Manual On Power System Protection PDF Free

Research Report / Publication No.
328
Manual on
Power System Protection
Editors
S.G. Patki, Bapuji Palki, V.K. Kanjlia, P.P. Wahi
CENTRAL BOARD OF IRRIGATION & POWER

9 Decades of Service to the Nation
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110 021
January 2018
Research Report / Publication No. 328
Manual on
Power System Protection
Editors
S.G. Patki
Bapuji Palki
V.K. Kanjlia
P.P. Wahi
Central Board of Irrigation & Power

Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021
2016
ISBN 978-8-17-336336-8
“Reproduction of any part of this publication in any form is permissible subject to proper acknowledgement
and intimation to the publisher. The publisher/author/editors have taken utmost care to avoid erros in the
publication. However, the publisher/author/editors are in no way responsible for the authenticity of data or
information given in the book.”
Disclaimer
Technical data presented and views expressed by the Expert Group Members are of their own and not of
the Organizations which they are representing. CBIP does not assume any responsibility for the above.
Designed and Published by : Shri V.K. Kanjlia, Secretary

Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021
Telephone +91-11-2611 5984/2611 6567/2410 1594
Fax: +91-11-2611 6347 E-mail: cbip@cbip.org
Website: www.cbip.org
MESSAGE
iii
FOREWORD
Protection and Automation systems play an important role in meeting the

challenge of providing reliable power supply. Within this, the protection for
various power system elements plays a major role. Two of the important
requirements on protection system are reliability, dependability and
security to provide reliable fault clearance and maintain stability of grid. In
the interconnected network, coordination of various protection schemes
is necessary to ensure minimal adverse impact on grid operation. Special
protection schemes are being implemented to ensure grid stability.
CBIP has brought out the first Publication No. 274 on ‘Protection of
Generators, Generator Transformers and 220 kV and 400 kV Networks’ in 1998. During 2005,
CBIP brought out another Publication no. 296 titled Manual on ‘Reliable Fault Clearance and
Back-up Protection of EHV and UHV Transmission Networks’. These were brought out under the
chairmanship of Shri Bhanu Bhushan of Power Grid and Shri Bapuji Palki of ABB respectively.
These publications have been well appreciated and are in great demand by engineering
professionals. Since then, there has been many fast technological advances and developments
in protection application during the last decade. National standards, Regulations and Code of
practice have been evolved. New series of IEC standards are published old standards have
been revised. For updating both the publications, CBIP constituted the Expert Group during
2013 headed by Shri S.G. Patki, Chairman CIGRE National Study Committee on Protection and
Vice President, Tata Power Company. Representatives from various sectors across the country,
comprising manufacturers, power utilities, testing laboratories, CEA who have been members of
the Expert Group, deliberated several times on the subject and based on valuable comments, this
publication has been published. The Expert Group deliberated on various topics for about three
years, which has helped CBIP in updation of this document covering all aspects of Power System
Protection. Several new topics have been added considering current technology and practices.
The manual gives the Fundamental Concepts, Requirements for protection system, Performance
Indices, Location of CT PTs, Protection of Generator and Generator Transformers, Power
Transformer /Auto Transformers Shunt Reactor, Protection of transmission Lines and cables,
HVDC systems, Busbar Protection, breaker failure Protection, Special protection Schemes,
Protection for Renewable energy sources, Fault Disturbance Recorder and Event logging, DC
battery and aux Power supply system, Switching devices, Communication system for Protection,
Basics for design of Protection schemes based on IEC 61850 standard, series compensated lines
and FACT devices, Validation, acceptance and Field Testing which form important elements of the
protection system.
The Central Board of Irrigation & Power wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions made
by Expert Group under the Chairmanship of Shri S.G. Patki, Former Chairman CIGRE National
Study Committee B5 on Power System Protection & Automation for preparation of this important
document.
We will be failing in our duty by not making special mention of Shri B.S. Palki, Former Chairman
CIGRE National Study Committee B5 on Protection & Automation and Advisor ABB Ltd., who has
taken the onerous responsibility of synthesizing this manual. His special contribution in the past
v
in helping CBIP for preparation of this manual during the year 1998 & 2005 in the first instance is
indeed laudable.
We also feel indebted to Expert Group members who are specialists in their respective fields
namely, Shri Rajil Srivastava, Shri Abhay Kumar and Shri B.B. Mukherjee from POWERGRID,
Shri P.P. Francis, Shri Subhash Thakur (Presently Chairman CIGRE NSC B5) and Ms. Saroj
Chelluri from NTPC, Shri S.K. Ray Mohapatra, CEA, Shri Rajiv Krishnan, Shri Girish and
Shri Nadeem Shaik from ABB, Shri H.B. Mukund, SIFANG Automation, Shri M.V. Kini, Tata Power,
Shri Uday Trivedi, Adani Power, Shri Kamin Dave, Ashida, Shri Deepak Saxsena, Welspun Energy
Limited, Shri Ritesh Bharat, GE Grid Solutions, Shri Kuldeep Tickoo, Siemens and Shri G.K.
Papneja, Omicron.
The revision of Manual could be accomplished by the untiring efforts and invaluable contribution
of all the Members of the Experts Group we are also thankful to the Special Invitees/Specialists
on the subject belonging to various organizations for their special contributions for the revision
work.
In this edition, two new chapters viz; Chapter 23: Current Transformer and Chapter 24: Voltage
Transformer have been added. Besides, some of the chapters have been revised to bring them in
line with rest of the chapters. These are - Chapter 4: Protection System Engineering, Chapter 5:
Performance indices, Chapter 9: Auto Reclosing, Chapter 11: Shunt Reactors, Chapter 12: Bus
Bar and Chapter 13: LBB.
We thank Shri Bapuji Palki and Shri Abhay Kumar for the initiative they have taken and for the
efforts put in updating the manual by adding additional chapters.
I also appreciate very sincere efforts and contribution made our officers namely Shri P. P. Wahi,
Director and Shri S.K. Batra, Chief Manager, CBIP for their utmost dedication for getting this
document revised & updated.
It is hoped that this Manual would serve as a useful and valuable guide for all the professionals &
stakeholders including Power utilities, Industries and Educational Institutions etc.
V.K. Kanjlia
Secretary
vi
PREFACE
Power system protection has important role to maintain reliability and stability
of Power system. Well coordinated protection schemes are essential and
important as we have a national grid with interconnections of all regions of
India. This aspect came in focus once again during the incidences of grid
collapse of North and North-east regions in July 2012. Present Protection
Manuals published by CBIP act as guide for Protection Engineers in India.
The first publication No 274, “Manual on Protection of Generators, Generator
Transformers, 220 kV & 400 kV networks “was released in November
1999. This was followed by publication number 296”, Manual on reliable
Fault clearance and Back up protection of EHV and UHV Transmission
Networks”, in September 2005. The complexity of Power system and technology in protection field
has changed rapidly in last decade. Some of the developments are:
• Growth of Generation capacity along with EHV network
• Interconnections of all regions and establishment of National grid
• Use of HVDC, FACTs and other technologies have been deployed
• Special protection schemes to ensure reliability in the event of contingencies
• High penetration of renewable energy resources
• Numerical technology in Relays, IEC61850 standard and developments in communication
technology
In response to above developments, the practices and implementation of protection schemes have
also undergone changes. To address above issues, need was felt for revision of Protection Manuals
and also to update them in line with current practices. It was also felt that both manuals should be
combined together while revising the same. With this objective an expert group was constituted
by CBIP in 2011 comprising of Members from utilities, manufacturers of relays and other domain
experts from Institutions. The committee members deliberated on the subject matter in the context
of Indian Power system and best practices on the issues as per published reports of CIGRE and
IEEE. Some members also participated in the deliberations of the Protection sub-committee of
Task force formed by CEA to analyse events and recommend measures following incidences of
July 2012. These recommendations have been duly incorporated after discussion on the same.
While attempt has been made to provide specific recommendations in most subjects, considering
the evolving nature of applications and practices in few new developments, the content has brought
out issues and some present practices are indicated. I am thankful to all the members of expert
group that contributed to this publications for their commitment and efforts for this revision.
The topics have been dealt in 22 chapters. Mr. B.S. Palki who chaired the committee that brought
out earlier two Manuals was requested to scrutinise the present work of revision of the old Manuals
and the committee is thankful for his inputs.
It is hoped that this Manual will be a useful guide to all practicing engineers on the subject of Power
System Protection .
Sanjay Patki
Chairman of CBIP’s Expert Group
Revision of Manual on Power System Protection
vii
EXPERT GROUP
POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
CHAIRMAN
Shri Sanjay Patki

Former Chairman CIGRE National Study Committee B5 on Protection and Automation
Former Vice President, The Tata Power Company Limited
Mumbai
Members
Shri Rajil Srivastava Shri S.K. Ray Mohapatra
General Manager S/S Chief Engineer
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Central Electricity Authority
Plot No 2, Sector 29 Sewa Bhavan, R.K. Puram
Gurgaon 122002 New Delhi 110066
Shri Subhash Thakur Shri P.P. Francis

Chairman CIGRE NSC B5 & Former General Manager
Addl. General Manager (PE-Elect) NTPC Ltd.
NTPC Ltd. EOC, Plot No. A-8A
EOC, Plot No. A-8A, Sector 24 Sector 24
Noida 201301 Noida 201301
Shri Abhay Kumar Ms. C. Saroj

Dy. General Manager (Engg.- S/S, Additional General Manager (PE-Elect)
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited NTPC Ltd.
Plot No. 2, Sector 29 EOC, Plot No. A-8A, Sector 24
Gurgaon 122 001(Haryana) Noida-201301
Shri Biswajit Bandhu Mukherjee Shri H. B. Mukund

Dy. General Manager – Engg (HVDC) Vice-President, Technology & Engineering Services
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Sifang Automation India Pvt Ltd.
Plot No. 2, Sector 29 Building No. 3 - Ground Floor & Building No. 4
Gurgaon - 122002 First floor, Sy No. 26/1 A 2, Kenchanahalli,
Kengeri Hobli
T.M. Industrial Estate, 12th KM Mysore Road
R.R. Nagar Zone, Bengaluru 560 059
Shri Rajiv Krishnan Shri M.V. Kini

Substation Automation Systems The Tata Power Co. Ltd.
ABB Limited Corporate Engineering - QA, I & T
PS-SA Technology Trombay Station A, Mahul Road, Chembur
Plot Nos. 5 & 6, II Phase Mumbai 400 074
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore 560058
Shri Ritesh Bharat Shri Saurabh Makwana

Director – Applications & Business Development Manager – Applications
GE Grid Solutions (Formerly Alstom Grid) GE Grid Solutions (Formerly Alstom Grid)
19/1 GST Road, Pallavaram 19/1 GST Road, Pallavaram
Chennai 600043 Chennai 600043
ix
Shri Kamin Dave Shri Kuldeep Tickoo
General Manager – Marketing & Application Head – Energy Automation Products
Engineering Siemens Ltd.
ASHIDA RC-IN IC SG EA
Plot No. A-308, Road No. 21 Plot 6A, Sector 18, Maruti Industrial Area
Wagle Industrial Estate HUDA, Gurgaon 122015
Thane (W) 400604, Maharashtra
Shri Shaik Nadeem Shri G.S. Papneja

ABB India Limited OMICRON Energy Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
Plot No. 5 & 6, Peenya Industrial Area Ph-II Unit No. 201E / A, 2nd Floor
Bangalore 560058 D21 Corporate Park
Near Dwarka Sector 8 Metro Station
Sector 21, Dwarka, New Delhi 110075
Shri Deepak Kumar Saxena Shri M.V. Girish

Vice President ABB India Limited
Welspun Energy PS-SAS Technology
Plot Nos 5 & 6, 2nd Phase
Bangalore 560058
Shri V.K. Kanjlia Shri Uday Trivedi

Secretary Associate Vice President– Protection & Metering
Central Board of Irrigation and Power Adani Power Ltd.
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri 8-A, ‘Sambhav,’ Opp. Judge’s Bungalow
New Delhi 110021 Bodakdev, Ahmadabad 380 015
Shri P.P. Wahi Shri S.K Batra

Director Chief Manager - Technical
Central Board of Irrigation and Power Central Board of Irrigation and Power
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri
New Delhi 110021 New Delhi 110021
Reviewer
Shri Bapuji Palki
Former Chairman CIGRE National Study Committee B5 on Protection and Automation
Domain Advisor
India Development Center
ABB GISL
Bhoruka Tech Park, Whitefield Road, Mahadevapura
Bangalore, Karnataka 560048
x
Contents
Message iii
Foreword v
Preface vii
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 : FUNDAMENTALS 4
2.1 Fault Clearance Systems 7
2.2 Back-Up Protection 8
2.3 Remote Back-Up Protection 9
2.4 Circuit Local Back Up Protection 9
2.5 Substation Local Back Up Protection 9
2.6 Duplicated Main Protections 9
2.7 Breaker Failure Protection 10
2.8 Recommendation for Application of Single Failure Criterion 10
Chapter 3 : Requirements for Protection System 17
3.1 External Requirements 17
3.2 Power System Requirements 18
3.3 Norms Used Transmission Planning in Indian Power System 18
3.4 Protection Criteria 19
3.5 Fault Current Withstand Capability 19
3.6 Recommendations for System Planners and Protection Engineers 20
Chapter 4 : Guidelines for Protection System Engineering 21
4.1 Introduction 21
4.2 Engineering of Protection System 21
4.3 DC Distribution 25
4.4 Panel Design 27
4.5 Fault Signaling 28
4.6 Interlocking 28
4.7 Documentation 28
4.8 Location of Cts and Vts 29
Chapter 5 : Performance Indices 36
5.1 Correct Performance 36
5.2 Dependability of Protections 36
5.3 Security of Protections 36
5.4 Reliability of Protections 37
5.5 Dependability of Switching Devices 37
5.6 Fault Clearance Time 38
5.7 Typical Example for Calculation of Various Performance Indices 39
5.8 Recommendations for Measurement of Performance Indices and Actions for Improvement 39
5.9 Adoption of Relay Setting and Functional Verification of Setting at Site 40
5.10 Storage and Management of Relay Settings 40
5.11 Root Cause Analysis of Major Protection Tripping (Multiple Element Outage)
Along with Corrective and Improvement Measures 40
5.12 Periodic Protection Audit 40
xi
Chapter 6 : Generator and Generator Transformer Protection 41
6.1 General 41
6.2 Requirements and Setting Guidelines 43
6.3 Generator-Transformer Protection 55
6.4 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Protections 57
6.5 Engineering Recommendations 59
Chapter 7 : Protection of Transmission Lines and Cables 64
7.1 Typical Transmission Circuit Arrangements 64
7.2 Complex Transmission Circuits 66
7.3 Transmission Circuit Failure Modes and Rates 70
7.4 Transmission Circuit Protection Requirements 71
7.5 Transmission Circuit Protection Schemes 72
7.6 Recommendations for Line Protection Relay 83
7.7 Requirements of Protection Relays / Functions 85
7.8 Transmission Circuit Protection Setting Criteria : Uncompensated Transmission Lines 87
7.9 Transmission Circuit Protection Setting Criteria : Series Compensated Transmission Lines 94
7.10 Setting Document for Multifunction Ied 94
7.11 Application Notes 94
Chapter 8 : Protection of Series CompEnsated Lines 96
8.1 Introduction 96
8.2 Challenges in Protection of Series Compensated and Adjacent Power Lines 96
8.3 Impact of Series Compensation on Protective Relays of Adjacent Lines 103
8.4 Distance Protection 104
8.5 Directional Residual Overcurrent Protection 106
8.6 Line Back-Up Protection Philosophies 107
8.7 Distance Protection Setting Guide Lines 107
8.8 Current Differential Protection 108
8.9 Simulation Studies 109
Chapter 9 : Auto-Reclosing 110
9.1 General 110
9.2 Basic Parameters of an Autoreclose Scheme 111
9.3 Requirements 115
9.4 Setting Guidelines 115
9.5 Recommendations 116
Chapter 10 : Protection of Power Transformers 118
10.1 Transformer Design 118
10.2 Typical Transformer Arrangements 118
10.3 Failure Rates of Power Transformer 119
10.4 Transformer Protection Requirements 119
10.5 Protection Schemes 120
10.6 Transformer Protection Scheme: 134
10.9 Engineering Guidelines 139
10.11 Typical Prot. Scheme of 400/220 kV Auto Transformer 140
xii
Chapter 11 : Protection of Shunt Reactors 141
11.1 Reactor Construction 141
11.2 Shunt Reactor Failure Modes and Rates 142
11.3 Typical Shunt Reactor Arrangements 142
11.4 Shunt Reactor Protection Requirements 142
11.6 Typical Main-1 Protection Schemes (Group A) 146
11.7 Main-2 and Back Up Protection Schemes (Group B) 146
11.9 Requirements and Setting Guide Lines 147
11.10 Engineering Guidelines 151
Chapter 12 : Protection of Busbar 153
12.1 Typical Busbar Arrangements 153
12.2 Location of Current Transformers 154
12.3 Failure Statistics 155
12.4 Busbar Protection Requirements 155
12.6 Backup Protection 159
12.8 Requirements and Setting Guide Lines 161
Chapter 13 : Local Breaker Backup Protection 163
13.1 Types of Circuit Breakers 163
13.2 Requirements of Circuit Breakers 163
13.3 Reliability of Circuit Breakers 163
13.4 Duplication of Trip Coils 164
13.5 Circuit Breaker Failure Protection 164
13.6 Tripping Schemes 167
13.7 Adjacent Circuit Breakers 168
13.8 Trip Coil and Close Coil Supervision 168
13.9 Supervision of Operating Mechanism 168
Chapter 14 : Protection of Facts (Fsc and Tcsc) 172
14.1 General on Series Compensation (Fsc & Tcsc) 172
14.2 Protection of Capacitor Elements and Units 174
14.3 Protection of Series Capacitor Banks 175
14.4 Additional Protections for Tcsc Banks 180
14.5 Platform Power 182
14.6 Power Supply for Spark Gap Firing Circuits 183
14.7 Power Supply for Ground Mounted Equipment 183
14.8 Signal Transmission 184
xiii
Chapter 15 : Protection of Facts (Svc & Statcom) 185
15.1 Introduction 185
15.2 Parallel Compensation 186
15.3 Static Compensator (Statcom) 188
15.4 Protection of Facts (Parallel Compensation Elements) 189
15.5 Protection System for Statcom 195
15.6 Recommendation 196
Chapter 16 : Protection of Hvdc Systems 199
16.1 Hvdc System Overview 199
16.2 Purpose of Protection System 202
16.3 Protection Philosophy 203
16.4 Protective Actions 204
16.5 Zones of Protections 206
16.6 DC Protections 206
16.7 AC Protections 226
Chapter 17 : Protection Schemes Based On Communication Systems 234
17.1 Protection Systems 234
17.3 Common Teleprotection Schemes 238
17.4 Noise and Interference Created by the Power System 242
17.5 Reliability of the Information Link 243
11.6 Output Power of Power Line Carrier Sets 244
17.7 Coupling Modes of Teleprotection Channels 245
17.8 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Most Commonly Used Links 245
17.9 Redundancy Requirements 247
17.10 Interfaces Between Teleprotection and Multiplexer Equipment 249
17.11 Use of Iec 61850 for The Communication between Substations 249
17.12 Recommendations for Selection of Communication Channels 250
Chapter 18 : Basics for Designing Protection Schemes Based On Iec 61850
Standard 252
18.1 Preface 252
18.2 Introduction to Iec 61850 253
18.3 History 253
18.4 Concepts 254
18.5 Interoperability 254
18.6 The Data Model 255
18.7 Iec 61850 Basic Architecture 257
18.8. Traffic Patterns Found in Iec 61850 Substations 259
18.9 Performance 260
18.10 Applications 260
18.11 Cyber Security 262
18.12 Security Tools 263
18.13 Benefits of Iec 61850 264
18.14 Challenges in Iec 61850 Implementation 267
18.15 Requirements for Network Communication and Processing 268
18.16 Specifying Iec 61850 Based Protection Schemes 269
18.17 Goose for Iec 61850 Implementation 270
xiv
18.18 Topology Considerations 273
18.19 Engineering Tools 277
18.20 Testing and Maintenance 278
18.21 Edition 2 of Iec 61850 285
Chapter 19 : Protection of Electrical Systems With renewable Energy
Resources 289
19.1 Background on Distributed Energy Resources and Current Practices 289
19.2 Basic Considerations 290
19.3 Protection Requirements 291
19.4 Ungrounded MV Connection 296
19.5 Solidly Grounded MV & HV Connection 297
19.6 Solidly Grounded MV and Delta HV 297
19.8 Transformer Connections 300
19.9 Recommended Der Interconnection Requirements 301
19.10 Protection of Distribution System with Distributed Energy Resources 302
19.11 Trends In Protection Systems 303
19.12 Protection Schemes for Future Distribution Networks with Der 305
19.13 Conclusion 309
Chapter 20 : Dc AuxiliAry Supply Systems 310
20.1 Charactristics of DC Auxiliary Sources 310
20.2 Station Battery Technology used in Substations 310
20.3 Duplication of Auxiliary DC Supply Systems 311
20.4 Duplication of DC Fuses on Auxiliary Supply 312
20.5 Duplication of Trip Coils 312
20.6 Battery Ground Fault Detectors 313
20.7 Recommendations for Duplication of DC Supply Systems and DC Distribution Schemes 313
Chapter 21 : Disturbance Recorder, Alarms and Event Logging 315
21.2 Definitions 315
21.3 Types of Disturbances 315
21.4 Disturbance Recording Considerations 316
21.5 Types of Records 317
21.6 Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) 318
21.7 Protective Relays with Fault Disturbance Recording and Event Recording 319
21.8 Time Synchronization 319
21.9 Processing 320
21.10 Present Day Disturbance Record and Recorded Signals 321
21.11 Recommended Digital Signals (Typical) & Trigger Options for DRS 322
21.12 Special Comments 322
Chapter 22 – Validation, Acceptance and Field Testing Techniques for
Testing of Protection Relays 324
22.2 Factory Acceptance Tests (Fat) 324
22.3 Sat/Commissioning Tests 324
22.4 Periodic Maintenance Tests 325
xv
22.5 Application Tests 325
22.6 Methods to Test Protection Devices 327
22.7 Recommendation of before Start to Test Relaying Scheme by Using Computerized
Relay Testing Kit 328
22.7.4 Application Notes 336
Appendix-A 337
Appendix-B 339
Appendix-C 341
Appendix-D 343
Appendix-E 346
Chapter 23 : Current Transformers 347
23.2 Current Transformer Output 347
23.3 Metering Cores 348
23.4 Protection Cores 348
23.5 Over Dimensioning of Current Transformers and Transient Performance 349
23.6 Protective Current Transformers as per Iec Standards 352
23.7 Protection Current Transformers as per Indian Standards 354
23.8 Selection of CT Cores 355
23.9 CT Requirements 356
23.10 Current Transformer Classification 357
23.11 Typical Example of Arriving at Eal for a Numerical Distance Relay 357
23.12 Current Transformer Requirements for Cts According to Class P and PX
of Iec and Class P and PS of IS 358
23.13 Optical Current and Voltage Transducers 359
Appendix-I 361
Chapter 24 : Voltage Transformers 365
24.2 Measuring Error 365
24.3 Voltage Transformers with Several Secondary Windings 366
24.4 Voltage Factor 368
24.5 Inductive Voltage Transformers as per Iec 61869-3 368
24.6 Capacitive Voltage Transformers as per Iec 61869-5 369
24.7 Inductive Voltage Transformers as per Is 371
24.8 Capacitive Voltage Transformers as per IS 373
24.9 Ferro-Resonance 374
24.10 Fusing of Secondary Circuits 374
24.11 Voltage Drop in Secondary Cabling 374
24.12 Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers 375
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Indian power system is growing steadily. In last decade (10th and 11th Five-year plan) the installed capacity
has almost doubled. To match with the growing demand, the transmission system is also expanding with
765 kV and 400 kV AC lines, new long distance HVDC links and series compensation including TCSC wherever
feasible on existing 400 kV and 220 kV lines. With the development of regional grids and interregional ties
resulting into the national grid, the power system is becoming more and more complex.
The complexity of the power system has further increased on account of high penetration of renewable
resources especiallythe wind and solar plants of MW scale.
Along with this growth, therequirement of high availability and reliable operation of large generating plants
with EHV and UHV transmission network assume tremendous importance in maintaining power system
stability for better grid operation. To realize the vision of “Reliable, Affordable and Quality Power for All” some
changes will be required in our approach towards integrated protection and automation system planning.
The protection and automation system used in the network plays an important role in meeting this
requirement, preventing system collapse during major system disturbances, reducing outage time and
minimizing the possibility of damage to the machines and equipment. Utilities should install protection
systems that are dependable. Here, dependability is the probability of not failing to clear a power system
fault or abnormality.
There are very significant technology changes in the area of protection and Control. From electronic static
relays , there was ashift to digital microprocessor based relays and then further to modern Numerical relays.
The numerical technology has improved the protection functionality as well as protection schemes. This has
contributed to improved reliability as well as dependability of relays. The information and data communication
capabilities of numerical relays provide vital inputs for operation of the grid subsequent to a fault or power
system disturbance. The configuration of the relays has become vital to ensure above objectives.
Recommendations contained herein for the protection of EHV system of 110 kV, 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV
are intended to be used by utilities in India, as a guide for the minimum provision of protections at different
voltage levels. The manual also contains a chapter on protection of Generator and Generator transformer,
HVDC, FACTs and Protection of systems with Renewable energy resources. Additional or superior provisions
can always be made by concerned utilities at their discretion. Detailed specifications of each protection will
have to be drawn by individual utilities while framing purchase specifications. Major functional requirements
and general setting criteria for various protections have also been dealt with in this document. It may be
noted that wherever setting ranges of relays have been mentioned in this manual, these are intended to be
indicative.
Following considerations have been taken into account while making these recommendations:
• Prevailing practices of various utilities in India and information about practices followed elsewhere in
the world.
• Experiences with the prevailing protection practices.Reference is also made to the recommendations
of the Protection Subcommittee of the Task force formed by CEA subsequent to major grid collapse
of North India in July 2012.
• The state-of-art in the protection field and features of the presently available relays such that the
specified requirements may be complied with, by reputed manufacturers with their proven products
without any deviation and at reasonable costs.
• Enhancing dependability of fault clearance system.
2 Manual on Power System Protection
When a fault occurs in the network a protective relay may fail to operate or a circuit breaker may fail to open
and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective relay or a switching device may prevent proper
clearance of the fault.
The addition of a second main protection increases the availability and dependability of fault clearance
system. In addition, the provision of backup protection that operates independently of specified devices in
the main protection system enhances this further. It can be generally said that provision of second main
protection and backup protections enhance the dependability of the fault clearance system.
While the provision of second main protection and backup protection enhances the dependability of fault
clearance system it increases the costs. Therefore there is often a tendency to choose to run the power
system without a reserve protection and adequate backup protection in the network. At voltage levels of
220 kV and below this is often the case. Since the number of shunt faults is high, consequences of failure to
clear a fault may be serious and result in high disturbance costs that are far greater than the costs involved
in providing additional protections.
The disturbance costs include the following
• Costs associated with the risk of injury to people and damage to third party property
• Costs associated with the risk of damage to power lines and other power apparatus
• Costs associated with the customer outages

• Costs associated with the voltage disturbances
• Costs associated with the customer’s complaints and ill will.
Therefore the utilities should base the decisions for theprovision of additional protection and backup protection
considering the costs involved in terms of disturbances leading towards uncleared faults. Recommendations
made in this manual have been done considering the above. It is further suggested that the protection
engineer should keep this aspect in mind while reviewing protection system in any given case. Numerical
technology and IEC 61850 standard are revolutionalising the protection and automation applications. The
protection and control schemes previously deployed using wire based philosophies can be implemented
using IEC61850 mechanisms with improved performance, reliability, and operational benefits.
Prior to the publication of this manual, there were two manuals of CBIP existing on this subject. These
are:
• CBIP Publication No:274 Manual on Protection of Generator, Generator transformers and 220kV
and 400 kV networks- October 1998.
• CBIP Publication No: 296- Manual on Reliable fault clearance and backup protection of EHV and
UHV transmission networks - September 2005.
As the contents of these two manuals were complimentary it was felt that they should be merged into one
and a revised version released after adding new information and new chapters.
The manual is structured as under.
• Chapter 2 defines some fundamental concepts of protection schemes for “fault clearance”. Additionally
a section has been added on system protection such as “special protection schemes” as mandated
by revised transmission criterion of 2013 to deal with system contingencies.
• Chapter 3 describes briefly the protection requirement arising internally for Power system performance
and requirements for protective systems from external authorities, governmental and other agencies,
equipment manufacturers, insurance companies, standardization organizations, utilities and
customers.
Introduction 3
• Chapter 4 deals with guidelines on engineering of protection schemes. Chapter also includes the
design choices for CT/PT locations.
• Chapter 5 defines some performance indices for protection devices and includes related activities
such as relay setting management with Protection Audits.
• Chapters 6 to 13 deals with the different power system components such as: transmission circuits
(overhead lines and underground cables) power transformers and shunt reactors. Each chapter
contains, requirements on the protection system, practices of protection, setting aspects and protection
coordination
• Chapter 14 and 15 deals with Protection aspects of FACTS Elements like TCSC, FSC, SVCs,
STATCOMs. These are new chapters.
• Chapter 16 deals with Protection and control aspects of HVDC. This is new chapter.
• Chapter 17 deals with protection schemes based on communication with current communication
technologies like fiber optic systems.
• Chapter 18 deals with Basics of designing protection schemes based on IEC61850 standard. This is
a new chapter.
• Chapter 19 deals with protection and control aspects of Grid connected renewable generation that
has become very significant in size to Indian Power system.
• Chapter 20 covers DC Auxiliary power supply system.
• Chapter 21 deals with Fault disturbance recording aspects provided with Protection IEDs.
• Chapter 22 deals with validation, acceptance and siteTesting of protection schemes
• Chapter 23 deals with current transformers as per both IS and IEC standards.
• Chapter 24 deals with voltage transformers as per both IS and IEC standards
Technology and Protection / control practices for new areas of power system such as HVDC, renewable
energy, FACTs etc are evolving and may be different from manufacturer to manufacturer. The practices and
recommendations described in chapters 14,15,16 and 19 are as per general concepts and may change in
future as technology and practices will evolve.
While preparing the manual expert group referred to Reports of various working groups on Protection under
CIGRE SC B5.
The manual gives the state of art in the protection field and gives features of the presently available relays
such that the specified requirements are compiled and objective of enhancing dependability of fault clearance
system can be achieved.
Finally it is hoped that the manual will help the protection engineers of various utilities in managing the
Protection system.
Chapter 2
FUNDAMENTALS
Primary protection is intended to operate when any fault or abnormal operating condition takes place in the
power system.
The provision of adequate protection is to detect and disconnect elements of the power system in the event
of fault and is an integral part of power system design.
Separation of the faulty section of the power system from the healthy section and minimizing the isolated
area prevents a wide spread system disturbance and minimizes shutdown of power supply.
The protection scheme actions will prevent expansion of the fault or minimize the consequences of the
fault including effects arising from failure of a relay or breaker The abnormal phenomenon originated by
failure to operate a relay or a breaker to operate correctly, a sudden change of power flow, or splitting of the
system during the process of fault clearance, any of which may cause the expansion of the fault, and the
deterioration of the power system stability.
Requirements for the protection relays
(1) Fault clearance performance in respect of
– Speed;
– Selectivity;
– Sensitivity;
(2) Reliability; and
(3) Cost
SENSITIVITY : Sensitivity is a term used when referring to the minimum operating level (current, voltage,
power etc.) of relays or complete protection schemes. Relays or protection schemes are said to be sensitive
if their primary operating parameters are low.
SELECTIVITY : When a fault occurs, the protection scheme is required to trip only those circuit breakers whose
operation is required to isolate the fault. This property of selective tripping is also called ‘discrimination’ .
SPEED : The function of protection systems is to isolate faults on the power system as rapidly as possible.
One of the main objectives is to safeguard continuity of supply by removing each disturbance before it leads
to widespread loss of synchronism and consequent collapse of the power system.
The additional functions that have been become available with the numerical technology:
• metering, oscillography, sequence of events capture with time tagging,
• remote setting and monitoring through communications,
• user configurability of tripping schemes and other control logic.
• Multiple setting groups for easy adaptability to network changes
• In spite of these additional functions, the required panel space and wiring is less than needed with
the previous technologies,
Fundamentals 5
• the burden on the VTs and CTs is substantially reduced
• the systems have an ability for continuous self-checking.
Protective Zone
Protective zone is an important factor that determines selectivity among the performances in which a
protection relay should be required.
Unit protection provides a protective zone by the location of the CTs to detect faults only between the CT
locations as a well defined zone according to the sensitivity of the settings.
Non-unit protection (excluding directional comparison) has a zone which changes in accordance with the
setting values and is not constrained by other CT locations.
The coordination between protection relays is the procedure to ensure that all the protection relays operate
systematically to minimize the power system outage area against any fault, considering the operation limits
or restriction conditions. On the other hand, when a fault occurs in equipment which the protective zone
does not cover, it may not be cleared, or it may take longer time for the fault to develop into the protective
zone and then be cleared. Therefore a fundamental principle of protection is that at least two different devices
are capable of detecting any fault anywhere on the power system.
CT Arrangement
There are three kinds of arrangement of CTs.
In arrangement (1), a CT for busbar protection and a CT for line protection are installed at the line side from
the breaker. In this case, the busbar protection will operate for a fault between the CT and the breaker, which
should essentially be a line fault, so a part of the busbar will be blacked out. However, as the fault is not totally
cleared by the busbar protection, the fault will also need to be cleared by the remote backup protection.
In arrangement (2), CTs for busbar protection and CT for power line protection are installed at the busbar
side of the CB. In this arrangement, when a fault occurs between the CT and the CB, which is originally
a busbar fault, the line protection will operate and therefore, the line will be out of operation. However, as
the fault is not totally cleared by the line protection, it will also need to be cleared by the remote backup
protection or locally by CBF if used.
In arrangement (3), the CTs are installed at both sides of the CB; that is the CT for line protection is installed
at busbar side of the CB and the CT for busbar protection is installed at line side of the CB. As both the
line protection and the busbar protection will operate against the fault between the CT and the CB will be
cleared at high speed.
The third arrangement is generally considered the best arrangement, because there is no dead zone for
fault detection between the CTs and the breaker as in the first two arrangements. However, each must be
considered in regards to the type of CT to be used (e.g. bushing or post), or the substation space.
Fault clearance scheme and Special Protection scheme :
Protection schemes are classified into two categories:
(1) Fault clearance scheme : This comprises of Primary /Main Protection and Back up protection that
carries out isolation of faulty element of Power system
(2) Special Protection Scheme: These are special schemes that prevents spread of disturbance and
ensures that all operating parameters are kept within allowable operating limits.
Primary /Main Protection : Main protection is installed for every equipment unit, such as a transmission line,
a busbar, a transformer etc.
When a fault occurs on any part of the power system, the main protection closest to the fault must operate
faster than the other protection to minimize the extent of the power system that must be isolated to clear the
fault. As the protection zones must overlap, consideration must be given to how the selectivity is achieved
to not cause both zones to be tripped
Main protection is generally provided as independent duplicate protection at higher Power system voltages
where the risk of one system failing to operate correctly in the intended high speed would cause widespread
consequential damage or power system instability. This is generally referred to as Main 1 and Main 2, or X
and Y protection.
Main I and main II protection is therefore provided using:
• two independent CT cores at the same location
• two VT signals on independent circuits from the VT although may be derived from the same VT core
due to the difficulty of duplicating VT posts
• two relays of different operating principles or vendors e.g. distance and differential, two distance from
different vendors or two differential relays from different vendors
• two independent trip coils in a common circuit breaker
A back-up protection is intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared, or an abnormal
condition is not detected, in the required time because of failure or inability of main protections to operate or
failure of the appropriate circuit-breakers) to trip. The back-up protection, by definition, is slower than main
protection. Back-up protection is installed to improve the dependability of the fault clearance system. Here,
dependability is the probability of not failing to clear a power system fault or abnormality.
Back-up protection shall operate when main protection fails to clear a fault. In such a case, the protection
may not operate correctly, the circuit breaker may not receive any tripping command or the circuit breaker
may fail to open and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective relay or a switching device may
prevent proper clearance of the fault.
Sometimes a second main protection or duplicate protection, intended to operate if the main protection
system fails to operate or is temporarily out of service is provided. This, however, should not be mixed up
with back-up protection. The second main protection is there to increase the dependability of normal fault
clearing mechanism and it must always operate very selectively, while the back-up protection may operate
with less selectivity because it operates after some time delay.
The requirements on back-up protection cannot be independent of the requirements on the entire fault
clearance system.
Use of elementary form of the single-failure criterion is often done while planning protection system
arrangement. It requires that the failure of any one component in a fault clearance system should not result
in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or abnormality.
Back-up protection is an important function of the protection system, and its design needs to be coordinated
with the design of the main protection. In this process, it is suggested that the protection engineer should
work closely with the power system planners and designers.
The system planner should inform the protection engineer regarding assumptions made during system
design and requirements on fault clearance system at various voltage levels in the system. He must inform
him of the needs of the protection system that must fulfill, as for example, the total fault clearance time. The
protection engineer must also be familiar with the following:
• System requirement and the system design criteria
• The plant specifications

Fundamentals 7
• The failure rates of the protected plant
• The requirements of performance indices of the fault clearance system
• The requirements of reliability of protection equipment
• The probability that a switching device fails to interrupt the fault current.
The power system planner should help the protection engineer in formulating the requirements of the fault
clearance system. Points to be considered are the stability of the power system and the type of bus bar
arrangement and switching scheme. Protection engineers and the power system designers must co-ordinate
the demands on fault clearance system, as also the performance of station equipment and strike a balance
between technical and economical benefits and the risks associated with making the protection system
more complex.
2.1 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS
The basic task of any fault clearance system is to detect a specified class of power system faults and
abnormalities and to disconnect the associated item of substation or plant from the rest of the power
system. Figure 2.1 shows the components of a fault clearance system. Here TE stands for teleprotection
equipment.
The faulty component should be disconnected as fast as possible and with minimum disturbance to the
consumers and minimum damage to the power apparatus. An essential property of the fault clearance
system is reliability. Reliability of protection includes dependability and security of protection. Fault analysis
and relay co-ordination are important issues for the reliability of protection systems.
A power system fault is a power system abnormality that involves, or is the result of, failure of primary
equipment and normally requires the immediate disconnection of the faulty equipment from the rest of the
power system by tripping of the appropriate circuit breakers. Power system faults can be shunt, series or
combination faults.
A non-power system fault tripping is an unwanted tripping of a circuit breaker as a result of faults, other than
the power system faults. The unwanted operations of a protection in the absence of a power system fault
or the tripping of a breaker due to other secondary equipment failure or due to human error are examples
of non-power system fault.
Fig. 2.1 : The fault clearance system

2.2 BACK-UP PROTECTION
All elements in the fault clearance system do not always operate correctly. Protection relays may fail to
operate or may operate when they are not required to operate. Switching devices may fail to interrupt the
fault current. Common practice is to use several protection systems operating in parallel. Back-up protection
is intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared, or abnormal condition is not detected, in the
required time because of failure or inability of other protections to operate or because of some other fault in
the main fault clearance system e.g., broken wire in cable from PT, broken wire in the cable from relay to
the CB trip coil or failure of the appropriate circuit breaker(s) to trip.
By providing back-up protection, it is possible to reduce the risk arising out of situation when a protection
relay or a switching device fails to operate.
The back up protections can be classified as under.
• Remote back up
The main protection and the back-up protection may reside in different substations. It is installed at
the remote substation primarily to protect its own substation and the power line, but is also to able to
detect faults that would normally be expected to be cleared by the local protection. The remote back
up relay will therefore have a slower operating time for faults in the local substation but will operate
if the local protection system (relay and breaker) fail to clear the fault.
• Local back-up
It is installed locally in the same substation and operates when the main relay fails to operate for a
fault. These relays generally have a slower operating time than the main protection perhaps due to
different operating characteristics or due to grading between the relays.
The local back up protections can be further classified as under.
Circuit local back-up protection
The protection senses the same current and voltage as the main protection.
Substation local back-up protection
The protection uses current different from the one used by the main protection.
Ideal back-up protection should be completely independent of the main protection. Current transformers,
voltage transformers, auxiliary tripping relay, trip coils and auxiliary DC supply systems should be duplicated.
This ideal condition is rarely attained in practice. The following compromises are usually made:
• There is only one current transformer but it has several cores. One core and its associated secondary
winding energise each protection. Some times one CT secondary winding feeds more than one
protection.
• Common voltage transformers are normally used because duplication would involve a considerable
increase in cost, because of the voltage transformers themselves, and because of the increased
space that would have to be provided. Since security of the VT output is vital, it is desirable that
the supply to each protection is either from separate cores or separately fused as close to the VT
as possible and continuously supervised by a relay that will give alarm on failure of the supply and,
where appropriate, prevent an unwanted operation.
• Trip supplies to the two protections should be separately fused. Duplication of tripping batteries and
of trip coils on circuit breakers is sometimes provided.
Fundamentals 9
2.3 REMOTE BACK-UP PROTECTION
Remote back up protection is the ideal form of back-up protection, in systems where it can function properly.
Second and third zones of distance relays are examples of remote back up. Sometimes variations of the in
feed at the remote bus bars may virtually prevent the application of remote back-up protection.
The advantage of remote back-up is that it is completely independent of the protection relays, current
transformers and voltage transformers of the main protection system. It is also independent of the auxiliary
DC supply system and the breakers in the substation. There are hardly any hardware failures that can affect
both the main protection and the back-up protection. The setting of Remote Back-up protection relays to
cover the fault outside the first zone of protection beyond the remote bus bars due to infeeds to the fault
from other parallel sources are quite complicated and sometimes less selective.
2.4 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
The circuit local back up protection uses the same current and voltage as the main protection. Delayed
directional or non directional over current and earth fault relays that are provided in the same circuit are
examples of circuit local back up protection.
2.5 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
A substation back up protection is a time-delayed protection provided in the same substation but normally
fed by a CT different from the one feeding the main protection. Over current protections provided in the
incoming feeders providing back up to protections in the outgoing feeders in a substation is one example of
substation local back-up protection. It must be noted that in a meshed network it may be difficult to obtain
back up protection of EHV lines by means of substation local back up protection.
In EHV substations it is possible to provide substation local back up protection by reverse looking elements
of distance relay.
2.6 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS
In EHV and UHV networks it is common practice to use duplicated line protections, viz.: Maini, Main 2
protections. Since the current transformers, the voltage transformers and the breakers are the expensive
components in the fault clearance system it may be difficult to justify the cost for their duplication.
Figure 2.2 shows example of modern line protection arrangement suggested.
Fig. 2.2 : Duplicated main protections

• Block-1 in Figure presents the first main protection, Main-1
• Block-2 represents the second main protection, Main-2.
Block-3 represents the teleprotection equipment for Main-1 Block-4 represents the teleprotection equipment
for Main-2 Block-5 represents the telecommunication equipment for Main-1 Block-6 represents the
telecommunication equipment for Main-2.
2.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Breaker failure protection is part of the local back-up protection. The breaker failure protection has to trip
the adjacent breakers when the main breaker does not interrupt the fault current. The most common, and
simplest, breaker failure protection consists of a timer, which the protection starts when it operates. If the
fault current persists for longer time than the setting of the timer, the breaker failure protection gives a trip
command to adjacent breakers. Figure 2.3 shows the basic decision process in any breaker failure protection.
The retrip signal shown here is optional.
Fig. 2.3 : Flow diagram for breaker failure protection
2.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION
It is recommended to apply the single- failure criterion in the planning of the fault clearance system. An
elementary form of the single-failure criterion requires that the failure of any one component in a fault
clearance system should not result in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or abnormality. The
single-failure criterion can be applied as follows:
• Assume that the power system is either in its normal switching state or that one line is out of
service.
Assume that a power system fault occurs on the power system. Consider the following types of
faults.
Three-phase fault
Phase-to-earth fault
Fundamentals 11
Phase-to-phase fault
Open conductor or broken conductor fault
Assume that there is a fault in the fault clearance system (in substation elements). Consider one of
the following types of faults in the fault clearance system.
Loss of input from a voltage transformer,
Loss of input from a current transformer,
A failure to operate of a protection relay,
A blown DC fuse,
An interruption of a tripping circuit
A failure of remote end communication (especially line differential protection)
A failure to operate of a switching device.
• Check if with the above fault(s), the fault clearance system clears the power system fault at pre-defined
locations considering the following types of faults on system elements:
A line fault
A bus bar fault
A fault in power transformer
A fault in the shunt reactor
Add second main protection or back-up protection until the fault clearance system clears al the
faults.
• Check if the healthy lines and healthy items of plant can withstand the fault current for the above
cases. Add second main protection, back-up protection or reinforce the primary equipment until it
withstands the fault current during the fault clearance time.
The protection engineer must carry out a more detailed analysis to check the above cases under different
outage conditions for which the system has been planned. Examples of outages to be considered are outage
of a line, outage of a power transformer, outage of a generator etc.
2.9 Special protection schemes (SPS)
SPS are designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take predetermined, corrective action
(other than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve system integrity and provide acceptable system
performance.
2.9.1 Requirements of SPS
A fault which occurs in a power system will be usually cleared at high speed and with the minimum blackout
area by the selective tripping by fault clearance relays to maintain stable operation in the power system and
localising the section of the network to be isolated.
However, if the initial fault is followed by further or consequential events such as breaker failure or unsuccessful
reclosing the network outage may extend to the whole power system, which may cause a wide area and/or
long duration blackout. It is rare that such consequential events occur independently but rather two or more
of these events occur sequentially or in parallel.
An example of the process to wide-area blackout is shown in Fig.2.4.
Introduction of SPSs is one of the solutions to mitigate the influence of consequential events in the
network.
Fig 2.4 : Typical Process to Wide-Area Blackout (ref 1)
According to Mr. P. M. Anderson (ref 2) SPS is defined as “A protection scheme that is designed to detect
a particular system condition that is known to cause unusual stress to the power system and to take some
type of pre-determined action to counteract the observed condition in controlled manner. In some cases SPS
are designed to detect a system condition that is known to cause instability, overload or voltage collapse.
The action prescribed may require opening of one or more lines, tripping of Generators, ramping of HVDC
power Transfer, load shedding or other measures.(ref 4 and 5)
SPS is used as the acronym for Special Protection Scheme, which has the same meaning as the “System
Protection Scheme”. IEEE uses the term System Integrity Protection schemes (SIPS)
2.9.2 Abnormal Phenomenon to be considered by the SPS
(a) Out-of-Step
In some cases power system faults may evolve into “cross country faults” affecting more than one transmission
line simultaneously or sequentially causing significant changes in power flows on the network. Power flows
may also be affected by sudden load changes or loss of generators on the grid. When these events occur,
possibly in combination, the mechanical power input and electric power output of generators may become
unbalanced leading to under/over frequency or under/over voltage on the network. In such conditions the
generators will lose synchronization with the power system. If this out-of-synchronism or out-of-step condition
is sustained for too long, cascading trip of the generators will be caused, and it has a possibility of causing
islanding of the power system network or widespread blackout of the whole power system. When such an
event occurs, the suitable controls which stabilize the power system by various kinds of protection relays
or SPSs are necessary to be executed in the power system including the generators which fall into out-of-
step.
The SPS detects out-of-step near the electrical centre, performs system splitting and prevents the extension
of the event. When a severe fault occurs in the system, the latter predicts out of synchronous, and conducts
the proper control such as a part of power shedding or system splitting to stabilize the power system at an
early stage.
Fundamentals 13
(b) Abnormal Frequency
Severe fault on the power system sometimes causes cascaded tripping of the lines or generators.The
unbalanced condition of generation of active power and consumption of power will cause fluctuation of the
frequency. If the supply is less than the demand, frequency will fall, whilst if the supply is in excess of the
demand, frequency will rise.
If the cascaded tripping of heavily loaded lines along with a power station outage causes the frequency to
drop, a SPS scheme will initiate controlled tripping such as load shedding or tripping of a pumped storage
generator during pumping in order to maintain the frequency. SPS schemes may also try to maintain the
correct frequency in an islanded part of the system until it can be reconnected to the rest of the system.
Following actions could be initiated.
• Tripping of generators
• fast generation reduction (runback) through fast valving or water diversion
• HVDC Power transfer control
• Load shedding
• controlled opening of interconnection to neighbouring system to prevent spread of disturbance
• Controlled islanding of local system into spate areas with matching Generation and Load
(c) Voltage Instability
When voltage instability results in voltage collapse, capacitors or shunt reactors are controlled by a SPS
and maintenance and recovery of voltage are performed so that it may not expand to the whole system.
Some actions are.
• change of voltage set point of Generator Voltage regulator
• automatic shunt switching
• control of series compensation
• Blocking of tap changer of Transformers
• under voltage load shedding
(d) Overload
When transmission lines, bus bars, transformers or even the switchgear are overloaded above their rated
limits, it may be necessary to use an SPS to initiate load shedding or generator shedding to prevent damage
to the overloaded item that may otherwise lead to a more significant power system fault. As one example,
such overloads may be caused by a fault on one of two parallel lines is cleared by tripping of the faulted line
which subsequently causes overload on the unfaulted line.
This may be avoided for example by the use of autoreclose on the faulted line to prevent sustained overload
of the healthy line. Wide area blackout can be triggered due to line overload.
Overloads may also occur due to specific operator action. For example simultaneous outage of two parallel
lines may be given for certain construction requirement.With these two lines out of service, the power flow will
be transferred to other lines which could consequently get overloaded. This overload can cause consequent
cascading line tripping throughout the system. The black out of July 2012 in North and north eastern India
was also triggered by overloading of critical 400 kV line while otherlines were simultaneously out of service
for control of overvoltages and other reasons.
2.9.3 “n-1” Criterion and SPS
There are three kinds of measures against the prevention of wide area blackouts as a result of fault expansion
throughout the network;
(1) The use of parallel lines and mesh grid arrangements of the power system
(2) Operator controlled switching of the power system to manage power flows
(3) The use of protection relays to minimise consequential power system damage to permit fast restoration
of supply
Service reliability of the power system is maintained by giving the suitable priority for these measures.
Whereas normal general protection schemes are designed to deal with one fault event as an “n-1” criteria,
the introduction of SPS also deals with an “n-2” fault or an “n-3” fault. The use of SPSs is generally more
economical than significant power system network development to create parallel lines or mesh grids.
As per section 3.5 of the Indian Electricity Grid Code, the ‘Planning Criteria’ is based on the security philosophy
on which the Inter State Transmission System (ISTS) in India has been planned. It states that as a general
rule, the ISTS shall be capable of withstanding and be secured against a certain credible contingency
outages without necessitating load shedding or rescheduling of generation during steady state Operation.
This criterion is better known as the N-1 criterion for planning.
The general structure of a typical SPS is shown in Fig. 2.5.
SPS consists of three main parts:
• Inputs which is the level of magnitude of system parameters and status of circuit breakers
• Decision making system which initiates some action
• Control actions that are pre-determined and can be armed or disarmed depending upon system
condition.
One of the vital element of SPS design is a reliable and secure communication infrastructure for data
exchange amongst monitoring and controlling action devices.
Synchro-phasors have now been deployed in Indian Grid for realtime monitoring of network, disturbance
analysis and model validation. Further schemes can be developed to achieve Wide Monitoring and control
through actions initiated through SPS based on data from synchro phasors.
Fig 2.5 : General Structure of a System Protection Scheme

Fundamentals 15
According to their control variables SPS can be classified as response-based or event-based. Response-
based SPS are based on measured electric variables (such as voltage, frequency, etc.) and initiate their
protective actions when the contingency has caused the measured value to hit the trigger level.
The two most common response based types of SPS are under-frequency load shedding and under-voltage
load shedding
• Event-based SPS are designed to operate upon the recognition of a particular combination of events
(such as the loss of several lines in a substation). Examples of event-based SPS are below:
• Generation rejection
• Load rejection
• System separation
• Turbine valve control
• Load and generator rejection
• Out-of-step relaying
• Discrete excitation controls
• Generator runback
• VAR compensation
• Combination of schemes
2.10 Islanding Scheme
When power system disturbance takes place, several Special Protection schemes initiate actions to limit the
spread of disturbance. Inspite of such action, the system parameters may further start deviating adversely.
In such situation it is recommended to isolate the region or area from neighbouring power system in order to
save part of the grid from total collapse. The power system island thus formed is expected to remain stable
by maintaining Load and Generation balance within the Islanded area through several control actions. The
island may have different types of generating plants. Thermal steam turbine driven generation will need fast
governing controls to control the frequency variations during islanded operations. The power number is very
small during islanded condition, The frequency is very sensitive to Load and generation changes during
islanded operation. It is desirable to select one of the units to control the frequency. Gas turbine generators
are more suited for such duty since it permits wider control on generation with fast response.
Islanding scheme may consist of set of relays that detect Rate of change of frequency, Under frequency,
direction of Power flow, Under voltage, phasors etc or combination of such sensors connected on Tie
points.
As the frequency starts dropping, prior to islanding point, it is necessary to carry out adequate Load shedding
so that post disconnection, island is generation surplus and frequency will start recovering immediately. Load
shedding is usually initiated by df/dt and under frequency relays.
The quantum of load shedding is pre-decided based on day’s schedule of import or export of power from
island and feeders are manually enabled for load shedding accordingly. Actual interchange is monitored on
scada system and load shedding schedule corrected.
The fall in frequency can be at high rate. Frequency can touch very low value momentarily before it starts
recovering after islanding. It is necessary that Generating units ride through very low frequency through
suitable time delay provided on under frequency protection.
Pre-islanding load shedding is further supplemented by specially set of relays for under frequency condition
during islanded operation. Distress load shedding for a block of load may be necessary by single manual
command from control centre (independent of scada system).
If the frequency starts rising, Automatic load restoration scheme may also be necessary.
Isolated grid condition is detected by all the generating units based on frequency criterion and Governors
start correcting speed as per set droop.
For each island there should be a pre-decided reconnection point with synchronization facility of island with
main grid.
Wide voltage variations are also expected during islanded operations. Excitation system is normally kept in
AVR mode. AVR will try to maintain voltage within the allowable band.
Oscillations and Power swing can cause undesirable tripping that can lead to collapse of island. Measures
such as PSS, Pole slip, PSB, back up impedance protections should be set carefully.
REFERENECES FOR SPS
1. CIGRE TB 432 Protection Relay coordination
2. Power system Protection - P. M. Anderson, IEEE press 1999
3. CIGRE TB 187 System Protection schemes in Power network
4. Deployment of SPS for enhancing reliability of Power system by Mr. V. K. Agrawal et all,POSOCO
5. Special Protection schemes in southern Region Power system by S. K. Sonee et all , SRLDC.
Chapter 3
REQUIREMENTS for protection system
The protection engineer has to understand requirements that are expected from the protection system before
deciding the arrangements for it. Here the requirements can be grouped under two categories:
• External requirements
• Power system requirements
3.1 EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS
External requirements for protective systems encompass a wide range of nontechnical considerations put on the
protection engineer by some external authorities. These considerations fall in the following six categories:
• Requirements imposed by various governmental and other agencies regarding safety.

• Requirements imposed by manufacturers of the primary equipment in order to validate equipment
warranties.
• Requirements by insurance companies who underwrite equipment failures.
• Legal requirements to meet “prudent utility practice and industry standards” in the event that primary
equipment failures result in personal injury or property damage and legal action is taken against the
utility by the parties incurring damage.
• Requirements for the safety grounding systems.
• General power quality requirements from the customer
• Grid codes for Transmission connectivity - Indian Electricity Grid Code 1st April 2010 and Transmission
planning criterion
Some of these requirements may not be imposed or felt at present by the protection engineers in India. But
as and when these are introduced by the concerned authorities to meet the requirements of the system as a
result of deregulation and restructuring coming into force, the appropriate protection application commensurate
with the changed environment will have to made by the concerned authorities. The following paragraphs
give some more details of these requirements.
3.1.1 Safety Regulations
Electrical Safety Regulations may require some back-up protections. These requirements are intended to
meet the minimum requirements associated with public safety.
3.1.2 Equipment Warranties
Utilities may obtain warranty as a part of purchase agreements. The manufacturer has the responsibility to
replace damaged equipment and may require the utility to provide a minimum level of protection.
3.1.3 Insurance Requirements
Devices may be covered by insurance. The insurance companies pay the cost of replacing failed equipment
and may require minimum levels of protection.
3.1.4 Industry Standards
In some cases personal injury and property damage liabilities are decided in court. The court’s decision may
be based on a review of protection standards. If the utility has not met the minimum levels of protection, they
may be held liable for the appropriate damages.
3.1.5 Prudent Utility Practice
Another common case against the utility is based on a review of prudent utility practice. If one utility uses
lower levels of protection than other utilities, it is argued that the utility is not following prudent utility practice
and they may be held liable for the appropriate damages.
3.1.6 Safety Grounding
Care is to be taken to provide for appropriate step and touch potentials during ground faults as also
control circuit transients associated with fault switching or even normal operations. Short clearance time is
advantageous because the risk of electric shock is greatly reduced and the risk of severe injury or death is
greatly reduced if the duration of a current flow through the body is very brief.
3.1.7 Power Quality
Power quality requirements are changing as competition increases. Potential customers will start asking for
reliability data of the electricity supply before they establish new plants. Some process industries cannot
tolerate even very short system disturbances.
3.2 POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In general protection system criteria must meet the planning and operating criteria requirements while
meeting the specific requirements of the power system element being protected and preventing damage to
other power system elements supplying fault current.
Over tripping of protective system must be limited to events where more than (n-1) dimensioning can be
tolerated by the system. Failure of the protective system to operate during fault events must be eliminated
by using appropriate back up protection to fulfill the requirement of planning criteria.
Duplicate protection and back-up protection must meet all of the design requirements of the planning criteria
at a minimal cost.
3.3 NORMS USED TRANSMISSION PLANNING IN INDIAN POWER SYSTEM
The planning and operational requirements and security standards for the purpose of transmission planning
for Indian power system are brought out in the Document titled “Manual on Transmission Planning Criteria”
issued by Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi in January 2013 and this may be referred for more details.
This document may be further subjected to revisions for updating in view of system expansion.
Following requirement has been spelt out pertaining to special Protection schemes:
– To ensure security of the grid, the extreme/rare but credible contingencies should be identified from time
to time and suitable defense mechanism such as Load shedding, Generation rescheduling, Islanding,
special Protection schemes (SPS) etc may be worked out to mitigate adverse impact application of series
capacitors, FACTs devices and phase shifting Transformers (PSTs) in existing and new Transmission
systems to increase Power Transfer Capacity
Requirements for Protection System 19
Further, appropriate Protection schemes are required for specific design/specifications pertaining to…
– Reconductoring with High ampacity conductors
– Use of Multi voltage ,multi circuit transmission towers
– Use of HVDC
– Use of GIS
– Meet N-1 criterion without system parameters crossing allowable limits
– N-2 contingency with SPS to restore operation within allowable limits within one and half hour
– System should survive faults in 400KV system for 100ms and 220/132KV system for 160ms.
3.4 PROTECTION CRITERIA
Protection criteria are developed and derived from the Planning and Operating Criteria. The purpose is to meet
the dimensioning requirements associated with faults so as to prevent loss of stability, loss of synchronism,
voltage collapse, undesired load shedding or unacceptable frequency and voltage excursions. Some utilities
may want to do preventive maintenance with the primary equipment in service.
Utilities may desire to provide for loss of one system element (such as equipment failure) during peak load
conditions. If this be the case such planning criteria should be made known to the protection engineer. It is
vital that there is very close collaboration between the planning and protection engineers at the very early
stages of the projects to identify the protection requirements for the envisaged projects.
There are three types of criteria, as mentioned below, that the protective system must meet.
• Criteria specific to the equipment within the protective zone must be met. These are construction specific
requirements such as tank rupture requirements of capacitor cans.
• Criteria specific to other equipment supplying fault current to the faulted element. These are fault current
withstand requirements such as the maximum fault current duration of a power transformer.
• Criteria specific to the stability of the network. These are topology specific time limits associated with
voltage and transient stability.
Power system faults subject the power generating units to voltage excursions and dips. If the power system
fault occurs close to the large power stations, there is a risk that many power generating units could get
disconnected from the transmission networks. This means that a correctly cleared fault may cause an outage
if the power-generating unit does not withstand severe voltage dips. Back-up delayed clearance of a power
system fault close to the power plant may cause a severe outage. General voltage stability requirements
determine the duration of the fault and are system configuration dependent.
3.5 FAULT CURRENT WITHSTAND CAPABILITY
No utility can specify that the power system elements specially CT, Isolators and circuit breakers besides
the power transformers shall withstand only fault currents associated with normal fault clearance and take
the risk of circuit breaker failures. The system elements are usually specified to withstand the fault currents
associated with back-up clearance times of 1.0 and 3.0 seconds.
The power system elements must withstand both normal rated load currents and fault currents specified.
The rated peak withstand current and the rated short time withstand current characterize the components.
Fault currents are usually small in the initial stages of development of power system. Normally, the
magnitude of the fault current increases as the system develops. The magnitude of fault currents influences
the dimensioning of the power system components like transformers, circuit breakers and other primary
equipment. High short circuit currents affect primarily the mechanical and thermal dimensioning of the power
system components.
The fault clearance system cannot normally influence the peak value of the fault current. The properties of
the fault clearance system can, however, influence the duration of the fault current. Thus, the fault clearance
time influences the heating of conductors during disturbances. The protection engineer must know how long
the power system components can withstand the fault currents without permanent damage. In general, the
components of the power system are specified to withstand the fault current duration associated with back-
up fault clearance as specified in national and international standards. For example, transformer through
fault capability is outlined in ANSI/IEEE C57.12.00 and IEC Publications 76-5.
The requirements in respect of Indian Power System for fault withstand currents of the power system elements
are brought out in the document entitled “Manual on Transmission Planning Criteria” of Central Electricity
Authority, New Delhi, January 2013. Some details from this are reproduced below.
Table 3.1 Rated breaking current capability of switchgear at different voltages
System voltage Fault level Duration

132 kV 31.5 1 sec.
220 kV 40 1 sec.
400 kV 40/50/63 kA 1 Sec.
765 kV 40 kA 1 Sec.
3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYSTEM PLANNERS AND PROTECTION ENGINEERS
For reasons brought out above, it is recommended that the system planners and designers assess the
requirements for 132 kV, 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV systems and coordinate with the protection engineers
to ensure that these requirements are fulfilled. Sometimes such requirements may have to be studied
on case-to-case basis where general guidelines may not be sufficient to meet the system requirements
and suitable measures taken. In view of rapid generation expansions there could be certain locations in
generation complexes where fault level may exceed the specified short time current rating. In such cases
suitable measures are required to be taken by the system planners to contain and limit the fault current
through effective use of Fault Current Limiters.
Chapter 4
GUIDELINEs FOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

ENGINEERING
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The Control and Protection System equipment in a Substation is a vital part that supervises, protects and
controls the transmission of electrical power.The increasing complexity in the substations of today, together
with the increasing transmitted power and the increasing fault current levels, means increasing requirement
set on the control and protection equipment. Lowest possible Life Cycle Costs and highest possible service
reliability are the main objectives. Flexibility and maintainability are also important factors in order to attain
a total reliability.
The selection of the primary apparatus, choice of AIS, GIS or Hybrid switchgear, switching arrangement to
be used and transformer sizes etc. are important in order to achieve a low life cycle costs. Then choices of
control and protection equipment is done e.g. conventional or computerized control equipment, single or
redundant protection systems, design and voltage of battery system, choice of battery type etc. All choices
must be done with the expected future development in mind. Later changes will always mean a much higher
cost than a selection made during inception considering future needs.
In this chapter some broad guidelines for Engineering of Protection System are given. These could be
refined if felt necessary by the utility according to its specific needs and practices.
These days, control and monitoring, signaling and event recording in most cases are done by SCADA
system.Guidelines for engineering of SCADAsystem is not addressed here.
4.2 Engineering of protection system
4.2.1 Group A and Group B Protection Systems
Wherever two sets of DC sources are available, to obtain redundancy and to be able to take a protection
out for maintenance, while protected equipment is in service, the relays are electrically and physically
segregated into two groups. Grouping is done to the extent possible in such a way that each group can
independently carry out protective functions with near equal redundancy. Interconnection between these
two groups shall not generally be attempted. However if absolutely necessary, such interconnection shall
be kept to the bare minimum.
A common practice used at redundant systems is:
• Use of redundant batteries shall be done.
• Two groups of protections are used each capable of performing the protection function fully.
• Physical separation of the two groups as far as possible.
• Different cores are used on the instrument transformers for the two protection groups.
• The circuit breakers are not duplicated for cost reason. However duplicated trip coils are used.
• Cables shall be laid in different cable ducts/layers as far as possible.

As the circuit breakers are not duplicated, the failure of a breaker to operate will mean that the fault is not
cleared. In order to clear the faults the surrounding breakers are then required to operate instead. For
applications where local back-up is required due to failure of “remote” protection relays to detect the fault, a
breaker failure relay is thus essential. The breaker failure relay measures the fault current still fed through
the breaker after expected tripping and will then trip all theadjacent circuit breakers.
4.2.2 Instrument Transformer Circuits
The instrument transformers are normally not duplicated but only provided with different cores for the two
sub-systems. The redundant protection systems are connected to different cores. One current transformer
core feeding both sub-systems should be avoided. Each Busbar protection should be fed from a dedicated
CT core. Any current loop feeding more than one panel should be avoided due to the risk of open circuits at
terminating point or in the terminal itself (especially when this has a disconnectable link). Both sub systems
are normally connected to the same CT junction box. Thus physical separation in different CT junction boxes
is normally not possible. However different cores of the CT should be taken through separate cables.
For voltage transformer circuits it is common to use separate secondary windings for the two sub-systems.
In some cases if two windings are not available (ex. At lower voltage levels), the circuits should be separated
using different fuse groups in the marshalling box. This is normally acceptable solution due to the high
availability of voltage transformers.
4.2.3 Physical Location of Panels
When sub-divided systems are used the physical location of the protective relays and necessary auxiliary
relays in the panels is of main importance.
The practice shall be to use different panels for group A and group B protection equipment. The reason for
physical split-up is to prevent problems to both the group of protections due to a single event like cable fire
or mechanical damage in a panel. It also allows working on one group when the other group is in service.
However in some cases where the sub-systems takes small place it is considered acceptable to put the
equipment for both sub-systems in the same panel.The risk of cable fire or other mechanical damage which
could influence the two systems in the same panel is negligible. Problems with mixing up of circuits due to
mistakes during erection, commissioning or maintenance must be considered and steps should be taken
to prevent such possibilities.
From above, it follows that an important part at panel design is to clearly indicate the object to which it
belongs. When sub-divided systems are used the sub-system belonging shall also be clearly indicated. This
includes clear separation of the equipment and clear labelling of different sections, separation parts between
sub-systems or objects. The separation must also be done inside the panel by physically separating the
terminal groups for the different protected equipment in the panel.
All equipment used in the protection system and also other auxiliary relays connected to the same battery
system, or fuse groups, shall be grouped together and clearly labelled. This includes the equipment for
closing, interlocking etc. which is located in the protection panel.
4.2.4 Exchange of Information between two Subsystems
The main principle used when sub-divided systems are utilized is to avoid signal exchange between the two
systems. As far as possible, sub-systems shall operate completely independent of each other. This gives the
highest total security during maintenance etc. due to human or equipment failure.However, in most cases,
some signals are required to go to other sub-system. The most common signals are:
Startand block of auto-recloser.
Auto-recloser is normally not duplicated due to speed problems with two units and also because a failure to
Guidelines for Protection System Engineering 23
autoreclose doesn’t result in serious issues. A number of signals are exchanged between the sub-systems
associated with starting and blocking of autoreclose function.
Start of Breaker Failure Protection
Similar to Auto-recloser function, the Breaker failure relay/ function (BFR) is not duplicated in redundant
systems. The reason for this is however completely different. The Breaker failure function has extremely
high requirements on the security against unnecessary trippings and duplication will mean an increased
dependability but the security will decrease. As the risk of breaker failure statistically is very low and the
security aspect is more important.The BFR function is only provided in one of the systems, normally in the
Group Aprotection system. The practice of giving DC changeover to BFR relay when a single BFR is used
is common these days as it adds to the reliability & availability. If breaker failure function is duplicated as
for example when duplicate busbar protection is used the risks involved with respect to security should be
taken note off.
The exchange of information between the systems should be handled with utmost care to prevent problems
e. g. when maintenance is done in one of the systems. Interface relays should be put inside or on front on
a preferably separate labelled area in one of the panels only. The terminals should also be clearly indicated
inside the panel for easy identification and disconnection of the correct terminals when the sub-systems
are to be separated.
4.2.5 Arrangement of Trip Circuits
Another main part of the protection system is the trip circuits. A failure of the trip circuit will of course cause
a failure to trip the breaker. As mentioned above the breaker itself is not duplicated for cost reason and the
only realistic means of improving dependability is to use two trip coils on the breaker. This will minimize
CB operational failure problems associated with DC supply, the wiring or the trip coil but will not give any
advantage for mechanical problems in CB operating mechanism.
4.2.6 Tripunit
In case of segregation being made as indicated above, scheme associated with each circuit breaker is
provided with two sets of trip units, one in Gr A and one in Gr.B. Each set consists of one unit for 1phase
and 3 phase tripping and another for 3 phase tripping only. 1 phase tripping unit and 3 phase tripping units
are initiated by functions as described below. However, in case the protection relay itself is having sufficient
number of trip duty contacts then separate 1 phase trip units may not be necessary. Dedicated 3 phase trip
relay units are normally required to cater to various protection functions giving 3 phase trip signal. Trip relay
supervision if often used to supervise healthiness of trip coil and give alarm.
A line protection cubicle thus will have both 1/3 phase trip unit and 3 ph trip unit in both the groups, while the
others like transformer / reactor and bus bar cubicles will have only 3 ph trip unit in both the groups.
1ph and 3ph trip (Protections which start auto recloser function)
• Main I Line Protection
• Main II Line Protection
These units shall be applicable for line circuits only and shall be with self-reset type contacts
3ph trip (protections which block auto reclosure function)
• Direct trip receive
• Reactor protections
• Bus bar protection

• LBB protection
• Transformer protections
• Overvoltage protection
• Back up protections
The 3 phase trip unit shall be latched type with hand/electrical reset facility
4.2.7 Direct Trip of Remote End Breaker
In line with the present practice it is recommended that for 400 kV and 765 kV systems, direct trip signal is
sent to remote end on the operation of following protections:
• LBB protection
• Reactor protection
• Overvoltage protection
• Bus Bar protection (under Tie CB open condition in case of one and half circuit breaker layout)
• Manual line trip
4.2.8 Trip Circuit Supervision
Another means of further improving dependability of the trip circuit is to include trip circuit supervision
relay/s. The trip circuit supervision relay shall be capable of monitoring under both CB OFF and CB ON
conditions. These can supervise the circuit from the relay panel to the breaker and will detect open circuit
or loss of DC supply. It should be ensured that all wiring is included in the supervision. Special care must
be taken when some trip contacts are provided in different panels which can happen for transformer bays
or generator bays.
4.2.9 Cabling
A common requirement for duplicated protection system is to use different cable ways for the two systems.
Often this requirement is limited to laying cables in different layers i.e. use of different cable ladders in the
same cable duct. However, under all circumstances, Group A and Group B signals must be in different
cables.
It is recommended that:
• Separate cables are used for AC & DC circuits
• Separate cables are used for DC 1 & DC 2 circuits
• Separate cables are used for CT & CVT circuits
4.2.10 Capacitive Discharges
Trip and important operation relays should be stable during the capacitive discharges which can occur at
an earth fault in the DC system. Wherever necessary, special types of relays with stabilization against this
discharge should be used.
Control & Protection IEDs normally use opto-isolated type binary inputs and their switching threshold rating
should be carefully chosen such that these do not go high in case of an earth fault in DC system.
4.2.11 Alarming and Testing
The protection system is designed according to “single failure criteria”. This means that the “single failures” in
the protection system must be discovered within a reasonable time. An alarming of secondary system faults
is thus of same importance as the alarming of primary faults. The alarms must be connected/ configured to
give annunciation at remote control location as well.
Some faults are not detected by the supervision equipment. To detect these faults regular system testing
and post fault disturbance analysis are of vital importance. Testing and analyzing of protection system
behaviour gives a possibility to detect “hidden faults” such as failure in some parts of a protection relay and
associated wiring connections or problems with selected settings, configurations or with the used measuring
principle.
A correctly performed alarming and regular testing of the protection system will ensure that faults in the
secondary circuits are discovered and the fault clearance is ensured when a fault occur in the primary
system.
4.2.12 General Aspects on Security and Dependability
As mentioned earlier, the reason for redundant systems is to ensure the local back-up i.e. secure fault
clearance according to the “single failure criteria”. This is fulfilled with the two independent systems where
one system can fail in any component of the fault clearance chain but the fault clearance in primary system
is secured.
Most unwanted tripping in sub-stations areattributed mainly to human errors. A basic principle at protection
system design should therefore be, to design the protection system as simple as possible while fulfilling the
single failure criteria.
The design of fault clearing system shall be such that human mistakes are avoided and this includes mistakes
during all stages of project i.e. right from basic design where guide-lines are set, through detailed design
stage, to erection, commissioning and maintenance stage.
It must be noted that the life-cycle cost of a plant comprises largely of cost for service and maintenance and
also cost for availability. The cost of an unnecessary tripping can be much higher than the initial incremental
investment needed to include some extra equipment to make a robust system. Unnecessary equipment and
complications should thus be avoided.
In summary it can be said that means to ensure a reliable redundant protection system are:
• Minimise the mixing of equipment from different protected objects or from different sub-systems in
the same panel.
• When mixing, clearly label the equipment on the front and also within the panel to indicate object or
subsystem belonging.
• A standardized terminal numbering system simplifies design and minimizes mistakes at panel design
and subsequent erection and commissioning.
• A separate terminal group should be used for inter-panel wirings
4.3 DC distribution
The auxiliary power system has a very central role in a substation. A fault in the battery system will mean
that neither control and protection equipment nor primary equipment can fulfil their tasks. Often a complete
station or a big part of a station is influenced by a main problem in the auxiliary power system.
Insubstations of 110 kV voltage level and above, two battery systems are used to provide redundant protection
systems.
At lower voltages, this may not be necessary as protection system with remote back-up protection is normally
used. The supervision of the auxiliary power supply is of utmost importance.
4.3.1 DC Distribution to Different Equipment
Since the availability of even the best engineered protection depends upon the integrity of the DC auxiliary
supply, considerable care has to be given to the design of a system which will retain the reliability of the
protection system as a whole, under all conditions. Secondly from an operational point of view, it is essential
that it is possible to work on any part of the protection system with full security, while not disturbing the rest
of the protection system. Sub-fusing of the DC circuits shall be done with care since blowing of the fuse
will have to be monitored. Also such sub-fusing shall be kept to the minimum and can be augmented with
isolating links as required.
It is desirable to limit the exposure of circuits that supply the IEDs so that possibility of their loosing DC power
supply is less likely. The DC supply associated with circuit breaker circuits must go out into the yard where
they have greater exposure to surges, faults or physical damage that can trip the DC auxiliary supply.
Arising out of these considerations, following guidelines for designing a suitable DC distribution system
have been set forth.
Following shall be connected to DC1
• Group A protection through separately fused / MCB feed.

