CIVIL LAW BAR 2019

A.1.
In January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6) month of pregnancy, was crossing a
street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven by Mr. X. As a result, Mrs. A
sustained serious injuries and further, suffered an unintentional abortion. Mrs. A was hospitalized
for two (2) months, during which she incurred P400.000.00 in medical fees. Her expenses were all
duly substantiated by official receipts. During the two (2)-month period of her confinement, she
was unable to report for work and earn any salary, which was established at the rate of
P50,000.00 per month. Mrs. A then filed a civil case for damages against Mr. X.

(a) Based on the case filed by Mrs. A. what is the source of Mr. X’s obligation to her as a result of
his acts? Explain. (2 %)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Mr. X’s obligation arose from a quasi-delict, one of the five sources of obligations
(Art. 1157, Civil Code). The Code also provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done
and such fault or negligence, is called a quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code). Here,
Mr. X, in recklessly driving a car, hit Mrs. A, thereby causing serious injuries and
unintentional abortion to the latter.

(b) May Mrs. A claim actual damages from Mr. X? If so, how much can Mrs. A claim? Explain.
(2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mrs. A can claim actual damages amounting to P500,000. Article 2199 of the
Civil Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
actual or compensatory damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. The medical fees totaling P400,000 were duly substantiated by official
receipts, Article 2200 of the Civil Code also provides that indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain. The rate of her salary was established at P50,000 per month; thus,
her inability to report for work and earn salary for two months entitled her to a total of
P100,000. Mrs. A, therefore, can claim her expenses for medical fees and two months’
worth of salary the total of which is P500.000.

(c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Birth determines
personality. The Court has held that an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, and if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs (Geluz v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Under Art. Il Sec. 12 of
the 1987 Constitution, the State is obliged to protect equally the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. This provision should be applied in favor of the unborn
child, and therefore modifies the Geluz v. Court of Appeals ruling.

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. The Court has held
that a conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Art. 40 of the New Civil Code,
which includes being a recipient of donations under Art. 742 of the New Civil Code, as well
as support. A claim for damages in favor of the unborn child should also prosper
[Quimiguing v. leao, G.R. No. 26795. July 31, 1970].

(d) What must Mrs. A prove if she wants to recover moral damages from Mr. X? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Mrs. A must prove that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
or similar injury. She must also prove that Mr. X’s reckless driving produced the physical
injury in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, without which she would not have suffered the same, that is the reckless
driving is the proximate cause of the injury, Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-
deliets causing physical injuries (Article 2219 of the Civil Code).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Mrs. A must prove the following: (1) that she suffered physical injuries; (2) that Mr.X
committed a culpable act or omission; (3) that the wrongful act or omission of Mr. X is the
proximate cause of the damages she sustained; and (4) that X’s act or omission is either a
criminal offense resulting to physical injuries or a quasi-delict causing physical injuries
(Mendoza v. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014).

(e) Assuming that Mrs. A is awarded actual and moral damages by the trial court, may she also
claim interest if the final and executory judgment award remains unpaid by Mr. X? If so, when
should the interest be reckoned and what is the rate of interest? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mrs. A may also claim interest. The interest should be 6% per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction. The Court held in Nacur vs. Gallery Frames (G. R.
No. 189871, August 13, 2013), interpreting BSP MB Circular No. 799, that when the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be the equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

A.2.
Hand W were married in 1990. H, being a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not heard from her husband, H.

One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since 1995. in consequence. W
diligently pursued all available means to ascertain her husband’s whereabouts, but to no avail.

Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP in 2008 for the death
benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the AFP, despite being cognizant of H’s status,
would not act on the claim, contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a judicial
declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.

In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary? In this case, is the
contention of the AFP, correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary only for the purpose of

contracting a subsequent marriage. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage contracted by a person who had a well-
founded belief that his/her prior spouse who had been absent for four consecutive years
was already dead, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The contention of the AFP is incorrect. The Court has declared that the AFP can
decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first
produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier and the claimant need
only present any “evidence” which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for
such number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. Article 391 of the Civil Code provides that a person in the armed
forces who has taken part in war and has been missing for four years shall be presumed
dead for all purposes. Here, W informed the AFP that her husband had been declared
missing since 1995, 23 years before the filing of her claim in 2018. There is, thus, no need
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death before the AFP can act on the claim of W |
Tadeo-Matias y: Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018).

A.3.
Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes
cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz’s illicit relationship, a
child named C was born. In C’s birth certificate. “Cruz” appears as the child’s surname, although
Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged Cas his child.

In 2018. Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition
in court for parental custody and change or correction of C’s surname in the child’s birth certificate
from “Cruz” to “Reyes,” At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.

(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Mr. Reyes should not be granted custody because C is an illegitimate child, who
shall be under the parental authority of his mother (Article 176, Family Code).

The Family Code provides that children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate (Article 165). In this case, C was conceived and born out of the illicit
relationship of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz who are not married; thus, C is an illegitimate child
of Mr. Reyes. The Court has held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of the child.
The Court has further declared that since the law explicitly confers to the mother sole
parental authority over an illegitimate child, it follows that only if she defaults can the father
assume custody and authority over the minor and that only the most compelling of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else (Briones y
Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004). There is no showing that Ms. Cruz, C’s mother
was unfit to exercise sole parental authority over C; therefore, she cannot be deprived of
C’s custody.

(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C’s surname from “Cruz” to “Reyes”?
Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Mr. Reyes cannot compel the change of surname from “Cruz” to “Reyes”. The
Court has held that Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. The Court further declared that
it is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children; hence, Mr. Reyes cannot validly compel the change or correction
of C’s surname (Grande – Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).

If they are still minors, however, the decision to use the father’s surname may be
exercised for them by their mother pursuant to the latter’s parental authority over
illegitimate children. In this case, the father cannot compel the mother to register the child
under his surname.

A.4.
F. a Filipina, married J. a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3) years, they had a falling out
and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan which was not opposed by
because under Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry. F’s divorce petition
was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.

May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently,
capacitate F to remarry here? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the legal effects of the divorce decree may be recognized in the Philippines, and
consequently, capacitate F to remarry.

In the case of Republic v. Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], the Court held
that under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity
to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Here, F
initiated a divorce petition in Japan and obtained a favorable judgment which capacitated
her Japanese husband to remarry. Applying Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code as
interpreted in Republic v. Manalo, the legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be
recognized in the Philippines which may capacitate F to remarry here.

[Note: The legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines;
however, it may not capacitate her to remarry as a matter of enforcement of said divorce.
Recognition is different from enforcement, the latter being subject to defenses].

A.5.
X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a child, Z.
They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020, When X’s parents found about the news,
they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a gold ring
valued at P250,000.00 which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child. One day, X
and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage plans.

(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it is a void donation. This is an ordinary donation inter vivos, not a donation
proper nuptias. The Civil Code provides that if the value of the personal property donated
exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing;
otherwise, the donation shall be void. A piece of jewelry like the family heirloom here which
is a gold ring, valued at P250,000.00, is a personal property. Here, the acceptance was
made orally; therefore, the donation is void (Article 748).

(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X’s parents revoke the donation on the ground
that the marriage of X with Y did not push through? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, because it is an ordinary donation, not a donation propter nuptias. The ground
that the marriage did not push through may only be raised to revoke donations by reason
of marriage which is defined by Article 126 of the Family Code, as those which are made
before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses (Art. 83, FC). Here, the donation was not made in favor of one or both of the future
spouses, but in favor of their child. X’s parents, therefore, cannot revoke the donation on
the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through.

