Jurists™ Bar Ops For The 2021 Bar Exam: Last-Minute Tips On Civil Law

JURISTS™ BAR OPS
FOR THE 2021 BAR EXAM

LAST-MINUTE TIPS ON CIVIL LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Question 1:
X is a 16-year old master chess player. But he looks older than his age. He won many
competitions locally and abroad. TV Channel 5 approached him in one competition and offered
to make a biopic movie about his life. X agreed and he and the producer signed a contract. After
which X accepted the advance payment of P200,000.00. When the movie came out, X’s parents
were shocked to know that it was about their minor son. They sued TV Channel 5 for annulment
of contract because of X’s minority. TV Channel 5, however, defended that it did not know that X
was still a minor. Should the contract be annulled?
Answer:
No, the contract should not be annulled. As a rule, a minor cannot enter into contracts because
of lack of capacity. However, as an exception, as held in several decisions (e.g. Suan vs.
Alcantara) of the Supreme Court, when a minor represents his age and the other party is not
aware of his minority, the minor is estopped and the contract is valid and binding. In this case, X
looks older than his age, he did not inform TV Channel 5 that he is a minor and TV Channel 5
was not aware of his minority. Furthermore, X even received the advance payment, thereby
ratifying the contract. Hence, the contract cannot be annulled.
Question 2:
X and Y were sweethearts. Y impregnated X but Y immediately broke up with X. During her
pregnancy, X demanded from Y for financial support for their unborn child. Y refused, claiming
that an unborn child has no personality and is not entitled to support. Is Y correct?
Answer:
No, Y is not correct. Under the Civil Code, personality begins at conception, provided that the
conceived child is born under the conditions favorable to it. Furthermore, in a case decided by the
Supreme Court (Quimiging vs. Icao), it was held that the unborn child has a right to support from
its progenitors even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere”. In this case, there is no doubt
that the unborn child is fathered by Y. Thus, he is incorrect in refusing the demand for support.
Question 3:
What is the status of a marriage where one of the spouses “refuses” to have sex? Void or
voidable?
Answer:
Under the Family Code, if the failure to have sex is due a physical inability or disability, the
marriage is voidable and can be annulled. However, in a case decided by the Supreme Court (Chi
Ming Tsoi vs. Lao Tsoi), if the failure or refusal is due to some mental condition or disorder, then
the marriage is void due to psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
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Question 4:
Bert and Brenda chose the regime of conjugal partnership of gains in their marriage settlement
executed before their marriage in 2010. Bert worked as the Executive Vice-President of Wealth
Manufacturing Corporation (WMC) since 2007. In 2017, Bert signed a comprehensive surety
agreement in favor of Investor’s Finance Corporation (IFC) for a loan contracted by WMC binding
himself solidarily for all obligations of WMC to IFC. WMC failed to pay the loan and IFC sued
Bert and attached several parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Bert and
Brenda. Brenda objected to the levy on their parcels of land and argued that the loan did not
redound to the benefit of the family. WMC argued that Bert’s continued employment in WMC as
its EVP is certainly a benefit to the family of Bert as he receives a hefty sum as compensation in
addition to his allowances. May the conjugal properties of Bert and Brenda be liable for the loan
of WMC? Explain fully.
Answer:
No, the conjugal properties of Brenda and Bert may not be held liable for the loans of WMC. As
a rule, the obligation must have redounded to the benefit of the family for the conjugal properties
to be answerable for the obligation. The benefit required is a direct benefit resulting from the loan
and not merely a spin-off of the loan itself. The benefit referred to by WMC is not a direct benefit
but an indirect benefit in the form of Bert’s continued employment with the company.
Question 5:
Ronnie Sotto is married to Cynthia. He, however, had an illegitimate son named Christian who
was already three years old. Cynthia came to accept Christian and he had been allowed to join
family gatherings. On May 5, 2018, Ronnie asked Christian’s natural mother, Carla, if he could
bring Christian to Tokyo Disneyland. Carla agreed. After the vacation of Ronnie and his family,
he refused to return Christian to Carla contending that Christian would have a better life with him
since he can provide the child with all the financial support he needs and that he has recognized
the child in his birth certificate which entitles him to have custody of Christina. Carla sued Ronnie
for habeas corpus. If you were the judge, to whom will you award custody of Christian? In view
of the recognition of Christian by Ronnie, may the latter compel the child to use his surname
Sotto?
Answer:
I will award custody to Carla. An illegitimate child shall be under the sole parental authority of
the mother even if he is recognized by the father. The recognition of Christian by Ronnie will not
be a reason to compel the former to use the surname of his father because in the case of
illegitimate children, they are given the right to use the surname if recognized by the father but
there is no compulsion on their part. The operative word used by 9255 is “may” indicating that
the use of the surname by the child is not mandatory.
Question 6:
Fely is married to Horacio. In 2001, Horacio who was an army lieutenant was sent on a military
mission in Mindanao. From the time he left, Horacio was never heard of again. In 2009 Fely filed
a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Horacio which the trial court granted. In 2015,
Fely married Bong and a child was born to them the following year. However, in June 2017, Fely
learned from her cousin in Cotobato that Horacio was still alive and was living with Gregoria. Will
the reappearance of Horacio have the effect of terminating the marriage of Fely and Bong?
Answer:
No, if the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage either
by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage will not terminate such marriage (SSS vs. Bailon, G.R. No.
165545, March 24, 2006). Article 41 of the Family Code provides that it is the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse which will terminate the subsequent marriage.
Question 7:
Kato married Kat in 2004. Five years prior to the marriage, Kato purchased on 120 equal monthly
installments a parcel of land in Batangas for P1,200,000. The deed contained a stipulation
whereby the seller, Kiko, reserved ownership over the land until Kato completes payment. Using
their combined income, Kato and Kat completed payment for the land in 2009. They also
constructed a modest bungalow for a total price of P800,000 on the land using the income from
