THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, VENANCIO CONCEPCION, Defendant-Appellant. G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922 Facts

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922
Facts:
Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and as member of the board of
directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation of
section 35 of Act No. 2747. Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by
the trial court.
Issue:
Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of
section 35 of Act No. 2747
Ruling:
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust
reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490;
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other
party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned,
with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the late Jose V.
Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962
Facts:
Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to return them. So, on 20 December
1950 in the Court of First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action
against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to pay their book
value in the total sum of P3,241.45
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the amount charged against him.
Ruling:
As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the estate of the late defendant
is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned to the
appellee, because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate. This is the
amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection on 31 January 1959 to the motion filed on 7
January 1959 by the appellant for the quashing of the writ of execution.
MACLARING M. LUCMAN, in his capacity as the Manager of the LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Marawi City, petitioner,
vs.
ALIMATAR MALAWI, ABDUL-KHAYER PANGCOGA, SALIMATAR SARIP, LOMALA CADAR,
ALIRIBA S. MACARAMBON and ABDUL USMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 159794 December 19, 2006
Facts:
The petition for mandamus filed by respondents before the trial court is rooted in their claim that they
were deprived of their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1997.
Respondents further alleged that these same funds were released by petitioner as Manager of Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the depositary bank, to third persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the barangay chairman has the right to demand the physical possession of the IRA
funds.
Ruling:
Yes, this prescribed legal framework governing the release and disbursement of IRA funds to the
respective barangays disabuses from the notion that a barangay chairman, relying solely on his
authority as a local executive, has the right to demand physical possession of the IRA funds
allocated by the national government to the barangay. The right to demand for the funds belongs to
the local government itself through the authorization of their Sanggunian.
GREAT ASIAN SALES CENTER CORPORATION and TAN CHONG LIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANCASIA FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 105774 April 25, 2002
Facts:
On June 23, 1982, Bancasia filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Great Asian
and Tan Chong Lin. Bancasia impleaded Tan Chong Lin because of the Surety Agreements he
signed in favor of Bancasia. In its answer, Great Asian denied the material allegations of the
complaint claiming it was unfounded, malicious, baseless, and unlawfully instituted since there was
already a pending insolvency proceedings, although Great Asian subsequently withdrew its petition
for voluntary insolvency.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are the proper parties against whom this action for collection should
be brought are the drawers and indorser of the checks in question, being the real parties in interest,
and not the herein petitioners.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Authority of Arsenio to Sign the Deeds of Assignment
Great Asian asserts that Arsenio signed the Deeds of Assignment and indorsed the checks in his
personal capacity. The primordial question that must be resolved is whether Great Asian authorized
Arsenio to sign the Deeds of Assignment. If Great Asian so authorized Arsenio, then Great Asian is
bound by the Deeds of Assignment and must honor its terms.
FELIX DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
AGUSTINA JARRA, administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea, deceased, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910
Facts:
On the 1st of September, 1906, Felix de los Santos brought suit against Agustina Jarra, the
administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea, alleging that in the latter part of 1901 Jimenea
borrowed and obtained from the plaintiff ten first-class carabaos, to be used at the animal-power mill
of his hacienda during the season of 1901-2, without recompense or remuneration whatever for the
use thereof, under the sole condition that they should be returned to the owner as soon as the work
at the mill was terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not there exist a contract of commodatum
Ruling:
The obligation of the bailee or of his successors to return either the thing loaned or its value, is
sustained by the supreme tribunal of Sapin. In its decision of March 21, 1895, it sets out with
precision the legal doctrine touching commodatum. The carabaos delivered to be used not being
returned by the defendant upon demand, there is no doubt that she is under obligation to indemnify
the owner thereof by paying him their value.
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN VALDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988
Facts:
When petitioner repudiated the trust and when it applied for registration in 1962; that petitioner had
just been in possession as owner for eleven years, hence there is no possibility of acquisitive
prescription which requires 10 years possession with just title and 30 years of possession without;
that the principle of res judicata on these findings by the Court of Appeals will bar a reopening of
these questions of facts; and that those facts may no longer be altered.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an error in applying res judicata.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. The findings of facts supported by evidence and evaluated by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, affirmed by this Court, We see no error in respondent
appellate court's ruling that said findings are res judicata between the parties. They can no longer be
altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago.
To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous
determination of issues without end.
SPOUSES WILFREDO PALADA and BRIGIDA PALADA,* Petitioners,
vs.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and SHERIFF MAYO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172227 June 29, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the bank, without their knowledge and consent, included their properties
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-225131 and T-225132,13 among the list of
properties mortgaged; that it was only when they received the notice of sale from the sheriff in
August 1998 that they found out about the inclusion of the said properties; that despite their
objection, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale; and that the auction sale was done in
Santiago City in violation of the stipulation on venue in the real estate mortgage
Issue:
Whether or not the loan contract was perfected.
Ruling:
The loan contract was perfected.
Upon receipt of the approved loan on March 17, 1997, petitioners executed a promissory note for the
amount of ₱1 million.38 As security for the ₱1 million loan, petitioners on the same day executed in
favor of the bank a real estate mortgage over the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-237695, T-
237696, T-237698, T-143683, T-143729, T-225131 and T-225132. Clearly, contrary to the findings
of the RTC, the loan contract was perfected on March 17, 1997 when petitioners received the ₱1
million loan, which was the object of both the promissory note and the real estate mortgage
executed by petitioners in favor of the bank.
BPI INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
G.R. No. 133632 February 15, 2002
Facts:
The trial court had held that private respondents were not in default in the payment of their monthly
amortization, hence, the extrajudicial foreclosure conducted by BPIIC was premature and made in
bad faith. It awarded private respondents the amount of ₱300,000 for moral damages, ₱50,000 for
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 for attorney’s fees and expenses for litigation. It likewise
dismissed the foreclosure suit for being premature
Issue:
Whether or not the loan is a consensual contract.
Ruling:
The loan contract between BPI, on the one hand, and ALS and Litonjua, on the other, was perfected
only on September 13, 1982, the date of the second release of the loan. Following the intentions of
the parties on the commencement of the monthly amortization, as found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents’ obligation to pay commenced only on October 13, 1982, a month after the
perfection of the contract.
MARGARITA QUINTOS and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BECK, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-46240 November 3, 1939
Facts:
The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return her certain furniture which she lent
him for his use. She appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which
ordered that the defendant return to her the three has heaters and the four electric lamps found in
the possession of the Sheriff of said city, that she call for the other furniture from the said sheriff of
Manila at her own expense, and that the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the
furniture be paid pro rata by both parties, without pronouncement as to the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not there exist a contract of commodatum
Ruling:
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under it the plaintiff
gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the ownership
thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latters demand
CAROLYN M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
RICA MARIE S. THIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154878 March 16, 2007
Facts:
Respondent denied that she contracted the two loans with petitioner and countered that it was
Marilou Santiago to whom petitioner lent the money. She claimed she was merely asked by
petitioner to give the crossed checks to Santiago.17 She issued the checks for ₱76,000 and ₱20,000
not as payment of interest but to accommodate petitioner’s request that respondent use her own
checks instead of Santiago’s
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable for the payable interests.
Ruling:
The Court do not, however, agree that respondent is liable for the 3% and 4% monthly interest for
the US$100,000 and ₱500,000 loans respectively. There was no written proof of the interest payable
except for the verbal agreement that the loans would earn 3% and 4% interest per month. Article
1956 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing."
CELESTINA T. NAGUIAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA QUEAÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 118375 October 3, 2003
Facts:
Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage with the Sheriff of Rizal Province,
who then scheduled the foreclosure sale on 14 August 1981. Three days before the scheduled sale,
Queaño filed the case before the Pasay City RTC, seeking the annulment of the mortgage deed.
8
The trial court eventually stopped the auction sale
Issue:
Whether or not there was a perfection of the contract.
Ruling:
The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the perfection of the contract of loan. For the Civil
Code provides that the delivery of bills of exchange and mercantile documents such as checks shall
produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed. It is only after the checks have
20
produced the effect of payment that the contract of loan may be deemed perfected. Art. 1934 of the
Civil Code provides:
"An accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon
the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the
object of the contract."
COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.
G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004
Facts:
Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house
stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized
housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show
up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
Issue:
Whether or not pari delicto is applicable in ejectment cases
Ruling:
The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code48 embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the
principle of pari delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari
delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement.
It leaves the parties where it finds them.49
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application.
One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-
established public policy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO PORRAS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 173654-765 August 28, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner explains that under Article 1980 of the New Civil Code, "fixed, savings, and current deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loans."
Corollary thereto, Article 1953 of the same Code provides that "a person who receives a loan of money or
any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal
amount of the same kind and quality."
Issue:
Whether or not the bank acquires ownership from the money deposited.
Ruling:
The Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who
are entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy
positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all the essential elements
constituting the crime of Qualified Theft.
BPI FAMILY BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
AMADO FRANCO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 123498 November 23, 2007
Facts:
This case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner BPI Family Bank (BPI-
FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco (Franco) in conspiracy with other individuals,3 some of
whom opened and maintained separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte (SFDM)
branch, in a series of transactions.
Issue:
Whether or not BPI can unilaterally freeze franco’s account.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Court is in full accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that BPI-FB cannot unilaterally
freeze Franco’s accounts and preclude him from withdrawing his deposits. However, contrary to the
appellate court’s ruling, we hold that Franco is not entitled to unearned interest on the time deposit
as well as to moral and exemplary damages.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANKLIN VIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115324 February 19, 2003
Facts:
On August 13, 1979, Doronilla issued a postdated check for Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Pesos
(₱212,000.00) in favor of private respondent. However, upon presentment thereof by private
respondent to the drawee bank, the check was dishonored. Doronilla requested private respondent
to present the same check on September 15, 1979 but when the latter presented the check, it was
again dishonored.
Issue:
Whether or not the transaction between the defendant doronilla and respondent vives was one of
simple loan and not accommodation.
Ruling:
No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the transaction between private
respondent and Doronilla was a commodatum and not a mutuum. A circumspect examination of the
records reveals that the transaction between them was a commodatum.
DULCE PAMINTUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172820 June 23, 2010
Facts:
The petitioner failed to remit payment for the diamond ring despite the lapse of the agreed period.
Neither did she return the diamond ring. Subsequently, Jeremias, through his lawyer, sent two (2)
formal demand letters7 for the petitioner to comply with her obligations under the Katibayan. The
demand letters went unheeded. Thus, the petitioner failed to comply with her obligations to
Jeremias.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a misappropriation of the diamond ring
Ruling:
The misappropriation of the diamond ring – was proven by Jeremias’ testimony that the petitioner
failed to return the diamond ring after the lapse of the agreed period or afterwards, despite the clear
terms of the Katibayan. Acting beyond the mandate of this agency is the conversion or
misappropriation that the crime of estafa punishes.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LEOVIGILDO A. PANTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 120262 July 17, 1997
Facts:
Respondent Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza,
PAL's Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights,
that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza
offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone,
the latter decline.
Issue:
Whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to provide hotel
accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by reason
of the cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to force majeure.
Ruling:
It has been sufficiently established that it is petitioner's standard company policy, whenever a flight
has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to provide them
accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups. In fact, petitioner's Mactan Airport
Manager for departure services, Oscar Jereza, admitted that PAL has an existing arrangement with
hotels to accommodate stranded passengers, and that the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were
5
reimbursed obviously pursuant to that policy.

