about their own mortality increases negative
evaluations of those who do not share their cultural worldviews
(for a recent review, see Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski,
1997). Derogation of dissimilar others presumably serves to
defend against the threat to their own worldview posed by the
Holly A. McGregor, Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in
Psychology, University of Rochester; Joel D. Lieberman, Department of
Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Jeff Greenberg, Jamie
Arndt, and Linda Simon, Department of Psychology, University of Ari-
zona; Sheldon Solomon, Department of Psychology, Skidmore College;
Tom Pyszczynski, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs.
Holly A. McGregor and Joel D. Lieberman share equal responsibility
for this work, which was partially supported by National Science Foun-
dation Grants SBR 9212798, 9312456, and 9601474. We wish to thank
Melanie Elliott for her assistance with this project.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either
Holly A. McGregor, Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psy-
chology, Meliora Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, New \brk
14627, or Joel D. Lieberman, Department of Criminal Justice, University
of Nevada, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455009, Las Vegas, Nevada
89154-3007. Electronic mail may be sent to mcgregor@scp.rochester.
edu or jdl@nevada.edu.
existence of those with different conceptions of reality. Solo-
mon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (1991) have argued that ef-
forts to defend one's worldview motivated by terror management
needs may also play a significant role in aggression against
worldview-threatening others. However, the measures used in
studies to date have been self-report evaluations of targets that
participants knew the targets would not see, and thus have not
involved actual harm to the target. If terror management pro-
cesses do indeed play a role in aggression, mortality salience
(MS) should elicit aggression against those who threaten one's
worldview. The purposes of the present research were to (a)
test the hypothesis that MS increases aggression against those
who threaten one's worldview and (b) investigate the inter-
changeability of derogation and aggression as alternative modes
of responding to MS and worldview threat.
Terror Management Theory
Terror management theory begins with the assumption that
humans are similar to other animals in that we share a common
evolutionary heritage, which includes a strong biological pro-
clivity for self-preservation or continued existence. Humans are
different from other species, however, in having unique cognitive
abilities that, among other things, make them aware of iheir own
existence and the possibility that their existence may end when

590
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
they die. This awareness, when juxtaposed with the drive to stay
alive, creates the potential for paralyzing terror. According to
terror management theory, this potential for terror is managed
by a dual component cultural anxiety buffer, consisting of (a)
a personalized version of a cultural worldview, which gives
subjective reality a sense of permanence, order, and meaning; a
set of standards that enable individuals to attain a sense of
personal value; and, if these standards are met, a promise of
either literal or symbolic immortality; and (b) self-esteem, the
belief that one is living up to the standards and values prescribed
by the cultural worldview. Because self-esteem and the cultural
worldview from which it is derived are so important in the
management of existential terror, a large part of human social
behavior is oriented toward their maintenance and defense.
Although treated by the individual as absolute reality, the
cultural worldview is a fragile social construction in need of
constant validation from others. Consequently, the existence of
others who share one's worldview bolsters faith in that
worldview, thus increasing its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer,
and the existence of others who do not share one's worldview
threatens one's faith in it, thus reducing its effectiveness as an
anxiety buffer. As a result, people generally respond favorably
to those who share their worldviews and negatively to those
who do not. Accordingly, a series of studies have shown that
MS leads to especially positive evaluations of those who validate
one's worldview and especially negative evaluations of those
who challenge it (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt,
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989).
These effects have been replicated in other laboratories in the
United States (e.g., Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, & Scott, 1997),
Canada (e.g., Baldwin & Wesley, 1996), Israel (e.g., Florian &
Mikulincet, 1997), Germany (e.g., Ochsmann & Mathy, 1994;
Ochsmann & Reichelt, 1994), and the Netherlands (e.g., M.
Dechesne, personal communication, March 1997). The effects
appear to be unique to thoughts of mortality; they have not been
found in response to thoughts of failure, dental pain, one's next
important exam, giving a speech in public, or worries about life
after college, or in response to a laboratory failure experience
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994;
Greenberg, Simon, Harmon-Jones, Solomon, Pyszczynski, &
Lyon, 1995; Greenberg et al., 1997).
All of the studies to date investigating the effects of MS on
reactions to others have involved only pencil- and-paper mea-
sures in which participants rate target individuals on intelli-
gence, likability, and so forth. However, Becker (1971, 1973,
1975) and others (e.g., Harrington, 1969; Lifton, 1983) have
proposed that the fear of death has greatly contributed to many
of the egregious historical examples of violence and war. Simi-
larly, Solomon et al. (1991) posited that reactions to the threat
posed by an alternative conception of reality include not only
derogation but aggression as well. Indeed, historically, many
have tried to neutralize a threat to their worldview by attempting
to annihilate those who are different. What more extreme way
to retaliate against a threatening worldview and assert one's
own convictions than to destroy or intentionally hurt those who
hold them? Consider, for example, the recent crisis in Bosnia,
in which the Serbs and the Bosnians were effectively destroying
each other because of their cultural, ideological, and religious
differences:
591
Wars and persecutions are, at bottom, expressions of rivalry be-
tween contending claims to immortality and ultimate spiritual
power. Religious victimization is a one-sided version of that process
with the specific psychological functions of rinding a target for
death anxiety. . . . (Lifton, 1983, p. 315)
Of course, no single study or small set of experiments is going
to definitively establish a role of terror management in past
or ongoing historical events. However, if terror management
processes do play a role in actual aggression, then MS should
encourage aggression against a person who threatens one's cul-
tural worldview.
But how would aggression against a worldview threatener
serve a terror management function? Whereas derogation of
worldview threateners or their arguments allows one to ratio-
nally dismiss the criticisms of one's worldview, aggression does
not. There are, however, three interrelated ways in which aggres-
sion may serve a terror management function and therefore be
a likely response to worldview threat under conditions of MS.
First, it may occur as a simple lashing out at the threatener.
After mortality is salient, people need faith in their worldviews
and so are likely to be displeased with anyone who threatens
that faith; aggression may be a primitive and particularly danger-
ous way to express this displeasure.
Such a response may be particularly likely because, as recent
research indicates, MS effects occur primarily when people are
in an experiential mode of thinking rather than a rational, ana-
lytic mode. In three studies, Simon et al. (1997) found that MS
led to derogation of a worldview threatener if experimental
conditions encouraged an experiential mode in participants but
not if the conditions encouraged a rational and analytic mode.
This suggests that terror management responses to MS are expe-
riential (from Epstein's, 1994, perspective: intuitive, primitive,
emanating from the unconscious) rather than rational. Certainly
aggression often seems to qualify as such an experiential re-
sponse. Indeed, when responding experientially, aggression may
serve as a defense even though it does not rationally refute the
attack; just as a drunk person who is outwitted may resort to
violence, an MS participant whose worldview is under attack
may do so when the opportunity is there.
Finally, to the extent that aggression asserts one's convictions
regarding one's worldview, it may be a way to defend one's
worldview despite not logically addressing criticisms. As an
example, after hearing one's country berated, in lieu of refuting
the arguments, one can go and dig a flag out of the closet
and display it proudly in the front of one's house. Similarly,
aggressing against another who attacks one's views can serve
to reassert one's own faith in one's worldview, the criticisms
be damned! Thus, given what we know so far about terror
management processes, there are good reasons to believe that
mortality salience will encourage aggression against a
worldview threatener. Our first study was designed to test this
hypothesis.
Measuring Aggression
Aggression is commonly denned by social psychologists as
behavior with intent to harm the individual who is its object
(e.g., Baron & Richardson, 1994; Berkowitz, 1993; Geen,
1990). Several different laboratory measures of aggression have
592 MCGREGOR E T AL.
been used over the years, including verbal assault (e.g., De-
Charms & Wilkins, 1963; Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966), direct
physical aggression involving noninjurious acts such as hitting
with a Styrofoam sword (Diener, 1976; Diener, Dineen, Endre-
sen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975), and administering electric shock
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1964; Buss, 1961; Hammock & Richardson,
1992a, 1992b; Taylor, 1967). Each of these measures has yielded
some evidence of validity (e.g., Bernstein, Richardson, & Ham-
mock, 1987; Diener et al., 1975; Shemberg, Leventhal, & All-
man, 1968), but each has certain ethical or practical limitations.
For our purposes, we wanted a face-valid measure of aggres-
sion that clearly indicated an intent to physically harm the target.
Probably the best existing measure of this nature is the amount
and intensity of electric shock that participants administer to
targets (e.g., Buss, 1961; Diener et al., 1975). However; the
association of the shock paradigm with the Milgram obedience
research presents problems with approval from university hu-
man subjects committees and with participants linking the study
to the well-known Milgram research. Also, as Hammock and
Richardson (1992b), among others, have noted, in the shock
paradigms, the intensity of shock could be associated with inten-
tions besides hurting the other (e.g., being a good teacher).
Because of these concerns, we sought to devise a new means
to measure intent to physically aggress against another. The key
was to provide the participant with an opportunity to engage in
a behavior that could cause physical harm to another individual.
We consequently devised a context in which participants deter-
mined the amount of hot sauce to be consumed by another
person who does not like spicy foods.
Thanks in part to our extensive personal research with South-
western cuisine, it was clear to us that hot sauces can indeed
inflict pain. There are also a number of well-publicized incidents
of hot sauce being used in malevolent efforts to harm others,
including child abuse (e.g., Arizona Daily Wildcat, 1995;
Brooks, 1992; Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, 1992; Donahue,
1989; Martin, 1994; Milne, 1995; "N.Y. foster mother," 1993;
Serrano, 1989; "Thirty-nine," 1992). In one case, a cook at a
New Hampshire Denny's restaurant spiked the food of two state
troopers with Tabasco sauce after they had stopped there to eat
breakfast. One of the officers reported that his mouth was
burned, and the other said that the food caused his stomach to
become upset. The cook was subsequently arrested for assault.