• Close and trip coil 1 of associated circuit breaker through separately fused /MCB feed.
• Disconnector, earth switch and operation circuits and enabling circuits etc. through separately fused/
MCB feed. In the case of a breaker and half CB arrangement, the disconnector, earthing switch
associated with the tie CB shall also be fed from DC1.
• Bay control unit for control function through separately fused/ MCB feed with a DC changeover supply
circuit. (A DC change over scheme is used to change over to DC2 in case DC1 fails.)
• LBB protection through a separately fused/ MCB feed.
Following shall be connected to DC2
• The DC2 distribution should be kept to minimum as much as possible. Preferably it should only be
used in relay panel and on breaker trip coil.
• Protection Group B through separately fused/ MCB feed.
• Trip coil 2 of circuit breaker through separately fused/ MCB feed.
To simplify the fault finding at earth faults in the DC supply system a structured terminal system is
recommended.
4.3.2 DC Supervision
A well designed supervision of the DC supply to each bay in a substation should be provided to supervise
the feeding fuse, an open circuit and a blown fuse/MCB in the sub distribution. Alarm contact of the DC/
DC converters, if used, should be connected to the supervision so that a common alarm is given when DC
problems anywhere in the distribution occurs.
As a rule every DC supply going through fuse should be supervised with a no-volt relay. These no-volt relay
contacts used for alarm shall be delay and drop off type to take care of momentary supply fluctuations. For
trip circuits where separate trip circuit supervision relays are provided, it is good practice to provide separate
DC supervision relays in order to differentiate between DC incomer fail and trip circuit fail.
Alarm circuits for DC problems will require secure AC supply and this must be ensured.
MCBs of adequate breaking capacity (short circuit current rating at rated voltage of the DC circuit) can also
be used instead of fuses. The auxiliary contacts (preferably fault trip type) of MCBs shall be used for DC
circuit supervision. DC fail, Trip circuit fail, IED fail contacts should be connected to give alarm.
4.4 Panel design
The panel design and construction shall be done following a number of general guidelines:
• The layout should follow the layout of the primary switchgear to avoid confusion.
• The panels should be clearly and visibly labelled, so that objects located in the panel is easily
identified.
• The possibilities of future extensions should be kept in mind both in panel design and the location in
the room etc.
Maintenance procedures should be simplified as much as possible and the design should minimize the risk of
mistakes such as testing the wrong object or the need of making a lot of reconnections, to enable testing.
Panel enclosure shall be proven to offer adequate shielding for electromagnetic compatibility particularly in
the presence of intense electromagnetic interference fields.
4.4.1 Terminals
The terminals inside a panel are small but important components in a substation. They should have possibility
to simple connect and disconnect wires with a clearly visible indication. A maximum of two cores / wires
are to be connected at each side of a terminal and a mixture of single core and stranded wires should be
avoided.
For terminal numbering, a clear nomenclature structure should be used to improve the total quality and ease
of troubleshooting. Different functional type of circuits in the panel can simply be separated. The system
used enables a clear separation of main and back-up protection and gives an indication of interface and trip
circuits which is of importance for the service and maintenance. A terminal nomenclature system allowing for
visibility of sub-system and circuit belonging is then an important part to simplify and ensure a correct design.
Suggested grouping is given below. Within this suitable terminal grouping and numbering can be done.
Relay Panel Main 1 and Main 2 Protection
• Current circuit : Core 1,Core 2, Core 3, Core 4, Core 5
• Voltage circuit : Feed1, Feed 2, Feed 3
• Open delta voltage circuit, if applicable
• PLCCcircuit (intertrip, Direct trip send / receive)
• Control & Trip circuit
• Group A and Group B Interface
• Trip outputs (incl CB fail, intertrip etc.)
Other Circuits
• Control circuits: DC distribution, Other circuits
• Annunciator circuits: DC distribution, Other circuits

• SCADA circuits: DC distribution, Other circuits
• Event recorder circuits: DC distribution, Other circuits
• Fault Recorder circuits: DC distribution, Other circuits
• DC Supply Main 1 (feeding MCB/fuse) : DC distribution
• DC Supply Main 2 (feeding MCB/fuse) : DC distribution
• AC Supply for Heaters Lighting etc. : AC distribution, Other circuits
External cables are terminated on the designated terminals. Cable cores are simple to erect if the connection
of the different cores of cable is inthe same circuit group. Extra terminals, duly numbered for future use
(normally 10-20%) should also beadded under each terminal group.
4.5 Fault signaling
When a fault takes place in the primary network, it’s of importance that the operating personal receives
information about fault type, whether the fault is persistent or transient, what phases are involved and the
fault location so that correct actions can be taken. At a fault in the protection and control equipment, it is of
great importance that the operating personal receives information about the disturbances so that corrective
actions can be taken. These faults don’t normally mean disturbance for the system service but need to be
repaired / rectified within a short time. An alarm for a fault in the battery system like a lost battery charging
need to be fixed within 4-10 hours depending on the batteries capacity so that the station is not left without
protection and control. A fault in the primary system would then have large consequences resulting in
equipment damage and disturbances over wide area. Several different equipment types are used to give
information about primary and control equipment faults. Among them are:
• Local Annunciation and indication
• Sequential Event recorder
• Disturbance recorder
• Line Fault locator
• Remote signaling
In order to achieve a high reliability and to follow up disturbances in the primary system, behaviour of the
protection system, post fault analysis is very important. These functions can be stand alone or part of
substation protection and automation system.
4.6 Interlocking
The interlocking system will prevent human mistakes which can lead to severe damages of equipment
and/or injuries of persons. With the developments that have taken place incontrol automation system and
the increasing integration of circuits, it is of greatest importance to always keep in mind the requirement of
independence between the operation circuits and the interlocking circuits.
Independence does not necessary mean independent hardware but the design of the circuit to achieve a
highest possible reliability is important.
4.7 Documentation
A big amount of documentation is necessary for each station in order to enable service, maintenance, fault
finding, purchasing of spare parts and extensions of the station. The documents produced are for varying
categories of personal. Erection, commissioning, maintenance and engineering departments, have all
different requirements and use different documentation in their work. The documentation can be separated
in following parts:
• Operation and Maintenance manuals.
• Electrical design: Circuit diagram, General arrangement drawing, foundation drawing, apparatus list,
wiring table and interconnection tables/ cable schedule etc.
• Erection manuals
• Primary equipment details required for setting calculations.
• Relay settings
• IED configuration files
• Factory test reports
• Commissioning test reports.
It is of utmost importance that the documentation is kept updated and that old versions are discarded. An
up-to-date document set shall be stored at the substation in hard as well as soft form.
4.8 Location of CTs and VTs
Instrument transformers (CTs and VTs) are used to obtain measured quantities of current and voltage in
appropriate form for use in control, protection and measuring equipment. In a substation these are installed
in different bays such as line, transformer, bus coupler and also at the busbar. The location of instrument
transformers have an impact on the engineering of the control and protection schemes. These aspects are
covered in this section.
4.8.1 Current Transformers
Location
The location of the current transformers decides the protection zones. The most common approach is to
locate the current transformer outside the circuit breaker, so that bus bar differential protection can cover
the circuit breaker. The location should generally be as close to the circuit breaker as possible. With this the
zones where an incorrect tripping is achieved is kept to minimum. For GIS switchgears a requirement to
cover all GIS compartments from the bus bar protection without any dead/blind zone is desirable. This can
be achieved by providing CT cores on both sides of each circuit breaker. This ensures an instantaneous trip
for all faults in the GIS and minimizes the risk of “burn-through”.
In double bus-bars scheme with bus coupler, the CTs are located on both sides of bus section breaker, which
facilitates overlapping of the two zones of protection and avoid blind zone. However it is also common to
provide CT on only one side of the circuit breaker to reduce costs.
When Transfer bus bars are used a location of current transformers outside the C-disconnector is preferred.
The protected object will then still be in operation when the transfer bus bar and transfer breaker is used
to bypass any of the main breaker scheduled for maintenance and only a rearrangement of the trip circuit
to the transfer breaker needs to be done which is quite simple.
At one and a half circuit breaker system different methods of locating the CT are practiced. Ideally, 8 CTs are
required to be provided for a CB and Half diameter. The complexity has prompted the practice of eliminating
the bus side CT of Main Breakers, to make a 6 CT scheme. If one CT in the tie bay is also removed it
becomes a 5 CT scheme. Removing the feeder CTs altogether and using summation of Main and Tie CB
CTs results in 4CT and removal of one more Tie CT becomes 3 CT scheme.
With removal of each CT from the ideal of 8 in a diameter, one “Blind” zone of protection gets introduced.
A blind zone is a live area of the switchyard uncovered by any primary protection. Faults in such sections
depend on end zone protection or Local Breaker Backup protection or remote back up for clearance. In 4CT
scheme when a circuit is off and that diameter is closed the “Tee” portion is unprotected. Some utilities do
provide overcurrent based STUB protection for such operating condition.
CT is failure prone equipment and reducing the number is desirable. However, primary protection capable
of detecting the fault correctly under all circumstances including CT failure must be provided. Utilities have
been following all the above schemes based on techno-commercial and layoutconsideration.
CT Polarity
As a practice the P2 terminal of the CT shall be towards the bus and P1 away from the bus.
Earthing
To prevent dangerous potential in the secondary circuit of a current transformer all secondary circuits shall
be earthed. The grounding of CTs is important to both safety and the correct operation of protective relays.
To assure safe and reliable operation, the neutral of the CT secondary should have a single ground location
for each circuit. The single ground is irrespective of the number of CTs or the chosen grounding location.
Utilizing a single ground eliminates the risk of redundant ground loops and associated problems.
During normal operation more than one ground on a CT circuit is not an obvious problem, other than the
difficulties it may cause during testing. However, during a fault condition, multiple grounds allow a different
ground potential rise for each CT. The result is a significant current flow through the CT circuit that is not
representative of the primary current. This ground loop typically creates a potential across the operating
coil of the differential relay, causing the relay to pick up as though a fault exists in the relay’s protective
zone. Tripping a differential relay due to a fault external to the zone of protection is one of the more frequent
nuisance trips. These nuisance trips may not only shut down the load but may require a maintenance crew
to spend days testing to determine that no real problem exists in the differential zone. Further, the actual
problem may go undiscovered until the system is re-energized into the original fault.
Neutral connection and earthing shall be made as under:
Protection core: Neutral and earth towards protected object.
Metering core: Neutral and earth toward the metering direction.
It is possible to earth the CT neutral either in CT junction box or in the control/protection cubicle. However, it
is preferable to earth the CT secondary neutral in the control/protection cubicle in order to provide maximum
security to the operating personnel. This should always be done at the panels where it enters first.
Reconnected CTs
Primary as well as secondary reconnections are used. At primary reconnection there are two primary windings,
usually only one turn each, which are connected in series or in parallel. Independent of the tap used on the
primary, the secondary core data does not change.
CTs with secondary taps have taps on the secondary winding. The secondary core data will then is linearly
reduced. Secondary taps that are not used shall be left open. Cores not used shall be short-circuited at
maximum taps. An open current transformer secondary circuit will mean dangerous voltages and must
therefore be avoided carefully.
Terminals
To enable a simple testing and reconnection of current circuits at commissioning/fault finding the terminals
should be brought to separate terminal blocks and suitable connections made on to these. With this a
simple change of current direction is achieved by changing the link. A simple test of each core can be done
from the terminals. The terminals should be of disconnecting types and should be suitable for connection
of normal test wires.
4.8.2 Voltage Transformer
Location
The location of the voltage transformers mainly depend on the switchgear arrangement, the protection, the
metering and the automation connected.
Normally, voltage transformers connected to the bus bars and at the low voltage side of the transformers
are satisfactory in a distribution substation. Directional Protection on outgoing bays are then fed from the
busbar VTs.
On the transmission voltage level the protection equipment will normally require voltage transformers at
all objects, sometimes with exception of the HV side of power transformers. Further, a single phase set
is located at the busbars for voltage, frequency and synchronizing purpose. This avoids complex voltage
selection schemes
Earthing and Fusing
The secondary circuits are fused and earthed in the VT marshalling box or in the control/ protection cubicle.
This will ensure that dangerous voltages will not occur. However, it is preferable to earth the VT secondary
neutral in the control/protection cubicle in order to provide maximum security to the operating personnel.
The fusing can be done with diazed fuses or Miniature Circuit Breakers (MCBs). VT secondary neutral should
also be grounded at one point only.
Supervision
A fault can always occur even if the plant is well designed and well-constructed. When a fault occurs it’s of
importance that the fault is immediately detected and an alarm given to enable the maintenance personal
to quickly repair the fault. A fault in a metering circuit will mean incorrect metering, with loss of income as a
result. A fault in a protection circuit can mean one missing or incorrect tripping which will lead to unnecessary
disconnection of one or several objects.
The supervision of a voltage transformer secondary circuit can be done using a relay designed to check
asymmetry between the phases. Any fuse failure will mean asymmetry between the phases which is then
detected and the relay can by that detect one or two phase fuse failure.
Another method is using a differential voltage where the voltage of a main fuse, supplying the protection
relay, and a pilot fuse are compared. This principle will detect one, two or three phase fuse failures.
Another solution used to detect fuse failures in some types of distance protection is to compare the occurrence
of zero or negative sequence voltage with the occurrence of zero or negative sequence current. If only
voltage occurs the problem is a blown fuse. If both current and voltages occur there isn’t a fuse problem
but it is a primary earth or phase fault. The drawback with this principle is that it will only detect one and two
phase fuse failures. However the normal faults on a voltage transformer circuits are single phase to earth
and very rarely between two phases.
If MCBs are used an auxiliary contact can be used to give alarm. If Distance protection relays shall be blocked
a special MCB with low instantaneous level and a very fast auxiliary contact must be used.
Cabling
Dedicated cables shall be used for the voltage transformer secondary circuits. The cable shall be screened
and earthed at both ends to keep the disturbance voltages to low levels.
The secondary cabling must be dimensioned to:
Ensure that fuse/MCB will operate, in a reasonable time, for a fault at the far end of the cables.
Keep the voltage drop, due to the burden, one level lower than the inaccuracies in the voltage
transformer.
A special problem occurring in voltage transformer circuits if fuses are used is the risk of back-feeding a
faulty phase from the healthy phases. This phenomena occurs when phase to phase connected load exists.
The phase with the blown fuse can reach rather high voltage level. The level is decided by the load in the
different phases.
Line CVTs coupling capacitors for power line carrier (PLC). They are then to be located at the line side of the
line traps and line earthing switches.
CVTs are used for metering, protection and synchronization. Located at the line entry they also enable
For 220kV,
indication of voltage on a line400kV and from
energized 765kVthelevel it is end.
opposite recommended that be
CVTs can also each line
used asbay is provided
coupling with CVTs in
capacitors
for power line carrier (PLC). They
all the three phases.are then to be located at the line side of the line traps and line earthing
switches.
Bus VTs/CVTs
For 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV level it is recommended that each line bay is provided with CVTs in all the
three phases. Three phase VTs/CVTs on the busbars provide input for metering equipment, relays and reference
voltage for synchronization.
Bus VTs/CVTs
CVT at the junction point of main and tie CB
Three phase VTs/CVTs on the busbars provide input for metering equipment, relays and reference voltage
for synchronization.
It is suggested that a single phase VT be provided at the junction point of main CB and Tie CB in one
and half
CVT at the junction breaker
point system.
of main and This will help in obtaining VT supply for synchronization purpose without
tie CB
going in for complicated voltage selection scheme.
It is suggested that a single phase VT be provided at the junction point of main CB and Tie CB in one and
1.1 This
half breaker system. CT and VT inlocations
will help obtainingin
VTdifferent
supply fortypes of bus configurations
synchronization purpose without going in for
complicated voltage selection scheme.
Double bus arrangement
4.8.3 CT and This
VT Locations in figure
is shown in Different Types
1. The CTsofshall
BusbeConfigurations
placed near the circuit breakers (CBs) and on the line side.
The detection zones of line relays and busbar relays start at the CTs. It is advantageous if the CT is
Double Bus Arrangement
located close to the CB. In the improbable case of a fault between the CT and CB the bus bar
protection
This is shown in willThe
Figure 4.1. detect
CTsand clear
shall the fault.
be placed near the circuit breakers (CBs) and on the line side.
The detection zones of line relays and busbar relays start at the CTs. It is advantageous if the CT is located
close to the CB. In the improbable case of a fault between the CT and CB the bus bar protection will detect
and clear the fault.
Fig. 4.1 : Double busbar arrangement
Double Main and Transfer Bus Arrangement
This is shown in Figure 4.2. It is advantageous to locate the CTs on the line side of the disconnectors for
Line and Transformer bays. In this way the protective relay connected to the CT will remain connected to
the line or Transformer when it is switched over to the transfer busbar.
Figure 1: Double busbar arrangement

Double main and transfer bus arrangement
connected to the line or Transformer when it is switched over to the transfer busbar.
This is shown in figure 2. It is advantageous to locate the CTs on the line side of the disconnectors for
Line and Transformer A separate
bays. InCT is required
this way the toprotective
be provided in the
relay Transfertobus
connected thecoupler bayremain
CT will to obtain
for faults on Transfer bus. Figure 3 shows overlapping of zones
connected to the line or Transformer when it is switched over to the transfer busbar. of protection
A separate CT is required to for
Guidelines be Protection
provided System
in the Transfer bus coupler bay to obtain selective
Engineering 33 tripping
for faults on Transfer bus. Figure 3 shows overlapping of zones of protection
A separate CT is required to be provided in the Transfer bus coupler bay to obtain selective tripping for faults
on Transfer bus. Figure 4.3 shows overlapping of zones of protection
Figure 2: Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
Fig. 4.2 : Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement

Figure 2: Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
Fig. 4.3 : Overlapping of zones of protection in double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
Bus Coupler and Bus Sectionalizer Bays
In the bus coupler and bus sectionaliser bays shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 a set of CTs is necessary
Figure 3 :Overlapping of zones of protection in double Main with Transfer bus arran
to enable different busbar protection zones to be formed. For faults between CB and CT the protection can
be arranged to give complete fault clearing with a short time-delay similar to LBB time delay. Sometimes CTs
on the two sides of CB are employed by some utilities but are usually not considered necessary. Therefore,
Figure 3 :Overlapping of zones of protection in double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
only one set of CTs is recommended considering costs involved in providing one more set of CTs.
4.8.4 CT and VT Locations in One and a Half Breaker Bus Configuration
These are shown in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. There are four main arrangements
that are normally used.
One and a half breaker arrangement with 4CTs

providing one more set of CTs.
1.2 CT and VT locations in one and a half breaker bus configuration
These are shown in figure 4, figure 5, figure 6 and figure 7. There are four main arrangements that
are normally used.
34 One and a half breakerManual
arrangement with 4CTs
on Power System Protection
One and a half breaker
One and a 6CTs half breaker arrangement with 3CTs
This isarrangement
shown in figurewith
4. The CTs are located close to the CBs. Tie CB is provided with two CTs.
Thisthere
Thus altogether is shown inper
are 4 CTs figure 5. The
Tie CB is provided with only one CT. Thus altogether there ar
diameter .
. per diameter. This means saving of one set of CTs per diameter which is quite substantia
This is shown in Figure 4.4. secondary
The CTs are located
side closemetering
one more to the CBs.
coreTieis CB is provided
provided. Thuswith twoCTs
these CTs.have
Thus6 cores on the se
altogether there are 4 CTs per diameter .
side compared to the ones used in 4CT arrangement which have only 5 cores on the secondary
Figure 5 shows overlapping of zones of protection in both 4CT and 3 CT arrangement.
a half breaker arrangement with 3CTs

wn in figure 5. The Tie CB is provided with only one CT. Thus altogether there are 3 CTs
er. This means saving of one set of CTs per diameter which is quite substantial. In the
side one more metering core is provided. Thus these CTs have 6 cores on the secondary
red to the ones used in 4CT arrangement which have only 5 cores on the secondary side.
Fig. 4.4 : One and half breaker arrangement with 4CTs
Figure 4 : One and half breaker arrangement with 4CTs
Oneof
ows overlapping and a Half
zones Breaker Arrangement
of protection with
in both 4CT and 3CTs
3 CT arrangement.
This is shown in Figure 4.5. The Tie CB is provided with only one CT. Thus altogether there are 3 CTs per
diameter. This means saving of one set of CTs per diameter which is quite substantial. In the secondary side
one more metering core is provided. Thus these CTs have 6 cores on the secondary side compared to the
ones used in 4CT arrangement which have only 5 cores on the secondary side.
Figure 4.5 shows overlapping of zones of protection in both 4CT and 3 CT arrangement.
Fig. 4.5 : Overlapping of zones of protection in One and half breaker arrangement with 4 CTs and 3 CTs
Figure 5 : Overlapping of zones of protection in One and half breaker arrangement with 4 CT
CTs
One and a half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs
Figure 4.6 shows 5CT arrangement. One CT each for the main CB and one CT for the Tie CB. In addition
a separate CT is provided on the line side thus making it altogether 5 CTs per diameter.
The advantages with this arrangement are:
Paralleling of two CTs to the main line protection is not required. This gives better transient response.
Separate stub protection can be connected.
Presently there are many installations with 4 CT arrangement where paralleling of two CT cores need to be
done to obtain the current flowing through the line. The performance of this 4 CT arrangement has been
satisfactory.
One and a half breaker arrangement with 6 CTs
Figure 4.7 shows 6CT arrangement. One CT each for the main CB and two CTs for the Tie CB. In addition
a separate CT is provided on the line side thus making it altogether 6 CTs per diameter.
The advantages with this arrangement are similar to that of 5 CT arrangement. Since one more CT is
provided for the Tie CB,
Paralleling of two CTs to the main line protection is not required. This gives better transient response
Separate stub protection can be connected
Fault between CB and CT is cleared instantaneously
Presently there are many installations with 4 CT arrangement where paralleling of two CT cores need to
be done to obtain the current flowing through the line. The performance of this 4 CT arrangement has
been satisfactory. Therefore, it is suggested that 4 CT arrangement can continued to be adopted at 400 kV
stations as is being done at present. For 765 kV stations, generally 3 CT arrangement is used from cost
considerations. 6 CT arrangement is used where delayed fault clearance for faults between the CT and the
CB in the diameter is not acceptable. Though 8 CT arrangement
Figure 6: Onewherein one
and half morearrangement
breaker CT can be provided on
with 5 CTs
the bus side of the breaker can be provided is possible, it is not practiced.
Fig. 4.6 : One and half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs Fig. 4.7 : One and half breaker arrangement with 6 CTs
Figure 6: One and half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs

Chapter 5
Performance indices
The task of fault clearance system is to detect power system faults and abnormalities, identify the faulty item
of the plant, and interrupt the fault currents as quickly and reasonable. In order to assess quantitatively the
reliability of fault clearance systems, there have to be a set of performance indices. For this purpose, certain
indices for protection devices and switching devices are recommended and these are described below.
5.1 Correct performance
To describe what is meant by correct performance and what is incorrect performance by a protective system
consider the following three cases:
Consider a fault in the power system for which the protection system provided should operate. If the protection
system operates and issues a correct tripping command, it should be taken as correct performance and if it
does not issue tripping command then it should be taken as incorrect performance (non-operation)
Consider a fault in the power system for which the protection should not operate. In this case, if the protection
system operates and issues a trip command then it is considered as incorrect performance.
Consider a case when neither a power system fault nor an abnormality exists and therefore the protection
should not operate. In this case, the protection system operates incorrectly & if it issues a tripping command
then it is considered as incorrect performance (mal-operation).
5.2 Dependability of protections
The dependability of protection is defined as the probability for a protection of not having a failure to operate
under given conditions for a given time interval. An index of dependability should measure the ability of the
protection system to operate when there is a power system fault for which the protection shall operate.
Index, D of dependability is defined as follows:
Here
Nf is the number of failures to operate at internal power system faults
Ns is the number of internal power system faults
Nc is the number of correct operations during the given time interval.
The performance index D is to measure the performance of protection when there is a power system
fault.
5.3 Security of protections
The Security of protection is defined as the probability for a protection of not having an unwanted operation
for a given time interval. An index of security should measure the ability of the protection not to operate when
it should not.
Performance Indices 37
Index, S of security is defined as follows:
Where
Nc is the number of correct operations
Nu is the number of unwanted operations of the protection during the given time interval.
Here Nu is sum of Nus and Nuu, where Nus is the number of unwanted operations of the protection in a given
time interval without any power system fault or abnormality and Nuu is number of operations of a protection
in a given time interval when there is a power system fault or abnormality for which protection should not
have operated.
The performance index, S is to measure the ability of protection of not having an unwanted operation in a
given time interval. It measures the performance of protection both when there is a power system fault or
abnormality and when there is no power system fault.
5.4 Reliability of protections
The reliability of a protection system is defined as the probability that a protection can perform a required
function under given conditions for a given time interval. The reliability of protection is the ability of not
having an incorrect operation. It is the combined ability of not having a failure to operate and of not having
an unwanted operation.
Index, R of reliability is defined as follows:
where,
Nc is the number of correct operations

Ni is the number of incorrect operations during the given time interval.
Here N, is sum of Nf and Nu, where Nf is the number of failures to operate on internal power system faults
in a given time interval and Nu is the number of unwanted operations of the protection during the given time
interval.
5.5 Dependability of switching devices
The dependability of a switching device is defined as the probability of not having a failure to interrupt the
fault current when the device has received a trip command
The dependability of a switching device is defined as follows:
where
Nc is the number of correct responses when the device has received an operate command.
Nf is the number of failure to respond.

5.6 Fault clearance time
The performance indices described above measures the probability of not having a failure to operate, the
ability of not having an unwanted operation and the probability of breaking or making the fault current. The
performance indices do not explicitly measure the speed of operation. For measuring the speed of operation
following is suggested:
Fault clearance time, T, is defined as:
Tf = Max {Tf,i} Where ,i = 1....N
Here, Tf,i Is the fault clearance time at terminal (i) of the protected section, and N is the number of terminals
of the protected section.
Equation below defines the fault clearance time, Tf,i at terminal (i) of the protected section:
Here, Tr,i is the operating time of the protection system at terminal (i), and Tb,i is the operation time of the
switching device at terminal (i). When necessary, Tr,i includes the operating time of the teleprotection
channel.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the concept of the fault clearance time, Tf and the fault clearance time, Tf,i at
the terminal (i) of the protected section.
Fig 5.1 : Single-line diagram for three terminal line
Fig 5.2 : The fault clearance times Tf, and Tf,i

Performance Indices 39
5.7 Typical example for calculation of various performance indices
Performance of Transformer and Reactor protections during a given time interval
Table 1 : Performance data of transformer and reactor protections
Type of operation Number of operation

Correct operation (Nc) 130
Incorrect operation (Nuu) 3
Failure to operate (Nf) 0
Operation causing non-power system fault tripping (Nus) 17
5.8 Recommendations for measurement of performance indices and actions for

improvement
It is recommended that utilities have a system of measuring and keeping record of the performance indices
for:
• Protection devices
• Switching devices
This can be valuable data for taking decisions regarding maintenance, modernizing and retroftting of switching
and protection system
It is recommended that once this practice is adopted and sufficient data is collected, a system of benchmarking
the Indices be introduced by utilities and actions be taken for improvement as considered necessary. The
approach should be to compare the indices collected in a particular period with the targets set, analyse why
there are differences and what actions can be taken to bridge the gaps and then take actions for improvement.
These actions can be regarding revision in relay settings, better maintenance practices, modernizing and
retrofitting of switching and protection system etc., as felt appropriate. The targets can then be set higher
and further actions be taken for improvement.
While evaluating this data apart from looking at protection devices and switching devices, attention should also
be given to remaining part of the fault clearing system viz., D.C. supplies, teleprotection signaling, healthiness
of tripping cables, termination etc. This will help to improve the design of fault clearance system.
In view of large scale deployment of Numerical Relays in the system, the tripping on account of Relay
algorithm problem, Confguration Problem, Relay Setting Advice & Adoption problem are on rising trend.
Hence, it is essential to track these trippings so as to initiate appropriate corrective action.
Following the Power system collapse of North and North-east India in july 2012, the sub-committee on
Protection coordination had made following recommendations to ensure reliable protection performance.
5.9 Adoption of relay setting and functional verification of setting at site
Protection application department shall ensure through field testing group that the final relay settings are
exactly adopted in the relays at field. There should be clear template for the setting adoption duly authorized
and approved by the field testing in charge.
No relay setting in the field shall be changed without proper documentation and approval by the protection
application department. Protection application department shall periodically verify the implemented setting
at site through an audit process
5.10 Storage and management of relay settings
With the application of numerical relays, increased system size & volume of relay setting, associated data
to be handled is enormous. It is recommended that utilities shall evolve proper storage and management
mechanism (version control) for relay settings. Along with the relay setting data, IED configuration file should
also be stored and managed.
5.11 Root cause analysis of major protection tripping (Multiple element outage)
along with corrective and improvement measures
The routine trippings are generally analysed by the field protection personnel. For every tripping, a trip
report along with associated DR and event logger file shall be generated. However, for major tripping in the
system, it is recommended that the protection application department shall perform the root cause analysis
of the event.
The root cause analysis shall address the cause of fault, any mal-operation or non-operation of relays,
protection scheme etc.
The root cause analysis shall identify corrective and improvement measures required in the relay setting,
protection scheme or any other changes to ensure the system security, reliability and dependability of the
protection system.
Protection application group shall keep proper records of corrective and improvement actions taken.
5.12 Periodic protection audit
Periodic audit of the protection system shall be ensured by the protection application team. The audit shall
broadly cover the three important aspect of protection system, namely:
• the philosophy,
• the setting,
• the healthiness of Fault Clearing System.
The sub-committee also recommended a model checklist that can be followed for carrying out the protection
audit as given in CEA report of taskforce on Power System Analysis Under Contingencies- August 2013
Generator and Generator Transformer Protection 41
Chapter 6
GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

PROTECTION
6.1 GENERAL
Generators are designed to run at a high load factor for a large number of years and permit certain incidences
of abnormal working conditions. The machine and its auxiliaries are supervised by monitoring devices to
keep the incidences of abnormal working conditions down to a minimum. Despite the monitoring, electrical
and mechanical faults may occur, and the generators must be provided with protective relays, which, in
case of a fault, quickly initiate a disconnection of the machine from the system and, if necessary, initiate a
complete shutdown of the machine.
6.1.1 Recommendations contained herein for electrical protective systems of generator and generator
transformer are intended to be used for generators of 10 MVA and above. It describes the requirements
of various protections, setting guidelines, tripping principles to help in determining application of these
protections, for units of various types and sizes
6.1.2 Generator protection system has evolved from standalone discrete electromechanical relays to static
relays and now to multifunction generator protection (MFGP) relay. Because of its distinctive advantages,
MFGP, are being retrofitted even in older machines. As most of the protection functions are available in both
Main I and II relays, Main I and Main II relays preferably be specified to be on different hardware platform.
The protection requirements of machines used in pumped storage schemes need further attention and the
recommendations given below do not cover these details.
6.1.2.1 Generator can be connected to the primary transmission system in following two ways:
I. Unit Scheme
In this scheme no switchgear is provided between the generator and generator transformer which
are treated as a unit. A unit auxiliary transformer is tapped off at the interconnection, for the supply
of power to the auxiliary plant.
II. Generator Circuit Breaker Scheme
In this scheme, a generator circuit breaker is provided between the generator and generator
transformer:
6.1.3 In view of generator unit being a complex system, various electrical hazards- require
consideration. These are given below:
• Stator insulation failure
• Overvoltage
• Rotor faults
• Loss of synchronism
• Over/under frequency
• Overload
• Unbalanced loading
• Loss of excitation
• Reverse power
• Inadvertent energization of generator
6.1.4 Following are the various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer
protection.
Type of Fault ANSI Device No. Protection Functions

GENERATOR STATOR
Short Circuits 87 G Generator differential
87 GT Overall differential
21 G Minimum impedance (alternatively
51/27 G Over current/under voltage)
Asymmetry Stator overload Earth 46G Negative sequence
fault stator
51G Overload
64 Gl 95% stator earth fault
64 G2 100% stator earth fault
Loss of excitation 40 G Loss of excitation
Out of step 98 G Pole slip
Monitoring 32 G/37 G Low forward power/reverse power (Double
protection for large generators)
Blade fatigue 81 G Minimum frequency
Inter turn fault 95 G Over voltage or over current
Mag. Circuits 24G Overfluxing volt/Hz
Higher voltage 59 G Over voltage
Accidental energization 27/50 G Dead machine
Monitoring 60 G PT fuse failure
GENERATOR ROTOR
Rotor ground 64 F Rotor earth fault
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
Short circuits 87 Overall Generator – Transformer differential
Overcurrent
51GT
Transformer differential
87 T
Ground fault 51 NGT Earth fault over-current Restricted earth
fault
87 NT
Overhang 87 HV HV winding cum overhang differential
including TEED (required CTs can be
provided in GT Bushing)
UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
Short circuit 87 UAT Transformer differential
51 UAT Over-current
Ground fault 51 NUAT Residual over-current
64 UAT Restricted earth fault
The transformer guards like Buchholtz protection, Winding temperature high, Oil temperature high, etc. are
also important and shall be provided as per transformer manufacturer’s recommendations.
6.1.5 Recommendations regarding selection of the generator protections for units of different types and
sizes are summarized in the table given below:
Recommended protections for Generators
Functions Steam/Gas Turbines Hydro Turbines

Small (< Medium (10- Large (> Small (< Medium (10- Large (>
10 MVA) 100 MVA) 100 MVA) 10 MVA) 100 MVA) 100 MVA)
Differential Y Y Y Y Y Y
95% Stator E/F Y Y Y Y Y Y
100% Stator E/F N O Y N O Y
Interturn Faults N Y Y Y Y Y
Backup Impedance N Y Y N Y Y
Voltage Controlled O/C Y N N Y N N
Negative Sequence Y Y Y Y Y Y
Field Failure Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reverse Power Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pole Slipping N N Y N N Y
Overload N N N Y Y Y
Over voltage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Under frequency Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dead Machine N N Y N N Y
Rotor Earth Fault N Y Y Y Y Y
Overfluxing N Y Y N Y Y
Y- Recommended N- Not Recommended O- Optional
6.2 Requirements and setting guidelines

6.2.1 Generator Stator
6.2.1.1 Generator Differential Protection (87 G)
This is a unit type protection, instantaneous in operation, covering the stator winding for phase to phase
faults.
The generator differential relay is not sensitive to single phase to earth faults due to the high
neutral earthing resistance arrangement. As this protection operates for generator internal faults,
opening the generator breaker in class-A or non- sequential mode eliminates the system in-feed
to the fault (if the unit is synchronized).
For all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above, this protection shall be provided.
Requirements:
(i) Be triple pole type with individual phase indication
(ii) Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
(iii) Be low impedance principle based

(iv) Operating current 5 to 10% of nominal current
(v) High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC
transients
Setting guidelines
The differential current setting should be set to a low setting to protect as much of the machine winding
as possible. A setting of 5% of rated current of the machine is generally considered to be adequate. This
sensitive setting is only allowed if the current transformers are well designed i.e., same types on both sides
and good transient behavior even in the case of small fault currents with large DC time constants.
The first part of the slope in the bias characteristic would typically be set to 0% in order to maintain protection
sensitivity irrespective of the generator loading condition.
The bias slope break-point threshold setting would be set to a value above the generator rated current, say
120%, to achieve external fault stability in case of transient asymmetric CT saturation. Slope of second part
of the bias characteristic would typically be set at 15-20%.
Also refer to manufacturer’s manual for slope setting recommendations as they are dependent on algorithms
used.
6.2.1.2 Overall Generator-Transformer differential protection (87)
This is a unit type protection with coverage from the generator terminals up to the HV breaker and the
generator transformer HV terminals. For GCB scheme duplicated transformer differential and generator
differential scheme may be provided instead of overall Generator- Transformer differential. Alternately, Overall
differential Zone may be restricted upto GT bushing whereas Zone of Teed protection may be extended to
cover up to GT bushing thereby eliminating the requirement of line side CT in GT Bays.
It will detect phase faults on both sides of the generator transformer and single phase to earth faults of the HV
side only (the earth fault current on the LV side is very small, due to the high neutral earthing resistance).
Generator transformer differential relays have harmonic restraint circuits to prevent incorrect operation when
the generator and unit transformers are energized from the system.
This shall be provided for all machines of rating 10 MVA above. The protection need not include Unit Auxiliary
Transformer (UAT) in its zone and UAT should be covered by a separate protection.
In case of breaker-and-half switching scheme, the CT’s associated with main and tie breakers shall be
connected to separate bias winding and these shall not be paralleled in order to avoid false operation due
to dissimilar CT transient response.”
Requirements:
(i) Be triple pole type with individual phase indication
(ii) Have through fault restraint features for external faults with an adjustable or multi-bias setting
(iii) Have, magnetizing inrush restraint features and also be stable for inrush under normal over fluxing
conditions, magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional time delay
e.g. use of timers to block relay operation
(iv) Shall have unrestrained instantaneous highset overcurrent unit operation which is unaffected by
inrush
(v) Have one bias winding per phase and per CT input. CT secondaries shall not be paralleled in order
to avoid false operation due to dissimilar transient responses.
(vi) Have an adjustable operating current

(vii) Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times setting
(viii) Have facility for ratio and phase angle correction through in built provisions.
Setting guidelines
Minimum operating current setting
A minimum operating current setting of about 15% greater than the worst turns ratio mismatch at the tap
changer extreme should normally be selected.
Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendations.
Unrestrained operating current setting
This is to provide instantaneous tripping in the event of severe internal faults and it is not blocked for
magnetizing inrush or transient over fluxing conditions. It should be set above the anticipated level of inrush
current. A setting of 10 pu is typically acceptable for most of the standard power transformer applications.
When CT from “T connection” are connected to IED as in the case of breaker and a half or the ring bus
scheme , special care shall be taken in order to prevent unwanted operation of transformer differential IED
for through faults due to different CT saturation of “T” connected CTs. In case of breaker-and-half switching
scheme, the CT’s associated with main and tie breakers shall be connected to separate bias winding and
these shall not be paralleled in order to avoid false operation due to dissimilar CT transient response.” If
such uneven saturation is a possibility, it is typically required to increase unrestrained operational level to
20-25 pu.
6.2.1.3 Backup Protections for Short Circuits
This shall be provided for all machines of 10 MVA and above. Voltage restrained over current relay may be
used in place of minimum impedance relay in case of machines with rating less than 10 MVA.
6.2.1.3.1 Backup impedance protection (21 G)
This operates for phase faults in the unit, in the HV yard or in the adjacent transmission lines, with a suitable
delay, for cases when the corresponding main protection fails to operate.
The impedance measured by the relay is influenced by the relay connection, the fault type and generator and
system source impedance for faults on the high voltage side of the delta-star connected generator transformer.
A circular characteristic the center of which corresponds to connection position of VT or compensation for
star delta transformer should be used for this reason. To avoid spurious tripping, Load Encroachment logic
should preferably be used.
The impedance relay shall have fuse-fail interlock.
Requirements:
(i) Be triple pole type
(ii) Have facility for at least two impedance zone with load encroach feature
(iii) Shall have two adjustable definite time delay relays of 0.5-5 seconds
(iv) Be suitable for measuring two and three phase faults within a set distance from the point of
installation
(v) Shall be able to operate for fault currents down to 0.3 In.
Setting guidelines
First stage can be set to reach the step-up transformer and another stage to reach further into power system.
It normally needs to be set with a time delay to coordinate with other downstream relays on the system.
The first stage detects short circuits in the generator or the LV-side of the step-up transformer. To coordinate
with the differential protection a short delay is used (close to 0.1s) to allow the differential protection to trip
first.
The second stage should be set to 70% of the maximum load impedance. This gives an adequate margin
for short time overloads, voltage variation etc., whilst giving adequate back-up protection for generator,
generator transformer and bus bar faults.
The time delay should allow coordination with downstream overcurrent and distance protection devices and
with stage 1 under impedance protection.
Alternatively it can be graded with the line protection, both in impedance and in time settings.
6.2.1.3.2 Voltage restrained/controlled overcurrent (51V) protection for small generators
This protection is recommended for small generators as protection against phase faults. For grid connected
generators, overcurrent protection should be fed from CTs located on phase side or HV Bushing CT of
Generator transformer.
• Be triple pole type
• Shall be able to operate when the fault current from the generator terminals becomes
• low due to excitation system characteristic

• Shall have under voltage criteria
• Shall reset to de-energised position if under-voltage criteria disappears
6.2.1.4 Negative Phase Sequence Protection (46G)
The negative phase sequence protection safeguards the generator rotor against over heating caused by the
induced double frequency (100 Hz) currents when negative phase sequence currents are present in the stator.
The negative phase sequence current can appear due to unbalanced single phase loads or transmission
line unsymmetrical faults. This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
• Have an alarm unit and a trip unit
• Have a continuously adjustable negative sequence current setting
• Have alarm unit range covering negative phase sequence current of 5-10% of generator
• rated current continuously adjustable
• Have a definite time setting range of 1-10 sees, associated with an alarm unit
• Have a trip unit with a variable time current characteristics matching with the generator
characteristic
Setting guidelines
This protection has normally a pick-up range of 0.03 to 0.3 per unit, and can protect the generator suitable
for the inverse time (I2)2t withstanding capability, and the continuous negative sequence withstanding
capability. The inverse time characteristic should consider the thermal heating by integration of the current
over time.
The relays should be set to the NPS capability of the generator. The NPS capability of the machine
varies considerably from one machine to another.
Alarm unit shall be set at 70-80% of continuous withstand capability value of the machine and time delay
for alarm can be 3seconds.
6.2.1.5 Generator Overload Protection (51G)
Overload relay is used as an additional check of the stator winding temperature.
This may be provided for hydro units where there are high head variations and connected for alarm. It may
also be connected for run back. As per CEA guidelines this protection is mandatory.
In case of thermal set there is no chance of thermal overloading as the machine is provided with number of
limiters and therefore is not recommended.
Requirements:
• Be of definite time over-current type
• Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 50-200%
• Have a drop-off/pick-up ratio greater than 95%
• Have an adjustable time setting range of 2.5 to 25 sec.
6.2.1.6 Generator Stator Earth Fault Protection
The high neutral earthing resistance arrangement limits the generator earth fault current to less than 10
amperes, thus minimising damage to the core laminations. Although a single phase to earth fault is not
critical, it requires clearance within a short time, due to the following:
• It may develop into a phase to phase fault (due to presence of ionised air).
• If a second earth fault occurs the current is no longer limited by the earthing resistor.
• Fire may result from the earth fault arc.
Two different types of stator earth fault relays are recommended both installed in the secondary circuit of
the generator.
6.2.1.6.1 0-95% stator earth fault protection (64G1)
This protection zone is limited to approximately 95% of the stator winding due to the danger of false tripping.
This shall be voltage relay monitoring the voltage developed across the earthing resistor by the neutral return
current. This is normally used as back up protection. It also covers the generator bus, low voltage winding
of the unit transformer and the high voltage winding of the UAT. When connected to open delta winding of
generator PT, the protection shall be blocked for PT fuse failure.
For faults within 10% of the generator neutral, the resulting current is not enough to operate the relay.
This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
• Single pole type

• Shall have independently adjustable voltage and time setting
• Suitable to protect 95% of stator winding
• Be suitable for operation from broken-delta voltage transformers or neutral grounding transformer
secondary
• Shall be insensitive to 3rd harmonic voltage
Setting guidelines
When fault occurs on the high voltage side of a generator ∆/Y step-up transformer, there is no voltage
displacement of the generator neutral due to zero sequence current. However there is a small capacitive
coupling between primary and secondary of the generator step up transformer and this will result in a small
generator neutral voltage for an external ground fault. In the absence of firm data from which the neutral
voltage is calculated, the sensitivity of 0-95% relay is limited to about 4-5%.
5% of the phase-to-ground voltage is the lowest trip setting recommended. In this way, 95% of the stator
winding from terminals will be protected.
Tripping time is typically from 0.5 to 1 second.
6.2.1.6.2 100% Stator Earth Fault Protection (64G2)
This protects the whole stator winding and the generator neutral. The relay generally operates on the principle
of frequency signal injection into the secondary of the earthing transformer, detecting the corresponding
current if an earth fault occurs. The relay is set in terms of insulation resistance. This is normally used as
the main protection.
This protection shall always be provided for machine above 100 MVA. The option is left to the utility depending
upon the importance of the machine for machines of smaller sizes. Frequency injection based relays are
recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above.
The 95-100% relay if separately available, may be connected for alarm and operator can take the machine
out.
Requirements:
• Be suitable to protect 100%) of stator winding

• Be insensitive to external faults, transients and inherent harmonic currents.
• Shall be based on frequency injection principle
• Have continuously adjustable time delay
• Relay based on injection principle
• shall continuously monitor ground and injection circuit
• shall continuously monitor injection signal and injection equipment
• shall be in service at standstill, startup and stop
Setting guidelines
• 100% stator earth fault relay (Injection Principle)
• Pick up level of the relay = 1000 ohms
• time delay –1-10 secs seconds

6.2.1.7 Loss of Excitation Protection (40G)
A complete loss of excitation may occur as a result of unintentional opening of the field breaker, an open
circuit or a short circuit of the main field or a fault in AVR.
When a generator with sufficient active load loses the field current, it goes out of synchronism and starts to
run asynchronously at a speed higher than the system absorbing reactive power for the excitation from the
system. Under these conditions the stator end regions and part of the rotor get over heated.
This is recommended for machines of all sizes above 10 MVA.
Requirements:
• Two stage mho characteristic lying in 3rd and 4th quadrant of impedance diagram with adjustable
reach and off set. Alternatively, protection based on admittance principle may also be considered.
• Shall have an under voltage relay and/or over current relay as an additional check
• Shall have timer with adjustable range to distinguish loss of excitation from power swings
Setting guidelines
The protection function is offset from the origin by one half of the direct transient axis reactanceX’d/2 to
prevent misoperation during system disturbances and other fault conditions. The diameter of the stage-I
circle is adjusted to be equal to the direct axis synchronous reactance .
Stage I with a diameter of 1.0 pu on the machine base to trip faster with a time delay less than 0.3 seconds
and sometimes with no time delay. The characteristic is adapted to the dynamic stability limit and responds
from full load down to 30 percent load.
Stage II supervises the steady state stability limit of the machine and tripping is normally delayed with a
time delay from 0.5 to 1.5 seconds. This is active for low load operation of the generator and partial field
voltage failure.
Recommended Setting Stage I Stage II

Diameter 1 PU ( Generator Base) Xd
Offset 0.5 Xd ’
0.5 Xd’
Time delay Zero with U/V Time delay -0.5-1.5s
6.2.1.8 Pole Slipping Protection (98G)
The loss of field protection shall be supplemented by an additional out of step function which detects all
pole slips.
Pole slipping of generators with respect to the system, can be caused by a number of conditions leading to
an increase in rotor angular position beyond the generator transient stability limits. Some of the causes of
pole slipping are:
• Large network disturbances

• Faults on the electrical network close to the generator
• Weak tie between the network and the generator (tripping of transmission lines)
• Loss of generator field (field winding or excitation supply failure)
• Operating the generator in an excessive under excited mode
This is recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above. For hydro machines utilities can decide depending
on machine parameters.
Requirements:
• Shall be capable of detecting a power swing which can lead to instability in addition to
• being able to detect an actual pole slip
• By varying size of the characteristic it shall be possible to ensure that a trip command is given to the
circuit breakers in such a way that separation of the poles occurs at a controlled angle at any time.
Setting guidelines
Out-of-step protection relies upon impedance measurements as viewed from the generator terminals. The
measured impedance is compared to specific characteristics to detect if a power swing is in progress. The
generator is connected to the grid via a unit transformer. The critical situation for a machine occurs when the
power swing trajectory crosses into the generator or unit transformer impedance. The out-of-step protection
should not operate for power swings out in the grid. Therefore two zones are often used.
If the source of oscillation lies within a generator/transformer unit, the machine has to be isolated from the
network after the first slip. Forward reach of relay characteristics shall cover generator/generator transformer.
Tripping in this zone shall be in the first pole slip. The reach of this zone is 0.7 XT.
If the source of oscillation lies outside the unit in the network, the generator should not be switched off or at
least not until several pole slips have occurred.
6.2.1.9 Low forward power/reverse power interlock relays (32G/37G)
The low forward power / reverse interlock is recommended for thermal machines and reverse power protection
may be used for hydro machines to protect against motoring. However, recommendation of OEM (Turbine
Manufacturer) needs to be taken into consideration as well.
When the steam flow through turbine is interrupted by closing the ESVs or the governor valves, the remaining
energy stored in the set is delivered to the system and the machine enters into a motoring condition drawing
power from the system to supply its losses while keeping the turbo alternator shaft at synchronous speed.
The low forward power relay detects that the unit is motoring and must therefore be shutdown.
Tripping for mechanical faults and abnormal conditions
For faults in the turbine or boiler, the turbine protection closes the ESVs. For abnormal conditions, the
generator protection closes the ESVs. When the generator develops low forward power, the relay after a
short time delay trips the generator breaker.
A protection field suppression signal may also be required if the AVR does not have a built-in facility to reduce
the generator field current as the speed decreases, to avoid overfluxing conditions.
Requirements:
• Be single phase power measuring type
• Have a power setting of approximately 0.5% - 1% of rated active power of generator unit
• Have independent time delay relay with setting range of 1-10 seconds and 0-20 seconds respectively
on pick up
• Have one more common timer with a pick up setting range 5-50 seconds for annunciation that the
Turbo generator set has started motoring
• Have suitable arrangement for preventing the operation of this protection during start up and
synchronising of the unit
• Shall be provided with possibility of angle correction to facilitate measurement of power accurately
Setting guidelines
Steam Turbine – 0.5-6%. With steam turbines, operation at full vacuum and zero steam input, motoring will
draw 0.5 to 3% of unit rating. A sensitive power relay is then required.
In order to override conditions of power swings due to disturbances or synchronizing, reverse power is
normally implemented with a long delay that could reach as high as 30 s.
For Sequential Tripping
Power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn
Timer tl - 2 seconds
For Anti Motoring Tripping
Power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn
Timer t2 – 20-30 seconds
Equipment manufacturer’s recommendation also needs to be considered.
When settings less than 0.2% are applied metering class CT inputs into the IED should be used.
6.2.1.10 Under-frequency protection (81G)
The under frequency protection
• Prevents the steam turbine and generator from exceeding the permissible operating time at reduced
frequencies
• Ensures that the generating unit is separated from the network at a preset value of frequency that is
less than the final stage of system load shedding
• Prevents the AVR from exciting the machine at reduced speeds when some protective relays may
not perform at all
• Prevent over fluxing of the generator. The over fluxing relay is used to protect against small overfluxing
for long periods while the over voltage and under frequency relays also protect against large over
fluxing for short times
The stator under frequency relay measures the frequency of the stator terminal voltage.
Though under frequency tripping is recommended by turbine manufactures, care should be taken by grid
operating personnel in ensuring that machines are not run at lower frequencies and instead resort to means
like load shedding in the event of overload.
Requirements:
• Have one alarm stage and two tripping stages
• Shall have setting of range of 45 Hz - 55 Hz with a least count of 0.1 Hz for each stage
• Timer for alarm stage have a range of 0.5 to 5 second with a least count of 0.5 second. Timers for
each tripping stage shall have range of 1 to 10 seconds with a least count of 0.1 second
• Shall have undervoltage blocking
Setting guidelines
It should disconnect the unit from the system when the frequency is lower than 0.95 of rated frequency.
The generator should feed the unit auxiliary so long as possible. It should be borne in mind that much of
the information concerning the operation of turbines and generators at off-nominal frequency often do not
belong to the public domain and may vary from one manufacturer to another. In view of that situation, it is
recommended that the relevant information for a particular equipment or installation regarding its frequency
operation capabilities should be obtained from the manufacturer. It is now customary practice for the equipment
manufacturer to give the final approval of the frequency protection scheme for a turbine or generator.
Stator under frequency relay pick up level = 48.5 Hz
Time delay for alarm - 2 Sec.
For time delay setting of tripping stages recommendations of turbine manufacturers may be followed.
6.2.1.11 Inter turn fault protection (95G)
It is generally considered difficult to obtain reliable protection against short circuit of one turn if the stator
winding has large number of turns per phase. Generator protections will not be able to detect such faults
unless faults evolve and convert into Earth Fault.
Inter turn fault protection is recommended only for machines where there is a split winding and all the six
terminals are brought out on the neutral side.
For generator with split neutrals, conventional inter-turn fault protective scheme comprises a time delayed low
set over-current relay which senses the current flowing in the connection between the neutrals of the stator
winding. Alternatively a split phase differential protection may be used. Another option is to use transverse
differential protection.
For generators with single winding, Inter-turn protection based on zero sequence voltage drop across winding
may also be used.
Requirements:
• Over current relay with time delay
• Over current relay shall have built in filters to reject higher harmonics
• Range of over current shall be selected depending on maximum spill current for external fault
Setting guidelines
For machines with Split winding Overcurrent relay shall be set to maximum unbalanced current in case of
external fault.
Time delay 0.2 - 0.4 seconds
For machine with non-split winding: Zero Sequence voltage drop across winding >5% with a time delay of
0.2 - 0.4 seconds may be adopted.
6.2.1.12 Generator Transformer & Generator Over Fluxing Protection (24 GT/24G)
Overfluxing protection is provided to safeguard the generator, generator transformer and unit auxiliary
transformer against operation at flux densities which may cause accumulative damage to the core. Separate
over fluxing protection is to be considered for generator circuit breaker scheme.
From the fundamental equation V = 4.44 x f x n x ∅, the level of flux is proportional to the ratio of terminal
voltage to frequency (v/f). This ratio is monitored by the protective relay.
An over fluxing condition is more likely to occur while the generator is separated from the system and the
speed is allowed to drop, but it can also happen with the machine on load if the tap changer of the generator
transformer (HV side) is on a low tap position and the excitation of the generator is manually increased. In
this case the increased generator terminal voltage may cause over fluxing tripping at nominal frequency.
The over fluxing protection operates with a time delay after which the tripping functions are executed.
This protection must be provided for generator-transformers of size 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
• Shall be phase to phase connected.

• Shall operate on the principle of measurement of voltage to frequency ratio.
• Have inverse time characteristics compatible with generator transformer over fluxing
• withstand capability for tripping.
• Provide an independent alarm with a definite time delay of value of V/f between 100%
• to 130% of rated value.
• Have a high resetting ratio of 98% or better.
Setting guidelines
For transformers, the established standard IEC 60076-1 states that a transformer should be in continuous
service without damage if the volt per hertz is below 1.05 per unit. The standards present the generator and
transformer limits. Generally the manufacturer’s limits are obtained individually for the transformer and the
generator. The limits may come in the form of a capability curve. In some cases the generator manufacturer
may choose to provide recommended protective settings instead of capability curves.
The limit curves for volts per hertz for a turbo generator and a step up generator transformer should be
joined together in the same diagram to show the overall limit that is the basis for the protection settings.
The over fluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic matched accordingly
for both alarm and trip.
The over fluxing alarm stage threshold setting, V/Hz Alarm Set, can be set lower than the trip stage setting to
provide an indication that abnormal conditions are present and alert an operator to adjust system parameters
accordingly.
6.2.1.13 Generator Over Voltage Protection (59G)
An over voltage on the terminals of the generator can damage the insulation of the generator, bus ducting,
breakers, generator transformer and auxiliary equipment such as voltage transformers, excitation transformer
etc.
This should be provided for machines of all sizes, hydro and thermal
Requirements:
• Shall have two separately adjustable stages

• Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 100 - 140% of rated voltage
• Have a drop off to pick up ratio greater than 95%
• Have a continuously variable time delay setting range of 0.5 - 5 seconds for one relay and 2 to 20
seconds for the other relay.
Setting guidelines
Typically this is set around 110% of the nominal phase-phase voltage or higher. Definite–time characteristic
can be used. This allows for coordination with the voltage regulator (AVR), to allow it to respond to a transient
over voltages that do not pose a risk to the generating plant; e.g. following load rejection where correct AVR/
Governor control occurs. The typical delay to be applied would be 1to 3s with a longer delay being applied
for the lower voltage threshold settings.
A instantaneous device may be used for extreme overvoltage (130-150%) of the nominal phase to phase
voltage . The time delay should be set to 0 s.
Stage 1 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.15 x Vn
Timers tl - 3 s
Stage 2 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.3 x Vn
Timer t2 - 0 s
However, machine dielectric rating and other overvoltage protection should also be considered.
6.2.1.14 Dead machine protection (27/50G)
Despite existence of interlocking schemes, a number of generators have been inadvertently energized
while at stand still or on turning gear. The generator and rotor may get damaged beyond repair under this
condition. Other protective relays like loss of excitation, back up impedance, reverse power would operate
with delays and this is not admissible. The dead machine protection permits fast tripping.
This should be installed in switchyard panel rather than in generator panel to ensure that protection is available
during maintenance periods when the generator protection can be rendered inoperative by switching off the
DC supply to the panel.
This protection is recommended for all machines of size 100 MVA and above. The protection is connected
to trip generator breakers, generator transformer breaker and the HV Bus.
Unlike conventional protection schemes, which provide protection when equipment is in-service, these
schemes provide protection when equipment is out of service. Thus, great care should be taken when
implementing this protection so that dc tripping power and relay input quantities to the scheme are not
removed when the unit being protected is off-line.
Requirements:
• Shall consist of 3 high speed over current relays of range (0.02 - 20 In) to initiate instantaneous
tripping if generator terminal voltage is below set value.
• Shall have under voltage relays of range (0.2-1 Un) to permit operation of over current relays when
voltage is low
• Shall have timers with adjustable range (0-60s) to avoid operation of protection for nearby fault when
the machine is in service.
• Shall be secure against voltage transients at closing
Setting guidelines
For Weak System For Strong System

Overcurrent relay 1.25-2 pu 3-4 pu
Under voltage relay 20% to 40% rated voltage 50% to 70% of rated voltage
Activation of relay (Greater Than
More than dead time typically 3 secs
system Fault clearing time)
After voltages rises above threshold limit of Under Voltage Relay
Deactivation time
Typically 1 sec.
6.2.1.15 Generator VT fuse failure monitoring (60G)
This has to be provided for all the machines since it is required for blocking of relays which can mal-operate
in the event of PT fuse blowing in primary side or secondary side.
Requirements:

• Be able to detect fuse failure in both primary and secondary side of VT
• Have a fixed setting of 70% of rated voltage and have a time delay of 40 to 50 milliseconds on pick
up
• Be of voltage balance or equivalent (Algorithm based on Voltage comparison method) type. Fuse
Failure algorithm based on dV/dt and dI/dt should not be used for high impedance grounded system
of generator and instead dV2/dt and dI2/dt may be used
• Have sufficient contacts to block tripping of those relays which are voltage dependent and give
alarm.
6.2.1.16 Rotor ground fault protection
This protection shall be provided for machines of all sizes. It is recommended that the protection is connected
only for alarm and the operator may take the machine out at the earliest opportunity after the first earth fault
has occurred. Recommended of generator manufacturer shall also be considered for trip logic.
• Shall be based on AC injection principle
• Shall be single stage or two stages
• Shall have built-in time delay to prevent unwanted operation of the relay
Setting guidelines
For most applications, the trip resistive setting is between 2 and 5 k Ohms and the alarm setting between
10 and 20 k Ohms.
Recommendation is made to carefully install the rotor-to-earth protective relay and particularly to take into
account the rotor winding to earth capacitance when required by the relay type. Two detection levels should
be set on the relay, one between 20 to 100 kOhms for alarm and another one between 1 and 5 k Ohms for
tripping.
In case tripping is applied, Setting Recommendations are:
Alarm level - 25 K ohm
Pick up level - 5 K ohm
Timer tl - 1 seconds
Timer t2 - 5 seconds
6.3 Generator-Transformer Protection
For short circuit protection, transformer-differential relay and over-current relay connected to different groups
are recommended. For ground faults, earth fault o/c relays and restricted earth fault relay connected to
different groups are recommended.
In case an overhang protection is required, the same may be combined with REF protection on HV side of
generator transformer.
6.3.1 Generator Transformer Differential Protection (87 GT/87 T)
Requirements:
• Be triple pole with individual phase indication

• Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current units which shall not operate
• during inrush
• Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
• Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also shall be stable under normal over
fluxing conditions. Magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional time
delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
• Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
• Have an adjustable operating current
• Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
• Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer or through
in built provisions.
Setting guidelines

When CT from “T connection” are connected to IED as in the case of breaker and a half or the ring bus
scheme , special care shall be taken in order to prevent unwanted operation of transformer differential IED
for through faults due to different CT saturation of “T” connected CTs. Thus if such uneven saturation is a
possibility, it is typically required to increase unrestrained operational level to 20-25 pu.
6.3.2 Generator Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection

6.3.2.1 Generator Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection (51 GT)
Requirements:
• Be of definite timeover current type
• Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current and 0.5-5 seconds time delay”
OR
• Be of IDMT characteristic (IEC standard inverse).
• Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current.

6.3.3 Generator Transformer Back Up Earth Fault Protection

6.3.3.1 Generator Transformer Back Up Earth Fault Protection (51 NGT)
This relay monitors the current in the generator transformer neutral. It can detect faults in the transformer
HV side or in the adjacent network.
Requirements:
• Be of single pole type
• Be of IDMT characteristic (IEC standard inverse).
• Have an adjustable setting range of 10 to 100% of rated current
6.3.4 HV winding cum overhang differential protection (87 HV/87 NT)
This is a unit type protection which operates for earth faults on the generator transformer HV side and also
covers a large portion of the HV winding and the HV terminals upto the HV current transformers. Alternately,
Zone of Teed protection may be extended to include transformer HV winding as well.
Requirements:
• Be triple pole type (Single pole if used as Restricted E/F Protection)
• Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
• Be high impedance or low impedance type
• Operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In
• High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC
transients
• Be provided with suitable non linear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to 1000 volts,
in case of high impedance type
• Be provided with faulty phase identification
Setting guidelines
For low impedance type of protections following may be followed. Minimum operating current setting of 10 %
of power transformer rated current is used for solidly earthed systems. If the CT transient performance of the
CTs is not identical this may have to be increased. Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendation.
6.4 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Protections
For short circuit protection, unit auxiliary transformer differential relay, overload relay for alarm and over
current relay connected to different groups are recommended. However a utility may carry out an application
check and decide not to have a separate differential relay for UAT.
For ground faults residual O/C relay and Restricted E/F relays connected to different groups shall be
provided. The type of connection may be either current based or voltage based depending on the grounding
system.
6.4.1 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Differential Protection (87 UAT)
This is a unit type protection covering the unit transformer and the cable connection to the unit board.
This protection operates for phase faults, but not for single phase to earth faults as this current is limited by
the neutral earthing resistance.
The unit transformer differential relay initiates a general trip and unit shutdown.
Requirements:
• Be triple pole with individual phase indication
• Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current unit which shall not operate during inrush
• Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
• Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable under normal over
fluxing conditions, magnetising inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional time
delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
• Have an adjustable operating current
• Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
• Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer or through
in built provisions.
Setting guidelines
6.4.2 Unit Transformer back up over current protection.

6.4.2.1 Unit Auxiliary Transformer back up over current protection (51 UAT)
Requirements:
• Be of IDMT over current type (IEC standard inverse).
• Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current. y
6.4.2.2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection (50 UAT)
Requirements:
• Be of instantaneous over current type
• Have an adjustable setting range of 500-2000% of rated current.