6
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007
Facts:
The accused knowing fully well that at the time she issued the said check she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the said check upon presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds
Issue:
Whether or not there was complete delivery of the check
Ruling:
It is admitted by complainant Ching that said check in his possession was a blank check and was
subsequently completed by him alone without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as check no.
002524 was incomplete and undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not acquire any
right or interest therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen
check.
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 155223 April 4, 2007
Facts:
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint10 for
sum of money with preliminary attachment against petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30. Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in addition
thereto averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false repor
Issue:
Whether or not the loan always bears interest.
Ruling:
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount shall earn compounded bank interests,
and per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in 1991 ranged from
25% to 32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by
the trial court which petitioner no longer assailed.
1awphi
ARWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 142277 December 11, 2002
Facts:
On August 13, 1993, respondent, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 63489 filed its complaint4 for the
recovery of the balance of the contract price and for damages against petitioner. For the completion
of the condominium project, the amount of P962,434.78 remained unpaid by petitioner. Repeated
demands by respondent for petitioner to pay went unheeded.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can recover the balance of the contract despite the absence of
stipulation of interest.
Ruling:
Even in the absence of a stipulation on interest, under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, respondent
would still be entitled to recover the balance of the contract price with interest. Respondent court,
therefore, correctly interpreted the terms of the agreement which provides that "the OWNER shall be
required to pay the interest at a rate of two percent (2%) per month or the fraction thereof in days of
the amount due for payment by the OWNER."
ROLANDO C. DE LA PAZ,* Petitioner,
vs.
L & J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183360 September 8, 2014
Facts:
L&J failed to pay despite repeated demands, Rolando filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
8
Money with Damages against L&J and Atty. Salonga in his personal capacity before the MeTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-7755. Rolando alleged, amongothers, that L&J’s debtas of January
2005, inclusive of the monthly interest, stood at ₱772,000.00; that the 6% monthly interest was upon
Atty. Salonga’s suggestion; and, that the latter tricked him into parting with his money without the
loan transaction being reduced into writing.
Issue:
Whether or not the principal loan is deemed paid isdependent on the validity of the monthly interest
rate imposed
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
The lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a creditor from
charging monetary interest.
Under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall bedue unless it has been expressly stipulated
in writing. Jurisprudence on the matter also holds that for interest to be due and payable, two
conditions must concur: a) express stipulation for the payment of interest; and b) the agreement to
pay interest is reduced in writing.
Here, it is undisputed that the parties did not put down in writing their agreement. Thus, no interest is
due. The collection of interest without any stipulation in writing is prohibited by law.
TOLOMEO LIGUTAN and LEONIDAS DE LA LLANA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS & SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 138677 February 12, 2002
Facts:
Petitioners failed to settle the debt which, as of 20 May 1982, amounted to P114,416.10. On 30
September 1982, the bank sent a final demand letter to petitioners informing them that they had five
days within which to make full payment. Since petitioners still defaulted on their obligation, the bank
filed on 3 November 1982, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 143, a complaint for
recovery of the due amount.
Issue:
Whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be partly subjective and partly objective.
Ruling:
The stipulated penalty might likewise be reduced when a partial or irregular performance is made by
the debtor. The stipulated penalty might even be deleted such as when there has been substantial
15
performance in good faith by the obligor, when the penalty clause itself suffers from fatal infirmity, or
16
when exceptional circumstances so exist as to warrant it.

ATTY. LEONARD FLORENT O. BULATAO, PETITIONER,
v.
ZENAIDA C. ESTONACTOC, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019
Facts:
Zenaida] filed [a Complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
and Damages against Atty. Bulatao, Atty. Diosdado L. Doctolero as Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Agoo, La Union, and Melchor A. Mabutas, as Sheriff of
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the same court] 5 seeking to declare the [DMRP] as
illegal, inexistent and null and void, and to make the contract unenforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulated interest rate should stand.
Ruling:
The agreement on the 5% monthly interest is void for being unconscionable, the
interest rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for loans or
forbearances of money, credits or goods will be the surrogate or substitute rate not
only for the one-year interest period agreed upon but for the entire period that the loan
of Zenaida remains unpaid.
KT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., represented by WILLIAM GO, Petitioner
vs.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Respondent
G.R. No. 228435
Facts:
On January 3, 2011, PSBank sent a demand letter to KT Construction asking the latter to pay its
outstanding obligation in the amount of ₱725,438.81, excluding interest, penalties, legal fees, and
other charges. For its failure to pay despite demand, PSBank filed a complaint for sum of money
against KT Construction.
Issue:
Whether or not the acceleration clause is valid.
Ruling:
It has long been settled that an acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. In the case
9
at bench, the promissory note explicitly stated that default in any of the installments shall make the
entire obligation due and demandable notice even without or demand. Thus, KT Construction was
erroneous in saying that PSBank's complaint was premature on the ground that the loan was due
only on October 12, 2011. KT Construction's entire loan obligation became due and demandable
when it failed to pay an installment pursuant to the acceleration clause.
SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOSSANTOS AND CARMENCITA M. DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 153852 October 24, 2012
Facts:
On April 4, 2000, prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale (i.e., the original date of March 7, 2000
having been meanwhile reset to April 6, 2000), the petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint (later
amended) for damages, fixing of interest rate, and application of excess payments (with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction). They alleged therein that Metrobank had no right to foreclose the
mortgage because they were not in default of their obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is not in default of their obligations
Ruling:
The petitioners fail to convince.
We consider to be unsubstantiated the petitioners’ claim of their lack of consent to the escalation
clauses. They did not adduce evidence to show that they did not assent to the increases in the
interest rates. The records reveal instead that they requested only the reduction of the interest rate
or the restructuring of their loans. Moreover, the mere averment that the excess payments were
28
sufficient to cover their accrued obligation computed on the basis of the stipulated interest rate
cannot be readily accepted.
CORAZON G. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO TORRES, respondents.
G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner paid the stipulated 3% monthly interest on the P750,000.00 loan,13 amounting to