A witness, who claimed to observe the incident, reported that
the cook did not like police officers and had acted intentionally
to harm the troopers {Arizona Daily Wildcat, 1995). A similar
aggressive act was portrayed in the recent film Mrs. Doubtfire,
in a scene in which the character played by Robin Williams put
an excessive amount of cayenne pepper on the food being served
to a man who was romantically interested in his ex-wife. These
incidents indicate that spicy food has indeed been used in both
real world acts and media portrayals of aggression.
Study 1
Tb assess the hypothesis that MS increases aggression against
those who threaten one's worldview, we used the amount of hot
sauce given to a fellow participant as the dependent measure of
aggression. Politically conservative and liberal participants were
induced to think about their own death or their next important
exam. They were then asked to read an essay, supposedly written
earlier in the session, that was derogatory toward either conser-
vatives or liberals. Participants then allocated a quantity of very
spicy hot sauce to the author of the essay, knowing that the
author did not like spicy foods and would have to consume the
entire sample of hot sauce. We predicted that, relative to the
other groups, MS participants who read an essay criticizing
their political stance would assign the author an especially large
quantity of hot sauce.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight male and 36 female American introduc-
tory psychology students at the University of Arizona participated in
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were recruited
on the basis of a pretest measure identifying them as having either liberal
or conservative political views. The measure consisted of a single 9-
point bipolar scale that ranged from extremely conservative (1) to ex-
tremely liberal ( 9 ) . Participants who were moderately conservative ( 2 -
4) and moderately liberal ( 6 - 8 ) were selected. Three participants were
excluded after reporting suspicion about the procedures, and one partici-
pant was excluded because she had seen the news report about the
Denny's chef's aggressive use of hot sauce and thought about it during
the experiment.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to
conditions in a 2 (MS vs. control) x 2 (worldview threaten vs.
worldview consistent) between-subjects design and were run in groups
of 4, consisting of either all liberal or all conservative participants. The
experimenter was blind to the participant's political stance, as well as
to experimental conditions.
Because prior terror management research has shown that MS has a
greater effect when participants are in an experiential mode (Simon et
al., 1997), the experimenters were trained to address participants in a
relaxed and casual manner. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants
were led to believe that they would be taking part in two experiments
investigating the relationship between personality and attitudes.
Bogus Study ] materials and procedure. The first experiment was
described as an examination of the relationship between personality
traits and how people form impressions of others. Participants were told
that they would write a short paragraph describing their opinion of
politics in the United States and exchange those essays with another
person. The participants were then led to individual cubicles and given
a sheet of paper that reiterated these instructions. After telling the partici-
pants they would have 5 min to work on their paragraphs and not to be
concerned with spelling or grammar, the experimenter left the cubicle.
After 5 min, the experimenter returned, collected the paragraphs,
handed each participant a packet that consisted of three questionnaires,
and told them to work through the entire packet in order. Tb encourage
an experiential mode of processing, the experimenter told participants
to give their first, natural response when answering the questions. The
first page consisted of a filler personality inventory, and the second
consisted of the MS manipulation (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). MS partici-
pants were instructed to "Please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of your own death arouses in you" and to "Jot down as specifi-
cally as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically
die, and once you are physically dead." Control participants were in-
structed to ' 'Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your
next important exam arouses in you'' and to ' 'Jot down as specifically as
you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically take your
next exam, and once you are physically taking your next exam.'' This
control condition concerns a future aversive event other than death and
has been used successfully in past terror management research (e.g.,
Greenberg et al., 1995). Participants then completed the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1991).
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
After completion of the personality packet, the experimenter returned
to the cubicle and handed each participant an essay that was purportedly
written by another participant but was in fact a bogus essay used to
manipulate worldview threat. The writer of the essay was identified only
by a three-digit number. Consequendy, although participants believed
the writer of the essay was present in the same session, they did not
know who it was. One essay was designed to conflict with the worldview
of liberal, but not conservative, participants:
Don't even get me started. Liberals are the cause of so many prob-
lems in this country, it1 s not funny. Not only that, but they get in
the way of decent Americans who are trying to solve all those
problems that they created in the first place. The bleeding heart
stance they take, of trying to help everyone is a joke and incredibly
stupid. How can they help the world when they can't even help
themselves?! Do Liberals put any thought into what they believe?
1 don't think so. If they did, they would realize that they are ruining
die country. Thankfully there are people in power that agree with
me who can, and will control the whiny Liberals, and put them in
their place. The best place for a Liberal is out of my sight. They
make me sick.
Thus, liberal participants who read this essay had their worldview threat-
ened, but conservative participants did not. The other essay was designed
to conflict with the worldview of conservatives, but not that of liberals:
Don't even get me started. Conservatives are the cause of so many
problems in diis country, it's not funny. Not only that, but they get
in the way of decent Americans who are trying to solve all those
problems that they created in the first place. The cold-hearted stance
they take, of trying to help only themselves is a joke and incredibly
stupid. They are too busy thinking of themselves, and don't care
about anyone else. Do Conservatives put any thought into what
they believe? I don't think so. Tf they did, they would realize that
they are ruining the country. Thankfully there are people in power
that agree with me who can, and will control the selfish Conserva-
tives, and put them in their place. The best place for a Conservative
is out of my sight. They make me sick.
Consequently, regardless of whether participants were liberal or conser-
vative, half read an essay that threatened their worldview and half did
not. All participants were asked to evaluate the essay using an "impres-
sion formation" form designed to allow them to evaluate the essay in
a nonjudgmental way. This was important because of the possibility that
a negative evaluative judgment about the essay at this point might pro-
vide them with an opportunity to defend their worldview, as in previous
MS studies (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990), thereby possibly negating the
need to aggress against the author. (We addressed this possibility directly
in Study 2.) The impression formation form consisted of five questions.
Participants were asked to guess the college major, the sex, and the age
of me author, what part of the country the author was from, and whether
the author was reserved or outgoing. After completing this evaluation,
participants were informed that the first study was completed.
Bogus Study 2 materials and procedure. The second study was de-
scribed as an examination of the relationship between personality and
food preferences. Participants were informed that they would be tasting
and giving their impression of a food sample, that in different experi-
ments different types of foods were being tested, and that dry foods and
spicy foods were being examined that day. In addition, they were told
that because the experimenter needed to be blind to certain specifics
about the sample type and quantity of food tasted, it was necessary for
participants to administer the food samples to each other. This provided
a plausible explanation as to why the participants, rather than the experi-
menter, were allocating the food to each other.
The experimenter then gave participants a taste preference inventory
593
to complete, which consisted of six rating scales to evaluate preferences
for different tastes and textures. The items evaluated were sweet, sour,
creamy, salty, spicy, and dry. Participants evaluated these items using a
21-point rating scale that ranged from no liking at all (1) to extreme
liking (21), These were included so that participants later could be
presented with a bogus taste preference inventory purportedly completed
by the person to whom they were giving the hot sauce.
Although participants were led to believe that two groups existed,
everyone was actually put into the same group, which sampled the dry
food and allocated the hot sauce. After completing die taste preference
inventory, the experimenter returned and informed participants that they
had been randomly assigned to the dry food group and that another
participant had selected a sample of cracker for them to eat. At this
point the participant was handed an envelope which contained a saltine
cracker and was instructed to consume the entire cracker and then to
evaluate it using a 9-point scale that ranged from no liking at all (1)
to extreme liking (9). The experimenter then left the room.
After several minutes, the experimenter returned carrying a tray with
hot sauce, a Styrofoam cup with a lid, a plastic spoon, a wooden spoon,
and a cup of water. Participants were informed that they would be
preparing a sample of hot sauce to give to another person and that, to
avoid confusion, they would be giving the hot sauce to the person whose
paragraph they read earlier. The experimenter then mentioned that be-
cause people are often curious as to the taste preferences of the other
participants they would be shown the taste preference inventory of the
person to whom they would be giving me hot sauce. Participants were
handed a bogus taste preference inventory indicating that the target
disliked spicy food. For the item "spicy—like hot salsa," the target
indicated a liking of 3 on the 21-point scale (where 1 indicated no liking
at all).
Participants were instructed to use the plastic spoon to place a quantity
of hot sauce into a 4-oz Styrofoam cup and seal it with the lid that was
provided.1 The participants were told that all quantities of hot sauce
were useful and to put in as much or as little hot sauce as they wanted.
However, it was made clear to the participants that the person who
received the hot sauce would have to consume the entire quantity of it.
To be sure the participants were aware of the intensity of the hot sauce
(which was quite hot), they were instructed to taste a sample of it with
the wooden spoon prior to allocating it to the target Participants were
told that because the cups were covered, the experimenter would not
know how much hot sauce had been allocated. They were again reminded
that they would be giving it to the person whose essay they read and
were instructed to write that person's number on the Styrofoam cup.
Thus, it was clear who would receive the hot sauce they prepared and
that their behavior would be anonymous.
Before leaving the cubicle, the experimenter handed the participants
a checklist to remind them of each step involved in allocating the hot
sauce. At the bottom of the checklist, the participants were asked to
indicate the number of spoonfuls allocated. To maintain a sense of ano-
nymity, the participants were asked to place this form inside an envelope.
At this point the experimenter left the cubicle, and the participants
allocated the hot sauce to the target.