6.4.3 Unit Transformer back-up earth fault protection

6.4.3.1 Unit Auxiliary Transformer back-up earth fault protection (51 NUAT)
Requirements:
• Be single pole type

• Be of IDMT over current type (IEC standard inverse).
• Have a setting rage of 10-100% of rated current and time setting range of 0.5-5 seconds
6.4.4 Unit Auxiliary transformer restricted earth fault protection (64 UAT)
Requirements:
• Be single pole type
• Have operating time less than 30 milli seconds at 2 times setting
• Be high impedance or low impedance type
• Operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In
• High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC
transients
• Be provided with suitable non-linear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to 1000 volts,
in case of high impedance type
• Be provided with fault indication
Setting guidelines:
For low impedance type of protections following may be followed:
Minimum operating current setting of 10 % of power transformer rated current is used for solidly earthed
systems. If the CT transient performance of the CTs is not identical this may have to be increased. Bias
setting as per manufacturer’s recommendation
6.5 ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATIONS

6.5.1 Redundancy
The protection functions shall be subdivided into two groups each being independent and capable of
providing uninterrupted protection even in the event of one of the protection groups failing. With application
of multifunction generator protection relays, all generator protection functions ( except protection function
based on injection principle) shall preferably be realized in both groups. Given below is recommendation
for dividing the protections in two groups:
Sl. Protection Function Class of Remark on grouping of protection

No. TRIP
1. Generator Differential Protection, A
(87 G).
2. Overall Differential Protection A
(87GT).
3. Generator Transformer Differential A 87 T shall be in a different channel than
Protection (87 T). 87 OA.
4. Duplicate Over hang differential A These relays shall preferably be located
Portection (87TT). in GT bay Relay panel.
5. Stator Earth Fault Protection Covering A

100% of winding (64G1).
64 G1 and 64 G2 shall be on two different
6. Duplicated Stator Standby Earth A channels of protection.
Fault Protection covering 95% of
winding (trip) (64 G2).
7. Inter-turn Fault Protection (95 G1) A If applicable
8. Loss of field protection (40G/1/2). A .
9. Back up Impedance Protection 3 A
pole (21 G).
GT HV Overcurrent(50/51GT). Alarm 87GT and 50/51GT shall be on different
10. Backup Earth Fault Protection on A channels
Generator Transformer HV neutral
(51NGT).
11. Negative Sequence Current A
Protection ( 46 G) .
12. Low- Forward Power/ reverse power 37/32 G1 and 37/32 G2 shall be in two
Interlock for steam turbine generator different channels of protection
(37/32G1 & 37/32 G2), each having
two stages,
(a) short time delay interlocked with B

turbine trip (0-5 sec)
(b) long time delay independent of A

turbine of turbine trip. (0)
13. Two Stage Rotor Earth Fault A
Protection (64F).
14. Definite Time Delayed Over Voltage A Over Flux function (24) shall be in a
Protection (59 G) different channel than O/V and U/F
functions.
15. Generator Under Frequency C
Protection (81G) with df/dt
elements.
16. Over Fluxing Protection (24) for A
Generator / Generator Transformer
17. Accidental Back Energisation A 50 GDM based on the two principle shall
Protection (50 GDM) be on two different channels.
18. Instantaneous and time delayed Over A
Current protection to be used on HV
side of excitation transformer.
19. Generator Pole Slipping Protection A
(98 G)
20. U n i t Tr a n s f o r m e r D i ff e r e n t i a l A 87 UT & 51 NUT can be one channel
Protection, 3 Pole (87UT) and 64 UT LV& 51 UT shall be in another
channel.
21. Unit Transformer LV back-up earth A
fault protection (51 NUT).
22 Unit Transformer LV REF (64 UT A
LV)
23. Unit Transformer back-up over current A

protection ( 51 UT)
24. Gen Transformer OTI/WTI trip Turbine After Turbine trip through class B other
Trip breakers are tripped.
25. Gen Transformer Buchholz PRD / A Buchholz and PRD shall be on different
other mechanical Protections channels.
26. Unit Transformer OTI/WTI trip UT LV OTI & WTI trip shall be on different
CB Trip & channels.
signal for
change
over of unit
board.
27. Unit Transformer Buchholz PRD/ A Buchholz and PRD shall be on different
other mechanical Protections channels.
In case of GCB scheme, Class A tripping shall further subdivided into Class A1 and A2.
Class A1- Trips
EHV CB, GCB, Field CB, Turbine Trip and UAT Incomer
Class A2 Trips
GCB Trip, Field CB, and Turbine
6.5.2 Tripping Principles
The generator Protection Relays initiate three modes of Trips

(i) Class-A Trips
The non-sequential trip or class-A Trip is initiated for all electrical faults, in which the turbine, generator
Breaker & field Breaker are tripped simultaneously.
(ii) Class-B Trip
The sequential trip or Class-B trip is normally initiated for mechanical faults or those faults where a delayed
generator trip will not result in damage to the Turbine, generator or other equipment. The reason for providing
sequential trip in thermal power plants is to avoid over speeding of turbine that may result on trip of the unit
Breaker while the steam is entrapped in Turbine. Turbine Trip signal is given first. The generator gets isolated
from the grid when the active power measured by low forward relay /Reverse power Relay (32/37G) is less
than 0.5-1.0% of nominal power for typically 2 secs approx.
(iii) Class-C trip
For system abnormalities, only the Unit breaker is tripped and the Generator and the auxiliaries are kept
charged to facilitate the fast reconnection. However, few protections which are basically for system related
abnormal conditions, are still connected to Class A as the operation of these protection indicates the persisting
un cleared faults in the EHV system which has to be viewed seriously. The various protective functions and
its mode of tripping has to be as given below:
Class Type of Faults

A (Non- All electrical trips with in HVCB,UT LV CB, Excitation system, TURBINE (All the
Sequential Trip) the Generator/GT/UT system tripped)
B (Sequential Mechanical protections HVCB, UT LV CB, Excitation system (Turbine tripped as
Tripping) a first stage and electrical system trip through 37/32.)
C System abnormality HVCB (Generator Under House Load)
Fig. 6.1 : Recommended Protection System for Generator-Transformer with GCB

Fig. 6.2 : Recommended Protection System for Generator- Transformer without GCB
References
1. Cigré B5-WG04: “International Guide on the Protection of Synchronous Generators” October 2011
2. IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection IEEE Std C37.102 -2006
3. CBIP Manual on Protection of Generators, Generator Transformers and 220 kV and 400 kv
Networks.
Chapter 7
protection of TRANSMISSION
LINES AND CABLES
In protection of transmission lines both dependability and security of protection are of paramount importance.
Any uncleared fault may create unwanted widespread tripping and lead to grid disturbances. On the other
hand, unintended operation of protection relay and tripping of transmission line during a stressed power
system condition may cause cascaded tripping and lead to grid disturbances.
Transmission circuit Main protection is required to provide primary protection for the line and clear all type
of faults on it within shortest possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity.
Transmission circuit back-up protection caters for failure of any main protection system to clear any fault that it
is expected to clear. A protection function that offers back-up for most faults may also provide main protection
for some fault conditions. However there could be some known limitations of the operating principles of the
main protection having restrictions in relay settings that could be applied to the main protection. Back-up
protection might be provided in one or more of the following forms.
• Circuit local back-up.
• Substation local back-up.
• Remote back-up.
Two main protections could be justified on the basis of being able to keep an important transmission circuit
in service with one set of protection remaining in service while second set of protection is taken under
maintenance. Where two main protection systems are justified one may take the opportunity to select main
protection systems that cover each other’s limitations.
The requirements of overhead line and cable protection systems vary greatly, due to the exposure of
transmission circuits to a wide variety of environmental hazards and are subjected to the wide variations in
the format, usage and construction methodologies of transmission circuits. The type of protection signaling
(tele-protection) or data communication systems required to work with the protection systems will also influence
protection scheme requirements.
7.1 Typical transmission circuit arrangements
This section offers a brief overview of common transmission circuit arrangements and physical construction
factors which might have some influence on the exposure of transmission circuits to faults and therefore on
the selection of back-up protection schemes. Transmission circuit construction can be considered in three
main categories:
• Overhead construction.
• Underground cable construction.
• Composite construction.
7.1.1 Overhead Transmission Circuits
Physical arrangements for overhead conductor support vary depending on voltage level and cost
considerations.
Protection of Transmission Lines and Cables 65
The electrical parameters of resistance, reactance and capacitance are mainly influenced by the size and type
of conductors, conductor configuration and geometry with respect to each other and with respect to ground
along with the earth wires on top of towers
The thermal balance of electrical heat input and heat dissipation governs circuit load current capacity. Heat
inputs are from l2R losses, solar radiation and solar conduction. Heat dissipations are through radiation and
conduction, which depends on ambient temperature, wind velocity and chill factors.
Use of correct line parameters is important for proper setting of protective relays. Calculation of overhead
line electrical parameters at nominal system frequency and line surge impedance are usually performed
using dedicated computer software. These calculations may then be verified by carrying out measurements
on final installations that could be subjected to field testing, as ground conduction effects influence the zero
sequence surge impedances. This information may then be used by protection engineers to determine
optimum relay settings. The CIGRE WG 34.04 report titled “Application guide on protection of complex
transmission network configurations” gives details of how the measurements of line impedance for the setting
of distance protection and fault locators can be carried out.
7.1.1.1 Ground Wires
Ground wires help to reduce the apparent tower footing resistance. It may be noted that all HV, EHV and
UHV lines need one or more than one ground wires at a certain height above the conductors to provide
the desired shielding The tower footing impedance parameters are required to be kept as low as practically
feasible and may need special measures like counterpoises and other known methods of reducing the
footing impedances.
The economic justification for ground wires, the number of ground wires required and their geometry is
mainly determined by ground flash density, keraunic levels and severity of lightning surges as also topology
of the line profile and tower heights.
Besides reducing the number of lightning induced faults, ground wires also help to reduce the apparent tower
footing resistance seen during conductor flashover to ground causing ground faults. They provide multiple
ground fault current return paths through many tower footings, which helps in this. The annual outage rate
of the transmission line is required to be as low as possible
As said earlier, individual tower footing resistances can be substantially reduced by the use of counterpoises,
which are generally of steel conductors buried under each tower with several configurations in crowfoot
layout or continuous counterpoises connecting two or more number of towers in a row. This is usually done
where soil resistivity is very high.
Even with ground wire shielding, a lightning strike to conductors or to earth wire or to tower peaks of a line
may cause an insulator back-flash over leading to line outage. This is due to discharge current flowing
through tower impedance and tower footing resistance, which will result in a transient tower voltage rise
with respect to power line conductors. Such voltage rise could be sufficiently high to cause a single or a
multi-phase back-flash from a tower to its power conductors. It is important to appreciate that where a high
transmission tower is erected on high profile ground with high tower footing resistance, ground wires may
increase the lightning outage rates. The transmission line designers cover this aspect while designing the
tower and conductor configuration and BIL of insulator strings. To minimize the risk of outages there should
be good coordination between BIL of insulator strings and tower footing resistance.
7.1.2 Underground Transmission Circuits
The electrical characteristics of HV and EHV cables for underground transmission circuits to carry a given
load are set by the physical configuration of the conductors and the properties of the insulating media, which
materially affect the capacitance of the cable. The materials used and the voltage rating determines the
external diameter and the weight of a cable. Heat dissipation within a cable is predominantly through l2R
load current losses and this is normally dissipated by conduction through the dielectric to the soil in which the
cable is buried. Cooling may be enhanced by special back-fills in cable trenches. Internal cooling for EHV
Cable may be obtained by circulating oil through hollow conductors or through other ducts within the cable.
Cables are assigned a continuous load current rating at reference environmental conditions.
Cable shunt capacitance per unit length is much higher than for overhead lines. Charging currents
increase with cable voltage ratings. This means that inductive shunt compensation is commonly required
for EHV cables and also for unusually long HV cables. A good example of such a scenarios could be
seen from the parallel cable rings at 400 kV in Berlin provided by Power Utility BEWAG and also in the
National Grid of UK.
Being less prone to fault-inducing environmental hazards than overhead lines, cable faults are almost exclusively
permanent faults. Consequently, automatic reclosing is not used for underground transmission circuits. In
cable circuits, faults can also occur in associated switchgear and cable joints. The level of incidence of faults
in these is often comparable to faults in the cable itself.
Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time; consequently they demand the use of protection
without any intentional time delay. This is a feature of unit protection, such as current differential protection,
through pilot wires or fibre optic cables, which is often applied to cable circuits.
Gas insulated Bus duct (GIB) are also used sometime where right of way (ROW) constraints are present.
GIB possesses less capacitance compared to underground cable and thus can be utilized for underground
transmission over longer lengths.
7.1.3 Composite Transmission Circuits
Planning strategies and design requirements sometimes demand the creation of composite transmission
circuits. The typical composite circuit is a mix of overhead and underground circuit.
Although less frequent, there are cases of non-homogeneous radial overhead lines, with different types of
conductor or varying conductor geometry along their route. This is often the case where a sub-transmission
line supplies many teed transformers, since it is possible to economize on conductor size as the circuit
loading decreases from the primary substation up to the most remote substation.
With non-homogeneous series impedance for a composite circuit, especially where cable sections are
involved, there may be some difficulty in setting optimum impedance settings for distance relays and in
setting optimum residual compensation for ground faults.
Although the transmission lines are originally planned to interconnect two substations after a period they are
altered to suit changing requirements in the transmission system. Often, the presence of multi-circuit lines,
multi-terminal lines and transformer tee-off’s, are due to these reasons.
In some cases, planning strategy may lead to a gradual implementation of complex transmission arrangements.
With long intervals between successive stages of implementation, it is not always possible to engineer
protection systems at each stage that will suit the final configuration. When such changes take place it is
recommended that changing, refurbishing or upgrading of protection systems harmonizing with the power
systems already in operation, be carried out.
7.2 Complex transmission circuits
The following types of lines can be classified as complex transmission circuits that often present special
protection difficulties:
• Parallel transmission lines where two or more three phase transmission circuits are arranged on the
same tower or follow the same right of way on adjacent towers.
• Multi-terminal lines having three or more terminals with substantial generation behind each.
• Tapped lines having one or more terminals with substantial generation behind them and taps feeding
only the load. The tap is done through a step-down transformer and do not have sufficient current
feedback to operate the relays.
• Composite lines where system elements like transformers, overhead lines or cables are connected
together without intermediate circuit breakers.
• Series Compensated lines
The protection of these complex transmission lines is very well described in the document produced
by CIGRE WG 34.04 in 1991 titled - “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network
configurations”.
7.2.1 Parallel Transmission Circuits
Often, for reasons of economy, two or more circuits are run in parallel on the same towers. Transmission
reliability is reduced in the event of multiple circuit faults caused by lightning and certain common mode
events, such as a tower collapse, which result in sustained faults. If insulation back-flash occurs with a direct
lightning strike to a tower, it could result in multi-circuit faults resulting into outages.
The possibility of multiple faults occurring simultaneously on more than one circuit of a transmission network
imposes special demands on protection in terms of phase selection for single-pole tripping, that may affect
high speed single phase auto-reclosing.
With double circuit tower construction, there is relatively strong inter-circuit magnetic coupling between
conductors, which is expressed in terms of various inter-circuit mutual impedances for the purposes of
short-circuit calculations and analysis of protection performance. It is usually acceptable to neglect the
positive and negative sequence mutual impedances, since they are only a fraction of the positive sequence
self impedances. It is sometimes necessary to consider the coupling from the positive sequence network to
the zero sequence network when setting sensitive residual over current protections. Zero sequence mutual
impedance should not be ignored, because of its relatively high value and its possible influence on proper
ground fault protection of lines.
The mutual coupling permutations that result from multiple circuits, which share a common right-of-way, are
complex in nature.
Mutual coupling is not restricted to parallel circuits at the same voltage level or to circuits which have two
common terminals. In some cases circuits may run in parallel for part of their route. Where there is a parallel
run, two circuits might use common, double-circuit support towers.
There are some cases of circuits at different voltage levels sharing the same tower. This may lead to inter-
system faults. Despite their severity, it may be very difficult to discriminatively detect such faults with protection
functions that are dependent on voltage measurement. The appropriate phase selection difficulties are even
greater for these lines. Phase-segregated unit protection based on current measurement is the best option
for both circuits when it is economically and technically feasible.
The main consequence of the magnetic coupling between parallel overhead lines is the modification of the
zero sequence voltage profile during a ground fault on one circuit. The zero sequence voltage profile along
any circuit will not be entirely dependent on the zero sequence current flowing in that circuit. Instead it will
depend on zero sequence current flowing in the parallel circuit(s).
It follows that protection functions based on voltage measurement are those most likely to be affected by
zero sequence mutual coupling, as highlighted below:
Directional ground fault protection

Zero sequence voltage and current signals are those most commonly employed by ground fault directional
control elements. A ground fault on one circuit may cause operation of directional ground fault protection
on a partially parallel circuit due to partial zero sequence mutual coupling. This problem does not exist for
parallel circuits between common substation bus bars.
Distance protection reach accuracy
The reach of distance protection ground fault elements is adversely affected by modification of power system
zero sequence voltage profile through zero sequence mutual coupling. If zero sequence currents flowing in
parallel circuits are of similar phase to the current in the protected circuits, ground fault distance elements will
under reach. If the currents are virtually in anti-phase, the distance elements will tend to over reach.
The tendency for distance protection to over reach is of no consequence for distance elements, which are
intended to overreach a protected line, such as Zones 2 or 3. Any tendency to under reach can be compensated
for, when setting the over reach elements. Consequently, all tele-protection schemes based on over reaching
elements are suitable for protection of magnetically coupled circuits, when set to take into account under
reaching during ground faults. However, where common impedance settings exist for phase and earth fault
impedance elements, it should be noted that any compensatory increase in distance element over reach may
make it necessary to employ current reversal guard logic in a teleprotection scheme. Where the over reaching
elements are also used to provide Zone-2 back-up protection for end zone faults, a compensatory increase in
reach may also create discrimination problems with phase to phase fault protection for short adjacent lines.
A potentially problematic case of Zone-I overreach to be noted is when a parallel circuit is switched out and
grounded at both terminals. In such an instance, the Zone-1 reach security margin may be greatly reduced
or it may even become negative in some applications.
One of the methods to compensate for the effect of zero sequence mutual impedance is to take zero sequence
current signal from the parallel circuit and use it to provide compensation. This technique is not effective
when parallel circuit is disconnected and grounded at both ends. For this reason this method is not used for
protection but used for fault location.
In general, it is not advantageous to introduce mutual compensation for distance protection schemes. The
advantages, if any, are usually far outweighed by the problems and operational complexities that would be
introduced. Most distance protection schemes can be set to provide fast tripping for faults along a multi-circuit
line and be stable for external faults without employing mutual compensation. There are also applications
where it is impossible to access the current from a magnetically coupled circuit at one or both terminals. In all
such cases the maximum reach of first zone setting fixed as 80% or less could be advantageous.
An alternative to implementing mutual compensation is to apply individual zero sequence compensation factor
for each zone of ground fault distance protection. Another option is different groups of setting parameters for
different operating conditions of the double circuit line.
From the above it transpires that correct calculation of the transmission line impedance matrix with zero
sequence parameters be carried out and proved by field tests before using them in setting the relays.
7.2.2 Multi-terminal Transmission circuits

Whenever a transmission circuit has three or more terminals, its protection may be subject to adverse effects
within the protected line due to the effects of in feeds. Depending on the protection operating principle,
these effects may be a cause for concern. Additional in feed can increase impedances seen by distance
relays and out feed can cause directional protection at one terminal to identify an internal fault as external.
Carrier-aided protection with efficient information links with judicious application of correct measurands and
protection relays should be applied
7.2.3 Shunt Compensated transmission circuit
The distributed shunt capacitance of a transmission line can cause a voltage rise when load is lower than
normal load. This is termed as Ferranti Effect.
Switched or non-switched shunt reactors are often used to compensate for high levels of shunt capacitance
for long overhead lines or for underground cables. The shunt compensation is invariably located at terminal
substations, where it may be connected to the associated circuit by an isolator switch or by a circuit breaker.
The former option is less expensive, but it may be necessary to de-energise the line to insert or switch-off
the reactor. Sometimes shunt reactors controlled by circuit breakers are connected to EHV bus bars. In
many other cases, shunt reactors (and many times Static Var Compensators with inductive and capacitive
compensation range) are also connected to the tertiary windings of Interconnecting auto-transformers (ICT)
for control of downstream voltage profile. With expansion of power network, many times the line lengths
get shortened and intermediate stations are connected with loop in and loop out (LILO) connections. Under
such conditions the non-switched line reactors provided on the long lines are removed or replaced by bus
reactors. Under certain conditions it may be advisable to use the controlled shunt reactor that could remain
on the line for all conditions of operation. Such application could be kept in view to provide minimum changes
in reactor shifting.
Shunt compensation equipment must have its own protective gear. Where a shunt reactor is connected to a
transmission circuit only by isolator switch, its protection requires a fast and reliable transfer-tripping scheme
in order to remove remote-end fault current in feed.
Shunt reactors do not have a great influence on the selection of line protection, except where differential
or directional comparison protection might be responsive to live-line switching of reactors. In such cases,
reactors may have to be excluded from the zone of line protection through the use of reactor CT’s in parallel
with line CT’s. It may also be necessary to inhibit any reactor back-up ground fault protection during single-
pole auto reclose sequences.
When single-pole tripping and autoreclosure is applied, capacitive and inductive coupling may delay the
extinction of the secondary arc and the faulted phase voltage decay may be delayed. This is due to resonance
between shunt reactor inductance and the capacitance coupling to live phases after the breaker is tripped.
This may delay arc extinction for a transient fault and so single-pole autoreclose dead-times may need to
be extended for limiting the parameter of secondary arc current to a practical value of about 10 amperes.
A Surge Protected Neutral Reactor usually of 0.2 to 0.4 pu ohmic value is connected between neutral of
EHV shunt reactor and the ground. This requires the ratio of zero to positive sequence impedance of shunt
reactor be around 0.9 to limit the BIL of shunt reactor to around 550 kV in a 400 kV network.
7.2.4 Series Compensated transmission circuit
As stability constraints limit the maximum value of power angle for long lines, the full load current capacity
can only be utilized if the transmission circuit impedance is reduced. The surge Impedance Loading (SIL)
of a transmission line, say 400 kV, is around 515 MW (twin moose ACSR conductor per phase) while the
thermal limit of the same line could be around 800 to 1200 MW under various operating conditions. This
is further complicated by shunt reactors directly connected on the lines that modify the SIL to about 70% of
original value. Such conditions always need extra capacitive vars if more power to the level of its thermal
capacity is required to be pushed into the line. The application of series compensation on transmission lines
is provided for such relief. Some of the other reasons for applying series compensation could be to avoid
voltage collapse, to optimize load distribution or to improve quality of supply apart from improving transient
stability.
Sometimes Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor (TCSC) is used. Some of the reasons for this could be
power oscillation damping, prevention of sub synchronous resonance or load flow control.
Series compensation has been universally applied to lines at all the known voltage level right from 11 kV
to 800 kV The protection relaying of such lines are quite complicated and need to be evolved after detailed
system studies.
The combined effect of series capacitors and their protective current diversion devices on line protection
performance and the impact of series compensation on protection of adjacent lines require detailed discussion
and is covered in the Chapter on Protection of FACTS (FSC & TCSC). For further detail, document produced
by CIGRE WG 34.04 titled “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network configurations”
may be referred for this.
7.3 Transmission circuit failure modes and rates
The failure rate of transmission lines range from 0.2 to more than 10 faults per 100 km per year. The failure
rate is a function of keraunic level, the insulation level and the existence of many environmental factors such
as vegetation proximity, fouling with over-grown trees air pollution levels, vandalism and bush fires or fires on
crops waste created by the farmers below or very close to lines. Some of these are described below:
7.3.1 Arcing Faults
Many types of fault-inducing events result in the creation of an arcing fault between phases of a line, between
phases and tower structures or between phases and ground. Fault arcs present non-linear fault resistance.
Estimates of fault resistance based on arc length can be obtained using well-known Warrington formulae or
various other empirical formulas used in Europe.
7.3.2 Smoke Hazard
Accidental or deliberately initiated bush fires are quite common during certain seasons. Burning of sugarcane
waste close to transmission line is one such example. Smoke from such fires may induce arcing faults as
a consequence of air ionization. Some faults may be located across insulators or between a pair of phases
and these will not differ much in nature from those initiated by lightning. Others may be located at the mid-
span between towers, from the lowest conductor to ground. Such mid-span faults can be highly resistive,
not only as a result of long arc lengths, but also as a result of the ground resistance between the point of
arc and the nearest support towers.
It may often be necessary to provide high resistance ground fault protection as supplementary main protection
in order to detect such faults, which may also act as back-up protection for solid faults and is therefore
recommended.
Faults resulting from bush fires are usually non-damaging faults, with a good chance of successful
autoreclosure following fault clearance. But the effectiveness of autoreclose schemes is frequently defeated
by the intense ionization of the insulating air in the vicinity of the fire, leading to new developing faults
following line re-energisation.
7.3.3 Vegetation Faults
There can be many line faults to ground, which are caused by rapidly growing vegetation. Bamboo plant is
one such example. From operational experience, such faults are known to be of high-resistance. The fault
presents itself as a very high resistance to earth (of the order of several kilo Ohms), until the steam and
smoke produced by thermal energy dissipation in the tree resistance results in a tree-length flashover. This
occurs after several seconds.
Ground fault elements of distance relays may not detect the high resistance faults and the sensitive ground
fault protection mentioned in the previous paragraph can also take care of high resistance faults due to
growing vegetation.
7.3.4 Forms of Overhead Line Faults
The failure rates of power lines vary from utility to utility and from year to year. The most common type
of fault is phase to ground fault (of the order of 75% or more) and most faults are transient in nature.
Since most faults involve ground, consideration must be given to the levels of ground fault resistance
that might be encountered for particular applications and whether the main protection will be able to
detect all such ground faults. If not, supplementary protection may be required to cover high resistance
faults. The ground fault elements of distance relays should be supplemented by a sensitive residual
over current relay.
7.4 Transmission circuit protection requirements
To determine the protection requirements for transmission circuits it is necessary at the first instance
to identify the main protection requirements for each of the system voltage level and then to identify
application specific requirements in relation to the protected circuit. Examples of possible main
requirements are listed below:
• Maintaining transient stability of the power system
• Maintaining operation of power station auxiliary system
• Avoiding loss of supply to bus bars
• Quality of supply
Examples of application specific requirements are listed below:
• Allow for failure of a protection signaling/communication channel
• Allow protection testing with the circuit in service
• Protect a transformer feeder
• Protect a tapped line through a step-down transformer
• Protect a circuit with more than two terminals
• Protect a circuit in series compensated network
• Detection of broken conductors/jumpers of overhead lines.
• Detection of high resistance faults on overhead lines
• Operate within short-time thermal ratings of overhead lines and cables
• Fault detection with weak or zero in feed from one circuit terminal
Combinations of main and back-up protection systems should be used to address the main and application
specific requirements for transmission circuits.
7.4.1 Maintaining Transient Stability
Common requirements for circuits at primary transmission voltages are the maximum permitted fault clearance
time in order to maintain system transient stability. A single time limit is often quoted for a particular transmission
voltage level, but separate limits might be quoted for different fault types. On the basis that most protection
arrangements rely on a single protection system to clear different types of solid fault, a single time limit is
usually used as a main design requirement. An exception sometimes exists to allow slower clearance of
high resistance ground faults that may not be severe in nature.
It must be recognized that the maximum permitted fault clearance times declared for a primary transmission
system will not remain fixed. Power systems undergo constant evolution. In particular, the changes in the
location, capacity and design of generating plant that occur on most power systems demand constant
reviews by system planners of the maximum permitted fault clearance times for existing transmission circuits.
For EHV system the desired fault clearance time of 5 cycles that include the relay time, breaker time and
carrier times is generally applied. It may be desirable for EHV lines to have a maximum total-break time of
circuit breakers as 2 cycles (40 milliseconds) giving freedom to optimize the time of protective relay and
information links.
When applying the single-failure protection design criterion, and where there is a potential transient
stability problem, a second protection system should be provided which will clear faults within the
maximum permitted time to maintain transient stability. The back-up protection should also be fully
discriminative, so that tripping of more than one circuit does not further impair the power transfer
capability of the transmission system.
This means that the second form of protection must be circuit-local and it must have similar operating speed
and discrimination qualities to those offered by the main protection. This form of protection is referred to as
second-main protection or Main-2 protection.
As discussed earlier, Main-2 protection is not generally regarded as being back-up protection. The cost of
this form of protection is easily justified in terms of the single failure design criterion and the costs of possible
system collapse resulting from inadequate back-up protection performance. Any additional protection
provided as back-up to two main protection systems (M1 and M2) would be back-up protection for a dual
failure criterion, where longer operating time limits would be allowed.
7.4.2 Maintaining Operation of Power Station Auxiliary System
Depression of power supply voltages for auxiliary plant in some generating stations may reduce the station
output. Maintenance of full generation output may be a critical power system security factor. In the case
of nuclear plant, auxiliary power supplies are also a major factor in providing full nuclear plant safety and
security.
The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems may be
factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults in the vicinity
of a power station.
7.4.3 Avoiding Loss of Supply
Where remote back-up protection or substation local back-up protection operates for an un-
cleared fault on one transmission circuit, there will be a complete loss of supply to the bus,
which supplies the faulted circuit. In the case of multi-bus substations (Double Bus, Breaker-
and-Half bus bars, Double Main and Transfer bus or single bus or main and transfer bus
substations), there will be loss of supply to some step-down transformers, which may or may
not result in loss of supply to consumers. There will also be loss of supply to any radial fed
downstream substations. In the case of a single bus arrangement, there will be a complete loss
of supply to local consumers. The costs of reduced supply capacity or total loss of supply must
be considered in relation to the cost of providing effective circuit local back-up protection to
avoid loss of bus supply.
7.4.4 Quality of Supply
A utility may enter into agreement with a large industrial consumer to limit the duration of severe voltage
depressions in order to secure a power supply contract to industries like mining industry or costly
continuous process industry. Quality of supply considerations may influence decisions not only about
the form of back-up protection to be applied to a power system but also other add-ons such as dynamic
voltage supports and needs to be reviewed as and when these demands are made by consumers on
a case-to-case basis.
7.5 Transmission circuit protection schemes
Listed below are schemes that are normally applied in India. Some of the main attributes and limitations in
the schemes are also listed under them. When applying these schemes it is essential that the main attributes
and limitations of are fully examined and understood.
7.5.1 Distance Protection (Without signaling channel)
7.5.1.1 Multizone Distance Protection (With Three or More Zones)
Attributes
• Fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
• Offers remote back-up protection
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or reverse Z4)
• Can be phase selective
• Communications independent tripping
• Application to multi-terminal lines
• Suitable for large in-zone loads
• Suitable for transformer feeders
• Suitable for composite circuits (lines/cables) Limitations
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line)
• Limited resistive fault coverage
• Dependent on VT signals
• No weak end in feed / open terminal tripping
• No detection of series faults
• Many designs can be directionally unstable for series compensated lines
• Zone 1 reach problems for series compensated lines
• Lack of discrimination for faults between circuits of different voltage levels
7.5.2 Distance Protection (Signal Aided)

7.5.2.1 Accelerated under reach distance protection
Attributes
• Communication independent fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
• Accelerated tripping at one end for faults in about 40% of the protected line
• Suitable for composite circuits (lines/cables)

Limitations
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line with 80% Zone 1 reach setting (for about 40% of protected line)
in case of communication failure
• Resistive fault coverage limited by Zone 1
• Not always suitable for multi terminal lines
• No trip acceleration signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping
7.5.2.2 Permissive under Reach Distance Protection
Attributes:
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or Z4)
Limitations:
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line) in case of communication
failure
• Not always suitable for multi terminal lines
• No trip acceleration signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping

Fig. 7.1 : Permissive underreach distance protection
7.5.2.3 Intertripping under Reach Distance Protection
Attributes
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or reverseZ4)
• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-1 from at least one terminal
Limitations
failure
• No intertripping signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping

7.5.2.4 Permissive Overreach Distance Protection
Attributes
• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-2 from all terminals (no out
feed)
• Open terminal signal echo logic possible
• Suitable for series compensated lines with special designs provide directional discrimination
Limitations
failure
• No permissive trip signal from weak end in feed / open terminal

7.5.2.5 Permissive overreach distance protection with weak in feed logic
Attributes
• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-2 from all terminals (no out
feed)
• Open terminal signal echo logic possible
Fig. 7.2 : Permissive overreach distance protection with weak infeed logic
Limitations
• Delayed tripping at one end for about 40% of protected line in case of communication failure
7.5.2.6 Blocking Overreach Distance Protection
Attributes
• Communication independent tripping with small delay at one end for faults in about 40% of the
protected line
Fig. 7.3 : Blocking overreach distance protection

• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where there is no out feed for an internal fault
• No degradation of performance at other terminals with weak-infeed at one terminal
• Dependable scheme for use with PLC (where in-zone fault attenuates PLC)
Limitations
• Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure
• No tripping at weak in feed terminal
7.5.3 Phase Comparison Protection

7.5.3.1 Modulated Power Line Carrier Communication
Attributes
• Fast tripping for 100% of line
• Communication independent tripping
• Tripping with one weak/ open terminal
• Tripping not affected by PLC attenuation
• Moderate resistive fault coverage
• Not dependent on VT signal
• Often suitable for series compensated lines with spark-gap capacitors and no internal fault current
inversion
• Can discriminate for faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
• Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure
• No remote back-up protection
• No tripping at weak in feed terminal

• Needs additional units for phase selection
• Not usually suitable for multi terminal lines
• Not suitable for transformer feeders
• Not suitable for series compensated lines with current reversal or large deviations in internal fault
current angle at one relay terminal for resistive faults
7.5.4 Current Differential Protection
7.5.4.1 Digital Communication
Attributes
• Fully discriminative without time delays
• Independent of VT signals
• Moderate to high resistive fault coverage
• Can be inherently phase- selective

• No problems with parallel circuits
• Suitable for composite circuits
• Tripping at all ends for internal faults without in feed from all ends
• Possible application to multi-terminal lines (some designs)
• No problems with series compensation
• No problems with power swings
• Variety of communications media possible
• Sophisticated supervision of communication links included
• Communication error checking for security
• Discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels
• Operational during single pole A/R
• Single phase tripping possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines Limitations
• Dependent on communication
• Does not inherently offer remote back-up protection
• Commissioning difficulties for long lines
• Sensitivity varies with load
• Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity
• Unstable with large in zone loads
• No detection of series faults (Broken conductors etc.)

7.5.4.2 Pilot Wire Communication
Attributes
• Fully discriminative without time delays

• Independent of VT signals
• Moderate to high resistive fault coverage
• No problems with parallel circuits
• Tripping at all ends for internal faults (some designs)
• No problems with series compensation
• No problems with power swings
• Discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels
• Supervision of pilots is possible (For security and dependability)
• Operational during single pole A/R
• Relatively low cost relays
• Single phase tripping possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines Limitations
• Not phase selective
• In feed terminal trip only
• Protection dependent on healthy pilots
• Requires metallic pilots
• Commissioning difficulties for long lines
• Limited to relatively short lines
• Insulation required for induced voltages in parallel and differences between substation ground
potentials
• Sensitivity varies with load (Biased schemes)
• Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity
• No detection of series faults (Broken jumpers etc)
7.5.5 Directional Protection

7.5.5.1 Directional Comparison Protection (Permissive)
Attributes
• Variety of communication media possible
• Fully discriminative with short time delays
• Suitable for long lines

• Can be phase selective (by design)
• Moderate-high resistive fault coverage
• Weak-infeed / open-terminal logic possible
• Possible application to multi-terminal lines
• Protection of parallel circuits
• Possible detection of series faults
• Some special designs are suitable for series compensated lines
• Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
• Protection dependent on communication
• Some standard designs e.g., DEF are not universally suitable for series compensated lines
• Pick up for external faults with no reach control elements
• Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole dead times
7.5.5.2 Directional Comparison Protection (Blocking)
Attributes
• Variety of communication media possible
• Fully discriminative with short time delays
• Communications independent tripping
• Suitable for long lines
• Can be inherently phase selective (by design)
• Moderate-high resistive fault coverage
• Protection of parallel circuits
• Possible detection of series faults
• Some special designs are suitable for series compensated lines
• Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different voltage levels

Limitations
• Security is dependent on communication
• Some standard designs e.g., DEF are not universally suitable for series compensated lines
• Pick up for external faults with no reach control elements
• Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole dead times
7.5.6 Protection scheme Considerations for Cable Circuit
The attributes and limitations of individual protection schemes described above are mainly made with respect
to overhead or hybrid transmission circuits. For pure cable circuits, which are generally relatively short in
length, the most common and favoured form of protection is current differential protection. Here again, it
should be preferably current differential protection using dark fibers / digital communication and not pilot
wires as the experience with the latter has not been satisfactory, especially where pilots are laid in the same
trench in which power cables are laid. This is often the case in city areas where distances are more than a
kilometer.
Remote back-up protection can be provided by time-delayed directional phase over current and ground over
current protection or by overreaching time-delayed zones of distance protection.
The relatively low impedance of cables per unit length, together with the relatively short length for a cable
circuit has traditionally precluded the application of distance protection in view of the low impedance setting
which would be required for under reaching zone of protection. However, distance relays have been applied
in blocking overreaching or permissive overreach signaling channel-aided schemes, without under reaching
zones.
With the advent of modern numerical distance relays, with lower impedance setting ranges, better accuracy
at low impedance settings and with the necessary range and accuracy of neutral impedance compensation
available it is now more feasible to apply under reaching distance protection schemes to cable circuits as
short as 2 km in length.
The distance relay when applied should preferably be as other Main (Main-2) protection.
7.6 Recommendations for line protection relay

7.6.1 General
Based on the discussions included above few general recommendations have been brought out and these
should be considered.
• The line protection relays are required to protect the line and clear all type of faults on it within shortest
possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity.
• Provision of independent Main-1 and Main-2 protection is important to ensure clearance of all faults
in the shortest possible time. As per the current practice this is followed for all lines at 765 kV, 400
kV level and in some cases for lines at 220 kV level. No change is proposed in this practice.
• With growing interconnections fast fault clearance in 220 kV lines is becoming important to avoid grid
disturbances. Therefore it is recommended that for all 220 kV lines too Main 1 and Main 2 protections
be provided.
• For 132 kV lines it is felt that provision of one Main protection and directional over current and
earth fault protection as back-up protection is adequate. However if in any given part of the 132kV
network, failure of fault clearance by primary protection is going to create wide spread disturbance
and consequences of such disturbances are too costly, provision of Main 2 protection should be
considered here too.
• If only one main protection is used, the back-up protection should be provided in a separate hard
ware unit. Distance relays have inherent features for providing back-up protection. When a distance
protection is provided as Main protection the Zone 2 element of the distance relay provides circuit
local back-up, the Zone-3 element provides remote back-up and reverse reach element of Zone 4
provides substation local back-up.
• Distance relay as Main protection should always be complemented by Directional ground protection
to provide protection for high resistive line faults.
• In case a line differential/phase comparison/directional comparison protection is used they do not

have inherent features to provide back-up protection. Therefore, it is recommended that they should
preferably be provided with additional elements that can provide back-up protection. Usually these
features are achieved by supplementing the unit protections with additional impedance elements.
• The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems
may be factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults
in the vicinity of a power station. This should be kept in mind while designing protection system close
to these locations.
• Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time. Unit protection should be used as
main protection and distance protection shall be used as Main-2. Differential protection with built in
back up impedance function can be used as both Main-I and Main-II protection.
Recommendation for provisions of line protection at different voltage levels are summarized as follows:
7.6.2 765 kV, 400 kV & 220 kV Voltage Lines
There should be two independent high speed main protection schemes called Main-I and Main-II with at
least one of them being carrier aided non-switched three zone distance protection. The other protection
may be a phase segregated current differential (this may require digital communication) phase comparison,
directional comparison type or a carrier aided non-switched distance protection. Further, if Main-I and Main-
II are both distance protection schemes, then they should be preferably of different types. However, they
need not necessarily be of different make. Both the protections should be suitable for single and three phase
tripping. In addition to above following shall also be provided:
• Two stage over-voltage protection. However in such cases where system has grown sufficiently or
in case of short lines, utilities on their discretion may decide not to provide this protection.
• Auto reclose relay suitable for 1 ph/3 ph (as required with deadline charging and synchro check
facility) reclosure.
• Sensitive IDMT directional E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay)
7.6.3 132 kV Lines
There should be at-least one carrier aided non-switched three zone distance protection scheme. In addition to
this, another non-switched/switched distance scheme or directional over current and earth fault relays should
be provided as back up. Main protection should be suitable for single and three phase tripping. Additionally,
auto-reclose relay suitable for 1 ph/3 ph (as required with dead line charging and synchro-check facility)
reclosure shall be provided. In case of both line protections being Distance Protections, IDMT type Directional
E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay) shall also be provided additionally.
7.7 Requirements of Protection relays / functions

7.7.1 Distance Protection : Distance Protection scheme shall have the following attributes:
• Numerical relay with at least Four independent zones
• Non-switched type with separate measurements for all phase to phase and phase to ground faults.
And having Career aided scheme logic like PUR, POR etc.
• Capable of single and three phase tripping
• Directional (mho or quadrilateral or other suitably shaped) characteristics for zone 1, zone 2 and
zone 3
• Capable of operation for close-up three phase faults and switch on to faults
• Adjustable characteristic angle to match line angle wherever applicable
• Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for reach measurement in zone 1 and better than
or equal to 10% of set value for zone 2 and zone 3
• Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for time measurement of zone 2 and zone 3
• Variable residual compensation
• Shall include power swing detection feature for selectively blocking, as required.
• Shall include suitable fuse-failure protection to monitor all types of fuse failure and block the
protection.
• Shall include load encroachment prevention feature like Load blinder
• Shall include Out of Step trip function
• Maximum operating time under given set of condition shall be as follows:
Table 1: Maximum operating times
SIR 4 15
Relay setting 10 Ohms 2 Ohms
Fault location (as % of relay setting) 60% 60%
Trip duty Contacts per phase* 4 4
Fault resistance Zero Ohms Zero Ohms
Max. Operating Times Including trip relays 45 ms for all faults 45 ms for 3 phase faults 60 ms for
(if any) and with CVT other faults
These trip duty contacts can be provided either in-built in the distance relay or through additional relay.
Making capacity of trip contracts shall be 30 A for 0.25 S with an inductive load of L/R > 10 ms
The line protection relays shall be suitable for use with capacitive voltage transformers having passive
damping and transient response as per IEC 186/ IEC61869.
7.7.2 Directional Comparison Protection
• Shall be a unit system of protection
• Shall be directional comparison type suitable for operation with one signalling channel, e.g., PLCC
• Shall have high speed fault detection based on principles like detection of post fault travelling wave,
superimposed components, etc.
• Shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults
• Shall be suitable for 1 and 3 phase tripping
• Shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CVT transients, VT fuse
failure, line charging currents, distorted primary currents and voltages, external switching activities
sudden power reversal, zero sequence, mutual coupling, shunt reactor “in-zone” switching etc. and
lightning strokes
• Shall have features like switch on to fault, weak end infeed, echo system
• Shall have feature to cover nearby fault at high speed in the event of channel fail
7.7.3 Phase Segregated Line Differential Protection
• The relay shall be all digital multi microprocessor based, designed for use with modern digital
telecommunication system multiplexer conforming to ITU-T (CCITT) specifications and Fibre Optic
medium.
• Each phase current shall be separately evaluated at both ends for both amplitude and phase.
• Shall be suitable for single phase tripping and autoreclosing.
• The message transmitted by the relay to other end shall include information on currents, supervision
information, CT saturation detection, synchronisation of terminals etc.
• The measurement shall be stabilised phase by phase for CT saturation.

• The communication delay shall be continuously measured and automatically compensated for in the
differential measurement.
• Communication telegram shall have error detection and correction feature.
• Suitable programmable evaluation algorithm will be provided to ensure proper security and dependability
of the message.
• The connection equipment from the relay to the communication shall be a 64 kbps Channel.
• An optional electrical or optical port shall be provided to directly connect the signal to auxiliary channel
of OLTE (optical line terminal equipment) by passing the multiplexer or for redundancy purpose.
• The relay shall have communication port for remote monitoring, programmaing and control.
• The direct intertrip signal also shall be transmitted as part of telegram.
• The sampling frequency for analog signals shall be minimum 2 kHz. Filtering and measuring techniques
shall be used to ensure correct performance during all operating and transient conditions.
• Shall be Current phase comparison type.
• Shall be suitable for operation with one signal channel.
• Shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults.
• Shall be capable of single and three pole tripping.

• Shall have facility for blocking/permissive trip modes
• Shall have facility for direct transfer tripping
• Shall have comprehensive alarm and test facilities
• Shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CT phase
errors, Propagation delays, Capacitance current etc., as is typical of unit protections.
7.7.5 Over Voltage Protection
The relay shall have following features:

• Have a high drop off to pickup ratio
• Have adjustable setting range for voltage and time
• Have two stages
• Low set stage shall monitor any one phase to phase voltage and shall have associated timer
• High set stage shall monitor all three phase to phase voltage and shall have associated timer
7.8 Transmission circuit protection setting criteria : Uncompensated

transmission lines
This section provides guideline for protection setting for both uncompensated and series compensated
lines.
7.8.1 Main distance relay zone-1 reach setting
Zone-1: To be set to cover 80% of protected line length. Set zero sequence compensation factor KN as
(Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
Where:
Z1 = Positive sequence impedance of the protected line
Z0 = Zero sequence impedance of the protected line
Note: With this setting, the relay may overreach when parallel circuit is open and grounded at both ends.
This risk is considered acceptable.
7.8.2 Zone-2 reach setting
Zone-2: To be set to cover minimum 120% of length of principle line section. However, in case of double
circuit lines 150% coverage must be provided to take care of under reaching due to mutual coupling effect.
Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
The 150% setting is arrived at considering an expected under reach of about 30% when both lines are in
parallel and a margin of 20%. The degree of under reach can be calculated using equation
K om
k OM / 1 + K o ∆ Z =
1+ ko
Where K0M = Z0M/ 3Z1

Zo − Z 1
and K0 = (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1. K0 =
3Z1
It is recommended to check the degree of under reach due to mutual coupling effect to be sure that setting
of 150% is adequate.
Sometimes impedance so selected might enter the next voltage level. However, un-selectivity in the Zone-2
grading is generally not to be expected when in-feeds exist at the remote sub-station as they reduce the
overreach considerably.
This holds good for majority of the cases, however, for certain cases, where in-feed from other feeder at the
local bus is not significant, Zone-2 of remote end relay may see the fault at lower voltage level. Care has to
be taken for all such cases by suitable time delay.
7.8.3 Zone-3 reach setting
Zone-3 distance protection can offer time-delayed remote back-up protection for an adjacent transmission
circuit. To achieve this, Zone-3 distance elements must be set according to the following criteria where
possible.
Zone-3 should overreach the remote terminal of the longest adjacent line by an acceptable margin (typically
20% of highest impedance seen) for all fault conditions.
Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.

However, in such case where Zone-3 reach is set to enter into next lower voltage level, Zone-3 timing
shall be coordinated with the back-up protection (Directional over current and earth fault relay) of power
transformer. Where such coordination cannot be realized, it is recommended to carry out simulation studies
for relay reach & time coordination and suitable solution may be devised. Some of the typical solution can be
like application of back up distance protection for power transformer, duplicated protection for downstream
220kV feeders or special protection scheme logic. Similar issues, if encountered for Zone-2 reach setting,
should also be addressed in the above manner.
7.8.4 Resistive reach setting
For phase to ground faults, resistive reach should be set to give maximum coverage considering fault
resistance, arc resistance & tower footing resistance. It has been considered that ground fault would not be
responsive to line loading.
For Zone-1 resistive reach, attention has to be given to any limitations indicated by manufacturer in respect
of resistive setting vis-a-vis reactance setting to avoid overreach due to remote in-feed. It is recommended to
study the impact of remote end infeed for expected power flow & fault resistance on the extent of overreach.
This is particularly important for short lines.
In case of phase to phase fault, resistive reach should be set to provide coverage against all types of
anticipated phase to phase faults subject to check of possibility against load point encroachment considering
minimum expected voltage and maximum load expected during short time emergency system condition.
It is recommended that all the distance relays should have quadrilateral / polygon characteristic. For relays
having Mho characteristic, it is desirable to have load encroachment prevention characteristic or a blinder.
In the absence of credible data regarding minimum voltage and maximum load expected for a line during
emergency system condition, following criteria may be considered for deciding load point encroachment:
Maximum load current (Imax) may be considered as 1.5 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5 times the
associated bay equipment current rating (the minimum of the bay equipment individual rating) whichever is
lower. (Caution: The rating considered is approximately 15minutes rating of the transmission facility).
Minimum voltage (Vmin) to be considered as 0.85pu (85%).

Due to in-feeds, the apparent fault resistance seen by relay is several times the actual value. This should
be kept in mind while arriving at resistive reach setting for Zone-2 and Zone-3.
7.8.5 Zone-2 timer setting
A Zone-2 timing of 0.35 seconds (considering LBB time of 200 m Sec, CB open time of 60ms, resetting
time of 30 ms and safety margin of 60 ms) is recommended. However, if a long line is followed by a short
line, then a higher setting (typically 0.6 second) may be adopted on long line to avoid indiscriminate tripping
through Zone-2 operation on both lines.
For special cases, following shall be the guiding philosophy:
Since Zone-2 distance protection is set to overreach the circuit it is intended to protect, it will also be
responsive to faults within adjacent power system circuit. For this reason the time delay for Zone–2 back-up
protection must be set to coordinate with clearance of adjacent circuit faults, within reach, by the intended
main protection or by breaker fail protection.
The following formula would be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone-2 time setting:
tz2 > tMA + tCB + tz2reset + ts
Where:
tZ2 = Required Zone-2 time delay
tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit main protection or Circuit Local back-up for faults within
Zone-2 reach
tCB = Associated adjacent circuit breaker clearance time
tZ2reset = Resetting time of Zone-2 impedance element with load current present
tS = Safety margin for tolerance (e.g. 50 to 100 ms)
Unequal lengths of transmission circuit can make it difficult to meet the Zone-2 secondary reach setting
criterion. In such cases it will be necessary to co-ordinate Zone-2 with longer time delay. The time tMA in
equation must be the adjacent circuit Zone-2 protection operating time.
7.8.6 Zone-3 timer setting
Zone-3 timer should be set so as to provide discrimination with the operating time of relays provided in
subsequent sections with which Zone-3 reach of relay being set, overlaps. Typical recommended Zone-3
time is 0.8 to 1.0 second.
For Special cases, where co-ordination between long and short lines is required, following formula would
be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone-3 time setting:
tz3 > tMA + tCB + tz3reset + ts

Where:
tZ3 = Required Zone-3 time delay
tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit local back-up protection
tCB = Associated adjacent circuit breaker clearance time
tZ3reset = Resetting time of Zone-3 impedance element with load current present
tS = Safety margin for tolerance (e.g. 50 to 100milliseconds)

7.8.7 Load impedance encroachment
With the extended Zone-3 reach settings, that may be required to address the many under reaching factors
already considered, load impedance encroachment is a significant risk to long lines of an interconnected power
system. Not only the minimum load impedance under expected modes of system operation be considered
in risk assessment, but also the minimum impedance that might be sustained for seconds or minutes during
abnormal or emergency system conditions. Failure to do so could jeopardize power system security.
Ideal solution to tackle load encroachment may be based on the use of blinders or by suitably setting the
resistive reach of specially shaped impedance elements or by use of polygon type impedance elements.
It is recommended that all the distance relays should have quadrilateral / polygon characteristic. For relays
having Mho characteristics, it is desirable to have load encroachment prevention characteristics or a
blinder.
In the absence of credible data regarding minimum voltage and maximum load expected for a feeder during
emergency system condition, following criteria may be considered for deciding resistive reach / blinder setting
to prevent load point encroachment:
Maximum load current (Imax) may be considered as 1.5 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5 times the
associated bay equipment current rating ( the minimum of the bay equipment individual rating) whichever is
lower. (Caution: The rating considered is approximately 15 minutes rating of the transmission facility).
Minimum voltage (Vmin) to be considered as 0.85pu (85%).
For setting angle for load blinder, a value of 30 degree may be adequate in most cases.
For high resistive earth fault where impedance locus lies in the Blinder zone, fault clearance shall be provided
by the back-up directional earth fault relay.
7.8.8 Zone-4 substation local back up protection
Zone-3 distance protection is usually targeted to provide only remote back-up protection. In such a case, the
distance relay may be provided with an additional zone of reverse-looking protection (e.g. Zone-4) to offer
substation-local back-up protection. The criterion for setting Zone-4 reverse reach would be as under.
The Zone-4 reverse reach must adequately cover expected levels of apparent bus bar fault resistance,
when allowing for multiple in feeds from other circuits. For this reason, its resistive reach setting is to be
kept identical to Zone-3 resistive reach setting.
With a reverse reach setting of less than the Zone-1 reach of distance protection for the shortest line connected
to the local bus bar, the Zone-4 time delay would only need to co-ordinate with bus bar main protection fault
clearance and with Zone-1 fault clearance for lines out of the same substation. For this reason this can be
set according to the Zone-2 time setting guidelines.
7.8.9 Use of system studies to analyse distance relay behaviour
Often during system disturbance conditions, due to tripping of one or more trunk lines, some lines get
overloaded and the system voltage drops. During such conditions the back-up distance elements may become
susceptible to operation due to encroachment of impedance locus in to the distance relay characteristic.
While the ohmic characteristic of a distance relay is independent of voltage, the load is not generally constant-
impedance. The apparent impedance presented to a distance relay, as the load voltage varies, will depend
on the voltage characteristic of the load. If the low voltage situation resulted from the loss of one or more
transmission lines or generating units, there may be a substantial change in the real and reactive power
flow through the line in question. The combination of low voltage and worsened phase angle may cause
a long set relay to operate undesirably either on steady state basis, or in response to recoverable swings
related to the initiating event.
The apparent impedance seen by the relay is affected by in-feeds, mutual coupling and therefore the behavior
of distance relay during various system condition needs to be studied wherever necessary to achieve proper
relay coordination.
It is desirable and hence recommended that system studies are conducted using computer-aided tools to
assess the security of protection by finding out trajectory of impedance in various zones of distance relay under
abnormal or emergency system condition on case-to-case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.
In addition, the settings must be fine-tuned, simulating faults using Real Time Digital Simulator on case-to-
case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.
Such facilities available at CPRI, POWERGRID or elsewhere in the country should be used for protection
related system studies.
7.8.10 Directional phase overcurrent protection
Directional phase over current relays are still being used as back-up protection for 220 kV transmission lines
by many utilities. In view of time coordination issues and increased fault clearance time in the event of failure
of main distance protection, it is recommended that for all 220 kV lines also main-1 and main-2 protections
similar to 400 kV lines be provided.
7.8.11 Directional ground overcurrent protection
Normally this protection is applied as a supplement to main protection when ground fault currents may be
lower than the threshold of phase over current protection. It might also be applied as main protection for
high resistance faults.
The ground over current threshold should be set to ensure detection of all ground faults, but above any
continuous residual current under normal system operation. Continuous residual current may arise because
of following:
• Unbalanced series impedances of untransposed transmission circuits
• Unbalanced shunt capacitance of transmission circuits.
• Third harmonic current circulation.
Various types of directional elements may be employed to control operation of ground over current (zero
sequence over current) protection response. The most common approach is to employ Phase angle difference
between Zero sequence voltage and current, since the relaying signals can easily be derived by summing
phase current signals and by summing phase voltage signals from a suitable voltage transformer.
However this method is not suitable for some applications where transmission lines terminated at different
substations, run partially in parallel. In such cases following type of directional control is recommended to
be used for the directional earth fault relay:
• Relative phase of negative sequence voltage and current
To ensure proper coordination, operating time must be set according to following criteria:
The DEF protection should not operate when the circuit local backup protection of remote end clears a fault
in an adjacent circuit i.e DEF should be coordinated with the remote end LBB.
7.8.12 Power swing blocking and OOS function
Large interconnected systems are more susceptible to Power Swings in comparison to the erstwhile smaller
stand alone systems. Inter-area Power Swings can be set up even due to some event in far flung locations
in the system. During the tenure of such swings, outage of any system element may aggravate the situation
and can lead to instability (loss of synchronism). It is hence extremely important that unwanted tripping of
transmission elements need to be prevented, under these conditions. Distance protection relays demand
special consideration under such a situation, being susceptible to undesirable mis-operation during Power
swings which may be recoverable or irrecoverable power swings.
Figure 7.4 given shows the trajectory of the swing impedance in the R-X plane, along with the Zone-1
fault detection characteristic, during a recoverable Power Swing and an irrecoverable Power Swing, as
seen by the distance relay, located at the electrical centre of the system. While the distance relay trips for
irrecoverable swings may be acceptable to some extent, tripping in the case of a recoverable swing will be
simply unacceptable. Unfortunately, the Power swing detection techniques themselves cannot distinguish
between the two. Thus, there is no option but to block distance relay from tripping in either case, if undesirable
tripping is to be positively avoided.
Having blocked distance relays from tripping on Power Swing, it may be desired that the line must be
tripped in the case of irrecoverable Power Swing (Instability). This can be positively achieved by the
introduction of Out Of Step (OOS) relaying. In the conventional relaying technology, this would have
required the use of a twin blinder type Pole Slip protection. In the state of the art numerical relays
this option is readily achievable, by detecting the opposite ‘sign’ of the ‘Resistance’ as the impedance
trajectory enters and leaves the Power swing detection characteristic. The principle is evident from Figure
7.4. In the event of an irrecoverable swing (loss of synchronism), the impedance trajectory entering the
detection characteristic from the positive resistance side will exit on the negative resistance side and
vice-versa. In the case of recoverable swings, on the other hand, the ‘sign’ of the ‘Resistance’ at entry
and exit will remain the same.
Fig. 7.4 : Power Swing Impedance trajectory
While the above philosophy is simple, it is often difficult to implement it in a large power system because
of the complexity of the system and the different operating conditions that must be studied. There are a
number of options one can select in implementing power-swing protection in their system. Designing the
power system protection to avoid or preclude cascade tripping is a requirement of modern day power system.
Below we list two possible options:
7.8.12.1 Block all Zones except Zone-I
This application applies a blocking signal to the higher impedance zones of distance relay and allows Zone 1
to trip if the swing enters its operating characteristic. Breaker application is also a consideration when tripping
during a power swing. A subset of this application is to block the Zone 2 and higher impedance zones for a
preset time (Unblock time delay) and allow a trip if the detection relays do not reset.
In this application, if the swing enters Zone 1, a trip is issued, assuming that the swing impedance entering
the Zone-1 characteristic is indicative of loss of synchronism. However, a major disadvantage associated
with this philosophy is that indiscriminate line tripping can take place, even for recoverable power swings
and risk of damage to breaker.
7.8.12.2 Block All Zones and Trip with Out of Step (OOS) Function
This application applies a blocking signal to all distance relay zones and order tripping if the power swing
is unstable using the OOS function (function built in modern distance relays or as a standalone relay).
This application is the recommended approach since a controlled separation of the power system can be
achieved at preselected network locations. Tripping after the swing is well past the 180 degree position is
the recommended option from CB operation point of view.
Normally all relay are having Power swing Un-block timer which unblocks on very slow power swing condition
(when impedance locus stays within a zone for a long duration). Typically the Power swing un-blocking time
setting is 2 sec.
However, on detection of a line fault, the relay has to be de-blocked.
7.8.12.3 Placement of OOS trip Systems
Out of step tripping protection (Standalone relay or built-in function of Main relay) shall be provided on all
the selected lines. The locations where it is desired to split the system on out of step condition shall be
decided based on system studies.
The selection of network locations for placement of OOS systems can best be obtained through transient
stability studies covering many possible operating conditions. Based on these system studies, It is
recommended to exercise the first two option given above.
7.8.13 Line overvoltage protection

7.8.13.1 For 400kV lines
Low set stage (Stage-I) may be set in the range of 110% - 112% (typically 110%) with a time delay of 5 seconds.
High set stage (Stage-II) may be set in the range 140% - 150% with a time delay of 100milliseconds.
7.8.13.2 For 765 kV lines
Low set stage (Stage-I) may be set in the range of 106% - 109% (typically 108%) with a time delay of 5 seconds.
High set stage (Stage-II) may be set in the range 140% - 150% with a time delay of 100milliseconds.
However, for over voltage Stage-I protection, a time grading of 1 to 3 seconds may be provided between
overvoltage relays of double circuit lines. Grading on overvoltage tripping for various lines emanating from a
station may be considered and same can be achieved using voltage as well as time grading. Longest timed
delay should be checked with expected operating time of Over-fluxing relay of the transformer to ensure
disconnection of line before tripping of transformer.
It is desirable to have Drop-off to pick-up ratio of overvoltage relay better than 97% (Considering limitation
of various manufacturers relay on this aspect).
7.8.14 Line differential protection
Many transmission lines are now having OPGW or separate optic fibre laid for the communication. Where
ever such facilities are available, it is recommended to have the line differential protection as Main-I protection
with distance protection as backup (built-in Main relay or standalone). Main-II protection shall continue to be
distance protection. For cables and composite lines, line differential protection with built in distance back up
shall be applied as Main-I protection and distance relay as Main-II protection. Auto-recloser shall be blocked
for faults in the cables. For very short lines, Both Main protections can be Line differential protection with
distance protection as backup (built-in Main relay or standalone).
7.8.15 Maintaining operation of power station auxiliary system of nuclear power plants
Depression of power supply voltages for auxiliary plant in some generating stations may reduce the station
output. Maintenance of full generation output may be a critical power system security factor. In the case
of nuclear plant, auxiliary power supplies are also a major factor in providing full nuclear plant safety and
security.
The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems may be
factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults in the vicinity
of a power station. This should be further taken up with utilities of nuclear plants and this and any other
requirements should be understood and addressed.
7.8.16 Coordination between system study group and protection engineers
For quite a few cases where system behaviour issues are involved it is recommended that power system
study group is associated with the protection engineers. For example power swing locus, out of step tripping
locations, faults withstands capability, zone2 and zone3 overlap reach settings calculations are areas where
system study group role is critical/essential.
7.9 Transmission circuit protection setting criteria : Series compensated

transmission lines
There are phenomenons associated with the protection of Series compensated lines which require special
attention and the same have been discussed in detail in Chapter on Protection of Series Compensated
lines.
7.10 Setting document for multifunction IED
The numerical terminals referred as IED (Intelligent electronic device) contain apart from main protection
functions several other protection & supervision functions which may or may not be used for a particular
application. Many of these functions are having default settings which may not be suitable and may lead to
mal-operations. Thus, It is important that the recommended setting document should contain all the settings
for all functions that are used and indicate clearly the functions not used (to be Blocked / Disabled). This shall
be followed not only for Line protection IEDs but also for other IEDs like Generator, Transformer, Reactor,
Bus bar protection and Control functions.
It is also recommended that graphical representation of distance relay zones on R-X plane including
phase selection, load encroachment & power swing characteristics should be done showing exact setting
calculated.
7.11 Application notes
• If found necessary, at certain locations, out of step tripping relays shall be provided for islanding the
system during grid disturbances
• For short line application distance relays should have shaped characteristics for ground faults and be
used in permissive over reach mode with weak end infeed logic. Further, if it is a double circuit line,
current reversal logic should also be available.
• O/V protection scheme for EHV lines shall be connected to trip concerned line breaker(s), start LBB,
block auto reclosure and send direct trip command to remote end circuit breakers.
• The directional earth fault relay recommended along with the distance relay should be seen as a
supplement to it and not as a back up. It helps to detect very high resistance fault which distance
relay cannot.
• HVDC Systems connected to AC networks with low short circuit levels can influence AC line protections
in it vicinity. This aspect needs to be looked into on case to case basis.
• Distance relays employed on lines in the vicinity of Series compensated network shall be suitable for
Series compensated line protection application.
• For details concerning protection of complex transmission lines reference may be made to CIGRE WG
34.04 report titled “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network configurations”.
Use of correct line parameters is important for proper setting of protective relays. Calculated values
of overhead line electrical parameters ought be verified by field-testing and this information then be
used for relay setting.
References
1. CIGRE WG 34.04 ; Application Guide on Protection Of Complex Transmission Network Configurations

1991.
2. CIGRE WG B5.10, 411: Protection, Control and Monitoring Of Series Compensated Networks
2010.
Chapter 8
Protection of SERIES COMPENSATED LINES
8.1 Introduction
Introduction of Series capacitor in the network results in virtual reduction of line reactance in order to enhance
power system stability and increase corridor loadability. Series capacitor has a self-regulating effect – its
response is automatic, instantaneous and continuous. The benefits of introducing series capacitor are:
• Steady state voltage regulation and raise of voltage collapse limit
• Increase power transfer capability by raising the transient stability limit
• Improved reactive power balance
• Increase in power transfer capacity
• Active load sharing between parallel circuits and loss reduction
• Reduced costs of power transmission due to decreased investment costs for new power lines
8.2 Challenges in protection of series compensated and adjacent power

lines
Series capacitors influence the magnitude and the direction of fault currents in series compensated networks.
They consequently influence phase angles of voltages measured at different points of series compensated
networks and this in turn has an impact on the performances of various protection functions whose operation
is based on properties of measured voltage and current phasors. Other phenomena like voltage and current
inversion at relay point, sub synchronous resonance and similar too influence the performance of different
protection schemes.
8.2.1 Voltage and current inversion

8.2.1.1 Voltage inversion
Figure 8.1 shows a part of a series compensated line with fault at point F. XL1 is line reactance between the
relay and the fault point F.
The voltage measurement is supposed to be on the bus side, and the series capacitor is located between
the relay and the fault point F.
The voltage UM will lead the fault current IF as long as XL1 > XC. From the directionality point of view this case
is similar to fault taking place on a line without series capacitor.
Voltage UM at the relay point will lag the fault current IF if: XC > XL1 .
In this case the voltage at the relay point reverses its direction. This phenomenon is commonly called as
voltage inversion. The consequences of this phenomenon on operation of different types of protections
in the series compensated networks depend on their operating principle. As for example it influences the
directional measurement of distance relays . Special measures must be taken in the distance relays to guard
against this phenomenon.
Protection of Series Compensated Lines 97
Fig. 8.1 : Voltage inversion on series compensated line
The phenomenon of voltage inversion does not take place when VTs are located on the bus side of the series
capacitor. Locating the VTs to the line side does not eliminate the phenomenon since it appears again for
faults on the bus side of the relay point.
8.2.1.2 Current inversion
Figure 8.2 presents part of a series compensated line with fault at point F. In non compensated lines, the fault
current I F normally flows from power source towards the fault point F. The introduction of Series capacitor
may change this situation.
Phase angle of the fault current I F compared to the source voltage U S depends if the resultant reactance
between the source and the fault position is inductive or capacitive. Two possibilities exist.
X S − X C + X L1 > 0

X S − X C + X L1 < 0
The first case is similar to conditions on non compensated lines or the case when the capacitor is bypassed
either by spark gap or by the bypass switch . The resultant reactance in this case is inductive in nature and
the fault current lags the source voltage by 90 degrees.
In the second case the resultant reactance is capacitive in nature. Fault current in this case will lead the
source voltage by 90 degrees, which means that it flows from series compensated line to the system. In this
case the system conditions can be given by equation.
X C > X S + X L1
Fig. 8.2 : Current inversion on series compensated line
This phenomenon is normally called as current inversion. Its consequences on operation of different types of
protections in series compensated networks depend on their operating principle. Current inversion influences
operation of distance relays and therefore they cannot be applied for the protection of series compensated
lines when possibility of current inversion exists.
The study of current inversion phenomenon should not be limited to protection devices based on measurement
of phase currents. Directional comparison protections, based on residual (zero sequence) and negative
sequence currents should be considered as well. Current inversion in systems with low zero sequence
source impedance (a number of power transformers connected in parallel) must be considered as practical
possibility in many modern networks.
Therefore it is recommended to check the possibility of current inversion through system studies in the
planning stage itself.
8.2.1.3 Low frequency transients
Series capacitors introduce oscillations in currents and voltages in the power systems, which are not common
in non-compensated systems. These oscillations have frequencies lower than the rated system frequency and
may cause delayed increase of fault currents, delayed operation of spark gaps as well as delayed operation
of protective relays. The most obvious difference can be generally seen in the fault currents.
Figure 8.3 shows a simplified picture of a series compensated network during fault conditions.
The waveforms of fault currents for a three-phase short circuit at the end of a typical 500 km long 500 kV
line with and without series compensation are shown in Figure 8.4.
In comparison to noncompensated line the magnitude of the fault current on compensated line not only is
higher due to the decreased apparent impedance of the line (60% compensation degree has been considered
for a particular case), but has also low frequency oscillations.
Fig. 8.3 : Simplified equivalent scheme of SC network during fault conditions
Low frequency transients have in general no significant influence on operation of line current differential
protection as well as on phase comparison protection. However they may significantly influence the correct
operation of distance protection in two ways:
• They increase the operating time of distance protection, which may in turn influence negatively the
system stability
• They may cause overreaching of instantaneous distance protection zones and this way result in
unnecessary tripping on series compensated lines.
Fig. 8.4 : Short circuit currents for the fault at the end of 500 km long 500 kV line without and with SC
Figure 8.5 represents typical impedance trajectory in dependence of time for a fault on series compensated
line with MOV used for over voltage protection of capacitor bank.
Fig. 8.5 : Time dependent impedance measurement influenced by low frequency transients
For this reason the reach setting should be reduced by a safety factor (Ks) to take care of possible overreach
due to low frequency oscillation.
8.2.1.4 High frequency transients
Presence of shunt reactors close to or on the series compensated line may cause together with series
capacitor and line shunt capacitance high frequency transients in the measured voltages and currents, which
may influence the operation of line protection. Spark gaps will flash over at line faults and short circuit the
capacitor, which will then discharge via the damping reactor. This will cause high frequency transient current,
the frequency of which will be determined by the dimension of series capacitor and damping reactor. The
damping reactor is generally dimensioned to provide the oscillation in the range of kHz. It is also necessary
to provide a damping resistor in series with reactor in order to limit the capacitor discharging current to
acceptable value.
Series capacitors are protected by spark gaps, gapped MOV schemes, or gapless MOV schemes.
Operation of the gap causes the capacitor to be short circuited during the power system fault, which
may result in unequal phase impedances. One must take this into consideration during system studies.
Steady-state fault analysis becomes more complex when a MOV is used for overvoltage protection of
series capacitors. Typical characteristics of a MOV, based upon expected fault current, can be used to
run steady state fault studies. This will be an approximation in determining the settings of the protection
system. More accurate fault analysis should be done with a transient simulation program i.e. EMTP,
PSCAD etc.
8.2.1.5 Transient recovery voltage
Series capacitors in a transmission line can have a significant effect on the transient voltage that appears
across the contacts of a circuit breaker when opening to clear a fault. The voltage that appears in such
situations is referred to as the transient recovery voltage (TRV). Transient recovery voltage (TRV) may
present danger for operation of line circuit breaker and has to be well investigated before the installation of
SC bank.
8.2.1.6 Sub harmonic Transient recovery voltage
Very high currents to shunt reactors and unloaded transformers have long time constant in the range of
several tens of seconds. They also have rather high inductances and may act together with series capacitor
in subharmonic oscillations.
These oscillating currents might cause overheating of the transformer. It might also overstress the
capacitor cans even during normal load conditions. In order to eliminate the sub harmonic resonance
condition, the series capacitor should be by-passed. Sub harmonic resonance conditions are very unlikely
to occur in EHV transmission systems since the transmission system normally is energized without the
series capacitor in service. For series capacitors on distribution systems, sub harmonic resonance may
be a problem because these systems are normally radial with a high degree of compensation.
8.2.1.7 Subsynchronous resonance (SSR)
Sub synchronous resonance (SSR) is a condition in a power system where the electrical network exchanges
energy with a steam turbine generating unit at one or more of the natural frequency of the combined system
below the synchronous frequency of the power system. It is unlikely that a hydro turbine generating unit and
a series compensated network could cause SSR. (Fig. 8.6)
Fig. 8.6 : Generator connected to a series compensated network
Electrical network exchanges energy with steam turbine generating unit at one or more of the natural
frequency of the combined system below the synchronous frequency. The oscillatory energy between the
mechanical and electrical systems can be even negatively damped (growing)
SSR may cause severe damages to the shaft system of generating units. Intensive initial system investigations
should be performed and counter measures provided if necessary
SSR might cause damage to the shaft system of the generating unit. If SSR conditions are suspected for a
series compensated network this should be studied during the stage of initial system studies.
8.2.1.8 MOV influence on apparent impedances
Series capacitors reduce the apparent impedance measured by the distance relays on protected lines. Typical
locations of series capacitor banks on power lines together with generally corresponding compensation
degrees are shown in Figure 8.7. A fault on remote bus is seen by distance relay close to the bus differently,
depending on location of series capacitor and the type of over voltage protection used on the capacitor bank
(spark gap or MOV).
Fig. 8.7 : Typical locations of capacitor banks on series compensated line
Use of spark gaps for capacitor overvoltage protection makes the picture relatively simple, because they
either flash over or not. The apparent impedance in first case corresponds to the impedance of a non-
compensated line as shown in Figure 8.8 case KC = 0%.
Fig. 8.8 : Apparent impedances seen by distance relay for different SC

locations and spark gaps used for overvoltage protection
The apparent impedance seen by the distance relay is always reduced by the amount of capacitive reactance
included between the fault and relay point, when the spark gap does not flash over, as shown for typical
cases in Figure 8.8.
Here it is necessary to distinguish between two typical cases:
Series capacitor only reduces the apparent impedance, but it does not cause wrong directional measurement.
Such cases are presented in Figure 8.8 for 50% compensation at 50% of line length and 33% compensation
located at 33% and 66% of line length.
The voltage inversion occurs in cases when the capacitor reactance between the relay point and fault appear
bigger than the corresponding line reactance as shown in Figure 8.8, for 80% compensation at local end. A
voltage inversion occurs in relay point and if no special measures have been taken in the relay design the
distance relay will see wrong direction towards the fault.
Fig. 8.9 : MOV protected series capacitor
The situation changes when metal oxide varistors (MOV) are used for capacitor overvoltage protection.
In contrast to spark gaps, MOVs carry current when the instantaneous voltage drop across the capacitor
becomes higher than the protective voltage level in each half-cycle. (Fig. 8.9)
Extensive studies have been done by Bonneville Power Administration in USA to arrive at a non-linear
equivalent circuit for a series connected capacitor using an MOV. The composite impedance depends on
total fault current and protection factor kp. The later is defined by equation.
U MOV
kp =
U NC
Figure 8.10 presents three typical cases for series capacitor located at line end (case LOC = 0% in
Figure 8.10. The following can be observed from these.
Effect of series capacitor prevails as long as the line current remains lower or equal to its protective current
level ( I ≤ k p ⋅ I NC ). The apparent line impedance in this case is reduced by the total reactance of the series
capacitor.
About 50% of capacitor reactance appears in series with resistive value, which corresponds to approximately
36% of capacitor reactance when the line current equals to two times the protective current level
( I > 2 ⋅ k p ⋅ I NC ). This is valuable information for arriving at the resistive reach setting of distance relay, for
phase-to-earth fault measurement as well as for phase-to-phase fault measurement.
Series capacitor becomes nearly completely bridged by the MOV when the line current is more than 10-times
the protective current level ( I > 10 ⋅ k p ⋅ I NC ).
Fig. 8.10 : Equivalent impedance of MOV protected capacitor in dependence of fault current
For reasons mentioned above Kp the protection factor should be considered while setting the relays.
8.3 Impact of series compensation on protective relays of adjacent lines

Voltage inversion is not limited only to the buses and to the relay points close to the series compensated
line. It can spread deep into the network and this way influence the selection of protection devices (mostly
distance relays) at remote ends of the lines adjacent to the series compensated circuit, and sometimes even
deeper in the network.
Fig. 8.11 : Voltage inversion in series compensated network due to fault current infeed
In the network shown in Figure 8.11 infeed current IA increases apparent value of capacitive reactance.This
makes voltage inversion spread deep in to the network. Steady state and dynamic network simulations need
to be done and studies should also consider faults with high resistance for which spark gaps or MOVs will
not conduct.
Extensive system studies are necessary before taking a decision to install series capacitor and define its
location in the network. Estimating their influence on performances of (especially) existing distance relays
correctly is a must. It is possible that the cost of number of protective relays, which need to be replaced by
more appropriate ones due to the introduction of series compensation, may influence the future of series
capacitors in the power network.
Possibilities of voltage inversion at remote buses should not be studied for short circuits with zero fault
resistance only. It is necessary to consider cases with higher fault resistances, for which spark gaps or MOVs
on series capacitors will not conduct at all. At the same time this kind of investigation must also consider the
maximum sensitivity and possible resistive reach of distance protection devices.
If MOVs are used for capacitor overvoltage protection, the impact of these nonlinear elements makes simple
calculations often impossible. Different kinds of steady state and dynamic network simulations need to be
done in such cases.
For reasons above studies should be carried out to find out impact of series compensation on protective
relays of adjacent lines preferably at the planning stage itself.
8.4 Distance protection
Distance protection is due to its basic characteristic the most commonly used protection on series
compensated and adjacent lines worldwide. At the same time it has caused a lot of challenges to protection
society, especially when it comes to directional measurement and transient overreach. Conventional distance
relay in fact does not measure directly impedance or quotient between line current and voltage. It operates
as a comparator and compares the operating quantity with stabilizing quantity. The operating quantity is
usually a voltage drop caused by measured current on line replica impedance, which corresponds exactly
to the desired percentage (reach) of line impedance. The stabilizing quantity is actual voltage drop on the
protected power line, which in case of internal fault is lower than the voltage drop on replica impedance
and vice versa.
Distance relays have in their replica impedance only the replicas of line inductance and resistance, but they
do not have any replica of series capacitor on the protected line and its protection devices (spark gap and
or MOV). This way they form a wrong picture of the protected line and all the “solutions” related to distance
protection of series compensated and adjacent lines are focused on finding some ways that help eliminating
the basic reason for the wrong measurement. The most known of these are decrease of the reach due to
presence of series capacitor which apparently decreases the line reactance, and introduction of permanent
memory voltage in directional measurement.
8.4.1 Distance protection with communication
The most common mode of communication used is distance protection in permissive overreaching mode
(Permissive Overreaching Transfer Trip – POTT).
Fig. 8.12 : Underreaching (Zone 1) and overreaching (Zone 2) zones on series compensated line
In order to obtain selectivity, the underreaching zone (Zone 1) must be set to a reach less than the reactance
of the compensated line as shown in Figure 8.12.
The underreaching zone will have reduced reach in cases of bypassed series capacitor as shown by dashed
line in Figure 8.12. The overreaching zone (Zone 2) this way has reach much beyond the protected line, but
must be ensured that it always covers the remote end bus with certain margin. Distance protection Zone 1
is often set to
X Z 1 = K S ⋅ ( X 11 + X 12 − X C )
Here Ks is a safety factor, presented graphically in Figure 8.13, which covers for possible overreaching due
to low frequency (sub-harmonic) oscillations. Here it should be noted that compensation degree KC in
Figure 8.13 relates to total system reactance, inclusive of line and source reactance. This safety factor is
applicable regardless of whether MOV or spark gaps are used for capacitor overvoltage protection.
Equation above is applicable for the case when the VTs are located on the bus side of series capacitor. It is
possible to remove XC from the equation in cases of VTs are installed on line side, but it is still necessary
to consider the safety factor Ks.
Fig. 8.13 : Underreaching safety factor Ks in dependence on system compensation degree KC
If the capacitor is out of service or bypassed, the reach with these settings can be less than 50% of protected
line depending on the compensation degree and there will be a section denoted by G in Figure 8.12 of the
power line, where no instantaneous and communication independent tripping occurs from either end.
For this reason permissive under reaching schemes can hardly be used as a main protection. Permissive
overreaching distance protection or some kind of directional or unit protection must therefore be used.
Fig. 8.14 : Permissive overreach distance protection scheme
The overreach must be of an order that it overreaches when the capacitor is bypassed or is out of service.
Figure 8.14 shows the permissive zones. The first underreaching zone can be kept in the total distance
protection scheme but it can only serve as a fast back-up protection for close up faults. The overreach usually
is of the same order as the permissive zone. When the capacitor is in service the permissive zone will have
a very high degree of overreach, which can be considered as a disadvantage from security point of view.
8.4.2 Double circuit, parallel operating series compensated lines

Two parallel power lines both series compensated running close to each other and ending at the same busbar
at both ends) can cause some additional challenges for distance protection due to the zero sequence mutual
impedance. The current reversal phenomenon can also raise problems from the protection point of view, particularly
when the power lines are relatively short and when permissive overreach schemes are used.(Fig. 8.15)
Fig. 8.15 : Double circuit, parallel operating line
8.4.3 Influence of zero sequence mutual impedance
Zero sequence mutual impedance ZM0 will not significantly influence the operation of distance protection as
long as both circuits are operating in parallel and all precautions related to settings of distance protection
on series compensated line have been considered. Influence of parallel line switched off & earthed at both
ends, on the operation of distance protection on single operating circuit is well known.
The presence of series capacitor additionally exaggerates the effect of zero sequence mutual impedance
between two circuits. The effect of zero sequence mutual impedance on possible overreaching of distance
relays is increased further compared to case of non-compensated lines. This is because while the series
capacitor will compensate self-impedance of the zero sequence network the mutual impedance will be same
as in the case of non-compensated double circuit lines. The reach of under reaching distance protection
zone 1 for phase to earth measuring loops must further be reduced for such operating conditions.
Zero sequence mutual impedance may also disturb the correct operation of distance protection for external
evolving faults during auto reclosing, when one circuit is disconnected in one phase and runs in parallel
during dead time of single pole auto reclosing cycle. It is recommended to study all such operating conditions
by dynamic simulations in order to fine tune settings of distance relays.
8.5 Directional residual overcurrent protection
The operating principle is based on directional comparison of residual currents IRSD = 3.I0 at both line terminals
during earth faults in power systems. Residual (open delta) voltage URSD = 3.U0 in relay point is used as a
reference quantity for directional discrimination. The communication scheme used may be either permissive
overreach or blocking. Directional residual overcurrent protection schemes are in general used as complementary
schemes to distance protection or back-up schemes for operation at high resistive earth faults.
Fig. 8.16 : Series capacitor at the end of power line and possible locations of voltage instrument
All basic application considerations, characteristic for directional residual over-current protection on
normal power lines apply also to series compensated lines with following additions. Low fault currents are
characteristic of high resistive faults. This means that the fault currents may not be enough to cause voltage
drops on series capacitors that would be sufficient to start their over-voltage protection. Spark gaps may not
flash over in most cases, and metal oxide varistors (MOVs) may not conduct any significant current. Series
capacitors may remain fully inserted during high resistive earth faults. (Fig. 8.16)
8.5.1 Operation of DEF protection at local end of protected line
The directional relay operates always correctly for reverse faults. VT located between bus and capacitor
generally does not influence directional measurement. But in case VT is located between line and capacitor
it may influence correct operation: While reverse faults are detected correctly the forward operation is
dependent on system conditions. Additional zero sequence source impedance can be added into relay
circuits to secure correct directional measurement.
8.5.2 Operation of DEF protection at remote end of protected line
In this case the current can be reduced to extremely low values due to low zero sequence impedance at
capacitor end. Further the measured residual voltage can be reduced to very low value due to low zero
sequence source impedance and/or low zero sequence current. Zero sequence current inversion may occur
at the capacitor end (dependent on fault position). Directional negative sequence OC protection too may
face very similar conditions.
Adaptive application of both the above OC protection principles can be considered wherever required to
get the desired result.
8.6 Line back-up protection philosophies
Series compensated lines form generally backbones of many power systems. Their protection must for this
reason be highly reliable, which means should have high dependability and high security. They are normally
protected with two independent protection systems, so called Main 1 and Main 2. There is generally no
special back-up, time delayed protection. The reason for this is need for a very short fault clearing time,
which influences to a great extent the total system stability.
8.7 Distance protection setting guide lines
• Basic criteria applied for Z1 & Z2 reach settings are:

• Zone-1 should never overreach for the fault at remote bus
• Zone-2 should never under reach for fault on protected line
• Permissive overreach (POR) schemes are usually applied
8.7.1 Zone1 setting
( )
Zone-1 is set usually at 80% of Ks × X Z 1 = K S ⋅ X 11 + X 12 − X C Where X11 is reactance between CT
and capacitor and X12 is reactance between capacitor and remote end Bus, Xc is reactance of capacitor
and KS is safety factor to prevent possible overreaching due to low frequency (sub-harmonic) oscillations.
These setting guidelines are applicable when VT is installed on the bus side of the capacitor. It is possible
to remove XC from the above equation in case VT is installed on line side, but it is still necessary to consider
the safety factor.
Alternatively, Zone-1 is set at 80% of line impedance with a time delay of 100millisecond. POR Communication
scheme logic is modified such that relay trips instantaneously in Zone-1 on carrier receive. (For remote end
relay of the line looking into series capacitor)
8.7.2 Zone 2 setting
Zone-2 is set to 120 % of uncompensated line impedance for single circuit line. For double circuit lines,
special considerations are mentioned section on double circuit lines should be considered.
Phase locked voltage memory is used to cope with the voltage inversion. Alternatively, an intentional time
delay may be applied to overcome directionality problems related to voltage inversion.
Special consideration may be required in over voltage stage-I (low set) trip setting for series compensated
double circuit lines. It has been experienced that in case of tripping of a heavily loaded circuit, other circuit
experience sudden voltage rise due to load transfer. To prevent tripping of other circuit on such cases, over-
voltage stage-I setting for series compensated double circuit lines may be kept higher at 113%.
8.8 Current differential protection
Fast development in communication technologies as well as development of microprocessor based

technologies is initiating positive changes in characteristics of state of the art line current differential
protections. This makes them today the most attractive protection for series compensated lines with the
following advantages in comparison to all other protection principles.
• Phase segregated measurement assures excellent phase selection

• Independence on voltage measurement in relay point makes it insensitive on voltage inversion
• True current measurement at line ends makes it practically insensitive to current inversion
• Comparison of line end currents in each phase separately makes it immune to current reversals on
parallel operating lines
• Phase segregated current measurement makes them insensitive to effects of zero sequence mutual
impedance on multi-circuit lines, independent of whether these lines are connected to the same or
different zero sequence sources.
Their most exposed disadvantages are:
• Dependence on communication links, which are still relatively unreliable for protection purposes,
even if they have their availability declared up to 0.9999. This requires always some kind of parallel
protection functionality within the same hardware, which takes over immediately after the faulty
communication link has been detected. Distance protection is a typical example, but it must not be
mixed with Main 1 or Main 2 protection functionality
• Communication links have their transmission time, which is directly added to the protection operating
time. It may happen this way that line current differential protection become in some cases too slow
to secure strict system stability requirements.
• Series capacitor itself practically does not influence the operation of line current differential protection.
Very small changes in its sensitivity may be observed when capacitors are protected by MOVs, which
may, due to their capacitive – resistive equivalent serial connection, introduce some additional small
phase angle in fault current supplied through the series capacitor.
• Basic operating algorithms of line current differential protections differ between different manufacturers.
It is important to check their operation for different system phenomena, which may cause false
continuous or transient differential currents. For this reason it is always necessary to perform extensive
dynamic simulation testing for each particular installation and check their suitability in connection with
the following items.
• Sensitivity dependence on line capacitive charging currents in steady state and transient
conditions.
• Stability of operation for line switching transients. Here it is extremely important to correctly simulate
eventual shunt reactors and their switching transients.
• Line discharging currents for external faults in power system, etc.