Kato’s farm which they used as a family dwelling.
a) Assuming that the parties are governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
is the land conjugal or exclusive?
b) What about the bungalow?
c) Suppose Kato died in 2013 and left Kat and his brother Kimpy as heirs, may the latter
compel partition of the bungalow and the land?
Answer:
a) The land is conjugal property of Kato and Kat.
Under the Family Code, property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds and
partly from conjugal funds belongs to the conjugal partnership if full ownership was vested to the
buyer during the marriage.
Here while the land was purchased by Kato prior to the marriage, there was a reservation of
ownership on the part of the seller until full payment. The full payment was completed at a time
when Kato was already married and using the conjugal funds from the spouses’ combined
income. Thus the full ownership vested upon the buyer Kato only during the marriage.
Hence the land is conjugal.
b) The bungalow is likewise part of the conjugal property of Kato and Kat.
Under the Family Code, anything acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund is conjugal property.
Here the house was acquired by onerous title or sale during the marriage using the income from
Kato’s farm. Income from separate property is conjugal or common fund. [Article 117, Family
Code]
Hence the bungalow is conjugal property.
c) No, Kimpy may not compel the partition of the bungalow and the land.
Under the Family Code, the family home shall continue despite the death of one spouse for a
period of ten years and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor.
Here the land and the bungalow constitute the family home of Kato and Kat and there is no
showing of any compelling reason for partition.
Hence Kimpy cannot compel the partition of the bungalow and the land.
Question 8:
While married, Leonardo Nonato and Marietta Barrido were able to acquire a property in Bacolod
City. Their marriage was subsequently declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. As such, Nonato filed a complaint for
partition. Whether partition in equal shares is the proper remedy under Art 147 of the Family
Code?
Answer:
Yes. Under the property regime in Art. 147 of the Family Code, any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to
the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. In
the case presented, since the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property
during the subsistence of their marriage, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, thus, the property is jointly owned by them in equal shares. (Barrido vs
Nonato, GR. No. 176492, October 20, 2014)
Question 9:
Sps. Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar (Aguilar spouses) died intestate. Rodolfo filed with the RTC
a civil case against Edna Siasat, the niece of the deceased Candelaria and who allegedly has
possession of the titles to the properties of the Aguilar spouses. Rodolfo alleged that he is the
only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses and after their death, he discovered that
the titles to the properties of his parents were missing. Rodolfo presented several pieces of
evidence to support his claim to be the sole heir. Among others, he presented Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 which bears his signature and thumb mark and indicates that Rodolfo is his son
and dependent. Both the RTC and CA ruled that the pieces of evidence presented by Rodolfo
failed to establish his claim to be the sole surviving heir of Aguilar spouses. Whether or not the
SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for the proof of filiation?
Answer:
Yes. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS form satisfies the requirement for proof
of filiation. By itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” (Aguilar vs.
Siasat, GR. No 200169, January 28, 2015)
PROPERTY
Question 10:
A lessee installs a machinery needed for his business in the leased premises. In the lease
contract, it was provided that upon the expiration of the lease, all improvements introduced by the
lessee shall belong to the lessor. What is the nature of the machinery installed by the lessee?
Immovable or movable?
Answer:
The machinery installed by the lessee is immovable property. Under the Civil Code, for a
machinery, a movable by nature, to be deemed immovable, it must be attached to an immovable
by the owner of the immovable property. This rule generally does not apply if the one who attached
it is a mere lessee. The exception, however, is when the lease contract provides that the
machinery installed by the lessee shall belong to the lessor upon the expiration of the lease
because in that case the lessee acts as an agent of the lessor. Thus, in the problem given, the
machinery installed is an immovable.
Question 11:
Arcadio and his wife Alicia built a house adjacent to the property of their neighbor Casmot in 1975.
Arcadio’s house had four large windows on each side of his property through which they enjoyed
the light and view of the neighboring estates. In 2013, Casmot started the construction of a thirty
storey condominium unit which effectively blocked the light and the view previously enjoyed by
Arcadio’s family. Arcadio filed a suit for injunction to restrain Casmot from continuing with the
construction on the ground that his family’s long continued enjoyment of the light and view through
the windows on their property for 39 years entitles them to the legal easement of light and view.
Will the suit prosper? Explain fully.
Answer:
No, the suit will not prosper. The easement of light and view is a negative easement because the
windows were opened on the wall of the supposed dominant estate. Thus, in order to acquire
by prescription the easement of light and view, the owner of the dominant estate Arcadio must
have served a notarial prohibition upon Casmot. It is the notarial prohibition which makes
apparent that which is non-apparent. Not having served the notarial prohibition, the opening of
the window on Arcadio’s property will not result into the acquisition of the easement of light and
view by prescription.
Question 12:
Yanu owns a parcel of land in Cebu. He left for Canada in 2009 and in his absence, Yetti occupied
Yanu’s land and cultivated it and harvested the fruits thereon on the assumption that the land was
owned by his (Yetti’s) grandfather. Yetti also constructed a small concrete house on the land in
2012 using the materials he purchased on credit from Yolly’s hardware store. When Yanu
returned in 2013, he sued Yetti for recovery of possession of the land and prayed that he be
reimbursed for the value of the fruits and that the house be removed. The trial court ruled for Yanu
and ordered Yetti to deliver the land and the value of the fruits from the time he occupied the land
in 2009. The court also ordered that the house be removed to restore the land to its former
condition.
a) Is the judgment of the court correct?