A.6.
Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following property regimes as enumerated under the
Family Code:

(a) Absolute community of property (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(Any 2 of the 3 may be considered):

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and
the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by
the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall
form part of the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property. (Article 92 of the Family Code)

(b) Conjugal partnership of gains (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(Any 2 of the 4 may be considered):

(1) Property which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) Property which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
 (3) Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with
property belonging to only one of the spouses; and

(4) Property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(Article 109 of the Family Code)

A.7.
Believing that he owned a certain parcel of land and completely unaware of any defect in his title
thereto, Mr. A started to build a house thereon. When Mr. P. the real owner of the land learned of
‘Mr. A’s actions, Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises. However. Mr. A
refused to leave, and instead, asserted that as a builder in good faith, Mr. P is obliged to sell the
land to him.

(a) Is the claim of Mr. A correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Mr. A is not correct. Mr. A who was completely unaware of any defect in his title,
is a builder in good faith. Mr. P who prompted Mr. A’s possession also acted in good faith.
Article 448 applies in this case, which provides that only the owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, has the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity for necessary expenses
and useful expenses where applicable, OR to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent; however, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building
or trees. The law grants said rights to the owner of the land. The builder in good faith, Mr. A
in this case, cannot compel Mr. P, the owner of the land, to choose which right to exercise,
for the option belongs to the owner alone.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No, Mr. A is incorrect. He is a builder in bad faith. When Mr. A started building his
house, he was completely unaware of any defect in his title and therefore, was, at the
outset, a builder in good faith but when Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the
premises before he completed the house, which Mr. A refused to do and he continued
building since he persisted in the belief that his title had no fatal defect, he became a
builder in bad faith. Mr. P, the real owner, who immediately asked him to leave the
premises, acted in good faith. He has by law the option of acquiring the house without
paying for it (Art. 499, Civil Code).

(b) Assuming that Mr. P all the while, know but did not object to Mr. A’s construction of the house
on his property, may Mr. A compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr. P’s bad
faith? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mr. A may compel Mr. P to purchase the improvements, Article 454 of the Civil
Code provides that when the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower
proceeded in good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply. Article 453 of the same
Code provides that it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. Article
447 provides that the owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another,
plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and,
if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any
event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. The landowner, having known and
without opposing the construction made by Mr. A is deemed to have acted in bad faith:
Article 447, therefore, applies and Mr. P shall pay the value of the improvement; i.e., the
value of the materials, plus damages.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Since Mr. A is a builder in bad faith for continuing to build despite being asked to
leave the premises, and Mr. P also acted in bad faith for not objecting to Mr. A’s
construction of his house on his property, they shall be treated to have both acted in good
faith (Article 453 of the Civil Code). The bad faith of Mr. A is neutralized by the bad faith of
Mr. P; thus, Article 448 of the Civil Code shall apply. The two options still belong to Mr. P,
not Mr. A.

A.8.
Mr. E leased a piece of land from Mr. F to be used for his sawmill business for a period of ten (10)
years. Consequently, Mr. E placed heavy machineries there on to be used for his aforementioned
business, with the intention of removing them after the expiration of the lease period.

Are Mr. E’s heavy machineries considered real properties under the Civil Code? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, they are movables. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner thereof in a land or building which is also
owned by him, for an industry or works which may be carried on in a tenement and which
tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or works, but not when so placed by a
tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner, for instance, if the lease contained a stipulation that any
useful improvement which the lessee introduces on the leased property shall pertain to the
lessor at the termination of the lease. Here, the heavy machineries were placed by Mr. E on
a piece of land leased from Mr. F with the intention of removing them after the expiration of
the lease period. Being movable in nature, said machineries were not deemed immobilized
(Davao Saw Mill Co. Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-40411, August 7, 1935).

A.9.
Ms. U is a usufructuary of a piece of land owned by Mr. L. During the existence of the usufruct,
Ms. U introduced various useful improvements on the land. Upon termination of the usufruct, Mr. L
requested Ms. U to remove the said improvements, but Ms. U refused, demanding instead that Mr.
L reimburse her the value of the same.

(a) What is a usufruct? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides (Article
562, Civil Code).

The Court has further declared that a usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply
allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property
of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, (plus, impliedly,
the jus possidendi) with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the
same (Moralidad v. Sps. Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006).

(b) Is Ms. U’s demand proper? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the demand is not proper. The Civil Code provides that the usufructuary may
make on the property held in usufruct any useful improvements, or expenses for mere
pleasure, which he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but
he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements should it be possible to do so without injury to the property (Article 579,
Civil Code).

Ms. U, thus, has no right to be indemnified for any improvements which she might
have made on the land held in usufruct. She may only remove them should it be possible to
do so without injury to the property.

A.10.
Village H and Village L are adjoining residential villages in a mountainous portion of Antipolo City,
Rizal, with Village L being lower in elevation than Village H. In an effort to beautify Village H. its
developer, X, Inc., constructed a clubhouse which included an Olympic-sized swimming pool and
an artificial lagoon on a portion of land overlooking Village L.

During the monsoon season, the continuous heavy rains caused Village H’s swimming pool and
artificial lagoon to overflow, resulting into a massive spillover that damaged various properties in
Village L. Aggrieved, the homeowners of Village L filed a complaint for damages against X, Inc. In
defense, X, Inc. contended that pursuant to the Civil Code, Village L, as the lower estate, was
obliged to receive the waters descending from Village H. the higher estate. Hence, it cannot be
held liable for damages.

Is X. Inc.’s position tenable? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

No, X Inc.’s position is not tenable. The Water Code provides that lower estates are only
obliged to receive waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from
higher estates (Art. 50, Water Code of the Philippines). The Code also provides that the
owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the natural flow.
Therefore, Village L, as the lower estate, was only obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without intervention of man descend from higher estates and not those which
are due to the massive spillover from constructions made by X, Inc. (Article 537 of the Civil
Code).

X, Inc, therefore, is liable for damages.

-END OF PART I –

PART II

B.11.
Mr. R is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Cebu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1234 issued in 1955. Since his acquisition of the lot. Mr. R and his
family had been in continuous, open, and peaceful possession thereof. Mr. R died in 1980,
resulting in the land being transferred in the names of his heirs, i.e., A, B. and C, who became
registered owners thereof as per TCT No. 5678. During the entire time, said land had never been
encumbered or disposed, and that its possession always remained with them.
Sometime in 1999. A, B, and C wanted to build a concrete fence around the parcel of land, but
they were opposed by Mrs. X, who started claiming ownership over the same property on the
strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly entered into by her with Mr. R during the time that
he was still alive, Aggrieved, A, B, and C intend to file a complaint for quieting of title against Mrs.
X.

(a) What are the substantive requisites for the action to prosper? Do they obtain in this case?
Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

For an action to quiet title to prosper, the following requisites must obtain in the
case:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

The requisites for an action to quiet the title obtain in this case, since A, B, and C are
the registered owners of the parcel of land, having inherited the same from their father Mr.
R, and the Deed of Absolute Sale, which cast a cloud on their title may be shown to be
invalid or inoperative (Heirs of Delfin v. Heirs of Bacud, G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016).

(b) Within what period should A, B, and C file the complaint for quieting of title? Explain, (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The action for quieting of title does not prescribe, because the plaintiffs are in
possession of the land [Heirs of Uheras v. CFI, October 30, 1978).

(c) Assuming that B and Care residing abroad, may A. without the knowledge of B and C, file the
complaint for quieting of title on behalf of all the heirs? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, A may file the complaint, provided that he files the same for the co-ownership.
Anyone of the co-owners may bring such an action in ejectment (Article 87 of the Civil
Code), even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all, assuming A wins the case. Parenthetically, if
A loses in the action to quiet title, it will if not affect B and C, because the Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The Court further held that if the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims the possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper (Celino v. Heirs of Alejo, G.R. No. 1618117, July
30, 2004).