8.9 Simulation studies
System studies, Use of Real Time digital simulators, Simulation Tests using EMTP / PSCAD files are very
important when applying protections for series compensated lines. It is recommended to carry out such
studies specific to each line.
References
1. Cigré SC34-WG04: “Application Guide on Protection of Complex Transmission Network Configurations”

May 1991
2. Cigre WG B5-10: “Protection, Control and Monitoring of Series Compensated Networks “
3. Anderson, P.M.; Farmer R.G.: “Series Compensation of Power Systems”, ISBN 1-888747-01-3,
PBLSH! Inc., Encinitas, California, 1996
Chapter 9
AUTO-RECLOSING
9.1 General
The auto-reclosing of power lines has become a generally accepted practice. Reports from different parts
of the world show that in certain networks in regions subject to a high lightning intensity only about 5 per
cent of the faults are permanent. Auto-reclosing therefore provides significant advantages. Outage times
will be short compared to where station personnel have to re-energise the lines after a fault. Additionally, in
interconnected networks, auto-reclosing helps in maintaining system stability.
Following different arrangements of auto-reclosing are possible:
• High speed single pole reclosing (HSAR)

• High speed three pole reclosing (HTAR)
• Delayed three pole reclosing (DAR)
• DAR with dead line (DL) and synchronism check (SC)
• HTAR with DL and SC
• HTAR with parallel line check (PC)
In case of HSAR and HTAR without check, the two ends can be reclosed at about the same instant. In case
of DAR and HTAR with DL and SC the C.B. at one end recloses first after the set dead time and with a
check of dead line condition. After a successful line re-energization from one end the voltage, phase angle
and possibly frequency on the line and station side are compared. At acceptable synchronous in-phase
conditions the C.B. at the second end is reclosed.
The typical A/R cycle for a transient fault is given in Figure 9.1:
Fig. 9.1 : A/R cycle for a transient fault

Auto–Reclosing 111
The typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault is given in Figure 9.2:
Fig. 9.2 : Typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault
Above figures explain some of the basic parameters of an auto-reclose function like Dead time, Reclaim
time & no. of shots of A/R function, fault duration, deionistaion time, arcing time & opening time of circuit
breaker.
9.2 Basic parameters of an autoreclose scheme
9.2.1 The Fault Duration
It is the time delay between the fault instant and the moment when the CB is opened and arcing is
extinguished.
9.2.2 Dead Time
The dead time of A/R function is the time delay between the moment when the A/R function is started and
the moment when the A/R relay (IED) closes its output contact and energises the closing coil of the CB.
The dead time setting should be sufficient to allow for complete deionization of the arc to prevent re-strike
of the arc on closing.
9.2.3 Reclaim Time
The reclaim time of A/R function is the time delay following the moment when the A/R functions issues
the reclosing command and the moment when the A/R function resets, and it is ready for a new reclosing
cycle.
The reclaim time should be sufficiently long to allow the CB operating mechanism to reset and to prepare
for another reclosing cycle.
9.2.4 The Number of Shots
A/R operating cycle that provides only one reclosing command is referred to as “Single-shot”. Whereas A/R
operating cycle that provides a sequence of reclosing commands is referred as “Multi-shot”.
Single-shot A/R mode is normally applied to transmission lines. Thus it prevents repeated reclosing on to
fault with relatively high current levels that may endanger system stability.
Multi-shot A/R mode is more common on sub-transmission and distribution level where there is low probability
of losing system stability.
9.2.5 Closing Pulse Duration
The closing command pulse duration allows the CB to properly energise its internal relays and execute the
command. Common settings are 0.1 to 0.2s.
9.2.6 Auto Reclose Operating Mode Requirements
It is a common requirement that the AR function shall provide single-pole AR, three-pole AR, Single & Three
pole AR, Non-Auto mode and a mode selector. When the single-pole (only) mode is selected, single-phase-
to-ground faults result in tripping of only the faulted phase, followed by AR. Multi-phase faults result in final
three-pole trips without ARSelecting the three-pole (only) mode results in a three-pole trip for any fault type
and a three-pole AR which may, as appropriate, be subject to synchro-check conditions. In the combined
single and three-pole mode, a single-phase-to-ground fault results a single-pole trip and AR without any control
condition; and a multi-phase fault results a three-pole trip and three-pole AR which may, as appropriate, be
subject to synchro-check conditions. Normally single shot AR is applied on Transmission system.
9.2.7 Operating Mode - Single Phase Auto Reclosing
Single-phase tripping is the least damaging to the power system and the most common. The advantages
are related to the fact that this type of tripping allows power transfer over the two remaining phases and has
a lower impact on stability. One of the disadvantages is that more complex protection is required in order to
distinguish between single-phase-to-ground and multiphase faults. However modern numerical relays (IEDs)
easilydeal with this problem without additional hardware. IEDs provide AR initiation signal to AR function
only in case of single phase trip on single phase to ground fault condition. Multiphase faults results into
three phase tripping and it may additionally send AR Block signal to AR function in case of evolving faults
i.e single phase fault evolving into multiphase fault.
In single-pole (only) operating mode, AR is allowed only for single-phase-to-ground faults, and multi-phase
faults result in a final three-pole trip. Thus, both ends of the transmission line remain connected by two
phases improving system stability. However, the induced voltage from the other two energised phases and
certain environmental conditions could lead to a continued secondary arc, resulting in a failure of the AR
cycle. Hence, setting of single-pole dead times on long transmission lines requires some attention to manage
such conditions if transmission line is not having line reactor with neutral grounding reactor (NGR).
An example of single – phase single shot AR cycle is shown in Figure 9.3 for a successful reclosing with
dead time of one second.
Fig. 9.3 : An example of single – phase single shot AR cycle for a successful reclosing.
9.2.8 Operating Mode – Three Phase
In this operating mode, any fault type results in a three-pole trip, which is then followed by AR which may
be either rapid AR (RAR) without any check conditions, or delayed AR (DAR)which may be subject to dead-
line or synchro-check conditions. Where AR with synchro-check is applied, one end of the line must first
reclose either rapidly without any check condition, or subject to a dead-line condition. With the line voltage
re-established, the remaining line-ends may be reclosed with synchro-check. This may require staggered
dead-time settings between ends; however, where a separate synchronization timer is available, uniform
dead-time settings may be applied.
An example of a synchro-check supervised three-pole AR is shown in Figure 9.4:
Fig. 9.4 : Synchrocheck supervised auto reclosing

9.2.9 Other Important Requirements of AR Function
9.2.9.1 Prepare Three Phase Trip
In single or two-pole tripping applications, it may be necessary, in certain circumstances, to trip three-pole.
Some examples include when the AR function is disabled or blocked, or if a new trip issues after the last
programmed shot. The “prepare three pole trip” condition forces all trips to issue as three-pole trips. For
permanent faults, the time of release of the conditions, in some AR functions, simultaneous with the close
command of the last programmed shot. If the device tripping function does not have a facility to trip three-
pole for evolving faults, then the AR function can help by releasing the condition for a short while after the
protection trip gets reset.
9.2.9.2 CB Ready Condition
The AR function requires a fast open-close-open (O-C-O) operating cycle of the CB and therefore the
operating mechanism must be ready for such a duty. In the event of the mechanism not being ready, the
AR cycle should be blocked and protection functions should issue final three-pole trip commands because
an AR cycle cannot be completed. The “CBready” condition is dependent on the operating mechanism and
could indicate a pressure within the limits for a hydraulic mechanism, or a charged close-spring for a spring
operating mechanism. Normally AR ready status of the CB is indicated by the CB by means of a binary
signal that is monitored by AR function.
9.2.9.3 CB Close/Open Positions
CB position is monitored at the start of AR cycle by AR function and the position of CB contacts is critical
for the operating logic of the AR function. The CBposition indication is given by the CB’s auxiliary contacts
and in many applications it is usedto block AR or to start the AR dead time. If the three poles of the CB are
opened for morethan a certain time then, usually, the AR function is blocked and the CB is deemed to be
out-of-service to avoid an unwanted AR close command. In this case, the discrimination time should avoid
AR blocking during the three-pole dead time for three-pole AR. Some IEDs use the three-poles-closed
indication to enable the AR cycle rather than using the three-poles open indication. In the case of single-pole
(only) AR, if the CB opens more than one pole, then a three-pole trip is forced and the AR cycle is blocked,
based on the position of the CB.
9.2.9.4 AR Block Condition
Several other functions of the protection scheme requires blocking of the AR function. Protection functions
that should block AR are as under:
• Bus Bar protection trip.

• Breaker failure trip.
• Line trip on Switch on to fault (SOTF)
• Direct transfer trip receive
• Complete carrier failure of tele-protection scheme.
• Manual CB close command
• Over voltage trip
• Line reactor trip of Non-Switched line reactor
• Circuit Breaker problems
• Zone-2/3 of distance protection
9.2.9.5 Sequential Closing of CB (CB Priority Closing)
In situations where two CBs at a local end are tripped and reclosed (e.g. breaker-and-a-half),the CBs are
typically reclosed insequence to reduce the wear and tear on the second CB forreclosing onto permanent
faults (in particular where this is the common CB on a breaker -and-a-half diameter). This requires an
additional feature which delays the reclosing of thesecond CB until the first CB has closed. This is done
using an output “Delay Follower” or a “Wait from Master” condition which picks up at the start of AR cycle
of first CB and resets after a set time delay after the closing command is issued to the first CB. This time
delay is to ascertain whether AR was successful or not. If the fault persists, the “AR Unsuccessful” signal
blocks the AR cycle of second CB. If the fault was transient, the second CB issues its close command either
immediately after release from the first CB or after its own set dead time, in accordance with the design of
the AR function itself.
9.3 Requirements
The auto reclosing function shall have following attributes
• Have single phase and/or three phase reclosing facilities.
• Have a continuously variable single phase dead time.
• Have continuously variable three phase dead time for three phase reclosing.
• Have continuously variable reclaim time.
• Incorporate a facility of selecting single phase/three phase/single and three phase auto-reclose and
non-auto reclosure modes.
• Have facilities for selecting check synchronising or dead line charging features.
• Be of high speed single shot type
• Suitable relays for SC and DLC should be included in the overall auto-reclose scheme if three phase
reclosing is provided.
• Should allow sequential reclosing of breakers in one and half breaker or double breaker
arrangement.
9.4 Setting guidelines
9.4.1 Dead Time
Auto-reclosing requires a dead time which exceeds the de-ionizing time. The time required for the de-
ionising of the fault path depends on several factors including the arcing time, fault duration, wind conditions,
circuit voltage, capacitive coupling to adjacent conductors, etc. The circuit voltage is the factor having the
predominating influence on the de-ionizing time. Single phase dead time of 1.0 sec. is recommended for
765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV system.
9.4.2 Reclaim Time
The reclaim time is the time during which a new start of the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked. If reclosing
shot has been carried out and the line is energised and a new fault occurs before the reclaim time has elapsed,
the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked and a signal for definite tripping of the breaker is obtained. After the
reclaim time has elapsed, the auto-reclosing equipment returns to the starting position and a new reclosing
sequence can occur. The reclaim time must not be set to such a low value that the intended operating cycle
of the breaker is exceeded, when two fault incidents occur close together. If the breaker is closed manually,
the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked and cannot start again until the reclaim time has elapsed.
For the breaker to be used for auto-reclosing, it is essential that it has the operating mechanism and breaking
capacity necessary for it to be able to perform the auto-reclosing sequences required.
9.4.3 Circuit Breaker Requirement
According to IEC Publication 56.2, a breaker must be capable of with standing the following operating cycle
with full rated breaking current:
0 + 0.3 s + CO + 3 min + CO
The recommended operating cycle at 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV is as per the IEC standard. Therefore,
reclaim time should be set considering the time delay required by CB between two CO operations.
9.5 Recommendations
Presently, 1 phase high speed auto-reclosure (HSAR) at 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV level is widely practiced
including on lines emanating from Generating Stations and the same is recommended for adoption. If 3-phase
auto-reclosure is adopted in future the application of the same on lines emanating from generating stations
should be studied and decision taken on case to case basis.
Modern numerical relays (IEDs) have AR function as built-in feature. However, it is recommended to use
standalone AR relay or AR function of Bay control unit (BCU) for lines at voltage level 220 kV and above .
For 132 kV lines, AR functions built-in Main distance relay IED can be used.
Fast simultaneous tripping of the breakers at both ends of a faulty line is essential for successful auto-
reclosing. Therefore, availability of protection signalling equipment is a pre-requisite.
Some protections start auto-reclosing and others block.
9.6.1 Protections which Start A/R
• Main-I and Main-II line protections.
9.6.2 Protections which Block A/R
• Breaker Fail Relay
• Line Reactor Protections
• O/V Protection
• Received Direct Transfer trip signals
• Busbar Protection
• Zone 2/3 of Distance Protection
• Carrier Fail Conditions
• Circuit Breaker Problems.
When a reclosing relay receives start and block A/R impulse simultaneously, block signal dominates. Similarly,
if it receives ‘start’ for 1-phase fault immediately followed by multi-phase fault the later one dominates over
the previous one.
Following comments are for multi-breaker arrangements of one and half breaker or double breaker
arrangement
In a multi-C.B. arrangement one C.B. can be taken out of operation and the line still be kept in service. After
a line fault only those C.Bs which were closed before the fault shall be reclosed.
In multi-C.B. arrangement it is desirable to have a priority arrangement so as to avoid closing of both the
breakers in case of a permanent fault. This will help in avoiding unnecessary wear and tear. A natural priority is
that the C.B. near the bus bar is reclosed first. In case of faults on two lines on both sides of a tie C.B. the tie
C.B. is reclosed after the outer C.Bs. The outer C.Bs. do not need a prioriting with respect to each other.
In multi-breaker arrangement it is necessary to trip two C.Bs. to clear a line fault and also auto reclose these
two. Basically two types of arrangement for C.B. associated relays are possible. One is C.B. Oriented and
another is Line Oriented.
Chapter 10
Protection of POWER TRANSFORMERS
The most widely used transformer at high voltage level is the Interconnecting Auto-transformer with a
tertiary winding and the Interconnecting Auto-transformer without tertiary winding. Two and three winding
transformers such as 400 kV/33 kV, 220 kV/33 kV and 132 kV/33 or 11 kV are also used quite extensively
at the transmission level. Transformer protection practices encompass a wide variety of protection schemes
and philosophies.
10.1 Transformer design
The magnetic circuit plays a key role in transformer protection because it influences the excitation current.
In steady state, the excitation current contains odd harmonics. During energisation or faults, the excitation
current may become unbalanced and contains large amounts of even harmonics.
The transformer oil is circulated in some manner to remove the heat from the windings. The oil flows from
the bottom of the tank, through the windings and to the top of the tank. This top oil temperature is usually
measured and monitored. In addition, the winding temperature is monitored to limit insulation deterioration.
The highest temperature occurs just inside the insulation on the conductor. The point with the highest
temperature is referred to as the hot spot. Another heating source is the eddy current losses in the core. The
resistive losses in the winding conductors and excitation current losses in the magnetic cores are two major
sources of steady state heating in the transformer. Over-excitation results in excessive excitation currents,
eddy current losses, and core heating.
Fault currents quickly increase the winding temperature. Transformers must withstand fault currents for a
given time. Axial and radial forces are generated on the windings due to these currents, which may damage
the insulation. The first current peak of fault current causes the maximum forces, which determines the
withstand limit.
10.2 Typical transformer arrangements
Transformer arrangements are usually independent of the type of transformer being used. Mostly these
are decided by substation cost and operating reliability needs. Arrangements are more a product of
substation costs and system operating reliability needs. Figure 10.1 covers some of the typical transformer
arrangements.
Figure 10.1A is the simplest with dedicated high and low side breakers.
Figure 10.1B adds a breaker and a half or a ring bus configuration to allow breaker maintenance and switching
flexibility on high voltage side.
Figure 10.1C adds a breaker and a half or a ring bus configuration to allow breaker maintenance and switching
flexibility on high voltage as well as low voltage side.
Protection of Power Transformers 119
Fig. 10.1 : Typical Transformer Arrangements
10.3 Failure rates of power transformer
The failure rates of power transformers range from 1% to 4% per year for 132 kV to 400 kV class and reported
to be around 6 % for 765 kV systems. The number of through faults may influence the failure rate.
Table 10.1 given below from IEEE can be taken as typical of transformer failure modes.
Table 10.1 : Transmission power transformer, IEEE 1975-1982
S. No. Mode Number %

1 Winding Failures 615 51
2 Tap Changer Failures 231 19
3 Bushing Failures 114 09
4 Terminal Board Failures 71 06
5 Core Failures 24 02
6 Miscellaneous Failure 72 13
Winding failures still represent the major exposure to transformer failure with tap changers being a distant
second. Two characteristics of transformers that cause problems for protection schemes are low magnitude
turn-to-turn faults and high magnitude magnetizing inrush current during energizing. Some internal faults
can result in less than 10% of a transformer rated current. On the other hand maximum fault current can
flow for a high side transformer bushing failure.
10.4 Transformer protection requirements
The transmission transformer is a major component in the bulk power system and is normally held to a
single contingency failure requirement. Based on types of failures, basic design of the transformer and
the requirements of the power system, the protective relaying schemes must meet the following main
requirements:
• Maintain transient stability of the power system.
• Prevent unwanted operation by load currents or by inrush currents or OLTC operation
• Maintain required quality of power
• Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by providing two
groups of protections
The protection system must satisfy the following requirements specific to the transmission transformer:
• Protect for internal tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.
• Protect for external tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.
• Protect for internal partial winding or turn-to-turn faults.
• Limit through fault magnitude and duration within transformer mechanical and thermal ratings.
• Limit top oil temperature to maximum temperature limit
• Limit hot spot winding temperature to maximum temperature limit
• Prevent rupture of transformer tank during internal fault
• Provide for failure of a switching device
• Limit overload as per thermal capability of the transformer
• Provide for Tertiary winding protections over voltages caused due to transferred lightning surges or
switching surges from high voltage sides
• Provide protection of winding insulation by suitably dimensioned and monitored surge arresters
• Provide protection from over-excitation of transformer core
Most transmission transformers are located in critical areas of the power system where either utility voltage
stability or transient stability may be a problem. Providing high-speed fault clearing to meet generator voltage
and stability limits is essential.
One of the key problems in security of a transmission transformer is tripping during a through fault current
flow. In many cases, this means that the faulted element (usually a transmission line) will be properly tripped
by the protection provided for it, failing which the back-up protection of the transmission transformer will
trip the transformer. This common mode failure where both line and transformer gets disconnected can be
disastrous to a single contingency designed power system. In many systems the single contingency limit
only exists during the peak load of the power system, which greatly reduces the possibility of cascading
failures. It does identify a serious potential problem if through fault trips are allowed to happen.
Turn-to-turn faults challenge the dependability of the transformer protection. The fault current is high, and
sometimes very high, but the changes in the phase currents may be less than 10% of the rated current.
Maintaining the quality of the power supply for sensitive industrial customers as well as for general customers
is a concern of transformer protection. The transformer can withstand a very long duration of low magnitude
through fault current but even this may cause severe problems for motor driven industrial processes, unless
the fault is cleared in a short number of cycles with due care for additional reactive power support.
Another requirement is that a protection relay can be taken for maintenance while the transformer is energized
for critical installations. Hence, it is required that the protection schemes meet redundancy requirements to
provide protection during outage of any one relay for maintenance. Normally this is done by grouping the
protections in two groups A and B that are not exactly duplicated but provide redundant protection groups.
Further, It is not advisable to keep main and back up protection functions in a single relay hardware.
10.5 Protection schemes
This section covers the main types of transformer protection schemes. Each scheme is briefly described
alongwith its advantages & disadvantages and how they meet the protective relaying requirements for
transformer protection. These types are as follows:
• Differential relay
• Ground fault protection (Restricted earth fault relay, residual, neutral or tank ground over current
relays)
• Directional or Non-directional phase over current relays (back-up protection)

• Directional or non-directional earth fault relays (Back-up protection)
• Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief devices for transformer
and Buchholz for OLTC) and overcurrent blocking relays
• Over-excitation relays (if applicable)
• Overload protections (Oil temperature, winding temperature relays for transformer and for OLTC,
current based over load relays)
• Over-voltage relay (open delta) for tertiary winding
• Brief description of these relay elements is given below
10.5.1 Transformer Differential Protection
Differential protection is the most commonly applied protection for transmission transformers. Basic principle
of Differential Protection is based on Kirchoff’s law (Sum of currents flowing through a node is zero), i,e
the currents into the Transformer is equal to the currents flowing out of the Transformer, which makes this
protection highly reliable.
In practical case, the following need to be taken into consideration, to make the Transformer Differential
Protection Relay, highly reliable:
(a) CT polarity
(b) CT Ratio mismatch as the CT ratios do not exactly match the Transformer Voltage ratios
(c) Difference in CT characteristic due to different CT manufacturer’s CT.
(d) Vector grouping of the Transformer
(e) CT remanence
(f) Inrush current during charging of the Transformer (Predominant 2nd harmonic and of significant
value flowing in only from the energized side of the Transformer while the other winding currents are
zero)
(g) Over excitation of the Transformer (Significant current of predominantly 5th harmonic).
There are mainly two types of differential relays.
• Low impedance or Percentage biased differential relay with harmonic restraint (2nd and 5th harmonic
restraint), and
• High impedance differential relay.
High impedance differential relay inherently requires identical CT (matching CT ratio, accuracy etc.) on all
sides of Transformer which is not a limitation for Low impedance (percentage Bias) differential relay. Hence,
Percentage bias differential relay with dual slope and harmonic restraint feature is most commonly used as
Differential protection for multi-winding transformer. The simplicity of comparing current into all terminals of
the transformer gives the differential relay very high reliability.
In case of percentage biased differential relays, zero sequence component filtering to be applied to avoid
false operation on external faults because of transformer neutral grounding falling in the differential protected
zone. The removed zero sequence component, however, makes the transformer differential relay less
sensitive but it is considered acceptable.
With present day numerical relays, it is possible to achieve CT ratio & Vector group matching in the relay
software itself, without the use of external Auxiliary CTs. Also the relays are provided with Inrush restraint
features during Transformer charging as well as during over excitation conditions.
Illustrated below in Figure is the flexible bias characteristics of a bias differential relay, the relay provides
to take care of CT remanence, accuracy errors, difference currents due to change in Transformer taps and
CT saturation during through fault.
First Slope S1 represents the threshold sensitivity at low current taking into account sensitivity at low current,
CT remnance – This slope is generally set around 10% and generally takes care up to 20% Transformer
load. In case of differential relay with only two slopes, this slope is considered as zero.
Second Slope S2 is set higher than S1 to take care of max. current mismatch for Transformer tap change
operations as well as CT transformation errors – This slope is generally set between 15% to 25% as per the
requirement and takes care of transformer load from 20 to 150%.
Slope S3 is to take care of through fault condition when differential current can occur due to CT saturation.
Setting is generally around 60% to 80% for currents higher than transformer continuous rating.
For the differential relay operation, the following equation is used:
ID > Set Value
ID/IR > Set Slope
Consider Aph (2 Winding Transformer)
ID = |IA1 + IA2|
IR = |IA1| + |IA2 |, some manufacturers use IR = 0.5 [|IA1| + |IA2 |] and some use IR = Maximum of |IA1| & |IA2 |
Where A1 is current is Transformer winding 1 (Or High side) and A2 is current in Transformer winding
2 (Or Low side)
In view of the different philosophies adopted by relay manufacturer, it is recommended to follow relay
manufacturer guideline for these setting parameters. (Fig. 10.2)
Fig. 10.2 : Bias differential relay characteristic

Harmonic restrain feature requirement in Bias Differential relay

Magnetising inrush current in the transformer causes the violation of the basic principal of differential
relaying since the magnetizing branch of the transformer can have a very low impedance without a
transformer fault. Current produced by magnetizing inrush can reach many times the transformer
rated current, and these currents appear in the differential relay. The inrush current duration can
range from few cycles up to many seconds. Magnetizing current inrush can also be caused by
any abrupt change of magnetizing voltage. Such transient include the occurrences of a fault, the
removal of the fault or change of character of the fault and out of phase synchronizing. A typical
waveform during the inrush current is given below: (Fig. 10.3)
Fig. 10.3
Inrush current consists of predominantly second harmonics. Many times, the harmonic current may not
appear in all the phases, and hence Cross block feature (Harmonic block in all three phases on detection
of harmonics in any of the phases) shall be enabled.
Over excitation also manifests itself into production of odd harmonics in the transformer current. Since the
third & other triplen harmonics are normally cancelled by the delta tertiary winding, Fifth harmonic restrain is
used in the differential protection. Hence, both second and fifth harmonics restrain feature is recommended
for EHV transformers.
Fig. 10.4 : Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer

(using external vector group correction)
Fig. 10.5 : Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer

(Vector group correction inside numerical relay)
The differential relay protection does an excellent job of meeting a large number of the protective relaying
requirements, but must be combined with other protective devices to provide full transformer protection.
10.5.2 Restricted earth fault (REF) protection
Zero- sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) provide best protection against phase-to-
ground faults in wye connected transformers connected to solidly grounded systems or resistance grounded
transformers. The vector sum of residual current and the neutral currents are utilized to energize the relay.
The relay discriminates faults in the transformer zone (Total zero sequence flowing in the relay) from the
faults outside the transformer protection zone (Practically no zero sequence current in the relay). These
relays are more sensitive than the transformer differential relays in detecting faults that involve part of the
transformer winding and ground.
Restricted Earth Fault relay can be (a) High Impedance Type or (b) Low Impedance or Biased differential
type:
(a) High Impedance REF
The high impedance restricted earth fault protection is similar to the high impedance differential
protection of busbars. Its application to a delta-wye transformer for detecting faults on the wye winding
is shown in Figure 6.8 below; it is assumed in this application that the ratio of the line CTs and the
neutral CT are the same. The relay (87 G) in this application is a high-impedance overcurrent relay.
The flow of zero-sequence currents shown in this figure are for an external fault. It is obvious that
there is no current in the relay because it circulates between the phase and neutral CTs. If the faulted
phase CT saturates, it acts like a short circuit for the flow of currents in the secondary circuit as shown
in Figure 10.6 and the current out of the neutral CT divides among the relay and the saturated CT.
Since the impedance of the relay is substantially high compared to the leads to the saturated CT,
most of the output of the neutral CT is routed through the saturated CT and very little current flows
in the relay.
Fig. 10.6 : 8 Restricted earth fault protection using a high impedance relay
Fig. 10.7 : 9 REF high impedance relay, Current flow with one saturated CT
REF protection pick up current (IREF) is normally taken as ten percent of Full load current (IFL). Value
of stabilizing resistor (RSTAB)is obtained by dividing stabilizing voltage (VSTAB) by pick-up current.
Stabilizing voltage VSTAB = IF x (RCT + 2RL) ;
RSTAB = VSTAB / IREF
Where: IF = Maximum through fault current, RCT = CT resistance, RL = CT circuit lead resistance
(b) Low Impedance (Biased) REF
The Low Impedance REF is in a way similar to Transformer Biased Differential Relay.
For Numerical REF relay, Relay Manufacturers use different methodology depending on the Algorithm
for detection & operation for Ground fault within the protected zone. Few of the calculation of the
Operating current (ID0) & the Restraint Current (IR0) is detailed below:
Method 1
The Operating (Differential) current, ID0 = |3I01 + 3I02 + 3I03|
Restraint Current, IR0 = Max {|3I01|, |3I02|, |3I02|}
3I01, 3I02, 3I03 are the Zero sequence currents on the HV, LV & Neutral side of the Transformers as
the case may be.
Method 2
ID0 = |k1Σ[IA+IB+IC] +k2IN|
IR0 = |k1Σ[IA+IB+IC] | OR ½ [k1max (|IA|, |IB|, |IC|) + k2|IN|] ------ k1 and k2 are constants
For the REF to operate, the following equation should be satisfied
ID0 > ID Set
IDO/IR0 > SD, the Set slope.
ID0 = Operating or Differential Zero Sequence Current

IR0 = Zero Sequence Restraint Current
IR = Restraint Current Setting for start of Slope SD
Fig. 10.8 : REF Slope Characteristic
In Low Impedance REF (Fig. 10.9), the Phase side & Neutral CT ratios can be different. The Ratio
compensation will be performed inside the relay.
Additionally, the following requirements will be addressed for the proper operation of the relay:
(i) Directionality of 3I01, 3I02 with respect to Transformer Neutral current 3I03 (Whether they are in
phase or in opposite directions)
(ii) In the event of one CT saturation which will result in differential current, condition 1 will decide
whether the fault in the REF zone or otherwise.
Fig 10.9 : Low Impedance REF (Numerical) relay
Typical Differential & REF protection scheme using Numerical Relay is shown below (Figure 10.10). Ratio
matching, Vector group compensation & Zero sequence compensation is done internally in the relay
software.
10.5.3 Local Distance Relay Protection
Distance relays can be used as primary protection or as back-up protection for the transformer. It consists
of a multi-zone impedance relay on the HV side or on LV side of the transformer looking into the transformer
as shown in figure.
Fig. 10.10 : Distance Relay Protection.
The main advantages of the distance relay are; it provides back-up for remote faults and protection for fault
withstand. It also provides overlapping protection with the bus protective zones by its reverse zone. This
can be beneficial if the bus protection is not duplicated and failure of bus protection to operate results in
delayed clearance of fault by over current relays on the other side of the transformer. It must be noted that
the distance relays cannot provide sensitive ground fault protection.
It has not been a practice to use this protection by utilities in India; however, it can be considered as back-up
protection on case-to-case basis and where coordination with overlapping Zone-3 of line distance protection
is required.
10.5.4 Directional and Non-Directional Phase Over current Protection
The phase over current protection is a very inexpensive, simple and reliable scheme for fault
detection and is used for transformer protection applications. It can provide limited overload
protection but cannot provide instantaneous protection for all internal faults. It can also provide
back-up protection for bus bars.
An additional high set unit is also usually provided. The instantaneous elements help in providing high-speed
clearance of terminal faults, heavy current faults that threaten system stability.
The relay suffers from having to be set very high for transformer inrush, for co-ordination with downstream
relays, and to allow transformer overloads. Therefore it is ineffective for low magnitude internal transformer
faults or phase to ground faults on the low voltage side of the transformer.
It does provide for transformer fault withstand protection and some limited over load protection. It can provide
back-up for failure of the switching device but only with very long time delays. In Transmission system
interconnecting transformer applications, directional over current relays are located on both the HV and LV
sides of the transformer. Both relays are set to see into the transformer. This allows better coordination with
external over current relays because of the need only to see part of the transformer windings.
Numerical over current relays provide upgraded performance for transformer back-up protection. The digital
filters remove the DC component and harmonics from the inrush current. Numerical back-up over current relays
can therefore be set much more sensitive than conventional types and are recommended to be used.
The need for directional overcurrent relays arise depending on the specific requirement. Figure 10.11 below
explains the requirement. Both the Transformers have overcurrent on the HV as well as on the LV side. If
the sources on both HV & LV are strong, the fault current ID = IC + IE + IF will be much greater than IC. In
this case selectivity can be achieved with non-directional inverse time relays. If the source on the LV side of
the transformer is weak, IE & IF would be small making ID ≈ IC, selectivity will not be achieved unless the
LV relays are directional overcurrent relays.
Fig. 10.11 : Directional Overcurrent protection application

10.5.5 Ground Fault Protection
Various ground fault protections used are described below. Generally, these protections are meant to provide
the grounded winding with a low sensitivity ground fault protection only. They do not provide other types of
protection.
Directional or Non-Directional earth fault relay
This type of protection is also specific to transformers with at least one directly grounded or resistance
grounded winding. The protection is specialized to protect for winding faults to ground. The connections
of the over current units can be only in the neutral, or in the residual phase. These connections can be set
much lower than the phase over current because of the cancellation of the phase current.
The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents can be one of the main problems with back-up ground
over current relays. Settings must be able to allow inrush, which usually means desensitizing the back-up
relay. Static relays that do not have filter for these harmonics usually can have problems. Numerical relay
offers the best characteristic since digital filters remove harmonics and DC offset currents from the inrush
and is, therefore, recommended.
Zero sequence over current relays
Zero-sequence over current relays provide protection against internal phase-to-ground faults. The neutral
current or the residual current may energize the over current relay. The setting may be much lower than
the rated phase current but time delay is required. Harmonic restraint may be required to obtain sensitive
settings. An additional high set unit is also usually provided.
Zero sequence over voltage relays
Zero sequence over voltage relays provide protection against phase-to-ground faults in transformers
connected to non-effectively grounded systems or for delta connected tertiary windings. The open delta
voltage energizes the relay. A filter to reject third harmonics may be necessary for application in delta
connected tertiary winding.
Tank Ground fault Protection
This type of protection is specific to transformers with at least one grounded or resistance grounded winding.
The protection is specialized to protect for winding faults to ground.
The tank ground fault protection or tank leakage protection is a ground-connected relay, which is
connected in series with the main tank ground. The tank is insulated from ground except for one path
which a current transformer around it has connected to the tank ground relay. The relay will see any
current flowing from the tank to the ground such as bushing failures, winding to tank failures, and core
to winding failures. Since minimum current flows through this path during normal operation it can be
set very sensitive. The problem with this protection is that it requires a single path to ground through
at most 1 ohm resistance. This creates a high voltage to remote earth from the transformer tank during
ground faults, which may cause safety problems. The path can easily be shorted out by inadvertent
control or metallic paths to the transformer case. Also care must be taken to prevent maloperation from
transformer tank capacitance currents.
In general this protection is meant to provide a grounded winding with a low sensitivity ground fault protection.
It does not provide any other type of protection.
It is not normal practice to use this protection by utilities in India but in some cases, particularly where
French practices are adopted, it has been used. According to French practice normally any transformer
winding fault other than inter turn fault will invariably involve earth. And the probability of having phase-
to-phase fault in 3 phase transformers is also quite remote. As such Tank Leakage protection relay along
with fire protection system (Drain and Stir Method) quite uniquely becomes the main protection for the
transformers. Mechanical type fault detectors (gas, oil, or fault pressure) and Over current Blocking
Relays
10.5.6 Over excitation protection
This is a specialized protective relaying application. No other relay provides adequate over-excitation
protection of the transformer core. Damage to the core laminations can occur if an excitation larger than
the Volts/Hertz rating of the transformer is reached. The flux in a transformer is directly proportional to the
ratio of applied voltage and its frequency. Either the absolute values or percentage values of the voltage
and frequency can be used for calculating flux. The flux is more than the rated value if V/f is more than one
per unit. Transformer manufacturers give a limiting curve [V/f = F(t)] for each transformer. Typical curve for
two types of Transformer is shown below (Figure 10.12):
Excessive flux density (Overfluxing) arises principally from the following system conditions:
(a) high system voltage
(b) low system frequency
(c) geomagnetic disturbances
Fig. 10.12 : Permissive over-fluxing in two power transformers
Geomagnetic disturbances may result in over fluxing without the V/f threshold being exceeded, which do
not warrant the Transformer to be disconnected (Tripped). Today’s differential relays provide a 5th harmonic
detection/restraint feature, which can be used to detect such a condition, as levels of this harmonic rise
under overfluxing conditions.
Reason (a) & (b) or combination of both leads to a higher flux in the core resulting in higher magnetizing
currents. This happens due to the non-linear magnetizing characteristics of the core. The core flux increases
and the magnetic losses increase for either of conditions (a) & (b). The magnetizing flux enters in other structural
parts of the transformer as well; this results in additional eddy current losses. Because of increased losses, the
temperature of the iron winding and some structural parts increases, which subsequently lead to deterioration of
the Transformer Core. A critical situation occurs in a transformer if the flux exceeds the rated value.
Most Transformers are rated for continuous operation at 1.1 V/f.. Beyond this value, depending on the
Transformer V/f limiting curve, the required setting can be adopted in the relay. Over excitation or Over
fluxing protection function usually has alarm and trip levels and some relays also offer emulation of the
transformer over fluxing capability curve. Both IDMTL as well as definite time characteristics are available
in today’s Numerical relay, for the Utilities to take corrective measures. For the interconnecting transformer
in the grid, over-fluxing protection is applied on both HV and IV side.
10.5.7 Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief devices for
transformer & OLTC chamber)
Transformer Buchholz protection, OLTC Buchholz Protection, Pressure Relief devices, etc., fall in this
class of protections. They are all designed to provide protection for low magnitude internal faults like
turn-to-turn faults. These types of faults are not covered by any of the other protection schemes. In addition
to this specialized protection they all provide some limited protection for insulation failure faults inside the
transformer tank. None of these protection schemes can detect faults outside the transformer or inside the
transformer bushings. All the schemes work on some type of pressure differential or pressure rise of the
oil or gas inside the transformer. The pressure from the internal tank fault is used to identify the fault and
provide fast tripping before a major fault occurs.
(a) Buchholz Relay
The gas accumulator relay (Buchholz Relay) operates on pressure accumulated due to sudden oil
or gas surge. It also operates due to long-term accumulation of gasses associated with overheating
of various parts of the transformer conductor and insulation systems. This will detect faults in their
early incipient stages and prevent significant damage.
Two ball-shaped floats and two plass-enclosed

reed switches are visible inside this cutaway
view of a Buchholz relay
Fig. 10.13 : Buchholz Relay
Sometimes security is a problem for these types of devices. The addition of an over current blocking
relay, which blocks or slows down the tripping of these devices for high magnitude current flows for
which the differential relay would operate quickly, may be used to improve security of the devices.
The problem is that some internal faults may occur as a result of a through fault and the devices may
incorrectly block tripping. However, if such mal-operations are observed provision of such blocking
devices may be done on case-to-case basis.
As stated above, generally these protections are mainly aimed at meeting external safety requirements
and for providing low magnitude turn-to-turn fault protection.
Large quantities of gas are produced when an arc due to an electrical fault occurs in the transformer.
The gas surges up towards the conservator tank and on its way, it drops two hinged floats, one at
the top and other at the bottom in the chamber. Each float is accompanied by a mercury switch.
The mercury switch on the upper float is connected to an alarm circuit and that on the lower float is
connected to an external trip via Trip relay.
These relays also detect excessive loss of cooling oil in the conservator tank of the transformer in
addition to the detection of gases produced in the transformer.
Most recent designs of Buchholz relays are equipped with facilities for collecting samples of the
accumulated gases so that they may be analyzed and the nature of fault may be estimated. A provision
for injecting dry air in the Buchholz relay is also made so that the operation of the relay may be tested.
Another provision that exists in Buchholz relays is to allow a technician to take a sample of the oil
and test it for the integrity of its insulating properties.
For higher reliability, duplicating of the initiating contacts is sometimes done and may be considered
on a case-to-case basis.
To avoid common failures and to allow optional gas collection from different places in the tank, one
of the utility provide in their system two Buchholz relays in each tank, which are located in separate
pipes from different areas of the tank to the conservator. Further there are two PRDs on each tank.
This is because they feel that these protection functions for sensitive internal fault detection cannot
be diversely covered and therefore need to be duplicated.
(b) Pressure relief device (PRD)
The transformer tank filled with cooling liquid is a container subject to internal pressure and has to be
provided with one or more safety valves suitably calibrated for the maximum allowed pressure (This
depends on the design of the Transformer Tank), so that overpressure caused by internal faults can be
instantaneously relieved through the valves, thus avoiding greater damages such as the deformation
or even the burst of the tank and the spraying of hot oil with subsequent fire risks. It is necessary to
protect the transformer tank with a suitable equipment capable of almost instantaneously discharging
overpressure already at the development, before the structure integrity is damaged, PRD provides
just this function.
10.5.8 Overload protections (Oil temperature, Winding temperature relays for transformer and
for OLTC, Overload relays Current and/or Thermal Replica based)
Thermal stress due to heat accumulation is one of the factors that cause insulation damage in Transformers.
Heat produced in the Transformers due to Transformer core & copper losses ages the Transformer winding
insulation. The heat emanating from the Transformer core & winding is transferred to the oil which in turn
heats up and can cause decomposition as well reduction of its dielectric strength. Though the Transformer
oil is continuously cooled either by natural convection cooling or by forced cooling, there will always be
instances when Transformers are overloaded and feed remote faults (Increase in current). Hence it is
necessary to monitor the Transformer oil & winding temperatures and take remedial measures, if the setting
limits are crossed.
(a) Oil Temperature Sensors
The top oil temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from
utility to utility and also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are 95°C
for alarm and 100°C for trip. Because of the heating and cooling requirements of a transmission
transformer some specialized temperature protection is required to provide protection over the full
range of operating limits of the transformer. The transformer temperature depends upon the ambient
temperature, the cooling system condition, the excitation voltage and the transformer load. To provide
for temperature protection a sensor is usually provided to indicate top oil temperature. The power
transformers have a large thermal heat sink and can withstand overloads for certain limited time.
Selective protection, monitoring and load management are considered necessary. The tripping of the
transformer should be the last action.
(b) Winding Temperature Sensors
Winding temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from utility to
utility and also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are 100°C for alarm
and 105°C for trip. To simulate the winding temperature, a resistor sized to approximate the heating
in the transformer winding at full load is used. The resistor is fed by a current transformer from one of
the phase currents. To add oil temperature, the top oil is circulated in to a well within the resistor. This
combined heating of the resistor from transformer current and top oil, is used to simulate the winding
temperature.
Sensors (presently adopted) techniques is to measure the temperatures directly. Direct

measurement sensors are placed in the windings at locations where the highest temperature is
expected to occur. The sensors are connected to the measurement device that is mounted outside
the tank through a hole in the tank wall with liquid-tight optical connectors. Accurate placement of
sensors depends on the ability to predict sites where the hottest spot is likely to occur.
Optical probe: Optical probes are widely used for temperature measurement. They have fast response
times and are very accurate. Most optical probes that have been used inside transformers can be
divided into two types, intrinsic fiber optic sensors and extrinsic fiber optic sensors. In both types, the
fiber optic probe is constructed of appropriate materials that allow the probe to be installed directly
inside the transformer tank and into the transformer windings. Generally, this is best done during
initial construction of the transformer or during major winding renovations.
RTD Probe: Commonly used RTD probes are located in dry wells at different locations in the
transformer tank, have been effectively used for decades to have a reasonable measurement of the
oil temperature in the area of the dry well.
The above temperature sensors do not meet any of the other requirements but are again the only
(Connected to trip relay through their initiating contacts) relays which meet the over load temperature
limit requirements.
For higher reliability duplicating of the initiating electrical contacts is sometimes done and may be
considered on a case-to-case basis.
(c) Overload Relays
Current based Overload Function
It is also a practice to use a simple over current relay with a time delay arranged to give alarm to
warn the operator of any overloading of the transformer. Some features such as, adaptive protection
settings that take into account winter and summer transformer loadings, may not be possible based
purely on current measurement. Sometimes economic consideration, before the advent of numerical
protection, necessitates measurement of only one phase current to detect overload.
Thermal Overload Function
The use of Numerical Relays and the facility to monitor the winding temperature of all the windings,
make Thermal Overload Relays a superior Back up Protection compared to Plain Current Overload
relays. The Transformer Thermal content (θ) is a function of Transformer Thermal Time Constant
(τ) and Transformer Load Current (I). The Thermal image is created in the relay and the Thermal
content is continuously monitored. The Alarm & Trip setting of the Thermal content θ can be set in
the relay.
Some features such as, adaptive protection settings that take into account winter and summer
transformer loadings, automatic load shedding and early warning for possible overload tripping is
achieved by Thermal overload function.
10.6 Transformer protection scheme:
To ensure redundancy and to eliminate common mode protection failure, protection scheme is divided in
two parts namely Group-A (fed from station DC-A) and Group-B (fed from Station DC-B) protection scheme.
Further, Main & Back-up protection functions are kept is separate relay hardware. To improve reliability,
Alarm & trip signals of a particular mechanical protection i.e OTI, WTI, Bucholtz etc. are wired seaparately
to Group-A & Group-B protection scheme.
When the Group-A and Group-B protection scheme have identical protection functions, they are usually called
as Main-I and Main-II protection scheme. In this case, It is not essential to have separate hardware for Main
and back-up protection functions. However, due to multi-breaker arrangement associated with transformers
at transmission substations, Main-I & Main-II scheme is normally difficult to implement for want of required
numbers of analog input channels in a relay.
Typical classification of Protection function in Group-A & Group-B scheme is given below:
10.6.1 Group-A protection scheme
Differential protection for high magnitude internal faults
Back-up directional Over-current or impedance protection
Over fluxing protection
Buchholz gas-accumulator relay for low current turn-to-turn faults
Top oil temperature sensor for over temperature protection
Neutral or residual over current protection, if provided
Sudden pressure (rate of rise) relay, if provided
10.6.2 Group-B protection schemes
Restricted earth fault protection
Back-up Directional over current and earth fault relays
Over fluxing protection
Pressure relay (PRV)
Winding temperature sensor for over temperature protection
OLTC Buchholz gas relay, if applicable

The non-directional over current relays are used when they could be coordinated with the over current
protection on connecting lines. Coordination requirements usually require the clearing times to be longer
than the other types of back-up protection. Directional over current relay improves the co-ordination by being
set to look through the transformer impedance. For this reason they are normally used for all interconnecting
transformers. When applied on both sides of the transformer, the current levels where coordination with
line relaying is required is limited by the transformer impedance which greatly improves the tripping times
for higher current faults in the transformer. The directional ground over current relay can be set much more
sensitive and with very short time delays. For all interconnecting transformers use of directional over current
and ground over current relays with high set units are recommended.
There are a number of general problems with back-up relay viz., the sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush
currents. Setting must be able to allow inrush, which usually means de-sensitizing the back-up relay.
Numerical relays can filter harmonics and DC offset currents from the inrush and therefore may be preferred.
In case of issues related to coordination of Transformer back-up overcurrent protection with the overlapping
back-up distance zone-3 of the line distance relays, it is recommended to use back-up impedance relay for
transformer protection.
10.7 Recommendations
Based on the discussions included above few recommendations have been brought out and these should
be considered.
A true Main-I & Main-II protection scheme is usually not provided in case of transformers in power transmission
system. But as operating requirements change and single contingency limits are pressed the level of Main-2
protection may be re-evaluated in future. Hence, it is recommended to have Group-A & Group-B protection
scheme for the transformers.
Numerical relays offer the best characteristic since digital filters remove harmonics and DC offset currents
from the inrush. Numerical back-up over current relays can therefore be set much more sensitive than
conventional types and are recommended to be used.
Harmonic restraint may be required to obtain sensitive settings in case of zero sequence over current
relays.
Sometimes security is a problem in case of Buchholz and PRD relays mostly because of contact malfunction
on moisture ingress. Suitable measure may be taken to improve security of these devices.
In case of mechanical type of fault detectors like Buchholz and PRDs, for higher reliability, duplicating of the
initiating contacts may be considered on a case-to-case basis.
For grid transformers, over excitation protection should be provided on both side (HV & IV) of the transformer
winding.
The power transformers have a large thermal heat sink and can withstand overloads for certain limited time.
Selective protection and monitoring and load management is necessary. The tripping of the transformer
should be the last action.
Fast clearance of faults in the transformer is important for stability of the system and therefore adequate
protections should be provided. Requirement of through fault withstand is also important and should be
considered in setting coordination.
Recommendations for provision of protective function & scheme for transformers of 765kV, 400 kV and 220
kV class are as follows:
• Transformer differential protection

• Restricted earth-fault protection

• Overfluxing protection (for both HV and IV side)
• Back up directional O/C + E/F protection on HV side
• Back up directional O/C + E/F protection on IV side
• Transformer mechanical or Body protections (Buchholz relay, Winding and Oil Temperature Indicators,
Oil Level Indicator, Pressure Relief Device, Sudden pressure rise relay, OLTC buchholz relay)
• Protection for Tertiary winding (if applicable)
• Overload Alarm
• Back-up impedance relay, if required
10.8.1 Differential Protection
Requirements
• Triple pole with individual phase indication

• Have unrestrained instantaneous high set over-current units which should not operate during
inrush.
• Have an adjustable and/or multi bias setting
• Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable under normal
overfluxing conditions. Magnetising inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional
time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
• Have an adjustable operating current with minimum operating setting of 15%
• Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of rated current
• The scheme shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer
or through in-built provisions.
Setting guidelines

A minimum operating current setting of about 15% to 20% of rated full load current (i.e. 0.15 to 0.2pu), which
is greater than the worst turns ratio mismatch at the tap changer extreme should normally be selected.
Bias setting
Bias setting should be normally done as per manufacturer’s recommendations. This is due to the fact that
algorithm used by each manufacturer is different.

When CTs from “T connection” are connected to IED as in the case of breaker and a half or the ring bus
scheme, special care shall be taken in order to prevent unwanted operation of transformer differential IED
for through faults due to different CT saturation of “T” connected CTs. Thus if such uneven saturation is a
possibility, it is typically required to increase unrestrained operational level to 20-25 pu.
Harmonic restrain setting:

This is to provide blocking to differential protection operation on detection of second harmonic & fifth harmonic.
Typical settings for the second and fifth harmonic restrain levels are 15% and 25% respectively.
10.8.2 Overfluxing Protection
Requirements
• operate on the principle of Voltage to frequency ratio and shall be phase to phase connected
• have inverse time characteristics, matching with transformer over fluxing withstand capability
curve
• provide an independent ‘alarm’ with the time delay continuously adjustable between 0.1 to 6.0 seconds
at values of ‘v/f’ between 100% to 130% of rated values
• tripping time shall be governed by ‘v/f’ Versus time characteristics of the relay
• have a set of characteristics for Various time multiplier settings. The maximum operating time of the
relay shall not exceed 3 seconds and 1.5 seconds at ‘v/f’ values of 1.4 and 1.5 times, the rated values,
respectively.
• have an accuracy of operating time, better than ±10%
• have a resetting ratio of 97% or better.
Setting guidelines
For transformers, the established standard IEC 60076-1 states that a transformer should be in continuous
service without damage if the volt per hertz is below 1.05 per unit.
The standards present the generator and transformer limit. Generally the manufacturer’s limits are obtained
individually for the transformer. The limits may come in the form of a over-fluxing capability curve.
The over fluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic matched accordingly
for both alarm and trip.
The over fluxing alarm stage threshold setting, V/Hz Alarm Set, can be set lower than the trip stage setting to
provide an indication that abnormal conditions are present and alert an operator to take corrective measures
accordingly.
10.8.3 REF Protection
Requirements
• Shall be single pole
• Have an operating current sensitivity of at least 10% of nominal current
• Be tuned to the system frequency
• Have a suitable non-linear resistor to limit the peak voltage during in-zone faults in case of high
impedance type
• Shall be high or low impedance principle type

Setting Guidelines
Minimum operating current

Minimum operating current setting of 10% of power transformer rated current is used for solidly earthed
systems. If the CT transient performance of the CTs is not identical, this may have to be increased. Stability
can be improved by selecting Stabilizing voltage (in turn stabilizing resistance) with sufficient security margin
i.e. normally 150% of the calculated value.
In case of low impedance relay, Bias and other settings to be done as per manufacturer’s
recommendation.
10.8.4 Back-up overcurrent protection relay and Earth fault protection scheme with high set feature
(on HV side and IV side)
Requirements
(a) Shall have three over current and one earth fault element(s) which shall be either independent or
composite unit(s).
(b) The scheme shall include necessary VT fuse failure relays for alarm purposes
(c) Over current relay shall
• have directional IDMT characteristic with a definite minimum time of 3.0 seconds at 10 times
setting and have a variable setting range of 50-200% of rated current
• have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable setting range
500-2000 % of rated current
• have a characteristic angle of 30/45 degree lead
(d) Earth fault relay shall
• have directional IDMT characteristic with a definite minimum time of 3.0 seconds at 10 times
setting and have a variable setting range of 20-80% of rated current
• have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable setting range
200-800 % of rated current
• have a characteristic angle of 45/60 degree lag
• include necessary separate interposing voltage transformers or have internal feature in the relay
for open delta voltage to the relay
Setting Guidelines
The current setting of the backup O/C relay shall be set above the expected maximum load current so as
to allow possible overload on account of loss of one of the parallel transformers. The first stage can provide
backup protection for faults on the transformer and the system. It should be coordinated with downstream
protection to provide discrimination for system faults. Normally, the pickup of the time delayed overcurrent
element is set to 125-150% of the maximum MVA rating to allow overloading of the transformer according
to IEEE Std. C37.91-2000.
The instantaneous overcurrent element should be set to pick up at a value higher than the maximum
asymmetrical through fault current. This is usually the fault current through the transformer for a low-side
three-phase fault. Due to low transient overreach , the instantaneous overcurrent element may be set to
110-130% of the through fault level of the transformer ensuring that the relay is stable for through faults. The
instantaneous pickup setting should also consider the effects of transformer magnetizing inrush current. A
50 to 100msec delay is usually added to the instantaneous element also to improve security.
The current setting of the backup E/F relay shall be set above the expected maximum load current unbalance.
Normally, Pick up setting of 10% of rated full load current is recommended for Transformer in transmission
system. The time setting has to be coordinated with other back up protections on the downstream side
(2nd or 3rd zone of distance relay) using relay coordination tools.
10.8.5 Overload Alarm relay
Requirements
Shall be of single pole type
Shall be of definite time overcurrent type
Shall have a continuously variable current range of 50-200% of rated current and
Continuously variable timer setting range of 1-10 sec.
Shall have a drop off to pick up ratio of 95% or better
Setting Guidelines
Overload relay shall be set at 110% of rated current with delay of 5 seconds. This shall be connected to
give only alarm and not for tripping.
10.8.6 Tertiary Winding Protection

There are variations in the practices adopted for bringing out the tertiary terminals of ICTs. Therefore,
depending upon the type of connections, adequate protection scheme may be adopted in consultation with the
manufacturer of the transformer. In case, tertiary winding CT is not connected to Transformer differential relay,
it is covered in the transformer overall differential protection zone for faults in tertiary to certain extent.
10.8.7 Back-up impedance relay

If required to provide coordination between the overlapping line distance back-up Zone-3 protection and
Transformer back up protection, Back-up impedance relay shall be provided. Normally, Back-up impedance
function available in any of the transformer protection IED can be utilized. The setting should take care of
the transformer inrush & other transients.
10.9 Engineering guidelines

Duplication of transformer protection is not considered necessary but the protection and monitors shall be
divided in two groups viz. Gr A and Gr B at 400 kV and above voltage level stations. At 220 kV level this is
recommended depending on the importance of the substation and where it is decided to go for two groups
of protection with two station batteries.
Given below is one possible way of grouping these protections:
Group A Group B
Differential relay R.E.F. Protection
Back up Protection (HV) Buchholz Protection trip
Overfluxing Protection (HV) Back up Protection (MV)
Oil temperature high tripping Overfluxing Protection (MV)
Buchholz alarm Overload protection (Alarm), Oil Temp. alarm
Pressure relief tripping Winding Temperature high tripping
Delta winding protection OLTC Buchholz tripping
Winding temp. alarm Oil level high/low tripping
• In case multiple independent contacts of Buchholz and PRD trip are available, then they should be
wired to both Group-A and Group-B protection.
• Group A and B protections shall be connected to separate DC source/separately fused supplies. DC

sources shall be supervised.
• Both Gr A and Gr B protections shall give out tripping impulses to HV, MV and LV (if applicable), circuit
breakers.
• If tertiary is loaded via a circuit breaker, then protection for tertiary loaded feeder shall normally trip
the tertiary circuit breaker.
Some important application notes connected with the Transformer are listed below.
• The transformer over fluxing protection has been recommended on both sides for interconnecting
transformers. This is to cover all possible operating conditions, e.g. the transformer may remain
energized from either side. For other transformers over fluxing relay shall be provided on the untapped
winding of the Transformer.
• In case of breaker and half switching schemes, the bias differential protection C.Ts. associated with
Main and Tie breakers should be connected to separate bias windings and these should not be
paralleled in order to avoid false operation due to dissimilar C.T. transient response.
• Whenever separate phase-wise C.Ts are available on neutral side of transformer winding (normaly
for 1-ph transformer units), triple pole high impedance relay may be provided instead of single pole
restricted earth fault relay.
• Protection zones and scheme should be designed such that outages of any singly relay hardware
does not result into outage of complete primary protection for a protected zone.
10.11 TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME OF 400/220 kV AUTO TRANSFORMER:
Fig. 10.14
References
Cigré B5-WG05 : “Modern techniques for protecting controlling and monitoring power transformers” 2011.
Chapter 11
Protection of SHUNT REACTORS
Shunt reactors are used to compensate for capacitive shunt reactance of transmission lines and cables.
They absorb reactive power especially during over voltage conditions and thus help maintaining system
voltage within limits. There are two main types of shunt reactors, dry air-core type and oil-filled air-core and
gapped-core types.
The oil-immersed shunt reactors are generally Y-connected with a solidly grounded or impedance-grounded
neutral and connected without any controlling circuit breaker directly to either ends of the EHV lines.
The dry type reactors or oil-filled reactors of 11 kV or 33 kV ratings are normally ungrounded star, connected
through controlling circuit breakers of suitable TRV ratings to the tertiary of Inter-connecting transformer
(ICT) of 400 kV / 220 kV ratio purely for reactive power consumption to control the voltage profile during light
load conditions. However the practice in India has been so far to use only oil immersed reactors connected
to the tertiary terminals because of non-availability of proven design of air-core reactors of higher ratings
at medium voltages indigenously even for such applications. However, air core reactors are widely used in
SVC or Statcom applications where they are connected at medium voltage levels.
The reactor bank protection considerations are a subset of the transformer protection and many similarities
exist.
11.1 Reactor construction
Dry-type shunt reactors of 11 kV and 33 kV ratings are considered very effective and widely used in Static Var
Systems or Static Compensators and also for absorbing reactive power during light load conditions that cause
higher voltage levels. The primary advantages of dry-type air-core reactor, compared to oil-immersed types,
are lower operating costs, lower weight, lower losses, and the absence of insulating oil and its maintenance.
The main disadvantages of dry-type reactors are limitations on voltage and kVA rating and the high-intensity
magnetic field. There is no magnetizing inrush current when the reactor is energized.
Oil-immersed shunt reactors are either coreless type (air core design) with linear characteristics at least up to
1.5 pu or gapped iron-core type with linearity restricted to 1.2 -1.3 pu. Both designs are characterized by low
frequency long time constant current when de-energized, which is determined by the parallel combination of
the reactor’s inductance and the line capacitance. The gapped iron-core design has a more severe energizing
inrush than the air core or core-less type. Both designs are constructed to provide linearity of inductance
and to reduce residual or remnant flux when compared to a transformer or reactor without gapped core.
Both designs are constructed for either self-cooling or forced cooling. Normally most of the reactors used in
India are natural cooling type. It may be mentioned that in air core design there is no iron core in the main
circuit flux path but liberally designed strong tank shields of either CRGO or sometimes copper are usually
provided. For control of switching surge over voltages, gapped core reactors with knee-point voltage of 1.2
or 1.3 provide better results. While shunt reactors of coreless type with linearity 1.5 pu are used for reactive
power absorption.
The shunt reactor construction has been quite complicated in view of control of core or tank vibrations within
stringent limits and the duties to be performed to withstand the severe over voltages during switching-on or
load rejections. There has been good statistics of failures of shunt reactors attributable to either construction
complications or system operational severity.
11.2 Shunt reactor failure modes and rates
Before discussing the reactor failure rates it is important to understand the modes of reactor failure. The
oil-immersed reactor faults can be broken into four categories:
• High current phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground faults
• Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor winding
• Miscellaneous failures such as loss of cooling or low oil
• Failure due to increased core and tank vibrations beyond the permissible limits
Because of the proximity of the winding with the core and tank, winding-to-ground failures can occur. The
magnitude of this fault decreases as the location of fault moves closer to the neutral side of the reactor.
Turn-to-turn faults cause only small change in phase currents. The current in the short-circuited fault path
would be quite high but will obviously not show as increase in the line current. This increases rapidly the
operating oil and winding temperature, increases the internal pressure, and causes accumulation of gas. If
these are not quickly detected they will evolve into a major fault.
The failure rates of oil-immersed reactors are quite high ranging from 3% to 5% per year.
11.3 Typical shunt reactor arrangements
There are two main arrangements for shunt reactor connection. The first is 11 kV or 33 kV tertiary connected
shunt reactors and the second is directly connected shunt reactor, connected to EHV system either through
a controlling circuit breaker, called switched type and the other directly connected to the line through an
isolator called non-switched reactors.
The tertiary supplied reactor bank is provided with a circuit breaker of suitable TRV ratings on tertiary
side.
The second method of connecting shunt reactor is to connect it to one or both ends of a long transmission line
or cable. These reactors are usually Y-connected with either a solidly grounded neutral or grounded through
a reactor of suitable impedance value. The neutral reactor connected between the star point of EHV shunt
reactor and the ground limits the secondary arc current to a low value of around 10 amperes typically for 400
kV system to ensure complete de-ionization of arc path when EHV system develops a single line to ground
fault. Arc extinction during line single-phase auto reclose dead time is assisted by this neutral reactor.
In the event of a fault in the un-switched shunt reactor itself, transfer trip command will be required to trip
the remote end breaker.
11.4 Shunt reactor protection requirements
Protection requirements for shunt reactors fall into five areas: high magnitude phase-to-phase faults, low
magnitude phase to ground faults, turn-to-turn faults, and other miscellaneous failures.
High magnitude phase faults in shunt reactors are required to be cleared based on the same criteria used
for the primary equipment supplying the reactor. For the tertiary supplied reactor the fault withstand of the
transformer must be considered the limit for the clearance time. The tertiary winding is quite sensitive to
phase-to-phase or three phase faults. As such efforts should be made to ensure that tertiary does not suffer
such faults. It is important to note that all the faults external to tertiary must be contained as always to a single
phase to ground fault. For the direct connected oil-immersed reactors, that are un-switched EHV reactors,
the critical clearance time shall of the same order of magnitude as applicable to EHV Lines.
Protection of Shunt Reactors 143
The single phase to ground fault in the system external to tertiary terminals shall normally be of very low
fault current amplitude. Such faults must, however, be detected and isolated to ensure that this does not
lead to phase-to-phase or three phase faults. The detection of turn-to-turn fault in the shunt reactor is rather
tricky and cannot be detected by conventional differential protection. The gas pressure increase or rate of
gas generation or the fall in reactor impedance gives a better indication and criteria for such protection.
Miscellaneous failures such as low oil level, high winding temperature or oil temperature are usually set
to alarm at a set level and to trip once the oil level or the reactor temperature reaches the next level of
setting.
The reactors, whether non-switched type provided on lines or switched type on bus bars or on tertiary of
the transformers, play a very important role to control the over-voltages on switching or on load rejection or
for enabling black-start of the network or for controlling the voltage profile of both the up-stream or down-
stream system.
The reactors therefore play a very active role to ensure satisfactory operation of the power system. Based on
the types of failures described above and the basic design of the shunt reactors to satisfy the requirements
of power system, the protective relaying schemes for the shunt reactors should meet the following key
requirements.
• Maintain transient fault and voltage stability of the power system

• Prevent unnecessary false tripping of the transmission reactor during critical load periods
• Maintain required quality of supply
• Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by providing two
groups of protections
Shunt reactors have to remain in service with active protection remaining vigilant and fully operational. The
direct tripping command to trip the remote breaker has to be through coded and secure signal via information
link. The power system cannot tolerate false trip command creating outage of the line.
For smooth control of voltage profile during peak and off peak hours frequent switching of shunt reactors
provided on the bus bars or on transformer tertiary will be required and the system should not fail on account
of such frequent operation of shunt reactors. The tough duty of circuit breakers for control of switched shunt
reactors with good margin in TRV requirements and switching cycle should be recognized.
The provision of Group-A and Group-B Protection system for the Shunt Reactors must meet the same criteria
as provided for the line and transformers.
The protection system must satisfy the following types of faults specific to the Shunt Reactors:
• Protect for internal phase to ground or phase to phase faults
• Protect for external tank faults to ground or phase to phase faults
• Protect for internal partial winding or turn-to-turn faults
• Limit top oil temperature to maximum temperature
• Limit vibration monitoring of core and tank wall
• Prevent rupture of reactor tank during internal fault
• Provide for failure of an interrupting device
• Provide for over-excitation of reactor core
The switching device TRV should match with specific requirement of reactor current switching. The knee-
point voltage of shunt reactor and linearity selected should match with the requirement of the system where
the reactor is located for adequate protection against over voltage and consequent overloads.
This section covers the main types of reactor protection schemes. Each scheme is reviewed to see its
advantages and disadvantages.
The protection schemes generally are as follows:
• Differential relay for phase to phase and phase to ground faults
• Impedance relay for turn to turn faults and back-up protection or phase and ground over current
relay
• Ground fault protection by Restricted earth fault, or Neutral displacement relay
• Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief devices)
• Oil temperature and winding temperature relays
• Peak-to-peak amplitude of vibration and tank monitoring
11.5.1 Reactor Differential Protection
Differential protection is the most commonly applied protection for Shunt reactors. Generally, the differential
relays provide quick clearance of phase-to-phase and ground faults.
11.5.2 Impedance Relay
Impedance relays are used as primary protection or as back-up protection for the reactor. It is also used for
detecting turn-to-turn faults within the reactor. Such relays also monitor the faults inside the reactor at some
good percentage of winding faults. Turn-to-turn faults inside reactor winding may not change the through
current of the reactor but the impedance values change drastically up to at least 50% of impedance of the
reactor. It consists of a single or preferably a two-zone impedance relay on the high side of the reactor
looking into the reactor.
The impedance relay has some benefits of providing high speed tripping in the Zone-1 protection and slower
speed tripping in Zone-2. It must not be set to operate for inrush characteristics during reactor energization
or de-energization. The setting of the relay has to be coordinated while taking into account the energizing
and de-energizing transients.
11.5.3 Phase Over Current Protection
The phase over current protection is a very inexpensive, simple, and reliable scheme for fault detection and
is used for some reactor protection applications as a back-up protection. The setting must be high enough
to prevent inrush currents from causing unwanted operation. When used it should have both instantaneous
and time delayed elements. The instantaneous elements help in providing high speed clearance of heavy
current faults which threaten system stability.
11.5.4 Ground Fault Protection
The ground fault protection within the shunt reactor is best provided by simple conventional Restricted Earth
Fault (REF) relay selected and set on the same philosophy as for transformer REF. For tertiary connected
reactors neutral over voltage relays are used. Sometimes a ground over current relay is used as a back-up
protection when phase overcurrent protection is provided.
11.5.4.1 Restricted Earth Fault Relay
Zero-sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) provide protection against phase-to-ground
faults in shunt reactors supplied from solidly grounded systems. Generally, this protection is also provided
for EHV shunt reactor with Neutral Grounding reactor connected between star point of shunt reactor and
ground.
11.5.4.2 Zero Sequence Over Voltage Relay
Zero-sequence over voltage relays provide protection against phase-to-ground faults on reactors supplied
from non-effectively grounded systems. The open delta voltage energizes the relay. A filter to reject third
harmonics may be necessary. The contact is connected to give alarm only.
11.5.4.3 Ground Overcurrent Relay
The ground over current protection is a very inexpensive, simple, and reliable scheme for fault detection and
is used for some reactor protection applications as a back-up protection for phase-to-ground faults. This is
used in conjunction with phase over current relay. When used it should have both instantaneous and time
delayed elements.
The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents is one of the main problems with back-up ground over
current relays. Settings must be able to allow inrush, which usually means desensitizing the back-up relay.
Numerical relay offer the best characteristic in this area since the digital filters remove harmonics and DC
offset currents from the inrush and are, therefore, recommended.
11.5.5 Mechanical Type Fault Detectors (Buchholz, Oil Level Indicators, Pressure Relief Devices)
These relays to be provided on shunt reactors of medium to high capacity are quite similar to those provided
on power transformers.
For higher reliability duplicating of the initiating contacts is sometimes done and may be considered on case-
to-case basis depending upon the location and size of shunt reactors and voltage class.
To avoid common failures and to allow optional gas collection from different places in the tank, one of the
utility provide in their system, two Buchholz relays in each tank, which are located in separate pipes from
different areas of the tank to the conservator. Further there are two PRDs on each tank. This is because
they feel that these protection functions for sensitive internal fault detection cannot be diversely covered
and therefore need to be duplicated.
11.5.6 Over Excitation Relay
The over voltage relays provided on the line or on transformers take good care of shunt reactor over-excitation.
It should however be noted that shunt reactors are most required during over voltages as they control and
limit the over voltages, even control the runaway voltage levels by providing more short time reactive power
to system when subjected to over voltages. Any tripping of the reactor under overvoltage condition would
only worsen the situation.
11.5.7 Top Oil and Winding Over Temperature Protection
The protections provided on shunt reactors are exactly similar to that provided on power transformers and
criteria for selection and setting should therefore be the same. For higher reliability duplicating of the initiating
contacts is sometimes done and may be considered on case-to-case basis depending upon then location
and size of shunt reactors and voltage class.
11.6 Typical main-1 protection schemes (Group A)
Protection schemes for the reactor bank must provide for full protection during fault conditions. In addition,
back-up protection should be provided when the potential for a failure to trip exists.
Typical Main-1 schemes consist of:
• Differential protection for high magnitude internal faults
• Over current or impedance relay for through fault withstand protection
• Buchholz gas-accumulator relay or sudden pressure relay for low current turn-to-turn faults
• Top oil or winding over temperature protection for temperature protection
• Neutral over current protection or Neutral over voltage relay as ground fault protection
11.7 Main-2 and back up protection schemes (Group B)
A true Main-2 protection scheme is usually not provided. The main reason is the low probability of a relay
failure during a protected event. Given the present record of reactor protection this seems to be adequate
to provide necessary reliability. But as operating requirements change and single contingency limits are
pressed the level of Main-2 protection may need to be re-evaluated in future.
For the direct connected oil-immersed reactors typical Main-2 protection consists of:
• Restricted earth-fault protection, high impedance type, covering the neutral reactor as well as the
main reactor
• Sudden pressure or gas accumulator relay for limited turn-to-turn faults