P270,000.00.14 After March 1996, petitioner was unable to make interest payments as she had
difficulties collecting from her clients in her jewelry business.15
Due to petitioner’s failure to pay the principal loan of P750,000.00, as well as the interest payment
for April 1996, private respondent demanded payment not only of the P750,000.00 loan, but also of
the P300,000.00 loan.
Issue:
Whether or not promissory note is a contract of adhesion.
Ruling:
The promissory note in the case at bar is not a contract of adhesion.
In the case at bar, the promissory note in question did not contain any fine print provision which
could not have been examined by the petitioner. Petitioner had all the time to go over and study the
stipulations embodied in the promissory note. Aside from the March 22, 1995 promissory note for
P750,000.00, three other promissory notes of different dates and amounts were executed by
petitioner in favor of private respondent.
SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181045 July 2, 2014
Facts:
PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed interest rates; that petitioners agreed that without
prior notice, PNB may modify interest rates depending on future policy adopted by it; and that the
imposition of penalties was agreed upon in the Credit Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the interest rate provision in the Credit Agreement should be declared null and void..
Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
In the face of the unequivocal interest rate provisions in the credit agreement and in the law requiring
the parties to agree to changes in the interest rate in writing, we hold that the unilateral and
progressive increases imposed by respondent PNB were null and void.
TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L.
PUNZALAN and JOSE MANALO, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 195641
Facts:
RPTSI failed to pay Calilung the amount stated in the promissory note when it fell due, prompting
him to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 154, Pasig City, a complaint for sum of
money against RPTSI and Paramount, docketed as Civil Case No. 56194. For its part, Paramount
filed a third party complaint against RPTSI and its corporate officers, Punzalan and Manalo, Jr.,
seeking reimbursement for all expenses it may incur under the surety bond.
Issue:
Whether or not the obligation of the respondents was a loan or forbearance of money
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit. It is cogent to observe that under the express terms of the judgment, the
respondents' obligation to pay the l4% interest per annum was joint and several. This meant that the
respondents were in passive solidarity in relation to the petitioner as their creditor, enabling him to
compel either or both of them to pay the entire obligation to him.
HONORIO C. BULOS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
KOJI YASUMA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164159 July 17, 2007
Facts:
The respondent sent a demand letter14 to each of the borrowers -- the petitioner, Dr. Lim and Atty.
Tabalingcos -- for the full payment of their outstanding obligation; but, to no avail. This prompted the
respondent to file with the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages and with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the petitioner, Dr. Lim and Atty. Tabalingcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreed interest rate of 4% per month or 48% per annum is unconscionable
Ruling:
The agreed interest rate of 4% per month or 48% per annum is unconscionable and must be
mitigated. Following established jurisprudence, the legal interest rate of 12% should apply,
1avvphi1
computed from the date of judicial demand, that is, 7 April 1990. The aforequoted paragraph 3 of the
guidelines is also appropriate herein, and a 12% interest per annum is imposed on petitioner’s
monetary liability to respondent from the date of the finality of this Decision until it is fully paid.
JOSEPH CHAN, WILSON CHAN and LILY CHAN, petitioners,
vs.
BONIFACIO S. MACEDA, JR., * respondent.
G.R. No. 142591 April 30, 2003
Facts:
Respondent purchased various construction materials and equipment in Manila. Moreman, in turn,
deposited them in the warehouse of Wilson and Lily Chan, herein petitioners. The deposit was free
of charge.
Unfortunately, Moreman failed to finish the construction of the hotel at the stipulated time. Hence, on
February 1, 1978, respondent filed with the then Court of First Instance
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have corresponding obligation or liability to respondent with respect to
those construction materials.
Ruling:
The Court disagree.
Respondent also failed to prove that there were construction materials and equipment in petitioners'
warehouse at the time he made a demand for their return.
Considering that respondent failed to prove (1) the existence of any contract of deposit between him
and petitioners, nor between the latter and Moreman in his favor, and (2) that there were
construction materials in petitioners' warehouse at the time of respondent's demand to return the
same, we hold that petitioners have no corresponding obligation or liability to respondent with
respect to those construction materials.
ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Petitioners,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD, represented by its Chairman, GOVERNOR
ARMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., et.al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192986 January 15, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A.
No. 265, and therefore, in view of the repealing clause in Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB
has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the maximum rates of interest which banks may
charge for different kinds of loans and credit transactions, or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue
enforcing CB Circular No. 905.
Issue:
Whether or not the lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does authorize stipulations charging
excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.
Ruling:
he lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations charging excessive,
unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.
It is settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche authority to raise
interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their
assets.
Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably struck down for
being contrary to morals, if not against the law.
SPOUSES DANILO SOLANGON and URSULA SOLANGON, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE AVELINO SALAZAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 125944 June 29, 2001
Facts:
The plaintiff-appellants alleged that they obtained only one loan form the defendant-appellee, and
that was for the amount of P60,000.00, the payment of which was secured by the first of the above-
mentioned mortgages. The subsequent mortgages were merely continuations of the first one, which
is null and void because it provided for unconscionable rate of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the third contract of mortgage which was foreclosed is valid.
Ruling:
The court find no merit in the instant petition.
In the case at bench, petitioners stand on a worse situation. They are required to pay the stipulated
interest rate of 6% per month or 72% per annum which is definitely outrageous and inordinate.
Surely, it is more consonant with justice that the said interest rate be reduced equitably. An interest
of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents.
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
Facts:
Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of U.S. $3,000.00 immediately
upon the finality of this decision, without interest for the reason that the said amount was merely held
in custody for safekeeping, but was not actually deposited with the defendant COMTRUST because
being cash currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs dollar account and defendant's only
obligation is to return the same to plaintiff upon demand.
Issue:
Whether or not the transactions falls under the part of prohibited transactions.
Ruling:
The mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be
considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to
Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action
against the other.
TRIPLE-V
vs.
FILIPINO MERCHANTS
[G.R. No. 160544. February 21, 2005]
Facts:
Petitioner argued that the complaint failed to aver facts to support the allegations of recklessness and
negligence committed in the safekeeping and custody of the subject vehicle, claiming that it and its
employees wasted no time in ascertaining the loss of the car and in informing De Asis of the discovery of the
loss.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was constituted as a depositary of the same car.
Ruling:
De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant while eating at petitioner's Kamayan
Restaurant, the former expected the car's safe return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was
constituted as a depositary of the same car. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a
contract of deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De
Asis availed of its free valet parking service.
WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. and IRENE L. LOUH,, Petitioners
vs
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondent
G.R. No. 225562
Facts:
The Spouses Louh made purchases from the use of the credit cards and paid regularly based on the
amounts indicated in the Statement of Accounts (SO As). However, they were remiss in their
obligations starting October 14, 2009. As of August 15, 2010, their account was unsettled prompting
5
BPI to send written demand letters dated August 7, 2010, January 25, 2011 and May 19, 2011. By
September 14, 2010, they owed BPI the total amount of ₱533,836.27. Despite repeated verbal and
written demands, the Spouses Louh failed to pay BPI.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulated interest is indeed iniquitous and unconscionable.
Ruling:
The stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence,
courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand. The stipulated penalty charge of
3% per month or 36% per annum, in addition to regular interests, is indeed iniquitous and
unconscionable
SPOUSES SALVADOR ABELLA AND ALMA ABELLA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ROMEO ABELLA AND ANNIE ABELLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195166
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that respondents obtained a loan from them in the amount of P500,000.00. The
loan was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated March 22, 1999 and was payable within
one (1) year. Petitioners added that respondents were able to pay a total of P200,000.00—
P100,000.00 paid on two separate occasions—leaving an unpaid balance of P300,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the text of the acknowledgment receipt is complicated and unclear
Ruling:
The text of the acknowledgment receipt is uncomplicated and straightforward. It attests to: first,
respondents’ receipt of the sum of P500,000.00 from petitioner Alma Abella; second, respondents’
duty to pay back this amount within one (1) year from March 22, 1999; and third, respondents’ duty
to pay interest. Consistent with what typifies a simple loan, petitioners delivered to respondents with
the corresponding condition that respondents shall pay the same amount to petitioners within one (1)
year.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO DE LA PEÑA, administrator of the estate of Father Agustin de la Peña, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-6913 November 21, 1913
Facts:
The arrest of Father De la Peña and the confiscation of the funds in the bank were the result of the
claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds thus deposited had been
collected by him for revolutionary purposes. The money was taken from the bank by the military
authorities by virtue of such order, was confiscated and turned over to the Government.
Issue:
Whether the P6,641 of trust funds was included in the P19,000 deposited
Ruling:
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal funds De la Peña did not thereby
assume an obligation different from that under which he would have lain if such deposit had not
been made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the money at all hazards. If the had
been forcibly taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the combatants
during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions of the Civil Code he would have been
exempt from responsibility
CA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993
Facts:
Aguirre, accompanied by the Pugaos, then proceeded to the respondent Bank on 4 October 1979 to
open the safety deposit box and get the certificates of title. However, when opened in the presence
of the Bank's representative, the box yielded no such certificates. Because of the delay in the
reconstitution of the title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her earlier offer to purchase the lots; as a
consequence thereof, the petitioner allegedly failed to realize the expected profit of P280,500.00.
Issue:
Whether or not there exist a contract of lease.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit
box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do
not fully subscribe to its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed by
the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; the contract in the case at bar is a special kind of
19
deposit.
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO, Petitioner,
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175490 September 17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Macalinao failed to settle her obligations, respondent BPI filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City a complaint for a sum of money against her and her husband, Danilo
SJ. Macalinao. This was raffled to Branch 66 of the MeTC and was docketed as Civil Case No.
84462 entitled Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Ileana Dr. Macalinao and Danilo SJ.
Macalinao.
Issue:
Whether or not THE REDUCTION OF INTEREST RATE, FROM 9.25% TO 2%, SHOULD BE
UPHELD SINCE THE STIPULATED RATE OF INTEREST WAS UNCONSCIONABLE AND
INIQUITOUS, AND THUS ILLEGAL.
Ruling:
The Interest Rate and Penalty Charge of 3% Per Month or 36% Per Annum Should Be Reduced to
2% Per Month or 24% Per Annum
Indeed, in the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, there
was a stipulation on the 3% interest rate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not the first
time that this Court has considered the interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive and
unconscionable.
SALVADOR CHUA and VIOLETA CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO TIMAN, MA. LYNN TIMAN and LYDIA TIMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 170452 August 13, 2008
Facts:
Respondents paid the loans initially at 7% interest rate per month until September 1999 and then at 5%
interest rate per month from October to December 1999. Sometime in March 2000, respondents offered
to pay the principal amount of the loans through a Philippine National Bank manager’s check
worth P764,000, but petitioners refused to accept the same insisting that the principal amount of the loans
totalled P864,000.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulated interest must be reduced.
Ruling:
The petition is patently devoid of merit.
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents’ loans must be equitably
reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum.8 We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a
plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3%9 per month and higher10 are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the
law
ANGEL JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LIM, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 4015 August 24, 1908
Facts:
The attorney for the plaintiff, Angel Javellana, file a complaint on the 30th of October, 1906, with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the defendants, Jose Lim and Ceferino Domingo Lim, he
sentenced to jointly and severally pay the sum of P2,686.58, with interest thereon at the rate of 15
per cent per annum from the 20th of January, 1898, until full payment should be made, deducting
from the amount of interest due the sum of P1,102.16, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the depositary can use the thing deposited.
Ruling:
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that —
The depository can not make use of the thing deposited without the express permission of the
depositor.
Otherwise he shall be liable for losses and damages.
Article 1768 also provides that —
When the depository has permission to make use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the
character of a deposit and becomes a loan or bailment.
The permission shall not be presumed, and its existence must be proven.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE M. IGPUARA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-7593 March 27, 1913
Facts:
The defendant therein is charged with the crime of estafa, for having swindled Juana Montilla and
Eugenio Veraguth out of P2,498 Philippine currency, which he had take on deposit from the former
to be at the latter's disposal. Juana Montilla's agent voluntarily accepted the sum of P2,498 in an
instrument payable on demand, and as no attempt was made to cash it until August 23, 1911, he
could indorse and negotiate it like any other commercial instrument. There is no doubt that if
Veraguth accepted the receipt for P2,498 it was because at that time he agreed with the defendant
to consider the operation of sale on commission closed, leaving the collection of said sum until later,
which sum remained as a loan payable upon presentation of the receipt.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is authorized to use the thing deposited.
Ruling:
In order that the depositary may use or dispose oft he things deposited, the depositor's consent is
required, and then:
The rights and obligations of the depositary and of the depositor shall cease, and the rules
and provisions applicable to commercial loans, commission, or contract which took the place
of the deposit shall be observed. (Art. 309, Code of Commerce.)
The defendant has shown no authorization whatsoever or the consent of the depositary for using or
disposing of the P2,498, which the certificate acknowledges, or any contract entered into with the
depositor to convert the deposit into a loan, commission, or other contract.
RESTITUTA M. IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
ALEX A. JAUCIAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 149004 April 14, 2004
Facts:
"Defendant alleges that all the above amounts were released respectively by checks drawn by the
plaintiff, and the latter must produce these checks as these were returned to him being the drawer if
only to serve the truth. The above amount are the real amount released to the defendant but the
plaintiff by masterful machinations made it appear that the total amount released was ₱462,600.00.
Because in his computation he made it appear that the true amounts released was not the original
amount, since it include[d] the unconscionable interest for four months.
Issue:
Whether or not the charging of interest of twenty-eight (28%) per centum per annum without any
writing is illegal.
Ruling:
The Petition has no merit.
The stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there were no express contract thereon.16 Hence,
courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand. We find no justification to reverse
or modify the rate imposed by the two lower courts.
DARIO NACAR, PETITIONER,
vs.
GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 189871 August 13, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Dario Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondents Gallery Frames (GF) and/or
Felipe Bordey, Jr., docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 01-00519-97.
On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner and found that he
was dismissed from employment without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was awarded
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of ₱158,919.92
Issue:
Whether or not the computation of the award is valid.
Ruling:
The computation the labor arbiter made shows that it was time-bound as can be seen from the
figures used in the computation. This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the
decision established and declared, can, by its nature, be re-computed. This is the part, too, that the
petitioner now posits should no longer be re-computed because the computation is already in the
labor arbiter's decision that the CA had affirmed.
DURBAN APARTMENTS CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style of City
Garden Hotel, Petitioner,
vs.
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179419 January 12, 2011
Facts:
Justimbaste got the key to said Vitara from See to park it[. O]n May 1, 2002, at about 1:00 o’clock in
the morning, See was awakened in his room by [a] telephone call from the Hotel Chief Security
Officer who informed him that his Vitara was carnapped while it was parked unattended at the
parking area of Equitable PCI Bank along Makati Avenue between the hours of 12:00 [a.m.] and
1:00 [a.m.]
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable to respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle.
Ruling:
The insured See deposited his vehicle for safekeeping with petitioner, through the latter’s employee,
Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim stub to See. Thus, the contract of deposit was
perfected from See’s delivery, when he handed over to Justimbaste the keys to his vehicle, which
Justimbaste received with the obligation of safely keeping and returning it. Ultimately, petitioner is
liable for the loss of See’s vehicle.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO
GILLERA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189998 August 29, 2012
Facts:
Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel chains in the East claiming to provide excellent
service, comfort and security for its guests for which reason ABB Alstom executives and their guests
have invariably chosen this hotel to stay
Issue:
Whether or not public documents may be used as evidence
Ruling:
The Court rules for plaintiffs-appellees.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
LARA'S GIFTS & DECORS, INC., Petitioner
vs.
MIDTOWN INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 225433
Facts:
Petitioner used the raw materials, the finished product allegedly did not pass the standards required
by petitioner's buyers from the United States (US) who rejected the products. Furthermore, due to
the economic recession in the US, subsequent orders made by petitioner's US buyers were
canceled. Petitioner claimed that on 19 February 2008, a fire razed its factory and office, destroying
its equipment, machineries, and inventories, including those rejected by the US buyers.
Issue:
Whether or not sales invoices are admissible
Ruling:
Although petitioner stated that it is not admitting the due execution of the sales invoices, petitioner's
Answer failed to specifically deny or contest under oath the genuineness or due execution of any of
the sales invoices or any of the signatures of petitioner's representatives or employees appearing
therein. Furthermore, petitioner failed to specify which of the sales invoices pertain to materials
delivered which were allegedly substandard and of poor quality.
FEDERAL BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner,
v.
FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 194507, September 08, 2014
Facts:
FSI filed a complaint for Sum of Money against FBI before the RTC of Makati City seeking to
collect the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-
Eight Pesos and Ninety-One Centavos (P1,635,278.91), representing Billings No. 3 and 4, with
accrued interest from August 1, 1991 plus moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s
fees.9 In its complaint, FSI alleged that FBI refused to pay said amount despite demand and its
completion of ninety-seven percent (97%) of the contracted works.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE 12% INTEREST RATE IS PROPER
Ruling:
The Court finds that 12% interest rate is inapplicable, since this case does not involve a loan or
forbearance of money.
This case, however, does not involve an acquiescence to the temporary use of a party’s money
but a performance of a particular service, specifically the construction of the diaphragm wall,
capping beam, and guide walls of the Trafalgar Plaza.
YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 126780 February 17, 2005
Facts:
Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did and Lopez also signed as a
witness. Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin insisted that it must be the
hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However, Lopez refused to accept the
responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking For
the Use Of Safety Deposit Box
Issue:
Whether or not the management is liable for the loss of money
Ruling:
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident considering that
Payam admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three times in opening the safety deposit box of
McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was still asleep. In light of the
34
circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the
employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlin's money
could and should have been avoided.
NONILLON A. BAGALIHOG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Br. 45, RTC of Masbate; and MAJOR
JULITO ROXAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991
Facts:
On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the
Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the
petitioner's house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had
sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate will not
constitute interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court
Ruling:
The Court finds that the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate will
not constitute interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and that,
consequently, the complaint should not have been dismissed by the respondent judge.
The Judiciary is as anxious as the rest of the government that crime be prevented and, if committed,
redressed. There is no question that the person who violates the law deserves to be punished to the
1âwphi1
full extent that the attendant circumstances will allow.

