Assignment on

Decentralization of Administration
in Bangladesh

Submitted By

 GPP 01 Khondoker Md. Nazmul Huda Shamim

 GPP 03 Md. Mizanur Rahman

 GPP 04 Mainuddin Ahmed

 IER 01 Md. Golam Mostafa
 IER 02 Mashuda Amatullah
 IER 05 Md. Abdul Mannan
 IER 06 Md. Sarwar Hossain

Fundamentals of Political Science and Public Administration

Master of Public Affairs

Civil Service College, Dhaka

Dhaka, Bangladesh

May 09, 2011

 Acknowledgement

At first we want to express our gratitude to honorable faculty Professor Dr.

Mohammad Mohabbat Khan for making us understand about topic on public

administration including the decentralization of adminstration in Bangladesh.

Again, we are also greatful to our honorable teacher Mr. Mohammad Alauddin,

Deputy Secretary to the Government of Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh for

guiding us to prepare assignments and term papers.

-Authors

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 Contents
Topic Page No.

Acknowledgment 02

1.0 Introduction 04

2.0 Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh 04

3.0 Decentralization of Public Administration 06

4.0 Problems and Issues of Public Administrative Reform in Bangladesh 07

5.0 Key Issues in Decentralization and Local Governance in Bangladesh 12

6.0 Conclusion 12

References 13

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1.0 Introduction

After four decades of independence, restructuring of the state is again at the center of
development dialog in Bangladesh. The dominance of family-based control over the two major
political parties, the impasse over national elections and the reemergence of the army in national
politics have given visible impetus to the debate on the structure of the nation-state in
Bangladesh. In particular, there is an active ongoing discussion in civil society and among key
policymakers whether Bangladesh should move from a highly centralized unitary state to a more
devolved entity where power flows to the top from grassroots. Strengthening of local
governments is increasingly seen as critical to bringing the state closer to the people, enhancing
its accountability to citizens, and moving the country away from the ‘winner-takes-all’ politics of
centralized governance.

It is recognized by all that for the sustenance and institutionalization of democratic tradition,
values and culture in the polity, an efficient, result oriented, gender sensitive, transparent,
corruption free and neutral public administration and a participatory and decentralized local
government system are the essential prerequisites. Even though there is disagreement among
scholars and practitioners as to the meaning, nature, strategies and outcome of the administrative
reform efforts, the developing countries believe that effective public administrative systems are
essential for achieving the national objective of development (Khan, 1998).

On the other hand there is general agreement today that a devolved self governing Local
Government system is a crucial component of the democratic set up essential for the success of a
pro-people development agenda (Khan, 2000). The goal of public administration in Bangladesh
like any other developing country is development. But there is debate among different authorities
on how the government will achieve this goal-either directly by itself or with the help of others
assuming the role of facilitator/controller or partner.

2.0 Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh

Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation state in 1971. Although a new state, Bangladesh is
an old country with a long recorded history of several thousand years. In its recent past it was
part of Pakistan (1947-1971) and was known as East Pakistan. Prior to this, different parts of the

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present Bangladesh territory were under the British India (1765-1947), the Mughals and other
Muslim rulers, and before them under various Buddhist and Hindu rulers. A turbulent history has
followed Bangladesh since its liberation. The founding father and the first Prime Minister,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, led his party, the Awami League (AL), to an electoral victory in 1973.
However, deteriorating economic and political situation led Sheikh Mujib to declare a state of
emergency in late 1974, and in early 1975 he became President, assuming dictatorial powers
through one-party rule. He and several of his family members were assassinated by a group of
army officers in August 1975. A series of further coups ensued, but by 1977 General Ziaur
Rahman had consolidated his power and assumed the presidency. In June 1978 General Zia won
the presidential election, and in the following year his newly formed party, the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP), won two-thirds of the seats in parliament. However, in May 1981
General Zia was assassinated by a group of army officers.

Local government is embedded in the post-liberation Constitution of Bangladesh. Article 11, for
example, reads, “people will effectively participate through their elected representatives at all
levels of administration to ensure a truly democratic system.” Further, Article 59 stipulates that:
“Local government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies,
composed of persons elected in accordance with law.”