• The back-up protection is provided with Impedance relay set with a time delay between 0.7 to 1.0
second and an impedance setting of 60% of the reactor impedance
Or
• Instantaneous and time delayed over current for phase and ground
The neutral reactor is not stressed under normal conditions and is normally protected only by Buchholz relay
in the Main-1 protection scheme, and oil temperature in the Main-2 scheme.
Based on the discussions included in several paragraphs above few recommendations have been brought
out. A few of these are listed below.
• A true Main-2 protection scheme is usually not provided in case of reactors. But as operating
requirements change and single contingency limits are pressed the level of Main-2 protection may
need to be re-evaluated in future.
• In place of impedance relay a phase and ground over current protection can also be used as back-up
protection.
• Numerical relays offer the best characteristic since digital filters remove harmonics and DC offset
currents from the inrush. Numerical back-up phase over current and ground over current relays can
therefore be set much more sensitive than conventional types and are recommended to be used.
• The over voltage relays provided on the line take good care of shunt reactor over excitation. Therefore
separate over excitation protection is generally not considered necessary.
• In case of mechanical type of fault detectors like Buchholz and PRDs, for higher reliability, duplicating
of the initiating contacts may be considered on a case-to-case basis.
• Fast clearance of faults in the reactor is important for stability of the system and limiting equipment
damage. Therefore adequate protections should be provided.
11.9 Requirements and setting guide lines
Recommendations for provision of protection and monitoring equipment for Reactors are as follows
• Reactor differential Protection

• Reactor REF Protection
• Reactor backup protection (Impedance type or definite time o/c & E/F)
• Protections and monitors built into reactor (buchholz, winding temperature, oil temperature, pressure
relief, oil level, Fire protection)
11.9.1 Differential Protection
Requirements
• Shall be triple pole type

• Have an operating current sensitivity of at least 10% of nominal current
• Be tuned to system frequency (for high imp. Relay)
• Have operating time not greater than 30 ms at 5 times of setting in case of High Imp. relay
• Have suitable non-linear resistors to limit peak voltage during in-zone faults in case of high impedance
type
• Shall be high or low impedance type
Setting Guidelines
When energizing an iron core shunt reactor the actual peak value of the current might rise to a value between
3 and 5.5 times rated current. The inrush currents in the three phases will experience different degree of
DC-offset. Due to the long DC-Time constant of the shunt reactor the time to steady state condition may be
fairly long and in the order of seconds. Under such conditions the operating point of the magnetic flux in the
CT’s will increase in the same direction as the DC-component. This situation persists as long as there is a
DC-component in the primary current. A result of this may be a time delayed saturation of the CT. Specifically
for low impedance differential protection connected to closed-core CT’s, this time delayed saturation may
cause undesirable protection operation. The fundamental value of the primary currents may in this situation
be close to rated current of the reactor. The differential protection then operates in the sensitive part of the
tripping characteristic. Even a small differential current may in this situation lead to an incorrect trip by the
differential protection
Use of CT’s of the same make and with identical ratings on both sides of the shunt reactors is recommended.
The philosophy is to avoid uneven saturation and thus prevent significant values of false differential currents.
This is not a 100% fail safe practice, but reports indicate that it has been quite successfully applied to shunt
reactors. One important reason for this is the fact that in shunt reactor applications the CT’s on the terminal-
and neutral-side both suffer under the same conditions. Other measures to avoid unwanted tripping of low
impedance differential protection under these conditions might be:
• Use of 2nd harmonic blocking/restraint feature in combination with cross blocking functionality
• Use of adaptive DC-biasing
The paragraph below gives some recommendations with regard to CT ratio to be used.
Generally for shunt reactor installations low CT ratios are often selected due to its low operating current
during normal operating conditions. The reactors are however often connected to bus bars or lines with
very high fault levels. As a result the magnitude of the currents during internal reactor faults may reach
such high levels that the CT cores suffer severe saturation. For low impedance differential protections the
resulting distorted differential currents may contain a large degree of 2nd harmonic current and thus cause
a blocking of the restrained differential function. Selecting a higher CT ratio may improve the situation in
some instances. For numerical differential protection the high level unrestrained diff function, as described
earlier, should also be used in order to secure a fast fault clearance (pick up)
The high set stage works totally independent of the 2nd harmonic blocking or other restraining quantities.
Generally it also has quite low requirements to the CT dimensioning. Dependable protection operation should
in most cases be guaranteed as long as the CT’s steady state saturation current exceeds the protection
setting level. The actual protections CT requirements must nevertheless be checked against the relay
manufacturer’s recommendations.
Fora shunt reactor application it should be possible to choose a setting of the high level unrestrained different
function as low as 200% to 400% of rated reactor current. This relatively sensitive setting is possible due
to the fact that:
There will be no high level through fault currents for external faults.
The possible false differential currents caused by temporary CT saturation during inrush conditions will be
decisive for the setting. These inrush currents are of relatively moderate level.
The numerical differential protection normally utilizes DFT filter technique of the input current which effectively
suppresses the dc component.
11.9.2 Restricted Earth-fault Protection
Requirements
• Shall be single pole
• Have an operating current sensitively of at least 10% of nominal current
• Be tuned to system frequency
• Have suitable non-linear resistors to limit peak voltage during in-zone faults
• Shall be high or low impedance type
Setting Guidelines
Applied to an oil immersed shunt reactor with directly grounded neutral the REF protection offers sensitive and
fast detection and tripping in case of internal phase to ground faults. Most of the possible fault localizations
in the winding are expected to be covered by this protection function.
There is however some possible challenges related to REF protections on shunt reactors that must be
addressed.
During energizing of the shunt reactor there is a possibility of saturation of CTs on the terminal side. In this
situation the REF protection will see a residual current from the terminal side which is not present on the
neutral side. A higher value of Stabilizing resistance usually solves this problem. Especially low impedance
REF protection may operate unnecessarily under such conditions. When using low impedance REF it is
therefore strongly recommended to use a protection with restraint feature. The restraint quantity should be
formed from the residual current from the terminal side CTs or from phase current.
11.9.3 Backup Protection Relay (Impedance Type)
Requirements
• Shall be triple pole type
• Shall have one or two zones
• Shall be single step polarized ‘mho’ or impedance distance relay suitable for measuring phase to
ground and phase to phase faults.
• Shall have a characteristic angle between 60-80 degrees
• Shall have a suitable range for covering 60% of reactor impedance
Setting Guidelines
The settings of the under impedance-zone should account for:
• Possible system dynamic temporary overvoltage
• Shunt reactor inrush current (reduced reactor impedance)
• Above the turn to turn shorted reactance
Temporary overvoltage in the system may cause the reactor to operate in the nonlinear area. The current in
the nonlinear area of the B-H curve will increase and will necessarily affect the apparent reactor reactance
as measured by the distance protection. This reactance will naturally be lower than the rated reactor
reactance.
During extreme inrush conditions with fully DC-offset, the shunt reactor might saturate, resulting in significant
reduction of the apparent reactor impedance. The zone reach of the distance protection must be chosen
to a value below this impedance with an additional safety margin. The saturated impedance will have to be
calculated or determined by tests. Generally the impedance measured by the distance protection may be
as low as 70% of shunt reactor rated impedance during switching.
In addition to the possible saturation of the reactor also the CT’s might suffer saturation during the inrush
conditions due to the slowly decaying DC-component.
Normally a setting of 60% of rated reactance is found to be adequate. Therefore impedance protections for
shunt reactors are set to a maximum impedance setting to cover at least 60% of rated reactor impedance.
Undesired operation during switching conditions has been observed but the tendency seems to be reduced
by numerical distance protection due to modern filtering algorithms.
A short circuit between winding turns of the same phase (turn-to-turn fault) will result in decreased apparent
phase impedance. The distance protection may detect such conditions. However the sensitivity may not be
sufficient to detect all turn-to-turn faults. As discussed above a zone reach setting of approximately 60% of
rated reactor impedance may be necessary in order to be stable against inrush conditions. A turn-to-turn
fault that only affects one or a few turns will then not be detected by zone 1 distance protection function.
The inductance of the reactor is proportional to the square to the number of turns of the winding. It is then
appropriate to conclude that a short circuit involving only 5% of the total turns would reduce the apparent
impedance of the reactor by approximately 10% of its rated value. For example, the apparent impedance
for a 5% turn-turn fault is approximately (0.95)2 *XL. Similarly a 20% turn-turn short circuit within the reactor
will yield an apparent impedance of 0.64*XL.
Therefore the impedance protection scheme does not offer a very sensitive detection of turn to turn faults.
Its advantage compared to other current based schemes is the ability to trip instantaneously for faults within
zone 1. However, when set to typically 60% of the rated shunt reactor impedance, more than 20% of the
total turns have to be shorted in order to achieve this fast tripping.
If time delayed zone 2 element is applied to the under impedance protection scheme, the sensitivity of the
protection for turn-turn faults will be enhanced. However, careful measures must be applied to secure the
protection during shunt reactor energization. This zone 2 element should be blocked during inrush conditions
or time delayed sufficiently to override the inrush phenomena.
11.9.4 Backup Protection Relay (Overcurrent /Earth fault O/C Type)
Requirements
• Shall be a single stage definite time 3 pole, overcurrent relay with adjustable current and
• Shall be connected for 2 O/C and 1 E/F connection and shall be non-directional with high reset ratio
and low transient overreach
Setting Guidelines
Phase overcurrent protection - Time delayed overcurrent (51 / I>, t)
The overcurrent threshold for the time delayed overcurrent function (51) should account for normal system
operation. In this regard, the current threshold must be set above the maximum reactor current as a result of
temporary system overvoltage or the voltage rise in healthy phases during a single phase to earth fault in the
connected grid. This voltage will rarely exceed 1.3 per unit in systems with solidly earthed neutral. A setting
of 1.5 times rated reactor current should normally be sufficient to override these temporary over voltages.
Phase overcurrent protection - Instantaneous overcurrent (50)
The overcurrent threshold for the instantaneous overcurrent function (50) must set above the shunt reactor
inrush currents. A typical conservative setting for analog instantaneous overcurrent protection is 6 times
rated current of the shunt reactor. For modern numerical protections using Discrete Fourier Filter (DFF) and
thereby only extracts the RMS value of the fundamental component a more sensitive setting is possible
based on manufacturers recommendation. This filter effectively suppresses the DC component and higher
harmonic components in the input quantity. For instance and according to some relay manufacturers, an
adequate setting of 2.5 times rated current with a time delay of 0.1s for this function could be applied to the
(50) function of shunt reactors.
Earth fault overcurrent protection

During a phase to ground fault located close to the neutral point, the currents on the terminal side will be
practically the same as before the fault. However due to the so called transformer effect the current in the
common neutral point (and in neutral side of the affected phase) will increase to a large magnitude. This
phase to earth fault would therefore be easily detected by an earth fault protection located on the neutral
point side but not by the terminal side earth fault protection. During a phase to earth fault on the terminal side
of the reactor (i.e. on bushing), the fault current measured on the terminal side will have a large magnitude
while the earth fault current in reactor neutral point will have a moderate magnitude. In this situation, one
of the reactor windings is practically short-circuited. The resulting unbalance current that appears in the
neutral point will typically have a value of approximately 1 per unit. This phase to earth fault would therefore
be easily detected both by an earth fault protection located on the terminal side and also by the earth fault
protection located on the neutral side. If both protections are initiated, then the location of the fault will be
easier to determine.
Earth fault overcurrent protection located on the neutral side is the preferred method for the following
reasons:
• It provides adequate and sensitive ground fault detection for faults near the neutral side of the
reactor.
• It provides adequate back up coverage in case of failure of primary protection (differential).

The use of 51N function on both terminal side and the neutral side of the reactor will enhance the protection
application for full fault coverage of the reactor winding and fault location.
The earth fault overcurrent protection is affected by shunt reactor inrush currents. If the relay is set too
sensitive, it might yield to undesired tripping under such conditions. Thus the relay pickup current and
associated time delay element must be accounted for by setting engineers. In addition, earth fault overcurrent
protection connected to the terminal side may experience CT saturation during shunt reactor energization
and adequate settings should be applied to avoid false tripping. This issue does not apply to the Earth fault
overcurrent protection connected to the common neutral side of the reactor. Nowadays, modern numerical
protection offer unprecedented techniques and solutions with various algorithms to detect 2nd harmonic
currents and offer the possibility to program logical equations to block and unblock various protection devices
according to a specific philosophy. For example, the 51G on the neutral side winding of the reactor may
be set to detect 2nd harmonic energization current and block the 51N provided on the terminal side of the
reactor. These new applications however have to be validated through proper relay simulation tests in the
laboratory.
Because the time delayed earth fault protection can be initiated for external phase to earth faults on the
system, it is important to use sufficient time delays to override the external faults.
11.10 Engineering guidelines
No duplication of reactor protections needs to be done but the protections and monitors shall be divided in
two group viz. Group A and Group B.
Given below one possible way of grouping these protections
Group A Group B
Reactor differential relay Buchholz trip
Reactor back up impedance relay Reactor REF relay
Oil temperature trip Winding temperature trip
Pressure relief trip Oil level high/low trip Fire protection trip
Buchholz alarm / Wind. Temp alarm Oil Temp. alarm
Group A and Group B. protection shall be connected to separate DC Source/separately fused supplies and
DC sources shall be supervised
Both Group A and Group B protections shall give out trip impulses to main breaker and also block auto
reclosing where they are directly connected to the line they should also trip remote end CB.
It may be noted that the connection of Restricted Earth Fault protection on the neutral side shall be from
residually connected bushing CTs (in case of bus reactor) or from the ground side CT in the neutral grounding
reactor (for line shunt reactor). The latter is to ensure that the protection covers the neutral earthing reactor
as well in the protected zone.
The impedance or overcurrent backup protection may not be able to detect inter-turn fault in the reactor, for
which the buchholz may be the only answer, unless the number of turns involved is very high. Manufacturers
of reactor and relays may be consulted in this regard.
In case, Reactor is provided with redundant/ duplicated trip contacts for Buchholz and PRD relay, then
redundant contacts should be wired to both Group-A and Group-B protection.
Some important application notes connected with the reactor are listed below.
• It may be noted that the connection of Restricted Earth Fault protection on the neutral side shall be
from residually connected bushing CTs (in case of bus reactor) or from the ground side CT in the
neutral grounding reactor (for line shunt reactor). The latter is to ensure that the protection covers
the neutral earthing reactor as well in the protected zone.
• The impedance or overcurrent backup protection may not be able to detect inter-turn fault in the reactor,
for which the Buchholz protection may be the only answer, unless the number of turns involved is
very high. Manufacturers of reactor and relays may be consulted in this regard.
• Buchholz and sudden pressure relays provide an excellent example of the classical protection dilemma
of dependability versus security. They are dependable for internal reactor faults but have shown a
tendency to operate undesired if exposed to vibrations. Design improvements have reduced their
tendency to mal operate but have not totally eliminated the security problem. If there is repeatedly
problems with mal operation of the sudden pressure relay, installation of a newer types of relays
(immunity to vibrations) may be solution to the problem. The Buchholz relay has a significant higher
security rating than the sudden pressure relays and this type should be the preferred solution for
conservator type shunt reactors.
• Unwanted trippings of Buchholz, PRD or sudden pressure relays are also attributable to ingress of
moisture in their terminal boxes during rainy season. Adequate sealing measures must be taken to
avoid such spurious trippings.
Reference
1. CIGRÉ B5-WG37: “Protection, Monitoring and Control of Shunt Reactors” 2013.

Chapter 12
Protection of Busbar
Busbars are the node points of a power system at which large amounts of electrical energy are concentrated.
Some busbars have often been left without dedicated local protection, since the occurrence of faults in
the bus-zone is commonly considered as being of low probability, and the fear of unwanted operation has
outweighed its advantages. The unplanned or nonselective outage of the busbar can lead to the loss of
power supply to a widespread area. The effect of a fault within a buszone can however be potentially far
more damaging than faults on other items of primary plant. The failure to clear a bus fault can lead to outage
of a complete substation, considerable equipment damage and system instability.
In the case where no local busbar protection is employed, bus-zone faults would be cleared by the back-up
or system protection. In some cases this may indeed suffice, e.g., at lower voltage levels, but for higher
transmission voltages where security of supply is of paramount importance and fault current levels are high,
the non-discriminative fault clearance and relatively slow clearance times would be unacceptable.
Where local busbar protection is employed, the zone of protection will include switching devices (bus selector,
bussection disconnectors, circuit breakers, grounding switches), parts of the CT on the bus side of the core
used for busbar protection, other connecting parts of the bus, in addition to the busbars themselves.
Busbar protection is expected to detect and clear all shunt faults i.e., phase to ground and phase-to-phase
faults within the assigned busbar zone bounded by the respective locations of the current transformers.
Faults can be caused by the failure of an item of primary system plant or human error, e.g., a forgotten
grounding clamp following maintenance work. Flashover due to external causes, e.g., dropping of wires by
birds, electrocution of birds and monkeys are also major causes for bus faults.
The protection is not normally required to clear open phase faults, i.e., an unbalance in the phase impedances
usually caused by the interruption of one or two phases. Detection and clearance of such series faults are
to be done by protections provided for other power system objects.
Although a number of methods of busbar protection are available, all are unit protection schemes. Back-up
protection is provided either by duplicating the local scheme, thereby preserving fast fault clearance, or by
reverse zone of line distance protection, or by time delayed distance relays in the remote stations, or by
directional back-up over current relays.
Four key issues (reliability, operability, maintainability and cost) need to be addressed while designing a
substation and selecting a busbar configuration. At EHV/HV levels, solutions that provide a high degree of
reliability can be justified. The modern busbar protection system are capable of dynamically replicating the
bus topology and also has design flexibility to protect all existing busbar arrangements. It also offers flexibility
in engineering, testing, commissioning and maintenance of the scheme and substation.
Some of the factors considered while designing the busbar protections scheme are security, dependability,
speed, sensitivity, selectivity, flexibility and cost of the scheme.
All the above requirements are interrelated; therefore, it is not possible to satisfy one without affecting the
other. The design solution should meet the requirements that correspond to the importance of the substation
within the network.
12.1 Typical busbar arrangements
Substations are either air-insulated (AIS) or metal-clad. Metal-clad switchgear is nowadays mainly gas-
insulated (GIS) using SF6, as the insulating medium. There are various types of substation construction. This
depends partly on the busbar arrangement as well as other specific considerations such as the available
space. The busbars in air-insulated substations are either made from ACSR conductors or for higher current
levels from tubing made of aluminum but rarely copper. SF6 gas-insulated switchgear may house all three
phases together in a three-phase enclosure, or for voltage levels above, typically 132 kV, separately in
single-phase enclosures. In the latter case the faults in the bus-zone can only be ground faults.
Many different busbar arrangements have evolved over the years, but the most common bus bar arrangements
are as follows:
• Single bus - single breaker (also with bus-section circuit breakers)
• Double bus - single breaker
• Double bus - double breaker
• Main and transfer bus (one or several main buses)
• Double bus - one and a half breaker
• Ring busbar / four-breaker mesh
12.2 Location of current transformers
The location of a current transformer in relation to its circuit breakers in a station partly determines the limits
of protected zone and all the breakers falling within this zone must be tripped in the event of a fault.
Usually the CT is located after the circuit breaker in order to cover faults in the breaker and the bay equipment
by the busbar protection. In this case (Fig. 12.1a),faults between the CT and the circuit breaker will be detected
by the busbar protection. After tripping of the circuit breakers associated with the measurement zone, the
fault will continue to be fed from the remote end of the feeder. Further tripping is required in order to clear
the fault. Usually this is through circuit breaker failure protection relay (LBB) initiating remote trip, or in its
absence by back-up protection. In the case of a line feeder, for example, a transfer trip command is sent to
the remote station to open the circuit breaker at that end of the line and to block autore closure.
If the circuit breaker is situated on the feeder side of current transformers (Fig. 12.1b), faults between the
breaker and CT will be outside the measurement zone of the busbar protection. Such a fault must therefore
be cleared by the protection system of that feeder and appropriate arrangements to trip the other circuit
breakers connected to the busbar usually by a circuit breaker-failure protection relay or a relay of similar
design.
Fig. 12.1 : Location of Current transformer in feeder

Protection of Busbar 155
In double busbars scheme with bus coupler, the CTs are located on both sides of bus section breaker, which
facilitates overlapping of the two zones of protection and avoid blind zone. However it is also common to
provide CT on only one side of the circuit breaker to reduce costs. In such cases, the fault between the CT
and the circuit breaker will have to be cleared by breaker fail relay. Modern busbar relays can extend the
differential zone up to CB by including or excluding the bus coupler CT depending upon the circuit breaker
status. In these relays, the fault between the CT and the circuit breaker will be cleared by bus differential
function.
12.3 Failure statistics
The probability of busbar faults is generally low. Detailed failure rate statistics for faults on busbar are usually
not kept by the utilities. The worldwide survey shows that dependability figures vary from 92 to 99.8% and
security figures from 84 to 91.8%. The failure rates range from 0.5 to 2 faults per 100 bays per year.
12.4 Busbar protection requirements
A busbar protection must be capable of clearing all phase to ground faults, and also phase-to-phase faults
where they can occur. Due to the fact that the short-circuit levels of busbar are often very high, busbar fault
clearance times are required to be as short as possible. In many cases the required fault clearance times
are always kept at the minimum, rather determined by the fault withstand capability and by considering the
stability requirements.
In SF6 gas insulated switchgear; there is the possibility that an uncleared arcing fault could cause a rupture
(burn-through) of the enclosure wall. This happens once the arc becomes stationary. The total “burn-through
time’ is influenced by a number of factors, e.g., how long the arc was mobile before becoming stationary,
fault current, gas pressure, and thermal diffusivity of the wall material.
The protection must remain stable during through-faults (outside the bus-zone) especially in the case of CT
saturation and switching operations. Due to the high ratio of through-faults to bus faults, busbar protection
is called upon to stabilize many more times than it has to operate.
Busbars are divided into zones, the boundaries of which are defined by the disconnectors or circuit breakers
and their associated current transformers. Each zone therefore requires an independent zone of protection
so that fault clearance is selective, that is, only those circuit breakers defining the boundary of the protected
zone are tripped. With the exception of simple busbar configuration (single busbarand breaker and a half),
these boundaries are not fixed and rather depend on the position of the bus selection isolators. For this
reason, the busbar protection must possess an accurate replica of the station’s primary bus configuration.
Information regarding the position of bus selection isolators is taken from their auxiliary contacts and used
in a logic, which ensures that the correct currents are combined for each zone of measurement and the
correct breakers are tripped in case of a fault in that zone.
To avoid malfunctioning of the scheme during on-load circuit switching from one bus to another, the isolator
auxiliary contacts should ‘make before’ and ‘break after’ the main contacts during the isolator making and
breaking operation respectively. The position of the isolator making must be stored in case auxiliary contact
voltage supply fails. Such arrangements require very sturdy and reliable isolator contacts. Now with numerical
relays replica of such auxiliary contacts can be provided in the scheme more accurately and reliably.
For busbars of strategic importance at 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV levels, a dedicated busbar protection
is provided. These busbar protection schemes can generally be categorized as high-impedance (in older
version), low-impedance and moderate-impedance (effectively a combination of plain circulating current and
biased differential scheme) and now numerical bu bar protection schemes.
12.5.1 High Impedance Circulating Current Protection
High impedance busbar protection is widely used due to its simplicity and inherent through-fault stability
during CT saturation. In the case of CT saturation caused by high through-fault current, the CT secondary
impedance is reduced to the resistance of its secondary winding. The measuring circuit comprises a high
impedance-stabilizing resistor connected across the circulating current arrangement of all the CT’s in parallel.
The value of the stabilizing resistor is chosen such that the voltage drop across the relay circuit is insufficient
to operate the relay for faults outside the protection zone.
If CT secondary switching is applied, a check zone measurement connected to separate CT cores is usually
added. The check zone measurement is an overall measurement taken over the whole substation and is, by
definition, independent of the isolator’s positions and auxiliary contacts. A trip command is only given when
both discriminating and check systems operate. Sometimes the relay setting is increased to value higher
than the heaviest loaded feeder current and check zone is dispensed with. It should be noted that this would
raise the minimum operating current.
An advantage of this scheme over low and moderate impedance scheme is that the primary operating current
can be set much below the circuit load resulting in a high sensitivity.
Disadvantages of this scheme are that the relay setting must take the CT secondary winding and wiring
resistances into account, which must be kept low, and the CT knee point voltage must be known and is
generally required to be high. All CT’s should have the same ratio (no turn correction) and should be of the
same type and performance (low stray impedance and of class PS or TPS). Furthermore, the stability of the
protection is dependent on the fault level.
For the above reasons high-impedance busbar protection is not recommended when CT ratios are different
and for complex busbar arrangements.
12.5.2 Moderate Impedance Protection
Many of the limitations of high impedance protection can be overcome using moderate impedance protection
(or stabilized high-impedance scheme), which is a combination of the normal high-impedance and stabilized
differential schemes. Although heavy through fault currents may produce a differential current that exceeds
the differential pick-up setting, the stabilizing current prevents tripping. The requirements made on the primary
CT’s are subsequently less stringent than for a simple high-impedance scheme.
12.5.3 Low Impedance Protection
Low impedance protection is the general name given to those schemes that do not employ a stabilizing
resistor, rather utilize current directly from the CT’s. A number of different measurement principles are
employed in low impedance schemes. These are described under 12.5.4 and 12.5.5 below.
12.5.4 Current Differential Protection
This type of protection is also known as current comparison with current restraint, biased or percentage
differential relaying. The operating current is the phasor sum of all feeder currents and the restraint current
is the arithmetic sum. A trip command is given when the operating current is greater than its pick-up level
(calculated from the minimum busbar short-circuit current) and the stabilizing factor, the ratio of operating
current to restraint current, exceeds its setting (typically 0.7 to 0.9).
In the case where CT ratios differ, the currents have to be balanced by using interposing CT’s. In newer
numerical protection equipment this is accomplished internally.
Depending upon the architecture, the low impedance busbar scheme are categorized into,
• Centralized busbar protection scheme
• Decentralized (Distributed) busbar protection scheme
12.5.4.1 Centralized Busbar Scheme
The architecture of centralized busbar solution is as shown in Figure 12.2.
In a numerical centralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired up to the
bus bar protection panel. The tripping is routed from busbar panel to respective feeder protection panel.
Fig. 12.2 : Centralised busbar protection scheme
The main benefits of centralized busbar scheme are:
• Reduction in cost
• Reduction in space
• Less hardware required
Followings are some of the disadvantages of centralized bus-bar solution
• Increased cabling (Not recommended for Kiosk based substation architecture)
• Difficult to test, upgrade and maintain once the substation is energized
• Individual bay cannot be taken out of service
• Limited number of zones
12.5.4.2 Decentralized Busbar Scheme
The architecture for centralized scheme is as shown in Figure 12.3.

Fig. 12.3 : Decentralised busbar protection scheme
In a numerical decentralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired up to the
respective bay units installed in respective feeder protection panel. The tripping of central unit (for bus fault)
is routed through fiber optic panel to respective feeder protection panel.
Following are some of the advantages of decentralized busbar solution:
• Reduction in inter panel wiring (simple engineering)
• Easy to test, upgrade and maintain, even if the substation is in energized condition
• Individual bay can be taken out of service
• Support higher numbers of differential zones
The disadvantages of decentralized schemes are:
• High cost
• More hardware involved (More no of IED’s)
Many a times, periodic testing of busbar protection to check the healthiness of the relay and associated
circuits is difficult since shutdowns of the substations or busbars are not easily available. Thus the problems,
if any, in the protection or in the associated circuits, gets discovered only when a fault takes place and either
the relay fails to operate or has operated inadvertently. With modern numerical distributed busbar relays, the
task of testing and maintenance gets simplified considerably and these may be preferred for this reason.
Either of the schemes can be selected considering importance of substation within network and the layout
of the substation.
The measuring principle for phase comparison protection is based on the assumption that the feeder currents
are phase coincident during a busbar fault. The duration of phase coincidence of all feeder currents is
checked for positive and negative half-cycles. In addition the non-coincidence is used as a blocking signal.
The differential current can also be included in the phase comparison, thereby further improving stability.
The pick-up level is set above the load current.
12.5.6 Gas Density Detectors in GIS Switchgear
Gas density detectors are normally used to activate alarm under low gas density conditions. These are used
for protection purpose by providing several levels of detecting SF6 gas density. Stage 1 gives alarm when
SF6 pressure comes below a certain value. When gas density falls further (Stage 2), it may not be possible
to extinguish an arc in the SF6 gas in the event of a fault. Therefore in such case a trip command is sent to
that circuit breaker. In stage 3 where the SF6 gas density is so low that it is unsafe even to trip the circuit
breaker, a trip signal (Zone Trip) is sent to the adjacent breakers and to the remote station (inter trip).
12.5.7 Supervision and Alarm Functions
The correct operation of busbar protection employed in complex busbar arrangements relies on the protection
having a faithful reproduction of the station configuration. If this is not the case, false tripping or unselective
tripping can occur.
For this reason, the position of the bus selectors is ideally given by the combination of two auxiliary contacts,
one reporting “isolator open’, the other “isolator closed’. For conventional busbar scheme, the voltage from
these two contacts were supervised by an auxiliary relay and a timer combination to ensure that an alarm is
raised if, for example, the isolator does not reach its end position or a wire from the auxiliary contacts becomes
detached. In modern numerical relays the same functionality can be achieved by the logic implemented
inside device. In the case of such an alarm, no further switching should take place, since this could under
some circumstances lead to false tripping. This alarm is often used to block the protection.
Protection schemes using differential current as the operating quantity also use it to supervise the current
transformer secondary circuits. The corresponding alarm can also be used to block the protection.
In high impedance schemes, a low set voltage relay with time delay, connected across the main relay is
used to detect a CT open circuit. It is made to short the secondary bus wires, with a time delay to prevent
malfunction of the total scheme during through faults. The defective zone relay alone cannot cause tripping
due to the presence of check zone relay, the contact of which is wired in series with the main zone relay.
The time delay set on this low set relay ensures that it does not give unwanted alarm in the event of an
internal fault.
12.6 Backup protection
It is possible to provide back-up protection of busbars by duplicating the dedicated protection or by using
elements of line protections like reverse zone of local distance protections or Zone 2 of remote end
protections.
12.6.1 Duplication of Local Busbar Protection
For substations of high strategic importance or where the bus arrangements are complex, the complete
bus bar protection can be fully duplicated. This is the preferred approach at bulk EHV transmission voltage
levels.
In cases where the burn-through time of SF6 switchgear is considered to be shorter than the tripping time
from remote back-up protection, then also the local busbar protection must be duplicated.
Duplicated protections invariably employ separate DC circuits and CT cores. They send trip impulses to
separate trip coils and use separate isolator position auxiliary contacts. Cross tripping of both trip coils is
also done.
11.6.2 System Protection
Where clearance time and selectivity requirements are not critical, busbars can be protected by overreaching
(Zone-2) element of distance relays in the remote stations. Tripping is therefore at the remote stations,
thereby disconnecting more transmission lines and loads than is actually necessary, and tripping times are
typically from 350 to 650 ms.
For the majority of substations, especially those at lower transmission voltage levels, back-up protection is
provided by the system protection, i.e., remote-end distance relay overreaching elements (second zone).
A reverse looking element of the local distance relay may be arranged to provide substation local back-up
protection.
Where the main busbar protection is provided by the second zone elements of distance relays (i.e., when
no busbar protection is provided), back-up protection can be considered as being provided by the 3rd zone
elements of distance relays in the more remote stations.
Based on the discussions included in several paragraphs of this chapter some important application aspects
connected with busbar protection and some recommendations have been brought out, and these should be
considered. A few of these are brought out below.
• If left uncleared, the effect of a fault in a bus-zone can be potentially far more damaging than faults
on other items of primary plant. The unplanned or unselective outage of the busbar can lead to the
loss of power supply to a widespread area. The failure to clear a bus fault can lead to considerable
equipment damage and system instability. Therefore busbar protection has an important role to
play.
• A dedicated busbar protection shall be provided where security of supply is of paramount importance,
fault current levels are high, and the non-discriminative fault clearance and relatively slow clearance
times are unacceptable.
• Busbar protections being of unit type, back-up protection is provided either by duplicating the busbar
protection, or by reverse zone of line distance protection, or by time delayed distance relays in the
remote stations, or by directional back-up over current relays.
• Where the main busbar protection is provided by the second zone elements of distance relays (i.e.,
when no busbar protection is provided), back-up protection can be considered as being provided by
the 3rd zone elements of distance relays in the more remote stations.
• For substations of high strategic importance or where the bus arrangements are complex, the complete
busbar protection should be fully duplicated.
• In cases where the burn-through time of SF6 switchgear is considered to be shorter than the tripping
time from remote back-up protection, then also the busbar protection must be duplicated.
• Duplication of busbar protection is recommended in all substations where failure to operate may cause
disturbances in the grid. For the 400 kV and 765 kV substations that fall in this class of substations,
duplication of busbar protection is strongly recommended. It may be noted that even those 400 kV
substations, which do not fall in this category initially, may become critical in future as the system
grows. In view of constraints in adding a second busbar protection at a later date, duplication may
be considered desirable from the initial stage itself. In view of continuing thrust on station automation
and SCADA application, the preference towards Numerical Protection schemes for all the elements
of a substation becomes quite beneficial.
• High impedance busbar protection is not recommended when CT ratios are different and for complex
busbar arrangements.
• Many a times, periodic testing of busbar protection to check the healthiness of the relay and associated
circuits is difficult since shutdowns of the substations or busbars are not easily available. Thus the
problems, if any, in the protection or in the associated circuits, gets discovered only when a fault takes
place and either the relay fails to operate or has operated inadvertently. With modern numerical relays
where self-supervision and on line monitoring of the relay and associated circuits are possible, the
task of testing gets simplified considerably and these may be preferred for this reason. The application
of Numerical Relays for busbar protection therefore assumes a special status.
12.8 Requirements and setting guide lines
Busbar protection is required to be provided for high speed sensitive clearance of bus bar faults by tripping
all the circuit breakers connected to faulty bus. Recommendations for providing busbar protection at different
voltage levels are as follows:
Busbar protection must be provided in all new 765 kV, 400 kV , 220 kV and 132 kV substations as well as
generating station switchyards.
Requirements
Each Busbar protection shall have following features.

• It shall be of 3 phase type and operate selectively for each busbar section.
• It shall operate on differential principle and provide independent zones of protection foreach bus.
• It shall provide zone and Phase indication.
• It shall be stable for through fault conditions upto maximum 31.5/40/50/63kA fault level as
specified.
• For applications where bus differential protection sensitivity has to be set below load current, as may
be a case with use of concrete structures, it is recommended that a separate check zone of high
impedance type is provided.
• It shall incorporate continuous supervision for C,T. secondaries against any possible open circuits.
In case of detection of any open circuiting of C.T. secondaries, after a time delay, the affected zone
of protection shall be rendered inoperative and an alarm initiated.
• It shall include D.C. supply supervision
• It shall include adequate number of high speed tripping relays.
• Whenever C.T. switching is involved the scheme shall include necessary C.T. switchingrelays and
have provision for C.T. switching incomplete alarm.
• It shall include IN/OUT switching facility for each Bus Bar zone.
Setting Guide Lines
The threshold for pickup and tripping should be set below the minimum expected fault current value with
a safety margin, and if possible above the maximum load defined either by the CT with maximum primary
rating or alternatively maximum expected load current in any of the bays.
The gradient of the slope of the stabilizing factor should be set to avoid spurious tripping on external faults.
A close-up external fault would cause the CT in the faulted feeder bay to carryall the fault current, while the
infeeding bays only carry a fraction of this current. A high stabilization setting provides for more stability against
faults outside the protected zone, but reduces the sensitivity for detecting internal busbar faults. Thus, the
gradient should be set as low as possible and as high as necessary. The slope is manufacturer-dependent
because they have different algorithms and ways of defining this factor. Thus, refer to the manufacturer’s
manual for setting recommendations. The criterion for an internal busbar fault could be written as Id > k x
Is, where Id is the differential current, Is the stabilizing current and ‘k’ is theslope which is manufacturer-
dependent factoror as recommended by relay manufacturer.
The busbar protection relays have a feature for detecting open CTs. The logic detects the instant in time when
a CT already connected is open-circuited. The action is to block the affected phase, and produce an alarm.
The user has to set a value for the minimum expected through-load current drop for open CT detection. This
level should be set as high as necessary to prevent spurious blocking due to the false differential current
caused by CT errors, but as low as necessary to detect the open circuit condition for the smallest loaded
CT connected to the differential zone. If the minimum load current is not available or if the load current is
too small when compared to the differential current present due to CT errors from the use of different types
of CT in the same substation, this value may be settled in between 20%-80% of the rated primary current
of the CT with the smallest ratio.
Considering the above the following are recommended.
Busbar differential protection should have overall sensitivity above heaviest loaded feeder current unless a
separate check zone has been provided. In cases where fault currents are expected to be low as brought
outunder specification requirements above, the protection should be sensitive enough to take care of such
expected low fault current. If check zone is provided, Slope setting of Check zone shall be set lower than
the Slope setting of Main zones.
In case of voltage operated high impedance type protection, the voltage setting should be above expected
voltage developed across the relay during maximum through fault current condition. In case of current
operated relays for stability under through fault condition, external resistance is to be set such that voltage
developed across relay and resistance combination is below the voltage required for forcing required relay
operating current.
C.T. wire supervision relays should be set with a sensitivity such that they can detect C.T. secondary open
circuit even in case of least loaded feeder.
• The D.C. supply for busbar protection shall be from an independent feeder.
• Faults lying between C.B and C.T. shall be cleared from one side by opening of C.B. on busbar
protection operation. However clearing of fault from other side shall be through breaker failure
protection/back up protection.
• 3 Phase trip relays shall be provided for each circuit breaker which shall also initiate Breaker failure
relay of concerned breaker.
• Length of secondary leads should be kept as minimum as possible. Where lead runs are excessive,
an increase in wire size or use of parallel conductors are means to reduce lead resistance.
• In case of existing substations where current transformers are of different ratios, biased type differential
protection is recommended.
• Numerical relay should be employed for Bus Bar protection which have self-diagnostic features.
Failure of any Bus bar protection module, communication link, DC supplies shall be alarmed.
Reference
1. Cigré B5-WG16: “Modern techniques for protecting Busbars in HV networks” 2010.

Chapter 13
LOCAL BREAKER BACKUP PROTECTION
Circuit breakers are primarily used to interrupt fault currents. In this chapter, the reliability of circuit breakers,
the practice of duplicating the trip coils, and the need for circuit breaker failure protection are discussed.
A circuit breaker is required to clear the faults in the system or remove the abnormalities by isolating the
defective system. Circuit breakers interrupt the fault current when it receives a trip command from the
protection system that has detected the abnormality or power system fault. But the circuit breaker is also
vulnerable to faults and can fail to open and break the fault current. These can then cause abnormalities in
the power system.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between two sets of reliability data for circuit breakers. Firstly, the
number of power system faults that a circuit breaker clears and secondly, the probability when the circuit
breaker fails to clear the fault or fails to follow the command to open. These two aspects are often put
together.
13.1 Types of circuit breakers
The circuit breaker type is identified by the type of dielectric media used to interrupt the fault or load current.
The types of dielectric used for the EHV circuit breakers are Oil, Air and SF6 gas. Vacuum circuit breakers
are used mainly in medium voltage applications. From the construction point of view, both for air insulated
substations (AIS) and gas insulated substations (GIS), the various types of circuit breakers in service are dead
tank circuit breakers and live tank circuit breakers. SF6 circuit breakers are of the most recent technology
and have been used extensively since 1975 in the transmission networks. Almost all the breakers in Indian
EHV transmission system are SF6 circuit breakers.
The operating mechanisms used are either pneumatic, hydraulic, spring charged or their combinations.
13.2 Requirements of circuit breakers
For protection purposes the following requirements are relevant:
• Operating time
• Breaking capacity
• Stuck breaker probability
• Operating sequence /duty cycle
For the design purpose, the following requirements are relevant:
• Circuit breaker trip coil burden
• Circuit breaker auxiliary switch contacts to give position indications to the protection system
13.3 Reliability of circuit breakers
It is important to know the failure rate for switching devices because uncleared faults, due to failure of circuit
breaker to follow the trip command, would cause extensive damage in the power system. It is also important
to know the failure rate probability of a circuit breaker to fail to open (stuck breaker) and interrupt the fault
current.
Table 13.1 shows probabilities of circuit breaker not opening on command or not breaking the current, during
manual or automatic opening to perform switching or to remove a fault. This could be considered as stuck
breaker probability. The probability has decreased from 0.95 to 0.24 stuck breakers per 10,000 commands
between 1974-77 and 1988-91. This shows that as technology of breaking has improved, the probability of
stuck breaker has come down.
Table 13.1 : CIGRE WG 13.06 survey data on probability of circuit breaker

to open or break carried out in 1988-91
System Voltage Probability of failure to open or break per 10000 commands

[kV] First Enquiry Second Enquiry
63-100 0.18 0.077
100-200 0.93 0.204
200-300 1.49 0.300
300-500 3.80 0.637
500 9.95 0.842
All Voltages 0.95 0.240
The CIGRE surveys indicate that the stuck breaker probability is quite low and the improvement in designs
of operating mechanism and devices would in future further improve the statistics of stuck breakers.
It is recommended that the utilities maintain the circuit breaker performance data through appropriate fault
reporting procedure and maintenance of records of circuit breaker operation. This will be useful in planning
back-up protection and other actions pertaining to circuit breaker performance and maintenance.
13.4 Duplication of trip coils
Most modern EHV systems have duplicated main protections as a standard feature and the requirement of
circuit breakers to have two trip coils. The speed of operation of circuit breaker will dictate the wattage of trip
coils and type of trip coil arrangements. A larger wattage may not be desirable from security point of view.
The trip current to the trip coil will be disconnected by the reliable auxiliary contact of circuit breakers.
13.5 Circuit breaker failure protection
There is always a risk, however small, that a circuit breaker may fail to obey the trip command given by
protective relays. It would however be possible to assure successful operation of the circuit breaker to
interrupt the load or fault current, by the duplicate trip coil operation.
It is to be seen that in the entire substation all the substation elements except the circuit breaker could be
duplicated to ensure successful operation through back-up operation provided by the redundant system.
Unfortunately circuit breaker is the only item of equipment that does not have any similar element to act as
a back-up to interrupt the fault current in the event of failure of main circuit breaker. As such breaker back-up
is provided by other means through the use of the local breaker back-up protection to give trip commands
to adjacent breakers and breakers at the remote end. This is usually done through trip logic provided in
bus bar protection, which trips all the breakers connected on the bus in the substation to which the stuck
breaker is connected. Circuit breaker failure protection is used to detect when circuit breakers fail to open or
break. The breaker failure protection belongs to the back-up protections because it needs some time delay
to detect a breaker failure and is therefore a delayed protection.
The probability of breaker failure is no doubt quite low. Only about 0.01% of all normal switching operations
result in a breaker failure. About 0.1% of all fault clearance operations may result in a breaker failure. This
means that the breaker failure must possess extreme security to avoid mal-operation when the breaker
operates correctly. At the same time, the breaker failure protection must be very fast to reduce the back-
Local Breaker Backup Protection 165
up fault clearance time. Finally, the breaker failure protection must be very dependable to clear the fault in
case of breaker failure. Several grid failures in India and abroad leading to blackouts have taken place due
to malfunctioning of Local breaker back-up protection.
13.5.1 The Basic Principle
The block diagram shown in Figure 13.1, gives the flow diagram for breaker failure protection. Any circuit
breaker failure protection works as follows. The main protection issues a single-pole or three-pole trip
command to one or more circuit breakers. At the same time, the main protection starts and primes the
associated circuit-breaker failure protection system in one or more phases in all these circuit breakers. At
this point, the main protection issues a trip command to the breaker controlling the faulty circuit. In the event
of stuck breaker not following the command, the LBB relay already primed with fault current still flowing,
issues a command to the trip relay logic in bus bar protection for removing all the breakers on the bus. There
is one fault detector per phase. A fault detector comprises a single-phase over current relay and may use
information from the auxiliary contacts of the breaker. The fault detector may use several criteria to detect
a breaker failure. The most obvious criterion is that the phase current is higher than a predetermined value.
There is one timer per phase or a common timer for the three phases in each breaker failure protection. The
timer starts when the main protection operates and starts the breaker failure protection. The setting of the
timer should allow the breaker to open and interrupt the fault current. The breaker failure protection operates
when the timer has operated and the fault detector has identified a breaker failure.
However, there could be a case of stuck breaker not being removed when the circuit current is quite low
and the LBB could not be primed. The operation of a Buchholz relay when a faulty transformer is energized
from one terminal only is one such example. In such case the current may be far below the operating value
of the fault detector. Tripping of a generating unit from a reverse power relay is another case. The current
may be as low as 1% of rated current and well below the operating value of the fault detector. In such
cases the best option is that the fault detector should be provided with information from auxiliary contacts
of circuit breaker, in addition to the current criterion. This will help detect breaker-failures accompanied with
low currents. Information from auxiliary contacts of circuit breaker without any other criterion will not provide
reliable fault detection.
Fig. 13.1 : Flow diagram for breaker fail protection

It is recommended that for operation of Buchholz protection and Reverse power protection additional criteria
from breaker auxiliary contact be provided.
13.5.2 Setting of the Timer
The back-up fault clearance time depends on the setting of the timer in the breaker failure protection and
the operating time of the back-up circuit breakers. The setting of the timer must be longer than the total
interruption time of the main breaker plus the decision time for the fault detector. Figure 13.2 illustrates the
makeup of the total back-up fault clearance time.
One may decide to plan and operate the power system to avoid transient instability at shunt faults with a
stuck breaker. The back-up fault clearance time then determines the transfer capability of the transmission
network. This means that it is very important to have a fast breaker failure protection.
It is desirable that the back-up fault clearance time is shorter than the operating time of the remote protections.
This is more or less a requirement in case of multi bus bar substations. One would lose the advantages with
the expensive bus bar configuration if Zone-2 of the distance protection in the remote substations operates
faster than the breaker failure
It is also possible to use one delay for single-phase faults and a shorter delay for multi-phase faults. This
is done to avoid transient instability at multi-phase faults in combination with a stuck breaker. The critical
fault clearance time is much longer for single-phase faults than for multi-phase faults. One utility who have
adopted this practice, allow bus tripping in the event of breaker fail, in 120 ms for multi-phase faults and in
240 ms for ground faults.
For single-phase faults, single-pole tripping and autoreclosing as well as three-pole tripping and autoreclosing
are practiced by utilities in India. It should be noted that the use of single-pole tripping and reclosing gives
higher value of critical fault clearance time in comparison with the use of three-pole tripping and reclosing on
single-phase faults. It may however be noted that the dead time of high speed single phase auto-reclosure
will be of the order of 1 to 1.5 second in order to ensure successful de-ionisation of secondary arc in the
event of multiple lightning strokes on the line.
Fig. 13.2 : Total Back-up fault clearance time
13.5.3 Fault Detector
It is necessary to use a fault detector with short and consistent decision time to obtain a short back-up fault
clearance time.
The main requirements upon the fault detector are as follows.
The fault detector must have :
• A very high security

• A short and consistent operating time
• A high pick up to drop off ratio
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
The fault detector is, therefore, the most important part of the breaker failure protection. The fault detector
must satisfy stringent requirements under very adverse conditions. They include: fault current with large DC
offset and saturated current transformers.
Usually, the fault detector uses an instantaneous over current relay. It is, however, not necessary that the
over current relay distinguishes between fault current and load current. This is the task of the main protection
and it controls the starting of the breaker failure protection. The over current relay checks whether current
is flowing on the line when the timer has operated.
In most cases the auxiliary energizing quantity, the DC voltage, is applied to the over current relay when the
main protection has started the breaker failure protection. The circuit breaker will fail to operate or break if
this current relay has not reset.
The current detector should have short reset time of the order of 3 to 4 ms.The reset time can be much
longer when a saturated current transformer energizes the over current relay. The secondary current of the
current transformer will not drop to zero immediately when the circuit breaker interrupts the primary current.
The current transformer generates a DC current when the flux decays from the saturation flux to the remnant
flux. Further the current transformer can go in to saturation and this may affect the operating time of the
breaker failure relay due to pick up and drop off of current relays in the presence of saturated current wave
forms. The current relay should be designed to take care of these situations.
Thus the requirements of the current relay can be summarized as under
• A very high security,
• A short and consistent operating time
• Short resetting time
• High reset ratio
• Insensitive to the dc component in the secondary current
• Insensitive to CT saturation
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
Another requirement on the breaker failure relay is for lines employing single phase auto reclosing. The
current relays should be started on a single-phase basis from the trip relays for proper operation.
13.6 Tripping schemes
The breaker failure protection shall trip the adjacent breakers on the bus bars when it has detected that a
breaker has failed to open or break. The adjacent breakers must then open and interrupt the fault current
through the command of bus bar protection.
Human errors during preventive maintenance or fault tracing have resulted in unwanted operation of the
breaker failure protection. It is possible to design the breaker failure protection to have two steps.
• The first step re-trips its own circuit breaker
• The second step has a longer delay and trips the adjacent circuit breakers if the breaker failure
protection does not reset after the re-trip of the breaker.
This approach may decrease the risk for unwanted operation of the breaker failure protection during
maintenance and fault tracing. Therefore, it is recommended that utilities consider two-stage tripping, where
possibilities of such unwanted trippings are foreseen.
13.7 Adjacent circuit breakers
The breaker failure protection trips the adjacent breakers (other circuit breakers that are feeding in to the
fault) when it has detected that the circuit breaker has failed to open and break. In principle the adjacent
breakers are the circuit breakers contributing to the fault current. This would require a direct transfer trip from
the breaker failure protection to the circuit breaker at the remote end of a power line with a stuck breaker.
Often, the adjacent breakers are all circuit breakers connected to the same bus bar as the stuck breaker.
The set of adjacent breakers will depend on the bus bar configuration.
13.8 Trip coil and close coil supervision
Open circuiting of the trip coil or closing coil will result in failure of breaker to isolate the fault, or failures to
auto reclose subsequent to a transient fault. In view of this, continuous supervision of trip coils and closing
coils should be provided. Open circuit faults in the close or trip coil or discontinuity in the tripping or closing
circuit should give alarm for the operator. It is common practice to provide supervision of trip coils with
provision to get alarm in the EHV/UHV system. Closing coil supervision is not common except in cases
where remote control is adopted.
13.9 Supervision of operating mechanism
To ensure proper operation of circuit breaker, healthiness of operating mechanism is essential. Leakages
in joints, piping etc., can result in loss of operating pressure and may result in auto trip of the circuit breaker
or failure to trip may result in stuck breaker condition. Two levels of alarms are normally provided to monitor
pressure in case of hydraulic or pneumatic mechanism. In case of spring charged mechanisms spring charge
condition is monitored.
Failure of a circuit breaker to open when a trip signal has been given to it can lead to wide spread tripping.
Disconnecting the adjacent breakers using a breaker failure protection can contain the impact. Failure to
provide this protection can lead to considerable equipment damage and system instability. Therefore breaker
fail protection has an important role to play.
Based on the discussions included in several paragraphs of this chapter some important application aspects
connected with bus bar protection and some recommendations have been brought out, and these should
be considered. A few of these are brought out below.
• It is recommended that the utilities maintain the circuit breaker performance data, which will be
useful in planning back-up protection and other actions pertaining to circuit breaker performance and
maintenance.
• One may decide to plan and operate the power system to avoid transient instability at shunt faults with
a stuck breaker. The back-up fault clearance time then determines the power transfer capability of the
transmission network. This means that it is very important to have a fast breaker failure protection.
• It is desirable that the back-up fault clearance time is shorter than the operating time of the remote
protections. One would lose the advantages with the expensive bus bar configuration, if Zone-2 of the
distance protection in the remote substations operates faster than the breaker failure protection.
• It is possible to use one delay for single-phase faults and a shorter delay for multi-phase faults in the
breaker fail protection. This is done to avoid transient instability during multi-phase faults in combination
with a stuck breaker. The critical fault clearance time is much longer for single-phase faults than for
multi-phase faults.
• For operation of Buchholz protection, an additional criterion from breaker auxiliary contact may be
provided.
• Another requirement on the breaker failure relay is for lines employing single-phase auto reclosing. The
current relays should be started on a single-phase basis from the trip relays for proper operation.
• It is possible to design the breaker failure protection to have two steps. This approach may decrease
the risk for unwanted operation of the breaker failure protection during maintenance and fault tracing.
Therefore it is recommended utilities consider two-stage tripping to avoid any unwanted operation of
circuit breaker fail protection.
• Similar to Auto-recloser function, the Breaker failure relay/ function (BFR) is not duplicated in redundant
systems. The reason for this is however completely different. The Breaker failure function has
extremely high requirements on the security against unnecessary trippings and duplication will mean
an increased dependability but the security will decrease. As the risk of breaker failure statistically is
very low and the security aspect is more important. The BFR function is only provided in one of the
systems, normally in the Group A protection system. The practice of giving DC changeover to BFR
relay when a single BFR is used is common these days as it adds to the reliability & availability
• It is a good practice to use breaker failure protection provided in a separate hardware than the one
used for main protection, when a multifunction numerical protective relay is used for line, transformer,
reactor etc. This will help avoid losing breaker fail protection function when main protection fails. Thus
it can be separate stand-alone relay or provided in bay controller or as part of bus bar protection.
• For 132 kV substations too, it is recommended that breaker failure protection be provided since any
failure of circuit breaker to open may create wide spread disturbance.
Recommendations for providing LBB protection at different voltage levels are as follows:
In all new 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV substations as well as generating stations switchyards, it must be
provided for each circuit breaker. For existing switchyards, it is considered a must at 765 kV, 400 kV levels
and also at 220 kV switchyards having multiple feed. In case of radially fed 220 kV substations, provision
of LBB protection is desirable but not essential.
13.11.1 Requirements
LBB protection shall have following features:
• Have short operation and drop off times.
• Have three phase current elements with facility for phase wise initiation.
• Have current setting range such that these can be set at minimum 100 mA for line and 50 mA for
generators (for 1A C.T. Secondary).
• Have two timers with adjustable setting: timer t1 for retrip and timer t2 for backup trip
13.11.2 Setting Guide Lines
Current level detectors should be set as sensitive as the main protections. A general setting of 0.1 A is
recommended for Lines and Transformers. However, in case of existing schemes associated with lines
having single phase autoreclosure and where phase wise initiation is not available, it is recommended that
2ph + 1 E/F element may be used with phase element set above maximum expected load current while E/F
element may be set sensitively.
Current level detector for generators may be set at 50 mA (for 1A C.T. secondaries).
Breaker fail relay can give re trip. This means that a second trip signal is sent to the protected circuit breaker.
The re trip function can be used to increase the probability of operation of breaker , or it can be used to avoid
back up trip of many breakers in case of a false start or due to mistakes during relay maintenance and testing.
It is often required that the total fault clearing time is less than critical clearing time. This time is generally
dependent on the ability to maintain transient stability in case of faults close to a Generating Station.
Zone 2 time of the distance relay must be set higher than the time of operation of LBB relay to avoid any
risk of premature tripping of the surrounding remote end breakers of the lines by the distance relay back up
zone (Zone-2) in the event of a successful LBB relay trip.
Guidelines for settings of timer for re trip and for Back up trip are given below.
Timer t1: This is re trip time delay.
To avoid any risk of a premature tripping command by the breaker failure protection, the minimum setting
of the timer t1 must be longer than the maximum time required for a successful main protection trip plus the
maximum reset time of the overcurrent function.
Therefore minimum time for timer t1 should be greater than Maximum operating time of main circuit breaker
+ Fault detector reset time + Timer errors+ Safety margin.
Timer t2: This is backup trip time delay.
Minimum time for timer t2 should be greater than t1+ Maximum operating time of main circuit breaker + Fault
detector reset time + Timer errors+ Safety margin.
Only if the above guidelines for the minimum settings of the breaker failure timers are strictly observed, is
the correct operation of the breaker failure protection is assured.
Generally timer setting of 100 mS for retrip, and timer setting of 200 mS for back up trip has been found to
be adequate.
• The relay is separate for each breaker and is to be connected in the secondary circuit of the CTs
associated with that particular breaker. This CT secondary may be a separate core, if available.
Otherwise it shall be clubbed with Main-I or Main-II protection core.
• For line breakers, direct tripping of remote end breaker(s) should be arranged on operation of LBB
protection. For transformer breakers, direct tripping of breaker(s) on the other side of the transformer
should be arranged on operation of LBB protection.
• For lines employing single phase auto-reclosing, the LBB relays should be started on a single phase
basis from the trip relays. This is to avoid load currents in the healthy phases, after single phase
tripping, leading to unwanted operation of the breaker failure protection, since the current setting is
normally lower than the load current.
• It is considered a good practice to have DC circuits of Gr.A and Gr.B protections and LBB relay
independent. A separately fused supply should be taken for LBB relay in this case.
• LBB cannot operate without proper initiation. It is good practice to provide redundant trip output and
breaker fail input where other forms of redundancy does not exist. One way of doing this is by providing
separate aux. relay in parallel with trip unit and using contacts of these for LBB initiation.
• Separation should be maintained between protective relay and CB trip coil DC circuit so that short
circuit or blown fuse in the CB circuit will not prevent the protective relay from energising the LBB
scheme.
• In addition to other fault sensing relays the LBB relay should be initiated by Bus bar protection. The
LBB will send remote end direct trip and help avoid wide spread tripping.
• Whenever used in combination with bus bar protection scheme, tripping logic of the same shall be
used for LBB protection also.
• For breaker-fail relaying for low energy faults like buchholz operation, special considerations may
have to be given to ensure proper scheme operation by using CB contact logic in addition to current
detectors. For both Transformer and Shunt Reactors this should be considered.
• For the CB controlling FACTS elements (like SVC, STATCOM etc.), where a trip due to controller
fault or Thyristor/IGBT cooling system failure may be issued to CB, a separate voltage based or CB
aux. contact based LBB logic should also be applied. This is essential because under such abnormal
condition, there may or may not be current through the circuit breaker.
Chapter 14
Protection of FACTs (FSC and TCSC)
14.1 General on series compensation (FSC & TCSC)
Series compensation in simple terms means a device (normally capacitor bank) inserted in series with the
power system. In high voltage transmission system, Capacitors are installed in series of the transmission
line, which is largely inductive, to achieve the following:
• Increase of transmission capability of long transmission line
• Reduction of transmission angle, increase of system stability
• Influence on power flow in parallel transmission lines
• Reduction of line voltage drop
• Limitation of load dependent voltage drops
• Damping of power oscillation by means of variable series compensation
This fixed percentage of series compensation can be anywhere from 20 to 80 percent of the line impedance.
Series compensation is mainly of two types:
• Fixed series compensation (FSC)
• Thyristor controlled series compensation (TCSC)
14.1.1 Fixed series capacitor banks
A Series Capacitor Bank (SC) is a piece of equipment that is connected in series with a transmission circuit,
and it is exposed to the same current-stresses and voltage-stresses as the transmission circuit itself. The
voltage stress may additionally be divided to two types:
(a) Series voltage stress (especially during faults and abnormal conditions)
(b) Shunt voltage stress.
The SC-equipment needs to be designed for these stresses. Of special interest are the different current-
stresses and associated voltage-stresses for which the SC needs to be designed. The most important
current-stresses for a transmission SC are the following:
• The normal current
• The maximum continuous current
• The 30 min. overload current
• The 5-10 s swing current
• Fault currents (essentially power frequency)
• Low frequency (below power frequency) oscillation currents
• Traveling wave current surges

Frotection of Facts (FSC and TCSC) 173
The design of a capacitor for the currents and the associated voltages, according to items 1– 3, is usually a
straight forward task. High swing currents, item 4 usually require special consideration (see below). Item 7
gives no excess voltages across the capacitor due to the short duration of the lightning or switching surge.
However, the transient capacitor voltages associated with item 5 or 6 may be substantial and would generally
exceed the inherent short time voltage capability of a capacitor unit. To design the capacitor for these high
voltage stresses would result in a completely uneconomical design.
Since the capacitor is sensitive also to short duration over voltages, the technical/economical solution is
to provide the SC with a fast-acting primary overvoltage protection. Traditionally the primary overvoltage
protection comprised a self-triggered (voltage triggered) spark gap firmly connected across the terminals
of the capacitor (single gap scheme, Figure 14.1). The spark gap had a spark-over time of some hundred
microseconds.
A bypass switch was connected in parallel with the gap. The gap was extinguished by closing the bypass
switch. A current limiting damping circuit (XL) was used to limit the capacitor discharge current upon gap
spark-over or bypass switch closing. Thus the SC was provided with a bypass circuit. The drawback of this
simple bypass circuit was the relatively long recovery time of the spark gap after it had operated, typically
400 – 600 ms depending on the magnitude of the through fault current. The consequence was that the
reinsertion time of the SC after external fault clearing was 400 – 600 ms.
Fig. 14.1 : Single gap Fig. 14.2 : MOV (gapless)
Fig. 14.3 : Dual gap Fig. 14.4 : MOV + bypass gap
The single gap scheme was improved in steps. In order to reduce the reinsertion time of the SC following
clearing of an external fault, two spark gaps with different settings were used (dual gap scheme, Figure
14.3). With the dual gap scheme, the reinsertion time after external fault clearing was reduced to 60 ms,
using an ordinary circuit breaker as “reinsertion switch” (Figure 14.3).
The next step was to use a metal oxide varistor as overvoltage protection for an SC (gapless MOV scheme,
Figure 14.2 or MOV scheme with a bypass gap, Figure 14.4). With the MOV scheme, the reinsertion time
after external fault clearing was reduced to zero, provided that the MOV was not bypassed for external faults.
Note that the bypass gap, which is designed as a forced triggered spark gap, is used for fast bypassing of
the MOV for internal faults.
It is important to note that the primary overvoltage protection also protects the capacitor from the overvoltage
that occurs when the capacitor is inserted or reinserted by opening of the bypass switch. The current at
capacitor insertion/reinsertion is called the insertion/reinsertion current and is defined in the standards for
SC. This current may be added to the list above, since it has a decisive influence on the design of the SC.
14.1.2 TCSC banks
A thyristor controlled series capacitor allows continuous control of the series capacitor reactance. This is
achieved by adding current through the capacitor via the parallel thyristor valve path see figure 14.4.
Fig. 14.5 : Thyristor controlled series capacitor
The main circuit of the TCSC consists of a capacitor bank and a thyristor controlled inductive branch connected
in parallel. The capacitor bank may have a value of e.g. 10…30Ω/phase and a rated continuous current of
1500…3000 A. The capacitor bank for each phase is mounted on a platform providing full insulation towards
ground. The thyristor valve contains a string of series connected high power thyristors with a maximum
total blocking voltage in the range of hundreds of kV. The inductor is an air-core reactor with a few mH
inductance.
The required operating range of a TCSC, i.e. the achievable apparent reactance as a function of the line
current depends on the application.
The apparent impedance of the TCSC (the impedance seen by the power system) can typically be increased
to up to 3 times the physical impedance of the capacitor. This high apparent reactance will mainly be used for
damping of power oscillations. During continuous valve bypass the TCSC represents an inductive impedance
of about 20 % of the capacitor impedance. Both operation in capacitive boost mode and valve bypass mode
can be used for damping of power swings. The utilization of valve bypass increases the dynamic range of
the TCSC and improves its effectiveness in power oscillation damping.
14.2 Protection of capacitor elements and units
Series capacitors are normally protected by conventional methods used for protection of power capacitor
elements. Fuse protection, capacitor overload protection and platform protection are discussed below.
Internal or external fuses are the primary protection of elements and units for series capacitors. Normally,
modern series capacitors are split into a certain number of legs containing capacitor cans in series-parallel
combination to form a H-configuration or two parallel strings. The unbalance protection must be coordinated
with the capacitor fuses.
The technology of the protection and control equipment used on series capacitors has evolved over the
years. Older equipment made extensive use of electromechanical protection and control equipment that was
located on the platform. The advancements in fiber optic communications technology have minimized the use
of protection and control electronics on the platform. The relocation of protection and control equipment from
the platform to the ground level has minimized the level of exposure to electrical environmental problems.
However, some electronic equipment will continue to exist on the platform, and must perform properly.
14.2.1 Externally fused Capacitors
Externally fused capacitors provide visual of fuse operation for faster maintenance and achieve protection
for dielectric failure, lead failures, internal bushing failures, and bushing flashovers. The fuse operation
at a failure within the capacitor elements removes the entire unit from service. The removal of the faulted
capacitor unit from the series capacitor upon the operation of an external fuse fulfils an additional desired
overvoltage protection requirement for the remaining capacitor units and minimizes the probability of case
rupture. Although the probability is low, if a capacitor failure occurs without fuse operation or in case of partial
defective capacitor units where the fuse has not blown, the unbalance protection will detect high unbalance
current and initiate a trip when only an alarm is required.
14.2.2 Internally fused capacitors
For internally fused capacitor elements, the scheme offers the possibility of allowing failure of internal capacitor
elements without affecting the overall expected life of the capacitors, and the removal from service of the
remaining capacitor elements in this case is not required. The arrangement also offers lower parallel energy
discharge in case of faults and provides compact can (container) size and simplicity in the design. On the
other hand, internally fused capacitors provide protection for capacitor elements only within the capacitor
sections. Connections between the elements and the bushing are not protected. Moreover, lack of visual
indication of fuse operation results in longer maintenance. Faults external to the protected capacitor sections
will result in the de-energisation of the entire series capacitor, e.g. during external bushing flashovers.
14.3 Protection of series capacitor banks
The main components of protection of series capacitor banks are shown in Figure14.6 and Figure 14.7.
Fig.14.6 :Typical connection diagram for FSC

Fig. 14.7 : Typical connection diagram for TCSC
Description of the components shown in these two figures are : 01- Capacitor, 02-Metal Oxide Resistor
(Varistor - MOV), 03-Bypass spark gap, 04-Bypass switch, 05-Reactor,06-Linear resistor with gap, 07-
Current Transformer, 08-Platform, 09- Isolating disconnector, 10-Bypass disconnector, 11-Earth switch,
12-Thyristor.
The MOV provides protection against overvoltages caused by high through current due to transmission line
faults. These overvoltages may persist until the fault is cleared by opening of the line circuit breakers of the
faulted circuit element. Modern series capacitor banks use highly non-linear Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV)
to limit the voltage across the series capacitor to a desired protective level. This protective level typically
ranges between 2.0 and 2.5 per unit, based on the voltage drop at the rated bank current. When limiting the
voltage across the series capacitor to the protective level during fault conditions, the MOV must conduct
the excess fault current and thereby absorb energy. A forced triggered spark gap and/or a bypass switch
is used to limit the MOV energy to within its absorption capability by bypassing the parallel capacitor/MOV
combination.
The current limiting damping reactor is a part of the capacitor discharge circuit. It is designed to limit the
capacitor discharge current amplitude and to damp out the oscillations caused by a controlled bypass gap
operation or by a bypass switch closing. The inductance is chosen to avoid parallel harmonic resonance
between the capacitor and bypass circuit. Table 14.1 presents an overview of typical series capacitor bank
protections and corresponding actions during their operation.
Table 14.1 : Overview of typical series capacitor bank protections
Reinsertion
Alarm level
Permanent
Permanent
Temporary
Function
Bypass
lockout
lockout
bypass
Others
Line
Flashover to platform protection X X breaker
trip
Spark gap protection X X
X X
Trigger circuit supervision (1 sys. (2 sys. X
fail) fail)
Only at repeated
Sub-harmonic protection X X X number of X
subharmonics
Capacitor discharge function X X X
Line
Bypass switch failure protection:
X breaker
close failure
trip
Bypass switch failure protection:
X X
open failure
Line
Bypass switch pole disagreement
X X breaker
protection
trip
Disconnector pole disagreement
X
protection
Used expressions:
Permanent lockout: The cause of the bypass has to be rectified and the lockout is manually reset.
Temporary lockout: The cause of the bypass is system related and the lockout can be automatically reset.
Permanent bypass: The series capacitor can be inserted manually without further actions
14.3.1 Capacitor unbalance protection
The capacitor unbalance protection monitors the status of the capacitor bank by measuring the current flowing
in the branch of the bridge connection (H-bridge) or the differential current between the two branches. Changes
in the capacitor bank caused by failed elements or capacitor bushing flashovers result in an increased value
of measured capacitor unbalance current.
A capacitor unbalance protection normally has three different setting levels and time delay levels:
• Alarm
• Low set bypass level
• High set bypass level
The alarm level and the low bypass level are set as the ratio between the unbalance current and the capacitor
current (line current). The high set bypass level is normally only related to the unbalance current.
14.3.2 Capacitor overload protection
The series capacitor bank is designed to withstand short time overloads, according to the specification,
without damage. However, with occasional peak loads, the overload might be relatively prolonged and of
such magnitude that it could result in degradation of the series capacitor units. Therefore the capacitor
current is monitored continuously by a capacitor overload protection with inverse time characteristic.. The
start level is always related to the rated series capacitor current (ICN).
14.3.3 Line current supervision
When the capacitor bank is bypassed by a protection with automatic reinsertion, a reinsertion is initiated after
a pre-set time. The purpose of the line current supervision is to avoid reinsertion of the series capacitors
on to a fault.
14.3.4 MOV overload protection
The object of this protection is to protect the MOV from high energy injection overload as well as thermal
overload. The protection initiates triggering of the forced triggered spark gap and the closing of the bypass
switch simultaneously. A typical MOV overload protection has three stages.
• Short time MOV energy protection
• High MOV current protection
• High MOV temperature protection
14.3.5 MOV Energy Calculations
The protection systems must determine the energy absorbed by the MOV during system faults. The energy
can be calculated as the integral of the dissipated power in the MOV. The current is typically readily available
from a CT in the MOV branch. The voltage across the MOV, is usually not measured but can be estimated
from the MOV U-I characteristic.
14.3.6 MOV short time energy protection
This protection prevents high energy absorption over a short time period which may cause hot-spots in the
metal oxide discs. This protection complements the MOV high current protection for internal line faults. It
also provides protection against high energy absorption due to faults external to protected line exceeding
those specified in the duty cycles.
The setting is usually based on the maximum energy accumulation due to the external fault duty cycle with
some margin in order to avoid bypassing of the series capacitor for external faults. When this energy level
is reached, the gap is triggered and/or the bypass switch is closed.
14.3.7 MOV high current protection
The purpose of the MOV high current protection is to reduce unnecessary energy absorption for heavy internal
faults. The setting should be above the maximum external fault current. Triggering of the spark gap and/or
initiation of closure of the bypass switch is instantaneous based upon current magnitude. Reinsertion of the
faulted phases follows a short time later (could be made within the dead time of the autoreclosing cycle or
after successful autoreclosing, depending on the utility practice).
14.3.8 MOV high temperature protection
The purpose of MOV high temperature protection is to prevent damage to the MOV discs due to overheating.
The maximum design temperature (approximately 180-200 ˚C) could be reached during a period of successive
transmission line faults or long term overload conditions.
The thermal model for the protection may include the ambient temperature which can be used in the simulation
of the overheating as well as the cooling process. Steady state load current on the series compensated line
(to calculate the resulting voltage across the MOV) is usually included in the model.
When the temperature reaches a set value, the spark gap is triggered and/or the bypass switch is closed.
The cooling characteristic of the MOV is part of the thermal model for the protection. Reinsertion is permitted
only when the MOV can safely withstand a critical fault immediately after the reinsertion has taken place.
14.3.9 MOV failure protection
The purpose of the MOV failure protection is to bypass the series capacitor in case of a faulty MOV. If a
MOV unit fails, the line current will pass through the MOV. One possible implementation of a MOV failure
protection is to use the ratio between the MOV current and the line current and order a series capacitor
bypass if a pre-set ratio is exceeded . Another possible implementation of an MOV failure protection is to
arrange an MOV current unbalance measurement. A bypass and permanent lockout of the series capacitor
is given at protection operation.
14.3.10 Flashover to platform protection
The purpose of the flashover to platform protection is to detect a flashover from any of the platform mounted
equipment and the platform. This is done by connecting one side of the main capacitor to the platform via
a current transformer, A bypass, remote end trip and permanent lockout of the series capacitor is given at
protection operation.
14.3.11 Spark gap protection
The purpose of the spark gap protection is to detect any unwanted spark over of the spark gap. This is done
by continuously measuring the spark gap current. The protection will issue a close order to the bypass switch
and also cause a permanent lockout of the SC.
14.3.12 Trigger circuit supervision
The purpose of this protection is to detect faults in the spark gap trigger circuit. The trigger circuit comprises
three main components:
• A trigger capacitor
• A trigger transformer
• A thyristor switch
In case of redundant systems, faults in both systems simultaneously will result in a bypass order and a
permanent lockout of the series capacitor. Fault in one of the systems will result in an alarm.
14.3.13 Sub-harmonic protection
A series capacitor in a power transmission network may, during certain conditions together with energizing
of unloaded transformers or reactors, cause sub-harmonic oscillations of such amplitude and frequency
that disturbances in the network arise. The purpose of the protection is to bypass the series capacitor if
such sub-harmonic disturbances occur. A typical protection uses notch-filters to suppress the fundamental
frequency component. The operation of this protection is always three‑phase.
14.3.14 Pole disagreement protection
The purpose of the pole disagreement protection is to detect disagreement between the position of the poles
of the bypass switch and disconnectors. The bypass switch pole disagreement protection will after a time
delay, issue a close order to the bypass switch and start the bypass switch failure protection, if it detects
pole disagreement of the bypass switch. The disconnector pole disagreement protection issues an alarm if
it detects pole disagreement of a disconnector.
14.3.15 Bypass switch failure protection
The purpose of the bypass switch failure protection is to detect a faulty bypass switch. If the bypass switch
has failed to close after a protective operation before the set time has elapsed, a trip order to the line circuit
breaker and to remote end will be given. The position of the bypass switch is normally supervised by the
auxiliary contacts. Measurement of the current through the bypass switch is not used. Also a permanent
lockout of the SC and an indication will be given.
14.3.16 Capacitor discharge function
The purpose of this function is to discharge the series capacitor via the bypass circuit when the transmission
line circuit breakers are opened, either deliberately or in conjunction with an internal line fault. When an
internal line fault occurs, the line is disconnected by the line circuit breakers.
This means that a DC voltage will remain on the series capacitor and may give the following
consequence:
• Delay of secondary arc extinction at the fault location. This can happen if the line reactors and series
capacitors are located in such way that a line reactor, a part of the line, the series capacitor and the
earth fault forms a closed loop. Discharging the capacitor with a close operation of the bypass switch
can mitigate this problem if it exists.
• Increased transient recovery voltage (TRV) stresses on line circuit breakers. The voltage across
the series capacitor may be added to the system voltage across the line circuit breaker at opening.
If the resulting TRV stress on the line circuit breakers is too high, the problem can be mitigated by
discharging (by-passing) the series capacitor before opening the line circuit breakers.
• If any of the line protections related to the series compensated line issues a trip order to its line circuit
breaker, a bypass order will be issued to the series capacitor. A typical implementation of the protection
uses two input signals from the line protection:
• Transmission line de-energized
• Line trip
14.4 Additional protections for TCSC banks
14.4.1 Thyristor overvoltage protection
The purpose of the thyristor overvoltage protection is to prevent the thyristor valve from blocking in situations
that can cause too high a voltage across the thyristor valve. The protection can either be implemented as an
indirect thyristor valve overvoltage protection that uses the thyristor current derivative or a direct overvoltage
protection that uses the voltage across the thyristors. The protection orders thyristor firing, send a close
order to the bypass switch and issues a permanent lockout of the TCSC.
14.4.2 Thyristor thermal overload protection
A TCSC thyristor valve may be protected from thermal overload by a protection that calculates the energy
dissipated in the thyristors and then calculates the average temperature of the silicon. If the thyristor
temperature increases above an alarm level, an alarm will be initiated and the maximum reactance reference
will be limited until the thyristor temperature has decreased below a release level. If the thyristor temperature
increases above the trip level then the protection will order a protective bypass and a close order to the
bypass switch along with a temporary lockout. All operations are 3‑phase and the temporary lockout is reset
when the thyristor temperature decrease below a reinsertion block level.
14.4.3 Capacitor DC-voltage protection
The purpose of the capacitor DC-voltage is to bypass the TCSC if there is a sustained DC component in the
capacitor voltage. The protection is normally line current compensated, i.e. it utilizes the ratio between the
capacitor DC voltage and the line current. In order to avoid undesired protective action due to difficulties in
the ratio calculation the protection is disabled if the line current drops below the release level. The protective
action is a mechanical bypass and a permanent lockout of the TCSC.
14.4.4 Reactance error protection
The purpose of the protection is to bypass the TCSC if there is a sustained reactance error when the bank is
operating in capacitive boost mode. The protective action is a mechanical bypass and a permanent lockout
of the TCSC.
14.4.5 TCSC low line current supervision
In addition to the conventional line current supervision that prevents series capacitor reinsertion during
transmission line fault conditions, the TCSC line current supervision also supervises low line current. A TCSC
cannot remain operating in capacitive boost mode when the line current becomes very low, typically in the
range of one tenth of the rated line current. There are two reasons for this:
• The measuring system has a limited resolution and noise suppression capability. Therefore the
response signals become too inaccurate for the control system.
• The auxiliary power used for thyristor triggering often is being picked up from the main circuit. When
the line current becomes too low, this power supply fails and the thyristors cannot be triggered.
When the line current is low, the corresponding fundamental power frequency component of the inserted
capacitor voltage is also low. In this condition the power flow in the line depends very little on whether the
series capacitor is inserted or bypassed. However, e.g. from a sub-synchronous resonance (SSR) point of
view, it may be important that the operating mode of the TCSC is well defined, either in bypass mode or
blocking mode.
If the low line current is sustained for a certain period of time the control system may be designed to either
block the thyristors entirely or to close the mechanical bypass circuit breaker. Normal operation should
automatically be started when the low line current condition disappears.
14.4.6 TCSC Valve Cooling System trip
The thyristor valves require a deionized water cooling system. There are several fault scenarios within
the cooling system, which require a bypassing of the Thyristor module or even a complete isolation of the
capacitor bank from the high-voltage transmission line. In case of loss of the cooling system the thyristor
valves have to be bypassed within very short time (typically 3s to 5s). Within further 20 to 30 minutes the
capacitor bank has to be disconnected from the line. Otherwise the water ionizes may cause flashover on
the thyristor module or from platform to ground. The two actions are summarized below:
(a) Cooling system bypass: It causes an immediate bypass of the TCSC-part. Cooling system bypass is
a group signal and is generated by the cooling system in case of:
• Water low flow.