Participants were then asked to indicate the type of food they had
1
The selection of hot sauce used in the experiments proved to be a
challenging endeavor. Because die hot sauce allocation had to be
weighed, it was critical to use a hot sauce that had an even consistency,
that would be quite hot, and that would ordinarily be applied in a volume
greater than a drop or two. As a result of these restrictions, we created
our own hot sauce by combining several available commercial products
in the following proportions: 5 parts Heinz chili sauce and 3 parts
Tapatio salsa picante hot sauce, produced by the Empacadora Company.
The final hot sauce had a consistency similar to cocktail sauce and was
indeed quite hot.
594 MCGREGOR ET AL.
tasted and the type of food they had given the target. Finally, participants
answered three other questions using 21-point rating scales. The ques-
tions were "To what extent did you use the TASTE PREFERENCE INVENTORY
when giving out the food sample to the other person?," on a scale
ranging from not at all (1) to completely (21); "How useful do you
think die TASTE PREFERENCE INVENTORY was when giving out the food
sample?,'' on a scale ranging from not at all useful (1) to extremely
useful (21); and "Using the scale below, indicate the extent to which
the person you gave die food sample to liked that kind of food,'' on a
scale that was the same as on the taste preference inventory and ranged
from no liking at all (1) to extreme liking (21).
Participants then left their cubicles and were debriefed. During die
debriefing, special care was taken to ensure that the participants did not
leave with any negative feeling that may have come from either reflection
on their own mortality or die knowledge that they may have caused
someone pain and distress. We assured participants that no one had
tasted the hot sauce they had administered. In addition, we explained
to them that they were simply responding to the situation that we put
them in and that in no way should they feel as though they were an
aggressive or otherwise bad person for giving the hot sauce to the target.
No participant objected in any way to the procedure or indicated distress,
and many said they were glad they had participated.
Results
The primary analyses to be reported are 2 (MS vs. exam salient)
X 2 (woridview-threaterring target vs. worldview-consistent target)
between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOWs). 2
To assure that participants were aware of the target's dislike
of hot sauce, the final questionnaire assessed the extent to which
participants recalled and used that information.3 The target os-
tensibly had rated hot sauce as a 3 on a 21-point scale. The
mean response for recall of the target's rating of liking hot
sauce, which did not differ by condition (Fs < 2.82), was 3.70.
Mean responses for the questions assessing usefulness of the
taste inventory and the extent to which they used it (which did
not differ by condition; Fs < 1), were 17.3 and 16.2. Thus,
participants in all conditions were equally aware that the target
did not like spicy food and used this rating in deciding how
much hot sauce to allocate.
MS and aggression. The main dependent measure of aggres-
sion was the weight in grams of hot sauce allocated to the
targets, determined by weighing the hot sauce in the Styrofoam
cups on an OHaus Cent-O-Gram triple beam balance. An
ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect of target,
F(l, 60) = 3.13, p < .09, reflecting the general tendency for
participants to allocate more hot sauce to the woridview-threat-
ening target than the worldview-consistent target. This effect
was qualified, however, by the expected MS X Target interaction,
F(l, 60) = 6.06, p < .02. Means are displayed in Table 1.
A planned orthogonal contrast provided strong support for
our main hypothesis: MS participants allocated significantly
more hot sauce to the author of the woridview-threatening essay
than did participants in the other three conditions, r(60) =
2.90, p < .01. A second orthogonal contrast compared the MS
worldview-consistent condition with the two exam conditions.
Previous research suggests that worldview-supportive targets are
reacted to especially positively following MS induction.
Whereas the means were consistent with this possibility, this
contrast was not significant, r(60) - 1,08, p > .28. A third
contrast compared the exam salient woridview-threatening and
Table 1
Study I: Cell Means for the Two-Way Interaction of Mortality
Salience X Target on Weight (in Grams), and Self-Report
Estimates (in Spoonfuls) of Hot Sauce Allocated
Mortality ;salient Exam control
Target M SD M SD
Weight
Worldview threatening 26.31 21.87 15.20 8.39
Worldview consistent 11.86 8.33 17.56 11.34
Self-report estimates
Worldview threatening 2.11 1.88 1.39 0.89
Worldview consistent 1.09 0.80 1.61 1.09
exam salient worldview-consistent conditions. This comparison
was not significant, t(60) = .49, p > .62, and indicates that in
the exam condition, type of essay had no effect on amount of
hot sauce allocated. Thus, as predicted, MS worldview threat
participants allocated a significantly greater amount of hot sauce
to a woridview-threatening target than did participants in the
other conditions.
A secondary dependent measure was participants' own esti-
2
Initial analysis of the primary dependent measure in all four studies
revealed heterogeneity of variance (all F s ^ > 4.01, ps < .05). This
heterogeneity resulted from high variance within the MS woridview-
threatening conditions. Violation of this assumption of ANOVA is not
considered a serious problem when cell /is are equal (Kirk, 1995).
Therefore, in the primary analyses in Studies 1 and 2, we randomly
dropped participants from the data set so that cell sizes were equal across
conditions (8 participants were dropped in Study l,and 1 participant was
dropped in Study 2). Although heterogeneity of vari ance was a problem
in Studies 3 and 4, cell sizes were equal, and consequently, no partici-
pants were dropped. An alternative solution for dealing with the hetero-
geneity of variance problem is to conduct a square root transformation
on the entire data set (Kirk, 1995). The results of that transformation
were very similar to those obtained by randomly dropping participants.
For Study 1, when all participants were included in the analyses, the
critical two-way interaction between MS and target was marginally sig-
nificant for both die raw and square root transformed means, both Fs( 1,
68) > 3.85, ps < .057, and the outcome of the a priori contrasts
paralleled those reported in the text. For Study 2, a one-way ANOVA
based on the entire data set yielded a marginally significant effect for
the raw means, F(2, 49) = 3.12, p = .053, and a significant effect on
the square root transformed means, F(2, 49) = 3.42, p < .05. Again,
the results of the orthogonal contrasts parallel those reported in the text.
However, throughout the body of the text and in the tables, we present
results based on equal n analyses, because these analyses allowed us to
use and display the raw means while minimizing the heterogeneity prob-
lem. Ft should also be noted that initial analyses for all studies mat
included gender and political orientation as independent variables re-
vealed only one significant effect, and that effect did not qualify the
primary results. Specifically, in Study 1, there was an MS X Gender
interaction, F ( l , 47) = 4.71, p < .04, on hot sauce allocation, which
resulted from the fact that, collapsing across targets, MS males allocated
an especially large amount of hot sauce.
3
Unfortunately, in Study 1, these measures were not included until
roughly halfway through the first study (n = 30).
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
mates of how many spoonfuls of hot sauce they had allocated
to the target. An ANOVA on this measure revealed the expected
significant MS x Target interaction, F( 1, 60) = 4.04, p < .05.
Means are displayed in Table 1.
A planned orthogonal contrast comparing the estimates of
hot sauce allocated by MS participants exposed to a worldview-
threatening essay to estimates of participants in the other three
conditions was significant, f (60) = 2.09, p < .05. Thus, partici-
pants' self-reports of hot sauce allocation produced the same
pattern as their actual hot sauce allocation. A second orthogonal
contrast compared the MS worldview-consistent condition with
the two exam conditions and was not significant, f(60) = 1.08,
p > .28. This indicates that MS did not lead to especially low
self-reports of hot sauce allocated to the worldview-consistent
target. The third contrast compared the two exam conditions
and was also not significant, t(59) = .50, p > .61.
Affect measures. The PANAS-X was administered directly
after the MS manipulation. Two-way ANOVAs on each of the
13 subscales revealed no effects on affect (Fs < 1.5). To further
investigate the role of affect in MS effects, we examined within-
cell correlations between each of the subscales of the PANAS-
X and both weight and self-report measures of hot sauce alloca-
tion. With the exception of the hostility subscale, none of the
within-cell correlations approached significance (allps > ,10).
To the extent that hostility is indicative of aggressive propensi-
ties, it is not surprising that within both the MS worldview-
threatening condition and the exam salient worldview-threaten-
ing condition, hostility was positively correlated with the weight
measure of hot sauce allocation, r(14) = .58, p < .05, and
r( 14) = .51, p < .05, respectively. Within the MS worldview-
threatening condition, self-report hostility was also positively
correlated with self-report estimates of hot sauce allocation,
r(14) = .52, p < .05, but this correlation did not reach signifi-
cance in the exam salient worldview-threatening condition, MS
had no effect on the hostility subscale (F < 1); therefore, this
measure probably reflected a preexisting individual difference
in level of hostility. Thus the correlation might best be interpre-
ted as indicating that people high in hostility, at either a trait or
state level, were more aggressive toward the worldview threat-
ener but not toward the worldview-consistent target.4 Whether
the hostility differences of participants who came into the study
reflected differences in trait hostility or just their current state
cannot be determined from the data.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 clearly supported the hypothesis that
MS leads to aggression against worldview-threatening others.
Specifically, participants in the MS worldview-threatening con-
dition allocated significantly more hot sauce to targets than did
participants in the three other conditions, and a self-report mea-
sure of hot sauce allocation yielded a similar pattern of results.
A priori contrasts indicated that these findings did not simply
result from participants having their worldview threatened.
There was no significant difference in the amount of hot sauce
given to the two targets in the exam control conditions. Rather,
it was the juxtaposition of MS and worldview threat that led to
a significant increase in aggressive behavior.
Treatment of the worldview-consistent target. Some prior
595
studies have shown that MS engenders more positive evaluations
of those who uphold important aspects of the cultural worldview
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990); one might therefore have ex-
pected to find significantly less aggression (i.e., smaller alloca-
tions of hot sauce) toward the worldview-consistent target in
the MS than in the exam salient control conditions. Whereas
the means were in the expected direction, the contrast was not
significant. Although some other MS studies have also failed to
find a significant increase in rating of the pro-worldview target
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992), the nature of the worldview-
consistent target used in this study may have played a role.