EMILIO TAN, JUANITO TAN, ALBERTO TAN and ARTURO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 48049 June 29, 1989
Facts:
On April 26,1975, Tan Lee Siong died of hepatoma . Petitioners then filed with respondent company
their claim for the proceeds of the life insurance policy. However, in a letter dated September 11,
1975, respondent company denied petitioners' claim and rescinded the policy by reason of the
alleged misrepresentation and concealment of material facts made by the deceased Tan Lee Siong
in his application for insurance. The premiums paid on the policy were thereupon refunded .
Issue:
Whether or not contract of adhesion is applicable in this case.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that there is no strong showing that we should apply the "fine print" or "contract of
adhesion" rule in this case. There is no showing that the questions in the application form for
insurance regarding the insured's medical history are in smaller print than the rest of the printed form
or that they are designed in such a way as to conceal from the applicant their importance.
RODRIGO RIVERA, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES SALVADOR CHUA AND VIOLETA S. CHUA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184458 January 14, 2015
Facts:
The Spouses Chua alleged that they have repeatedly demanded payment from Rivera to no avail.
Because of Rivera’s unjustified refusal to pay, the Spouses Chua were constrained to file a suit on
11 June 1999. The case was raffled before the MeTC, Branch 30, Manila and docketed as Civil
Case No. 163661
Issue:
Whether or not there is already a "bar by prior judgment."
Ruling:
The petitions involve an identity of parties and subject matter raising specifically errors in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Where the Court of Appeals’ disposition on the propriety of the
reduction of the interest rate was raised by the Spouses Chua in G.R. No. 184472, our ruling
thereon affirming the Court of Appeals is a "bar by prior judgment."
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL, Respondents
G.R. No. 169596 March 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public transportation. On December

13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane,
swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company
(PNCC). Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but
respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s undertaking to repair the damaged radio
room.
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be replevin
Ruling:
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by
that fact alone in custodia legis.
THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. PEDRO VILLAFUERTE, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan
(Branch 4), and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents-
appellees.
G.R. No. 129995 October 19, 2001
Facts:
Involved in the present controversy is an expanse of real property (hereinafter referred to as the
BASECO property) situated at Mariveles, Bataan and formerly registered and titled in the name of
either the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (BASECO), the Philippine Dockyard
Corporation or the Baseco Drydock and Construction Co., Inc..
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of the escrow order by the trial court "was patently irregular”.
Ruling:
The instant petition is devoid of merit. An escrow11 fills a definite niche in the body of the law; it has a
distinct legal character.12 The usual definition is that an escrow is a written instrument which by its
terms imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his
agent with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depositary until the performance of a condition
or the happening of a certain event, and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or
obligee.
SPOUSES TAGUMPAY N. ALBOS and AIDA C. ALBOS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES NESTOR M. EMBISAN and ILUMINADA A. EMBISAN, DEPUTY SHERIFF MARINO V.
CACHERO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 210831 November 26, 2014
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of the Loan with Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation, Deed of Final Sale, and Contract of Lease before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3246, and later raffled
to Branch 99 of the court, petitioners alleged that the foreclosure sale is void because respondents
only released ₱60,000.00 out of the ₱84,000.00 amount loaned, which has already been paid.
Issue:
Whether or not the compounding of interest should be in writing
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The compounding of interest should be in writing
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the parties have agreed for the loan to earn 5% monthly
interest, the stipulation to that effect put in writing. When the petitioners defaulted, the period for
payment was extended, carrying over the terms of the original loan agreement, including the 5%
simple interest.
ATTY. DIONISIO CALIBO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DR. PABLO U. ABELLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 120528 January 29, 2001
Facts:
Private respondent instituted an action for replevin, claiming ownership of the tractor and seeking to
recover possession thereof from petitioner. As adverted to above, the trial court ruled in favor of
private respondent; so did the Court of Appeals when petitioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Mike Abella was the absolute owner of the tractor
Ruling:
As found by the trial court and affirmed by respondent court, the pledgor in this case, Mike Abella,
was not the absolute owner of the tractor that was allegedly pledged to petitioner. The tractor was
owned by his father, private respondent, who left the equipment with him for safekeeping. Clearly,
the second requisite for a valid pledge, that the pledgor be the absolute owner of the property, is
absent in this case. Hence, there is no valid pledge.
THE MANILA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ROBERTO and AIDA AMURAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179628 January 16, 2013
Facts:
On March 7, 2000, respondent-spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao entered into a Construction
Contract Agreement (CCA)6 with Aegean Construction and Development Corporation (Aegean) for
the construction of a six-storey commercial building in Tomas Morato corner E. Rodriguez Avenue,
Quezon City. On November 15, 2001, due to the failure of Aegean to complete the project,
respondent spouses filed a Complaint, against petitioner and Intra Strata to collect on the
performance bonds they issued in the amounts of ₱2,760,000.00 and ₱4,440,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
The CIAC has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, both requisites are present.
The parties agreed to submit to arbitration proceedings "any dispute arising in the course of the
execution and performance of the CCA by reason of difference in interpretation of the Contract
Documents x x x which the parties are unable to resolve amicably between themselves."
AUTOCORP GROUP and PETER Y. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION and BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 166662 June 27, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Autocorp Group failed to re-export the items guaranteed by the bonds and/or liquidate the
entries or cancel the bonds, and pay the taxes and duties pertaining to the said items despite
repeated demands made by the BOC, as well as by ISAC. By reason thereof, the BOC considered
the two bonds, with a total face value of P1,034,649.00, forfeited.
Failing to secure from petitioners the payment of the face value of the two bonds, despite several
demands sent to each of them as surety under the Indemnity Agreements, ISAC filed with the RTC
on 24 October 1995 an action against petitioners to recover the sum
Issue:
Whether or not the obligation is due and demandable.
Ruling:
Petitioners’ obligation to indemnify ISAC became due and demandable the moment the bonds
issued by ISAC became answerable for petitioners’ non-compliance with its undertaking with the
BOC. Stated differently, petitioners became liable to indemnify ISAC at the same time the bonds
issued by ISAC were placed at the risk of forfeiture by the BOC for non-compliance by petitioners
with its undertaking.
RCJ BUS LINES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
vs.
MASTER TOURS AND TRAVEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177232 October 11, 2012
Facts:
Master Tours wrote RCJ a letter, demanding the return of the buses to it and the payment of the
lease fee of ₱ 600,000.00 that had remained unpaid since 1993. On February 2, 1998 RCJ wrote
back through counsel that it had no obligation to pay the lease fee and that it would return the buses
only after Master Tours shall have paid RCJ the storage fees due on them.
Issue:
Whether or not RCJ has the obligation to pay rents.
Ruling:
The Court finds no basis in the above for holding that RCJ’s obligation to pay the rents of ₱
600,000.00 on the buses depended on the buses being rehabilitated. Apart from delivering the
buses to RCJ, the agreement did not require any further act from Master Tours as a condition to the
exercise of its right to collect the lease fee.
Of course, the lease agreement provided for two payments: ₱ 400,000.00 upon the signing of the
agreement and ₱ 200,000.00 upon completion of rehabilitation of the buses.
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171266 April 4, 2007
Facts:
On January 6, 2000, petitioner was personally served with an undated Pre-Assessment

Notice6 (PAN) assessing it of deficiency on its purchases of securities from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas or Government Securities Purchased-Reverse Repurchase Agreement (RRPA) and its FSD
for the taxable years 1996 and 1997
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s FSD is subject to DST for the years assessed.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that certificates of time deposit are subject to the DST and that a certificate of time
deposit is but a type of a certificate of deposit drawing interest. "In this case, a depositor of a savings
deposit-FSD is required to keep the money with the bank for at least thirty (30) days in order to yield
a higher interest rate. Otherwise, the deposit earns interest pertaining only to a regular savings
deposit.
E. ZOBEL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION, and
SPOUSES RAUL and ELEA R. CLAVERIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 113931 May 6, 1998
Facts:
Respondent spouses defaulted in the payment of the entire obligation upon maturity. Hence, on
January 31, 1991, SOLIDBANK filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment, against respondents spouses and petitioner. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 91-55909 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner under the "Continuing Guaranty" obligated itself to SOLIDBANK as a
guarantor or a surety.
Ruling:
Strictly speaking, guaranty and surety are nearly related, and many of the principles are common to
both. However, under our civil law, they may be distinguished thus: A surety is usually bound with
his principal by the same instrument, executed at the same time, and on the same consideration. He
is an original promissor and debtor from the beginning, and is held, ordinarily, to know every default
of his principal.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,* Respondent.
G.R. No. 160324 November 15, 2005
Facts:
"PPIC paid the installments due on June 1, 1977, December 1, 1977 and June 1, 1978. The
payments due on December 1, 1978, June 1, 1979 and December 1, 1979 were rescheduled as
requested by PPIC. Despite the rescheduling of the installment payments, however, PPIC defaulted.
Hence, on April 1, 1985, IFC served a written notice of default to PPIC demanding the latter to pay
the outstanding principal loan and all its accrued interests. Despite such notice, PPIC failed to pay
the loan and its interests.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable under the guarantee agreement
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious
IFC claims that, under the Guarantee Agreement, ITM bound itself as a surety to PPIC’s obligations
proceeding from the Loan Agreement.15 For its part, ITM asserts that, by the terms of the Guarantee
Agreement, it was merely a guarantor16 and not a surety. Moreover, any ambiguity in the Agreement
should be construed against IFC -- the party that drafted it.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167134 March 18, 2015
Facts:
Trust Indenture Agreement[s] are not subject to documentary stamp tax for the reason that
relationship established between parties is that of the trustor and trustee, wherein the funds and/or
properties of the trustor are given to the Trustee Bank not as a deposit but under a Common Trust
Fund maintained and to be managed by the Trustee.
Issue:
Whether or not the term "agreement" includes wills.
Ruling:
The term "agreement" includes wills.
The burden fell upon TRB to produce the Trust Indenture Agreements, not only because the said
Agreements were in its possession, but more importantly, because its protest against the DST
assessments was entirely grounded on the allegation that said Agreements were trusts. TRB was
the petitioner before the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6392 and it was among its affirmative allegations
that the said Trust Indenture Agreements were trusts, thus, TRB had the obligation of proving this
fact.
SPOUSES RAUL and AMALIA PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., Respondent.
G.R. No. 156335 November 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC their complaint against respondent for a sum of money and damages.
The Complaint32 essentially demanded a return of the investment, alleging that Amalia never
instructed respondent's employee Lee to invest the money in an LTCP; and that far from what Lee
executed, Amalia's instructions were to invest the money in a "trust account" with an "interest of
around 16.25% with a term of 91 days."
Issue:
Whether petitioners are bound by the terms and conditions of the DIMA, TIA, Directional Letter and
COIs, the Court holds in the affirmative and finds for respondent.
Ruling:
The DIMA, Directional Letter and COIs are evidence of the contract between the parties and are
binding on them, following Article 1159 of the Civil Code which states that contracts have the force of
law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith.47 In particular, petitioner Amalia
affixed her signatures on the DIMA, Directional Letter and TIA, a clear evidence of her consent
which, under Article 1330 of the same Code, she cannot deny absent any evidence of mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.48
As the documents have the effect of law, an examination is in order to reveal what underlies
petitioners' zeal to exclude these from consideration.
FIDELIZA J. AGLIBOT, Petitioner,
vs.
INGERSOL L. SANTIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185945 December 05, 2012
Facts:
Private respondent-complainant Engr. Ingersol L. Santia (Santia) loaned the amount of