B.12.
D, an Overseas Filipino Worker, was on his way home to the Philippines after working for so many
years in the Middle East. He had saved P100,000.00 in his local savings account which he
intended to use to start up a business in his home country. On his flight home, tragedy struck as a
suicide bomber blew up the plane. All the passengers, including D, died. He left behind his
widowed mother M; his common-law wife, W, who is the mother of his twin sons, T and S; and his
brother, B. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives, and no other properties except the money
in his savings account.
Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from D and how much should each receive? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

D’s heirs entitled to inherit from him are:

M (his mother) – P50,000 and T and S (his twin sons) – P25,000 each.

D died intestate and his heirs are the mother (legitimate ascendant) and his twin
sons (illegitimate). The mother gets one-half of his estate and his two illegitimate sons get
the other half (Article 991). W, the common-law wife” is not an heir ab intestato because
she is not a legal spouse. She is merely a partner in a non-marital union.

B.13.
M, single, named his sister N in his will, as a devisee over a certain parcel of land that he owned,
with the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it, upon N’s death, to her illegitimate
daughter O. who was then only a year old.

Is the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death to a valid
case of fideicommissary substitution? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, this is a valid case of fideicommissary substitution. Article 863 of the Civil Code
provides that a fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. First, there
is the absolute obligation imposed upon the fiduciary N to preserve and to transmit to the
fideicommissary the part of the inheritance. Second, O, the fideicommissary, as the
fiduciary’s illegitimate daughter is one degree from the fiduciary. Furthermore, O’s
illegitimate status is of no moment, because Art. 863, referring to the “heir” does not
distinguish between legitimate from illegitimate relationships.

B.14.
Prior to his death, H, married to W, with children X, Y, and Z, executed a holographic will
entirely written, dated, and signed by him. In his will, H instituted W, X, and Y as his heirs, and
consequently, made testamentary dispositions in their favor. H, however, expressly disinherited Z
on the ground that the latter once filed a civil case against him in order to collect a particular sum
of money he previously owed Z.

(a) Was the disinheritance of Z proper? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it is not a proper ground to disinherit. Article 916 of the Civil Code provides that
disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. Article 919 of the same Code provides that the following shall be sufficient
causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate. That Z once filed a civil case against him in order to collect a particular sum of
money he previously owed is not one of the grounds for a valid disinheritance.

(b) Assuming that the disinheritance of Z was improper, how will it affect the institution of heirs and
testamentary dispositions made in II’s will? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Article 918 of the Civil Code provides that disinheritance for a cause which is not one
of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime.

B.15.
Mr. P offered to sell his Manila Polo Club shares to Ms. Q for P2,500,000.00. Ms. Q
accepted on the condition that their agreement will not take effect until after one (1) year. Mr. P
then acceded and both of them shook hands, Excited about the prospect of acquiring Mr. P’s
shares, Ms. Q approached the former and offered to pay him an earnest money equivalent to 1%
of the purchase price, which Mr. P accepted. After one (1) year, Ms. Q approached Mr. P seeking
the enforcement of their agreement for Mr. P to sell his shares to her. Mr. P refused to honor their
agreement, claiming that the same was covered by the Statute of Frauds because it was not
reduced into writing and hence, unenforceable.

Is the position of Mr. P correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the position of P is incorrect. The Statute of Frauds only applies to purely
executory contracts; partial performance removes the contract from the ambit of the
Statute of Frauds and not to partially or completely executed contracts. Article 1482 of the
Civil Code provides that whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. The payment
of earnest money, such as in this case, is tantamount to partial execution of the contract
which precludes the application of the Statute of Frauds. The contract has been partially
performed and a benefit was already accepted when the seller accepted earnest money
from the buyer (Article 1403 (2)(d); Averia v. Averia, G.R. No. 141877. August 13, 2004;
Mactan-Cebu International Aiport Authority v. Tudtud, (2008).

B.16.
C Corp. entered into a contract with D, Inc. for the construction of the latter’s production
warehouse. In consideration thereof, D, Inc. was obliged to pay C Corp. the amount of
P50,000,000.00 within a period of one (1) month from the time of the project’s completion. To
secure the payment of the said sum, D, Inc. entered into a surety agreement with S Company.

After more than a month from the completion date of the project, C Corp. remained unpaid.
Claiming that it was suffering from serious financial reverses, D, Inc. asked C Corp. for an
extension of three (3) months to pay the P50,000,000.00 it still owed, to which C Corp. agreed.
However, after more than three (3) months, D, Inc. still refused to pay. Hence, C Corp, proceeded
to collect the above sum from the surety, S Company.

F or its part, S Company refused the claim and raised the defense that the extension of time
granted by C Corp. to D. Inc. without its consent released it from liability

(a) Will the defense of S Company against the C Corp. claim hold water? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the defense holds. The Court has held that the provisions of the Civil Code on
Guarantee, other than the benefit of excussion, are applicable and available to the surety.
One of the provisions of the Civil Code on Guarantee is Art. 2079 which provides that an
extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor
extinguishes the guaranty. Here, the parties entered into a surety agreement; thus, the
extension granted without the consent of S Company extinguished the suretyship
[Autocorp Group vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 166662, June 27, 2008;
556 SCRA 250].

(b) Assuming that S Company instead refused the claim on the ground that C Corp. has yet to
exhaust D, Inc.’s property to satisfy the claim before proceeding against it, will this defense
prosper? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the defense will not prosper. Art. 2047 provides that if a person binds himself
solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this
Book shall be observed and in such case the contract is called a suretyship. Under Article
2059, the excussion shall not take place if he (the guarantor) has bound himself solidarily
with the debtor, S Company, therefore, cannot refuse the claim on the ground that C Corp.
has yet to exhaust D, Inc.’s property to satisfy the claim before proceeding against it.

B.17.
In 2015, O, the original registered owner of a 300-square meter property covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1234, appointed F as its caretaker. A year after, while was abroad,
F surreptitiously broke open O’s safe and stole the duplicate copy of the said OCT. F then forged a
Deed of Absolute Sale and made it appear that O sold the property to him. Consequently. F was
able to have OCT No. 0-1234 cancelled and in lieu thereof a new title. Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-4321. was issued in his name.

A few months after, F offered the property for sale to X After conducting the required due diligence
to verify the title of F, and finding no occupant in the property during ocular inspection, X signed
the contract of sale, and thereupon, fully paid the purchase price. A few days later, X was able to
obtain TCT No. T 5678 under his name.

When O discovered T’s fraudulent acts upon his return in 2017. O immediately filed a complaint
for reconveyance against F and X, principally pointing out that F merely forged his signature in the
Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly made in F’s favor and thus, F could not have validly transferred
the title thereof to X. Consequently, he sought the return of the subject property to him.

(a) Will the prayer of O for the return of the subject property prosper? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the prayer of O will not prosper, because X purchased the land from an apparent
owner in good faith and for value. Section 53 of P.D. 1529 provides that in all cases of
registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
holder for value of a certificate of title. The Court in the case of Heirs of Abalon v. Andal
(G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014), defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before
receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
(b) Assuming that O could no longer recover the subject property in view of X’s registration thereof
in his name, may a claim against the Assurance Fund pursuant to the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree be instituted? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, a claim against the Assurance Fund may be instituted. Section 95 of P.D. 1529
provides that a person who, without negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land
under the operation of the Torrens system arising after original registration of land,
through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any
certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law
from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be
paid out of the Assurance Fund.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The property is already registered under the name of X, an innocent purchaser for
value. The registration of the innocent purchaser for value’s title is a condition sine qua
non in order to properly claim against the Assurance Fund. This is because it is only after
the registration of the innocent purchaser for value’s title and not the usurper’s title which
constitutes a breach of trust can it be said that the claimant effectively sustains loss or
damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein Manuel v. RD for Legazpi
City, G.R. No. 224678, July 3, 2018].