Although the essays were designed to either threaten or not
threaten participants' worldviews, they were not designed to
directly support them. For example, liberal participants in the
threat condition read an essay claiming that liberals were ruining
the country, whereas liberal participants in the consistent condi-
tion read an essay claiming that conservatives were ruining the
country. Although this latter essay does not attack the partici-
pant's worldview, it does not necessarily support it either, and
thus there is no guarantee that participants would agree with
the sentiments expressed in it. Thus, if participants had read
an essay directly supporting their worldview (e.g., if liberal
participants read an essay stating that liberals were wonderful
people and their beliefs were the solution to the country's prob-
lems), the tendency to allocate less hot sauce to the worldview-
consistent author may have been stronger.
The aggression measure. Given that hot sauce allocation to
a person who dislikes spicy foods is a new measure of aggres-
sion, it is important to consider the extent to which it validly
taps the aggression construct. The fact that the measure yielded
theoretically predicted results suggests that it has construct va-
lidity. Furthermore, given prior evidence of a relationship be-
tween hostility and aggression (see, e.g., Geen, 1990), the fact
that hostility and hot sauce allocation were significantly corre-
lated in both MS and control worldview-threatening conditions
provides additional evidence of its validity as an index of ag-
gression. Further evidence of the validity of this measure in-
cludes reports in the debriefings by a number of participants
that they intended to create discomfort in the recipient and the
newspaper accounts of actual incidents of aggression using hot
sauce that were cited in the introduction.
To gain additional information about the use of hot sauce as
a means of aggressing, using an experimenter unaware of our
purpose or the findings of Study 1, we also asked a separate
sample from the same participant pool to taste the hot sauce,
rate it, and, on viewing a cup with 26.3 g of the hot sauce
(the mean amount allocated in Study 1 in the MS worldview-
4
Fbr all four studies, we conducted a variety of medianonal analyses
to examine the possibility that affective responses to MS mediate its
effects on aggression. As in previous studies, no evidence of such af-
fective mediation was found. Details of these analyses are available on
request from the authors. Whereas these and previous data suggest that
these effects are not mediated by affect, recent evidence indicates that
they are mediated by a delayed increase in the accessibility of death-
related thoughts. Further, death-related thoughts have been shown not
to be accompanied by increases in arousal or affect (Arndt & Greenberg,
1996; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; for an
overview of the relevant evidence, see Greenberg et al., 1997).
596 MCGREGOR E T AL.
threatening condition), to indicate how much pain or discomfort
would be caused by consuming that amount of hot sauce. The
hot sauce was rated quite hot, 7.2 (n = 10) on a 9-point scale
with endpoints of not at all hot (1) and extremely hot (9).
Similarly, the mean amount allocated in the MS worldview-
threatening condition was viewed as likely to cause considerable
pain or physical discomfort, with a mean of 7.8 (n — 10) on a
9-point scale with endpoints of not much discomfort (1) and
extreme discomfort ( 9 ) . Thus, the hot sauce allocation measure
seems a reasonable way to assess aggression that may be useful
in other research on aggression.
Affect and arousal as alternative explanations. The terror
management explanation for the findings of Study 1 is that
MS intensifies participants' need to defend their worldview;
therefore they lash out at the worldview threatener. One alterna-
tive explanation of the present findings would be that MS created
negative affect, which then triggered aggression (e.g., Berko-
witz, 1993; Geen, 1990). However, the affect measures did not
reveal any evidence that MS created more negative affect than
the exam control, and correlational analyses did not reveal any
evidence that the effects of MS were mediated by affect.
Another possibility is that MS generated physiological
arousal, which then intensified the negative reaction to the
worldview threatener through either the enhancement of domi-
nant responses or excitation transfer (Zillmann, 1979). Al-
though conceivable, we believe these alternatives are highly un-
likely for a variety of reasons. First, using measures of skin
conductance, blood pulse volume, and heart rate, two prior stud-
ies failed to find any evidence of increased physiological arousal
in response to this exact MS treatment (Arndt & Greenberg,
1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Second, if MS created arousal,
it would most likely be labeled as affect and lead to elevated
reports of negative affect; this did not happen in the present
research—or in over 30 prior MS studies (for an overview of
this entire body of work, see Greenberg et al., 1997).
Third, in two prior MS studies, whereas MS led to increased
worldview defense but no negative affect, comparison condi-
tions did not increase worldview defense but did generate nega-
tive affect (Greenberg et al., 1995). If this negative affect in-
volved arousal, this work suggests that neither negative affect
nor arousal is sufficient to produce worldview defense. Fourth,
prior research clearly shows that subtle MS treatments lead to
higher levels of worldview defense than more impactful ones
and that MS effects are stronger after a delay than they are
immediately after the induction (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994).
Presumably, if there were some as yet undetected arousal re-
sulting from MS treatments, arousal and dominant response
amplification would be higher with stronger treatments and di-
rectly after the treatment than with subtler treatments and after
a delay (see Footnote 4 ) .
Although it is true that excitation transfer effects rely on a
short delay following a substantially elevated level of arousal,
such effects are also unlikely to be involved in this and other
MS research. In addition to the fact that our treatment clearly
does not produce a large initial increase in arousal, the plausibil-
ity of the excitation transfer explanation is further reduced be-
cause MS effects have been found in studies that varied consid-
erably in the length of time between the MS treatment and the
dependent variables, whereas the work of Zillmann and col-
leagues (e.g., Zillmann, 1979) clearly demonstrates that excita-
tion transfer occurs within a precise, highly limited time frame.
Thus, the existing evidence regarding the MS treatment used in
this research casts serious doubt on explanations of these find-
ings that are based on negative affect or arousal.
Study 2
In Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate the target
using an "impression formation" form, which contained en-
tirely nonevaluative questions about the target. This was done
because of the possibility that if participants had the opportunity
to report a negative evaluation of the target before allocating
hot sauce, they might take advantage of it to defend their
worldview. Of course, in previous terror management studies
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990), worldview defense has been
shown to occur in this way. If worldview defense occurred at
this point, it is possible that participants would not also need
to defend their worldview by later aggressing against the targets.
Consequently, one factor that might reduce aggression toward
worldview-violating targets is the opportunity for participants
to first derogate the worldview threateners. Similarly, if partici-
pants are able to defend their worldview by aggressing against
the target, they may not subsequently need to derogate them. A
second study was conducted to examine these possibilities as
well as to replicate the primary findings of Study 1.
It is important to examine these hypotheses, because doing
so should shed some light on the nature of terror management
and responses to MS. The existing theory doesn't precisely
specify whether in a given instance MS will motivate a variety
of negative responses to a worldview threatener or whether one
response will serve to sufficiently bolster the worldview, thereby
eliminating the need for other defensive responses. Although
this is likely to depend in part on the strength of the threat, our
hunch is that for most threats, terror management processes
would function much like dissonance reduction. Evidence from
dissonance research indicates that once people use one mode
of dissonance reduction, they are less likely to use other modes
(e.g., Gotz-Marchand, Gotz, & Irle, 1974; Scheier & Carver,
1980; Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). Therefore, we hy-
pothesized that the use of aggression would reduce or eliminate
the use of derogation, and vice versa. Of course, this would
occur only if aggression does indeed serve the same defensive
function that derogation does. Thus, the results of this study
may also address the issue raised in the introduction concerning
the function of aggression by MS participants in response to
worldview threat.
In this study, all participants read a worldview-threatening
essay and were given the opportunity to both allocate hot sauce
and critically evaluate the author. Because Study 1 established
that MS does not encourage aggression against a target who
does not threaten the worldview, and previous work has shown
that MS does not encourage derogation against such targets,
only the worldview-threatening target was used in Study 2. Parti-
cipants thought of their own mortality or dental pain and were
given an opportunity to aggress against a worldview threatener.
Half the MS participants were given the opportunity to allocate
the hot sauce prior to evaluating the target, and half were given
the opportunity to evaluate the target prior to allocating the hot
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
sauce. The dental pain control participants allocated hot sauce
first and then evaluated the target. Because there was no reason
to expect high levels of aggression or derogation in the control
condition, order of dependent variables was not manipulated in
this condition.
Consistent with the findings of Study 1, we expected that MS
participants who were not first asked to evaluate the target would
allocate a greater amount of hot sauce to a worldview-threaten-
ing target than would other participants. However, such in-
creased aggression should be reduced or eliminated among MS
participants who were first allowed to defend their worldview.
Similarly, we expected that MS-evaLuate-first participants
would express more negative attitudes than the other participants
toward the target, but that such derogation would be reduced
or eliminated when MS participants were first given an opportu-
nity to aggress against the target.
Method
Participants. Twenty-seven male and 31 female introductory psy-
chology students at the University of Arizona participated in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were recruited on the
basis of the same pretest used in Study 1 to classify them as either liberal
or conservative. Three participants were excluded from the analyses after
reporting suspicion about the experimental procedures, 1 was excluded
because he was confused about the instructions, and 2 were excluded
because they were not American citizens and the essays were designed
specifically to criticize American conservatives or liberals.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of three conditions: an MS-evaluate-last condition, where partici-
pants administered hot sauce prior to evaluating the worldview-threaten-
ing target; an MS-evaluate-first condition, in which participants ex-
pressed their attitudes toward the worldview-threatening target prior to
administering the hot sauce; and a control condition, in which partici-
pants were asked to write an essay about experiencing dental pain, and
administered hot sauce prior to evaluating the worldview-threatening
target. A between-subjects design was used, and participants were run
in groups of 4, consisting of either all liberal or all conservative partici-
pants. The experimenter was blind to both participants' political stance
and experimental conditions.