b) May Yetti compel Yanu to sell the land to him?
Answer:
a) No, the judgment is not correct. Yetti is presumed a builder in good faith because he
believed that the land on which he was building on was owned by his predecessor. (Article
526 Civil code) As such, he is entitled to the fruits received before his possession is legally
interrupted. (Article 544) The court also erred in ordering the demolition of the house
because the only options of the landowner in case the builder is in good faith are to
appropriate the building with appropriate indemnity or to compel the builder to buy the
land. Demolition of the structure is not one of the options given to the landowner.
b) No, Yetti may not compel Yanu to sell the land to him. Under the law, even if the builder
acted in good faith, the option still belongs to the landowner because by the principle of
accession, as owner of the principal which is the land, he becomes the owner of anything
which is added or incorporated into it subject to his obligation to indemnify the builder or
planter if the landowner decides to appropriate the building or improvement.
Question 13:
Is patrimonial property susceptible to acquisitive prescription?
Answer:
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the state.” It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. Accordingly, there
must be an express declaration by the state that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands
are expressly declared by the state to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by the Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. (Republic of the Philippines
vs. Cortez G.R. No. 186639 February 5, 2014)
Question 14:
Does a Certificate of Title vest ownership?
Answer:
NO. It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However,
certificates of title do not vest ownership. They merely evidence title or ownership of the property.
Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds that it was
issued irregularly. (De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation G.R. No. 194751 November
26, 2014)
Question 15:
A, B, C and D are co-owners of a parcel of land. The had their land surveyed and the result
showed that the adjoining lot of E encroached their land by 500 square meters. They filed a suit
for unlawful detainer against E. The MTC dismissed the case saying that an ejectment suit is not
the proper remedy to recover the portion encroached. Is the MTC correct?
Answer:
Yes. A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an
ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff‘s property. (Ruben
Manalang, et. al. vs. Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani G.R. No. 156995 January 12 2015) The
action filed by A, B, C and D did not allege that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
portion of their property by E hence, it cannot be an unlawful detainer suit.
Question 16:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by X against Y. X alleged that Y occupied a piece of his
land by constructing a piggery thereon without his consent. Y, on the other hand, alleged that the
land is owned by his wife who inherited the same from her father.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for forcible entry for failure to establish his prior possession
of the parcel of land. Thereafter, X died. Consequently, the heirs of X filed a complaint with the
trial court for recovery of possession of the same portion of said parcel of land. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because of res judicata. Is there res judicata?
Answer:
No. There is no identity of causes of action. The forcible entry case only involves the issue of
possession over the subject property while the recovery of possession case puts in issue the
ownership of the subject property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute
of ownership. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or
physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party
may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such
prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should
be the owner of the property. (Sps. Ocampo vs. Heirs of Dionisio G.R. No. 191101 October 1,
2014)
Question 17:
If the owner of the land encroached upon requires the builder, whether in good faith or bad faith,
to buy the land, how must the price be fixed?
Answer:
The price must be fixed at the prevailing market value, reckoned at the time that the landowner
elected the choice, and not at the time that the property was purchased or acquired by the
landowner. (Mercy Vda. De Roxas vs. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 182378, March 6,
2013)
Question 18:
X promised to donate a property to Y. Y constructed a house thereon before the donation. If the
property was not donated to him, is Y considered a possessor in good faith?
Answer:
The mere promise to donate the property to Y cannot convert him into a builder in good faith for
at the time the improvement was built, such promise was not yet fulfilled. It was a mere expectancy
of ownership that may or may not be realized. If at all, Y is a mere possessor by tolerance. A
person whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners is not a possessor in good
faith. Hence, he is not entitled to the value of the improvements built thereon. (Pada-Kilario vs.
CA G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000)
Question 19:
A, a co-owner of a parcel of land, allowed C to reside in said land. After some time, A later
demands that C should vacate the property, but the latter refused. May A file an ejectment suit
even if he is a mere co-owner of the lot?
Answer:
Yes. Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. A’s action for ejectment against
C is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property. (Resuena vs. CA,
G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005)
Question 20:
Can a co-owner acquire the share of the other co-owners by prescription?
Answer:
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
(Antipolo Ining (deceased), survived by Manuel Villanueva et. al., vs. Leonardo Vega et. al., G.R.
No. 174727, August 12, 2013)
Question 21:
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of
way through a portion of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the market. He has
chosen a point where he will pass through a housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to
pass another way which is about 2 kilometers longer. Who should prevail?
Answer:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650, the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the
criterion of shortest distance. Since the route chosen by Federico will prejudice the housing
project of Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass another way even though
it will be longer.
Question 22:
Daniela bought a property that was surrounded by other properties. She demanded a right of way
through Samantha’s property. The right of way demanded will cut through half of the house of