• Expansion vessel low level.
• Main circuit low pressure & flow sensor fail.
• Main circuit high conductivity.
• Valve inlet water temperature high.
• Valve inlet water temperature sensor fail.
• Pump 1 fail & pump 2 fail.
• AC supply failure (AC supply 1 & 2).
• DC supply failure (DC supply 1 & 2).
• Cooling controller (PLC) fail.
(b) Cooling system trip: After bypassing the TCSC part, plant control starts an auto-isolation sequence
or the operator takes out the bank manually. If the protection systems don’t get the feedback signal
for Platform Disconnected within the 30 minutes, a line trip command is given. The trip signal is a
group signal and is generated by the cooling system in case of:
• Water low flow.

• Main circuit high conductivity.
• Pump 1 off AND pump 2 off.
• AC supply failure (AC supply 1 AND 2).
• DC supply failure (DC supply 1 AND 2
14.5 Platform power
All the equipment on the platform of a series capacitor is energized at line potential. It is theoretically possible
to have fully insulated EHV class instrument transformers and avoid most of the platform power supply
issues. In such cases all the protection and control equipment would then be located in a ground level
control building. However, the costs would be prohibitive and would complicate the design of the platform.
Various techniques can be used to provide power to the protection and control equipment on the platform.
Measures should be taken to ensure safety of the series capacitor on the loss of platform power. In addition,
power supplies are required for protection, control and monitoring equipment located in the control building
at ground potential.
14.5.1 Requirements on the Power Supply
For any series capacitor installation, the following platform power supply considerations are important:
• Adequate performance during very low line current and voltage conditions; power supplies must be
secure and not cause a spurious by-pass of the bank. Consider e.g. the simultaneous energization
of the power transmission line and the series capacitor and let us assume that there is an earthing
clamp somewhere on one of the platforms.
• For a condition when the series capacitor is energized on the faulted transmission line, the start-up
time for the current and voltage based supplies must be negligible so as not to impair the duty cycle
or protection operating speed requirements.
• Adequate shielding and de-coupling of power supply circuits from the primary system is important,
especially for those circuits used to provide power for spark gap firing circuits.
• Cold weather performance, both while the series capacitor is in service and while the series capacitor
is disconnected from the transmission line for a long period of time.
• Reduce the component count for platform power supply related equipment without sacrificing
dependability and security e.g. eliminating the requirement for batteries and battery chargers where
possible.
14.5.2 Current Transformer Supply
Many installations use line current based power supplies driven by CTs operable down to line currents of
less than 10% of the rated line current. There must be current on the line before the power supply will turn
on. It is dependable for faults with high currents but not if the line is open circuited or for low line currents. A
current transformer supply uses a small core CT, with a thyristor crowbar to short the secondary when the
power supply capacitor is charged to a suitable level. The CT must operate over a wide range. The thyristor
must be capable of handling the maximum ring down current for a series capacitor fault.
14.5.3 CVT Supply
A CVT supply provides a voltage with the energized, independent of the line current. It is sometimes referred
to as an inverted CVT supply since the base unit is mounted at the platform level. Some installations include
a ground mounted base unit as a voltage signal for protection and control purposes. The disadvantage of
this scheme is that the power supply is unreliable during close-in shunt faults.
14.5.4 Battery Supply
To combat problems of poor power supply performance when the line current drops below the power
supply threshold or the series capacitor is isolated for an extended period of time, platform batteries may
be provided. Batteries would be charged from a CT or from a CVT supplies discussed above. The battery
is sized considering cold weather performance, permissible platform power weight and size, and desired
performance for the specified outage interval. The routine maintenance of the battery requires a series
capacitor outage, which will affect the availability factor.
14.5.5 Non-conventional Power Supplies
Some installations have used solar collectors to augment the other supply alternatives. Other installations
use light pulses sent from ground level to power the platform mounted fiber optic instrument transformers.
Future schemes may consider through fiber optic CTs accomplished by using a direct measurement with a
Faraday sensor or using Pockels cell technology.
14.6 Power Supply for Spark Gap Firing Circuits
Two broad options may be considered: schemes that work on the voltage divider principle, by utilizing the
voltage across capacitor cans, or from power CT or CVT base unit mounted on the platform.
14.7 Power Supply for Ground Mounted Equipment
The ground mounted supplies would be the same as required in a substation.

14.8 Signal transmission
The information from the platform on line potential can be sent to ground level by various methods. The
currents could be obtained using conventional iron core CTs. For voltage levels above 100 kV the cost for
such solutions is high. Usually, the information is sent to ground potential via fiber optics. Signals from low
voltage CTs mounted on the platform can be multiplexed (and) or sent, individually via optical fibers, down
to ground level using various methods of modulation or digital transmission protocol. Other direct measuring
methods are available. Some optical CTs use a fiber optic from the platform to the ground level and send a
laser pulse up to provide energy to the electronics coding at the current level and sending it back down via
the same fiber. At the platform an iron CT can be used, since the insulation requirement is not a problem
in this case.
A second method of getting the current information down from the platform would be to use the Faraday
effect on an optical CT. This requires two fibers per CT. A polarised light signal is sent up from the ground
level and the magnetic field shifts the light. The angular shift of the light is a measure of the instantaneous
current.
There may be non-power system information that must be sent to or from the platform, e.g. the signal to trig
a spark gap. Some designs do this on the platform while others perform the calculations at ground level to
determine when the protection level has been reached. The trend is to use fiber optics to send the information
from the platform to ground level for high voltage banks because of economical reasons and reliability. There
is also a trend to have the protection and control system at ground level to simplify maintenance and trouble
shooting. However some installations have all protection and control equipment mounted on the platform
and only status information necessary for operating the equipment is sent down to ground level.
References
1. Cigre WG34-04: “Application Guide on Protection of Complex Transmission Network Configurations”

1991.
2. Cigre WG 34-01 : “Reliable fault clearance and Backup protection” 1999.
3. Cigre WG B5-10: “Protection, Control and Monitoring of Series Compensated Networks” 2010.
Chapter 15
PROTECTION OF FACTS (SVC & STATCOM)
15.1 INTRODUCTION
The IEEE defines FACTS as “alternating current transmission systems incorporating power-Electronics
based and other static controllers to enhance controllability and power transfer capability. The main purpose
of these systems is to supply the network as quickly as possible with inductive or capacitive reactive power
that is adapted to its particular requirements, while also improving transmission quality and the efficiency
of the power transmission system.
• FACTS provide
• fast voltage regulation
• increased power transfer over long AC lines
• damping of active power oscillations, and
load flow control in meshed systems, thereby significantly improving the stability and performance of existing
and future transmission systems
Main Elements of Facts: FACTS are divided into two categories, determined by the way in which they are
connected to the power system. A distinction is made between parallel Compensation (which continues to
be the most common) and series compensation.
Fig. 15.1
Series compensation and its protection has been described in a separate chapter. Shunt or parallel
compensation is being described in subsequent sections of this chapter.
15.2 PARALLEL COMPENSATION
SVC (Static Var Compensator) : It is a member of the FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission System) family.
By means of thyristor control of reactive power, it enables dynamic voltage control at the point of common
connection with a grid. The fast response of an SVC makes it highly suitable for fulfilling functions such as
steady-state as well as dynamic voltage stabilisation, meaning power transfer capability increases, reduced
voltage variations, and flicker reduction at industrial arc furnaces. SVCs are special in the sense that they are
needed the most during network disturbances. At these occasions they may make the difference between
a network collapse and successful continued operation. It is therefore imperative that they do not trip when
they are needed the most. Security is the number one requirement on SVC protections, given reasonable
dependability is maintained. The way to achieve high security is to minimise the number of relays and
protective functions used in a plant.
SVC is normally connected to the Bus or line (referred to as Point of Common Coupling i.e. PCC) via a
step-down transformer, called Coupling transformer. Normally, a SVC is a combination of one or more of the
following branches connected to the Medium voltage bus (Secondary of the coupling transformer) :
• TSC: Thyristor Switched Capacitor
• TSR: Thyristor Switched Reactor
• TCR: Thyristor Controlled Reactor
• FC: Fixed Filter Circuit (single-, double- or triple-tuned)
Fig. 15.2
TSC – Thyristor Switched Capacitor
Due to transient phenomena at switch-on, TSCs are not continuously controlled but instead are always
switched on and off individually as required by the system. Consequently, a TSC cannot inject a reactive
current with variable amplitude into the system, meaning that it supplies either maximum reactive current or
none at all. Through the precise triggering of thyristor valves, most of the transient phenomena at switch-on
can be avoided. TSC branches do not generate harmonic distortions.
Protection of Facts (SVC & Statcom) 187
TCR – Thyristor Controlled Reactor
TCRs are used to continuously regulate the inductive reactive power from zero to the maximum, depending
on the requirements, by means of current. They do not generate transients; at the increased fitting angles
(above 90°), however, they do generate harmonic currents that must be absorbed by filters.
TSR – Thyristor Switched Reactor
In order to prevent all harmonic currents when reactors are used, the reactors (like capacitors) can also be
switched only by means of Thyristors. In this mode, they do not generate harmonic current.
The magnitude and the occurrence of harmonics in a TCR branch are given in Figure 15.1.
Filter branches
Harmonics are whole multiples of the fundamental frequency (50 Hz/60 Hz) that are superimposed
on it. Harmonics cause the system voltage to deviate periodically from the sinusoidal shape,
resulting in voltage distortion. Harmonics are caused by the TCRs in SVC. A high harmonic content
in the voltage of an electrical network can result in an unacceptable temperature rise in electric
machines and a voltage increase in capacitor banks. The 5th, 7th, 11th, and 13th harmonics are
characteristic of TCRs and are especially dominant, but maximum magnitudes decrease very fast
with increasing harmonic numbers. The magnitude and the occurrence of harmonics in a typical
TCR branch are given in Figure.
Fig. 15.3
Harmonic Filters are provided in the SVC to absorb harmonics generated by TCR branches. The number
of filter branches and their resonance tuning frequency depend on the basic design of the Static VAR
Compensator (SVC) and the harmonic distortions in the system. Filters can be tuned either to a single
frequency or to multiple frequencies simultaneously. In most of the SVC, 5th & 7th Harmonic filters are
provided.
15.3 STATIC COMPENSATOR (STATCOM)
The STATCOM, like SVC, is a shunt connected reactive power compensation element of the FACTS family
capable of providing dynamic inductive & capacitive reactive power electronically by means of switching
solid state devices. It is in basically a solid-state switching converter, called Voltage Source Converter (VSC)
capable of providing independently controllable real and reactive power at its output terminals when it is fed
from a DC source at its input terminals.
OPERATING PRINCIPAL: The basic voltage source converter scheme is shown in the figure.
From a DC input source, a charged capacitor, converter produces a three phase controllable output voltage
Uc at the fundamental frequency of the AC power system. Each output voltage is in phase and coupled
with the corresponding AC system voltage via a small reactance. The small reactance can be the coupling
transformer reactance or a small additional reactor, usually referred as phase reactor / coupling reactor.
The magnitude and phase angle of Uc can be controlled by varying the conduction period of the switching
devices (usually IGBT etc.) If the amplitude Uc of the converter is increased higher than the system voltage
phasor Us, then the current phasor leads the voltage phasor and the current flows from the converter to
the AC system and the converter generates (supplies) reactive power (Capacitive power). If the amplitude
Uc of the converter is decreased lower than the system voltage phasor Us, then the current phasor lags
the voltage phasor and the current flows from the AC system to the converter and the converter absorbs
(supplies) reactive power (Inductive power). Similarly, Active power exchange between the converter and
associated power system can be controlled by varying the phase angle of the converter output voltage VC
with respect to Vs.
Fig, 15.4
In practice, the semiconductor switches of the converter are not lossless, so the energy stored in the dc
capacitor is eventually used to meet the internal losses of the converter, and the dc capacitor voltage
diminishes. However, In case of STATCOM, the VSC is used for reactive-power generation and the converter
itself keeps the capacitor charged to the required voltage level. This task is accomplished by making the
output voltages of the converter lag behind the ac-system voltages by a small angle (usually in the 0.18–0.28
range). In this way, the converter absorbs a small amount of real power from the ac system to meet its internal
losses and keep the capacitor voltage at the desired level. The same mechanism can be used to increase
or decrease the capacitor voltage and thus, the amplitude of the converter-output voltage to control the var
generation or absorption. The reactive- and real-power exchange between the STATCOM and the ac system
can be controlled independently of each other. This is explained in the figure below:
Fig. 15.5
Typical Voltage Vs Current characteristics of SVC and STATCOM on p.u basis is given below:
Fig. 15.6
PERFORMANCE: A STATCOM does all the functions of SVC with following additional advantages:
• It provides improved under-voltage performance as the STATCOM provides rated output current
independent of the system voltage. It is evident from the V-I characteristics shown above.
• It has small foot print can be delivered as containerized solution by many vendors.
• It has faster response compared to SVC.
STATCOM with Hybrid configuration: STATCOM providing leading and lagging current from the same valve
has symmetrical current capacity i.e it inherently has equal inductive and capacitive Mvar rating. To achieve
desired Unsymmentrical Mvar rating, Mechanically switched Reactors (MSR) or Mechanically switched
Capacitor bank (MSC) are added to the STATCOM HV or MV Bus bar. Thyristor Switched Cpacitor (TSC)
and Thyristor switched reactor (TSR) can also be used to get desired rating of the STATCOM station.
15.4 PROTECTION OF FACTS (PARALLEL COMPENSATION ELEMENTS)
15.4.1 Protection System for SVC
Static Var Compensator (SVC) come in a wide number of arrangements, and they are custom designed for
specific applications. For SVC applications the control and protection system plays an essential role in the
overall performance of the power system. From protection standpoint, an extensive protection system is
generally required for SVCs to optimise the equipment operational limits for maximum utilisation. Different
relay protection principles for different fault cases applicable to SVC system are employed to provide
comprehensive protection.
SVCs are normally having delta connected MV bus and residual voltage protection is used to detect ground
faults. Earth fault protection is provided for the SVC MV Bus by using a grounding transformer (ZigZag
winding transformer). Special protection functions are integrated in the SVC control system to detect abnormal
operating conditions and to react rapidly to avoid damage and unnecessary tripping by the plant protection
system. Those protection functions and their interaction with power system is an important criterion for
selection and application of each protection device. Further, SVC branches are exposed to severe current
and voltage transient during system disturbances. Insensitivity to harmonics and DC current are essential.
In general, SVC can be divided into following protection zones:
• Coupling Transformer HV & MV side
• Delta connected Medium Voltage (MV) Bus
• TSC Branch
• TCR Branch
• Harmonic Filter Branch

• Auxiliary transformer branch, if applicable
Fig. 15.7
15.4.2.1 Coupling Transformer (HV & MV) Protection
Utility SVCs normally make use of a power transformer between the High voltage (HV) busbar of power
grid and the SVC medium voltage (MV) busbar. This power transformer is the only connection of SVC MV
bus to the HV mains.
SVC transformers are, like generator transformers, made with a large turn ratios. The voltage on the SVC MV
bus is typically in the span of 11-30 kV irrespective of the voltage level on the mains. This large ratio results in
very high short circuit currents on the MV bus, it is frequently in the range of 50-90 kA (rms symmetrical). The
transformer current in its MV bushings also become large due to large power and low voltage, typically in the
range of 5-15 kA. The large fault and load current must be considered when designing the protection system.
Sometimes the transformer differential current relay is connected directly across the power transformer.
Sometime, the transformer differential protection zone is extended to also include the SVC MV busbar. In
this design the CTs in all the other SVC branches are used to close the differential zone.
Fig. 15.8 : Typical protection zone arrangements for SVC showing HV Bus bar, coupling transformer,
SVC MV bus , TCR, TSC, Filter (DTF) and auxiliary transformer tapping, grounding transformer.
Standard transformer protective functions like differential current, restricted earth fault current and overcurrent
functions are used. When it comes to overvoltage protection, it is important to note that SVC transformers are
made with large magnetic cores. The saturation voltage is typically as high as 120-130% of nominal voltage.
This figure is derived from the large voltage variation on the SVC MV bus. The transformer impedance is
normally close to 15% on its power rating. As the current through the transformer is purely reactive (inductive
or capacitive) the voltage on the MV bus will vary +/- 15% when the SVC goes from fully capacitive to fully
inductive operation. Typically the voltage reference for the SVC controller is settable between 100% and
110% voltage on the mains. Totally the voltage on the MV bus will vary from +25% to -15%. The power
transformer must be designed not to saturate at maximum continuous voltage on this bus. Hence Over-
fluxing protection for SVC coupling transformer are more important for MV side. The setting for HV and MV
side shall also be different depending on the transformer capabilities.
Conventional transformer Mechanical/body protection like Buchholz function, sudden pressure function,
high oil temperature, high winding temperature, low oil level etc. are also applied.
In case the MV bus bar is not covered in the coupling transformer differential protection zone, separate
bus differential protection for MV bus bar may be provided. Open delta voltage protection using MV bus PT
signal is provided. Under-voltage and over-voltage protection for MV bus are also normally provided. Using
Neutral grounding transformer of the SVC Bus, ground overcurrent can also be provided.
15.4.2.2 TCR Protection
A TCR or TSR branch is delta connected where each phase consists of a thyristor valve and two reactor
stacks. The thyristor valve is electrically located between the reactors. By combining one line Current
Transformer (CT) with two branch CTs, a protective zone encompassing two reactor halves and a thyristor
valve is created in a main differential protection. By permutation, three such zones are aggregated in the
TCR to provide detection and clearance of inter-zone faults. Time delayed overcurrent relays, with an added
instantaneous step sensing the branch currents are generally used as back-up. The reactors are protected
by thermal overload relays. The split arrangement of the reactors in each phase provides extra protection to
the thyristors in event of a reactor fault, i.e. fault current is limited and the risk for steep front voltage surges
eliminated. The valves are also protected against thermal overload by a specific function (TCR current limiter)
in the SVC control system. Differential protection can be of high or low impedance type. The protection serves
as the main protection for short circuits between the different protective zones. The protection is unaffected
by SVC energization and any valve misfiring. Unsymmetrical TCR operation and turn to turn faults can also
be detected by a negative phase sequence protection. However, turn to turn faults are extremely difficult to
detect. The small unbalances and sequence currents associated with turn to turn faults generally are smaller
than the existing tolerable unbalances in the system, i.e. unbalances due to negative sequence, component
tolerances, etc. Consequently there seems to be no reliable handle to distinguish between the intolerable
and tolerable conditions. As the turn to turn fault spreads to more turn, the current will increase. Negative
sequence relays must consider conditions mentioned above, the settings are generally high which makes
the relay insensitive. The relay should be time delayed to avoid operation on system transients and external
faults. The valves are also protected against thermal overload by a specific function (TCR current limiter) in
the SVC control system, The selective protection simulates the temperature inside the reactor and works
with the time constant of the reactors. For some installations this protection is installed in the SVC control
system. Usually it is very rare that this protection operates since the TCR current will be limited by protective
control features implemented in highly reliable SVC control systems.
15.4.2.3 TSC Protection
A TSC is delta connected where each phase consists of a thyristor valve, a reactor and a capacitor bank.
The thyristor valve is electrically located between the reactor and the capacitor. The capacitor bank is
generally divided into two parallel halves with a number of capacitor units connected in series and parallel.
The differential protection scheme is like TCR protection is also used here. An overcurrent relay sensing
the line currents in the TSC provides backup. Unbalance protection function supervises the voltage across
capacitor by measuring unbalance current. Unbalance current can be measured in different configurations
(H bridge or double star bank arrangement). Two overvoltage criterion are used: One overvoltage criterion
for the unit and one criterion for internal elements. In case of excessive capacitor voltage, an alarm or a
trip command is issued. In the TSC branches the thyristors are protected by arresters across the valve.
Arresters shall preferable be located so that a current flow in an arrester will not be seen as a transient
fault by the differential relay and cause false tripping. In TSC topologies where currents are bypassed from
differential CT’s, extra time delays must be added to avoid false tripping. Negative sequence protection can
also be used.
15.4.2.4 Harmonic Filter Protection
For most SVC installations harmonic filters are connected. Harmonic filters perform the dual task of providing
reactive power generation at fundamental (grid) frequency and performing the harmonic filtering needed to
take care of the harmonics generated by the TCR. Filter banks for SVC applications are generally divided
into two parallel banks in Y-Y connection with ungrounded neutrals tied together. Internal fuses protect
the capacitor units. Differential protections are not to be preferred in harmonics filter since complicate bus
arrangement will apply. Harmonics filters are generally ungrounded and double wye connected. This means
that the two strings in the capacitor bank is tied together internally in the capacitor bank, see figure below.
Differential protections for filter banks will require CT’s with high current rating in the neutral. Unbalance
current measured in double Y-Y filter capacitor bank Harmonics generated by the system and the TCR are
important when designing small capacitor banks and shall be considered in rating calculations as well as for
the protection of the capacitors. Overload protection functions shall supervise the voltage across capacitors
by measuring branch currents and calculation the resulting capacitor voltage, including the effects of harmonic
frequencies. Relays that are designed to operate for fundamental component shall not be used. Unbalance
protection function supervises the voltage across capacitor by measuring unbalance current. Unbalance
current can be measured in different configurations as described for TSC. Two overvoltage criterions are
used: One overvoltage criterion for the unit and one criterion for internal elements. In case of excessive
capacitor voltage, an alarm or a trip command is issued.
15.4.2.5 Auxiliary Transformer Protection
It is quite common to use the SVC MV bus for one source of auxiliary power to the SVC. The high short circuit
power on the bus makes it difficult to trip the aux power transformer in case of a fault, not fuses nor circuit
breakers would do. Fuses are for maximum 40 kA short circuit power and circuit breakers for maximum 63
kA. Tripping the complete plant to disconnect the aux power is bad for the forced outage availability. The
best way to overcome the difficulties is to install a series reactor in front of the aux power transformer. It
should be designed to bring down the fault current below 40 kA. Current limiting fuses are the fastest and
best means to minimise damage to the aux power transformer. In order to be able to replace the fuses or to
avoid unsymmetrical operation after a fault a disconnector is also needed. The aux power transformer shall
be protected by means of overcurrent relays, tripping the complete plant in case the fuse operation fails. Load
current is very low, typically in the range of 10 A. A protection scheme is needed to detect current slightly
above the max load for overload purpose and at the same time being able to detect short circuit current in
the range of 40 kA. This can be done by two different overcurrent relays, one connected to a CT with a turn
ratio matching the load current and a second one having a turn ratio selected for short circuit current.
15.4.2.6 Ground Fault Detection
Ground faults within an SVC are extremely rare. Overhead lightning protection of the complete SVC yard
is provided. The medium voltage (downstream the main power transformer) electrical circuit is built with
relative large clearances/creepage distances. The thyristor branch circuits/equipment are fenced in. The
environment is considered clean, the pollution level is low. Surge arresters are provided on the SVC medium
voltage circuit. The key to avoid ground faults is to keep animals and unwanted material out of the energized
areas. An alternative solution related to ground fault location within the SVC. The philosophy is to increase
the reliability of the SVC by eliminating the grounding circuit. With the grounding transformer removed the
ground fault has to be detected by a voltage relay sensing a zero-sequence voltage. Since the ground fault
now will not be selective detected, it will instead be located by an automatic reclosing sequence. Upon SVC
trip, all the branch disconnectors will be opened. The SVC breaker is then reclosed. Two scenarios are to
be considered:
(a) If the ground fault remains, the SVC main circuit breaker is tripped again and it is concluded that
the ground fault is on the common SVC bus, or within the main power transformer. Filters installed
without disconnectors will be included in the energisation sequence. The SVC is then put into lock-out
condition.
(b) If the ground fault remains but the SVC is not tripped, the fault has to be in one of the SVC branches.
These are then closed in one-by-one, using their motor-operated disconnectors, until we get a ground
fault trip again. The branch that initiates this second ground fault tripping is then isolated using its
motor-operated disconnector. Finally the SVC main circuit breaker is closed in again and the SVC
resumes operation in degraded mode, if allowed. SVC operation without harmonic filters is generally
not recommended.
The above-described auto-reclose sequence will take somewhat (say one minute) longer time to complete,
than a normal start sequence. It also will involve one additional (no load) transformer energization. However,
It is normal to provide a medium voltage grounding transformer (zig-zag connection) for selective ground
fault detection within SVC MV system.
15.4.2.7 Protective Control Features in SVC control system
Fundamental frequency current or voltage overload in any branch in the SVC is prevented by the control
system. There are control functions making sure that the total SVC current i.e. the current through the power
transformer or the current in the TCR cannot become higher than the component ratings. The voltage on
the SVC MV bus is also controlled to make sure it cannot exceed its design value. DC current in the TCR
is actively suppressed by a control function manipulating the thyristor firing instants. When it comes to
detecting malfunctions in the plant the most important function is to compare the actual currents in thyristor
controlled branches with currents simulated in the control system. The simulation is based on measured
system voltage and actual firing orders to the thyristors. In case there is a deviation between the two values
exceeding a limit the plant is considered faulty. There are also a number of self supervision functions and
hardware checks making sure the control system is working properly.
In case of a detected faulty control system the operation will automatically be transferred to a redundant
system, in case such a system is not available the SVC will trip the HV circuit breakers.
15.4.2.8 Recommendation
Security takes precedence over dependability in the protection system for an SVC. The plants are installed
to improve the voltage stability in the grid during and after major network disturbances. They must not trip
when they are needed the most unless major faults appear in the main circuit. Only required protective
functions, such as short circuit detection shall be employed. In case other functions are added they should
be significantly time delayed. Overload of SVC components is not possible unless the control system is
faulty. Self supervision detects control system failures. Time delayed over current and overvoltage protection
may be used to further enhance control system failure detection. Briefly the protection requirements are
summarized below:
(i) Transformer Protection
• Differential protection (87T)
• REF protection (64T)
• Directional Overcurrent protection (50, 51)
• Ground Overcurrent (51N)
• Overflux protection
• Transformer mechanical trips
(ii) SVC (MV) Bus Protection
• Bus Differential protection (87)
• Ground over current protection (51N), used with neutral Grounding Transformer
• Under / Over Voltage (59 Ph-Ph) protection
• Over voltage (Open Delta) protection
(iii) TSC Branch Protection

• Differential protection (87)
• Ground over current protection (51N)
• Capacitor Overvoltage (Using current signal) protection
• Capacitor unbalance protection (60C)
• Over current protection (50, 51)

(iv) TCR Branch Protection
• Reactor branch unbalance protection
• Thermal Overload protection
(v) Harmonic Filter Protection
• Capacitor Overload (Using current signal) protection
• Neutral Voltage shift (59N) (If applicable)
(vi) Auxiliary transformer protection
• Open delta voltage protection
15.5 PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR STATCOM
Static Compensator (STATCOM) come in different sizes and usually the modern STATCOM utilize multi
modular or chain link topology which does not require harmonic filters. Absence of Harmonic filters make the
design very versatile and normally for a particular rating, same STATCOM design can be used irrespective
of location of the STATCOM in the power system network. The control and protection system of STATCOM
plays an essential role in the overall performance of the power system. From protection standpoint, an
extensive protection system is generally required for STATCOM to optimise the equipment operational limits
for maximum utilisation. Different relay protection principles for different fault cases applicable to STATCOM
are employed to provide comprehensive protection.
Like SVCs, STATCOMs are also normally having delta connected MV bus and residual voltage
protection is used to detect ground faults. Earth fault protection is provided for the SVC MV Bus
by using a grounding transformer (ZigZag winding transformer). Special protection functions
are integrated in the STATCOM control system to detect abnormal operating conditions and to
react rapidly to avoid damage and unnecessary tripping by the plant protection system. Those
protection functions and their interaction with power system is an important criterion for selection
and application of each protection device. Insensitivity to harmonics and DC current are also
essential. In general, STATCOM can be divided into following protection zones:
• Coupling Transformer HV & MV side
• Delta connected Medium Voltage (MV) Bus
• Harmonic Filter Branch, if applicable
• Auxiliary transformer branch, if applicable
• STATCOM branch
15.5.1 Coupling Transformer (HV & MV) Protection
Protection for Coupling Transformer and MV Bus are same as described for SVC.
15.5.2 Harmonic Filter Protection
Harmonic filters, if any, required for STATCOM are usually High frequency Harmonic filters and very small
in size. Due to small size of the capacitor bank, Capacitor unbalance protection is normally not provided.
Overload protection is normally provided which shall supervise the voltage across capacitors by measuring
branch currents and calculate the resulting capacitor voltage, including the effects of harmonic frequencies.
Relays that are designed to operate for fundamental component shall not be used. Overcurrent protection
may be used as back up protection.
15.5.3 Auxiliary Transformer Protection
Protection for Auxiliary transformer is same as described for SVC.
15.5.4 STATCOM Branch Protection
Protection of the STATCOM branch includes the protection for phase reactors, branch bus bars, Solid state
Valves or Valve module and associated Valve DC Capacitor. Protection against power system faults are
achieved by providing Overcurrent and/ or Differential relays. Protection against Valve overcurrent and DC
Capacitor overvoltage is achieved through redundant control system. Normally overcurrent in the valves
are detected by Valve Control system and the faulty Valve module is bypassed either through a mechanical
bypass switch operation or electronically through valve switching. Normally STATCOM valves are provided
with redundant valve module (1 or 2) and unrestricted operation of STATCOM is achieved through bypassing
of the faulty valve module. Overvoltage on the Valve DC side are monitored and controlled through valve
switching or through a crowbar circuit mechanism. Capacitor can may also have some built-in internal fuse
or some mechanical protection. Usually, control signals from Controller to Valve modules are also supervised
and detection of any faults may result into bypassing of that valve module or trip of the entire STATCOM.
15.5.5 Protection for MSC or TSC
It shall be same as described for SVC TSC branch protection.
15.5.6 Protection for MSR or TSR
It shall be same as described for SVC TCR branch protection.
15.6 RECOMMENDATION
Just Like SVC, Security takes precedence over dependability in the protection system for an STATCOM.
The plants are Installed to improve the voltage stability in the grid during and following major network
disturbances. They must not trip when they are needed the most unless major faults appear in the main
circuit. Only required protective functions, such as short circuit detection shall be employed. In case other
functions are added they should be significantly time delayed. Overload of STATCOM components is not
possible unless the control system is faulty. Self supervision detects control system failures. Time delayed
over current and overvoltage protection may be used to further enhance control system failure detection.
Briefly the protection requirement are summarized below:
(i) Transformer Protection
• Differential protection (87T)
• REF protection (64T)

• Directional Overcurrent protection (50, 51)
• Ground Overcurrent (51N)
• Overflux protection
• Transformer mechanical trips
(ii) STATCOM (MV) Bus Protection
• Bus Differential protection (87)
• Ground over current protection (51N), used with neutral Grounding Transformer
• Under / Over Voltage (59 Ph-Ph) protection
• Over voltage (Open Delta) protection
(iii) STATCOM Branch Protection
• Differential protection (87) and/or O/C protection (50, 51)
• Valve Overcurrent protection ( in Controls)
• DC overvoltage protection (in Controls)
(iv) MSC/TSC Branch Protection
• Capacitor Overvoltage (Using current signal) protection
(v) MSR/TCR Branch Protection
• Reactor branch unbalance protection
• Thermal Overload protection
(vi) Harmonic Filter Protection
• Capacitor Overload (current signal) protection (if appl.)
• Neutral Voltage shift (59N) (If applicable)
(vii) Auxiliary transformer protection
• Open delta voltage protection

References
1. Working Group of the Substation Protection Subcommittee of IEEE “Static Var Compensator Protection”
(IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 10. No. 3 July 1995, page 1224 –1233)
2. K. Wikström, Z. Gajic, B. Poulsen “The Design of a Modern Protection System for a Static VAR
Compensator” (Cigre, October 19-24, 2009, Jeju Island, Korea)
3. Cigre working group report 14.19, year 2000 on STATCOM
4. M. Halonen, B. Thorvaldsson, K. Wikström “Protection of Static Var Compensator” (Cigré, October

19-24, 2009, Jeju Island, Korea).
Chapter 16
Protection of HVDC SYSTEMs
16.1 HVDC SYSTEM OVERVIEW

16.1.1 Principle
The fundamental process that occurs in an HVDC system is controlled conversion of electric current from
AC to DC at the transmitting end (Rectifier) and controlled conversion from DC to AC at the receiving end
(Inverter).
The term controlled rectification and inversion means that the DC output voltage can be precisely controlled
electronically. The principle of HVDC System is illustrated in Figure 16.1. Here, the control of DC side quantities
(i.e. Ud1, Ud2 and Id in Figure16.1) is achieved by varying the firing angle of converter valves, which decides
the instant at which the conduction starts in converter valves. By controlling both converters, the desired
magnitude of voltage and current can be achieved and consequently the desired amount of power can be
transmitted in the desired direction.
Fig. 16.1 : Principle of HVDC System
16.1.2 Applications
The first application for HVDC converters was to provide point to point electrical power interconnections
between asynchronous AC power networks. There are other applications which can be met by HVDC
converter transmission includes following:
• Interconnections between asynchronous systems

Some continental electric power systems consist of asynchronous networks such as the East, West,
Texas and Quebec networks in North America and island loads such as the Island of Gotland in the
Baltic Sea make good use of HVDC interconnections.
• Deliver energy from remote energy sources
Where generation has been developed at remote sites of available energy, HVDC transmission has
been an economical means to bring the electricity to load centers. Gas fired thermal generation can
be located close to load centers and may delay development of isolated energy sources in the near
term.
• Import electric energy into congested load areas
In areas where new generation is impossible to bring into service to meet load growth or replace
inefficient or decommissioned plant, underground DC cable transmission is a viable means to import
electricity.
• Increasing the capacity of existing AC transmission by conversion to DC transmission
New transmission rights-of-way may be impossible to obtain. Existing overhead AC transmission
lines if upgraded to or overbuilt with DC transmission can substantially increase the power transfer
capability on the existing right-of-way.
• Power flow control
AC networks do not easily accommodate desired power flow control. Power marketers and system
operators may require the power flow control capability provided by HVDC transmission.
• Stabilization of electric power networks.
Some wide spread AC power system networks operate at stability limits well below the thermal
capacity of their transmission conductors. HVDC transmission is an option to be considered to increase
utilization of network conductors along with the various power electronic controllers which can be
applied on AC transmission.
16.1.3 HVDC Converter Arrangements
HVDC converter bridges and lines or cables can be arranged into a number of configurations for effective
utilization. Converter bridges can be arranged either in monopolar or bipolar configuration as shown in 12
pulse arrangement in Figure 16.2. The monopolar configuration can be further subdivided into monopolar
ground return and monopolar metallic return based on the type of return conductor.
Various ways in which HVDC transmission is used are shown in simplified form in Figure 16.3 and include
the following:
16.1.3.1 Back-to-Back HVDC System
There are some applications where the two AC systems to be interconnected are physically in the same
location or Converter station. No transmission line or cable is required between the converter bridges in
this case and the connection may be monopolar or bipolar. Back-to-back DC links are used in Japan for
interconnections between power system networks of different frequencies (50 and 60 Hz). They are also
used as interconnections between adjacent asynchronous networks.
16.1.3.2 Point to Point or Two Terminal HVDC Transmission System
When it is economical to transfer electric power through DC transmission or cables from one geographical
location to another, a two-terminal or point-to-point HVDC transmission is used. In other words, DC power
Protection of HVDC Systems 201
from a DC rectifier terminal is dedicated to one other terminal operating as an inverter. This is typical of
most HVDC transmission systems.
16.1.3.3 Multi-Terminal HVDC Transmission System

When three or more HVDC converter stations are geographically separated with interconnecting transmission
lines or cables, the HVDC transmission system is defined as multi-terminal. If all HVDC converter stations
are connected to the same voltage then the system is called parallel multi-terminal HVDC. If one or more
converter bridges are added in series in one or both poles, then the system is called series multi-terminal
DC. Parallel multi-terminal HVDC transmission has been applied when the HVDC converter station capacity
exceeds 10% of the total rectifier capacity. It is expected that a series multi-terminal HVDC converter
station would be applied when its capacity is small (less than 10%) compared to the total rectifier capacity.
A combination of parallel and series connections of converter bridges is a hybrid multi-terminal system.
Multi-terminal HVDC systems are more difficult to justify economically because of the cost of the additional
HVDC converter stations.
From the protection point of view, there is no major difference compared to two terminal HVDC system
when multi-terminal configuration is used. Basically the protections remain the same for a multi-terminal
transmission as for a normal two terminal transmission and are provided in each converter/bipole. However,
the scenarios which are required to be adequately taken care of in protection coordination of multi terminal
operation are following:
• One of the key requirement in a multi terminal operation is fast disconnection of a faulty converter.
There is a necessity to block and disconnect a specific converter with minimum impact or disturbance
on the other converters. For optimized operation, a fast telecommunication link between stations is
used to transmit and receive the orders between the paralleled converters.
• There is a possibility that there is a fault in a converter which may require permitting the parallel healthy
converter to remain in operation while the fault is being cleared in the faulty converter. Protective
switching action may be co-ordinated with parallel healthy converter.
• There is another possibility of a fault in common area of the parallel Converters requiring forced
retarding in both parallel converters for fault clearing, thus having impact on all parallel converters
on the same polarity DC line.
For a DC line fault, all the rectifiers must be de-energized until the faulty converter has been disconnected
from the DC line. After fault clearance with suitable de-ionisation time, parallel rectifiers shall be connected
in staggered manner with proper co-ordination between the rectifiers.
Fig. 16.2 : Monopolar and Biploar HVDC Configurations

Fig. 16.3 : HVDC Converter Arrangements
16.1.3.4 Unit Connection
When DC transmission is applied right at the point of generation, it is possible to connect the converter
transformer of the rectifier directly to the generator terminals so the generated power feeds into the DC
transmission lines. This might be applied with hydro and wind turbine driven generators so that maximum
efficiency of the turbine can be achieved with speed control. Regardless of the turbine speed, the power
is delivered through the inverter terminal to the AC receiving system at its fundamental frequency of 50 or
60 hz.
16.1.3.5 Diode Rectifier
It has been proposed that in some applications where DC power transmission is in one direction only, the
valves in the rectifier converter bridges can be constructed from diodes instead of thyristors. Power flow
control would be achieved at the inverter, and in the case where the unit connection is used, AC voltage
control by the generator field exciter could be applied to regulate DC power. This connection may require
high speed AC circuit breakers between the generator and the rectifier converter bridges to protect the diodes
from overcurrents resulting from a sustained DC transmission line short circuit.
16.2 PURPOSE OF PROTECTION SYSTEM
The protection system is required to limit the equipment damages caused by system abnormalities or
excessive fault currents and thereby minimize fire risk and hazard to the people. In some cases, it enables
reduced power transfer in the grid and helps to avoid complete collapse of the HVDC system, which may
cause grid disturbances.
Following are the main functions of HVDC protection system:

16.2.1.1 Fault Isolation
The protection system is intended to detect the faults or any abnormal conditions and thereby isolate the
faulty equipment or section from healthy sections. In some cases it is also required that complete HVDC
system shall be tripped.
16.2.2 Co-ordination with Converter Control
Whenever the protection system operates, it is a necessity that control system acts so that the stress on
protected section or part of HVDC station can be minimised. Hence, it is required that protection system sends
the information regarding detection of fault and trip to the control system. In case of EHVAC transmission
protection, it is the task of protection system to detect the fault and trip the circuit breaker whereas in case
of HVDC, both control & protection systems are integrated with each other and are assigned the task of
protecting the HVDC system.
16.3 PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY
The HVDC protection system is designed based on the following general requirements:
16.3.1 Act Fast
The protection system is designed to act fast i.e., to detect the permanent fault or abnormal condition and
isolate the faulty equipment or section, typically within three fundamental frequency cycles. In case of non-
permanent faults, the protection system is designed to recover the system up to 90% of pre-fault power
typically within two to five fundamental frequency cycles.
16.3.2 Selectivity
Each equipment or section is protected by its own zone of protection so as to avoid unnecessary tripping
due to external zone fault. The overlapping with its adjacent zone is provided in each zone so that no part
is left unprotected. A local breaker backup / breaker failure function is also provided to protect in case the
associated circuit breaker fails to open even though the protection has issued a trip command. In that case,
a tripping command is issued to the next infeed zone circuit breaker.
16.3.3 Redundancy
The protection system redundancy is achieved by using any of the following principles, depending upon the
equipment or plant section:
(i) Main & Backup, in which different algorithms are used. Now-a-days, utilities are not opting this
redundancy option in DC protection system.
(ii) Main 1 & Main 2, in which different manufacturers of protection devices are used.
(iii) System A & System B, in which duplicated protection devices of identical design and functionality
are used. In this case, both System A & System B remains in Active mode which means that both
systems receive same inputs and gives necessary output signals in parallel.
The control system redundancy is achieved by System A and System B principle; however, unlike the
protection system redundancy of System A & System B type, in this case only one system remains in Active
mode and other in Standby mode. It means, both systems receive same inputs but only the System which
is in Active mode gives necessary output signals. In case the normal Active system becomes faulty or is
unavailable due to maintenance purpose, then Standby system is changed into Active mode automatically
and gives necessary output signals.
16.3.4 Hardware Availability
The protection system availability is achieved by providing different source of power supply and utilizing
different measuring equipment for redundant protection device.
16.3.5 Self-Monitoring
Each protection device is capable of self-monitoring through its own watch-dog feature. In case of protection
device hardware fault, the tripping is not issued.
However, if hardware fault arises in both redundant control & protection devices, then complete HVDC
system is tripped.
16.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
Following actions are employed in the control and protection system for protecting the sections or part of a
complete HVDC station:
16.4.1 Circuit Breaker Tripping
The objective of this action is to isolate the HVDC equipment from the AC system, thereby clearing the fault
and reducing stress on the equipment. For an urgent converter fault such as a valve short circuit where the
converter is in immediate danger, the rated withstand of the valve should be greater than the operating time
of the circuit breaker, inclusive of the detection time. This is typically, three fundamental frequency cycles.
For a non-urgent converter fault where the converter is not in immediate danger, it is desirable to wait until
the control system has reduced the load current to a low level before tripping the feeder circuit breaker.
In case of converter feeder circuit breaker tripping, the filters should be opened at the same instant, or earlier,
to assist the opening of the feeder circuit breaker.
16.4.2 Block
Protective blocking is used to stop the flow of both AC and DC current in order to limit the effect of the fault.
This is achieved by simply removing the firing pulses to all the valves in the converter. Normally a protective
block is followed by a trip of the circuit breaker, as only removing the firing pulses may not always stop
conduction.
16.4.3 Valve Refire
The entire valve should be refired to prevent possible valve damage caused by partial blocking if more
than a certain number of thyristors (taking into account the number of redundant levels) are protectively
triggered.
16.4.4 Inhibit Raise
For moderate overvoltages the tapchanger is inhibited from tapping up to ensure that the overvoltage
condition is not worsened due to tapchanger action.
16.4.5 Force Lower
For more severe overvoltages the tapchanger is forced to tap down to alleviate the stress on the equipment
due to the overvoltage.
16.4.6 Block and Bypass (Bypass)
This action provides a DC short circuit across the converter bridge. It consists of blocking four
valves in the six-pulse bridge and firing the remaining two as a bypass pair. In each 6-pulse
bridge there are three possible bypass pairs. Under some circumstances, for example an external
flashover across a valve, it is necessary to select the pair containing the flashover valve. Once the
DC current has been stopped, the converter valves can be blocked and the converter AC feeder
breaker tripped.
16.4.7 Forced Retard
This action forces rectifier firing at a high firing angle into the inversion region, to extinguish the current
flowing on the DC side.
16.4.8 DC Line Fault Recovery Sequence
When a DC line fault has occurred the pole or converter control attempts to restart the power transmission
after a de-ionisation time. The purpose of this sequence is to restore operation as soon as possible after a
DC line fault.
16.4.9 Electrode Line Current Reduction
In case one electrode line is not available, the DC Protection System sends an “Electrode Line Current
Reduction Request”. In the Control System, this signal limits the maximum current reference values and
therefore the Poles Current Capability of both poles to 50%. Caused by this limitation the ground current in
the remaining electrode line cannot exceed the selected limitation.
16.4.10 Balanced Bipolar Mode
In this mode, both poles are operated with very small electrode currents, independently of their operation
mode.
Fig. 16.4
16.5 ZONES OF PROTECTIONS
A complete HVDC station consists of AC busbars, AC lines, AC filter banks (comprising of AC filter sub-banks
and/or Shunt capacitor/Shunt reactor) & connecting AC busbar section, Converter transformer & connecting
AC busbar section, Converter or Pole, DC filter, DC busbar, DC line and Electrode line.
The protections of AC busbars and AC lines are not explained here because the configuration of AC busbars
and AC lines comprises of conventional components and are generally protected by the use of standard
numerical relays; however, whenever these components are adjacent to the HVDC components or sections,
the overlapping of the protection zones is always provided.
These protection of HVDC system comprises of several protection zones such as AC Filter Protection, AC
Filter Connection Protection, Converter Transformer Protection, Converter or Pole Protection including
equipment within valve hall, dc Switchyard including smoothing reactors, DC Filter Protection, DC Busbar
Protection, DC Line Protection and
Electrode Line Protection, metallic return conductor protection. The zone of each protection is illustrated in
Figure 16.4.
16.6 DC PROTECTIONS
16.6.1 Converter Protection
The Converter protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of Converter
protection is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.5 shows possible fault cases and a typical CT and VT
arrangement for realising Converter Protections.
Fig. 16.5
The Measuring Equipments of the above typical schematic are as per below:
IdlH Pole Side DC CT in Valve Hall

UdlH Pole side DC Voltage Divider in DC yard
IdCH Pole side DC CT in DC Yard
IacY Valve side AC CT for Y-Y Converter X-Mer
IacD Valve side AC CT for Y-D Converter X-Mer

Uac AC side Capacitive Voltage Transformer
IdcN Neutral side DC CT in Valve Hall
UdN Neutral Side DC Voltage divider
Idee1 DC CT in Electrode line
Idee2 DC CT in Electrode line
IdlN Neutral Side DC CT in DC yard
HSNBS High Speed Neutral Bus Switch
HSGS High Speed Grounding Switch
MRTB Metallic Return Transfer Breaker
MRS Metallic Return Switch
IdMRS DC CT in MRS circuit
IdSG DC CT in HSGS circuit
Following protections (duplicated) are provided per Converter:
16.6.1.1 AC>DC Differential or Valve Short Circuit Protection
This protection is provided to protect against a valve short circuit and other phase-to-phase short circuits
which give rise to high AC currents and low DC currents (refer all Fault 1 to Fault 9 in Figure 16.5). The
protection is provided for both upper valve group and lower valve group. This protection is a Main protection
within each system.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 16.5):
(IacY – MIN(IdCH, IdCN)) > Threshold OR
(IacD - MIN(IdCH, IdCN)) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 1.5 to 2.5 p.u. and Operating time t = 0-1 ms.
Since very high short circuit current can flow through the Thyristor Valve and converter transformer, the
protection activation time as fast as it can.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Tripping of converter circuit breakers
16.6.1.2 DC Differential Protection
DC differential protection is used to detect ground faults on the dc side of the converter terminal. Typically,
it is implemented separately for several protection zones.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 16.5):
(IdCH - IdCN) > Threshold (for Converter level)
(IdLH - IdLN) > Threshold (for Pole level)
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u.; t = 5 ms.
Initiated Actions:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.3 Asymmetry Protection or DC Harmonic Protection
This protection is provided to detect the persistent presence of fundamental and 2nd harmonic voltages or
current between the DC terminals of the pole cause by a valve misfire or successive commutation failure
due to distorted ac voltage or due to control malfunctioning. This protection is a Backup protection within
each system.
Evaluation Principle (refer Figure 16.5)
For fundamental frequency protection: IdLH(50 Hz) > Threshold
For 2nd harmonic protection: IdLH(100 Hz) > Threshold
Typical Settings
For fundamental frequency protection: Threshold = 0.05IdL and Operating Time t = 700 ms.
For 2nd harmonic protection: Threshold = 0.05IdL and Operating Time t = 2000 ms.
Necessary co-ordination with ac system fault clearing time and commutation failure, such that it shall not
activate pre-maturely in case of transient events.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.4 DC Under voltage Protection
This protection is used in case of inverter faults while telecommunication is not available. It also acts as
back up to DC line faults protection for remote DC line faults. Sometimes it may be activated for persistent
very low ac voltage in either end of HVDC terminal station.
This protection is provided to protect the converter against high voltage converter faults to neutral or ground.
This protection is a Backup protection within each system.
Evaluation Principle (refer Figure 16.5): UdL < Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.2 p.u. and Operating time t = 1 s.
Initiated Actions:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.5 Group Differential Protection or Commutation failure
Inverter station may be subjected to single or multiple commutation failures. It may be due to ac network
commutation voltage disturbance or firing angle problem. Group differential protection is provided to protect
the converter against DC faults that are bypassing the inverter (refer Fault 4 and Fault 5 in Figure 16.5).
This protection is a Main protection within each system.
This is detected if dc current is higher than valve side ac current than the commutation failure is indicated in
the bridge. In some philosophy valve conduction status is being monitored. Along with valve gate pulse which
indicate valve conduction status. Commutation failure is indicating current flowing with irregular combination
of valve conduction cycle which is not in the correct sequence of valve firing.
(MAX(IdCH, IdCN) - MAX(IacD, IacY)) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u. and Operating time t = 0.1 to 1 s
Threshold = 1 p.u. and Operating time t = 10 to 50 ms
Initiated Actions
The control system shall acts to avoid the occurrence of more commutation failures. It is generally achieved
by increasing the commutation margin angle. In case of multiple commutations inverter is going to block.
• Block inverter
• Tripping of associated circuit breakers
AND
Bridge Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against commutation failure of six pulse group and firing
malfunction (refer Fault 1, Fault 3, Fault 6 to Fault 9 in Figure 16.5). The protection is provided for both
upper-six-pulse-valve group and lower-six-pulse-valve group. This protection is a Main protection within
each system.

(MAX(IacY, IacD) - IacY) > Threshold OR
(MAX(IacY, IacD) - IacD) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.4 p.u. and Operating Time t = 100 to 200 ms.
Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u. and Operating Time t = 0.2 to 1 s.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.6 Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to protect against the overcurrents in any of the valve winding connections of
converter transformer which can result from insulation failures within the converter or as a consequence of a
control system failure (refer Fault 1 to Fault 4, Fault 6 to Fault 9 in Figure 16.5). This protection is a Backup
protection within each system.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 16.5)
Activated in case Valve side star and delta side current are higher than some threshold value. One threshold
is triggered a faster protection to block the converter and trip ac side breaker. Another Thresholds is co-
ordinated with the thermal loading of the valve, and protection activated, if this excessive current persisting
for specified time leads to higher Thermal stress on Thyristor junction, it shall issue block /trip signal.
Max(IacY,IacD) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 1.25 to 3.5 p.u. (4 stages) and Operating time t = 30 s to 5 ms (4 stages).
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.7 Open Converter or DC Overvoltage Protection
This protection (refer 59/37DC in Figure 16.5) is provided to stop the rectifier operation against open DC
line or a blocked inverter. This protection is a Main protection within each system.
UdH > Threshold1

UdH > Threshold2
UdH > Threshold3 AND IdCH < Threshold4
Typical Settings
Threshold1 = 1.024 p.u. and Operating time t = 1000 ms
Threshold2 = 1.4 p.u and Operating time t = 10 ms
Threshold3 = 1.024 p.u., Threshold4 = 0.01 p.u. and Operating time t = 20 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.8 Sub-Synchronous Resonance Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against sub synchronous resonance (SSR) conditions.
This protection acts as Main protection within each system. SSR protection trips when the absolute value of
SSR content of neutral side DC current is exceeding a threshold value and the SSR current is not decreasing
with at least a threshold slope.
IdCH(fResonance) > Threshold1

Delta(IdCH(fResonance)] < Threshold2
Typical Settings:
Depends on the AC system: fResonance typically 17 to 35 Hz
Threshold1 = 0.01 to 0.02 p.u., Threshold2 = 0.001 to 0.002 p.u.
Initiated Actions
• Force retard rectifier
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.9 AC Overvoltage Protection
This protection is provided to detect the overvoltages which could not be cleared using the AC filters and
shunt reactors. This protection is a Main protection within each system. This zone is bus bar and connected
equipment. This is due to execessive reactive power generation at bus bar short circuit capacity reduction
or load throw of due to blocking of converter. The concept is to trip the filter banks in case of blocking of
converters to take corrective measure of the surplus reactive power unnecessary connected at bus.
MAX(UacL1, UacL2, UacL3) > Threshold OR
MAX(UacL1, ULac2, UacL3) > Threshold OR
Uac magnitude > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 1.1 to 1.5 p.u. and
Operating Time t = 5 s to 100 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.10 AC voltage stress Protection of Converter
Ac over-voltage protection is used to prevent excessive voltage stress on the dc side of the converter
equipment that is exposed to connected AC voltage. This mainly the equipment of converter transformer
secondary and valves. The combination of primary side ac voltage and tap changer position can produce
excessively high voltages on the secondary windings.
The protection monitor the primary side of AC voltage and tap position and calculate no load voltage secondary
voltage (valve side) exceeding threshold
Evaluation Principle
Udi0 > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = To be co-ordinated with voltage withstand capability of valve, secondary winding and Operating
Time t = Equipment withstand capability with time
Initiated Actions
Inhibit tap changer movement
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.11 AC Undervoltage Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against loss of AC voltage for longer duration than AC
Fault clearing times. This protection is a Main protection within each system.
MAX(UacL1, UacL2, UacL3) < Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.3 p.u. and
Operating Time = 1.5 s to 2 s
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.1.12 AC Valve Winding Ground Fault Supervision
This protection is provided to protect the converter against phase to ground fault on the valve windings
while in the Blocked status of operation (refer Fault 7 to Fault 9 in Figure 16.5). This protection is a Main
protection within each system.
MAX(UsumY, UsumD) > Threshold1 and IdCH < Threshold2
Typical Settings:
Threshold1 = 0.25 p.u.
Initiated Actions
> Deblock inhibit
16.6.1.13 Excessive Delay angle Protection
This protection is used to protect the stress on snubber circuit element in thyristor valves. The protection
function monitors firing angle, extinction angle and operate to prevent tap changer action. If the angles is
greater than threshold it shall stop the converter.
16.6.2 DC Filter Protection
Dc filter protection is similar to ac filter protection explained later in the section. The protection is going to
detect mainly High Voltage capacitor cans. It also detects any excessive harmonic current flowing through
the resistor and reactor.
In case bank is equipped with suitable isolator, the protection initiates automatic isolation of the filter bank.
Any ground faults in the DC filter, High voltage (pole bus) Differential protection initiated necessary switching
action.
The DC filter protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of DC filter protection
is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.6 shows a typical CT arrangement for realising DC Filter Protections.
Following protections (duplicated) are provided:
16.6.2.1 Capacitor Differential Over current Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against short circuits, faults to neutral or ground within
capacitor. This protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS(IT11 - IT12)> Threshold
Typical Settings
Unbalance of one capacitor unit
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Pole isolation
Fig. 16.6
16.6.2.2 Capacitor Unbalance Supervision
This protection is provided to protect the healthy capacitor units from stress caused by faulty units. It detects
short circuiting of capacitor element rows whilst allowing a continuous “natural” balance error of the capacitor
bank. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
(IT11 + IT12) < Threshold1
(IT11 + IT12) > Threshold2
Typical Settings
Trip in case of faulty capacitor element group
Instantaneous trip when whole unit is faulty
Initiated Actions
If (IT11 + IT12) < Threshold1, then open DC filter HV side disconnector
If (IT11 + IT12) > Threshold1, then
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.2.3 Inverse Overcurrent Time Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against excessive harmonic currents and overheating of
the reactor. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Int(Isum-Imax_continious) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Depends on the overload characteristic of the inductance
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.2.4 DC Filter Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against faults to ground or neutral within protection zone.
The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Abs(Isum - IT2) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.3 x MAX(Isum - IT2) and Operating Time t = 10 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Open neutral bus switch
16.6.3 DC Line Protection
The DC line protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of DC line protection
is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.7 shows a typical CT(DCCT) and VT(Dc Voltage divider) arrangement
for realising DC Line Protections.
When a dc line to ground fault occurs, the dc voltage drops to a lower level at a certain rate, which is a
function of traveling waves initiated by the fault. The dc line fault detection makes use of this traveling wave
concept and generally uses both the rate of change of dc voltage, dV/dt, and the dc voltage level. Through
UdH to detect and distinguish a dc line fault. The rate of change is measured under a selected time window
to discriminate any voltage drop on the healthy pole of a bipolar line, induced by the traveling wave on the
faulted line.
DC line fault protections are implemented at the rectified terminal. Generally, fast and slow fault detection
schemes are provided to cover the entire line. The fast protection detects a high rate of change of voltage
in a small time interval, indicating a low impedance fault or a fault close to the rectifier. The slower part of
protection responds to a dc depression over a larger time interval, to detect high impedance faults or faults
closer to the inverter terminal. Use of low dc voltage is generally made to minimize any false detection on the
healthy line. The dV/dt thresholds need to be carefully selected during system studies and/or field tests to not
only avoid false triggering on the un-faulted pole, but also to avoid activation for ac faults near the inverter
terminal. It may be noted in case of low ac voltage in HVDC terminal, the DC voltage reduction is going
down in a sluggish rate due to presence of smoothing reactor on DC side provide necessary discrimination
of DC line fault and low ac voltage.
The dc line fault protection function initiates a sequence of operations that is intended to extinguish temporary
faults and resume normal operation. On detection of a fault, the rectifier retards its firing angle (into the
inverting region), thereby stopping the flow from of current from the rectifier into the fault. Simultaneously,
the inverter increases its margin angle to a very high value as its control system tries to maintain current flow
under the fault condition (very low dc voltage). These actions combine to extinguish the fault current.
The dc controls then block firing to totally stop operation of the converters. Then, after a preset delay time
(typically about 0.2 to 0.5 seconds to allow deionization of the fault), the control systems at the rectified and
inverter terminals restart and restore power transfer to the pre-fault level. The post fault recovery usually
required about typical 100 ms on a strong ac system, and may require as much as 500 ms on a very weak
ac system. This sequence of actions is called a temporary dc line fault sequence. Typically, arcing faults
caused by lightning strikes are cleared by this sequence.
If the fault restrikes during or shortly after the recovery process, the protection sequence is triggered
again. Normally, the same sequence is followed, but the deionization delay in longer (approximately 0.5 to
1.0 second). The protection system may be programmed to attempt as many as three restarts, following
progressively longer deionization delays. If the final restart is unsuccessful, the converters are tripped.
Recognizing that dc line faults can be caused by insulator degradation (contaminated or physically damaged
insulators), HVDC systems generally utilize a scheme where the last restart attempt is with a reduced dc
voltage. Such a scheme may permit post fault operation at a reduced power transfer as reduce voltage
operation, even with degraded insulation on the line.
16.6.3.1 Travelling Wave front Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground (refer Fault 2 and Fault 3 in Figure
16.7). The evaluation principle for WFPDL is detection of the discharge wave by evaluating the rate of change
of voltage and current. The zone of each station overlaps with other station so that no part of the DC line is
remaining unprotected. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
d(UdH)/dt > Threshold1 OR
Delta UdH > Threshold2 OR
d(IdLH)/dt > Threshold3
Typical Settings
Depends on the AC grid and DC line characteristic
Initiated Actions
• DC line fault recovery sequence
• If numbers of restarts are reached, then block rectifier, then block inverter and then trip converter
circuit breakers
Fig. 16.7
16.6.3.2 Under voltage Sensing Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground or neutral (refer Fault 1 to Fault 3 in
Figure 16.7). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
d(UdH)/dt > Threshold1 and UdH < Threshold2
Typical Settings
Depends on the AC grid and DC line characteristic
Initiated Actions

circuit breakers
16.6.3.3 Under voltage Operation Protection
This protection is provided to detect the high impedance DC line faults (refer Fault 1 to Fault 3 in Figure 16.7).
The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Threshold1 < UdH < threshold2
Typical Settings

Threshold2 = 0.6 p.u. and
Opeating Time = 0.5 s
Initiated Actions

circuit breakers
16.6.3.4 DC Line Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground (refer Fault 2 in Figure 16.7). The
protection acts as Main function within each system
ABS(IdL-IdL(other station)) > Threshold

Typical Settings
Operating Time t = 0.5 s
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.3.5 Remote Station Fault Detection or AC-DC Conductor Contact Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against AC line contact to DC line and in adverted Block
of Inverter.
IdLH(50Hz) > Threshold1 & IdLH > Threshold2 OR
UdLH(50Hz) > Threshold3 & IdLH(50Hz) > Threshold4
Typical Settings
Operating time t = 500 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.4 Electrode Line Protection
The electrode line protection is realised through System A and system B at bipole level. The zone of electrode
line protection is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.8 shows a typical CT arrangement for realising Electrode
Line Protections.