For the most part, the cover story and procedure were identical to
Study 1. Upon arrival, participants were directed toward cubicles and
presented with a packet of personality questionnaires, which contained
the MS manipulation. The topic of dental pain was used instead of an
important exam, so that thoughts of another aversive event could be
used as a control condition.
Next, participants were given the same bogus essay used in Study 1
to threaten their worldviews. However, unlike in Study 1, all participants
read the worldview-threatening essay. Participants were then given the
first of two different impression formation forms. MS-evaluate-last
participants and control participants were presented with the nonevalua-
tive impression formation form used in Study 1, which allowed them to
evaluate the target without engaging in worldview defense. MS-evalu-
ate-first participants were given an opportunity to evaluate the target in
a judgmental way, prior to allocating die hot sauce. Participants in this
condition were presented at this point with an evaluative impression
formation form (Greenberg et al., 1994), which included three questions
regarding the target and two questions regarding agreement with the
essay. Participants were asked, "How much do you like this person?,"
"How intelligent do you think this person is?," "How knowledgeable
do you think this person is?," "How much do you agree with this
person's opinion?," and "From your perspective, how true do you think
this person's opinion is?" Participants responded to these questions
597
using a 9-point rating scale with endpoints of not at all (I) and totally
(9). Participants then sealed these forms in a blank envelope.
After completing either the evaluative or nonevaluative impression
formation form, all participants were asked to complete the taste prefer-
ence inventory. As in Study 1, participants were shown a bogus version
of the taste preference inventory, indicating that the target did not like
hot sauce. The participants were then asked to allocate hot sauce to the
target and to give a self-report of the number of spoonfuls of hot sauce
administered. Following this, manipulation checks were delivered. Parti-
cipants were then given a second impression formation form. Participants
in the MS-evaluate-first condition, who had previously completed the
evaluative impression formation form, were given the nonevaluative im-
pression formation form. Participants in the MS-evaluate-last and con-
trol conditions, who previously had completed the nonevaluative impres-
sion formation form, were presented with the evaluative impression
formation form. Finally, all participants were debriefed, thanked, and
dismissed.
Results
The primary analysis to be reported is a one-way ( M S -
evaluate-last vs. MS-evaluate-first vs. dental pain) A N O W
The mean response for recall of the target's rating of liking hot
sauce was 2.86 (which did not differ by condition, F — .12).
For the question assessing the usefulness of the inventory, the
mean response was 16.2 (which did not differ by condition, F
= .12). For the question assessing the extent to which partici-
pants used the inventory, the mean response, which again did
not differ by condition, was 15.6 (F = 1.21). As in Study 1,
participants in all conditions were equally aware that the target
did not like spicy food and used this rating in deciding how
much hot sauce to allocate.
MS and aggression. An ANOV\ on the weight (in grams)
of hot sauce allocated to the target yielded a significant main
effect for condition, F ( 2 , 48) = 3.36, p < .05. Means are
displayed in Table 2. A planned orthogonal contrast to test the
hypothesis that MS-evaluate-last participants would allocate
significantly more hot sauce to targets than participants in the
other two conditions was significant, r(48) = 2.42, p < .02. A
second contrast, comparing MS-evaluate-first participants to
dental pain participants, was not significant, /(48) = .91, p >
.36. Thus, MS participants allocated significantly more hot sauce
when they were not able to verbally derogate the targets prior
to the administration of hot sauce. However, when MS partici-
pants were able to first express their attitudes toward the target,
the amount of hot sauce allocated was not significantly greater
than for controls.
Table 2
Study 2: Cell Means for the Weight (in Grams), and Self-
Report Estimates (in Spoonfuls) of Hot Sauce Allocated
Mortality Mortality
salient salient Dental pain
evaluate last evaluate first control
Measure M SD M SD M SD
Weight 16.98 13.70 11.50 8.69 8.44 4.78
Self-report estimates 1.59 1.18 1.07 1.25 0.74 0.44
598 MCGREGOR E T AL.
An ANOVA on participants' estimates of how many spoonfuls
of hot sauce they allocated to the target revealed a marginally
significant effect for condition, F(2,48) = 2.96, p < .07. Means
are displayed in Table 2. A planned orthogonal contrast again
provided support for our main hypothesis: Estimates of hot
sauce made by MS-evaluate-last participants were greater than
estimates made by the other participants, t(4S) = 2.25, p <
.03. A second orthogonal contrast compared the MS-evaluate-
first participants with dental pain participants and, as expected,
was not significant, f(48) = .92, p > .36.
Attitude toward and agreement with the target. As in previ-
ous research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994) separate composite
measures of attitudes toward the author and essay were com-
puted from the evaluative impression form. We predicted that
MS participants who evaluated the target prior to administering
hot sauce would evaluate the target less positively than other
participants. However; no difference was expected between MS
participants who evaluated the target after administering hot
sauce and control participants. We had similar predictions re-
garding agreement with the essay, but we were less confident
for this measure because prior research has typically found
stronger effects on evaluation of the target than on agreement
with the essay (indeed, the latter measure has sometimes failed
to yield significant effects, e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994).
A one-way ANGVA on the attitude toward the target measure
yielded a marginally significant result, F(2, 47) — 2.75, p <
.08 (means are displayed in Table 3). An orthogonal contrast
offered support for the hypothesis that MS-evaluate-first parti-
cipants would evaluate the target less positively than other parti-
cipants, t(47) = 2.26, p < .03. A second orthogonal contrast,
comparing MS-evaluate-last participants and dental pain parti-
cipants, was not significant t(47) = .50, p > .57. Thus, MS
led to more negative attitudes toward the worldview-threatening
target, but only when these attitudes were assessed prior to
the opportunity to aggress. A one-way ANO\A on the essay
agreement composite revealed no significant effect, F(2, 48) =
.23, p > .79 (means are displayed in Table 3).
Within-cell correlations for target evaluation and hoi sauce
allocation. Within-cell correlations between attitude and be-
havior measures were assessed. In the dental pain control condi-
tion, there was a significant negative correlation between weight
of hot sauce allocation and target rating, r(14) = —.60, p <
.02, as well as between self-report of hot sauce allocation and
target rating, r(14) = - . 6 1 , p < .02, indicating that the more
negatively the target was rated, the more hot sauce was allocated.
Table 3
Study 2: Cell Means on Composite Measures of Attitude
Toward and Agreement With Target's Essay
Mortality Mortality
salient salient Dental pain
evaluate last evaluate first control
Measure M SD M SD M SD
Target rating 5.47 1.48 4.06 2.23 5.10
Agreement 3.06 1.79 2.88 2.35 3.35
Note. Lower means indicate more negative evaluations of target.
However, in the two MS conditions, although the correlations
between both weight and self-report estimates and the target
ratings were in the negative direction, they did not approach
significance (ps > .20).
Affect measure. One-way ANOV^s on each of the 13
PANAS-X subscales (administered immediately after the MS
manipulation) revealed no effects of condition on affect {Fs <
.90). As in Study 1, we conducted within-cell correlations be-
tween each of the PANAS-X subscales and both the weight
and self-report measures of hot sauce allocation. In contrast to
the findings of Study 1, the within-cell correlations between
hostility and weight were not significant, although they were
positive (e.g., r( 15) = .30, in the MS-evaluate-last condition).
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the basic findings of Study 1: MS increased
aggression against the target when participants were not given
an opportunity to derogate the worldview-threatening target
prior to aggressing. The findings also supported the hypothesis
that MS participants would engage in less aggressive behavior
toward a worldview-threatening target if they were first given
an opportunity to derogate the target. Whereas MS-evaluate-
last participants allocated more hot sauce to targets than did
the other participants, when MS participants were able to first
derogate the target, they did not allocate significantly more hot
sauce than control participants.
In addition, consistent with previous terror management re-
search (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990), a planned contrast showed
that MS-evaluate-first participants derogated the worldview-
threatening target relative to the other participants. However,
when MS participants were able to aggress against the target
prior to this evaluation, there was no difference in liking for the
target between MS and control participants. The general pattern
of results suggests that aggression against the target and deroga-
tion of the target serve the same terror management function,
because once one mode of defense is used, the other is not.
As noted earlier, other types of psychological defenses have
also been shown to work in this manner. Tn general, evidence
concerning dissonance reduction indicates that people will
choose whatever mode of dissonance reduction is most salient
and available and that once they have used that mode, they will
not use alternative modes (e.g., Gotz-Marchand et al., 1974;
Scheier & Carver, 1980; Simon et al., 1995). For example,
Simon et al. (1995) found that after writing a counterattitudinal
essay, people either shift their attitude to be more consistent with
the essay or reduce the importance of their action, depending on
which is measured first or which is easier to do. Similar findings
have also been reported for defense of self-esteem (e.g.,
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985).
Given this reasoning, and the reciprocal between-condition
relationship between target derogation and aggression in Study
2, one might have expected, in the MS conditions, a positive
correlation within-cells between the two measures such that the
more aggression, the less derogation. However, this runs counter
to the intuitive relationship between liking and aggression: The
1.65
1.89
less you like someone, the more you aggress against that person.
Indeed, in the control condition, in which mortality concerns
were not activated, there was a strong negative correlation be-
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
tween the two measures (i.e., the more aggression, the less
derogation). In contrast, in the two MS conditions, the correla-
tions were trivial and nonsignificant.5 Whereas we cannot defin-
itively interpret these correlations, this pattern may have oc-
curred because the tendency in the MS conditions to use one
mode of defense or the other may have counteracted the more
general tendency to treat someone poorly to the extent you don't
like that person. Consistent with this idea, Simon et al. (1995)
found similarly small nonsignificant within-cell correlations be-
tween modes of dissonance reduction.