Samantha. Samantha claimed that Daniela can actually use the other side of his property which
is next to an irrigation canal by building a bridge over the irrigation canal. Daniela refused because
that would not be the shortest route and it would be costly to her. Is Daniela entitled to have a
right of way through Samantha’s property through the route that she demanded?
Answer:
No, Daniela cannot demand the route that she wants. Applying the Civil Code, in easement of
right of way, when there is a conflict between convenience to the requesting property, also called
the dominant estate, and the prejudice caused to the requested property, also called the servient
estate, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the criterion of convenience. In this case, the
route demanded will seriously prejudice Samantha because it will cut through half of her house.
On the other hand, the way through the irrigation canal is very much possible albeit it will be costly
to Daniela.
Question 23:
Who has the burden of proving entitlement to an easement of right of way?
Answer:
The dominant estate owner must prove by preponderance of evidence the entitlement to an
easement of right of way. (Cristobal vs. CA G.R. No. 125339 June 22, 1998)
Question 24:
Jose claims that a footpath was used by him and his ancestors for more than 50 years. Later on,
a subdivision developer enclosed the estate and blocked the footpath of Jose. Jose contends that
he had already acquired the easement of right of way by prescription having used it for 50 years
or more. Is Jose’s contention correct?
Answer:
No. The use of the footpath (right of way) is apparent but not continuous. It is not incessant and
depends upon the acts of men. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. An easement of
right of way being a discontinuous easement can only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription. Further, the subdivision has the right to enclose and fence its property for privacy
purposes. (Abellana vs. CA G.R. No. 97039 April 24 1992)
Question 25:
Because of the Covid-19 Pandemic lockdowns, online business, work from home, became
popular. X made a production plant at home which emitted odorous and bad smells. When
complained, X claimed that she has all the right to do as she wishes because it is within her
property. Is she correct?
Answer:
No, X is not correct. The right to property, while Constitutionally protected, is not absolute. One
of the limitations is that arising from conflict with other rights. Particularly, the Civil Code states
that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
Question 26:
X and Y were to be married in April 2020. They hired a wedding planner, booked the hotel, the
caterer, makeup artists and singers. Then the Covid-19 pandemic came. The government locked
down the whole country, preventing mass gatherings, including the weddings. X and Y demanded
that the wedding push through. While everyone agreed, the hotel refused. The Hotel claimed that
its obligation is made impossible by due to a fortuitous event. X and Y objected, claiming that no
one from the side of the couple, from the hotel or from the suppliers has been afflicted with Covid-
19. Is the Hotel correct in refusing to hold the wedding?
Answer:
Yes, the Hotel is correct. Under the Civil Code, an obligor is excused from performing an obligation
to do when the obligation cannot be performed due to impossibility or fortuitous event. A fortuitous
event is an event or happening that is unexpected, or even if expected cannot be avoided, without
fault on the part of the obligor. In this case, the reason for the Hotel’s inability to perform its
obligation is the strict government response to the Covid-19 pandemic, not simply the disease.
The lockdown and order preventing or prohibiting mass gatherings is an event beyond the control
of the Hotel.
Question 27:
John filed a case for specific performance with damages against AHRI before the HLURB. AHRI
filed its answer and argued that it was relieved of its obligation to complete the amenities due to
its difficult financial condition which rendered compliance with its obligation so difficult and under
Article 1267, it was released from its obligation under the contract to sell. Is AHRI correct?
Answer:
No, AHRI is not correct. AHRI’s invocation of Art. 1267 which provides that “when the service
has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor
may also be released therefrom in whole or in part,” was factually unfounded. For Art. 1267 to
apply, the following conditions should concur, namely: (a) the event or change in circumstances
could not have been foreseen at the time of the execution of the contract; (b) it makes the
performance of the contract extremely difficult but not impossible; (c) it must not be due to the act
of any of the parties; and (d) the contract is for a future prestation. The requisites did not concur
because the difficulty of performance under Art. 1267 of the Civil Code should be such one party
would be placed at a disadvantage by the unforeseen event. Mere inconvenience, or unexpected
impediments, or increased expenses did not suffice to relieve the debtor from a bad bargain.
(TAGAYTAY REALTY CO., INC. v. GACUTAN, G.R. No. 160033, July 1, 2015)
Question 28:
Sacramento Steel Corporation (SSC) is a business entity manufacturing and producing steel and
steel products. It entered into a credit agreement with International Exchange Bank (IEB). SSC
defaulted in the payment of its obligations. IEB’s demand for payment went unheeded. IEB filed
case for injunction with damages against SSC to enjoin it from removing the mortgaged chattels
outside of its premises. SSC on the other hand filed a case to annul mortgage contracts and to
restructure its outstanding obligations. IEB later filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage. Metrobank moved to intervene in the case between SSC and IEB contending
that as creditor of SSC, it has a legal interest in the properties subject of the litigation. Metrobank
prayed that the mortgage contracts between IEB and SSC be rescinded on the ground that they
were entered into to defraud the latter’s creditors. Is Metrobank entitled to have the mortgage
contracts rescinded?
Answer:
No. The following successive measures must be taken by a creditor before he may bring an action
for rescission of an allegedly fraudulent contract: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through
levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as are
exempt by law from execution ; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save those
personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the contracts executed by the
debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana). It is thus apparent that an action to rescind, or an
accion pauliana, must be of last resort, availed of only after the creditor has exhausted all the
properties of the debtor not exempt from execution of after all other legal remedies have been