In March 1982 the army chief, General Hossain Mohammad Ershad, took power in a bloodless
coup. After failing to legitimize his status through elections, in March 1985 Ershad banned
political activity, staged a presidential election, and declared himself the winner, despite a dismal

voter turnout. Three years of violence ensued and a state of emergency was declared by Ershad.
In December 1990 Ershad relinquished power to a neutral caretaker government, which
organized a free election in February 1991. The election was won by the BNP, led by Khaleda
Zia, General Zia’s widow. Subsequent elections in 1996 were won by the Awami League and its
allies and in 2001 by the BNP and allies. Notably, with the return of democracy Bangladesh has
also experienced a negative form of confrontational and agitational politics, what Blair (1995)
terms as the politics of the streets, which has resulted in constant political instability.

The main political parties are the AL and the BNP, followed by smaller parties such as the Jatiya

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Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islami Oikyo Jote, and a host of smaller parties. The army has
long played a prominent role in Bangladeshi politics, starting with the war of liberation in 1971
but being particularly notable following the military coup in mid-1975. After the fall of Ershad in
1990, the army temporarily withdrew from politics but again attempted to seize power in the run-
up to the general election in June 1996, albeit unsuccessfully. In the decade that followed the
army refrained from becoming directly involved in politics. In January 2007, however, the army
took centre-stage yet again, when it put an end to violent street protests and the political impasse
between the two main political parties. Since then Bangladesh has been ruled by a military-
backed caretaker government.

The Bangladeshi civil service has been instrumental in sustaining military or semi-military rule
in 1975-90, a linkage that has impeded the institutional development of the service. Career
bureaucracy was established by the British in 1817 with the objective of creating a class of
officials would act as the agents of the Crown. To ensure this, the bureaucracy, especially its
higher echelons, was insulated from the people and oriented to bear loyalty towards the ruling
class. Neither independence from the British in 1947 nor liberation in 1971 has brought any
significant changes to this orientation (Morshed 1997: 9). The occasional and rather half-hearted
reform initiatives have been largely resisted by the civil service, and, to the present day, it
remains politicized, unaccountable to public and corrupt. One reason for the system of holding
general elections under neutral caretaker governments is that many civil servants back one of the
political parties in the hope of being awarded lucrative postings and other benefits. The political
history of local governments in Bangladesh can be summed under four periods: the pre-colonial
period, colonial period (1726-1947), East Pakistan period (1947-71) and post-liberation period
(since 1971).

3.0 Decentralization of Public Administration

In many countries, decentralization provides the context in which Public Administrative Reform
(PAR) Interventions are taken up. A major drawback with many decentralization initiatives is the
lack of administrative capacity of the public administration at the local levels and the absence of
accountability lines of this administration to the local people. For decentralized government to
succeed there needs to be a centre to enable it; thus attention must focus on, for example, fiscal
transfer mechanisms; mechanisms for ensuring local level planning and budgeting is informed by
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and integrated in national planning and budgeting; systems for monitoring and oversight linked
to the budget; and appropriate human resource régimes.

4.0 Problems and Issues of Public Administrative Reform in Bangladesh

Administrative reform is not new in Bangladesh. Numerous reform programs were undertaken
during the Pakistan period because there were widespread criticisms of anti-democratic practices
in the service structure. However, reform efforts failed to produce significant results.
Bureaucracy, by virtue of its historically strong position, allegedly manipulated all reform
measures in its favor (Khan 1980). Since the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state,
different governments attempted to reorganize the administrative system to suit the needs of their
respective policy declarations. Different types of regimes have ruled the country in the last three
decades.
However, there is no serious attempt to implement the recommendations of different reform
committees/commissions/study groups. At this point, we will focus on major factors that hinder
the implementation of administrative reform. Particular attention will be given to an analysis of
factors impeding NPM-style reforms in Bangladesh.

4.1 Lack of Political Commitment

The commitment of political leadership is a driving force behind implementation of
administrative reform efforts. In Bangladesh, the experiences of the last three decades suggest
that the political leadership has never been serious in its attempt to overhaul the administrative
system (Khan 1998, 173). While campaigning for electoral victory, the major political parties
always emphasize reforming the administrative system. After assuming power they never
translate their intention into reality. With elections every five years short-run political
calculations have dominated decision making, as the political leadership perceives the immediate
political costs of administrative reforms to out weigh the longer-run benefits.