Remaining issues. The results of Studies 1 and 2 clearly
show that MS increases aggression against worldview-threaten-
ing others. The findings of Study 2 also indicate that derogation
of and aggression against such a target serve the same function
in that once participants had engaged in one of the behaviors,
they did not engage in the other behavior. However, two issues
were not completely resolved. First, in Study 2, although the
planned orthogonal contrasts provided clear support for the
hypotheses on both the hot sauce and evaluation measures, a
pairwise (two-tailed) comparison between the MS-evaluate-
first and MS-evaluate-last conditions would not have been sig-
nificant (p = .11). Given the importance of the questions of
whether derogation and aggression serve the same terror man-
agement function and, more generally, whether one form of MS-
motivated defense reduces the need for others, we decided to
replicate Study 2 in a third study.
The second issue concerns whether the effects of MS are
specific to targets who threaten one's worldview or would occur
in reaction to any target who somehow impinged negatively on
the participants. According to terror management theory, MS
should encourage negative reactions only to those who impinge
on one of the two components of the cultural anxiety buffer:
self-esteem or, as in this research, the worldview. Prior research
suggests that MS effects on evaluations are limited to
worldview-threatening targets (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Ro-
senblatt et al., 1989). However, because the first two studies did
not include a noxious target who did not challenge participants'
worldviews but would have been an appropriate target for ag-
gression, we cannot be certain that the MS effects on aggression
are limited to worldview-threatening targets, as terror manage-
ment theory predicts.
Therefore, we designed Study 4 to determine whether MS
would encourage aggression against a target who provoked par-
ticipants without threatening their worldviews. Unfortunately,
the terror management prediction is a null result: no effect of
MS. A potential problem arises, however: How would we then
know that in Study 4, MS would affect aggression against any
target? Our economical solution to this problem was to conduct
Studies 3 and 4 simultaneously, with participants randomly as-
signed to one of seven conditions, from among the three condi-
tions of Study 3 and the four conditions of Study 4. If M S -
evaluate-last participants from Study 3 exhibited increased ag-
gression, then an absence of an effect of MS on aggression
against the non-worldview-threatening target in Study 4 would
support the idea that MS effects are indeed specific to
worldview-threatening targets.
Study 3
Study 3 is a replication of Study 2, with the same design and
dependent measures. However, in this study, rather than selecting
599
liberal and conservative participants and having targets attack
one position or the other, we simply had American participants
react to an anti-U.S. essayist, as has been done in past research
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). The only other difference was
that we moved the measure of affect to after participants had
tasted their food sample to keep the procedure consistent with
the conditions of Study 4. We expected that MS-evaluate-last
participants would exhibit especially high hot sauce allocations
and that MS-evaluate-first participants would exhibit especially
negative attitudes toward the anti-U.S. target.
Method
Participants. Seventeen male and 25 female students enrolled in psy-
chology courses at the University of Arizona participated in partial ful-
fillment of a course requirement. RJQT participants were excluded from
the analyses because they reported suspicion about the experimental pro-
cedure, two were excluded because of experimenter error, and three were
excluded because they were not Americans and the worldview-violating
essays were targeted specifically at American beliefs.
Materials and procedure. The design of Study 3 was identical to
Study 2, with two exceptions. First, because participants were not se-
lected on the basis of their political ideology, a different worldview-
threatening essay was developed. Participants were asked to write about
"the direction the country is heading in" and were later given an essay
designed to derogate the United States:
That's an easy question to answer—I think this country basically
totally sucks—it's ugly, unfriendly, and out of control. There is no
real freedom here. It's easy to see why so many other countries
hate us. The only way things can change is if we have a new
government. And I don't mean a new president. Somebody should
get things together to overthrow the government—the president,
congress and all that. And put in a new type of government that
would be better. America thinks this is a great country but it is not.
People who are happy wiui America are stupid.
The other variation from Study 2 was the timing of the PANAS-X
measure. In Studies 1 and 2, die PANAS-X was administered immedi-
ately after the MS manipulation. However, in the present study it was
delivered immediately after participants consumed and rated their liking
of the food sample. This change was made because participants in Stud-
ies 3 and 4 were randomly assigned to conditions from the same general
sample and run in the same sessions, and in Study 4 the PANAS-X
was used as a manipulation check on affective reactions to the manipula-
tion of the food sample.
Results
Because Study 3 was a replication of Study 2, the primary
analyses to be reported were again one-way (MS-evaluate-last
vs. MS-evaluate-first vs. dental pain) ANOVAs and planned
5
As an anonymous reviewer noted, from the perspective of dissonance
theory, one might predict that more hot sauce allocation would lead to
more derogation and that more derogation would lead to more hot sauce
allocation. However, cognitive consistency was apparently not the over-
riding concern in these studies (responding to the threat was). In addi-
tion, in this context, consistency between the dependent measures may
not have been a salient concern. After MS and worldview threat, aggres-
sion may simply not need to be further justified by subsequent derogation
of the target. In addition, just because you don't like someone does not
necessarily mean that you will physically aggress against them.
600 MCGREGOR ET AL.
contrasts. As in the previous two studies, participants in all
conditions were equally aware that the target did not like spicy
food (Af = 4.00) and used this rating in deciding how much
hot sauce to allocate (M = 14.07); neither varied by condition
(F < .40).
MS and aggression. An ANOV*V on the weight (in grams)
of hot sauce allocated yielded a significant main effect for condi-
tion, f ( 2 , 39) = 3.56, p < .04. Means are displayed in Table
4. A planned orthogonal contrast to test the hypothesis that M S -
evaluate-last participants would allocate more hot sauce than
participants in the other two groups was significant, f(39) =
2.65,p < .02. However, as expected, a contrast comparing M S -
evaluate-first participants to dental pain participants revealed
no hint of a difference, t(39) = .32, p > .15. Thus, the main
findings of Study 2 were replicated.
On the secondary measure of estimates of amount of hot
sauce allocated, an ANOVA yielded a marginally significant
effect for condition, F(2, 39) = 3.06, p < .06. Means are
displayed in Table 4. Planned orthogonal contrasts supported
our hypothesis. Estimates of hot sauce made by MS-evaluate-
last participants were significantly greater than estimates made
by the other participants, *(39) = 2.47, p < .02, and there
was no difference between MS-evaluate-first and dental pain
participants, r(39) = .16, p > .87.
Attitude toward and agreement with the target. The same
two composite measures of evaluation of the target and agree-
ment with the target were computed. A one-way ANOVA per-
formed on the evaluation measure yielded a nonsignificant trend
toward an overall effect, F{2, 39) = 2.27, p < .12. Means are
displayed in Table 5. An orthogonal contrast comparing M S -
evaluate-first participants with both MS-evaluate-last and den-
tal pain participants yielded a marginally significant effect,
r(39) = 2.02, p < .052. As expected, the contrast comparing
MS-evaluate-last and dental pain participants did not approach
significance, r(39) = .69, p > .49.
We expected MS-evaluate-first participants to exhibit sig-
nificantly lower agreement with the essay than participants in
the other groups. In Study 2, the ANOVA and planned compari-
sons on this measure did not approach significance. However, in
the present study, the A N 0 \ A revealed a marginally significant
effect, F ( 2 , 39) = 3.18,/? < .053, consistent with this hypothe-
sis. Means are displayed in Table 5. When MS-evaluate-first
participants were compared with the other two conditions, a
significant difference was found, t(39) - 2.34,p < .03. Finally,
the contrast comparing MS-evaluate-last and dental pain parti-
cipants did not approach significance, f(39) = .94, p > .36.
Table 4
Study 3: Cell Means for the Weight (in Grams), and Self-
Report Estimates (in Spoonfuls) of Hot Sauce Allocated
Mortality Mortality
salient salient Dental pain
evaluate last
evaluate first control
Measure M SD M SD M SD
Weight 28.49 32.08 12.63 9.21 10.29 6.55
Self-report estimates 3.09 3.74 1.29 1.09 1.15 0.90
Table 5
Study 3: Cell Means on Composite Measures of Attitude
Toward Target and Agreement With Target's Essay
Mortality Mortality
salient salient Dental pain
evaluate last evaluate first control
Measure M SD M SD M SD
Target rating 4.81 2.35 3.83 1.65 5.29 1.37
Agreement 4.46 2.74 3.11 1.94 5.29 2.16
Note. Lower means indicate more negative evaluations of target.
Within-cell correlations for target evaluation and hot sauce
allocation. Within-cell correlations were again conducted on
the attitude and behavior measures. However, none of the within-
cell correlations approached significance (ps > .23).
Affect measures. One-way ANOVAs performed on each of
the 13 PANAS-X subscales revealed a significant effect on
self-report ratings of attentiveness, F(2, 39) = 8.19, p < .01.
The means were 3.46, 3.20, and 2.54, respectively, for M S -
evaluate-last, MS-evaluate-first, and dental pain conditions.
This effect suggests that MS participants were more attentive
than dental pain participants. There was also a significant effect
on overall positive mood, F(2, 38) = 3.65, p < .04, which
reflects the fact that MS participants reported more positive
moods than dental pain participants. The means were 2.92, 2.65,
and 2.21, respectively, for MS-evaluate-last, MS-evaluate-first,
and dental pain conditions. No significant effects were found on
the remaining 11 subscales. Of course, the finding of increased
positive mood in response to MS is paradoxical and may reflect
a tendency to deny one's distress at thoughts of one's own
death; Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, and Simon (1995)
and Rosenblatt et al. (1989) also found some evidence of an
increase in positive mood in response to MS. Interpretation of
these mood findings is complicated by the fact that in Studies
3 and 4, the PANAS-X was completed immediately after the
participants had tasted and evaluated the food sample; this pro-
vided a check on participants' affective responses to the drinks
their partners assigned them in Study 4 and was included in
Study 3 to make the procedures between the two studies as
parallel as possible. Thus, the effect of the treatment on these
affect scales may have been influenced by the food tasting expe-
rience. In addition, interpretation of the role of affect in reac-
tions to targets is difficult because at this point in the experiment,
the evaluate-first participants already had had the opportunity
to derogate the target through verbal evaluations, but the evalu-
ate-last participants had not yet had the opportunity to aggress
against the target.