16.6.4.1 Electrode Bus Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect against earth faults at electrode bus (refer Fault 1, Fault 2 and Fault 7
in Figure 16.8). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS((IdE-IdE_op)-(Idee1+Idee2)-IdSG) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.05 ... 0.07 p.u. and
Operating Time t = 300 to 500 ms
Initiated Actions
In case of bipolar operation, warning is generated
In case of monopolar operation:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.4.2 Electrode Current Balance Protection
This protection is provided to protect against earth faults at electrode line (refer Fault 5 and Fault 6 in Figure
16.8). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS(Idee1-Idee2) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Operating Time t = 2000 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter

Fig. 16.8
16.6.4.3 Electrode Over current Protection
This protection is provided to protect against electrode overcurrent. The protection acts as Main function
within each system.
ABS(Idee1) > Threshold1 OR
ABS(Idee2) > Threshold2
Typical Settings
Operating Time t = 0.5 s to 5 s
Operating Time t = 2 s to 10 s
Initiated Actions
• Electrode line current reduction sequence
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter

16.6.4.4 Electrode line open circuit Over voltage Protection
This protection is provided to protect against Open electrode line. The protection acts as Main function
within each system.
UdN > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 90 kV. (Depending on BIL selection of Neutral bus)
Initiated Actions
• Close ground switch
• Balanced bipolar mode operation
16.6.4.5 Station Ground Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to protect against station ground overcurrent and earth fault in metallic return
operation. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
IdSG > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.4.6 Open Conductor Electrode Line Protection
This protection is provided to protect against open electrode line conductor fault. The protection acts as
Main function within each system.
(Idee1 > Threshold1; Idee2 < Threshold2) OR
(Idee1 < Threshold2; Idee2 > Threshold1)

Typical Settings
Initiated Actions
• Electrode line current reduction sequence.
16.6.5 DC Busbar Protection
The DC busbar protection is realised through System A and system B. The zone of DC busbar protection is
shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.9 shows a typical CT arrangement for realising DC Busbar Protections.
16.6.5.1 HV Side DC Bus bar Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar in case of faults to ground or neutral within protection
zone. The protection acts as Main function within each system. Zone covering Bus bar, Air core smoothing
reactor, HV side of DC filter in this protection.
ABS(IdL - IdH) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.5.2 Neutral Side DC Busbar Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar against earth faults or faults to neutral between the
low voltage side of IdCN DC current measuring and the IdLN DC current measuring. The protection acts
as Main function within each system. Neutral DC bus bar, air core smoothing reactor equipment located in
this zone.
ABS(IdN - IdE) > Threshold

Typical Settings
Operating Time t = 50 to 1000 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
Fig. 16.9
16.6.5.3 DC Differential Backup Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar against Earth faults or faults to neutral on the HV or LV
side between the IdLH DC current measuring and the IdLN DC current measuring. The protection acts as
Main function within each system.
Abs(IdL - IdE) > Threshold

Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.05 to 0.25 p.u. and Operating Time t = 50 to 1000 ms.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
16.6.5.4 Valve Protection
Thyristor failure protection: It monitors the number of thyristor has failed in a valve If it exceeds some pre-set
number, necessary alarm and tripping of the converter is initiated. Thyristor monitoring is done through fibre
optic check back signal from thyristor level to Valve control/ valve base electronics
Several types of thyristor-valve protections are used in HVDC systems. Some of the more common ones
are following:
Thyristor failure protection monitors the number of failed thyristor in every valve. Voltage across each
individual thyristor is monitored within the valve system. If the voltage is zero when the thyristor should be in
a blocked state, then the thyristor is considered to be failed. This voltage monitoring (no voltage or voltage
across the each thyristor device) function is performed at the valve and a signal is transmitted from each
thyristor level to the control system through fibre optic light guides. The control system counts the number
of failed cells in each valve. Normally, valves have redundant thyristor levels and can continue to operate
with one or more failed thyristor levels. Hence, failure of thyristor levels up to the redundant number is only
alarmed. If the number of failed thyristor exceeds the redundancy, then a protective action is triggered,
normally stopping operation of the converter.
The Series connection of thyristors and the protection to be considered in HVDC application
Modern Thyristors for HVDC application have blocking voltage in the range of 5 to 16.5 kV; Depending upon
the DC voltage level of 12 pulse converter bridge, the number of thyristor is in series required of the order of
100 or more. It may be noted that Thyristors is not an ideal switch. difficulties arise from the multiple series
connection, some of which are also attributable to manufacturer inadequacies of the components. Turn on
which must take place simultaneously for all elements in series circuit. A prerequisite for this would be that
the gate pulse would be applied simultaneously to all thyristors. This is not case in real world. It may further
be noted that turn on delay time and may not be identical and may be dependent on the damping circuit (R-C
snubber) connected in parallel to each thyristor level. Turn on protection is also dependent upon selection of
saturable reactor, generally connected in series of each thyristor module /valve section (number of thyrsitor
levels are connected in series to form thyristor module or valve section).
Turn off protection is also included for each thyristor; This may be given in each thyristor level or each valve
section basis
Voltage break over (VBO) protection or Protective firing protects the thyristor under conditions when it is
subjected excessive overvoltage. This protection acts to …thyristor when the voltage is above a set threshold.
It is implemented within the valve itself on each thyristor level, in the electronic packages associated with
each of them.
Valve base-electronic protection detects problems related to firing pulses problem in the opto interface
control.
Valve cooling protection detects problems in the valve cooling system. For example, a water cooling system
may monitor water inlet/outlet temperatures, water conductivity, water pump outlet pressure, water flow rate,
etc. Alarm and protective actions are triggered when the monitored parameters exceed or deteriorate the
normal operating ranges.
16.7 AC PROTECTIONS
16.7.1 Converter Transformer Protection
The converter transformer protection is realised through standard principles which are generally applied
in a power transformer of any EHVAC switchyard and comprises of differential protection, high impedance
restricted earth fault protection, ground earth fault overcurrent protection, thermal overload protection, over-
fluxing protection, directional definite time / inverse-time overcurrent protection and directional earth fault
overcurrent protection.
Fig. 16.10
The protection scheme includes the use of separate numerical relays for Main 1, Main 2 and Backup
protections. It means that some protections are duplicated as Main 1 & Main 2 and these protection relays
can send tripping commands to the circuit breakers without any intended time delay. The protection system
also incorporates some backup functions through a separate relay which can provide tripping commands
to the circuit breakers after a defined time delay. The zone of Converter Transformer Protection is shown
in the Figure 16.4. Figure 16.10 shows the CT arrangement in a typical Converter Transformer protection
scheme.
Initiated Actions
Switch off converter transformer by sending trip commands to its all associated circuit breakers.
16.7.2 Converter Transformer Connection Protection
This protection is provided to protect the part or section of the AC busbar which connects the Converter
Transformer with the main AC busbars. Generally the protection is realised through Main 1 and Main 2
principle by using separate numerical relays for both. The zone of Converter Transformer Connection
Protection is shown in the Figure 16.4.
The differential protection is provided as Main 1 and Main 2 protections. It means that the duplicated differential
protection is provided and both protections give tripping commands to the circuit breaker without any intended
delay. Refer Figure 16.11 for possible fault case (Fault 2) and CT arrangement to realise the scheme.
ABS(IT2(50Hz) – IT12(50Hz) > Threshold OR
ABS(IT3(50Hz) – IT12(50Hz) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Typical differential protecting of the Relay
Initiated Actions
Switch off converter transformer by sending trip commands to its all associated circuit breakers.
16.7.3 AC Filter Connection Protection
This protection is provided to protect the part or section of the AC busbar which connects the AC Filter
bank with the main AC busbars. Generally the protection is realised through Main 1 and Main 2 principle
by using separate numerical relays for both. The zone of AC Filter Connection Protection is shown in the
Figure 16.4.
The differential protection is provided as Main 1 and Main 2 protections. It means that the duplicated
differential protection is provided and both protections give tripping commands to the circuit breaker without
any intended delay. In this scheme, the protection relay uses multiple CT inputs. Refer Figure 16.11 for
possible fault case (Fault 1) and CT arrangement to realise the scheme.
ABS(IT1(50Hz) – SUM(IT11(50Hz)sub-bank1..n) > Threshold OR
ABS(IT3(50Hz) – SUM(IT11(50Hz)sub-bank1..n) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Typical differential protecting of the Relay

Initiated Actions
Switch off complete AC filter bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breakers.
Fig. 16.11
16.7.4 AC Filter Sub-bank Protection
The AC filter sub-bank protection is realised through Main and Backup principle. The AC filter sub-bank
protection zone is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.12 shows possible fault cases and CT arrangement in
a typical AC Filter Sub-bank.
Following protections are generally provided for each AC filter sub-bank protection:
16.7.4.1 Differential Protection
This protection is provided to detect the ground faults (refer Fault 1 in Figure 16.12) within a sub-bank.
Generally, a low impedance type differential protection is provided and acts as a Main protection. A similar
protection as a Backup can also be provided for the sake of redundancy.
ABS(IT1(50Hz) – IT3(50Hz)) > Threshold

Typical Settings
Operation time t = 0 ms
Initiated Actions
Switch off AC filter sub-bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker.
16.7.4.2 Overcurrent Protection
This protection comprises of two functions: the instantaneous overcurrent which protects the sub-bank
against thermal overstress and the inverse-time overcurrent to detect the short circuits faults (refer Fault
1 in Figure 16.12) within a sub-bank. This protection basically protects from the overcurrent which could
destroy or damage the AC Filter Sub-bank and acts as a Main protection. A similar protection as a Backup
can also be provided for the sake of redundancy.
For instantaneous overcurrent: IT1(50Hz) > Threshold
For inverse-time overcurrent: IT1(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve
Typical Settings
For instantaneous overcurrent: Threshold > 1 to 4 p.u. and
Operating Time T = 1 to 10 ms
For inverse-time overcurrent: The setting depends on thermal overload curve of the components.
Initiated Actions
16.7.4.3 Overload or Overvoltage Protection of AC Filter Sub-bank Capacitors
This protection is provided to protect the AC filter sub-bank capacitors against voltage overstress.
For each phase the protection determines the capacitor voltage by integrating measured line current
to give a signal representing the voltage waveform applied to the capacitor. The peak values of
the signal are evaluated according to an inverse voltage-time withstand curve. This function acts
as a Main protection.
Typical Settings
Depends upon the overload curve of capacitor.

Initiated Actions
Fig. 16.12
16.7.4.4 Unbalance Supervision of AC Filter Sub-bank Capacitors
This protection is provided to detect the faulty capacitors and short circuit of capacitor elements in H-type
capacitor bank (refer Fault 5 in Figure 16.12) within AC filter sub-bank. The function basically protects healthy
capacitor units from being overstressed caused by faulty units. Also, it supervises the de-tuning of AC Filter
Sub-bank. This function acts as a Main protection. A similar protection as a Backup is also provided for the
sake of redundancy.
Evaluating Principle
The evaluation algorithm calculates the changes in calculated fundamental frequency current of each phase.
The change of magnitude indicates the change in capacitance whereas change in phase angle denotes the
leg in which the change in capacitance has occurred.
In alternative evaluation algorithm, this function compares the rate of change of current, measured in between
two arms of H configured capacitor bank with respect to the circuit current.
Typical Settings
The tripping command can be issued instantaneously or delayed depending upon the failure of number of
capacitor elements within a capacitor unit.
Initiated Actions
16.7.4.5 Overload Protection of AC Filter Sub-bank Resistors
This protection is provided to protect AC filter sub-bank resistors against thermal overstress (refer Fault 3
in Figure 16.12). This protection contains two functions: the instantaneous and inverse-time overcurrent
protection. This function acts as a Main protection.

For instantaneous overcurrent: I42(50Hz) > Threshold.
For inverse-time overcurrent: I42(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve
Typical Settings
The setting depends on time-overcurrent curve of resistor and short circuit current through resistor.
Initiated Actions
16.7.4.6 Overload Protection of AC Filter Reactors
This protection is provided to protect AC filter sub-bank reactors against thermal overstress (refer Fault 4
in Figure 16.12). This protection contains two functions: the instantaneous and inverse-time overcurrent
protection. This function acts as a Main protection.

For instantaneous overcurrent: I41(50Hz) > Threshold.
For inverse-time overcurrent: I41(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve.
Typical Settings
The setting depends on time-overcurrent curve of reactor and short circuit current through reactor
Initiated Actions
Switch off AC filter sub-bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker
16.7.4.7 Zero Sequence Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to detect the earth current flowing through grounding, caused by ground faults,
conductor interruption or circuit breaker malfunction. This function acts as a Backup protection.

(IT3(50Hz)Phase L1 + IT3(50Hz)Phase L2 + IT3(50Hz)Phase L3) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.2 p.u. and Operating Time t = 100ms
Initiated Actions
16.7.5 Shunt Capacitor Protection
The shunt capacitor is generally provided as a part of AC Filter and serves as a sub-bank. In some cases,
it is possible that the shunt capacitors are connected directly to the AC busbar as a separate branch / arm.
The Shunt Capacitor Protection zone is shown in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.13 shows possible fault cases and
CT arrangement in a typical Shunt Capacitor branch / arm.
Due to the less number of components as compared a typical AC filter sub-bank, the protections are also
less. The shunt capacitor protection comprises of differential protection (generally a low impedance type),
overcurrent protection, overload / overvoltage protection of capacitors units, unbalance supervision of
capacitors units and a zero sequence overcurrent protection. The evaluation principle of protection and
redundancy is same as that of AC Filter Sub-bank protection.
Initiated Actions
Switch off shunt capacitor by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker
Fig. 16.13
16.7.6 Shunt Reactor Protection
The shunt reactor is generally provided as a part of AC Filter and serves as a sub-bank. In some cases, it is
possible that the shunt reactors are connected directly to the AC busbar as a separate branch / arm.
The protection of shunt reactor is realised through standard principles which are generally applied in shunt
reactor of any EHVAC switchyard and comprises of differential protection (in this case generally a low
impedance type), restricted earth fault protection and impedance protection.
The Shunt Reactor Protection is realised through Main and Backup principle. Its protection zone is shown
in Figure 16.4. Figure 16.14 shows possible fault cases and CT arrangement in a typical Shut Reactor
branch / arm.
Initiated Actions
Switch off shunt reactor by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker.
Fig. 16.14
References
1. Ake Ekstrom (1990) High power electronics HVDC and SVC

2. Kimbark- Direct Current Transmission
3. J Arrillaga,_Y._H._Liu,_N._R._Watson(auth.) Flexible Power Transmission-The HVDC options
4. ChanKi_Kim,_Dr_Vijay_K._Sood,_GilSoo_Jang,_Seon HVDC TRANSMISSION Power Conversion
Applications in Power Systems
5. IEC 60919 -1, IEC 60919-2
6. EPRI, HVDC hand book
7. Technical Specification of PowerGrid
8. ABB, Siemens, ALSTOM websites
9. www.eceuidaho.edu
Chapter 17
Protection Schemes based on

communication systems
Protection systems must meet sensitivity, time response, selectivity and reliability requirements in order to
meet fault clearing requirements. Protection schemes applied to geographically separated terminals such as
cables or lines, very seldom meet all these requirements without using telecommunications. For example,
stand-alone step-distance schemes, provide very reliable and sensitive protection capable of clearing faults
without using telecommunications, but time response for end zone faults is longer and high-speed auto-
reclosing is not possible without telecommunication. Telecommunications are therefore needed to ensure
that time response and selectivity requirements are met for all power system fault conditions.
Telecommunications is also essential for some types of protection schemes, like analog comparison schemes,
to operate.
17.1 PROTECTION SYSTEMS
There are two methods of using telecommunication in protection schemes:

• Non unit protection: A protection whose operation and section selectivity are dependent on the
measurement of electrical quantities at one end of the protected section by the measuring relays and,
in some cases, on the exchange of logic signals between the ends.
• Unit protection: A protection whose operation and section selectivity are dependent on the comparison
of electrical quantities at each end of the protected section
17.2 BASIC METHODS
The basic methods of using telecommunication for line protection schemes may be broadly classified as
follows:
• Analog Comparison Schemes: Analog comparison protection is based on the transmission and
comparison of electrical parameters such as currents (amplitude and/or phase) between the various
terminals. It is also called unit protection
• State Comparison Schemes: State comparison protection schemes use communication channels
to share logical status information between the terminals. It is also called non unit protection
17.2.1 Analog Comparison Schemes
In analog comparison protection terminals at each end sends its sample currents to each other and compares
them with the remote ones. When an internal fault occurs, the result of the comparison will be a differential
value, so that, if it is higher than a threshold, the relay will initiate the trip.
It is applicable to any overhead line or cable at all voltage levels and for any type of system neutral
arrangement. It is particularly suitable where:
• Distance relays (without acceleration schemes) have limitations, for example:
– Very short lines and cables due to their low impedance, which makes it difficult to find an adequate
setting to get an instantaneous trip for faults on the main part of the line
– Multi-terminal lines, since the intermediate in feeds modify the impedance seen by the distance
relays, which depends not only on the distance to the fault, but also on the infeed from the remote
terminals, making difficult for an accurate measure of the impedance
Protection Schemes Based on Communication Systems 235
– No potential transformers and only current transformers are installed at each end of the line
Analog comparison protections have the following advantages:

• Not responsive to system swings and out-of-step conditions
• Unaffected by inadvertent loss-of-potential (i.e., due to a blown potential fuse)
• No mutual coupling problems from parallel lines.
• Not subject to transient problems associated with coupling capacitor potential devices.
• With segregated current differential there are no problems of phase selection for single pole auto-
reclosing at simultaneous faults on different circuits and phases close to one line end, because it
operates only for faults between current transformers in each phase.
• Some relaying problems in EHV transmission lines due to applying series capacitors are also overcome,
e.g. voltage reversal, current inversion or phase imbalance.
Analog comparison protection are of the following types:
17.2.1.1 Current Differential Line Protection
It is based in the principle of current comparison. Figure 17.1 shows a basic scheme of the differential line
protection. Current differential relays measure the current of the protected line at both ends. A local relay
sends the current values (iA) to the remote end and receives the current values from the remote end (iB)
via a telecommunication system. In each relay, an evaluation circuit compares the sum of the local and
remote current values, i.e. the differential current (iD), with an operation threshold value Iop. For a fault on
the protected line the differential current value will exceed the operation threshold value, a trip signal is sent
to the local circuit breaker.
The current values used in the differential protection must be taken at the same instant at all ends of the
line for comparison, so a delay compensation circuit is needed for the local values to compensate the
transmission time of the remote values.
Fig. 17.1 : Principle of differential line protection

17.2.1.1.1 Telecommunication systems used for differential line protection

Differential protection systems using pilot wires
Pilot wires consist of a pair of metallic wires normally embedded in an aerial or underground cable. Pilot wires
connect both ends electrically and establish a differential circuit where the secondary quantities may be in
the form of current signals or voltage signals, which are proportional to the primary current. The application
of differential protection using pilot wires is restricted on lines up to 10-25 km depending upon the scheme
used. Although the tendency is to replace pilot wires by optical fibers which are free from electromagnetic
interference, their use may still be justified for economic reasons. Traditionally, electromechanical pilot wire
differential relays are used. It is possible to use pilot wires for the digital communications channel. It may
be used to replace aging and sometimes obsolete pilot wire relays with a modern numerical line differential
relays using proper interfacing modems.
Differential protection systems using modulation or coding techniques

Modulation or coding techniques that are compatible with analog and digital telecommunication circuits are
used to overcome some of the shortfalls experienced with direct pilot wires coupling. Typical techniques
that are used:
• Frequency modulation (FM) for analog voice frequency (VF) channels.
The instantaneous current values at each terminal are transmitted as analog quantities to the other
terminals in a voice frequency band using frequency modulation. Whatever transmission media for
analog voice channels may be applied.
• Numerical coding for digital telecommunication systems
The instantaneous current values at each end of the power line are sampled, converted to digital data
and transmitted towards the other terminals through a digital telecommunication system.
Dedicated optical fibers

Direct optical fiber links between protection terminals are also used. A higher reliability is achieved because
intermediate devices are eliminated.
Multi-terminal configuration
The differential principle may be applied to multi-terminal lines. The protection relies on the sum of the inflowing
currents, which are added geometrically. For this purpose, the measuring circuits have to be so arranged
that at each end of the line, the local current and the currents from each of the others ends of the line are
available for comparison. Generally, the most recent designs allow up to five terminals applications.
Fig. 17.2 : Five terminal line with master-slave system

Fig. 17.3 : Five terminal line with master-master system
In master-slave system, the current samples are sent from all slave relays to one master relay
where the evaluation is made, and trip signals are sent to the remote ends when needed. In this
system, communication channel is only needed between the master, and each one of the slave
relays as shown in Figure 17.2.
In master-master system, current samples are exchanged between all relays, and an evaluation is made in
each relay. This means that a communication channel is needed between every relay included in the same
line differential protection zone as shown in Figure 17.3.
For a two-terminal system, the master-slave configuration can be used, but a master-master, where the
current information is exchanged between both terminals and evaluated at both ends is normally preferred,
since this gives a shorter operating time than that in a master-slave configuration.
Current samples from relays located geographically apart from each other, must be time coordinated so that
the current differential protection operates correctly.
17.2.1.2 Phase Comparison Protection
Phase comparison compares the phase angle of the fault current at the two terminals of the protected line.
If the two currents are essentially equal and 180 degrees out of phase, the relays detect an external fault
and do not initiate a trip. If these two currents are essentially in phase, the relays detect it as an internal fault
and initiate a trip to the appropriate breakers.
17.2.2 State Comparison Schemes
Protection systems in this class are based on the transmission of simple two-state information, “Yes/No”
command, from one end of the protected circuit to the other. The protection equipment sends a command
when it detects power system abnormality and faults. The protections that send commands can be grouped
as under:
• Those which send a command to trip
• Those which send command to block

The former includes those that perform direct tripping (as for isolation of un-switched shunt reactor on
line) from the received signal, and those that perform tripping dependent on the conditions of relays at the
receiving end after receipt of the command “to trip”.
In the second case, a block command is in itself sufficient to block the tripping at the receiving end.
The choice of protection scheme, e.g., tripping or blocking, and the method by which the command
is transmitted, depends upon a number of factors that include the type of information links and
their susceptibility to interference. The following sections give typical examples of protections in
this class.
17.2.2.1 Systems Based on a Command “To Trip”
The main forms of protection that fall under this type are:
• Direct inter-tripping (sometimes called transfer tripping)
• Direct tripping command e.g.: for shunt reactor faults. (Such commands are usually coded for security
reasons)
• Accelerated distance protection
• Permissive under reaching transfer tripping (PUTT)
• Permissive overreaching transfer tripping (POTT)
In all the cases, the transmission of information from one end to another indicates that a fault in the forward
direction has been detected at the sending end.
The transmission of information takes place on a faulty line and thus they face attenuation problems.
17.2.2.2 Systems Based on a Command “To Block Tripping”
In this class of protection, communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when the fault is detected in the
reverse direction. Tripping is carried out when this blocking signal is not received within a certain time (20-
40 ms) and the local relay has detected a fault in the forward direction. To allow for this time, the tripping is
delayed by the time required to receive the signal from remote end.
Thus the receipt of a signal, blocks the local protection from initiating tripping. Therefore, in a blocking
scheme no tripping signal is transmitted along the faulted line, instead the signals are transmitted to the
remote ends on healthy lines.
In blocking schemes, the transmission of signal is an essential requirement for avoiding unwanted tripping
on external faults. Any failure of information link does not generally affect the ability of the protection to trip
correctly for internal faults but can permit unwanted tripping for external faults. Therefore a short transmission
time and good dependability are more important than security.
17.3 COMMON TELEPROTECTION SCHEMES
The different schemes, together with associated zone settings, permissive criteria and tele-command mode,
are summarized in Table 17.1. Depending upon the requirements of the systems, there are many variations
and combinations of the basic categories given below:
Table 17.1 : Properties of command protection systems
Operating mode Under reaching Overreaching Permissive criteria General requirements

sending sending receiving
Permissive Under Zone-1 Under impedance Secure and fast
reach Under voltage Over
current Distance and
direction
Permissive overreach Zone-2 Distance and Secure and Fast
direction
Direct Trip Zone-1 None Secure & Dependable
Accelerated Under Zone-1 Zone-2 Secure and Fast

reach
Blocking overreach Reverse looking Distance and Fast and Dependable
direction
17.3.1 Permissive Schemes
As mentioned earlier in permissive schemes the communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when the
fault is detected in forward direction. Tripping is carried out when the communication signal carrier receive
(CR) is received and the local relay has detected a forward fault.
• In a permissive under reaching scheme the communication signal is sent from a zone that under
reaches the remote end.
• In a permissive overreaching scheme the communication signal is sent from a zone that overreaches
the remote end.
11.3.1.1 Permissive under Reach Schemes
In a permissive under reaching scheme, the communication signal is sent from a zone that under reaches
the remote end. Receipt of the signal at the other end initiates tripping, if the remote end protection at the
other end has detected the fault.
In order to have high security, the receiving end must not be sensitive to false signals coming from adjacent
lines. These false signals are usually generated when faults occur, or when circuit breaker or isolators
operation takes place. Because of the overreaching of the permissive device, a false signal received can lead
to a nonselective tripping.
In a double circuit power line, a noise signal can easily be transmitted from the faulty to the healthy power line
due to the mutual coupling between the two circuits. Precautions must be taken against such non-selective
tripping.
17.3.1.2 Permissive Overreach Schemes
In a permissive overreaching scheme, the communication signal is sent from a zone that overreaches the
remote end. Receipt of the signal at the other end initiates tripping, if the remote end protection has detected
the fault.
The permissive overreaching schemes are advantageous for the protection of short transmission lines. The
reason being the overreaching zones can be set to detect larger fault resistances compared to under reaching
zones and this helps in detecting high resistance faults in short transmission lines. It can be generally said
that they have the following advantages for short transmission lines.
• Better performance for high resistance faults

• Superior to pilot wire as digital decisions are exchanged instead of analogue signals.
• Superior to phase comparison relays which requires faithful communication of phase Information
• Teleprotection requirements are similar to those described under section permissive under reach.
The operating time of the protection system for all positions of faults on the protected line circuit includes
the overall transmission time, and this should be relatively short, i.e. of the order of 15-30 ms or less.
17.3.2 Direct Trip
Typical applications for direct transfer tripping are remote tripping for operations of protections like breaker
fail protection and reactor protection intertripping. Underreach with direct transfer tripping, (line protection)
is an exception.
In the case of direct tripping, the tripping command from the teleprotection equipment goes directly to the
circuit breaker tripping coil. Thus a spurious tripping signal resulting either from interference or human error will
cause unwanted, usually three-phase, tripping of the line and will block the operation of any auto-reclosure
relay. A genuine transfer tripping signal, on the other hand, must on no account be lost, whether there is
interference on the communications channel or not, otherwise the line fault would not be isolated resulting
in serious consequences.
Extremely high security and high dependability are therefore more important than transmission time for direct
transfer tripping. In order to fulfill these requirements, coded tripping is used. Coded signals (Frequency shift
signals) provide the necessary additional security against incorrect interpretation of speech, audio signals
coupled into the system and incorrect manipulations on the equipment. Coded frequency can provide adequate
reliability in respect of both dependability and security with fast overall operating times.
Normally a redundant channel is used in all cases where direct tripping is used.
17.3.3 Accelerated Under Reach
This is generally a distance protection using telecommunication, with under reach protection at each section
end, and in which a signal is transmitted when a fault is detected by the under reach protection. Receipt of
the signal at the other end permits a sequential measurement by an overreach zone to initiate tripping.
The acceleration scheme in which the basic zone is switched to extend beyond the basic transmission line
protected is not quite as fast in operation as the other permissive under reach distance schemes. This is
because an extra time is required for the directional measuring unit to make a new measurement and operate
after the range has been extended from Zone-1 to Zone-2. However when the security requirements (to
avoid a non-selective operation due to the receipt of a spurious signal) is dominant, this scheme although
slightly slower than the other permissive schemes, is safer from unwanted operation.
Reliability requirements on the teleprotection are about the same as for other permissive schemes, with the
difference that the security requirements are slightly less severe.
17.3.4 Blocking Overreach
Blocking schemes are used when communication signals are not to be transmitted over faulty line or when
boosting of signal is not permitted.
In this class of protection, communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when the fault is detected in the
reverse direction. Tripping is carried out when this blocking signal is not received within a certain time (20-
40 ms) and the local relay has detected a fault in the forward direction. For a fault on the line, the reverse-
looking directional units at the two ends do not send blocking signals and the overreaching first zones trip
their respective circuit breakers.
Thus the receipt of a signal blocks the local protection from initiating tripping. In a blocking scheme no tripping
signals are transmitted along the faulted line, instead the signals are transmitted along the healthy lines to
the remote ends for faults in the reverse direction to prevent tripping of the overreaching protections
In blocking schemes, the transmission of signal is an essential requirement for avoiding unwanted tripping
on external faults. Any failure of information link does not generally affect the ability of the protection to trip
correctly for internal faults but can permit unwanted tripping for external faults. An incorrect signal for a fault
on the protected line cannot prevent tripping, but only delay it. The loss or appreciable delay of the blocking
signal for an external fault will, however, cause false tripping of the protected line. Since the overreaching
first zone of the relays have to be delayed sufficiently long to allow time for a blocking signal to be received, a
short and consistent transmission time for the blocking signal is essential. It is important that the transmission
time should not increase due to interference.
Therefore it follows from these considerations that a short transmission time and good dependability are
more important than security.
In blocking systems, the transmission of a command is not required in the case of an internal fault.
Thus, internal faults that might delay or interrupt the telecommand are not a problem, and the
additional attenuation normally introduced by the fault path need not be considered while defining
the requirements of PLC link unlike in the case of permissive systems mentioned under permissive
under reach and accelerated under reach.
Because of the possibility of a non-selective operation in the case of failure of the teleprotection, supervision
features may be included to change the settings of the overreaching zones of relays to the normal 70-80%
of the protected circuit in such a cases. Thus it is necessary to monitor the signals continuously both ways
or to provide some forms of automatic self-checking facilities for the channels.
17.3.5 Echo Policies
It could be useful in some teleprotection schemes to return the received signal as a way to accelerate tripping
at the other end. Examples of this application can be found in weak end in feed condition which can occur on
a transmission line, either when the circuit breaker is open, so there is no current in feed from that line end,
or when the current in feed is low due to weak generation behind the protection. The following will happen
in various schemes of teleprotection described above.
• In permissive overreach schemes both circuit breakers may fail to trip instantaneously due to no carrier
send signal and no relay operation in weak end.
• In permissive under reach schemes fast fault clearance of the whole line section will not be there
because no signal will be sent from the weak end.
• In blocking scheme or permissive under reach scheme the low in feed end will fail to trip
instantaneously.
To overcome these problems in lines connecting a strong and a weak station and in permissive
overreaching scheme, the weak end has to be equipped with a weak in-feed logic and a step of the
protection relay will be reverse looking. If a teleprotection signal is received at the weak end and
if the protection does not see the fault backwards or forwards and there exists an under voltage
condition, an internal fault is assumed and the signal is echoed back allowing tripping. The logic
also sends trip signal to CB on the weak end side. Due to implementation of weak end in feed
logic described above the following will happen.
• In case of permissive under each scheme the last 10-20% towards weak end will be cleared in Zone
2 time. If this is not acceptable overreach scheme should be used.
• In blocking scheme weak end circuit breaker cannot be tripped. In such case direct tripping from
Zonel and accelerated zone must be used.
• When operating with one end disconnected or open, it may be useful to continuously send permissive/
acceleration signal. With this method, the trip will be faster as the connected end does not have to
wait for the echoed signal.
It is recommended that, on case-to-case basis, utilities consider using echo signals in the protection systems,
as, for example, weak end in feed tripping logic. Such features are usually available in the modern numerical
relays.
17.4 NOISE AND INTERFERENCE CREATED BY THE POWER SYSTEM
Telecommunication systems may fail to perform correctly because of interference from the power system.
Equipment failure and human errors by maintenance staff are a few other reasons for failure of the system
to operate.
The interference from the power system may exist during normal operation or may arise at power system
faults. The severity of the interference depends on the signal-to-noise ratio, the spectrum, and the duration
and time of interference.
17.4.1 Perturbations During Normal Operation

17.4.1.1 Corona
The level of noise due to Corona depends on the power system voltage, the climatic conditions and the
type of information link. The presence of Corona does not generally affect protection, except possibly in
some cases of very low power (1W or less) Power Line Carrier equipment on 220 kV circuits and above.
It may be noted that the PLC transmitters used in India normally have peak envelop power capabilities in
the range of 20-80 watts. It may, however, be noted that for most of the lines the carrier strength of 20 watts
meets all the requirement of adequate signal to noise ratio.
17.4.1.2 Isolator Operation
The operation of an isolator (with total opening time of 6 seconds or so) causes re-striking arcs at least for 3
seconds for 400 kV systems. They generate high amplitude bursts of high frequency current. The repetition
frequency of the bursts is in the order of 1kHZ or more. The duration of the pulse-train exceeds 0.5 to 6s.
The pulse train constitutes a high-energy broadband noise source that gives rise to poor signal-to-noise
ratios.
17.4.1.3 Switching by Circuit Breakers
The switching in or out of a circuit, e.g., a line or a transformer, produces high frequency oscillation, which
is coupled to the equipment in a similar manner as mentioned under isolator operation. The duration of this
type of noise is however limited to the arcing time of the circuit breaker, and is typically around 20 ms or
less.
17.4.2 Perturbations During Power System Disturbances
17.4.2.1 Arcing Faults
At the onset of fault arc and before the arc is fully established, the noise levels are relatively high and have
duration of up to 5ms. When the arc is established, the noise falls to a lower level. The arc and the noise
level remain unaffected until the circuit breaker operates.
11.4.2.2 Interruption of Fault Current
A breaker generates high-frequency noise at the interruption of fault current. The duration of such noise is of
the order of 1-3 ms and the frequencies lie in the range up to at least 50 kHZ. The short duration of the noise
compared to the response time of the protection system reduces its significance.
17.4.3 Effect of Different Forms of Interference on Teleprotection
The importance of the different forms of interference depends on the signal-to-noise ratios, the frequency
spectrum, duration of the interference and the time at which it takes place. Generally, the type of interference
generated under isolator operation is the most serious because of its high amplitude, wide frequency spectrum,
duration and frequency of occurrence. Because it occurs under normal conditions, it is important in relation
to causing unwanted operation of systems based on a “command to trip” where permissive features are
not used.
Interference caused during power system faults and their clearance, although less severe than in case of
isolator operation, are important because they occur at the time during which the teleprotection is in active
operation. Furthermore, protective relays on other circuits may at this time be activated. Interference from
normal circuit-breaker operation and corona are generally the least severe.
17.5 RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION LINK
The main parameters of an information link are:
• Transmission Time
• Dependability
• Security
• Availability
The optimum compromise between these parameters differs according to the particular application (blocking,
permissive tripping, direct transfer tripping). A protection-signaling concept is always a compromise; the
application defines the best compromise.
17.5.1 Transmission Time
The transmission time of a teleprotection system is the time elapsed between the instant of change in state
at the command input and the instant of the corresponding change in state at the command output, excluding
propagation time.
The nominal transmission time T0 is the time that elapses from the instant a signal is applied to the input of the
teleprotection transmitter until it appears at the output of the teleprotection receiver. The nominal transmission
time T0 is the transmission time measured under noise-free transmission conditions. The measurement is
carried out with the transmitter and receiver connected back-to-back and there is no interference on the
channel.
The maximum actual transmission time Tac is the maximum transmission time encountered under noisy conditions
for a defined dependability and signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio or bit error rate (BER). The actual transmission
time is measured with continuous white noise or with random bit errors applied to the transmission path
depending upon the type of teleprotection system.
Since a longer transmission time enhances signal reliability with respect to mal-operation, the transmission
time should not be chosen shorter than really required for the application.
17.5.2 Dependability
Dependability relates to the ability to issue and receive a valid command in the presence of interference
and/or noise.
Noise may disrupt a teleprotection channel by delaying a genuine command signal or by preventing the
receiver from delivering a command.
Dependability is a measure of the system’s ability to receive output trip commands during adverse signal
conditions. It characterizes the receiver’s ability to recognize a genuine tripping signal within a given time in
spite of interference on the communications channel.
17.5.3 Security
Security relates to the ability to prevent interference and noise from generating a command state at the
receiving end when no command signal is transmitted.
Security is a measure of the communication system’s ability not to trip falsely under adverse signal conditions.
Security is the property of the receiver not to generate spurious tripping signals in the presence of interference
on the communication channel.
17.5.4 Availability
The availability of equipment is also very important. This will depend on the mean time between failure,
MTBF, and the mean time to repair, MTTR, which is the time it takes to repair a fault.
17.5.5 Recommendations for Measurement of Security and Dependability
Reliability is always a concern for teleprotection systems. Reliability is a compromise between security and
dependability. Security is the ability to properly restrain from tripping when not called for and dependability is
the ability to trip when required. While security is not improved by increased redundancy, dependability is.
It is recommended that utilities measure dependability and security of each teleprotection equipment and
keep a record. The data may be based on time stamped data from teleprotection devices or event loggers.
This may be valuable information to monitor the performance of the telecommunication equipment and the
data can be used in taking decisions regarding maintenance, retrofitting and modernization. It may also be
desirable to carry out field tests as a part of acceptance tests to measure the security and dependability of
the carrier signals.
For detailed definitions of these parameters, reference may be made to IEC 60834-1 Teleprotection equipment
of power systems - Performance and Testing (Part 1: Command Systems).
11.6 OUTPUT POWER OF POWER LINE CARRIER SETS
While planning a carrier system it is recommended that, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is calculated
considering the noise level for the various system voltages, weather conditions, line attenuation at the
operating carrier frequencies. If the calculated SNR is not adequate the output power of the carrier set may
have to be increased. For long power lines this check is particularly important.
A typical SNR calculation takes in to account the following parameters into consideration.
• Line voltage
• Line length
• Line configuration (e.g: conductor diameter, number of bundles and transpositions)

• Frequency band used
• PLC transmit power
• Mode of Coupling
IEC 60663 “Planning of (Single -sideband) Power line carrier system” gives details of these calculations. The
available SNR for PLC links should be better than the limits specified in this IEC standard, for speech, data
and teleprotection signals.
For a given transmission line, the SNR can be improved by increasing output power of the carrier set. Better
SNR will help the link to perform properly during adverse and uneven weather conditions.
For teleprotection, it is recommended to use single tone and the maximum power for the commands during
its transmission. This maintains good SNR for the commands during interference in the lines and increases
the reliability that the command be received at the other end, thereby improving security and dependability
figures.
17.7 COUPLING MODES OF TELEPROTECTION CHANNELS
PLC equipment are most commonly used in relaying communication channels protecting high voltage
transmission lines.
Where phase-to-ground coupling is used for teleprotection channel, it has to be kept in mind that the phase
used for coupling could be seriously affected by a fault, in which case the efficiency and reliability of the
channel will be drastically reduced.
Phase-to-phase or inter-circuit or intersystem coupling involves double the number of coupling elements and
consequently more expensive, but it has the following advantages:
• The line attenuation will be lower than the phase-to-ground coupling arrangement.
• There is less radiation with phase-to-phase coupling.
• Greater security, since even if one phase conductor breaks, the other coupling continues to work as
phase-to-ground system.
Inter-phase or phase-to-phase coupling provides success probability up to 92%. Though the cost of this is
more compared to phase to ground coupling cost, it is strongly recommended to use this mode of phase-
to-phase coupling or intercircuit coupling when fault clearance time is critical. Therefore the following are
recommended wherever carrier protection is used.
• Phase- to- phase coupling for 765 kV and 400 kV lines.
• Phase- to- Phase coupling or intercircuit coupling for 220 kV and 132 kV lines.
17.8 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MOST COMMONLY USED LINKS
All communications systems are subject, in varying degrees, to interference and noise of various forms. These
can corrupt the information arriving at the receiver, either by simulating a signal when no real signal exists,
or by preventing or delaying operation of a real signal. When the signal-to-noise ratio falls to less than some
critical value, the probability of the correct transmission of a message decreases rapidly and the probability
of incorrect and unwanted operation increases. The critical value is a complex function of the properties
of the particular telecommunication system. There are four possible states of a telecommunication system
when used for protection and these have to be considered in relation to the transmission and reception of
information. They are shown in the Table 17.2.
Table 17.2 : Response of a teleprotection channel
Condition of communication at Channel at receiving end State of protection

sending end
(a) If a command is generated The command is received and “Wanted action”, i.e., correct Trip
obeyed or Block is ensured
(b) If a command is generated The command is not received or “Missing action” i.e. either failure to
obeyed trip or failure to block (Unwanted
operation)
(c) A command is not generated A command is present received and “Unwanted action” either unwanted
obeyed tripping or unwanted blocking
(d) A command is not generated A command is not present “No action” correct
The design of teleprotection systems, and the ways in which information links are used, need to take account
of practical limitations arising from the fact that influence of interference cannot be completely avoided. In
many cases it is possible to choose design criteria giving emphasized importance to producing “wanted
tripping” compared with avoiding “unwanted tripping”, or vice versa, in relation to the effects of interference
and/or failure of the telecommunication system. The balance between these i.e. risk of “unwanted tripping”
and reliability of “wanted tripping” depends largely on basic considerations such as the requirements of the
power system and the characteristics of the protection system.
The following are the most commonly used teleprotection equipment used by utilities in India:
• Power line carrier (PLC) equipment. This is based on a capacitive connection of signals with frequency
in the range 32- 500 kHz on the power line.
• Fiber Optic Links. Optical fibers have the advantage to be insensitive to noise and can transmit a huge
amount of information.
Radio / Microwave links are other modes of communication but are not used for various reasons in India for
teleprotection application. Tables 17.3 and 17.4 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these.
Table 17.3 : Properties of power line carrier links
Advantages Disadvantages
• The overhead power line is normally a very • Prone to high impulsive noise level generated
reliable transmission medium. by line faults, lightning and isolator breaker
• Long distances, many hundreds of kilometers operation.
can be covered by each link without repeaters. • Limited frequency band available. This limits the
• Transmission takes place between the number of PLC links that can work within a given
two stations, which are interconnected for network.
teleprotection purpose. • Limited bandwidth (4 kHz) restricting the minimum
• The equipment is situated at the substation, giving transmission time for a teleprotection command
easy access for control and maintenance. system to approximately 12 ms.
• PLC equipment is reliable with a high MTBF • Additional attenuation in case of line faults.
(100 000 to 200 000 hours). • Limited power due to national regulations.
• It is the most pervasive infrastructure and • Difficulties in getting the necessary frequencies
therefore has high availability from the concerned government authorities.
• Existing power lines are used and no additional
cables need to be laid. Therefore tangible cost
reduction in network development, deployment
and management
Table 17.4 : Properties of fiber optic links
• Insensitivity to electric and magnetic interference • For long distances, repeaters have to be used.
fields, produced by isolator sparks, corona • A break in the fiber will result in the loss of a huge
discharge, lightning, radio transmitters etc. amount of information.
• Fibers also pose no threat in dangerous • Installation costs are high.
environments such as chemical plants where
• The terminations of a fiber optics cable are
a spark could trigger an explosion. It doesn’t
complex and require special tools.
corrode and is unaffected by most chemicals.
• Requires highly skilled labor to terminate. Optical
• Potential isolation between high- voltage
fibers cannot be joined /spliced together as easily
equipment and telecommunication equipment.
as copper cable and requires additional training
• Transmission time is very low of personnel and expensive precision splicing and
• No cross-talk problems. measurement equipment
• Large bandwidth. • They are more fragile than coaxial cable
• High transmission speed.
• Low signal loss and extraordinarily low bit error
rate.
• Their light weight and small size also make them
ideal for applications where running copper
cables would be impractical
• Reduced system costs in terms of available band
width & Reduced maintenance costs
• Last but not least is the security aspect, it is very,
very difficult to tap into a fiber cable to read the
data signals- secure communications system
17.9 REDUNDANCY REQUIREMENTS

Redundancy is defined as ‘the existence of more than one means for performing a given function’. It is
obvious that protective relay system dependability can be increased by added redundancy and if one of the
systems does not trip for an in-zone fault, a redundant system may. Security on the other hand, is generally
decreased by increased redundancy, as there are added devices in the system that may trip when not called
upon to do so. However, redundancy does not influence dependability and security to the same degree.
A teleprotection scheme consists of relays, communications interface device and a communications channel.
For relaying, the preferred method of meeting reliability requirements has been to use physically separate,
redundant devices.
It is generally understood, that teleprotection redundancy will increase the dependability of the whole system,
though it will also increase the possibility of reduced security, caused by added protection relays and not
necessarily due to the new teleprotection.
If fault clearance time is critical, back-up teleprotection should be installed taking into account the following
considerations:
• Dual output contacts and input relays in distance protections.
• Separate DC battery supply or common DC battery supply separately fused for each teleprotection
equipment.
• Separate communication path for redundant audio tone channel.
• Cross-connection between channels used for Main-l and Main-2 protection.
It is recommended that redundant channels be provided for very important lines at 132 and 220 kV level as
well as for all lines at 400 kV and 765 kV utilizing PLCC channels for teleprotection.
Redundancy in telecommunication equipment may be enhanced as follows:
17.9.1 Redundancy in PLCC Equipment
• Complete PLC equipment working on the same coupling (balanced combiner which splits the signal
between the phases) or Ph-Ph coupling.
• Another PLC equipment coupled to a parallel power transmission line i.e., inter-circuit coupling can
also be considered.
17.9.2 Redundancy in Fiber Optic Equipment
17.9.2.1 Redundancy in Fiber Cable
• Two fibers from the same cable
• Two separate cable routes
17.9.2.2 Redundancy in Fiber Optic Equipment
• Two sets of equipment through different fibers of the same cable
• Two sets of equipment through fibers of different cables

• Card level redundancy (Power supply card, protection card, CPU board)
• Use of dual direction fiber optic terminal equipments FOTEs (Type SDH)
17.9.2.3 Example of Fiber Optic in Three-terminal Line Applications
Figure 17.4 shown below gives how redundant communication paths can be provided in case of three-terminal
line application. If a fiber pair already exists between each line terminal, this is accomplished without any
additional communication interfaces. The pass-through function is using the same communication heads
as the direct communication path. Similar to the double circuit line application, data from A to B is sent both
directly from A to B and on the redundant channel from A to C to B.
Fig. 17.4 : Redundant communication paths in case of three-terminal line

17.10 Interfaces Between Teleprotection and Multiplexer Equipment
The standard IEEE C37.94 describes the interconnection details for N, where N = 1, 2…12, times 64 kilobit
per second connections of teleprotection equipment to digital multiplexers using optical fiber. Requirements
for both physical connection and the communications timing are also included.
The frame structure is designed to allow the passage of information in packet format from the multiplexer
to the teleprotection equipment and from the teleprotection to the multiplexer equipment. The format was
chosen so:
(a) The frame is a valid International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) recommendation G.704 pattern
from the standpoint of framing and data rate. However, the data structure is not a standard data
format.
(b) The bit pattern would have approximately equal ones and zeroes (for transmission through accoupled
optical circuits).
(c) The frame would have an easily detected bit pattern for frame synchronization.
(d) The frame structure is identical in both directions. The frame is the same size and format regardless
of the number of 64 kilobit per second timeslots being utilized.
17.11 Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations
IEC 61850 was devised for communications within the substation, on a substation LAN. However, recognizing
the need for teleprotection, an addition to the standard was made in 2009, published as a Technical Report:
IEC 61850-90-1. The Technical Report presents a number of use cases-applications requiring information
exchange between substations. The report describes the communication requirements for these applications
and gives guidelines for communication services and communication architecture to be used.
In summary, there are two methods to be used for GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented System Event)
communications between substations:
• Tunneling: When Ethernet networks are available between the substations, the communication
service uses an Ethernet device that provides a bridge to the remote substation LAN.
• Gateway: A teleprotection device that, while interacting with the IEC 61850 LAN, extracts the
teleprotection information from the GOOSE message and delivers it over any conventional
communication link.
17.11.1 Tunneling
Tunneling is a method for connecting multiple substation networks and allowing direct access to functions
in remote stations. For IEC 61850, the relevant kinds of traffic for teleprotection are multicast GOOSE
messages on Ethernet Layer 2. The tunnel accepts the message and passes it through unchanged, and
does not care about the actual information content of the messages. Consequently, the tunnel does not
need to be reconfigured if the information exchanged between functions changes, or if additional functions
exchange information.
The station network becomes extended to include the remote station. Devices (servers) in the
remote stations become addressable. Technically speaking, a route is provided for the IP addresses
in the remote station.
In practice, tunnels will be established by means of network switches or routers.

Fig. 17.5 : Substation to substation communication using tunneling
17.11.2 Gateway
Gateways connect multiple substation networks by establishing indirect access to functions in remote
stations. Gateways can be used if the communication link between substations does not fully support Ethernet
communication (e.g., power line carrier, copper, radio or SONET/SDH).
Fig. 17.6 : Substation to substation communication via a Gateway
Explicit teleprotection equipment is needed. The teleprotection device on the sending side filters and recodes
information for the actual communication media used to transfer the information. On the receiving side, the
teleprotection equipment re-creates the information from the remote end to provide it in a form that is usable
for the functions in the substation. The teleprotection equipment on the receiving side acts as a proxy for
the function on the sending side. As far as the communication is concerned, Proxy B2 looks like Function
B2 from the view of Function A2 as shown in Figure 17.6.
17.12 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTION OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Security of a teleprotection system can go down if the communication channel is not of high security. In most
cases power line carrier (PLC) is widely used. As brought out earlier Fiber optic is superior to PLC and is
quite versatile. Therefore it is recommended that wherever possible Main-I protection should be equipped with
the best of teleprotection equipment, for example Fiber Optic communication using OPGW.
Especially for lines and cables it is also very important that Main-I protection and Main-2 protections cover
part of the protected equipment zone, independent of the communication channel, to provide fast opening of
the local circuit-breaker. Thus use of a non-unit protection like distance relay as one of the main protection,
is a must. This action is very useful to accomplish system stability, though, generally, time of clearance will
be greater under some conditions (one end open).
In this chapter some important aspects connected with the communication system and some recommendations
have been brought out and these should be considered. Few of these are brought out below:
• It is recommended that redundant channels should be provided for very important lines at 132 and
220 kV level and for all lines at 400 kV and 765 kV utilizing PLCC channels for teleprotection.
• Utilities should measure dependability and security of each teleprotection equipment and keep a record.
This may be valuable information to monitor the performance of the telecommunication equipment and
the data can be used in taking decisions regarding maintenance, retrofitting and modernization.
• While planning a carrier system it is recommended that, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is calculated
considering the noise level for the various system voltages, weather conditions, line attenuation at the
operating carrier frequencies. If the calculated SNR is not adequate the output power of the carrier
set may have to be increased. For long power lines this check is particularly important.
• In case of PLCC, Inter-phase or Phase-to-Phase coupling provides high success probability. Therefore,
Phase-to-phase coupling for 765 kV and 400 kV lines, Phase- to- Phase coupling or inter circuit coupling
for 220 kV and 132 kV lines is recommended to be used
• In case of short transmission lines, when distance protections are applied, the permissive overreaching
schemes are advantageous for detection of high resistance faults and are therefore to be used.
• On case-to-case basis, utilities should consider using echo signals in the protection systems, as, for
example, week end in feed tripping logic
references
1. CIGRE report, Protection using Telecommunications, CE/SC 34 34/35.11, 2001, Ref. No. 192
2. IEC/TR 61850-90-1, Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 90-1:
Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations
3. IEC 60834-1 Ed.2, Teleprotection equipment of power systems – Performance and testing Part 1:
Command systems
4. IEC 60834-2 Ed.1, Teleprotection equipment of power systems – Performance and testing Part 2:
Analogue comparison systems
5. IEEE Std. C37.236-2013, IEEE Guide for Power System Protective Relay Applications Over Digital
Communication Channels
Chapter 18
Basics for designing Protection Schemes

based on IEC 61850 standard
18.1 Preface
Since being published in 2004, the IEC 61850 communication standard has gained more and more relevance
in the field of substation automation. It provides an effective response to the needs of the open, deregulated
energy market, which requires both reliable networks and extremely flexible technology – flexible enough
to adapt to the substation challenges of the next twenty years. IEC 61850 has not only taken over the drive
of the communication technology of the office networking sector, but it has also adopted the best possible
protocols and configurations for high functionality and reliable data transmission. Industrial Ethernet, which
has been hardened for substation purposes and provides a speed of 100 Mbit/s, 1 Gigabit,10 Gigabit and
hence enough bandwidth to ensure reliable information exchange between IEDs (Intelligent Electronic
Devices), as well as reliable communication from an IED to a substation controller. The definition of an
effective process bus offers a standardized way to digitally connect conventional as well as intelligent CTs
and VTs to relays. More than just a protocol, IEC 61850 also provides benefits in the areas of engineering
and maintenance, especially with respect to combining devices from different vendors.
The IEC 61850 international standard for communications in substations brings a new era in the development
of substations. It affects not only the design of the substation protection, monitoring and control system,
but also the design of the substation secondary circuits. High-speed peer-to-peer communications using
GOOSE messages and Sampled Analogue Values (SAV) allow development of distributed applications
based on status, current and voltage values communicated between devices connected to the substation
local area network.
IEC 61850 is a promising toolbox for communication inside a substation and outside of the substation in
the forthcoming years. It is expected to progressively replace the existing protocols and facilitate inter-
operability between vendors. The standard is a means to build substation automation projects more than
a goal in itself.
Fast automation scheme is one of the main benefits expected from the IEC 61850. One aim is initially to replace
the conventional wiring between devices. New protection schemes will appear that are not easily feasible
with the conventional technology. This might be within a substation or between substations. It is essential
not only to identify the communication requirements, but also the capability of the subscribing devices to be
configured with the right logic. Such arrangement minimizes the hardware needs between IEDs since many
hardwired signals can be replaced by communication messages. This will improve substation design and
maintenance, aid standardization of hardware communication interfaces and focuses on version control.
Logical dataflow needs to be analysed carefully in order to avoid a bottleneck on the Ethernet network.
GOOSE messages, used to transmit peer-to-peer data are continuously repeated, so just subscribing to any
data might consume too many resources for fast automation. Defining abnormal conditions is also essential
such as the cases when some devices are missing, when the communication is broken, when an IED is out
of service or fails, etc. Special attention to redundancy and self-healing mechanisms should be given with
the communication system when used to exchange critical messages between IEDs.
Interoperability between protective IEDs from different vendors in the substation becomes a necessity in
order to achieve substation level interlocking, protection and control functions, and improve the efficiency/
use of microprocessor based relay applications. Substation integration and automation can help a utility to
achieve reduced installation, maintenance and operational costs. This is possible because of the integration
Basics for Designing Protection Schemes Based on IEC 61850 Standard 253
of microprocessor-based devices (particularly protective relays) into complex transmission substation

schemes or even System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS). Protection functions based on exchange of
signals between multiple protection devices exist today in the form of wiring between outputs and inputs
of the different IEDs. The future goal is to replace expensive hardwired systems with ones based on the
exchange of digital signals between IEDs over a substation LAN.
The biggest obstacle in this integration process is the fact that IEDs from different manufacturers or even
from the same vendor use different communication protocols, profiles and user interfaces for real time data
acquisition, data archiving, substation control and fault record extraction. This can greatly reduce the benefits
of integration because of the need for additional hardware (such as protocol converters), software (multiple
user interface programs) and, increase engineering and staff training costs. The industry is currently in the
process of developing a universal platform according to IEC 61850 standard that will allow a “plug-and-play”
technology to replace today’s proprietary devices.
This requires a significant joint effort by experts, who until recently came from completely different fields
such as power system protection, metering, information systems, communications, energy control systems,
etc. One solution to this problem is the object-oriented approach to the client-server and peer-to-peer
communication between IEDs in the substation and across the power system.
The development of user-friendly graphical interfaces to allow the configuration of the protective device to
send and receive data over the network is also required.
18.2 INTRODUCTION TO IEC 61850
Introduction
IEC 61850 is the international standard applicable to substation automation systems (SAS) that defines
the communication between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) in the substation, and the related system
requirements. The standard defines and offers much more than only a protocol. It provides:
(a) Standardized object oriented data models for primary plant and IED functions within the substation.
(b) Standardized communication services (the methods used to access and exchange data)
(c) Standardized formats for configuration files -the Substation Configuration Language (SCL).
(d) Requirements for system engineering processes and tools) Peer-to-peer (e.g. IED-to-IED)
communication.
(e) Definition of conformance testing) Process Bus.
The standard currently includes mapping of data onto Ethernet. Using Ethernet in the substation offers many
advantages, most significantly including:
(a) High-speed data rates (currently 100 Mbit/s, rather than 10’s of kbit/s or less used by most serial
protocols)
(b) Multiple client/server connections
(c) Ethernet is an open standard and widely used
(d) Fibre Ethernet is suited to the substation environment as it is not susceptible to EMI IEC 61850 offers
a full automation and communication solution for the substation.
18.3 History
The industry’s experiences have demonstrated the need and the opportunity for developing standard
communication protocols, which would support interoperability of IEDs from different vendors. Interoperability
in this case is the ability to operate on the same network or communication path sharing information and
commands.
The IEC 61850 standard was based partly on UCA2.0, a substation automation concept developed in the
USA under EPRI. In 1997, IEEE/EPRI and IEC TC57 decided to merge both standards to provide a global
and unique substation automation solution. The IEC 61850 standard was first issued in 2004 and comprising
14 parts. Edition 2 of the IEC 61850 standard has been released in 2010.
18.4 Concepts
As seen in Figure below, it enables integration of all protection, control, measurement and monitoring
functions within a substation. In order to allow a free allocation of functions to IEDs, interoperability is provided
between functions to be performed in a substation but residing in equipment (physical devices) from different
suppliers. The functions may be split physically into parts performed in different IEDs but communicating
with each other (distributed function). Therefore, the communication behaviour of such parts called logical
nodes (LN) supports the requested interoperability of the IEDs. The functions (application functions) of a
SAS are control and supervision, as well as protection and monitoring of the primary equipment and of
the grid. Other functions (system functions) are related to the system itself, for example supervision of the
communication.
The IEC 61850 standard defines the information and information exchange in a way that it is independent of
a concrete implementation (i.e., it uses abstract models). The standard also uses the concept of virtualization.
Virtualization provides a view of those aspects of a real device that are of interest for the information exchange
with other devices. Only those details that are required to provide interoperability of devices are defined in
the IEC 61850 series.
Fig. 18.1
18.5 Interoperability
A major benefit of IEC 61850 is interoperability. IEC 61850 standardizes the data model and services required
to interface with substation IEDs. This responds to the utilities’ desire of having easier integration for different
vendors’ products, i.e. interoperability. It means that data is accessed in the same manner in different IEDs
from either the same or different IED vendors, even though, for example, the protection algorithms of different
vendors’ IED types remain different.
One of the main objectives of IEC 61850 is to allow IEDs to be directly configured from a configuration file
generated at system configuration time. At the system configuration level, the capabilities of the IED are
determined from an IED capability description file (ICD) which is provided with the product. Using a collection
of these ICD files from varying products, the entire protection and automation of a substation can be designed,
configured and tested (using simulation tools) before the system is even installed into the substation.
18.6 The Data Model
To ease understanding, the data model of any IEC 61850 IED can be viewed as a hierarchy of information.
The categories and naming of this information are standardized in the IEC 61850 specification. The levels
of this hierarchy can be described as follows:
Physical Device
It identifies the actual IED within a system.
Logical Device
It identifies groups of related Logical Nodes within the Physical Device. The allocation of Logical Nodes to
specific Logical Devices is not defined in the standard.
Logical Node
It identifies the major functional areas within the IEC 61850 data model. Logical Nodes are instantiated in
an IED or computer using prefix characters and/or an instance number.
Common Data Class
A Common Data Class is a composite set of data attributes, defined by the standard to relate to substation
applications. In particular, it specifies common data classes for:
Fig. 18.2
(a) Status information
(b) Measured information
(c) Controllable status information
(d) Controllable analogue set point information
(e) Status settings,

(f) Analogue settings.
(g) Specifies the data attribute types used in these common data classes.
Data Attribute
This is the actual data (measurement value, status, description, etc.). For example, stVal (status
value) indicating actual position of circuit breaker for Data Object type Pos of Logical Node type
XCBR. The data model for a server is described in the Model Implementation Conformance
Statement (MICS) document.
The Communication services
The communication services are the methods used to access and exchange data throughout the system.
The IEC 61850 standard defines the services for the following functions.
Client -server associations
It permits communication to be established between a client and a server.
Data model interaction
It permits retrieval of data model information (allows self-description of an IED) and allows writing of data
values (for example for IED configuration).
Dataset
It permits the grouping of data and data attributes. Used for direct access, GOOSE and for reporting and
logging.
Substitution
It supports replacement of a process value by another value.
Setting Group Control
It defines how to switch from one set of setting values to another one and how to edit setting groups.
Buffered Report, Unbuffered Report and Log
Generating reports and logs based on parameters set by the client. Reports may be triggered by changes of
process data values (for example, state change or dead band) or by quality changes. Logs can be queried
for later retrieval. Reports may be sent immediately or deferred. Reports provide change-of-state and
sequence-of-events information exchange. The difference between buffered and un-buffered reporting is
that the former is able to store events during communication breaks and continue the sequence of events
once the connection to the client is re-established.
Control
It describes the services to control, for example, devices. Direct and Select Before Operate control types
are specified.
Generic Substation Event (GSE)
It supports a fast and reliable system-wide distribution of input and output data values; peer-to-peer exchange
of IED binary status information, for example, a trip signal. The GOOSE messages are not command signals.
They are multicast reports of the change of state of a protection element used in a distributed protection
scheme.
Tripping model in IEC 61850

Depending on the protection scheme, one or more protection functions can operate on a Circuit Breaker. All
operate signals coming from protection LN are combined to a trip command in one protection trip conditioning
LN (PTRC). PTRC handles the trip signal conditioning (minimum trip command duration, single/three-pole
decision, etc).
Therefore, in general, there shall be a PTRC LN between every protection LN and the circuit breaker node
(XCBR).
Transmission of Sampled Values

Fast and cyclic transfer of sampled analogue values, for example, from instrument transformers.
Time Synchronization
It provides the time base for the device and system, using SNTP.
File Transfer
It defines the exchange of large data blocks such as disturbance record files.
The communication services for a client or server (or publisher or subscriber) are described in the Protocol
Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) document.
18.7 IEC 61850 Basic Architecture
IEC 61850 Standard introduces a view of a substation automation system comprising three hierarchical levels
(station, bay and process), and hence two levels of communication network connecting these hierarchical
levels – the station bus and the process bus.
A simplified diagram with the communications architecture of an IEC 61850 Substation and Process Bus
based substation automation system is shown in
Fig. 18.3
The Merging Units (MU) interfacing with conventional or non-conventional instrument transformers multicast
sets of measured sampled values (currents and voltages) to multiple IEDs in the substation over the substation
local area network.
A “Process Bus” normally will support services defined in IEC 61850-9-2 for sampled analogue values,
but may also provide information such as the status of breakers and switches and possibly trip commands
through an input/output unit (I/OU) using the services defined in IEC 61850-8-1. In some cases the Merging
Unit and the Input/output unit can be combined in a single device.
The IEDs interface with the process bus via the Ethernet network and make decisions regarding fault
detection, faulted phase selection and protection elements operation etc., and can take action based on
their functionality. This is typically to operate their IED outputs in order to trip a breaker or to initiate some
other protection or control function (e.g. BF Breaker Failure or AR Auto-Reclose functions).
Interaction between different IEDs and the clients in the IEC 61850 based protection systems is achieved
based on the exchange of communication messages over the “Station Bus”
Fig. 18.4
The IEC 61850 Standard does not prohibit the station bus and process bus from being combined in one
physical Ethernet network. Today, however, concerns about sufficient bandwidth for sampled analogue
values mean that in practice they are often separate physical Ethernet networks. When 1 Gbit/s or 10 Gbit/s
Ethernet networks are deployed for IEC 61850 applications, it is more likely that station bus and process
bus will be combined.
A Proxy Server is a network entity located between a client application and one or multiple physical devices,
and acts as a client/server.
For Client-Server communication, the data model of each physical device can be re-created by the proxy
server to serve the transmitted information (e.g., when a device that is not IEC 61850 compliant is to be
integrated). For GOOSE and SAV, the messages are published by the proxy server with the same format
as from the physical device. A separate logical device is used to represent every legacy device.
Logical Devices enable the building of proxy servers, in such a way that Logical Devices are – from a
functional point of view – transparent. Each Logical Device can be identified independently of its location
(whether in a separate physical device connected to the network or in a proxy server).
Parts 8-1 and 9-2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time-critical and non-time-critical data
through local-area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames over 10/100TX or 100FX physical media
– i.e. Ethernet.
18.8. Traffic Patterns found in IEC 61850 substations
Most traffic in IEC 61850 automation systems is based on TCP/IP/Ethernet, as depicted below.
In the station bus, we may find:
(a) Control and monitoring traffic
(b) Reports and commands, which are based on MMS over TCP/IP,
(c) Protection traffic based on GOOSE messages, which are multicast Ethernet frames,
(d) Synchronization information, based on SNTP/UDP/IP and IEEE1588,
(e) Management information, being the most common used protocols
(f) FTP for exchanging SCD/CID files and HTTP for accessing IED’s configuration parameters
In the process Bus:
(a) Sample analogue values, which are multicast Ethernet frames,
(b) Position Status and Breaker Tripping/Closing
(c) Traffic based on GOOSE messages, which are multicast Ethernet frames
(d) Synchronization information, based on IEEE1588.
Fig. 18.5
As shown in Figure above, it is clear that an IEC 61850 will face the same security challenges as any TCP/
IP/Ethernet based automation system. For that reason, we will focus right now on understanding the main
threats we will face for TCP/IP/Ethernet networks. From a protection point of view, the Ethernet based traffic
for GOOSE messages and Samples Analogue Values is more critical, more details are provided related to
the security threats.
18.9 Performance
Performance of the communication is discussed in Part 5 of the IEC 61850 standard. Part 5 defines both
performance classes and message types, and states the maximum transfer times applicable to each.
For protection, Part 5 defines three performance classes: (a) Performance class P1 applies typically to a
distribution bay or to bays where low requirements can be accepted. (b) Performance class P2 applies
typically to a transmission bay or if not otherwise specified by the customer. (c) Performance class P3 applies
typically to a transmission bay with top performance synchronizing feature and breaker differential. Part 5
defines various message types:
(a) Type 1A Fast messages for “Trip”
(b) Type 1B Fast messages for …“Close”, “Reclose order”, “Start”, “Stop”, “Block”, “Unblock”, “Trigger”,
“Release”
(c) Type 2 – Medium speed messages
(d) Type 3 – Low speed messages