4.2 Limited Capacity of Government

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Administrative reforms need concerted efforts on the part of the government in power. Unless it
can demonstrate its capacity, its reform agenda is bound to fail to deliver the desired results. It is
now a fact that successive governments in Bangladesh have miserably failed to demonstrate this
capacity. A number of factors can be discerned that have stifled the capacity of successive
governments to push through reform initiatives. The failure in the institutional structure of the
state has been quite alarming in recent years. The rule of law is in limbo, crippling public lives in
all spheres. The state appears to be a captive to predatory interests. Development agencies
constantly break rules and regulations to serve sectional interests (World Bank 1996).

Massive corruption and underhand deals with criminals have made them virtually ineffective.
Moreover, there has been a systematic abuse of the office of the police force by politicians (CPD
2001). On the other hand, the judicial system is subjected to some fundamental and procedural
problems. The union of the police and the criminal justice authority, in the hands of the executive
government, has simply eroded their autonomy and bred a tendency to the misuse of power for
personal and political gain by members of the ruling party (U.S. State Department 2001).

4.3 Bureaucratic Resistance

The issue of comprehensive administrative reform has to be seen in the context of the role and
influence of the public bureaucracy. In Bangladesh, administrative reforms have faltered for lack
of appreciation and support by the civil servants who are responsible for implementing reforms
that are likely to impact on them (World Bank 1996; Khan 1991;Khan and Zafarullah 1982).
Most civil servants adopt a protectionist attitude toward the existing power configuration, which
usually benefits vested interest groups including themselves.

They see reform attempts as downgrading their present status, position, and power and
orchestrate resistance to frustrate reform implementation. The tendency of most civil servants to
preserve the status quo, and, if possible, extend their zone of influence within the public service
system, is very much evident in Bangladesh (Khan 1991, 81).
Weak political leadership further bolsters bureaucratic resistance to administrative reforms.This
issue is particularly important when the Bangladesh government has an NPM-stylereform agenda
on the table.
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4.4 Factionalism in the Public Sector
Instead of implementing broad-based reform programs, successive governments have been
interested in playing with the existing factional strife within the public bureaucracy, in
maintaining status quo, and in building up their own support base. The deep-seated factionalism
has many dimensions: rivalry between the generalists and the specialists, spoils system entrants
versus recruits through competitive examinations, freedom fighters versus non-freedom fighters,
pro-Awami league versus pro-Bangladesh Nationalist Party civil servants, civil servants with a
military background versus civil servants with civilian backgrounds, and factionalism based on
district affiliation (Siddiqui 1996, 18-19).

Allthese groups bargain with the political leadership regarding matters affecting their own
interests. If the reform program threatens the interests of particular groups, they tend tomount all-
out efforts to halt implementation.

4.5 Ineffective Basic Public Management Processes

It is known that, in developed countries, NPM is typically used to improve existing institutions
where the bureaucracy is already conversant with basic public management processes. However,
in most developing countries, including Bangladesh, solid institutional frameworks, rule of law,
proper control structures, checks and balances, the civil service system, and accountability
systems are all absent or ineffective (Arellano-Gault 2000, 400; Schick 1998).

Western countries are now trying to change the precepts of classical organization theory as a way
of reinventing government. Despite good intentions ,most developing countries have failed in
that direction. Commentators argue that the precepts of NPM such as strategic management,
performance management, etc., can be effective only when the basics of administration are in
place (Kiggundu 1989).

Bangladesh public administration has demonstrated its deficiencies in establishing a rule-based

system and enforcing a control structure, resulting in numerous dysfunctional consequences
(Hudaand Rahman 1989; World Bank 1996).
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4.6 Corruption
Although corruption is one of the areas identified by different commissions, committees, and
study groups as needing reform intervention, it may be considered as a factor impeding the
reform programs. Bangladesh administration has been plagued by both political and
administrative corruption. Corruption is an old phenomenon. However, in recent years, it has
reached its peak (Sobhan 1993; Khan 1999). One report suggests that since independence
corruption has accounted for a staggering Taka 540 billion in only three sectors of the economy:
privatization of industries, banking and insurance, and the upazila parishad (Transparency
International, Bangladesh Chapter 1999, 2).

In fact, it is difficult to find any sector of the government without corrupt practices (Kochanek
1993,258-263; Khan 1999). Almost all forms of corruption are found in politics and
administration in Bangladesh: bribery, abuse of authority, nepotism, favoritism, patronage, theft,
and deceit (Khan 1999; Haque 2001b; Sarker 2001).