As in Studies 1 and 2, within-cell correlations were conducted
between each of the PANAS-X subscales and both the weight
and self-report measures of hot sauce allocation. In contrast to
Study 1, the within-cell correlations between the hostility sub-
scale and weight were not significant (e.g., r(14) = .002, in
the MS-evaluate-last condition). The only other correlation to
approach significance was between attentiveness and self-report
of hot sauce allocation in the MS-evaluate-first condition, r( 14)
= —.51, p = .06. Thus, the more attentive participants in the
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
MS-evaluate-first condition were, the less hot sauce they re-
ported allocating.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 generally replicated the findings of
Study 2. Once again, MS-evaluate-last participants allocated
the most hot sauce and MS-evaluate-first participants evaluated
the target most negatively. In this study, a pairwise comparison
of hot sauce allocations between MS-evaluate-last participants
and MS-evaluate-first participants was significant, 2(39) =
2.14, p < .04. However, the findings regarding derogation of
the target were a bit weaker than in Study 2. Although the
planned orthogonal contrasts were supportive in both studies, a
pairwise comparison of hot sauce allocation was not significant
in Study 2, and the overall F for attitude was not significant in
Study 3. However, when the data from Studies 2 and 3 were
combined, all ANO\S\s were significant, as were all predicted
differences, whether assessed by planned contrasts or pairwise
comparisons (all ps < .05). Thus, overall, these two studies
replicated the findings of Study 1 and also suggest that deroga-
tion and aggression are two functionally equivalent responses
to worldview threat in response to MS.
Study 4
As noted earlier, our final study was designed to address the
question of whether the effect of MS on aggression is specific
to those who threaten one's worldview or whether this effect
would generalize to any appropriate noxious target person. A
considerable body of research on aggression demonstrates that
people are likely to aggress against others who deliver a noxious
stimulus to them (see, e.g., Geen, 1990, for an overview). There-
fore, in Study 4, we had MS and control participants allocate hot
sauce to someone who allocated either neutral or very unpleasant
tasting juice to them. In general, we should have found increased
hot sauce allocations to the target who allocated the unpleasant
juice and increased negative affect in those who drank the un-
pleasant juice. The key question, however, was whether MS
would intensify aggression against this target. If so, it would
suggest that MS encourages aggression against others who im-
pinge negatively on participants independent of the implications
for the individuals' cultural worldview. If not, it would support
the terror management view that MS encourages aggression only
against others who threaten one's worldview, just as it has been
found to encourage derogation of only such targets (e.g.,
Greenberg et a l , 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
Method
Participants. Sixteen male and 44 female psychology students par-
ticipated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Five participants
were excluded because they reported suspicion about the experimental
procedure, two were excluded because of experimental error, and two
were excluded because they were nonnative speakers and had trouble
following the experimenter's instructions.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to
conditions in a 2 (MS vs. control) X 2 (noxious vs. neutral juice)
between-subjects design. The design of the study was identical to Study
1, with the following exceptions.
601
First, because the goal of the study was to determine whether MS
would influence reactions to a target who negatively affected participants
but did not threaten their worldview, we replaced the worldview-vio-
lating essay with a neutral essay that was designed to neither threaten
nor bolster participants' cultural worldviews. The topic of the essay
participants were asked to write was changed from * 'the direction the
country is heading i n " to "recreational interests." Thus, all participants
were presented with the following bogus essay:
I think that recreation is very important I like lots of different
activities. I like playing basketball, softball, and soccer. I also like
tossing a frisbee and swimming. Exercise is important to me so I
use machines at the rec center pretty regularly. I also like going to
the movies, reading, and hiking. And music, especially live music.
So there are many things I'm into, but I'm not really a fanatic about
any one kind of recreational activity.
Next, we manipulated whether the target provided participants with
a negative experience. In the first two studies, participants were told
that we were investigating the effects of personality on taste preferences
for dry and spicy foods. However, in Studies 3 and 4, we informed
participants that we were also interested in tart foods. Instead of the
cracker sample, participants in Study 4 received a sample of juice.
They were told that the juice sample was selected for them by another
participant, and that they ' 'selected this flavor from a variety of flavors
which ranged from neutral to very tart in taste. So, they could have
given you any one of a number of flavors to taste, and this is the one
they chose." All participants were then given a container of a purple
"juice." The taste of the juice was manipulated to be either very sour
and distasteful or neutral and rather bland.6 Unpleasant tasting juice of
this nature has been successfully used to create an unpleasant experience
in past research (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson,
1996). Participants were instructed to consume the entire amount of
juice and then rate the taste of the juice on a 9-point scale with end
points of neutral (1) and very tart (9) and to rate their liking of the
juice on a 9-point scale which ranged from no liking at all (I) to extreme
liking (9).
Next, the PANAS - X was given to the participants. It was administered
at this point in the experiment, rather than after the MS manipulation,
because we wanted to use it to assess the affective impact of the juice
manipulation. Because we were attempting to anger participants in a
manner that did not violate their worldview, we expected the bad juice
groups to report higher ratings on the hostility and negative mood sub-
scales than the neutral juice groups.
Because Studies 3 and 4 were run simultaneously within experimental
session, it was necessary to ensure that the time it took participants to
complete the materials for both studies was equivalent. Consequently,
even though the recreation essay was used as a filler item in Study 4, and
we did not expect any group differences, we included the nonevaluative
impression formation form after participants had read the essay arid the
evaluative impression formation form after participants had allocated
the hot sauce and completed manipulation checks.
Finally, participants were debriefed. Because some participants in this
study drank the unpleasant tasting juice, we made sure that participants
understood why that manipulation was used. While participants reported
that the juice tasted very unpleasant, no one reported being upset about
our use of this manipulation or about any other aspect of our procedure.
s
The bad juice was a 2 oz (57 g) mixture of unsweetened grape
Kool-Aid with 1 tsp of white vinegar added. The vinegar had the effect
of making it extremely unpleasant to drink. The neutral juice consisted
of 2 oz (57 g) water, with one drop of red food coloring and one drop
of blue food coloring added. The food coloring was used to give the
neutral sample an appearance identical to that of the bad juice.
602 MCGREGOR E T AL.
Results
The primary analyses to be reported are 2 (MS vs. dental
pain) x 2 (neutral vs. bad juice) ANOVAs. As in Studies 1 and
2, participants were aware that the target disliked hot sauce (M
= 3.13) and found this information useful in allocating hot sauce
amounts (M = 16.18); neither measure varied by condition
(Fs < 2.10). For the question assessing the extent to which
participants used the inventory, the mean response was 15.97.
There was an unexpected main effect of juice sample, F ( l , 56)
= 4.59, p < .04. Participants in the bad juice condition reported
using the taste preference inventory less than participants in the
neutral juice condition (Ms = 14.40 and 17.53, respectively).
This may indicate that participants in the bad juice condition
were irritated by receiving their juice sample and as a result
were significantly less interested in taking the target's taste pref-
erences into account.
Juice sample evaluations. Participants also evaluated the
flavor and taste of the juice samples. Not surprisingly, partici-
pants in the bad juice condition reported it to be significantly
more tart (M = 7.8) than did participants in the neutral juice
condition (M = 2.0), F ( l , 56) = 130.32, p < .01. On the
second question, which asked them to rate their level of liking
for the juice, the difference between participants in the neutral
juice (M = 2.0) and bad juice conditions (M = 1.7) was not
significant, F( 1,56) = 1.07, p > .43. The lack of significance
on this measure is most likely a reflection of the specific wording
of the question. Participants evaluated the juice on a scale that
ranged from no liking at all (1) to extreme liking (9) with a
midpoint of moderate liking (5). The endpoint of no liking does
not permit participants to express extreme disliking they may
have felt for the sample. In addition, the midpoint of 5 reflects
moderate likiag rather than a neutral evaluation that one would
expect from water. Consequently, it may have been impossible
for participants to demonstrate a distinction between reactions
of neutral feelings toward, and strong dislike for, the sample.
In other words, a floor effect may have kept a difference from
emerging on this measure. This is particularly likely given the
significant differences found on participants' evaluation of the
flavor of the juice and on the hostility subscale of the PANAS-
X measure (reported later in this section). In addition, in a
later study (Lieberman & Greenberg, 1997) the endpoint of no
liking at all was replaced with extreme disliking, and significant
differences in the expected direction were obtained.
MS and aggression. As expected, an ANOVA on the weight
(in grams) of hot sauce allocated to the target yielded a signifi-
cant main effect for sample type, F ( l , 56) = 4.33, p < .05.
Bad juice participants allocated more hot sauce than neutral
juice participants (Ms = 24.67 and 15.36, respectively). How-
ever, there were no hints of a main effect of MS or an interaction
of MS and sample type, F( 1,56) - .01, p > .97, a n d F ( l , 56)
= .64, p > .42, respectively. Cell means are displayed in Table
6. Thus, it appears that although our manipulation of sample
type was successful in increasing aggression, MS did not moder-
ate this effect; in fact, in the bad juice condition, the mean hot
sauce allocation was higher in the dental pain condition than in
the MS condition. Consequently, the effects of MS on aggression
do not appear to extend to non-worldview-threatening targets.