B.18.
In light of a new business venture, Mr. A entered into a lease contract with Mr. B involving one of
the latter’s warehouses. One day, Mr. B, who was then encountering financial difficulties,
approached Mr. A and sought for a loan, which Mr. A readily granted to him. In order to secure the
loan obligation, Mr. B mortgaged the leased warehouse in favor of Mr. A. In addition, Mr. B
executed a promissory note in favor of A, wherein prior demand was waived by him.

When Mr. B defaulted on his loan obligation. Mr. A simply stopped paying rentals due to Mr. B on
the ground that legal compensation had already set in up to the concurrent amount. Furthermore,
since there was still a balance due on the promissory note, Mr. A foreclosed the real estate
mortgage over Mr. B’s property. without any prior demand furnished to Mr. B.

Aggrieved, Mr. B opposed the foreclosure due to the lack of prior demand, contending that the
waiver of prior demand was stipulated in the promissory note and not in the mortgage instrument.
Mr. B likewise argued that when Mr. A invoked legal compensation between the unpaid rentals
and the loan arrearages, it amounted to a novation that resulted in the extinguishment of the loan
contract between them. As such, the real estate mortgage, being a mere accessory contract to the
principal loan, was necessarily extinguished.

(a) May Mr. A validly claim legal compensation? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mr. A may validly claim legal compensation. The Civil Code provides that when
all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by
operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the
creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation (Article 1290, Civil Code).
 All requisites obtain in this case. For compensation to be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same
time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable,
they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been
stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by
third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor (Article 1279, Civil
Code).

(b) May Mr. A validly foreclose on the real estate mortgage even without prior demand to Mr. B?
Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mr. A may validly foreclose the mortgage. The Court has declared that a
provision on waiver of notice or demand is legal and valid. Although the Civil Code
provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the
fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee (Article 1169), the law expressly provides that
demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is
when the parties expressly waive demand. Since Mr. B waived the requirement of prior
demand in the promissory note, he was considered in delay or in default when he failed to
pay the loan obligation [Sps. Agner, v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 182963,
June 3, 2013; BPI v. CA, 523 Phil. 548 (2006)].

(c) Is Mr. B’s claim of novation correct? Explain, (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER :

No, Mr. B’s claim is incorrect. A novation is express when the new obligation
declares in unequivocal terms that the old obligation is extinguished and it is implied when
the new obligation is incompatible with the old one on every point. The test of
incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together, each one with its own
independent existence. Here there is neither express nor implied novation (Arco Pulp and
Paper Co., Inc. v. Lim, G.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No Mr. B’s claim is incorrect, because there was no new contract entered into
between Mr. A and Mr. B. When there is neither a valid new contract nor a clear agreement
between the parties to a new contract, there is no novation. Without the new contract, the
old contract is not extinguished by novation (Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lugman,
G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011). Besides, legal compensation is another mode of
extinguishment of the obligation different from novation. Here, what took place is partial
legal compensation; hence, Mr. Bis still in default as to the unpaid loan arrearages.

B.19.
Mr. A entered into a lease contract covering one of his commercial buildings with XYZ Company, a
partnership composed of X, Y, and Z, as lessee, for use as an office space. Upon failure to receive
the rental payments when they fell due, Mr. A immediately sought payment of the same from X, Y,
and Z, asserting that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the partnership for its
debts.
X, Y, and Z disagreed with Mr. A’s contention, arguing further that in any event, rentals should not
be paid up until Mr. A makes the necessary arrangements for the repair of the defective electrical
wirings in the office that caused power outages and hence, made it difficult, if not impossible, for
them to conduct their usual business operations.

Rule on the parties’ respective arguments. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Mr. A’s contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership for partnership debts is untenable. Article 1768 of the Code provides that the
partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners. Article 1816 of the Civil Code further provides that all partners, including
industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their property and after all the partnership
assets have been exhausted, for the contracts which may be entered into in the name and
for the account of the partnership, under its signature and by a person authorized to act for
the partnership,

The contention of X, Y, Z that the rentals should not be paid up until Mr. A. makes the
necessary arrangements for the repair of the defective electrical wirings in the office that
caused power outages is correct. Article 1658 of the Civil Code provides that the lessee
may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs
or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased.
Repair of defective electrical wirings are necessary repairs.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Mr. A’s contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership for partnership debts is untenable. X, Y, Z are not the real parties in interest
against whom a claim for payment of the unpaid lease rentals may be made. According to
the Court in the case of Saludo, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank (G.R. No. 193138, August 20,
2018], the general rule under Article 1816 of the Civil Code is that partnership assets are
primarily liable for the contracts entered into in the name of the partnership and by a
person authorized to act on its behalf. All partners – in this case, X, Y, and Z – are only
liable pro rata with all their property after all the partnership assets have been exhausted.
This is because it is the partnership, an entity possessing of a juridical personality
separate from its partners, that entered into the contract of lease. Said partnership has
concomitant rights and obligations with respect to the transactions it enters into for which
the partners may not be made liable:

B.20.
Distinguish the following:
(a) Contract of sale and contract to sell (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER 1:

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional (Art. 1458 (2), Civil Code). A
contract to sell is a kind of conditional sale.

In an absolute sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold. In both contracts to sell and contracts of conditional sale, title to the property
remains with the seller despite delivery. Both contracts are subject to the positive
suspensive condition of the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price or the fulfillment of
the condition.
SUGGESTED ANSWER 2:

In an absolute sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold.

In a contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the property
upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is “by operation of law
without any further act having to be performed by the seller.”

In a contract to sell, transfer of title to the prospective buyer is not automatic. “The
prospective seller (must) convey title to the property [through a deed of conditional sale
(Olivarez Realty Corporation And Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez V. Benjamin Castillo, G.R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014).

(b) Interruption and tolling of prescription of actions (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means

that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand [Overseas Bank
of Manila v. Geraldez, 94 SCRA 937 (1979)]

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the “prescription of actions is
interrupted” inter alia, “when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.” This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such a
written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have
already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered
inefficacious. The effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the
obligation, to make prescription run again from the date of the interruption. [Philippine
National Railway’s vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 740 (1989)]

In Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez, the Supreme Court ruled that tolling merely
suspends the period that has already elapsed.

– END OF PART II –
CIVIL LAW 2018

I.
Sidley and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and Sonia were another
couple with one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in the same plane accident. Sidley
and Sonia met when the families of those who died sued the airlines and went through grief-
counseling sessions. Years later, Sidley and Sonia got married. At that time, Solenn was four (4)
years old and Sonny was 5 years old. These two (2) were then brought up in the same household.
Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and Sonny developed romantic feelings towards each other, and
eventually eloped. On their own and against their parents’ wishes, they procured a marriage
license and got married in church.

(a) Is the marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, voidable, or void? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage is voidable for lack of parental consent. At the time of their marriage,
Solenn and Sonny were only 19 and 20 years old, respectively. Assuming their marriage
was under the Family Code, Article 14 provides that parental consent is required where
either or both of the parties are between 18 and 21 years old at the time of marriage.

In the absence of such parental consent, Article 45 of the Family Code provides that
the marriage is voidable. Since the marriage was against their parents’ wishes, their
marriage is voidable. Unlike in the Civil Code, their being step-siblings is immaterial under
the Family Code and will not render the marriage void since such is not considered
incestuous nor against public policy.

(b) If the marriage is defective, can the marriage be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it can be ratified by free cohabitation. Article 45(1) of the Family Code provides
that such voidable marriage may be ratified by free cohabitation of the party/ies over 18
years old but below 21 who married without the consent of his/her parents, by living
together as husband and wife after attaining the age of 21.
 Here, Solenn and Sonny freely cohabitated and lived as husband and wife after
attaining 21 years, then the marriage is considered ratified, provided that the parents have
not filed an action for annulment before the parties reached 21 years old.