₱2,500,000.00 to Pacific Lending & Capital Corporation (PLCC), through its Manager, petitioner
Fideliza J. Aglibot (Aglibot). Allegedly as a guaranty or security for the payment of the note, Aglibot
also issued and delivered to Santia eleven (11) post-dated personal checks drawn from her own
demand account maintained at Metrobank, Camiling Branch. Upon presentment of the aforesaid
checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient
funds or closed account. Santia thus demanded payment from PLCC and Aglibot of the face value of
the checks, but neither of them heeded his demand.
Issue:
Whether or not Aglibot can invoke the benefit of excussion
Ruling:
Aglibot cannot invoke the benefit of excussion
It is settled that the liability of the guarantor is only subsidiary, and all the properties of the principal
debtor, the PLCC in this case, must first be exhausted before the guarantor may be held answerable
for the debt. Thus, the creditor may hold the guarantor liable only after judgment has been obtained
13
against the principal debtor and the latter is unable to pay, "for obviously the ‘exhaustion of the
principal’s property’ — the benefit of which the guarantor claims — cannot even begin to take place
before judgment has been obtained.
PEDRO C. PASTORAL, petitioner,
vs.
MUTUAL SECURITY INSURANCE CORPORATION and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-20469 August 31, 1965
Facts:
Plaintiff deferred its collection of rentals for the months of October and November, 1957 until the
beginning of December; but when no payment was made despite demands, plaintiff advised, and
demanded payment from, the surety company on December 5, 1957, Exhibit C. Up to the date of the
trial and despite numerous demands by plaintiff, defendant failed to pay any rental (except P2,000 in
March, 1958 from the Bureau of Public Highways) nor to return the crane to plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of guaranty or suretyship may have a retroactive effect.
Ruling:
A contract of guaranty or suretyship is only prospective, and not retroactive in operation (Socony
Vacuum, Corp. vs. Miraflores, 67 Phil. 304; El Venceder vs. Canlas, 44 Phil. 699; Asiastic Petroleum
Co. vs. De Pio, 46 Phil. 167), unless a contrary intent is clearly shown. Consequently, Pastoral, was
entitled to assume that the notice provided by the surety bond did not, and was not intended to
include any defaults incurred prior to his acceptance. The surety, which drafted the bond, could have
expressly provided, if it so chose, that the five-day notice therein provided should extend to the
amounts of falling due on October 5 and November 5, but the surety failed to do so, and cannot
blame Pastoral therefor.
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSOLIDATED SUGAR CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 117356 June 19, 2000
Facts:
On April 27, 1990, CSC filed a complaint for specific performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
1118. Defendants were Teresita Ng Sy (doing business under the name of St. Therese
Merchandising) and herein petitioner. Since the former could not be served with summons, the case
proceeded only against the latter. During the trial, it was discovered that Teresita Ng Go who
testified for CSC was the same Teresita Ng Sy who could not be reached through summons. CSC, 7
however, did not bother to pursue its case against her, but instead used her as its witness.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of sugar under SLDR No. 1214M was a conditional sale or a contract to sell
and hence freed petitioner from further obligations.
Ruling:
"It is understood and agreed that by payment by buyer/trader of refined sugar and/or receipt of this
document by the buyer/trader personally or through a representative, title to refined sugar is
transferred to buyer/trader and delivery to him/it is deemed effected and completed (stress supplied)
and buyer/trader assumes full responsibility therefore…
ROSALINA CARODAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 210542
Facts:
Barbara and Rebecca failed to pay their loan obligation despite repeated demands from China Bank.
Their failure to pay prompted the bank institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property on 26 November 1999. From the extrajudicial sale, it realized only Pl.5 million
12
as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale. This amount, when applied to the total outstanding loan
13
obligation of Pl,865,345.77, would still leave a deficiency of P365,345.77.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Rosalina is liable jointly and severally with Barbara and Rebecca for the
payment of respondent China Bank's claims.
Ruling:
The Court finds that Rosalina is liable as an accommodation mortgagor.
In Belo v. PNB, we had the occasion to declare:

63
An accommodation mortgage is not necessarily void simply because the accommodation mortgagor
did not benefit from the same. The validity of an accommodation mo1igage is allowed under Article
2085 of the New Civil Code which provides that (t)hird persons who are not parties to the principal
obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. An accommodation
mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a recipient of the loan, otherwise that would be contrary to his
designation as such.
JN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPS. RODRIGO and LEONOR STA. ANA, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 151060. August 31, 2005
Facts:
PhilGuarantee made several demands on JN, but the latter failed to pay. On 30 May 1983, JN,
through Rodrigo Sta. Ana, proposed to settle the obligation "by way of development and sale" of the
mortgaged property. PhilGuarantee, however, rejected the proposal.
11
PhilGuarantee thus filed a Complaint for collection of money and damages against herein
12
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the guarantor may be compelled to pay the creditor
Ruling:
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of
the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in
34
turn, must be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the
35
creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal
remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.
36
JOSE C. TUPAZ IV and PETRONILA C. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 145578 November 18, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners did not comply with their undertaking under the trust receipts. Respondent bank made
several demands for payments but El Oro Corporation made partial payments only. On 27 June
1983 and 28 June 1983, respondent bank’s counsel5 and its representative6 respectively sent final
demand letters to El Oro Corporation. El Oro Corporation replied that it could not fully pay its debt
because the Armed Forces of the Philippines had delayed paying for the survival bolos.
Issue:
Whether petitioners bound themselves personally liable for El Oro Corporation’s debts under the
trust receipts
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling with the modification that
petitioner Jose Tupaz is liable as guarantor of El Oro Corporation’s debt under the trust receipt dated
30 September 1981.
On Petitioners’ Undertaking Under the Trust Receipts
A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers, and employees.
Debts incurred by these individuals, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct
liability of the corporation they represent.12 As an exception, directors or officers are personally liable
for the corporation’s debts only if they so contractually agree or stipulate.
CCC INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. KAWASAKI STEEL
CORPORATION, F.F. MAÑACOP CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., AND FLORANTE F.
MAÑACOP, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156162, June 22, 2015
Facts:
Kawasaki informed CCCIC about the cessation of operations of FFMCCI, and the failure
of FFMCCI to perform its obligations in the Project and repay the advance payment
made by Kawasaki. Consequently, Kawasaki formally demanded that CCCIC, as surety,
pay Kawasaki the amounts covered by the Surety and Performance Bonds. Because
CCCIC did not act upon its demand, Kawasaki filed on November 6, 1989 before the
RTC a Complaint17 against CCCIC to collect on Surety Bond No. B-88/11191 and
Performance Bond No. B-88/11193.
Issue:
Whether or not ARTICLE 2079 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES APPLIES TO