exhausted and have been proven futile. Metrobank does not appear to have sought other
properties of SSC nor has it exercised all other legal remedies against SSC. Hence, it is not
entitled to the rescission of the mortgage contracts. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
International Exchange Bank, GR 176008, August 10, 2011).
Question 29:
A Joint Affidavit of Undertaking was executed containing a stipulation where C and G promised
to replace the damaged car of R of the same model and of at least the same quality, and in the
event that they cannot replace the car within the stated period, they would pay the cost of R’s car
with interest at 12% per month for any delayed payment after November 15, 2015, until fully paid.
Is the Joint Affidavit executed by C and G a contract that can be the basis of an obligation to pay
a sum of money in favor of R?
Answer:
Yes. Contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential
requisites for their validity are present. In determining whether a document is an affidavit or a
contract, the court must look beyond the title of the document, since the denomination or title
given by the parties in their document is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. In the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to
be pursued. If the terms of the document are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words appear to be
contrary to the parties’ evident intention, the latter shall prevail over the former. (Cruz vs Gruspe,
G.R. No. 191431, March 13, 2013)
Question 30:
Congress enacted RA 8436 which authorized the COMELEC “to use an automated election
system (AES) xxx for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing /consolidation of
results for the national and local elections”. Smartmaatik won the public bidding for the AES
contract. COMELEC, through a resolution, approved Smartmaatik’s PCOS Extended Warranty
Proposal through direct contracting in view of the reason that time is of the essence such that the
Commission and the Bids and Awards Committee are constrained by tight time schedule if public
bidding are to be conducted in the refurbishment and/or repair of the machines considering all
procurement activities are lined up. COMELEC and Smartmaatik entered into the Extended
Contract Warranty. Is the Extended Warranty Contract valid?
Answer:
NO. The principle of autonomy of contracts cannot preclude the Extended Warranty Contract
from scrutiny. “Government contracts shall be void as against the law and public policy, where a
statutory requirement of open competitive bidding has been ignored. As a corollary, agreements
directly tending to prevent bidding for covered government contracts may violate public policy”.
The exhortation holds true with respect to the Extended Warranty Contract which is
unquestionably a government contract imbued with public interest. (Pabillo vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
216562, April 21, 2015)
Question 31:
Amalia was the owner of lots 1, 2 and 3. Amalia allowed her children and grandchildren the use
and possession of her properties. In 2013, Amalia executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
her daughter Cora, bearing on its face the price of P250,000. On the same day, Amalia also
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Cora which empowered Cora to administer Lots
1,2, and 3. Amalia and her other children continued to possess the lands in question. Thereafter,
Amalia and Cora left for the U.S. When Cora returned to the Philippines in 2016, she registered
the sale over lots 1 and 2 with the Registry of Deeds. In 2017 Amalia died in the U.S. and was
succeeded by her four children. Soon, Cora sought to eject her siblings Bong and Dado, who
were then staying on the properties. Only then did Bong and Dado learn of the transfer of titles of
Amalia to Cora. Were the Deeds of Absolute Sale between Amalia and Cora over the properties
valid?
Answer:
There was no valid contract between Amalia and Cora because their consent was absent. The
contract of sale was a mere simulation. Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want
the contract they have to produce legal effects expressed by its wordings. In ruling that the Deed
of Absolute Sale was simulated, the lower court considered the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of the parties. In this case, there was no indication that Amalia intended to
alienate her properties in favour of Cora. Amalia continued exercising acts of dominion and
control over the properties even after the execution of Deeds of Absolute Sale. The SPA executed
on the same day as the Deeds of Absolute sale appointing Cora as administratix of Amalia’s
properties is repugnant to Cora’s claim that the ownership of the same had been transferred to
her.) (CLEMENTE v. CA (G.R. No. 175483, October 14, 2015)
Question 32:
Spouses Tan and Cornelio executed a deed of sale covering two lots. On the face of the deed,
the sum of P400,000 appears as consideration of Cornelio’s purported purchase of properties.
The deed was also undated. After the execution of the deeds, the TCTs of the lots were delivered
to Cornelio although none of the parties are in actual physical possession of the properties. It
appears that the Tans executed the deed merely to show to their neighbors that they are the true
owners of the property because a certain Juan was illegally conveying portions of these lands to
unsuspecting buyers. Spouses Tan later tried to recover the TCTs from Cornelio but the latter
refused to return them despite repeated demands. Spouses Tan filed a complaint for annulment
of the deed of sale alleging that the subject deed was simulated and hence null and void. Is the
subject deed void?
Answer:
YES. The parties never intended to be bound by the agreement. Instead, the subject deed as
executed merely as a front to show the public that Spouses Tan were the owners of the properties
in order to deter the group of Juan from illegally selling the same. Although the subject deed
between the parties stipulated a consideration of P400,000, there was actually no exchange of
money between them. And finally, the undated deed, which serves as counter-agreement to, and
which was simultaneously executed with, the subject deed, unmistakably evinces absolute
simulation. (TANCHULING, ET.AL. v. CANTELA (G.R. No. 209284, November 10, 2015)
Question 33:
Margaret leased her studio apartment to Myrna for a stipulated rent of P15,000 per month for one
year, payable on the first Friday of every month. As a condition for the acceptance of the lease,
Myrna demanded that the plumbing be first fixed no later than 30 days, to which Margaret agreed.
Meanwhile, the first rent fell due and Margaret demanded payment from Myrna. The latter,
however, refused to pay on the ground that Margaret had not yet complied with her obligation to
fix the plumbing. Margaret still sued Myrna for eviction.
a. What is delay? Is Myrna in delay?