II
After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four months pregnant, Sancho married Sandy. Both
were single and had never been in any serious relationship in the past. Prior to the marriage, they
agreed in a marriage settlement that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage. Shortly after the marriage, their daughter, Shalimar, was born.

Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on installment, under a
Contract of Sale, with the full purchase price payable in equal annual amortizations over a period
of ten (10) years, with no down payment, and secured by a mortgage on the land. The full
purchase price was Php 1million, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. After paying the fourth
(4th) annual installment, Sancho and Sandy got married, and Sancho completed the payments in
the subsequent years from his salary as an accountant. The previous payments were also paid out
of his salary. During their marriage, Sandy also won Php 1 million in the lottery and used it to
purchase jewelry. When things didn’t work out for the couple, they filed an action for declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on the psychological incapacity of both of them. When the petition
was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by Sandy were found to be the only
properties of the couple.

(a) What is the filiation status of Shalimar? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Shalimar is a legitimate child. Children conceived or born before the judgment of

absolute nullity of the marriage because of psychological incapacity under Article 36 has
become final and executory shall beconsidered legitimate (Article 54, Family Code). Since
Shalimar was born before the judgment granting the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of Sancho and Sandy under Art. 36 became final and executory.
Shalimar is a legitimate child.

(b) What system of property relationship will be liquidated following the declaration of nullity of
their marriage? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The property regime that will be liquidated is co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Family Code. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article 147,
Family Code). Sancho and Sandy were capacitated to marry each other; however, their
marriage was declared void under Article 36.

(c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Sancho should get the parcel of land while Sandy should get the jewelry. According
to Article 147 of the Family Code, property acquired through their work or industry by a
man and a woman, who are capacitated to marry each other and who cohabited under a
void marriage, shall be governed by rules on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to
the contrary, properties acquired while they live together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

In the given case, Sancho bought the parcel of land and paid for it using his salary
while Sandy used her winnings from the lottery to purchase the jewelry.

It was not established that Sandy cared for or maintained the family; hence, she
should not be deemed to have contributed to the acquisition of the parcel of land. The
jewelry was acquired by Sandy using her lottery winnings which she obtained not by work
or industry but by chance.

(d) Is Shalimar entitled to payment of presumptive legitime? If yes, how much should be her share
and from where should this be taken? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Shalimar is not entitled to presumptive legitime. The liquidation of the co-
ownership under Article 147 did not provide for the obligation to pay the presumptive
legitime of the common children. Said obligation applies only to the liquidation of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code, which provisions are inapplicable to a void marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the parties should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership [Dino v. Dino, 640
SCRA 178 (2011); Valdes v. RTC, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)].

III
Silverio was a woman trapped in a man’s body. He was born male and his birth certificate
indicated his gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he reached the age of 21, he
had a sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, and, from then on, he lived as a female. On the basis
of his sex reassignment, he filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his
gender, to female. While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, he
met Sharon Ston, who also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her
gender, from female to male.

Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia (“CAH”) which is a
condition where a person possesses both male and female characteristics. At puberty, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual
development. Alleging that for all intents and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had
become a male, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender should be
changed from female to male, and that her first name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff.

Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their marriage will be frowned
upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA where they got married based on the
law of the place of celebration of the marriage. They, however, kept their Philippine citizenship.

(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for correction of entries in his
birth certificate? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, there is no legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition. As settled in
the case of Silverio v. Republic (G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007), our laws do not
sanction change of name and correction of entry in the civil register as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment. Sex reassignment is not one of the grounds for which change
of first name may be allowed under Republic Act No. 9048. The petition for correction of
entry as to sex of the birth certificate of Silverio cannot prosper, because the said
document contained no error and it cannot be corrected. Silverio was born a male. The sex
of a person is determined at birth. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.

(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon’s petition? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, my answer will not be the same. In the case of Republic v. Cagandahan (G.R.
166676, September 12, 2008), the Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sharon is considered an intersex, because he has CAH, which means that she has the
biological characteristics of both male and female. Based on that case, Sharon’s petition
should be granted since he has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. The change of name
should also be granted considering that it merely recognizes Sharon’s preferred gender.
(c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally recognized as valid in the
Philippines? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it cannot be legally recognized as valid. Laws relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad (Article 15, Civil Code). One of the requisites of a marriage is that the
contracting parties must be a male and a female (Article 2, Family Code). Since Silverio and
Sharon are Filipino citizens their status, condition and legal capacity is determined by
Philippine law, their marriage abroad is not a valid marriage under Philippine law, because
both contracting parties are males.

IV

Severino died intestate, survived by his wife Saturnina, and legitimate children Soler, Sulpicio,
Segundo and the twins Sandro and Sandra. At the time of his death, the twins were only 11 years
of age, while all the older children were of age. He left only one property: a 5,000 sq. m. parcel of
land. After his death, the older siblings Soler, Sulpicio, and Segundo sold the land to Dr. Santos
for PhP500,000 with a right to repurchase, at the same price, within five (5) years from the date of
the sale. The deed of sale was signed only by the three (3) older siblings and covered the entire
property. Before the five (5) years expired, Soler and Sulpicio tendered their respective shares of
PhP166,666 each to redeem the property. Since Segundo did not have the means because he
was still unemployed, Saturnina paid the remaining PhP166,666 to redeem the property. After the
property was redeemed from Dr. Santos, the three (3) older children and Saturnina, for herself and
on behalf of the twins who were still minors, sold the property to Dr. Sazon, in an absolute sale, for
PhP1 million. In representing the twins, Saturnina relied on the fact that she was the natural
guardian of her minor children.

(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase, valid? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the sale is valid but only with respect to the shares pertaining to Soler, Sulpicio
and Segundo. Upon Severino’s death, his heirs became the co-owners of the only property
he left since the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). In a co-ownership, each co-owner may alienate his part
but the effect of the alienation with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to the co-owner who alienated his share (Article 493, Civil Code). The
repurchase by Soler and Sulpicio was valid up to their respective shares. The repurchase
of Segundo’s share did not make Saturnina the owner of the share redeemed although she
is entitled to reimbursement.

(b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their share after they reach the
age of majority? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The second sale was valid only as to the aliquot shares of Saturnina and of the three
older siblings. Under Article 225 of the Family Code, the father and the mother shall jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without
the necessity of a court appointment. This guardianship, however, only extends to powers
of administration over the property of the child, and does not include the power to alienate,
which is an act of strict dominion. Saturnina had no authority to sell the twins’ property,
and the sale to that extent is unenforceable. Since it is already unenforceable, the twins do
not need to redeem the property upon reaching the age of majority. (The sale is null and
void)

V
Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a 25-year old son, Santino
(whom she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to her death since he attempted to kill her at
that time), and a 20-year-old daughter, Sara. She left an estate worth PhP 8 million and a will
which contained only one provision: that PhP1 million should be given to “the priest who officiated
at my wedding to my children’s late father.” Sara, together with two (2) of her friends, acted as an
attesting witness to the will.