THE CASE AT BAR.
Ruling:
Article 2079 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the instant case. To free
itself from its liabilities under the Surety and Performance Bonds, CCCIC cites Article
2079 of the Civil Code, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2079. An extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the
guarantor extinguishes the guaranty. The mere failure on the part of the creditor to
demand payment after the debt has become due does not of itself constitute any
extension of
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
time referred to herein.
The aforequoted provision clearly speaks of an extension for the payment of a debt
granted by the creditor to a debtor without the consent of the surety.
MARIANO LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION,* Respondent.
G.R. No. 188539 March 12, 2014
Facts:
The debtor, Raul Arroyo, defaulted on his loan obligation. Thereafter, petitioner received a Notice of
Final Demand dated August 2, 2001, informing him that he was liable to pay the loan obtained by
Raul and Edwina Arroyo, including the interests and penalty fees amounting to ₱7,703,185.54, and
demanding payment thereof. For failure of petitioner to comply with said demand, respondent filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against him and the Arroyo spouses. Since the Arroyo
spouses can no longer be located, summons was not served on them, hence, only petitioner actively
participated in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner executed a Continuing Suretyship
Ruling:
Yes.
Comprehensive or continuing surety agreements are, in fact, quite commonplace in present day
financial and commercial practice. A bank or financing company which anticipates entering into a
series of credit transactions with a particular company, normally requires the projected principal
debtor to execute a continuing surety agreement along with its sureties.
BENJAMIN BITANGA, petitioner,
vs.
PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 173526 August 28, 2008
Facts:
Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise
Agreement. Hence, on 7 September 2000, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution8 against Macrogen Realty, which CIAC granted.
On 29 November 2000, the sheriff9 filed a return stating that he was unable to locate any property of
Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia Branch.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the benefit of excussion
Ruling:
Petitioner cannot avail himself of the benefit of excussion.
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the
principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must
be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the
latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the
debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.
TUASON, TUASON, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MACHUCA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22177 December 2, 1924
Facts:
Tuason, Tuason & Co., in turn, caused the Universal Trading Company and its president Antonio
Machuca, personally, to sign a document (Exhibit B), wherein they bound themselves solidarily to
pay, reimburse, and refund to the company all such sums or amounts of money as it, or its
representative, may pay or become bound to pay, upon its obligation with "Manila Compañia de
Seguros," whether or not it shall have actually paid such sum or sums or any part thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff has the right to recover of the defendant
Ruling:
The plaintiff has the right to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,663, the value of the note
executed by the plaintiff in favor of "Manila Compañia de Seguros" which the plaintiff is under
obligation to pay by virtue of final judgment. We do not believe, however, that the defendant must
pay the plaintiff the expenses incurred by it in the litigation between it and "Manila Compañia de
Seguros.
INTRA-STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156571 July 9, 2008
Facts:
The Bureau of Customs demanded payment of the amounts due from Grand Textile as importer,
and from Intra-Strata and PhilHome as sureties. All three failed to pay. The government responded
on January 14, 1983 by filing a collection suit against the parties with the RTC of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the bonds under consideration are surety bonds
Ruling:
Yes. The bonds under consideration are surety bonds (and hence are governed by the above laws
and rules) is not disputed; the petitioners merely assert that they should not be liable for the reasons
summarized above. Two elements, both affecting the suretyship agreement, are material in the
issues the petitioners pose. The first is the effect of the law on the suretyship agreement; the terms
of the suretyship agreement constitute the second.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004
Facts:
The petitioner sent to the respondents separate letters demanding full payment of the amount
of P47,872,373.98 plus accruing interest, penalty charges, and 10% attorney's fees pursuant to their
joint and solidary obligations under the deed of undertaking and surety bond. When the respondents
32
failed to pay, the petitioner filed on 9 July 1991 a civil case for collection of a sum of money against
the respondents before the RTC of Makati City.
Issue:
whether the respondent contractor has defaulted in the performance of its obligations under the
service contract
Ruling:
Default or mora on the part of the debtor is the delay in the fulfillment of the prestation by reason of a
cause imputable to the former. It is the non-fulfillment of an obligation with respect to time.
52 53
It is undisputed that only 51.7% of the total work had been accomplished. The 48.3% unfinished
portion consisted in the purchase and installation of electro-mechanical equipment and materials,
which were available from foreign suppliers, thus requiring US Dollars for their importation.
SPOUSES BHAGWANDAS & SATI GIDWANI and SAMUEL SHARUFF, petitioners,
vs.
DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARINDUQUE MINING &
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION (formerly Marinduque Iron Mines, Inc.) and JUDGE FEDERICO
C. ALIKPALA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-31442 June 24, 1983
Facts:
PLASTIC ERA failed to pay the promissory note it executed in favor of the Manufacturers Bank &
Trust Company, and as a result thereof. the latter in turn files a claim against the bond issued by
DOMESTIC INSURANCE, which on October 27,1960, paid the sum of P20,000.00 to said bank.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent abandoned and waived its rights or cause of action under the Pledge
Agreement.
Ruling:
As aptly observed by the trial court, "there were two securities given to DOMESTIC INSURANCE for
the faithful compliance of the obligation of PLASTIC ERA to pay the promissory note it executed in
favor of the Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co., namely, the counter-guaranty agreement jointly
executed by PLASTIC ERA, Kishu Gidwani and Bhagwandas Gidwani and the second was the
pledge of shares of stock made by Sati B. Gidwani. By paying the promissory note to the
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Company, DOMESTIC INSURANCE thereby was subrogated to the
rights of the former to demand for and collect payment of the amount due thereon from PLASTIC
ERA, the maker of the promissory note.
SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
LUTGARDO VILLAREAL AND FREDERICK SO, respondents.
G.R. No. 143304 July 8, 2004
Facts:
Respondents demanded from petitioner payment of their separation benefits, commissions, vacation
and sick leave benefits, and proportionate 13th month pay. But petitioner refused and instead,
withheld their 13th month pay and other benefits.
On April 16, 1997, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for payment of their monetary
benefits against petitioner and its president, Augusto Pardo
Issue:
Whether or not set-off or legal compensation cannot take place between petitioner and respondent
Ruling:
In this case, set-off or legal compensation cannot take place between petitioner and respondent So
because they are not mutually creditor and debtor of each other.
A careful reading of the Memorandum dated August 22, 1994 reveals that the "lump sum
10
compensation of not less than US $6,000.00 will have to be refunded" by each trainee to BOHLER,
not to petitioner.
In fine, the Court ruled that petitioner has no legal right to withhold respondents’ 13th month pay and
other benefits to recompense for whatever amount it paid as security for respondent Villareal’s car
loan; and for the expenses incurred by respondent So in his training abroad.
COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 130886 January 29, 2004
Facts:
JIGS and ELBA defaulted in the payment of their respective loans. On October 30, 1984, appellant
RCBC made a written demand (Exhibit ‘N’) on appellee CIC to pay JIG’s account to the full extend
(sic) of the suretyship. A similar demand (Exhibit ‘O’) was made on December 17, 1984 for appellee
CIC to pay ELBA’s account to the full extend (sic) of the suretyship. In response to those demands,
appellee CIC made several payments from February 25, 1985 to February 10, 1988 in the total
amount of ₱2,000,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable to pay legal interest over and above its principal
obligation under the surety bonds issued by it.
Ruling:
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced.
Jurisprudence is clear on this matter. As early as Tagawa vs. Aldanese and Union Gurantee Co. and 9
reiterated in Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. P.L. Galang Machinery Co., Inc. , and more
10
recently, in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and R & B Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. , we have
11
sustained the principle that if a surety upon demand fails to pay, he can be held liable for interest,
even if in thus paying, its liability becomes more than the principal obligation. The increased liability
is not because of the contract but because of the default and the necessity of judicial collection. 1
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS S. YUJUICO (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY BRENDON V. YUJUICO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 163116 June 29, 2015
Facts:
LTC failed to pay constraining plaintiff-appellant to file the instant collection suit in court. Judgment of
the RTC On November 19, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against
Jesus, as well as his counterclaim. It considered Exhibit B, the second continuing guarantee
8
executed by Jesus on February 22, 1967, as pivotal inasmuch as the credit guaranteed by the first
continuing guarantee executed on February 8, 1966 had become "part of the credit under the
second agreement," observing that Jesus had not been sued "for any availment by YLTC under
Exhibit B, but for those obtained by YLTC
after the third guaranty agreement, Exhibit CC, was executed," to which Jesus was not a signatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the undertaking of Jesus was that of a surety.
Ruling:
The undertaking of Jesus was that of a surety, not a guarantor.
It is apparent that the courts below, as well as the petitioner, interchangeably used the terms
guaranty and surety in characterizing the undertakings of Jesus under the continuing guaranties.
The terms are distinct from each other, however, and the distinction is expressly delineated in the
Civil Code
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006
Facts:
"[Respondent alleged that, as a result of JDS’s failure to comply with the provisions of the contract,
which resulted in the said contract’s rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish the project,
for which it incurred an additional expense of three million two hundred fifty six thousand, eight
hundred seventy four pesos (P3,256,874.00).
Issue:
Whether or not Death is a defense of Santos’ heirs which Stronghold could also adopt as its defense
against obligee’s claim.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by
the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.9 Only obligations that are
personal10 or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Inc., petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, respondent.
G.R. No. 138544 October 3, 2000
Facts:
SIMC repeatedly availed of its credit line and obtained six (6) other loan[s] from [Petitioner] SBTC in
the aggregate amount of [s]ix [m]illion [t]hree [h]undred [s]ixty-[n]ine [t]housand [n]ineteen and
50/100 [p]esos (₱6,369,019.50). Accordingly, SIMC executed Promissory Notes Nos.
DLS/74/760/85, DLS/74773/85, DLS/74/78/85, DLS/74/760/85 DLS/74/12/86, and DLS/74/47/86 to
cover the amounts of the abovementioned additional loans against the credit line.
Issue:
Whether or not the indemnity agreement was a continuing surety
Ruling:
The Indemnity Agreement is a continuing surety does not authorize the bank to extend the scope of
the principal obligation inordinately. In Dino v. CA, the Court held that "a continuing guaranty is one
37 38
which covers all transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the description or
contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the expiration or termination thereof."
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO), Petitioner,
vs.
NEW DAGUPAN METRO GAS CORPORATION, PURITA E. PERALTA and PATRICIA P.
GALANG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173171 July 11, 2012
Facts:
New Dagupan withheld payment of the last instalment, which was intended to cover the payment of
the capital gains tax, in view of Peralta’s failure to deliver the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 52135
and to execute a deed of absolute sale in its favor. Further, New Dagupan, through its President,
Julian Ong Cuña (Cuña), executed an affidavit of adverse claim, which was annotated on TCT No.
52135 on October 1, 1991 as Entry No. 14826. 8
Issue:
Whether or not mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the contract
Ruling:
As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the contract.
However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit the amount for
which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to
secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES TOMAS CABATINGAN and AGAPITA EDULLANTES Represented by RAMIRO DIAZ
as Their Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167058 July 9, 2008
Facts:
Respondent spouses Tomas Cabatingan and Agapita Edullantes obtained two loans, secured by a
real estate mortgage,1 in the total amount of ₱421,2002 from petitioner Philippine National Bank.
However, they were unable to fully pay their obligation despite having been granted more than
enough time to do so.3 Thus, on September 25, 1991, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgage pursuant to Act 3135
Issue:
Whether or not a creditor may foreclose on a real estate mortgage
Ruling:
A creditor may foreclose on a real estate mortgage only if the debtor fails to pay the principal
obligation when it falls due.15 Nonetheless, the foreclosure of a mortgage does not ipso
facto extinguish a debtor’s obligation to his creditor. The proceeds of a sale at public auction may
not be sufficient to extinguish the liability of the former to the latter.16 For this reason, we favor a
construction of Section 4 of Act 3135 that affords the creditor greater opportunity to satisfy his claim
without unduly rewarding the debtor for not paying his just debt.
CITIZENS SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PASCUAL M. PEREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48958 June 28, 1988
Facts:
Pascual M. Perez Enterprises failed to comply with its obligation under the contract of sale of goods
with Singer Sewing Machine Co., Ltd. Consequently, the petitioner was compelled to pay, as it did
pay, the fair value of the two surety bonds in the total amount of P144,000.00. Except for partial
payments in the total sum of P55,600.00 and notwithstanding several demands, Pascual M. Perez
Enterprises failed to reimburse the petitioner for the losses it sustained under the said surety bonds.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of assignment is an absolute conveyance
Ruling:
The deed of assignment cannot be regarded as an absolute conveyance whereby the obligation
under the surety bonds was automatically extinguished. The subsequent acts of the private
respondent bolster the fact that the deed of assignment was intended merely as a security for the
issuance of the two bonds. Partial payments amounting to P55,600.00 were made after the
execution of the deed of assignment to satisfy the obligation under the two surety bonds.
EMILIO Y. TAÑEDO, petitioner,
vs.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 136603 January 18, 2002
Facts:
Declaring the "Continuing Guaranty" as having been extinguished after plaintiff branded it as a
"worthless security" and preferred to avail, as it did avail, of the provisional remedy of attachment;
and declaring defendants Alfredo Ching and Emilio Tañedo relieved of their obligation under the said
continuing Guaranty
Issue:
Whether the "continuing guarantee" executed by the petitioner is a contract of (surety) adhesion.
Ruling:
Even if the "continuing guarantee" were considered as one of adhesion, we find the contract of
"surety" valid because petitioner was "free to reject it entirely". Petitioner was a stockholder and
12
officer of Cheng Ban Yek and Co., Inc. and it was common business and banking practice to require
"sureties" to guarantee corporate obligations.
TERESITA MONZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES
RELOVA and SPS. BIENVENIDO &
EUFRACIA PEREZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171827
Facts:
Respondents alleged that on 28 December 1998, Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of the spouses
Perez for the amount of P600,000.00, with interest of five percent per month, payable on or before 28
December 1999. This was secured by a 300-square meter lot in Barangay Kaybagal, Tagaytay City.
Denominated as Lot No. 2A, this lot is a portion of Psu-232001, covered by Tax Declaration No. 98-008-1793.
On 31 December 1998, Monzon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of the
spouses Perez.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents would be the first mortgagors
Ruling:
If respondents’ mortgage contract was executed before the execution of the mortgage contract with Addio
Properties, Inc., respondents would be the first mortgagors. Pursuant to Article 212620 of the Civil Code, they
would be entitled to foreclose the property as against any subsequent possessor thereof. If respondents’
mortgage contract was executed after the execution of the mortgage contract with Addio Properties, Inc.,
respondents would be the second mortgagors. As such, they are entitled to a right of redemption pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
SPOUSES ALFREDO and SUSANA ONG, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondent.
G.R. No. 160466 January 17, 2005
Facts:
BMC needed additional capital for its business and applied for various loans, amounting to a total of
five million pesos, with the respondent bank. Petitioners-spouses acted as sureties for these loans
and issued three (3) promissory notes for the purpose. Under the terms of the notes, it was
stipulated that respondent bank may consider debtor BMC in default and demand payment of the
remaining balance of the loan upon the levy, attachment or garnishment of any of its properties, or
upon BMC’s insolvency, or if it is declared to be in a state of suspension of payments. Respondent
bank granted BMC’s loan applications.
Issue:
Whether or not the reliance of petitioners-spouses on Articles 2063 and 2081 of the Civil
Code is misplaced
Ruling:
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contentions.
Reliance of petitioners-spouses on Articles 2063 and 2081 of the Civil Code is misplaced as
these provisions refer to contracts of guaranty. They do not apply to suretyship contracts.
Petitioners-spouses are not guarantors but sureties of BMC’s debts. There is a sea of difference in
the rights and liabilities of a guarantor and a surety. A guarantor insures the solvency of the
debtor while a surety is an insurer of the debt itself. A contract of guaranty gives rise to
a subsidiary obligation on the part of the guarantor.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the Port of
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FEDERICO C. ALIKPALA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXII, GONZALO SY and TOMAS Y. DE LEON, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32542 November 26, 1970
Facts:
Counsel for the respondents admitted that the petitioners have not been heard on the seizure
proceedings and the imported cargo have already been advertised for sale and the same would
have been sold had not this Court issued a restraining order. The first question submitted for
resolution is whether the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition and to issue the
ancillary remedy prayed for.
Issue:
whether the bondsman can satisfy a liability of P513,865.46, which is the aggregate amount of the
bonds submitted.
Ruling:
The objection on this ground has been brushed aside by the lower court in its order of September 8,
1970, since the private respondents "have shown that the bonding company obtained reinsurance
on part of their liability for those bonds." But it appears, as manifested by said respondents
themselves, that only two of the bonds submitted by them, in the respective amounts of P94,647.80
and P78,981.24, are covered by reinsurance, leaving more than P340,000.00 not reinsured. In view
thereof, it is incumbent upon the respondents to either cause of sufficient portion of the other bonds
submitted by it to be covered by reinsurance or to put up other surety bonds acceptable to the
Collector of Customs, the same to be justified before respondent Court in case of dispute.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY CO., INC. and THE COURT OF APPEALS (Second
Division), respondents.
G.R. No. L-20567 July 30, 1965
Facts:
The holding is now assailed by the Bank. It contends the power of attorney obtained from ATACO
was merely in additional security in its favor, and that it was the duty of the surety, and not that of the
creditor, owed see to it that the obligor fulfills his obligation, and that the creditor owed the surety no
duty of active diligence to collect any, sum from the principal debtor
Issue:
Whether or not principal debtor were considered as mere additional security
Ruling:
Even if the assignment with power of attorney from the principal debtor were considered as mere
additional security still, by allowing the assigned funds to be exhausted without notifying the surety,
the Bank deprived the former of any possibility of recoursing against that security. The Bank thereby
exonerated the surety, pursuant to Article 2080 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2080. — The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their
obligation whenever by come act of the creditor they cannot be subrogated to the rights,
mortgages and preferences of the latter.
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CARDLINE INC., MARY C. CALUBAD, SONY N. CALUBAD, and NG BENG
SHENG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201417
Facts:
Cardline leased four machines (machines) from Orix as evidenced by three similarly-worded lease
agreements. Cardline’s principal stockholders and officers - Mary C. Calubad, Sony N. Calubad, and
Ng Beng Sheng (individual respondents) – signed the suretyship agreements in their personal
capacities to guarantee Cardline’s obligations under each lease agreement.
Cardline defaulted in paying the rent: the unpaid obligations amounted to P9,369,657.00 as of July
12, 2007. Orix formally demanded payment from Cardline but the latter refused to pay.
Issue:
Whether the parties intended to deduct the guaranty deposit from the unpaid obligation.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the return or recovery of the machines does not reduce Cardline’s outstanding
obligation unless the returned machines are sold. No sale transpired pursuant to the lease
agreements. Moreover, the guaranty deposit was not meant to reduce Cardline’s unpaid obligation.
Thus, Cardline’s actual damages remain at P9,369,657.00.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES also known
as PHILIPPINE EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT AGENCY, Petitioner
vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Respondent
G.R. No. 233850
Facts:
Respondent PVB alleged that on November 23, 2011, PVB, together with other banking institutions
(Series A Noteholders), entered into a Five-Year Floating Rate Note Facility Agreement (NF A) with
5
debtor Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PhilPhos), a PEZA registered domestic