b. Under the Civil Code, what are the instances where demand by the creditor is not
necessary for delay to exist?
Answer:
a. Under the Civil Code, delay occurs when those obliged to deliver or to do something
fails to do so and the obligee has made a judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this case,
Myrna is not yet in delay. Under the same law, in reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. Here, Margaret cannot demand Myrna’s
obligation to pay rent under the lease because she, Margaret herself, had not yet
complied with her obligation to fix the plumbing.
b. In the following situations, demand by the creditor is not necessary in order that delay
may exist:
1. When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; or
2. When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that
the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service to
be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or
3. When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond
his power to perform.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Question 34:
Spouses Lito and Linda Jimenez executed a promissory note and real estate mortgage in favor
of the Rural Bank of Hagonoy (RBH) to secure a loan which they obtained from the bank in the
amount of P300,000.00. About two months thereafter, the RBH in turn borrowed money from
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in the amount of P600,000.00. As security for the loan that
RBH obtained from BSP, they pledged the promissory note executed by the Jimenez in favor of
RBH and the latter also surrendered possession of the loan documents as well as the TCT of the
Jimenez to BSP. BSP later demanded payment of the loan from the Jimenez and when the latter
failed to pay, BSP filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by
the Jimenez. The Jimenez contested the extrajudicial foreclosure and filed an application for
preliminary injunction. Does the Rural Bank of Hagonoy have the right to pledge the security
documents of BSP? Does BSP have the right to foreclose the mortgage of the Jimenez?
Answer:
RBH has no authority to pledge the security documents to BSP during the term of the real estate
mortgage contract between Rural bank and the spouses Jimenez because if it is within the term
of the contract, the mortgaged property remains to be property of the Jimenez.
The RBH was neither the absolute owner of the subject property nor the security documents it
had pledge to BSP. The possession of the security documents was given to the Rural Bank merely
as security collateral in case of non-payment of the loans. Its only purpose is to guarantee the
fulfillment of the Jimenez obligation and in case of default on the part of the latter bank as credit-
mortgagee by way of judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure.
BSP has no authority to foreclose the subject mortgage. The mere pledge and deposit of the
mortgage contract, transfer certificate of title and promissory note executed by the RBH in favor
of BSP, does not produce the effect of giving BSP the authority to intervene with the transaction
between the Spouses Jimenez and the Rural Bank because under the principle of relativity,
contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and their heirs. In the absence of a
valid assignment of RBH’s right to BSP, the latter cannot proceed against the property of the
Jimenez. (BSP vs. Libo-on November 23, 2015 G. R. No. 173864)
Question 35:
iBank, a commercial bank, granted Yulim, a domestic partnership, a credit facility in the form of
an Omnibus Loan Line for P5,000,000.00. The partners, namely, H, I, J and K executed a
Continuing Surety Agreement in favor of iBank whereby bound themselves jointly and severally
with Yulim and unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed full and complete payment of any and
all credit accomodations granted by the bank to Yulim. Yulim defaulted on the said note. iBank
sent demand letters to Yulim but the demand went unheeded. iBank then filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money with Replevin against Yulim and its sureties, H, I, J, and K. Are the individual
defendants liable for the obligation of Yulim?
Answer:
Yes, the individual defendants are jointly and severally with Yulim. A surety is considered in law
as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation
of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. And it is well settled that
when the obligor or obligors undertake to be ―jointly and severally liable, it means that the
obligation is solidary, as in this case. There can thus be no doubt that the individual petitioners
have bound themselves to be solidarily liable with Yulim for the payment of its loan with
iBank.(Yulim International Company vs. International Exchange Bank (now Union Bank), G.R.
No. 203133 February 18, 2015)Thus, the provisions on solidary obligations will apply.
Question 36:
ERDI was engaged in realty construction and the sale of condominium buildings. Rosario
Tajonera, the VP of ERDI, obtained loans from PNB and entered into several credit agreements.
As security, ERDI executed REM over 3 parcels of land.The parties entered into an amendment
of the loan agreement whereby the credit line of ERDI was increased by PNB. PNB refused to
release the balance of the last credit accommodation granted to ERDI which resulted in the delay
of the completion of the project. Upon failure to pay, PNB foreclosed the said property and a new
title was issued in the name of PNB. The ERDI filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation
of mortgage. It alleged that the title to the mortgaged property that was transferred to PNB as a
consequence of the foreclosure proceedings was null and void as their mortgage obligation had
been novated and no new loans were released to them. Is the contention of ERDI correct?
Answer:
YES. The agreement between PNB and Spouses Tajonera and ERDI was one of a loan. Under
the law, a loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to
another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or quality shall
be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party is the
creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal obligation is
dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should ideally be simultaneous.
This means that in a loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount and the debtor repays
it when it becomes due and demandable. PNB, not having released the balance of the last loan
proceeds in accordance with the Amendment had no right to demand from Spouses Tajonera’s
compliance with their own obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like
a loan does not perform its obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is
expected of them while the other's obligation remains unfulfilled. (PNB vs. Spouses Tajonera,
G.R. No. 195889, September 24, 2014)
Question 37:
Menelia Chua borrowed from Spouses Martires the amount of P150,000. The loan was secured
by a real estate mortgage over 24 memorial lots located at Holy Cross Memorial Park. Upon
failure of Chua to pay the obligation, the titles over the said lots were transferred in the name of
the Spouses Martires, without foreclosure by virtue of a Deed of Transfer. Chua then filed a
complaint with the RTC seeking the annulment of the mortgage contracts and the alleged forged
Deed of Transfer of their lands to Spouses Martires. Spouses Martires opposed, alleging that the
Deed of Transfer was valid. Is the transfer of the lands to Martires via the deed of transfer valid?
Answer:
No, the transfer is not valid. The original transaction between the parties was a mortgage and the
intent of both Chua and Martires is that the subject property shall serve as security for the former's
obligation to the latter. The execution of the disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said
document was executed to circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive
respondent of her mortgaged property without the requisite foreclosure. The subsequent
assignment of ownership of the lands to the Spouses Martires without the benefit of foreclosure
constitutes pactum commissorium which is prohibited by law. (Spouses Lehner vs Chua, G.R.
No. 174240, March 20, 2013.)
Question 38:
X borrowed P2 Million from Y. As security, X offered his house and lot. Y drafted a Deed of Sale
with right of repurchase. X failed to pay the loan within the stipulated period. Y filed an Affidavit of
Consolidation to attest that the seller has not repurchased the property. Is Y correct?
Answer:
No, Y is not correct. The contract entered by X and Y was an equitable mortgage because the
property was not intended to be sold but only to be used as security for the payment of the loan.
Under the Civil Code, the creditor cannot appropriate the property given as security because that
would violate the rule on pactum commissorium. Thus, Y’s Affidavit of Consolidation should not
be accepted.
TORTS
Question 39:
X, a bestselling online seller of lip tints, found her sales going down because her customers were
having lip rashes. X even had to refund some of the buyers. When X had her stocks examined by
a chemist, it was found that it had a high alcohol content. Due to this, X demanded damages
against her supplier on the basis of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. Her supplier defended that X is
not entitled to damages on the basis of Art. 2176 because they have a pre-existing contract. Is
the supplier correct?
Answer:
No, the supplier is not correct. Jurisprudence (e.g. Loadmasters vs. Glodel Brokerage) postulates
that a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. In this case, the negligence or fault of the supplier broke the contract because the object
of the sale between them was toxic and not suitable for public consumption. Hence, the action for
damages can proceed.
Question 40:
When does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply?
Answer:
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the accident is
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained
of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured. The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. (Josefa vs.
MERALCO, G.R. No. 182705, July 1, 2014)
Question 41:
X, a Grab driver, was bumped by a speeding Toyota Innova owned and driven by Y. X was
hospitalized and was not able to earn a living for a month. In the trial for damages against Y, X
claimed actual damages in the form of hospital expenses, therapy expenses, medicines, and lost
of regular income. All except the regular income was substantiated with receipts. The trial court
still awarded actual damages for regular income, estimating it at P4,000.00 per week based on
the average sales of X. Is the trial court correct?
Answer:
No, the trial court is not correct. Jurisprudence (e.g. Sui Yong vs. IAC) postulates that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed and that they must be duly proved. Here, the trial
court simply based its award on X’s testimony. This is wrong because the question of income