On the secondary measure of participants' self-report esti-
Table 6
Study 4: Cell Means for Weight (in Grams), and Self-Report
Estimates (in Spoonfuls) of Hot Sauce Allocated
Mortality salient Dental pain control
Juice sample M SD M SD
Weight
22.82 14.26 26.53 25.78
Bad
Neutral 17.07 9.39 13.64 15.74
Self-report estimates
Bad 2.00 1.20 2.42 2.15
Neutral 1.25 0.80 1.24 1.34
mates of how many spoonfuls of hot sauce they allocated to the
target, an ANOVA again yielded a significant effect for sample
type, F ( l , 56) = 6.56, p < .02. Bad juice participants reported
more spoonfuls allocated than did neutral juice participants (Ms
= 2.21 and 1.25, respectively). Cell means are displayed in
Table 6. As with the weight measure, there were no hints of a
main effect of MS or an interaction of MS and sample type, F( 1,
56) = .29, p > .59, and F ( l , 56) = .33,p > .57, respectively.
Attitude toward and agreement with the target. As in the
previous studies, composite measures of evaluation of the essay-
ist and agreement with the essay were computed and subjected
to 2 X 2 ANOVAs. These measures were included to ensure
procedural equivalence with Study 3. Because the participants
were presented with a neutral essay, we had no strong expecta-
tions regarding this measure; however, we felt it possible that a
negative reaction to the target who delivered the noxious stimu-
lus would be found.
A two-way ANOVA performed on the attitude measure
yielded no significant effects, Fs < 1.06. Means are displayed
in Table 7. However, there was a main effect for juice type on
the agreement measure, F(\, 56) = 4.42,p < .05. Participants
in the bad juice condition reported less agreement with the target
(M = 5.9) than participants in the neutral juice condition (M
= 6.8). This may indicate that anger at the target on the part
of participants in the bad juice condition carried over to the
evaluative rating of agreement with the targets. No main effects
or interactions involving MS were found (Fs < .14).
Affect measure. Two-way ANOVAs performed on each of
the 13 PANAS-X subscales revealed several significant effects.
Significant main effects of sample type were found on hostility,
F ( l , 49) = 9.71, p < .01, overall negative mood, F ( l , 49) =
5.62, p < .03, and surprise F( 1,49) = 7.64, p< .01. Bad juice
participants reported feeling more hostile (Ms = 1.8 vs. 1.2),
having a more negative mood (Ms = 1.48 vs. 1.18), and feeling
more surprised (Ms = 2.04 vs. 1.45) than neutral juice partici-
pants. Thus, it appears that we were successful in our attempts
to irritate our participants in a manner that did not violate their
worldview.
An unexpected main effect of MS occurred on the surprise
subscale as well, F ( l , 49) = 6.38, p < .02. MS participants
reported feeling less surprised in general (M = 1.5) than dental
pain participants (M = 2.0). Although, as in Study 3, this effect
 TERROR MANAGEMENT AND AGGRESSION
Table 7
Study 4: Cell Means on Composite Measures of Target
Rating, and Agreement with Target's Essay
Dental pain
Mortality salient control
Juice sample M SD M SD
Target rating
Bad 5.77 1.62 6.11 1.06
Neutral 6.31 1.59 6.31 1.16
Agreement
Bad 5.90 1.98 5.87 1.92
Neutral 6.67 1.67 6.97 1.19
Note. Lower means indicate more negative evaluations of target.
may have been influenced by the juice tasting that followed the
MS induction, it may indicate some denial of the affective im-
pact of MS.
As in the first 3 studies, within-cell correlations were con-
ducted between all PANAS-X subscales, including the hostility
subscale, and both the weight and self-report of hot sauce alloca-
tion measures. Again, the correlations involving the hostility
subscale did not attain significance, although the relationships
were in the expected direction in the MS conditions (e.g., be-
tween hostility and weight r(15) = .23, in the MS-bad juice
condition). No other correlations between the remaining sub-
scales and the weight or self-report measures approached sig-
nificance. One might have expected some evidence that self-
reported hostility mediated aggression against the target; how-
ever, none was found (Geen, 1990, noted that self-reported anger
and hostility and aggression often do not covary as well as
might be expected).
Discussion
The results of Study 4 indicate that MS does not increase
aggression against an appropriate noxious target who did not
threaten participants' worldview—someone who made them
consume a very unpleasant tasting drink. This lack of effect
cannot be attributed to a general lack of effects of MS, because
randomized conditions run simultaneously (reported as Study
3) revealed that MS did increase aggression against a worldview
threatener. Thus, the evidence from these studies as well as
prior research seems to support the specificity of MS effects
to worldview-relevant targets. These findings also add to prior
research indicating that MS effects do not result from arousal
or the generation of negative affect, for if they did, one would
expect MS to amplify aggression against any appropriate target.
General Discussion
Taken together, these four studies indicate that MS motivates
aggression against those who threaten one's worldview. Thus,
these studies provide the first empirical evidence consistent with
the idea that mortality concerns contribute to the historically all
too common phenomenon of aggression between those who
603
have different views of the world. However, the findings of
Studies 2 and 3 indicate that, as Solomon et al. (1991) have
proposed, aggression is only one of a number of responses
to a worldview threat motivated by mortality concerns. When
participants were first given the opportunity to aggress against
the target, they did so and did not express a particularly negative
attitude toward the target. Similarly, when first given the oppor-
tunity to express dislike of the target, they did that and did not
engage in significant aggression. This pattern of results suggests
that derogation and aggression are two alternative ways to de-
fend the worldview in response to the increased need for protec-
tion produced by MS.
In addition to providing support for terror management the-
ory, these findings also tell us something new about terror man-
agement that goes beyond the level of specification of the basic
theory. The results indicate that MS can lead to at least two
different defensive reactions to a woridview threat and that once
one mode of addressing the threat is used, the other mode is
not needed. As previously noted, terror management may be
similar in this regard to other psychological defenses such as
dissonance reduction and self-esteem defense. It might be
worthwhile in future research to assess the possibility that if
the threat were particularly great or persistent, multiple modes
of defense might be used in concert.
Another issue worth exploring is whether people might use
other modes besides derogation and aggression to defend their
worldviews in response to MS. Indeed, following Berger and
Luckmann (1967), Solomon et al. (1991) noted that, histori-
cally, in addition to derogation and aggression, people have also
often tried to defuse worldview threat through assimilation and
accommodation. Assimilation involves attempting to convert
others to one's own point of view. Missionary activity is one
example of this approach. Accommodation involves incorporat-
ing certain compelling or appealing components of a threatening
alternative worldview into one's own while discarding the
threatening components. A historical example of this may be the
incorporation and meaning-altering transformation of various
aspects of the 1960s American hippie counterculture into main-
stream American society. Hence, blue jeans became high fash-
ion, granola bars became chocolate covered, and revolution-
espousing rock music became soothing background stimulation
for shopping mall excursions. Of course, research is needed to
determine whether MS does indeed motivate efforts at assimila-
tion and accommodation in response to worldview threat as well
as derogation and aggression.
We believe that it is also important to investigate factors that
determine which mode of defense is most likely to be used by
a given person in a given situation. The present research suggests
that people will choose the first mode of worldview defense
provided for them; however, there are undoubtedly also other
situational and dispositional factors that affect which mode of
worldview defense is chosen. Indeed, the aggression literature
has revealed a variety of factors that facilitate or inhibit aggres-
sion (see, e.g., Baron & Richardson, 1994; Geen, 1990; Ham-
mock & Richardson, 1992a); perhaps these would steer MS
individuals toward either aggression or alternative responses to
worldview threat. Of course, in the present research, participants
were not aware of alternative ways to respond to the threat when
the first dependent measure was assessed. By simultaneously
604 MCGREGOR E T A L .
providing people with a number of possible ways to address
worldview threats following MS, future research may be able
to clarify the roles that dispositional and situational variables
play in determining which of the many possible responses to
MS a given individual tends to choose.
Conclusion
The present studies are the first to provide behavioral evi-
dence of aggression in response to MS. In so doing, they offer
what is probably the most compelling evidence to date that
mortality concerns play a significant role in social behavior;
Clearly this work demonstrates that death-related thoughts can
motivate a highly significant and problematic type of social
behavior. Indeed, the hot sauce allocations by MS participants
could have caused considerable pain not only to the mouths but
also to the gastrointestinal systems of the intended targets.
These findings are thus consistent with Solomon et al.'s
(1991) contention that terror management processes contribute
to aggression, as well as with the writings of Becker (1973,
1975) and others who have argued that the fear of death plays
a major role in intergroup aggression. Prom a practical perspec-
tive, further work is of course needed to assess the scope of
terror management processes in both interpersonal and in-
tergroup conflict, and to identify ways of attenuating the aggres-
sion that MS can produce. Perhaps methods to address the fear
of death could be developed individually or culturally that would
reduce the propensity for people to resort to violence against
those who view the world differently than they do. As Becker
(1975) noted:
If men kill out of animal fears, then conceivably fears can always
be examined and calmed. . . . Elie Wiesel, who survived a Nazi
concentration camp, summed it all up . . . "Man is not human."
But it is one thing to say that man is not human because he is a
vicious animal and another to say that it is because he is a frightened
creature who tries to secure a victory over his limitations. . . .
Cultural developments . . . might influence the fear of death and
forms of heroism; and so blunt the terrible destructiveness they
have caused, (p. 169)
Even before the first drop of blood is shed, many conflicts
probably involve elevated mortality salience; this research sug-
gests that such thoughts of mortality may be not only conse-
quences of these conflicts but significant contributors to their
violent escalation as well.
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Received November 16, 1995
Revision received May 6, 1997
Accepted May 9, 1997 •