corporation situated in Leyte, up to the aggregate amount of ₱5 billion. Under the said NFA,
respondent PVB committed the amount of ₱1 billion.
Issue:
Whether an obligation is a suretyship is not a matter of nomenclature and semantics.
Ruling:
Petitioner TIDCORP downplays the waiver of the benefit of ex cuss ion by making the specious
argument that the waiver does not define or characterize a guaranty and that it is supposedly merely
one of the effects of a guaranty. But as already explained, the waiver of the benefit of excussion is
the crucial factor that differentiates a surety from a guaranty.
SPOUSES NILO RAMOS and ELIADORA RAMOS, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL OBISPO and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193804 February 27, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners filed on October 12, 1999 a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with
damages against FEBTC and Obispo. Petitioners alleged that they signed the blank REM form given
by Obispo who facilitated the loan with FEBTC, and that they subsequently received the loan
proceeds of ₱250,000.00 which they paid in full through Obispo.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2085 applies.
Ruling:
It may be argued that having received the amount of ₱250,000.00, plaintiffs-appellees became
parties to the principal obligation and as such, the provision of the last paragraph of Article 2085 no
longer applies. While it is undisputed that plaintiffs-appellees received the amount of ₱250,000.00,
the record, however, reveals that they received the said amount not from defendant FEBTC but from
defendant Obispo. It could be inferred that the ₱250,000.00 given by defendant Obispo to plaintiffs-
appellees was some form of remuneration in lending their title to him as security for his credit line
with defendant-appellant FEBTC.
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, et. Al., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011
Facts:
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square meters, located in Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was originally part of a larger parcel of land, known as Lot No.
356 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring 749 square meters, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16676,8 in the name of Valeriano Semilla (Valeriano), married to
Potenciana Acosta.
Issue:
Whether or not Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith.
Ruling:
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is
that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the
mortgage is considered null and void. However, an exception to this rule is the doctrine of
"mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the
mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given
effect by reason of public policy.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(FORMERLY PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION.), Petitioner,
v.
ASIA PACES CORPORATION, et. Al., Respondents.
G.R. No.187403, February 12, 2014
Facts:
On January 19, 1981, respondents Asia Paces Corporation (ASPAC) and Paces Industrial
Corporation (PICO) entered into a sub-contracting agreement, denominated as “200 KV
Transmission Lines Contract No. 20-/80-II Civil Works & Electrical Erection,” with the
Electrical Projects Company of Libya (ELPCO), as main contractor, for the construction
and erection of a double circuit bundle phase conductor transmission line in the country
of Libya.
Issue:
Whether or not the bonding companies’ liabilities to TIDCORP under the Surety Bonds
have been extinguished by the payment extensions granted by Banque Indosuez and
PCI Capital to TIDCORP under the Restructuring Agreement.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to
whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are
interwoven as to be inseparable. Although the contract of a surety is in essence
secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor is direct,
primary and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and duty of another although he
possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any
benefit therefrom.
THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LIMITED, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION (NOW BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), Respondents.
G.R. No. 183486
Facts:
The Letter of Credit was amended twice to reflect changes in the terms of delivery. On November 2,
1993, the Letter of Credit was first amended to change the delivery terms from FOB ST Iligan to
FOB ST Manila and to increase the amount to US$488,400. It was subsequently amended on
5
November 18, 1993 to extend the expiry and shipment date to December 8, 1993
Issue:
Whether or not a letter of credit is a commercial instrument
Ruling:
A letter of credit is a commercial instrument developed to address the unique needs of certain
commercial transactions. It is recognized in our jurisdiction and is sanctioned under Article 567 of
63
the Code of Commerce and in numerous jurisprudence defining a letter of credit, the principles
relating to it, and the obligations of parties arising from it.
SPOUSES ENRIQUE M. BELO and FLORENCIA G. BELO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and SPOUSES MARCOS and ARSENIA ESLABON, respondents.
G.R. No. 134330 March 1, 2001
Facts:
Respondent PNB rejected the tender of payment of petitioners spouses Belo. It contended that the
redemption price should be the total claim of the bank on the date of the auction sale and custody of
property plus charges accrued and interests amounting to Two Million Seven Hundred Seventy Nine
Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Eight and Seventy Two Centavos (P2,779,978.72).6 Petitioners
spouses disagreed and refused to pay the said total claim of respondent PNB.
Issue:
Whether or not accommodation mortgage is void.
Ruling:
An accommodation mortgage is not necessarily void simply because the accommodation mortgagor
did not benefit from the same. The validity of an accommodation mortgage is allowed under Article
2085 of the New Civil Code which provides that "(t)hird persons who are not parties to the principal
obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property." An accommodation
mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a recipient of the loan, otherwise that would be contrary to his
designation as such.
MAMERTA VDA. DE JAYME,
et. Al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al, respondents.
G.R. No. 128669 October 4, 2002
Facts:
Respondents deny that any fraud was employed, nor was there a scheme to make the spouses sign
as mortgagors instead of guarantors. They aver that the spouses were fully advised and
compensated for the use of their property as collateral with MBTC; that they voluntarily signed the
deed of mortgage upon the request of George Neri, whom they previously trusted and who fulfilled
his promise to pay the loan to General Bank and who obtained the release of the same property by
faithfully paying his indebtedness with General Bank.
Issue:
Whether or not MBTC is a purchaser in good faith
Ruling:
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in considering MBTC as a purchaser in good
faith. MBTC had no knowledge of the stipulation in the lease contract. Although the same lease was
registered and duly annotated on the certificate of title of Lot 2700, MBTC was charged with
constructive knowledge only of the fact of lease of the land and not of the specific provision
stipulating transfer of ownership of the building to the Jaymes upon termination of the lease.
JOSE C. CORDOVA, Petitioner,
vs.
REYES DAWAY LIM BERNARDO LINDO ROSALES LAW OFFICES, ATTY. WENDELL
CORONEL and the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,*** Respondents.
G.R. No. 146555 July 3, 2007
Facts:
Sometime in 1977 and 1978, petitioner Jose C. Cordova bought from Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation (Philfinance) certificates of stock of Celebrity Sports Plaza Incorporated (CSPI)
and shares of stock of various other corporations. He was issued a confirmation of sale.4 The CSPI
shares were physically delivered by Philfinance to the former Filmanbank5 and Philtrust Bank, as
custodian banks, to hold these shares in behalf of and for the benefit of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the application of Article 2241 is proper.
Ruling:
Petitioner’s argument is incorrect. Article 2241 refers only to specific movable property. His claim
was for the payment of money, which, as already discussed, is generic property and not specific or
determinate.
Considering that petitioner did not fall under any of the provisions applicable to preferred creditors,
he was deemed an ordinary creditor under Article 2245:
Credits of any other kind or class, or by any other right or title not comprised in the four preceding
articles, shall enjoy no preference.
MANUEL D. YNGSON, JR. (in his capacity as the Liquidator of ARCAM & COMPANY,
INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171132 August 15, 2012
Facts:
ARCAM filed before the SEC a Petition for Suspension of Payments, Appointment of a Management
or Rehabilitation Committee, and Approval of Rehabilitation Plan, with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. The SEC issued a TRO and
subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining PNB and the Sheriff of the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga from proceeding with the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties. An interim
8
management committee was also created
Issue:
Whether or not the right of PNB to foreclose should be respected
Ruling:
In this case, PNB elected to maintain its rights under the security or lien; hence, its right to foreclose
the mortgaged properties should be respected, in line with our pronouncement in Consuelo Metal
Corporation.
As to petitioner's argument on the right of first preference as regards unpaid wages

TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 160328 February 04, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner failed to pay the full amount of Check No. 019972 or to make arrangements for its full
payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor thereof in December 1988. Although petitioner made
cash and check payments after the dishonor, the same were treated by LIVECOR as continuing
payments of the outstanding loan.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable.
Ruling:
There is no merit in prosecution’s claim that even if the 6 checks be considered replacement of the
dishonored check, petitioner should still be held liable because they did not cover the entire amount
of the dishonored check as 1 of the 6 checks for P25,000.00 also bounced for insufficiency of funds.
Note that the replacement check for P25,000.00 was dishonored in July 1989 but LIVECOR notified
PERPETUAL of the dishonor only after 3 years or on March 10, 1992.
SPOUSES WILFREDO N. ONG and EDNA SHEILA PAGUIO-ONG, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBAN LENDING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172592 July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Complaint,6 docketed as Civil Case No. 9322, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City, for declaration of mortgage contract as abandoned, annulment of deeds, illegal
exaction, unjust enrichment, accounting, and damages, alleging that the Memorandum of Agreement
and the Dacion in Payment executed are void for being pactum commissorium.
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement and Dacion en pago constitutes pactum
commissorium
Ruling:
The Court finds that the Memorandum of Agreement and Dacion in Payment constitute pactum
commissorium, which is prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code which provides:
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them.
Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void."
The elements of pactum commissorium, which enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the
mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings,30 are: (1) there should be a
property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there
should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of
non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.
J.L. BERNARDO CONSTRUCTION, represented by attorneys-in-fact Santiago R. Sugay, Edwin
A. Sugay and Fernando S.A. Erana, SANTIAGO R. SUGAY, EDWIN A. SUGAY and FERNANDO
S. A. ERANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAYOR JOSE L. SALONGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105827 January 31, 2000
Facts:
Petitioners allege that, although the whole amount of the cash equity became due, the Municipality
refused to pay the same, despite repeated demands and notwithstanding that the public market was
more than ninety-eight percent (98%) complete as of July 20, 1991. Furthermore, petitioners
maintain that Salonga induced them to advance the expenses for the demolition, clearing and site
filling work by making representations that the Municipality had the financial capability to reimburse
them later on. However, petitioners claim that they have not been reimbursed for their expenses.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2242 is applicable
Ruling:
Article 2242 only finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e. when the same
specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such
property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of
preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid
ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien should
14
then only be enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the
preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
G.R. No. 126200 August 16, 2001
Facts:
Marinduque Mining executed in favor of PNB and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) a
second Mortgage Trust Agreement. In said agreement, Marinduque Mining mortgaged to PNB and
DBP all its real properties located at Surigao del Norte, Sipalay, Negros Occidental, and Antipolo,
Rizal, including the improvements thereon.
Issue:
Whether or not DBP is in bad faith
Ruling:
No.
The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only when such corporate fiction is used
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime. To disregard the separate
14
juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It
cannot be presumed. In this case, the Court finds that Remington failed to discharge its burden of
15
proving bad faith on the part of Marinduque Mining and its transferees in the mortgage and
foreclosure of the subject properties to justify the piercing of the corporate veil.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA CUBA, respondents.
G.R. No. 118342 January 5, 1998
Facts:
Plaintiff failed to pay her loan on the scheduled dates thereof in accordance with the terms
of the Promissory Notes;
Without foreclosure proceedings, whether judicial or extra-judicial, defendant DBP

appropriated the Leasehold Rights of plaintiff Lydia Cuba over the fishpond in question
Issue:
Whether the act of DBP in appropriating to itself CUBA's leasehold rights over the fishpond
in question without foreclosure proceedings was contrary to Article 2088 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
The Court agrees with CUBA that the assignment of leasehold rights was a mortgage
contract.
It is undisputed that CUBA obtained from DBP three separate loans totalling P335,000, each
of which was covered by a promissory note. In all of these notes, there was a provision that:
"In the event of foreclosure of the mortgage securing this notes, I/We further bind
myself/ourselves, jointly and severally, to pay the deficiency, if any."
7
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVA MALLORCA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22538 October 31, 1967
Facts:
Ruperta Lavilles failed to pay her mortgage debt. PNB, on April 16, 1958 foreclosed the mortgage
extrajudicially. On May 12, 1958, a certificate of sale was issued to PNB as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale. This certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
Issue:
Whether or not PNB has the right to consolidate its title
Ruling:
The Court, accordingly, rule that PNB has the right to consolidate its title on the entire lot mortgaged
by Ruperta Lavilles in its favor, including the 20,000 square meter-undivided interest of Primitiva
Mallorca. And this, by virtue of the foreclosure sale and the expiry of Mallorca's right of redemption.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172892 June 13, 2013
Facts:
PDIC conducted an evaluation of RBTI’s financial condition and determined that RBTI remained
insolvent. Thus, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 675 dated June 6, 1997 directing PDIC
to proceed with the liquidation of RBTI. Accordingly and pursuant to Section 30 of the New Central
Bank Act, PDIC filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet a petition for
assistance in the liquidation of RBTI.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2241 and 2242 are applicable.
Ruling:
The law expressly provides that debts and liabilities of the bank under liquidation are to be paid in
accordance with the rules on concurrence and preference of credit under the Civil Code. Duties,
taxes, and fees due the Government enjoy priority only when they are with reference to a specific
movable property, under Article 2241(1) of the Civil Code, or immovable property, under Article
2242(1) of the same Code. However, with reference to the other real and personal property of the
debtor, sometimes referred to as "free property," the taxes and assessments due the National
Government, other than those in Articles 2241(1) and 2242(1) of the Civil Code, such as the
corporate income tax, will come only in ninth place in the order of preference.
ABUNDIO BARAYOGA and BISUDECO-PHILSUCOR CORFARM WORKERS UNION (PACIWU
CHAP-TPC), Petitioners,
vs.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,* Respondent.
G.R. No. 160073 October 24, 2005
Facts:
"Sometime later, on August 28, 1988, BISUDECO contracted the services of Philippine Sugar
Corporation (Philsucor) to take over the management of the sugar plantation and milling operations
until August 31, 1992.
"Meanwhile, because of the continued failure of BISUDECO to pay its outstanding loan with PNB, its
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT, as the sole
bidder. On April 2, 1991, APT was issued a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale.
Issue:
Whether APT Is Liable for the Claims of Petitioners Against Their Former Employer
Ruling:
The Petition has no merit.

In the present case, petitioner-union’s members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor in May
1991 seek to hold APT liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. Significantly,
prior to the actual sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30, 1992, the APT board of
trustees had approved a Resolution on September 23, 1992.
GLORIA OCAMPO and TERESITA TAN, Petitioners,

vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, URDANETA, PANGASINAN BRANCH and EX OFFICIO
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164968 July 3, 2009
Facts:
Ocampo and Tan availed of the Quedan Financing Program for Grain Stocks of the Quedan and
Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation6 (Quedancor), whereby the latter guaranteed to pay the Land
Bank their loan, upon maturity, in case of non-payment. Pursuant thereto, they delivered to the Land
Bank several grains warehouse receipts (quedans), and executed a Deed of Assignment/Contract of
Pledge covering 41,690 cavans of palay.7
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is valid.
Ruling:
The essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set
apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or
the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of
payment.54 In the case before Us, the loan amount was established. It was also admitted that 80%
was guaranteed by Quedancor, while the remaining 20%, by the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.
Finally, the records show that Ocampo and Tan obtained the loan from the Land Bank and it was the
latter which released the loan proceeds.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA LETICIA FERNANDEZ and ALICE SISON Vda. DE FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163117 December 18, 2009
Facts:
On 11 December 2002, respondents filed with the trial court a complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgages, notice of extra-judicial sale and foreclosure proceedings with application for a temporary
restraining order or writ of injunction against EPCIB and Sheriff IV Crisanto M. Parajas.10
On 16 December 2002, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order to enjoin the
foreclosure sale.11 The trial court also set the hearing of respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction on 6 January 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreclosure is valid.
Ruling:
Foreclosure is valid where the debtor is in default in the payment of an obligation. 23 The essence of a
contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass
of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an
obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in payment. 24 Foreclosure is but
a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, VENANCIO CONCEPCION, Defendant-Appellant. G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922 Facts

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, VENANCIO CONCEPCION, Defendant-Appellant. G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922 Facts

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962

G.R. No. 159794 December 19, 2006

G.R. No. 105774 April 25, 2002

The petition is bereft of merit.

Authority of Arsenio to Sign the Deeds of Assignment

G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910

Whether or not there exist a contract of commodatum

G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988

G.R. No. 172227 June 29, 2011

Whether or not the loan contract was perfected.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The loan contract was perfected.

G.R. No. 133632 February 15, 2002

Whether or not the loan is a consensual contract.

G.R. No. L-46240 November 3, 1939

Whether or not there exist a contract of commodatum

G.R. No. 154878 March 16, 2007

Whether or not respondent is liable for the payable interests.

G.R. No. 118375 October 3, 2003

The trial court eventually stopped the auction sale

Whether or not there was a perfection of the contract.

G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004

Whether or not pari delicto is applicable in ejectment cases

The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases

G.R. Nos. 173654-765 August 28, 2008

G.R. No. 123498 November 23, 2007

Whether or not BPI can unilaterally freeze franco’s account.

The petition is partly meritorious.

G.R. No. 115324 February 19, 2003

G.R. No. 172820 June 23, 2010

Whether or not there was a misappropriation of the diamond ring

G.R. No. 120262 July 17, 1997

reimbursed obviously pursuant to that policy.

G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007

Whether or not there was complete delivery of the check

G.R. No. 155223 April 4, 2007

Whether or not the loan always bears interest.

G.R. No. 142277 December 11, 2002

G.R. No. 183360 September 8, 2014

The Petition is devoid of merit.

G.R. No. 138677 February 12, 2002

when exceptional circumstances so exist as to warrant it.

ZENAIDA C. ESTONACTOC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019

Whether or not the stipulated interest rate should stand.

G.R. No. 228435

Whether or not the acceleration clause is valid.

The petition is partly meritorious.

G.R. No. 153852 October 24, 2012

Whether or not petitioner is not in default of their obligations

The petitioners fail to convince.

G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003

Petitioner paid the stipulated 3% monthly interest on the P750,000.00 loan,13 amounting to

Whether or not promissory note is a contract of adhesion.

The promissory note in the case at bar is not a contract of adhesion.

G.R. No. 181045 July 2, 2014

The Court grants the Petition.

G.R. No. 195641

Whether or not the obligation of the respondents was a loan or forbearance of money

G.R. No. 164159 July 17, 2007