could have been duly established through receipts or financial documents from the company.
Hence, the award of P4,000 per week as lost regular income should be deleted.
Question 42:
The Aegis Nursing Institution, Inc. (ANI) was lambasted by Ding in a radio broadcast as
operating a diploma mill churning out ill-trained nursing graduates who had paid their way
through. ANI sued Ding for moral damages. Ding filed an answer where he raised the defense
that a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because it cannot experience physical
suffering or wounded feelings. Is Ding’s defense meritorious? Explain.
Answer:
No, Ding’s defense that a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages is not meritorious.
Under the Civil Code provisions on Torts, moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation. The Supreme Court has held that the law does not
distinguish whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
Here Ding was guilty of libel or defamation when he lambasted ANI in a radio broadcast.
Hence he is liable for moral damages to ANI. [Filipinas Broadcasting Corp. v. Ago Medical and
Educational Center, G.R. 141994, 17 Jan 2005; Article 2219(17)]
Question 43:
Can the court award moral damages despite the failure of the parties to present other evidences
other than the death of the victim in cases of homicide or murder?
Answer:
YES. Moral damages are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide, such as when the victim
was gunned down in front of his house. If medical and funeral expenses were substantiated,
actual damages may be awarded. However, damages for loss of earning capacity may not be
awarded absent documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The testimony
of the wife of the victim, a Senior Desk Coordinator of a radio station, as to the latter’s monthly
salary without any documentary evidence will not suffice to substantiate the claim. (Espineli v.
People G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014)
Question 44:
Can actual damages and temperate damages be awarded at the same time?
Answer:
No. temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the
same time. (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010)
Question 45:
MMTC entered into an Agreement to Sell with Rapid Transit Corporation under the Bus
Installment Purchase Program of the government. Rapid was given authority to operate the buses
which were the subject of the sale although MMTC still appears to be the registered owner until
the price is fully paid. On May 5, 2015 one of the buses driven by Rapid’s driver hit and ran over
Maligaya Coo, a pedestrian, while she was crossing Taft Avenue. The heirs of Maligaya filed a
suit for damages against MMTC, Rapid Transit and the latter’s driver. MMTC filed an Answer
claiming that it has no liability to the heirs of Maligaya because it was not the beneficial owner of
the bus but Rapid Transit and that it was the latter’s employee who was guilty of negligence.
Resolve.
Answer:
The contention of MMTC is without merit. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner
of a motor vehicle involved in a vehicular accident continues to be liable to third persons who are
injured as a result of the operation thereof. The main aim of the motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.
Instances are numerous where vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or
with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so prejudicial to the
public that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained in the interest of the determination
of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. (MMTC v. Cuevas
June 15, 2015)
Question 46:
In 2010, X sued Y for sum of money, arising from a loan contract. The court decided in favor of
X. The decision became final and executory in December 2012. To this day, Y has not paid the
money judgment. What legal interest rate shall be imposed on the unpaid monetary judgment?
Answer:
The legal rate of interest on judgments based on money obligations is 6% provided for under the
Monetary Board Circular (No, 799) as applied by the Supreme Court in several cases (e.g. Nacar
vs. Gallery Frames). However, this rate of 6% will only be applied prospectively or from July 1,
2013. Before July 1, 2013, the rate is 12%. Thus, in this case, from December 2012 to June 30,
2013, the rate shall be 12%. From July 1, 2013 onwards, the rate shall be 6%.
OTHER TIPS:
Check out the following provisions.
ART. 1293, CIVIL CODE
ART. 43, CIVIL CODE
ART. 33, FAMILY CODE
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

b) What about the bungalow?

a) The land is conjugal property of Kato and Kat.

Hence the land is conjugal.

Hence the bungalow is conjugal property.

a) Is the judgment of the court correct?

Is patrimonial property susceptible to acquisitive prescription?

Does a Certificate of Title vest ownership?

Can a co-owner acquire the share of the other co-owners by prescription?

Who has the burden of proving entitlement to an easement of right of way?

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

a. What is delay? Is Myrna in delay?

When does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply?

Check out the following provisions.

ART. 1293, CIVIL CODE

ART. 638, CIVIL CODE

ART. 493, CIVIL CODE

ART. 1227, CIVIL CODE

ART. 1397, CIVIL CODE

ART. 2183, CIVIL CODE

ART. 2230, CIVIL CODE

ART. 43, CIVIL CODE

ART. 33, FAMILY CODE

ART. 1388, CIVIL CODE

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