It is really an intractable problem for Bangladesh. While the bureaucratic provision of service as
well as state ownership of enterprises are causing serious problems, their outright contracting out
and privatization may not solve the problem.

4.7 Politicization of Administration

There is also an unprecedented level of politicization of administration. While this phenomenon
is common in almost all countries, it has taken an ugly turn in Bangladesh and its ramifications
are detrimental to the basics of administration. There are basically two aspects of politicization.
One aspect relates to politicization of the service delivery system in that loyalty based on the
clientelist nexus gets preference in the system. The other aspect relates to how public servants
are politicized for petty party or sectional interests (Zafarullah and Khan 2001; Khan 1998;
Siddiqui 1996).

Over the last thirty years since independence, all governments have tried to entice civil servants
for petty party interests. In doing so, they have inducted people under the spoils system,
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promoted people on party or other petty considerations, politicized the Public Service
Commission by appointing people to this constitutional body based on party affiliations and
tampered with the selection process to choose party loyals (Zafarullah, Khan, and Rahman 1997;
Ahmed 1986; Siddiqui 1996; Sobhan 2002). The culture of partisanship has infected the
bureaucracy to a point where professional advancement is unrelated to performance or integrity.

This parochial administrative culture has encouraged rank opportunity and protected corruption
as well as incompetence. The politicization itself is related to the clientelist nature of Bangladesh
politics. With this pattern of politicization, it is an impossible task to reform the public
administration system along the NPM model

4.8 The Role of International Donor Agencies

Being an aid-dependent country, Bangladesh has always remained susceptible to the pressures of
the international donor agencies in formulating and reformulating its reform agenda. As one
Bangladeshi scholar observed two decades ago, “Bangladesh policymakers must wait upon
decisions in Washington, London, Tokyo, Bonn and Paris be fore they formulate their annual
development budgets, announce an import policy, formulate a food policy, or even decide how
many children should be born. The decision makers of the developed world hold the lifeline of
any regime in Bangladesh in their hands and can create havoc in the life of a country in a way
that was inconceivable two decades ago” (Sobhan 1981, 345).

Donors’ involvement in the reform program is not new in Bangladesh. In fact, it dates back to
the 1950s and 1960s when the international technical assistance program contributed to
institution building efforts in Pakistan. In the post-independent period, the World Bank funded
the public administration project in 1983. It was designed to enhance efficiency in the civil
service through improved and expanded training, upgraded personnel management, and better
organization and management.

5.0 Key Issues in Decentralization and Local Governance in Bangladesh

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Seven key issues are hinder for decentralization with the intergovernmental structure in
Bangladesh:
• The system is heavily centralized
• The structure is complex and fluid
• Subnational governments have little accountability
• Expenditure assignments are very imprecise
• Local governments have limited access to own source revenues
• Intergovernmental transfers are small on international standards and unpredictable
• Central government monitoring is not focused on quality service delivery

6.0 Conclusion
Administrative decentralization is not an easy task, particularly in a country like Bangladesh
which is confronted with multifarious problems. This does not imply that the government should
be indifferent toward decentralization. Some initiatives can be taken Firstly; the political
leadership must commit itself to reform programs, as they are bound to yield both high political
and economic payoffs to the government itself. Secondly, the government must act promptly to
restore discipline in the governing system through positive instruments of order, protection,
provision, redress, and rule before embarking on micro level reforms in the administrative
system. Thirdly, we endorse the comments of Schick(1998), that the politicians and officials
must concentrate on the basic processes of public management.

References

Khan, M.M. (1998), Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.

Khan, M.M. (1980), Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Administrative Efforts in

the Civil Service of Pakistan, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
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Siddiqui, K. ed. 2005. Local Government in Bangladesh, Revised Third Edition, Dhaka,

University Press Ltd.

Lane, F.S. (1994), Current Issues in Public Administration, New York: St. Martins Press.

Haque, A.S. (1990), Paradoxes in Public Administration: Dimensions of Development, Dhaka,

University Press Ltd.

Asaduzzaman, M.1985. “Local Government Finance in Bangladesh: Problems and Potentials,”

Bangladesh Journal of Political Economy 7(1A):184-197.

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