On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no debts, divide the
estate and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the amount that each of them will inherit,
and where (i.e., legitime/free portion/intestate share) their shares should be charged. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Santino and Sara are entitled to P3.5 Million each while the priest who officiated at the wedding of
Sol to her children’s father is entitled to receive P1 Million as legacy from the free portion of the
Sol’s estate. 2 Million out of the 3.5 Million comes from their legitime, while the remaining 1.5
Million is from the free portion.
Santino is not disqualified to inherit from her mother, because an attempt against the life of the
decedent is a cause for unworthiness of an heir only if there is a final judgment of conviction
(Article 1032, Civil Code). The given facts do not mention that Santino was convicted of an attempt
against the life of Sol.
Sara is also capacitated to inherit from Sol. The statement found in Article 1027 of the Civil Code
that an attesting witness to the execution of a will shall be incapable of succeeding is qualified by
Article 823, Civil Code, which provides that the devise or legacy in favor of a person who is an
attesting witness to the execution to the will shall be void. Sara is not a devisee or legatee under
Sol’s will. She is an intestate and compulsory heir.
The priest is also capable of succeeding as a legatee, because under Article 1027, Civil Code only
the priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness and his relatives within
the fourth degree and the church to which he belongs are disqualified from inheriting from the
decedent by will. The priest only officiated the wedding of the decedent.
VI
Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from their
grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income from his inherited land, so he
asked a local contractor to build a row of apartments on his property which he could rent out. The
contractor sent him the plans and Sammy noticed that the construction encroached on a part of
Santi’s land but he said nothing and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by
the local contractor. Santi, based locally, and who loved his cousin dearly, did not object even if he
knew of the encroachment since he was privy to the plans and visited the property regularly. Later,
the cousins had a falling out and Santi demanded that the portion of the apartments that
encroached on his land be demolished.
Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the demolition.
Since the builder and the landowner both acted in bad faith, their rights shall be the same as
though both had acted in good faith (Article 453, Civil Code). Sammy is not a builder in good faith
with respect to the portion of the apartment encroaching on Santi’s property, because he knew
that he was not the owner of the land when he built the apartment. There is bad faith, likewise, on
Santi’s part, because he did not object to the construction although he had knowledge thereof
(Article 453, Civil Code).
In cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith, the landowner does not
have the option to demand the demolition of the work (Article 448, Civil Code).
VII

Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained unmarried
and devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and two (2) nieces: Socrates, Saffinia, and
Sophia. She wrote a will giving all her properties remaining upon her death to the three (3) of
them. The will was admitted to probate during her lifetime. Later, she decided to make a new will
giving all her remaining properties only to the two (2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia. She then tore up
the previously probated will. The second will was presented for probate only after her death.
However, the probate court found the second will to be void for failure to comply with formal
requirements.
(a) Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the said doctrine will not apply.
In the case of Molo v. Molo (G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951), the court stated that the
doctrine of relative revocation is a rule where revocation of the old will is a suspensive condition or
depends upon the efficacy of the new disposition, and if the new will intended as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in force. This was applied based on
the fact that the original will appears to be lost; hence, the second will was executed with a
revocatoty clause, but in both instances, the wife was instituted as the universal heir.
In this case, however, the revocation of the original was not through the execution of a subsequent
will with a revocatory clause, but through destruction with intent to do so. It does not appear either
that the revocation of the old will operates as a suspensive condition to the efficacy of the
subsequent will, because the testator revoked the 1st original will, as she does not wish to institute
the same heirs, unlike in Molo v. Molo where the wife was the heir in both wills.
(b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid but both Saffinia and
Sophia renounce their inheritance? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, my answer will be the same. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not apply
where the the new will is rendered ineffective due to the renunciation of the heirs instituted therein.
Renunciation has nothing to do with the validity of the will, but only pertains to whether or not the
heirs accept their share in the inheritance. Since the new will is still valid, the doctrine does not
apply (Article 832, Civil Code).
VIII
Sofronio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with Sabrina, resulting in her
pregnancy and the birth of their son Sinforoso. Though his wife knew nothing of the affair, Sofronio
regretted it, but secretly provided child support for Sinforoso. Unfortunately, when Sinforoso was
10 years old, Sofronio died. Only Sofronio’s father, Salumbides, knew of Sabrina and Sinforoso.
For the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso, Salumbides gave Sabrina usufructruary rights
over one of his properties — a house and lot — to last until Sinforoso reaches the age of majority.
Sabrina was given possession of the property on the basis of caucion juratoria. Two (2) years after
the creation of the usufruct, the house accidentally burned down, and three (3) years thereafter,
Sinforoso died before he could reach the age of 18.
Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it continue after Sinforoso’s
death? (2.5 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the usufruct will continue after the house was burned. If the usufruct is constituted on
immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter should be destroyed in any
manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the materials
(Article 607, Civil Code). The usufruct over the land and the materials continues. The thing was
lost only in part, the right continues on the remaining parts (Article 604, Civil Code).
No, it will be extinguished after Sinforoso’s death. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if
the third person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly
granted only in consideration of the existence of such person or contrary intention clearly appears
(Article 603, 606, Civil Code). The circumstances given show that the usufruct was established by
Salumbides in consideration of the existence of Sinfroso. It was meant for his support; hence, his
death extinguished the usufruct even though he died before reaching the age of majority.
IX

Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel for their wedding reception. The
couple was so unhappy with the service, claiming, among other things, that there was an
unreasonable delay in the service of dinner and that certain items promised were unavailable. The
hotel claims that, while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by
the sudden increase of guests to 450 from the guaranteed expected number of 350, as stated in
the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract.
In the action for damages for breach of contract instituted by the couple, they claimed that the
Banquet and Meeting Services Contract was a contract of adhesion since they only provided the
number of guests and chose the menu. On the other hand, the hotel’s defense was that the
proximate cause of the complainant’s injury was the unexpected increase in their guests, and this
was what set the chain of events that resulted in the alleged inconveniences.
(a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the doctrine does not apply. In the case of Spouses Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la Hotel (G.R.
No. 190601, September 7, 2011), the doctrine of proximate cause, is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Where, however,
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
make law between them.
Here, there is a contract, the terms and conditions of such contract will govern the rights and
obligations between the contracting parties in case of breach thereof, not the doctrine of proximate
cause.
(b) Was the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract a contract of adhesion? If yes, is the contract
void? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is a contract of adhesion, but the same is not void.
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of
contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. Here, the
contract is ready-made by Sangria, as the spouses only chose the menu and provided the number
of guests but they cannot modify the terms thereof; hence, a contract of adhesion.
Although a contract of adhesion, it is not entirely against the law and is as binding as ordinary
contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely,
but the effect, as ruled in Orient Air v. CA (G.R. No. 76931, May 29, 1991), is that in case of
ambiguity it is
construed against the party who caused it to be drafted and could have avoided it by the exercise
of a little more care.
X

Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to another. The relationship
produced a daughter Sabina, who grew up with her mother. For most parts of Sabina’s youth,
Steffi spent for her support and education. When Sabina was 21 years old, Sinclair’s wife of many
years died. Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day prayers
for Sinclair’s late wife, Sinclair and Steffi got married without a marriage license, claiming that they
have been cohabiting for the last 20 years.
After graduating from college, Sabina decided to enroll in law school. Sinclair said that he was not
willing to pay for her school fees since she was no longer a minor. Sinclair claimed that if Sabina
wanted to be a lawyer, she had to work and spend for her law education.
(a) What is Sabina’s filiation status? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was conceived and born outside a
valid marriage (Article 165, Family Code). She was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage
between Sinclair and Steffi. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who,
at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated (Art. 177, Family Code). At the time of Sabina’s conception, her parents
were disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, because Sinclair was married to
someone else.
(b) Is Sinclair legally required to finance Sabina’s law education? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he is legally required to finance Sabina’s education. Support comprises everything
indispensable for education among other things in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported shall include his schooling or training for
some profession even beyond the age of majority (Art. 194, Family Code). Parents and their
illegitimate children are obliged to support each other (Article 195,
Family Code). Considering the foregoing rules, Sinclair is enjoined by law to finance Sabrina’s law
education even beyond the age of majority.
XI

Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for the amount of PhP 1
million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed to pay for all prior unpaid utility bills
incurred by the sole proprietorship. A month after the Contract to Sell was executed, Samantha
still had not paid the PhP 50,000 electricity bills incurred prior to the sale.
Since Sergio could not operate the business without electricity and the utility company refused to
restore electricity services unless the unpaid bills were settled in full, Sergio had to pay the unpaid
electricity bills. When the date for payment arrived, Sergio only tendered PhP 950,000
representing the full purchase price, less the amount he paid for the unpaid utility bills. Samantha
refused to accept the tender on the ground that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and
Sergio did not have authorization to pay on her behalf.
(a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge and consent of
Samantha? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The payment by Sergio resulted in the extinguishment of the obligation of Samantha to the utility
company and Sergio was legal subrogated to the utility company’s credit. Sergio, thus, became
Samantha’s new creditor.
Under Article 1302 (3), Civil Code, it is presumed that there is legal subrogation when, even
without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation pays,
without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter’s share. A person interested in the
fulfillment is one who will benefit from the extinguishment of the obligation.
Here, Sergio is an interested person since he was the business successor-in-interest of the
Samantha and he cannot conduct his business without paying the debtor of Samantha. Since
there is legal subrogation, Sergio stepped into the shoes of the utility company as the new creditor
to the P50,000 credit; thus there can be valid partially legal compensation of the two credits
between him and Samantha who are principally debtors and creditors of each other up to the
concurrent amount of P50,000 (Art. 1279, NCC).
(b) Is Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi.
The requisites for mora accipiendi are: (i) offer of performance by the debtor; (ii) offer must be to
comply with prestation as it should be performed; and (iii) the creditor refuses to accept the
performance without just cause.
Here, Sergio validly made an offer to comply with the prestation of payment, albeit for P950,000
only. Sergio’s offer is justified based on the concept of partial legal compensation up to the amount
of P50,000, since Sergio and Samantha are in their own right principal debtors and creditors of
each other. Samantha’s refusal was without just cause as she cannot be permitted to benefit or
use as a defense her own failure to fulfill her part of the obligation to pay the electricity bills.
XII

Saachi opened a savings bank account with Shanghainese Bank. He made an initial deposit of
PhP100,000. Part of the bank opening forms that he was required to sign when he opened the
account was a Holdout Agreement which provided that should he incur any liability or obligation to
the bank, the bank shall have the right to immediately and automatically take over his savings
account deposit. After he opened his deposit account, the Shanghainese Bank discovered a scam
wherein the funds in the account of another depositor in the bank was withdrawn by an impostor.
Shanghainese Bank suspected Saachi to be the impostor, and filed a criminal case of estafa
against him. While the case was still pending with the Prosecutor’s office, the bank took over
Saachi’s savings deposit on the basis of the Holdout Agreement.
(a) What kind of contract is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank?
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A contract of simple loan is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank. Fixed,
savings and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code]. The creditor is the depositor, while
the debtor is the bank.

(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit. In the case of Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosales (G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014), it was held that the “Hold Out”
clause, which was similar to the Holdout Agreement in the instant case, can be invoked only if
there was a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated
in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi- delict.
The only possible source of obligation of Saachi to Shanghainese Bank based on the given facts
is delict. As the criminal case filed by the bank against Saachi was still pending and no final
judgment of conviction has been rendered, Saachi had no valid and existing obligation to the bank;
thus, the bank had no right to take over the deposits of Saachi.
XIII

Sonny Inc., (SI) purchased several heavy machineries from Single Equipment Philippines, Inc.
(SEP) for PhP 10 million, payable in 36 monthly installments. A chattel mortgage was constituted
on the same machineries as security for the amount. As additional security, the President of SI,
Stan Smith, mortgaged his personal house and lot. SI failed to pay the 16th and succeeding
monthly installments. SEP then commenced a collection suit against SI, and in the course of the
proceedings, a writ of attachment was issued against SI’s properties, including the mortgaged
machineries. The attached properties were subsequently sold at public action, but the proceeds
thereof were insufficient to satisfy the judgment credit.
(a) Can SEP legally recover the deficiency? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, SEP can legally recover the deficiency. The prohibition against further collection under Article
1484 of the Civil Code, or the Recto Law, only applies if the seller chooses to foreclose the chattel
mortgage and not when the seller opts to exact the fulfilment of the obligation (Tajanlangit v.
Southern Motors, G.R. 10789, May 28, 1957). SEP chose to exact the
fulfillment of the obligation by commencing a collection suit against SI. SEP did not opt to
foreclose the chattel mortgage over the equipment. The machineries were sold in an execution
sale and not in a foreclosure sale; hence, the prohibition against further collection does not apply.
(b) Instead of collecting the deficiency, can SEP commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose
the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot in order to recover the deficiency? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, SEP can commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage. SEP may choose to
foreclose the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot. What SEP is prohibited to do, based on the case
of Cruz v. Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation (G.R. No. L-24772, May 27, 1968), is to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after it has extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage on
the machineries sold on instalment, because if such is allowed, the protection given by Article
1484 would be indirectly subverted, and public policy overturned. In this case, SEP has not
foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the machineries.
XIV

Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the adjoining Lot
B. Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of Lot B. Since Socorro
was allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that supported the adjoining property,
Segunda caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 50 sq. m. on Lot A’s Transfer
Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a legal easement.
(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, a legal easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. According to Article 684 of the Civil
Code, no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. In the given case, an easement of lateral and
subjacent support exists in the property of Soccoro in favor of the property of Segunda.
In the case of Castro v. Monsod, (G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011) in which the situation of the
properties of the two landowners were similar to that in the given problem, the Supreme Court held
that an easement existed in favor of the property of higher elevation, because it was the owner of
the said property which sued to have the easement recognized. Such finding, however, does not
mean that no similar easement exists in favor of the property of lower elevation, since Article 684
does not make a distinction as to the elevation of the property.
(b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the
servient estate proper? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential
Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486,
Feruary 2, 2011). Segunda is not claiming ownership over the property of Socorro. She only
wanted a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement. According to the Supreme Court in
the cited case, an annotation of the existence of the lateral and subjacent support is no longer
necessary, because it exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property.
A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including
her successors-in-interest.
XV

Simon owned a townhouse that he rented out to Shannon, a flight attendant with Soleil Philippine
Airlines (SPA). They had no written contract but merely agreed on a three (3)-year lease. Shannon
had been using the townhouse as her base in Manila and had been paying rentals for more than a
year when she accepted a better job offer from Sing Airlines. This meant that Singapore was going
to be her new base and so she decided, without informing Simon, to sublease the townhouse to
Sylvia, an office clerk in SPA.
(a) Can Simon compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Simon can compel Shannon to reduce the agreement into writing. While an agreement for
the leasing of real property for a longer period than one year is covered by the Statute of Frauds,
thus, requiring a written memorandum of its essential provisions under Article 1403, Civil Code.
According to Article 1406 of the Civil Code, the parties may only avail themselves of the right
under Article 1357 of the Civil Code if the contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The
contract was taken out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of Part
Performance.
Under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe the
form of contract required by law.
(b) Does the sublease without Simon’s knowledge and consent constitute a ground for terminating
the lease? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it does not constitute a ground for terminating the lease. In the contract of lease of things, if
there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
sublet the thing leased (Article 1650, Civil Code). In this contract, there appears to be no
prohibition regarding subleasing; thus, there is no violation of the contract which can be used as a
ground for terminating the contract. The act of a lessee in subleasing the thing without notifying
the lessor leased is not one of the causes for which the lessor may terminate the lease and
judicially eject the lessee (Article 1673, Civil Code).
XVI

Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to Suri. She then left to
work as a caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents in the Philippines. Selena, now 34
years old and a permanent resident in Canada, met and married Sam who is a 24-year old
Canadian citizen who works as a movie star in Canada. Sam’s parents are of Filipino ancestry but
had become Canadian citizens before Sam was born. Wanting Suri to have all the advantages of
a legitimate child, Selena and Sam decided to adopt her. Sam’s parents, already opposed to the
marriage of their son to someone significantly older, vehemently objected to the adoption. They
argued that Sam was not old enough and that the requisite age gap required by the Inter-Country
Adoption Act between Sam as adopter and Suri as adoptee was not met.
Are Sam’s parents correct? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Sam’s parents are incorrect. Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995, the requirement that the adopter must be at least twenty-seven years of age
and at least sixteen years older than the adoptee does not apply if the adopter is the spouse of the
parent by nature of the adoptee. Since, Sam is the spouse of Selena, who is the parent by nature
of Suri, Sam may adopt Suri even if he is below twenty-seven years of age and is not at least
sixteen years older than the adoptee. [NOTE: The Inter-Country Adpotion Act of 1995 requires that
only a child who is below 15 years of age and is voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department of Social Work and Services (DSWD) may be adopted under the inter-country
adoption law, and the adopter must be at least 27 years of age and at least 16 years older than
the child to be adopted at the time of application unless the adopter is the natural parent of the
child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent.
XVII
Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the Philippines and begot
three children. While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with the children, Semuel went abroad to work
and became a naturalized German citizen. He met someone in Germany whom he wanted to
marry. Semuel thereafter came home and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
partition of the common properties acquired during his union with Sofia in the Philippines. The
properties acquired during the union consisted of a house and lot in Cavite worth PhP 2 million,
and some personal properties, including cash in bank amounting to PhP 1 million. All these
properties were acquired using Semuel’s salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home
mother. In retaliation, Sofia filed an action, on behalf of their minor children, for support.
(a) How should the properties be partitioned? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The properties should be divided equally between Sofia and Semuel. The property relations of
Sofia and Semuel is governed by Article 147 of the Civil Code, because they lived exclusively with
each other as husband and wife and they were capacitated to marry each other. Under the said
provision, the wages and salaries of Sofia and Semuel shall be owned by them in equal shares;
hence, the cash in the bank from Semuel’s salaries and wages is co-owned by Semuel and Sofia
in equal shares. Article 147 also provides that the property acquired by the partners through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired during the cohabitation shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 provides further that if the efforts of one of the parties consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household, he or she is deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition of the property even if he or she did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of the said property. Sofia, as a stay-at-home mother, cared for and maintained the family,
consequently, she is deemed to have contributed in the acquisition of the house and lot. As co-
owner, Sofia is entitled to one-half of the property.
(b) Should Semuel be required to support the minor children? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Yes, Semuel should be required to support the minor children. Parents and their illegitimate
children are obliged to support each other (Article 195, Family Code). Semuel is required to
support his illegitimate children with Sofia. The children are illegitimate, because they were
conceived and born outside a valid marriage [Article 165, Family Code].
XVIII

Shasha purchased an airline ticket from Sea Airlines (SAL) covering Manila-Bangkok-Hanoi-
Manila. The ticket was exclusively endorsable to Siam Airlines (SMA). The contract of air
transportation was between Shasha and SAL, with the latter endorsing to SMA the Hanoi-Manila
segment of the journey. All her flights were confirmed by SAL before she left Manila. Shasha took
the flight from Manila to Bangkok on board SAL using the ticket. When she arrived in Bangkok,
she went to the SAL ticket counter and confirmed her return trip from Hanoi to Manila on board
SMA Flight No. SA 888. On the date of her return trip, she checked in for SMA Flight No. SA 888,
boarded the plane, and before she could even settle in on her assigned seat, she was off-loaded
and treated rudely by the crew. She lost her luggage and missed an important business meeting.
She thereafter filed a complaint solely against SAL and argued that it was solidarily liable with
SMA for the damages she suffered since the latter was only an agent of the former.
(a) Should either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that Shasha suffered? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only SAL should be held liable for damages.
This case has the same factual milieu with that of China Airlines v. Daniel Chiok (G.R. No.
152122, July 30, 2003), where the court cited British Airways v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
121824 January 29, 1998), ruling that as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner was
held liable even when the breach of contract had occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of
another airline. It also cited Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83612,
November 24, 1994), in which the Court held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline
remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the
passengers to one of their destinations.
In this case, since the contract of air transportation is between Shasha and SAL, the latter as
principal remains liable as the principal despite the fact that the breach occurred in SMA. SMA
cannot be held liable in this case, because the court has no jurisdiction over it. It is imperative and
in accordance with due process and fair play that SMA should have been impleaded as a party in
the present proceedings before this Court can make a final ruling on this matter.
(b) Assuming that one is an agent of the other, is the agency coupled with interest? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the agency was constituted as a means of fulfilling an obligation which had already been
contracted and also a bilateral contract depends upon the agency [Article 1927, Civil Code]. In the
case of Philex Mining v. CIR, (G.R. No. 148187, April 16, 2008) the Court defined an agency
coupled with an interest as one that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an
interest of a third party that depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both principal and agent.
Here, since the ticket is exclusively endorsable to the agent, SAM, then it has a mutual interest
with the principal, SAL, in the fulfillment of the obligation.
XIX

Sebastian, who has a pending assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), was
required to post a bond. He entered into an agreement with Solid Surety Company (SSC) for SSC
to issue a bond in favor of the BIR to secure payment of his taxes, if found to be due. In
consideration of the issuance of the bond, he executed an Indemnity Agreement with SSC
whereby he agreed to indemnify the latter in the event that he was found liable to pay the tax.
The BIR eventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially commenced action against both
Sebastian and SSC to recover Sebastian’s unpaid taxes. Simultaneously, BIR also initiated action
to foreclose on the bond. Even before paying the BIR, SSC sought indemnity from Sebastian on
the basis of the Indemnity Agreement. Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR
anything yet, and alleged that the provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed SSC to
recover from him, by mere demand, even if it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was void for
being contrary to law and public policy.
Can Sebastian legally refuse to pay SSC? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Sebastian cannot legally refuse to pay. A stipulation in an indemnity agreement providing that
the indemnitor shall pay the surety as soon as the latter becomes liable to make payment to the
creditor under the terms of the bond, regardless of whether the surety has made payment actually
or not, is valid and enforceable; in accordance therewith, the surety may demand from the
indemnitor even before the creditor has paid [Security Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. Globe
Assurance Co., Inc., (58 OG 3708, 1962)]. Under the terms of the contract, Sebastian’s obligation
to indemnify became due and demandable from the moment he has incurred liability and not from
the moment of payment.
XX

Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with his parents in Sariaya, Quezon. He
boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013. In the middle of the
journey, the bus collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction, which was overtaking the
vehicle in front of the truck. Though the driver of the SBL bus tried to avoid the truck, a mishap
occurred as the truck hit the left side of the bus. As a result of the accident, Simeon suffered a
fractured leg and was unable to report for work for one week. He sued SBL for actual and moral
damages. SBL raised the defense that it was the driver of the truck who was at fault, and that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
(a) Is SBL liable for actual damages? Moral damages? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on what the source of obligation the action is based.
If based on contract, SBL will be liable for actual damages, but not moral damages. As a common
carrier, SBL is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and the law expressly provides that its
liability does not cease upon proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting and supervising its driver. It is not liable, however, for moral damages as Art. 2220
requires it to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, which is not provided by the facts.
If the action, however, is anchored under quasi-delict, SBL will be liable for actual and moral
damages. As a common carrier, it is required to exercise extraordinary diligence. Moral damages
also may be awarded under Article 2219 if the plaintiff suffered physical injuries as a result of a
quasi-delictual act.