(e) Type 4 – Raw data messages
(f) Type 5 – File transfer functions
(g) Type 6 – Time synchronization messages
(h) Type 7 – Command messages with access control
In order to perform protection schemes that are time-critical, certain performance levels are required for the
high-speed peer-to-peer (GSE) messaging. It should be noted that, where messaging for protection schemes
are routed through proxy servers, lower performances will result.
18.10 Applications
Most applications to date have concentrated on client server data exchange for substation automation
purposes. Applications of GOOSE have been limited by the opportunities to retrofit and user confidence in
replacing hardwired solutions with communication-based solutions. There are today some pilots or advanced
projects to demonstrate the use of Process Bus IEC 61850-9-2. Nevertheless, some valuable experience is
being gained both in GOOSE and SAV schemes.
Modelling of Multifunctional IEDs in IEC 61850
The modelling of complex multifunctional IEDs from different vendors that are also part of distributed functions
requires the definition of basic elements that can function by themselves or communicate with each other.
These communications can be between the elements within the same physical device or in the case of
distributed functions (such as substation protection schemes) between multiple devices over the substation
local area network. The basic functional elements defined in IEC 61850 are the Logical Nodes. A Logical
Node is “the smallest part of a function that exchanges data”. It is an object that is defined by its data and
methods and when instantiated, it becomes a Logical Node Object. Multiple instances of different logical
nodes become components of different protection, control, monitoring and other functions in a substation
automation system. They are used to represent individual stages in a protection function. A multifunctional
protection IED has a complex functional hierarchy that needs to be modelled according to the definitions of
the IEC 61850 model.
Fig. 18.6
Logical nodes are grouped in logical devices, usually to represent specific functions that are part of a server.
Sometimes if the IED has a more complex hierarchy, it is necessary to introduce intermediate layers in the
model – sub-functions.
Fig. 18.7
The above-described IED functional hierarchy needs to be appropriately represented based on the modelling
hierarchy presented in Part 7 of IEC 61850.
The standard does not only model the IEDs, but also the communications architecture and the primary
substation equipment. The substation model is based on CIM.
Configuration Language
An IEC 61850 based Substation Automation System is described using the Substation Configuration Language
(SCL). SCL is based on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and allows the exchange of configuration
data between different tools, possibly from different manufacturers. Depending on the purpose of the SCL
file, four types are distinguished:
(a) IED configuration description (.icd file): provides LN capability and data-model of an IED not yet used
in any application;
(b) System Specification Description (.ssd file): consists in the single line diagram and the LN requirements
only on a functional point of view;
(c) Substation Configuration Description (.scd file): defines all the specific substation automation system
details, from the communication to the LN allocation – which IED performs which function;
(d) Configured IED Description (.cid file): is the part of .scd file concerning a specific IED. From this file
the IED configuration tool can get the necessary parameters that are needed to make the device
work in the system (e.g. address, name values assigned according to the specific project names).
Fig. 18.8
18.11 Cyber Security
A critical aspect to look at when cyber security is deployed to comply with national requirements such as
NERC CIP and international requirements such as IEC 62351, is to identify the critical assets and critical
cyber assets in a substation.
Typical critical assets and critical cyber assets are all the hardware and software installed in a substation
which would affect the reliability or operability of the substation and consequently the power system if one
of them is compromised or destroyed.
Every critical cyber asset within a substation should be included in an electronic Security Perimeter. The
Responsible Entity within the Utility shall identify and document the Electronic Security Perimeter(s) and all
Access Points to this/these Perimeter(s).
Typically a physical security perimeter and an electronic security perimeter are defined to protect all critical
assets and critical cyber assets in a substation. The physical security perimeter could be the wall or the
fence of the substation.
The access points in the substation automation architecture are:
(a) Ethernet Links to SCADA,
(b) Ethernet links to configuration and maintenance software,
(c) Serial links to SCADA
It is important to emphasize that IEC 61850 was initially designed for communication within the substation.
When IEC 61850 is used outside the substation, then there are further issues to be considered.
18.12 Security tools
Having sound TCP/IP protocol stack implementations is desirable to mitigate security problems. In addition
to it, there are tools that may help the administrator handle security issues. Some of these tools are briefly
described in the following paragraphs:
Vulnerability scanners work at different layers of the OSI reference model. Many of them have a client-server
structure. They scan all the ports of a system, searching for open ports and using known exploits to see how
vulnerable the system is. This in fact is the same approach that attackers use. New vulnerabilities are found
and their corresponding exploit developed almost every day. Therefore scanners will require updating their
vulnerability databases, which is usually done via Internet (some tools require a subscription fee).
An Intrusions detection system, often called IDS, looks for intrusion attempts in the systems. An IDS can
use different information sources, a network IDS analyses network traffic to detect intrusion attempts while
a host based IDS uses the system logs of a host. An attack detection engine will process the data and will
register, alert and/or react in accordance to a predefined strategy. Like vulnerability scanners, they keep a
database with attack patterns that can be updated from the Internet.
Networks monitoring tools analyse and make reports of the captured data. They are composed by a set of
modules and scripts that capture network activity data and format the information to be stored and displayed
on screen or printed. They can generate graphs that can be used in web sites to show the network traffic in
real time. There are several tools for network auditing and penetration testing. They can also facilitate the
interception of network traffic normally unavailable to an attacker. They may also perform man-in-the-middle
attacks against redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions.
Layer 2 packet filters can act as layer 2 firewalls and also permit MAC address translation. They are included
in the standard Linux kernel since version 2.4 and may be present in some “traditional” firewall systems too.
There are also ARP traffic filters that set rule tables to filter ARP packets. These tables can be configured
and modified in the Linux kernel.
There are many layer 3 and 4 packet filters. Some of them are software tools to be installed in PC like
machines while others are special purpose devices. They usually perform Network Address Translation and
have logging capabilities too. They can intercept and manipulate network packets.
Honeypots and honeynets are software pieces or devices that attract attackers as they pretend to be
vulnerable systems. They are tools that allow administrators to gather information about the attackers and
their techniques. They can also distract attackers from relevant real services and alert administrators about
such situations.
It should be noted that many of these tools are often offered together as a single security bundle and include
other additional features such as VPN, etc.
Security Effective Architecture for IEC 61850 substations
Working Group 15 of Technical Committee 57 of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) develops
standards for end-to-end cyber-security of the electric system, in particular for the communication protocols
defined within TC 57. No general key management system has been specified, but related design choices
for security mechanisms partly define key management aspects.
Security measures in IEC 62351 include SSL/TLS with specific parameters for TCP/IP profiles, electronic
certificates for MMS profiles, challenge-response authentication for 60870-5 profiles, digital signatures
for 61850 profiles. The main impairment of the security measures proposed in IEC 62351 are the extra
computing requirements for the devices in the network and especially key management requirements. The
need for a X.509 PKI infrastructure and certificate management may delay the deployment of IEC 62351
and increase its cost.
Message monitoring of IEC 61850 GOOSE and Samples Analogue Values
GOOSE messages in IEC 61850 contain data objects that if properly used by the subscribing IED can
significantly reduce the probability for a successful cyber attack. By monitoring the state and sequence
numbers in the message, the subscribing IED can detect messages from a remote intruder that are out
of order or duplicated due to the latency caused by the Internet transmission from a remote location. The
same applies to sampled values messages but in this case the criterion for monitoring is the sample counter
number.
18.13 BENEFITS OF IEC 61850
In an open market, power transmission and distribution network operators need to run the power systems
reliably and efficiently at minimum operating cost. There is a world-wide incentive to achieve these operational
objectives by taking advantage of the capability of substation automation systems. It becomes important
that there is only one standard protocol moving to the future so as to allow the elimination of the diversity
of protocols that exist today. The standard must be for an open communication system which permits
equipment from different manufacturers to operate seamlessly together. With the aging of the workforce and
the introduction of such new technology, there is also a need to develop tools that are easy to use, facilitate
the better engineering, commissioning and maintenance practices.
Reduction in Costs
One important goal for the utilities today is to improve efficiency and, therefore, to cut costs wherever possible.
However, this must not endanger the safety and reliability of the grid performance and by no means lower
the grid transmission capacity or availability.
The use of IEC 61850 can lead to a reduction in both capital expenditure and the costs associated with asset
maintenance. Examples of potential savings include:
(a) By making use of signalling through process and station busses within a substation, the amount and
complexity of wiring can be considerably reduced leading to significant cost savings. This brings less
cabling and potential savings both inside the control building using a station bus and, furthermore,
between the switchyard and the building when using process bus.
(b) The application of non-conventional instrument transformers such as Optical CTs/PTs could bring
further cost benefits as they are more lightweight and may be less expensive than conventional
ones.
(c) Hardware savings follow due to the fact that the number of IO in the IEDs can be reduced.
(d) Less wiring also leads not only to less installation costs, but also less testing and maintenance costs
during the lifetime of the substation automation system.
(e) Furthermore, any subsequent modifications to schemes involving connections between IEDs will also
become less expensive as changes to hardwiring will be minimized.
(f) The costs associated with primary equipment outages on e.g. heavily used transmission circuits can
be significant and any reduction in their duration or frequency would be of value to utilities. Outages
are sometimes necessary due to a requirement to modify certain aspects of the protection installed
for a feeder. This is particularly the case if changes are required to the wiring involving measurement
transformers and one or more relays. If it is permissible to continue to operate a circuit with one of
the main schemes out of service, the use of a process bus to send sampled values representing the
secondary circuit measurements will permit other schemes to continue to reliably function without
interference as secondary wiring is not disturbed. Moreover, another relay could potentially be brought
into service if required to meet specific company operating regulations.
(g) IEC 61850 specifies the use of an open and common protocol stack containing for example TCP/
IP facilitating the access to public and private data networks. Using the same physical layer, remote
interrogation of substation equipment is becoming easier, alleviating maintenance and reducing the
number of site visits.
(h) The use of a common international standard also opens up the substation automation market to more
competition – potentially giving the user a larger selection of IEDs, suppliers and system integrators.
It also allows users to avoid common mode failures by using different vendor equipment.
(i) Through the WAN, it will be possible to more easily get hold of any equipment data. This applies for
non time critical data (disturbance records, event reports, setting parameters, etc.). Better use of data
will lead to improvements in asset management and a reduction in device count … assuming that is
it is correctly integrated with asset databases!
Higher Performance
The substation automation system solutions should improve performance regarding e.g. capacity, speed
and efficiency in fault tracing, maintenance and re-energization after grid faults.
The capability of Ethernet components is expected to increase every year, and it will be possible in a few
years’ time for the utility to have one single communication infrastructure, making the flow of data more
streamline in the organization. Nevertheless, for Cybersecurity reasons, an intelligent structure and the
positioning of appropriate firewalls are needed.
The major advantage of IEC 61850 is the interoperability of IEDs’ of different manufacturers and the elimination
of gateways. The absence of gateways means less equipment, no unnecessary communication delays
and no additional errors caused by protocol conversions. The use of Ethernet communications for all the
substation automation functions means standardized and simpler cabling in comparison with the use of serial
communications. This is an advantage in project execution, equipment installation and equipment testing.
Process bus implementation gives further advantages by using non-conventional CT instrument transformers
are also not affected by CT saturation and the opening of secondary CT circuit conditions like the conventional
ones.
Simplifying Engineering
The standard must provide means to support updating, modifying, extending and maintaining the substation
automation system and its communication system, over the whole lifetime of the substation.
IEC 61850 defines also the Substation Configuration description Language (SCL) which allows the
configuration of an automation system to be defined and the setting of the standardized parameter of IEDs
from different manufacturers to be fixed by the user or any of the manufacturers involved.
Due to less hardwiring in the substation, engineering is simpler and less expensive both in the
initial phase, when the substation is built, and in any modifications made later due to changes
needed for any reason.
Using IEC 61850, it is expected to reduce project time, simplify system integration with all related engineering
and reduce maintenance and, after a time, probably also training efforts.
Flexibility
The standard must be flexible and it shall allow changes in user’s preferences and requirements like
extensions as well as changes due to the manufacturers’ innovations e.g. there will be functions tomorrow
which are not thought of today.
IEC 61850 offers solutions to the abovementioned requirements. It provides interoperability of equipment
from different manufacturers, and leads to minimum change solutions for interoperability of equipment from
different generations. It covers all the automation functions in substations. A communication can exist within
the Station Level or the Bay Level, and can also exist between two levels, for example between the Bay
Level and the Process Level.
IEC 61850 does not specify any mandatory system topology, the use of both station bus and process bus
at the same time, or if station and process bus should be separated or not.
The utility has the flexibility to specify the system topology according to the criticality of the substation
(reliability, redundancy requirements). Nevertheless, the implementation of process bus between the primary
equipments (instrument transformers, disconnectors, breakers) and bays looks promising for the future by
removing most of the wires within the yard.
If non-conventional CTs can easily be constructed to have better accuracy than conventional ones and if
they can be made more flexible, e.g. by introducing a programmable ratio, this will also be of advantage.
Process bus can be used also with conventional instrument transformers, as the merging units can be made
to interface with either new technology or conventional equipment.
Reliability
The reliability of station signalling in a communication system is improved compared to the hardwired systems
as the communication system can be continuously monitored and an alarm can be given immediately when
some problems occur in the communication system. In hardwired systems less problems can be automatically
detected as for example trip circuit supervision.
Other advantages of IEC 61850 compared with other standards
IEC 61850 is a standard which covers the communications at all the three levels of equipment in a substation,
namely at Station Level, Bay Level and Process Level. Other communication protocols such as DNP3,
Modbus, etc. cover the communications at only one or two of these three levels because most standards
were developed for specific purposes.
Such advantages are:
(a) IEC 61850 specifies high speed communication based on GOOSE message (time critical data) and
use of report by exception rather than polling as used in master-slave serial communication protocols.
For this it uses publisher / subscriber and client / server mechanisms respectively.
(b) The Ethernet topology also allows to have more than one client which eases the implementation of
redundancy in comparison with a master/slave architecture.
(c) In case of failure of one client or server, the IEC 61850 communication between the other clients
and servers is not affected which is not the case of a conventional master-slave communication
architecture.
(d) The use of multicasting (i.e. one device sending a message simultaneously to several devices inside
one logical LAN-segment) improves the performance of time-critical messages (GOOSE messages). It
reduces network message traffic and communication time by eliminating the need to repeat messages
to each individual device sequentially.
(e) TCP/IP is the transmission control protocol of the Internet. IEC 61850 facilitates data transfer through
public or private data networks by using TCP/IP also. Data of other protocols based on Ethernet and
TCP/IP, such as web-services data for remote maintenance, can be transmitted in parallel via the
same communication infrastructure.
(f) Any changes in communication technology in the future will cause minimum changes in the abstract
models and services and may require mapping to a new profile.
(g) In IEC 61850, the data model is clearly defined and is also easy to extend without losing the
interoperability.
(h) The IEC 61850 defines a series of data names and associated rules for extension (Logical Nodes
and their attributes) that avoid the interpretation between the different projects actors and facilitate
the integration of the different components of the system as well as the integration of the system with
its environment (primary devices, remote control).
(i) Unlike legacy protocols such as Modbus, IEC 61850 devices can self describe themselves to client
applications without any manual configuration of the data objects. Self description facilitates automatic
configuration.
(j) Unlike legacy protocols, IEC 61850 specifies a standard configuration language based on XML and
using the Logical Nodes described above. This allows to formally exchange configuration data between
system tools and avoids the manual association of data references between tools.
(k) Time sync methodologies such as SNTP are a key component of IEC 61850. SNTP time synchronization
accuracy in the range of 1 ms is sufficient for event reporting but not for process bus. Development
of an IEEE 1588 profile is on-going and will allow time sync over Ethernet in future IEC 61850 based
substation, ensuring a time synchronization accuracy better than 1 microsecond.
(l) The transmission rate of 100 Mbits/s allows fast data transfer, for example faster disturbance recorder
extraction than serial protocol can do.
(m) IEC 61850 uniquely provides data with a quality attribute and a time stamp which improves the
reliability of information as such as validity (good, invalid, reserved, questionable) and test.
(n) In conventional substation automation systems, data concentrators and protocol gateways are required
between different IED’s, HMI and RTU. With IEC 61850 and substation LAN, all data is transmitted in
one standard format and such data concentrators and protocol gateways are only needed for SCADA
communication links.
(o) IEC 61850 provides a standardized reporting capability that will be invaluable in the development of
automated analysis and diagnostic tools.
18.14 Challenges in IEC 61850 Implementation
Since the release of the new IEC 61850 standards in 2004, many utilities consider the implementation of
IEC 61850 station bus to replace the existing hardwired protection and control schemes as for example
CB failure initiation/trip, bus blocking scheme, A/R scheme, load shedding, automatic restoration, control
interlocking, etc.
However the main obstacles and barriers for the acceptance of IEC 61850 and its wide spread implementation/
application could be summarized as follows:
(a) Needs for more skilled personnel,
(b) Needs of new tools to support IEC 61850 implementation for engineering, testing and
maintenance,
(c) Lifetime of additional electronic components, for example switches, merging unit, etc,
(d) Doubts in GOOSE signal reliability and security,
(e) Some substation IEDs are still using legacy protocols which can represent a significant investment,
(f) Lack of a standard method for presenting GOOSE messages in AC/DC schematics,
(g) Different implementation of IEC 6150 services by vendors,
Despite many of the Challenges IEC 61850 offers many incentives as follows:
(a) Brings new possibilities of information sharing and exchanging between devices and applications in
the substation,
(b) The wide range of services and detailed models can make it acceptable as a worldwide communication
standard in power system application,
(c) Monitoring of the GOOSE messages (copper wired signals are not!) and LAN devices,
(d) Easier to design, maintain and expand with the right tools …,
(e) Less wiring, bay standardization, overall cost reduction during lifetime of the substation (engineering,
installation, maintenance)
(f) Live testing can be made without outage,
(g) Improve self-monitoring of the complete substation automation IEDs and system,
(h) Improve the substation safety by replacing analogue circuits with communication links,
(i) Maintenance simplified due to interoperability and hopefully one day, interchangeability!
18.15 Requirements for Network Communication and Processing
A networked communications system can be leveraged to support rather sophisticated capabilities, such as
the ability of a system to continue operation in spite of failures.
When implementing a protection scheme based on IEC 61850, it is important to check what happens when
any system component, for example IEDs, merging unit, a switch or a fibre fail:
(a) Is a contingency mode of operation feasible, whereby the scheme operation can continue, even with
acceptable degradation? What would this require in terms of programming and wiring?
(b) If any system component fails, what are the consequences?
• Are too many critical resources associated with the same IED?
• Is distributing them among several IED the right approach?
• Can critical functionality be replicated in two IEDs, so that it is still available if one of the IEDs
fails?
This would require that IEDs and their applications be able to tell when other system components fail (for
example, through interlocks, watchdog monitoring, etc.) and that they be able to subscribe to messaging
from non-failed devices with the same capabilities when redundancy exists. Otherwise, the system needs
to adapt its behaviour because there is a missing message. In some cases, where the criticality is not such
an issue, no contingency requirement will be defined.
18.16 Specifying IEC 61850 based Protection Schemes
The general procedures for specifying IEC 61850 protection schemes consist of the following steps:
STEP A: Determine functional requirements based on:
(a) the layout of the substation from an electrical point of view
(b) the identification of the types of equipment,
(c) the identification of the protection and control philosophy,
(d) The performance requirements,
(e) The identification of what data is available or required.
(f) The consideration of protection schemes – identify what events will cause what actions by what
equipment,
(g) The determination of information flow requirements – identify
(h) Information required from each substation device
(i) Information to be sent to each substation device
(j) The determination of information security requirements and the contingency operation.
STEP B: Users will determine which logical nodes and data are needed for which applications.
STEP C: Check availability of required IEC 61850 logical nodes and data in the approved devices.
STEP D: Develop IEC 61850 data exchanges within the substation.
STEP E : Data to be exchanged between devices and applications to be defined such as GOOSE based
messages, Samples Analogue Value messages, Client / Server messages.
These steps define explicitly what IEC 61850 data items are sent, where, and under what conditions within
the substation. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the actual data exchanges are clearly defined:
(a) the maximum transfer times,
(b) the maximum response times,
(c) the maximum size of messages,
(d) security,
(e) availability
(f) backup and/or redundancy and other performance criteria.
Logical dataflow needs to be analysed carefully in order to avoid a bottleneck on the Ethernet network and IED
itself. The use of managed switches and VLAN is essential to reduce the traffic on the LAN when necessary.
Defining abnormal conditions is also essential such as devices missing, communication broken, or when an
IED is out of service or fails, etc. Special attention to redundancy and self-healing mechanisms to be taken
into account with the communication system when used to exchange critical messages between IEDs.
18.17 GOOSE FOR IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION
The use of GOOSE messages provides high-speed communication mechanisms between IEDs, thus
enabling the implementation of substation level protection, interlocking or distributed control systems. The
GOOSE service model defined in the standard provides a possibility for a fast and reliable exchange of
data between IEDs.
GOOSE Publishing
Fig. 18.9
A published GOOSE message may contain multiple data objects or attributes. If no attribute value has changed
from the previous message it will be published after a relatively long time interval of T0 (for example, 1 to 10
seconds). When any value contained in the data set changes, the updated message will be published with
no intentional time delay. Then, the next time interval will be the minimum set time T1 (for example 1 or 2
milliseconds), and then increase to T2 (for example with a time interval twice of T1), and so on, according
to the configured repetition mechanism.
Each GOOSE message carries StNum and SqNum parameters (shown in the standard section 15.2.3.1, part
7-2, Ed1). StNum indicates the change of a GoCB data set value. SqNum indicates the message sequence
for the same data values. Any new data change in the data set will cause the GOOSE publisher to increment
StNum, reset SqNum and change the repeat time interval to T1.
By establishing a proper relationship between the fast repetition of messages following a change of data
set value and cyclic stable repetition intervals, the GOOSE message flow in the network can be decreased
while achieving high speed and reliability levels.
GOOSE Subscribing and Processing
The subscriber needs a mechanism to deal with the GOOSE messages. Besides the data content in the
GOOSE message, it also contains additional information, such as the two parameters of StNum and SqNum.
Based on these two parameters, the subscriber can be aware if the current GOOSE message contains
new data or not, which can help it to filter GOOSE messages, saving time and processing resources for
the subscriber.
Special attention needs to be paid to the processing of GOOSE messages in which the Test bit value is True,
however, this is not clearly interpreted in Ed 1 of the standard.. It has to be well understood by the user what
is its implementation and configuration is in a specific IED.
GOOSE Performance
One of the important differences between IEC 61850 and other communication protocols is the introduction
of high-speed peer-to-peer communications defined as IEC GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Station
Event). These messages are used for the exchange of a wide range of possible common data organized
by a DATA SET.
The peer-to-peer communications in an integrated substation protection and control system are based on
what is defined as a GSE. This is a Generic Substation Event (GSE) and it is based upon the asynchronous
reporting of an IED’s functional elements status to other peer devices enrolled to receive it during the
configuration stages of the substation integration process. It is used to replace the hard-wired control signal
exchange between IED’s, as seen in the previous sections, for interlocking and protection purposes and,
consequently, is
mission sensitive, time critical and must be highly reliable
The associated IEDs, receiving the message, use the contained information to determine the appropriate
response for the given state change. The decision of the appropriate action to GSE messages and the action
to take, should a message time out due to a communication failure, is determined by local intelligence in the
IED receiving the GSE message.
Considering the importance of the functions performed using GSE messages, IEC 61850 defines very strict
performance requirements. The idea is that the implementation of high-speed peer-to-peer communications
should be equal to or better than what is achievable by existing technology. Thus the total peer-to-peer
transfer time should be less than 4ms.
For GSE messaging, the transfer time means the complete transmission of a message including necessary
handling at both ends. The time counts from the moment the sender puts the data content on top of its
transmission stack up to the moment the receiver extracts the data from its transmission stack, as shown
below.
Fig. 18.10
Another key requirement for the GSE messages is very high reliability. Since the messages are not confirmed,
but multicast, and considering the importance of these messages, there has to be a mechanism to ensure that
the subscribing IED’s will receive the message and operate as expected. To achieve a high level of reliability,
messages will be repeated as long as the state persists. To maximize dependability and security, a message
will have a time-to-live, which will be known as “hold time”. After the hold time expires, the message (status)
will expire, unless the same status message is repeated or a new message is received prior to the expiration
of the hold time. The repeat time for the initial GSE message will be short and subsequent messages have
an increase in repeat and hold times until a maximum is reached. The GSE message contains information
that will allow the receiving IED to know that a message has been missed, a status has changed and the
time since the last status change.
GOOSE data exchange is based on a Publisher/Subscriber mechanism-using multicast. The GOOSE

messages are repeated until there is a new change of state. The time between the consecutive transmissions
of GOOSE messages immediately after the change of state are very short (a few milliseconds), followed by
an increase in repeat and hold times of subsequent messages until a maximum is reached.
In the case where legacy devices exist, these devices do not support GOOSE messages. This function will
be performed by the gateway. The gateway will continuously poll the legacy devices for status changes, and
will form and send the appropriate GOOSE messages to the network. One GOOSE message is sent for each
individual logical device in the gateway, i.e. there will be one GOOSE message for each legacy IED.
If a GOOSE message has to be processed by a legacy device, the gateway will subscribe to this message,
and after processing it, will send a control signal to the appropriate legacy IED for further action. This approach
allows the interface of legacy devices with IEC 61850 compliant devices on the substation LAN. However,
since the messages between the legacy and the IEC 61850 IED will always go through the gateway, it will be
affected by its characteristics and will always be slower than the pure peer-to-peer communications between
IEC 61850 IEDs. The control system designer has to evaluate the degradation in performance and determine
if this is acceptable. If not, the legacy IEDs have to be replaced by IEC 61850 compliant IEDs.
Fig. 18.11 :
Comparison between the performance of hard wired and GOOSE based accelerated schemes
Numerous tests performed by different IED manufacturers and test companies show that GOOSE based
distributed applications consistently outperform hard wired schemes with the same functionality. This may
look strange at the beginning, but as can be seen from the careful analysis of the factors that determine the
overall operating time of a distributed protection function, it is what should be expected.
If we consider that the breaker tripping and the communications exchange between the two ends
of the protected line is performed in the same manner by the IEDs in both cases, we will have to
analyze the time from the operation of the directional element in the sending relay and the resulting
detection of the operation of the opto input of the teleprotection IED at the sending end of the line,
as well as the time from the receiving of the accelerating signal and the resulting detection of it by
the relay at the receiving end.
In the conventional hard wired scheme this will include the operating time of two output relays (each about
3 ms) plus the two detections of the energization of opto inputs (depending on the availability or lack of
filtering and the scanning of the opto inputs this time for each can be from 2 to 8 ms).
If we assume an average time of opto input with filtering of about 5 ms, the total time at each end for the
hard wired interface between the relay and teleprotection IED will be about 8 ms, giving us a total of about
16 ms for both ends.
If we look at the time between the directional element output and the communication device detection of
the GOOSE message, according to IEC 61850 it should be less than 4 ms at each end of the line, giving
us a total of about 8 ms for both ends. When we compare the two solutions, we see that the GOOSE based
scheme will be about 8 ms (half a cycle at 60 Hz) faster than the hard-wired equivalent.
18.18 Topology Considerations
Parts 8-1 and 9-2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time-critical and non-time-critical data
through local-area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames over 10/100TX or 100FX physical media.
Ethernet based technology is flexible and with its devices is able to connect via different communication
systems. Communication links are possible between different substations located in different geographical
locations over a Wide Area Network (WAN). The Standard does not define how the physical network is built
for Ethernet based station or process bus and in this chapter, a few simple examples are given.
Modern Ethernet systems are switched networks where network devices such as Ethernet switches have
knowledge of connected devices and therefore are able to route the unicast messages (in IEC 61850 typically
reports and controls) in a Point-To-Point manner without distributing the traffic to all nodes in network. GOOSE
and SAV are based on Ethernet Multicast messages and these types of messages are forwarded within a
subnet simultaneously to all its nodes.
Redundancy of communication in IEC 61850 based systems is not required by the standard, but it is often
used as it increases the availability of the applications themselves, and so may also be specified by the
customer or end user. It especially improves the safety when using GOOSE services between IEDs, as
failures in communication links are not tolerated when using GOOSE for protection purposes. Even though
the first edition of the standard does not include any selected technology, the second edition does reference
IEC 62439 that serves to reference and define some different methods of redundancy.
Station Bus Topologies
Star Topology
Star Network is the basic Ethernet topology in today’s switched networks. All devices are connected with
single point-to-point links to switch and network devices routes the traffic between IEDs in substation. This
type of topology is straightforward as it uses only standard Ethernet functionality and it does not necessarily
need any configuration.
Fig. 18.12
If a substation is large and consists of several IEDs and switches, the backbone connections between
Ethernet switches can be made redundant using a mesh or ring. IEDs have one link to Ethernet station bus.
In this topology, switches typically require management possibilities and support of redundancy protocol,
e.g. RSTP, to be able to handle loops in network.
RSTP is an IEEE standard, and is referenced from IEC 62439. In RSTP when communication is interrupted
between switches, an alternative path is established to link switches in the network. However recovery times
from communication failures could be between hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds, and therefore
may not be suitable for fast distributed automation applications.
Fig. 18.13
Loop Topologies
This is a network topology in which each device acts as a repeater with two communication ports, one for
data input and the other for data output. The devices are then daisy-chained to form the loop. Management
functions and a redundancy protocol e.g. RSTP are needed to manage the network loop and reroute paths
in disturbance situations. IEDs need to be able to forward Ethernet traffic from one port to another if the
traffic is not dedicated to it. The loop topology requires an Ethernet switch to logically open one point in the
network, to inhibit the circulating of Ethernet messaging in network.
Fig. 18.14
Redundant Ring Topology

The redundant ring topology among switches and IEDs is a network topology which uses a redundant ring
to communicate between network nodes. IEDs with a single Ethernet port may be connected to switches on
the ring, or IEDs with suitable redundant Ethernet ports may be connected directly onto the ring.
Today’s redundant ring implementations are proprietary, but in the future, redundant rings can be implemented
conforming to the HSR method defined in IEC 62439 in order to provide both recovery times suitable for fast
distributed automation applications and interoperability between different vendors’ equipment.
Fig. 18.15
Redundant Star Topology
Redundant Star topology is basically doubled star topology where every IED has point-to-point connections
to different backbone networks. This type of network also requires double amounts of Ethernet switches for
redundant paths. Redundancy logic must be implemented in all IEDs connected to station bus.
Today’s redundant star implementations are proprietary, but in the future, redundant stars can be implemented
conforming to the PRP method defined in IEC 62439 in order to provide both recovery times suitable for fast
distributed automation applications and interoperability between different vendors’ equipment.
Fig. 18.16
Switch on loop with IEDs connected to 2 adjacent switches
This type of IED connection is the same as for redundant star. Additionally, in both redundancy networks the
backbone is redundant forming loop between Ethernet switches. In this topology switches typically require
management possibilities and support of redundancy protocol, e.g. RSTP, to be able to handle loops in
network. Redundancy logic must also be implemented in all IEDs connected to station bus.
Fig. 18.17
The new IEC 62439 gives some performance comparison between the different redundancy methods /
protocols. While designing an IEC 61850 based protection scheme, such considerations should be taken
into account to ensure the required performance of the protection scheme.
Table: IEC 62439 Standard
Protocol Solution Prime Redundancy End node Network Recovery time fault or repair
loss protocol attachment topology
IP IP routing Yes Within the Single Single meshed >30 s typical not deterministic
network
STP IEEE Yes Within the Single Single meshed >20 s typical not deterministic
802.1D:1998 network
RSTP IEEE Yes Within the Single Single meshed >2 s typical not deterministic
802.1D:2004 network
CRP IEC S2439, Yes In the end Single and Connected, 1 s worst case for 512 end
Clause 7 nodes double Doubly meshed nodes
MRP IEC 62439, Yes Within the Single Ring 200 ms worst case for 50
Clause 5 network switches
BRP IEC 62439, Yes in the end Double Connected. 4,8 ms worst case for 500 end
Clause 8 nodes Doubly meshed nodes
PRP IEC 62439, No in the end Double Independent 0s
Clause 6 nodes double meshed
Process Bus Topologies
Typically, in today’s systems the process bus is separated from the station bus. As the process bus is also
based on Ethernet technology, any of the topologies mentioned in this chapter could be used. Issues to be
considered carefully for the process bus include reliability and availability, time synchronization, and testing.
The process bus may have a different topology to the station bus. Process bus traffic could also be sent in the
same physical network as station bus traffic, thus forming a single unified network for all substation data.
18.19 Engineering tools
Engineering tools include tools that allow the integration of documentation generated from the conception of
an installation during the engineering stage (plans, manuals, etc) for the duration of its life. These tools should
also integrate intermediate stages of modifications and extensions, and also facilitate the commissioning
and maintenance of protection and control systems. Basically, engineering tools should cover the following
issues:
(a) Integration of protection and control systems’ information
(b) Integration of electrical, electromechanical and civil systems
(c) Protection logic and settings management
(d) Control logic and settings management
(e) Configuration, execution and documentation of commissioning and maintenance tests
(f) Integration with protection management systems
(g) SCADA configurations management
Therefore, several types of tools may be considered for the management of the configuration of the IEDs
of a given substation. An initial classification of the type of tool could be:
A. Standard Tools: These are tools for modifying any function of the IED that has been modeled as an
IEC 61850 function. These tools are, or are based on, SCL editors and MMS clients.
B. Proprietary Tools: These are tools provided by each vendor and are required for editing the proprietary
part of a device configuration. Ideally, the objective should be to reduce the need of these proprietary
tools to a minimum.
Moreover, and depending on the different needs of modification, we may distinguish between three
fundamental types of tools:
(a) Parameterization Tools: These are tools for “online” change and change management, basically
the IED settings.
(b) Configuration Tools: These are tools for the implementation and management of “offline” changes.
They can also be classified in two types:
• System level: These can be used for the complete engineering of one or several substations.
This type of tool works with and outputs SCD files.
• IED level: Simpler tools, optimized to facilitate maintenance and oriented to modifications at
the IED level. This type of tool can import ICD and SCD files and outputs CID files. This may
be the same tool as for parameterization of the IED.
(c) Testing Tools: These are tools for both control and protection maintenance personnel and engineering
personnel, and facilitate the tests on the IED, client and server, allowing simulating equipment and
performing automations. This type of tools can be divided into:
• Oriented towards IED testing: These are tools that allow automating the tests of the functionality
of the IEDs. This may include, analysis e.g. spying and monitoring, Performance evaluation and
Simulation
• Oriented towards Client testing: These are server emulation tools, which allow testing the
behaviour of station level clients, such as station computers and gateways.
18.20 Testing and Maintenance
The IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems allows the development of high-speed
peer-to-peer communications based distributed protection applications that result in significant changes
in the ways protection functions are implemented. This replacement of functions implemented in a single
device with equivalents using exchange of analogue and status information over the substation local area
network (LAN) requires new technology for their testing.
In order to properly define the methods for testing of complex IEC 61850 substation automation systems it
is important to properly define what a system definition is and to consider what existing methods for system
testing are known. Complex systems are not specific to only the electric power systems domain. They exist
in industry, communications, computing and many other fields. Software development can be considered the
development of complex systems that exchange information between different functional modules. Modern
substation automation systems in reality are complex distributed software applications based on exchange
of information over the substation local area network. That is why there are application-functions performing
some overall task like “management of a substation”, via logical nodes.
The physical system is composed of all devices hosting these functions and the interconnecting physical
communication network. The boundary of a system is given by its logical or physical interfaces. Within the
scope of the IEC 61850 series, ‘system’ always refers to the Substation Automation System (SAS), unless
otherwise noted”.
Depending on the complexity of the system, its components can be simple functional elements, subsystems
or a combination of the two. A subsystem is then defined as a set of elements, which is a system itself,
and also a part of the whole system. In the substation protection and automation domain we can consider
different functions performed by the system as subsystems. The system can contain one or many functions
that can have several layers of one or many sub-functions and at the bottom – a sub-function can contain
one or many functional elements (logical nodes in IEC 61850).
System Testing
System testing is testing conducted on a complete, integrated substation automation system, subsystem or
distributed function. Its goal is to evaluate the system’s compliance with its specified requirements.
When we do commissioning or maintenance testing we assume that the individual functional elements
are operating properly, especially if there are no alarms in any of the IEDs that are included in the system
test. In this case a top-down approach is suitable, since we are interested in the overall performance of the
tested system function and not in the behaviour of the components of the system. This fits the Black Box
approach, which means that we take an external perspective of the test object to derive the test cases and
analyze the results.
Functional Testing
Functional testing of any function or sub-function requires from the test designer to select a set of
valid or invalid inputs and determine the correct expected output for each test condition defined
in the test plan.
The purpose of functional element testing is to determine if the tested element has the expected behaviour
under different realistic test conditions. The functional elements in system testing are considered units, i.e.
the smallest testable parts of any system.
System testing looks at the overall performance of the system from an external observer point
of view. Bottom-up or top-down testing methods can be used depending on the type of test
performed. In all cases, it is important to clearly identify the system or function boundary that will
define the requirements for simulation by the test system and monitoring the behaviour of the
tested function.
Fig. 18.18
Fig. 18.19
Testing of IEC 61850 Systems

The method for testing of both types of systems is proposed based on the following order of system
components tests:
(a) Testing of IEC 61850 protocol compliance of the individual components of the system
(b) Testing of Merging Units
(c) Testing of IEC 61850 compliant IEDs
(d) Testing of bay level distributed applications
(e) Testing of substation level distributed applications It is assumed that all components of the system
have already passed conformance testing, i.e. that IEC 61850 with all its models and services is
properly implemented.
IEC 61850 Test System Components

A test system designed for IEDs or distributed applications based on IEC 61850 have multiple components
that are needed for the testing of the individual functions, as well as a complete application.
Fig. 18.20
Test Configuration Tool takes advantage of one of the key components of the IEC 61850 standard – the
Substation Configuration Language. The Configuration Tool is used to create the files required for configuration
of different components of the test system. It imports or exports different configuration files defined by Part
6 of IEC 61850.
The test system Configuration Tool reads the information regarding all IEDs, communication configuration and
substation description sections. This information is in a file with .SCD extension (for Substation Configuration
Description) and is used to configure the set of tests to be performed.
The overall functionality of any IEC 61850 compliant device is available in a file that describes its capabilities.
This file has an extension .ICD for IED Capability Description.
The IED configuration tool sends to the IED information on its instantiation within a substation automation
system (SAS) project. The communication section of the file contains the current address of the IED. The
substation section related to this IED may be present and then shall have name values assigned according
to the project specific names. This file has an extension .CID (for Configured IED Description).
Power System Simulation Tool generates the current and voltage waveforms. The specifics of each
simulated test condition are determined by the complete, as well as the configured functionality of the tested
device or application.
The simulation tool requirements will also be different depending on the type of function being tested. For
example, if the tested function is based on RMS values or phasor measurements, the simulation tool may
include a sequence of steps with the analogue values in each of the steps defined as Phasors with their
magnitude and phase angle. Based on these configuration parameters the simulation tool will generate the sine
waveforms to be applied as analogue signals or in a digital format to the tested components or systems.
If the tested functions are designed to detect transient conditions or operate based on sub-cycle set of
samples from the waveform, an electromagnetic transients simulation will be more appropriate.
Virtual Merging Unit simulator: While under conventional testing the waveforms generated by the simulation
tool will be applied to the tested device as current and voltage analogue signals, a Virtual Merging Unit will
send sampled measured values as defined in IEC 61850 over the Ethernet network used for the testing.
The Virtual Merging Unit simulator should support sampling rates as agreed in IEC 61850 9-2 LE. For
protection applications the simulator should send 80 samples / cycle in 80 messages/cycle. Each message
contains one sample of the three phase currents and voltages (WYE class).
Virtual IED simulator that is used to represent components of the system that are not available at the
time of testing, for example during factory acceptance testing. During the testing this module send GOOSE
messages that the function or Sub-function under test uses as inputs that determine its behaviour under
the test conditions applied.
The fifth component of the testing system is a tool that can simulate network traffic, remote and local operator
or system engineer.
Test Evaluation Tool that includes the monitoring functions used to evaluate the performance of the tested
elements within a distributed sampled analogue value based system. Such evaluation tool requires multiple
evaluation sub-modules that are targeted towards the specifics of the function being tested. They might be
based on monitoring the sampled measured values from a tested merging unit, GOOSE messages from a
tested IED, as well as reports or waveform records from the tested device.
Reporting Tool that will generate the test reports based on a user defined format and the outputs from the
simulation and evaluation tools.
Functional testing of IEC 61850-9-2 Based Merging Units
Since Merging Units are an essential component of any IEC 61850 process bus based application, they
have to be tested to ensure that they provide the required sampled measured values. The currents and
voltages applied to the Merging Unit will be based on current and voltage waveforms produced from the
network simulator in order to simulate different system conditions, such as high current faults or low current
minimum load conditions.
At the same time the Test Evaluation tool will need to receive the sampled analogue values from the tested
merging unit and compare the individual sampled values from the Merging Unit with the samples coming from
the network simulator. The testing of Merging Units will require first of all a very accurate time synchronization
of both the test device and the tested MU.
It is necessary to analyze the phase (time) and magnitude differences of the individual samples and compare
these to the calibration specifications of the MU. Proper documentation and reporting is required in the same
manner as meter testing is performed today.
Fig. 18.21
Functional testing of IEC 61850 GOOSE Based IEDs
The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on publishing and subscription of GOOSE messages
can be achieved in a way similar to the testing of conventional hardwired devices. The difference is that in
this case there may be no hard wiring between the test device and the tested IED for status signals. The
test devices needs to be configured as a GOOSE publisher to simulate different signals required by the test
object for the testing, as well as it needs to be a GOOSE subscriber in order to receive messages from the
test object and evaluate its performance. In many cases it is recommended to simulate and monitor also
hardwired signals.
Fig. 18.22
Functional testing of IEC 61850-9-2 Based IEDs
The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on sampled measured values can be achieved in
a couple of different ways depending on the requirements of the specific test. One approach is acceptable
when testing the IED only, while another can be used if the testing includes the complete MU/IED system.
The difference is that in the first case there is no hard wiring between the test device and the tested IED –
i.e. the test system can be communications based only.
The key component of this module is the Merging Unit simulator described earlier in the paper. It will have to
take the waveforms generated from the Network Simulator and then format them in the required 80 samples/
cycle and multicast the individual sampled values to the LAN 80 times per cycle (e.g. 80 messages/cycle).
The testing of different types of functions available in the IED will be similar to what was described earlier
for the hybrid device. This applies to both the configuration and analysis modules of the test system.
The test system needs to subscribe to and monitor the GOOSE messages received from the tested IED
that represent the operation of the tested functional elements in order to determine if the devices operated
as required. If the tested device has relay outputs as well, they will have to be wired into the test device
and their operation (time tag) will be compared with the received GOOSE messages to determine if the
performance of communications based solutions is analogous to the hard-wired case.
The test system may also retrieve the waveform records from the tested device and again compare them
with the original waveforms from the simulation tool.
Fig. 18.23
Functional testing of Distributed Applications
The testing of distributed bay and substation level functions that are based on communications only will
be similar functionally to the testing of individual IEDs. The main difference is that in this case there will be
multiple test devices with virtual simulators or analog outputs. The simulation of the substation and system
environment required for the functional testing of bay and system level functions will require the simulation
of multiple merging units (IEC 61850 9-2 interface) and other IEDs (IEC 61850 8-1 interface).
The evaluation of the performance of the distributed functions is based on the subscription of the test
system components to the GOOSE messages from the different IEDs participating in the tested distributed
applications. If these devices also have relay outputs hardwired to the test devices, their operation will have
to be monitored as well in order to evaluate the performance of the tested system and if necessary compare
the communications based to hardwired solutions
Fig. 18.24
IEC 61850 Testing Related Features
The methods for testing described in the previous sections of the article are predominantly used for type,
acceptance, commissioning, factory and site acceptance testing. In order to support the testing of IEC 61850
system components in energized substations, Edition 1 of the standard already had many different features
that could be used for testing. These features included:
(a) The possibility to put a function or a functional element (logical nodes or logical devices) in a test
mode
(b) The possibility to characterize a GOOSE message as a message being sent for test purpose
(c) The possibility to characterize a service of the control model as being sent for test purpose
(d) The possibility to flag any value sent from a server in the quality as a value for test purpose
However, Edition 1 was not very specific on how to use these features. As a consequence, they were not
supported by all vendors since interoperability could not be guaranteed.
This has been improved with Edition 2. Besides more detailed specifications on how to use the existing
features, additional features have been added.
18.21 Edition 2 of IEC 61850
The Edition 2 of IEC 61850 will introduce many new features that will further enhance the power of the
standard. There are new features that should make the life of the end user easier – assuming the features
are supported by future products. It is expected, that interoperability between engineering tools will be
improved something that is urgently needed. New features supporting functional and system testing should
facilitate the ways a IEC 61850 based installation needs to be tested – during commissioning, in case of
problems but as well for routine testing.
At the same time, the backward compatibility should exist to a large extent thus safeguarding the investments
already made.
GOOSE Control Point for Maintenance
Fig. 18.25
When a project with a of lot of GOOSE messages is implemented, there is a need to check each GOOSE
message during the internal system validation, Factory Acceptance Test and Site Acceptance Test.
To check the validity of the GOOSE messages and its related function, and knowing that GOOSE messages
are virtual input or output signals in comparison with hardwired copper signals, a new mechanism should be
built for engineers to test, change and notify the status of each GOOSE message in a convenient way.
For example, a GOOSE message is exchanged between two IEDs: IED1 being the Publisher and IED2 being
the Subscriber. A GoCB in the Publisher side IED1 controls the related GOOSE message. The parameter of
“GoEna” in Publisher is applied to control the GoCB function such as sending GOOSE messages or not.
The “GoEna” in the GoCBs has been always “Enabled”. One solution is like that, for each GOOSE message,
the Publisher and the Subscriber message are both implemented with a Single CONTROL Point (SPC) to
permit/block the sending or receiving of a GOOSE message.
Fig. 18.26
In the Subscriber side, the connection form Publisher may be lost because of some physical or unknown
reasons, while the loss of communication may be easily detected in the Subscriber side, and a SPS (Single
Point Status) can be used to identify the status change for the communication from the Publisher. If the
GOOSE connection fails, a warning report will be sent to the HMI via MMS communication to get the
corresponding attention.
During maintenance or routine tests, on one hand, the status of the related GOOSE message between
Publisher and Subscriber is always expected to be active, while on the other hand, we may expect the
data sent by the Publisher being testing data. So we use a SPC in the Publisher IED1 to implement the
control function which means that when the control point is enabled, IED1 will send real data in the GOOSE
connection, otherwise it will send virtual zero. And in Subscriber IED2 side, a similar SPC can be applied
to permit itself to receive the real data from the GOOSE message. So if the control point is disabled, the
subscriber IED2 will discard all data received, the data in processing will be replaced by virtual zero, which
will be in need of the test logic function in Subscriber side.
All the GOOSE Connection Status (SPS) and Control Points (SPC) can be totally monitored and controlled
from a central HMI. This will help the customers and engineers to implement a GOOSE related function test
in a more easy and convenient way.
REFERENCES
Standards
1. IEC 61850-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 1: Introduction and
Overview
2. IEC TS 61850-2: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 2: Glossary
3. IEC 61850-3: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 3: General requirements
4. IEC 61850-4: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 4: System and project
management
5. IEC 61850-5: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 5: Communication

requirements for functions and device models
6. IEC 61850-6: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 6: Configuration description
language for communication in electrical substations related to IEDs
7. IEC 61850-7-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 7-1: Basic communication
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Principles and models
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Abstract communication service interface (ACSI)
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Common data classes
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Compatible logical node classes and data classes
11. IEC 61850-8-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 8-1: Specific
Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) – Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to
ISO/IEC 8802-3
12. IEC 61850-9-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 9-1: Specific Communication
Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over serial unidirectional multidrop point to point link
13. IEC 61850-9-2: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 9-2: Specific
Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
14. IEC 61850-10: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 10: Conformance
Testing
15. IEC 61850-90-1: Use of IEC 61850 for the Communication between Substations
16. IEC 60050-441 IEV Switchgear, control gear and fuses
17. IEC 60050-448 IEV Power system protection
18. IEC 60050-605 IEV Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity – Substations
19. IEC 60044-1 Ed. 1.2 2003-02
20. ANSI C57.13-1993
21. IEC 60044-2 Ed. 1.2 2003-02
22. IEC 62439-3 (FDIS): High availability automation networks -Part 3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol
(PRP) and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR)
23. IEC 62351-6: Power systems management and associated information exchange -Data and
communications security -Part 6: Security for IEC 61850
Cigré and Other publications
24. Document basedon CIGRE WG 5.36Report (Abridged and Summarized)
25. CIGRE Brochure 401, Functional Testing of IEC 61850 Based Systems. SC B5 WG B5.32, 2009.
26. CIGRE SPECIAL REPORT 8 FOR GROUP B5 Protection and Automation, CIGRE 2008 session.
27. CIGRE Paper B5-106 Process communication in switchgear according to IEC 61850 – architectures
and application examples, CIGRE 2008 session.
28. ISA 99WG01, “Security for Industrial and Automation Control Systems – Terminology, Concepts and
Models,” Standard ISA-99.01.01,2007.
29. WG B5.38 “The Impact of Implementing Cyber Security Requirements using IEC 61850”
30. Security assessment of the transmission control protocol (TCP), CPNI technical note, February
2009.
31. Cryptographic Key Management for SCADA Systems, Issues and Perspectives. L. Piètre-Cambacédè,
P. Sitbon. International Journal of Security and Applications, July 2008.
32. Functional Testing of IEC 61850 Based Systems -Christoph Brunner, Alexander Apostolov, 2011
Chapter 19
PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITH

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES
19.1 BACKGROUND ON DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES AND CURRENT PRACTICES
As a general practice protection concepts for electrical systems are designed and implemented to provide
protection of people against electrical hazards, prevent damage to installations and limit stress on equipments.
Additionally they uphold stability and reliability in the power system. Specific requirements for protection
systems are selectivity, speed and sensitivity. With an increasing number of distributed energy resources,
basic assumptions for the design and implementation of protection systems are becoming complicated
and protection concepts need to be adapted accordingly. CBIP along with experts is looking into these
developments and hence tried to bring this new topic for the book.
The usage of Renewable energy Resources (DER) in utilities in India is expected to increase significantly
in next decade. Further especially with the realization DERs the move to smart grids is inevitable. The
renewable energy injections are generally at medium voltage levels or sub transmission levels. However
there is going to be huge injection at LT level with rooftop solar and net metering concepts becoming reality
in next few years. The existing distribution systems or sub transmission level have been generally designed
for unidirectional power flows, and feeders are opened and locked out for any fault within system. However,
it has been observed that this practice leads to a loss of significant generation where each feeder may have
significant DER penetration.
The progressive increase in penetration levels and generator sizes, as well as the fluctuating nature of power
and its dispersed locations pose a number of technical challenges for the DNO/TSO relating to:
• Stability
• Voltage profile and voltage transients
• Congestion
• Losses
• Fault Ride Through (FRT) capability
• Short circuit levels
• Power Quality
• Control and monitoring
• Protection co-ordination
• Islanding Detection
• Synchronization
• Balancing of active and reactive power (reserve requirements)
Utilities have to start operation of distribution systems with DER as a way to improve the reliability of the
power system however, the difference between short circuit levels for cases where the distribution system
is connected to the DER system may vary. This may result in malfunctioning of over current (OC) protection
or other protection schemes. In addition, the operation of renewable DERs on-grid and off-grid changes
the short circuit level and thus may impact overall protection schemes. Furthermore, the short circuit power
contribution varies with the DER technology adopted for e.g. Wind turbines contribute less current when
their internal protection (crowbar protection) is activated but if crowbar protection is not available the fault
feeding ability of WTGs increases. Similarly the wind turbines use different technologies and each has
different impacts on fault feeding capabilities. The conventional WTGs based upon induction generators
and excitation system had huge capability to both absorb and inject reactive power and feed fault current
due to inherent rotating inertia available. The conventional rules of electro-mechanical energy conversions
were applicable. With the support of power electronics the present generation of WTGs has been developed
on totally new concepts. The new generation wind turbines mainly used two technologies (i) Double fed
Induction generators (DFIG) and (ii) Full converter-inverter variable speed synchronous generators. For
DFIGs conventionally only 70% capability is available as rotating inertia that too have much faster control
due to power electronics and balance through complete power electronics. Thus the fault feeding capability
of DFIGs is much less than conventional equivalent wind turbine. The variable speed synchronous machines
have 100% connection with two levels of power electronics and the fault feeding depends much upon the
circuit response and the conversion-inversion power electronic components. These do not contribute much
to the fault levels. The famous Chinese grid collapse of 2011 is attributed to these typical features of wind
turbines and non availability of regulation for any corrective action. The solar inverters also do not contribute
as much fault current as conventional synchronous generation systems.
It is commonly acceptable to establish different DER connection criteria for distribution networks generally
radial up to 66 kV (30 MW generators) and for (sub-) transmission meshed networks of voltage levels
110/132 kV and above. (50 MW and above generators) Thus, this technical chapter primarily focuses on
radial networks topologies.
Regardless of a precise definition for LV, MV, HV and EHV terms, as they can vary from country to country,
it is commonly accepted the following network structure and the associated generation size.
• LV distribution network (< 1 kV). Small DER
• MV distribution network (1 to 35 kV radial). Medium DER.
• Regional MV sub transmission network (35 to 66 kV mainly radial, but also meshed in some cases).
Large DER
• HV sub transmission network (100 to 170 kV). Large DER.
• HV transmission network (170-345 kV). Large concentrations of DER (Wind Farms & Solar Parks)
19.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
As the share of DER is increasing the fundamental principles of protection systems are going to be changed.
The system source impedances are going to increase with DERs. This leads to lower fault current and poor
voltage regulation and higher voltage unbalance. Source of power will be more but source of current for
faults will be far less. The power sources will be hugely distributed therefore protections coordination will be
very difficult. A coordinated protection with remote ends and islanding can be achieved only by seamless
integration of protection, communication and control devices over wide area network. Huge investment
in secured and reliable communication (SCADA system) in dedicated corridor will be required. Broadly a
paradigm shift in protection philosophy will be required.
Generally, the short circuit current contribution of DER differs from these “conventional” energy resources
in many ways:
(i) The location of DER is different, i.e. distributed rather than central. Thus, short circuit contributions
from DER originate from directions not necessarily considered in conventional protection schemes.
This issue is similar to unexpected load flows under normal conditions and can result in phenomena
such as “blinding” or “sympathetic tripping”.
Protection of Electrical Systems with Renewable Energy Resources 291
(ii) Many DER are not directly connected synchronous or asynchronous machines, but coupled to the
network via inverters. The magnitude of the short circuit current of these inverters is usually limited
to values not much higher than the nominal current to protect the inverter itself. Accordingly, the short
circuit capacity of grids dominated by inverter current sources is significantly lower than that of grids
with rotating machines of the same rating.
(iii) The lower short circuit contribution is also connected to a different time characteristic of the short
circuit current. While rotating machines behave like a voltage source under short circuit conditions,
inverters act more like a current source limited to nominal current, and the time characteristic of the
current determined by the control scheme of the inverter.
(iv) The capability to operate during and after faults in the system has not been a strong requirement for
decentralized generation on the contrary, it was and is often required that DER immediately disconnect
under faulty grid conditions so that the well established protection schemes can be maintained.
However, with a growing number of DER and an increasing importance of DER to provide short circuit
capacity both during and after the fault, the Fault Ride through (FRT) capability is of major concern.
(v) Some distributed generation connected to low voltage level especially the rooftops may be mostly
hidden to the network operator, i.e. not officially declared and announced by the users. If the amount
of hidden LV DER is high, its impact to LV level protection and safety may be critical.
19.3 PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
This section aims to describe the different aspects concerning protection as a consequence of the connection
of DER to the network.
19.3.1 System Considerations
A proper understanding of the characteristics of the power system, including steady state and dynamic system
performance, is essential in ensuring the correct arrangement of protection and control of the DER/Utility
interface. A selection of appropriate protection and control philosophy is determined by factors such as:
• Electrical characteristics of the network at the connection point (fault level, network structure, etc.).
• Voltage profile and power transfer capability at the connection point.
• Type of connection to the network (radial/tapped, dedicated or non dedicated line, etc.).
• The prospective fault current contribution from the DER to the utility network and vice versa.
• The dynamic response of the DER units to the utility network faults
• Disturbances and the ability of the DER units to maintain stability on loss of the utility connection.
• Backup protection policy of the utility network at connection point (clearance time requirements).
• Auto-reclosing policy on the utility network.
• Co-ordination requirements with the utility protection.
• Grounding arrangement of the DER when operated in an islanded
19.3.2 Dynamic Response of Generation Sources
The generating plant is defined as stable in steady state if, following a small disturbance, the system returns
to the stable steady state operating condition. Small disturbances arise frequently as a result of:
• Load fluctuations
• Switching operations
• Un-damped power oscillations which result in sustained voltage and power swings.
Generating units are transiently stable if, following a large system disturbance, each generating unit settles
to a new steady state operating condition. Large system disturbances arise following a severe or close up
electrical faults as a result of major load or generation loss. During severe electrical faults the output of the
generating unit can be substantially smaller than the mechanical input from the prime mover and the rotor
will accelerate and start to swing against the system. Provided the fault is cleared quickly, the generating unit
controllers respond rapidly and adequate network connections are maintained following the fault, the oscillations
are damped and the stability can be maintained. If the swing is not contained, large cyclic power exchanges
will occur between generating units and the network, potentially resulting in damage to the generating units,
mal operation of protection systems and unacceptable voltage depressions in the utility supply network. It
has to be appreciated that the DER generating plant should be considered an integral part of the overall
transmission or distribution system to which it is connected. The design of the system should aim to maintain
system stability and prevent the loss of synchronism of generating plant under all operating conditions.
Generating plant which does become unstable should be rapidly disconnected from the network. Protection
equipment provided for the disconnection of generating plant should, however, be designed to ensure that
unnecessary tripping does not occur for conditions of transiently stable operation. In the event that system
stability studies show a risk of instability, suitable protection should be provided to detect the condition and
disconnect the DER generating unit(s) from the utility network. This may be achieved either by tripping the
generating plant, or by tripping the interface circuit breaker(s) and retaining islanded operation of the DER
plant. In bigger plant the tripping of DERs is not desirable and DERs are required to stay connected to the
system. This is called the Fault Ride through capability of DERs.
19.3.3 Power Electronics Interfaced Machine
Power electronioucs can be used as an interface for a wide variety of energy sources. They convert the
DC energy for connection to the AC system or decouple small rotating machines from the network and thus
provide more flexibility in terms of machine rotational speed and efficiency of energy capture (e.g. wind).
Other benefits of power electronic interfaces are their fast control of active and reactive power as well
as voltage regulation, which can potentially enhance the operation of a weak remote network or support
intentional islanding. The typical arrangements of using a power electronics interface for DER installations
are presented in Figure When interfacing with the DC power sources (fuel cells, batteries, etc.), a DC-AC
inverter is used to regulate the AC output of DER into the grid. When used with a rotating machine, an ACDC
rectifier is added to rectify the uncontrolled AC power source. DC-DC converters are almost always found
in photovoltaic battery charging systems to regulate and optimize the power input.
Fig. 19.1
The fault behavior and capability of the inverter is a function of the control design and the size of the power
electronic components (which are usually influenced by cost). This area is currently not completely
understood or standardized and there are only limited guidelines as to the minimum or recommended fault
contribution of an inverter interfaced DER. A number of publications demonstrate that the fault current
from inverter based DER can be up to two or three times the inverter’s full load current for one cycle or
less. But by far it lot depends upon the output filter component values. In a highly optimized solutions there
can be as low as 1.2 to 1.3pu only for a very short period of 0.06 - 0.25 cycles. This is within the transient
or maximum sub transient period for synchronous generators and such currents would have little impact on
the operation of traditional over current relays. Therefore during grid-connected mode there is no defined
impact on the existing protection strategies due to the variation in fault current contribution. During intentional
islanding mode, however, alternative schemes which are not based on the fault to load current ratio may be
required. Furthermore, there may be a problem with inverter’s internal protection reacting too quickly and
too sensitively to faults on the network; in some cases, a network fault could lead to unnecessary tripping
of many inverters and, in an islanded system, this could have severe consequences.
19.3.4 Requirements of Fault Ride Through Capability
First designs of wind turbines disconnected quickly when a voltage drop occurred. This was done both to
comply with utility regulations that aimed at preventing islanding, and to protect the power electronics converter
in variable speed turbines. However, as the wind penetration has increased, generators have been required
to remain stable and connected to the network when faults occur on the transmission network. Otherwise
the power system would be exposed to a great loss of generation with the consequent danger of the system
frequency dropping too rapidly and load shedding becoming necessary. A generator shall remain connected
without tripping to the system during external faults when system voltage measured at the HV terminals of the
network transformer, remains above the corresponding curve. Recent Grid codes require increased network
supporting functionalities during normal (parallel with utility network) operation from connected DER units to
prevent unnecessary disconnection of DER units and to ensure for example the stability of the network.
Under voltage protection should be set to meet the requirements described above. This is known as fault
ride-through capability (FRT) and is included recently in the Grid Codes as a requirement.
The detailed requirements of voltage level and duration of the fault are defined by codes of various countries,
however Indian code at present do not mandate the settings and it is more dependent of the application
engineers of the generators who need to coordinate the same with local grid voltage settings. In addition to
the previous requirement, the generators should not consume reactive power during and after faults or do
it under restricted conditions. In some grid codes, even reactive support has to be provided to the network
during and after faults, (e.g BDW code of Germany) contributing to the voltage recovery of the system.
Likewise, wind farms should provide its maximum available active power as quickly as the technology allows
with a minimum gradient.
Figure shows a typical fault ride through capability curve. It is obvious that DER following this requirement
will have an impact on protection scheme applications and settings. Similar settings are now done for the
solar PV inverters.
Fig. 19.2 : Typical fault Ride Trough curve

19.3.5 Dynamic Performance of Wind Turbines
The main factors potentially having an impact on transient stability are:
• Wind power plants are constructed at locations with a good wind resource and are usually integrated
through radial connections, which is not necessarily favorable from the perspective of grid voltage
control.
• Power flows are considerably different in the presence of a high wind or no wind conditions.
• Wind turbines are relatively weakly coupled to the system because they are usually connected to
lower voltage levels (sub transmission and distribution systems) compared to the conventional power
plants.
• The intermittent nature of wind power is not seen to be relevant to transient stability, but because of
limited predictability of wind speed, systems with high amounts of wind power usually require higher
spinning reserve than conventional power systems.
• Wind generators do not contribute to the system inertia as conventional generators so the frequency
fluctuations after disturbances or with loss of generation are greater when there is a high proportion
of wind power generation.
• It is possible to assess the impact of the three main wind turbine types on power system dynamics
and stability in a qualitative sense by analyzing their properties.
• Squirrel-cage induction generators used in constant-speed turbines cause significant power and torque
fluctuations, but offer good inertial contribution. They can lead to voltage and rotor-speed instability.
During a fault, they accelerate due to the unbalance between mechanical power extracted from the
wind and electrical power supplied to the grid. During voltage restoration, they consume high amounts
of reactive power, impeding voltage restoration. This eventually leads to voltage and rotor-speed
instability. Voltage recovery process, squirrel-cage induction generators tend to slow down voltage
restoration. In such cases capacitor banks are normally used for reactive power control. (However
such generators are now not used in grid)
• Doubly-fed induction generators (DFIG) became popular from last 4-5 years have little impact on the
transient stability performance of the system. They are capable of providing sufficient reactive power
support and voltage control.
• Full converter generators have even less impact on the transient stability performance of the system
than the DFIG. The converter’s fast control of active and reactive power or of the AC voltage at the
generator terminals can provide reactive power to the network both during steady-state conditions as
well as during disturbances. Although full converter generators can potentially be beneficial for system
operation and stability (for example contributing to system frequency regulation), the full extent of the
added benefits is not sufficiently understood at the moment.
With variable-speed turbines, the sensitivity of the power electronic devices to over currents caused by system
faults can have serious consequences for the stability of the power system. When the penetration level of
variable-speed turbines in the system is high and they are all set to disconnect at relatively small voltage
drops, this could lead to a large generation deficit. To prevent this, now grid companies and transmission
system operators facing a high contribution of wind power in their control area are currently proposing and
demanding Low Voltage Ride through and manufacturers are implementing new solutions to reduce the
sensitivity of variable-speed wind turbines to grid voltage.
19.3.6 Inverter Converter Based Short Circuit Contribution
As the solar generation and more and more full controlled low speed synchronous wind generators will increase
the use of convertors and invertors in the distribution grid will become a trend. The fault current contribution
of DER is strongly technology dependent. Distributed generators based on rotating generators (conventional
synchronous or induction machine) will produce a relatively high current during a fault (a current level of about
200 to 400% of nominal current in a few cycles after the fault inception); while generators interfaced through
power electronics will limit the DER current magnitude to a maximum of 1 to 2 p.u. during the fault. Therefore
coordination problems during normal operation are less likely with DER interfaced through inverters and with
a strong main substation. Voltage support by converter-coupled generation for unbalanced faults (single-
phase-to-ground, phase-to-phase, and two-phase-to-ground) differs from the “expected” voltage support of
directly-coupled synchronous generators in terms of magnitude and unbalance. This is because the converters
involved are often current-controlled voltage sources whose contribution is, in most cases, balanced by
control design and as required by current grid codes, resulting in positive-sequence contributions only. DER
units coupled by full converters allow injecting negative-sequence current if required. This behavior would
make the fault detection easier. Negative-sequence control of the DER as described it allows for reduction
of the overvoltage in the healthy phases and increase of the unbalanced current for easier fault detection.
It can be expected that the future grid codes will specify asymmetrical current injection. Furthermore, strict
over-current limits are applied in order to protect the converters. These limits can reach 1.3 pu for stator
reactive current and 0.4 pu for the line side converter reactive current. State-of-the-art balanced fast voltage
control of converter coupled generation for unbalanced faults might impact network protection, either by
hindering fault detection/clearance (impact on sensitivity of the protective system) or by triggering undesired
disconnection of the generation (impact on security of the protective system) due to:
(i) Small resulting short-circuit phase currents
(ii) Reduced short-circuit power of the network which leads to deeper voltage dips in faulted phases
(iii) Overvoltage in healthy (non-faulted) phases.
As a result the need for secure operation of the power system, provided by protection based on three-phase
over and under-voltage, over-current, distance (impedance, angle) and differential protection relays or any
combination of those, then state-of-the-art balanced fast voltage control of converter-coupled generation for
unbalanced faults requires further investigation and implementation.
A further difference between conventional networks and DER connected networks is the behavior of the fault
transient. For instance, different transients generated by inverter controllers could affect some relays, e.g. the
direction determination. Short circuit calculation programs normally use traditional generator models, with a
voltage source behind impedance. These programs may not be able to give reliable results for Converter-
based generators. It might be very difficult to model inverter control in this type of programs, especially if they
do not include the functionalities of electromagnetic transient calculation programs. Moreover, the control
algorithms, including operation and control of the crowbar in certain wind generator units will significantly differ
between different converter manufacturers and these algorithms will not always be available for modeling
due to intellectual property rights. Further the behavior of Current and Voltage Transformers (additional VA
burden) on account of harmonics may never be simulated in present simulators available in market.
Fig. 19.3 : Inverter Short Circuit

19.3.7 Power Flow, Short-circuit Power and Fault Current
Turbines based on the doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) also contribute to the fault current. However,
due to the sensitivity of power electronics to rotor over currents, they are quickly disconnected when a fault
is detected. The ability to support the grid in case of voltage dips is an area that is now well developed and
is being incorporated in the machines and grid codes. The protection method is often based on the so-called
crowbar protection. During severe voltage dips due to grid faults, the rotor side power electronic converter
is quickly disconnected from the grid in order to protect it against possible large current peaks during such
events. In order to achieve this, the three-phase rotor winding is short circuited via the crowbar switch and
consequently the DFIG generator behaves like a normal SCIG generator. For limiting the rotor current and
for influencing the speed torque characteristic of the machine, the rotor can preferably be bypassed through
impedance. The crowbar is released in a short time usually before the fault clearance. The units have thus
the capability to provide reactive power support to the system during sustained faults and contribute to the
voltage recovery of the system.
Wind turbines with a direct-drive generator (full converter) and other converter based generation such as
PV have a limited capacity to contribute to the fault current because the power electronic components
of the converter are normally not capable of supplying a fault current. The short-circuit current is usually
limited to 10-20% above the rated current and converters are normally equipped with under-voltage
relays and over-current limiting in case of disturbances on the distribution system. Therefore, they are
quickly disconnected in case of a fault. However, recent designs offer ride through capability, which is
achieved by applying specific control strategies to the inverter so that the converter fault current can
be limited in a controlled way.
DER leads to fundamental changes in power flows, which requires re-consideration in voltage profile and
voltage stability. Under certain circumstances of Wind generation the power flow may change quite suddenly
due to wind shifts. Additionally, the direction of short-circuit currents may change in case of very large wind
plants causing non-selective tripping and different transient phenomena can be observed. At transmission
level less problems regarding power flow and short-circuit current patterns are expected as transmission
grids are predominantly used to connect large generators. Short-circuit currents are normally much higher
and faults are cleared much faster than in distribution networks.
19.3.8 System Grounding
In most utility networks, the HV transmission system is solidly grounded. Accordingly, DER connections to
the system are generally grounded. However may utilities force the vector groups at interconnection points.
There are few utilities in India where HV transmission system remains grounded at one end only and if the
utility line terminals are opened at the interconnection point the system may become ungrounded. This is
mainly dominant in southern part of India. In the evaluation of the DER installation, the consequences of
ungrounded operation must be evaluated. The inverter topology generally demands the ungrounded star
connection at transformers. The above two conditions together put limitation in the system grounding topology.
Three possible scenario of grounding are shown in figure. A determination must be made as to whether or
not the transmission system can be temporarily ungrounded. The classic situation where this can occur is
when the utility end of the transmission line has tripped but the DER units remains connected through a
power transformer with an HV delta connection.
19.4 UNGROUNDED MV CONNECTION
The ungrounded MV system is generally not a preferred option as it increases the cable rating from U /
0
U to U /U which increases the cost of vast cabling networks. The MV system is grounded by zigzag
E E E
Transformers. The DERs are generally located in areas of very high ground resistivity and hence the
selection of impedance for grounding transformer should be done carefully to facilitate the ground
return current flow during fault conditions. It ensures very high impedance in Zero sequence isolation
between DER and Grid ensures.
19.5 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV & HV CONNECTION
Grounded transformer connection in MV system and the HV transmission system keeps to potential rise under
limits. No isolation between Grid and DER, e.g. DER faults can be seen by the utility grid. Often, there can be
a conflict between the system requirement for grounded operation and protection requirements. Few spurious
trappings due to poor selectivity characteristics of relaying system are unavoidable. The discriminatory fast
tripping from the utility end of the transmission system also does not damage the system. This is appropriate
considering that transmission equipment ratings (e.g.: surge arresters) are sized for grounded operation.
The selection may perform poor from harmonic mitigation point of view and the harmonic injects into the
grid needs to be monitored carefully. No isolation for third harmonics.
19.6 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV AND DELTA HV
In many instances the installations will be HV delta, LV grounded star. This connection may be satisfactory for
loads but may present overvoltage problems as discussed above. If ungrounded operation is to be considered,
studies need to be performed to determine whether resizing of surge arresters or other equipment needs to
be made. The conditions of remote end tripping with DER connected create lot of high voltage disturbances.
This ensures Zero sequence isolation between DER and Grid ensures no fault current in-feed from utility
side for DER winding faults.
Option-I Option-II Option-III

Fig. 19.4 : Various Grounding Methods
19.7 PROTECTION OF THE DER INTERCONNECTION
The protection of DER interconnection is generally requirements imposed by the grid utilities. It detect faults
within the DER plant that can be fed by the utility system or abnormal operating conditions that lead to
voltage or frequency excursion out of statutory limits. The issues include the reduction of protection reach
and sensitivity, coordination problems, automatic reclosing voltage supervision, check synchronizing and
out of step protection.
Besides conventional over current protection, neutral voltage displacement (NVD) protection is required as
a back-up earth fault protection. When it comes to the DER and its interface protection, however, it is the
DER owner’s responsibility. In addition to standard generator protection, the DER owner must ensure that
islanding detection is applied. Generally, loss of grid protection application should be mandatory for small
DER.
Regarding the strategy for DER protection, small power units say upto 5 MW are traditionally operated in
such a way that for any disturbance in the network, they are immediately switched off by very sensitive
instantaneous relays of utilities. Few years back the DER units which wanted protection against anti islanding
use to prefer this. As the DER sizes and number started increasing the grid code and utilities started
demanding for medium and large power plants, to contribute to the stability of the network by remaining
connected during external disturbances. This requirement termed as “fault ride through” (FRT) capability
as explained earlier. To achieve the FRT capability the DER power electronics should be operational during
the voltage variation period. This requires the especial power supplies within the DER capable of power up
electronics circuits during voltage dips or supported by external uninterrupted auxiliary sources. Thus each
inverter should have UPS system to support grid by FRT operation. The setting of FRT is generally defined
in the grid codes by utilities of many countries. The protection settings of Feeder and external line system
is achieved by coordinating (delaying) the relays with the network protection so the FRT revival system
becomes effective.
Due to the increasing penetration of distributed generation in recent years, in a number of countries including
India utilities tend to put forward similar requirements even for the smaller power generating plants. However,
it can sometimes be in conflict with the need of the owner to protect the unit from damage. The greater
capability to withstand faults should not affect the sensitivity for the islanding detection, so a compromise
between sensitivity for islanding detection and stability under external disturbances is needed. It is preferable
that all conversion-inversion devices should have a IEC 62116 compatible anti islanding devices.
19.7.1 Interface Protection
Firstly, interface protection considers those protection elements which are applied for a DER installation at
the utility/DER interface to provide coverage for DER faults that may be fed by the utility system. In fact,
such protection has to be provided not only for DERs but for any load connected to the utility grid. Secondly,
the interface protection in case of DERs should also include detection of abnormal voltage or frequency
conditions caused either by the utility or by an out of range operation of the DER.
Most DER interfaces include the following protection functions:
• Over current relays (51-51N) to protect against overloads and short-circuits inside the DER installation.
Depending on the size of the transformer, short-circuit protection may be assumed by a transformer
differential relay.
• Over and Under-frequency relays (81O-81U), which disconnect the plant under unstable conditions
of the network and prevent undesirable islanded operation and self-excitation of the generator.
• Over and of Under-voltage relays (59, 27), which prevent the islanded operation of the generator with
an abnormal voltage or a malfunction the electronics There can be several instances when an under
voltage is detected but should not cause disconnection of the generator, such as a fault outside the
protective zone; a fault on adjacent lines or even remote lines; increased loading and power swings.
To maintain stability and reliability of the power supply, and to reduce the chances of nuisance DER
tripping, a two-stage under voltage strategy is recommended for all LV and HV connected generation.
Conversely, to meet Fault-Ride-Through (FRT) capability requirements a single stage of delayed
under voltage is applied in some cases.
• Over voltage conditions are usually more hazardous compared to under voltage conditions. Hence,
the time delay settings for over voltage relays are shorter.
• Another important issue is that the interface protection must be coordinated with the remote utility
protection. Co-ordination means:
• Fully selective clearing – the DER’s protection will clear all faults in the DER’s installation before the
utility’s relaying initiates tripping for such faults.
• Simultaneous clearing – the DER’s protection will clear all faults in the DER’s installation coincidentally
with utility clearing of such faults.
Fig. 19.5
19.7.2 Line Protection
Line protection is required to remove the DER in-feed to transmission line faults. Line protection requirements
are driven by:
• Transformer connections of the DER
• Transmission line relaying practices for the utility grid
• Critical fault clearance time
• Form of connection to the DER (tapped connection or radial circuit)
• Size of connected DER and main transformer

Generally the DERs are radial connected from the utility GSS in Indian practices. There are exceptional
cases when the DERs are given connection by making the LILO arrangement in existing Transmission
networks.
19.8 TRANSFORMER CONNECTIONS
The primary consideration is whether the main power transformer is a source of zero sequence current or not.
The HV star – LV delta connection delivers ground fault current to the utility for transmission phase-toground
faults. The logical protection choices with this transformer connection would include residually connected
ground over current relays and ground distance protection. Occasionally, an HV delta – LV grounded star
connection is used. For this situation neither ground over current detection nor ground distance protection
will work. Typically, the HV VT open delta secondary voltage should be measured. This will detect the zero
sequence voltage for a single phase to ground fault on the transmission system.
19.8.1 Transmission Line Relaying practices for line protection
The type of network to which the generator is connected, the philosophy and practices of protection of the
utility network determine the type of protection. Coordination with other network protections has to be studied
to prevent unnecessary trips. For example, under voltage settings must consider the co-ordination with other
network relays under external faults but also the FRT requirements of DERs.
Additionally, the short circuit current contribution of the converter based generators can affect the protection
performance. The impact on the performance of the current line protection needs to be assessed, especially
for those connection schemes in which current detected by relays is exclusively supplied by DER, i.e. direct
line connections, tapped connections or connections to a substation with a few lines.
The utility line protection practices of similar line protection setting of local and the remote end protection
may not fulfill the co-ordination requirements with DERs as sources of fault feeding. For example it is
easier to coordinate two distance relays with each other than an over-current relay with a distance relay.
Secondly, it is likely that the protection clearance speed requirements for faults fed from the DER are kept
similar to those for the utility line relaying. Generally this may conflict or remain non- coordinated with the
FRT capability of DERs.
In HV (sub) transmission networks: The distance protection on radial feed will not be effective or off any
effective use for DER ends. This is truer in solar PV inverter based technology and Wind parks using 100%
converter-inverter based turbines. For inverter based PV solar plants fault current contribution varies very
widely based upon instant solar radiation. It is observed that in most of the fault incidents the distance
protection on the plant side will not start. The grid source side distance protection should be set in independent
mode with time delay for FRT element to DERs to be effective. The FRT characteristics should be finalized
in coordination with grid operators. If the Redundant protection based on distance protection with a tale-
protection aided tripping scheme (POTT or PUTT) is available it should be used as line differential protection.
With communication channel the weak end in-feed protection logic should be set carefully at DER ends. As
practice a weak-in feed scheme at plant end is a good solution to preserve the single pole reclosing cycle
in case of the generator is off-line.
In double circuit lines dedicated line connections to DERs, line protection should be also provided at the
generator end. This is required as the in feed will come from un-faulted lines. The DFIG end conventional
wind plants have enough fault feeding capability and the feeders should have normal distance protection
schemes. The short-circuit current of DFIG wind turbines with crow-bar protection is reduced to the rated
current level typically in 9 cycles (150-180 millisecs). This gives the opportunity for the first zone of distance
relays or communication aided tripping distance schemes to operate, but not for time delayed distance zones.
DER generators based on converters do not provide enough short circuit current in any time so distance
relays are expected to mal operate.
Line differential protection is most preferred but not very cost effective provision for the DERs. Some solutions
to overcome the limitations of distance relays for fault detection could be overcome by using line differential
protection instead or a hybrid tele-protection scheme with weak-in-feed and echo logic. The performance
of line differential is not affected by local conditions of plants like wind and solar insolation but the current
threshold for tripping should be set very low at the generator end.
Ground directional over current relays are expected to mal-operate or operate slower, so line differential
protection should be set with enough sensitivity to detect high resistance faults.
19.9 RECOMMENDED DER INTERCONNECTION REQUIREMENTS
The protection challenges and priorities for integration of DER into the power network also depend on the
level of DER penetration which will differ from region to region. For integration of small scale DER the main
priority is the safe and secure operation of the utility network. One of the main priorities is that islanding is
not allowed which is the situation today in most countries. In most DER installations outside India voltage
and frequency protection is required at the point of common connection which is relied upon to provide some
level of anti-islanding protection. Islanding and survival is still not a common practice in Indian utility sector.
However it is recommended that the relaying at the interconnection point should be ready with above two
protections and should be used for standby protection for anti islanding which is at present a part of Power
electronics protection.
For the integration of medium scale DER the main priority is protection co-ordination to avoid large scale
tripping of generation. High DER penetration makes it desirable to involve DER units in the power balance
on the highest system level. Instead of tripping DER units for remote system disturbances, it is desirable
for DER to withstand much greater variations in voltage and frequency. Voltage protection settings must
co-ordinate with FRT characteristics and frequency relay must do it with system load-shedding protection.
Operation at the wider frequency band, between 47 to 52 Hz, and the wider voltage range may help the
integration of medium scale DER. However, this approach entails difficulties for the distribution networks as
wider frequency operation could severely limit the islanding detection capabilities of the present protection
practices. As a practice for any FRT functionality minimum time required is 500-800 millisecs. The line over
current relay should be coordinated as per prevailing FRT settings of the region.
The change in the nature of the generation mix has pushed most of the network operators (transmission and
distribution) in different countries to develop rules and other technical requirements regulating the integration
of DER into the power system to ensure security of supply, reliability and power quality. This information
can either be included in the utilities rules, or is required by the regulation authority under codes or laws,
or both, depending on the country.
There should be specific interconnection rules for small DER units, generally connected to MV system with
stricter requirements on protection than for the bigger generators because of less control and monitoring
over the small generating installations by the network operator. For medium and large generation, technical
requirements are normally included in the Grid Codes.
Until recently, wind and solar generators were exempted from technical requirements and system services
capability. However, due to the increasing penetration of wind farms in some regions which result in equivalent
large size power plant, this exemption was found to jeopardize the system security and power quality,
CEA/CERC have developed and issued additional grid codes that impose technical requirements on wind
generators to enable system operators to have control over wind farms.
The grid codes of several countries require mandatory voltage and frequency operating ranges and fault
ride through capabilities. Additionally, in some countries have made it mandatory for large DERs to have
capabilities to contribute to frequency and voltage/reactive power control during steady state operation and it
is bound to be mandated in Indian grid codes also in future. To meet these requirements new wind generators
generally include power electronics with reactive power controls in various modes.
19.9.1 Frequency Operating Range
European grid codes, generators, including wind farms, are required generally to be capable of operating
continuously at full power output between 47.5 Hz and 52 Hz and time (or power). Indian grid codes are
more governed by ABT regulatory guidelines and the latest regulation requirements for wind generators to
operated from Hz. The present regulations in India considerers the DERs as must run generators hence no
backing downs are considered but the situation may not remain same for years to come.
19.9.2 Blinding and Sympathetic Tripping
In conventional distribution networks, the fault current is only provided by the connection point to the
transmission network, which is a strong source. DERs connected to the distribution system, the short circuit
current contributions may originate from different paths than the central connection point and may result
in “blinding”. Blinding is caused by the fact that DER fault currents have an impact on the voltage at their
connection point. Thus, while the overall fault current at the fault location increases due to the DER fault
current contribution, the fault current provided via the central connection point decreases. Blinding may
result in delayed or unselective tripping, especially of over current protection, and may also negatively affect
distance protection as it can cause under reaching due to the in feed. Sympathetic tripping may be overcome
by the application of directional relays.
Fig. 19.6 : Fault currents without distributed generation
Fig. 19.7 : Fault currents with distributed generation
In addition to the effect of “blinding”, with a significant increase of DER, the short-circuit capacity of the
transmission system will probably decrease because the number of large conventional power stations that
provide the high fault levels will be reduced. This would negatively impact the protection coordination in
distribution networks with high DER penetration.
19.10 PROTECTION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES
One of the most important changes caused by the massive integration of DER into the distribution network
is the bi-directionality of fault currents. This implies the need to develop more complex protection systems
on the distribution network, which are able to deal with several contributions to fault current.
All protection schemes where DERs are involved must be checked. There must be a large enough fault
current to start the relevant protective devices:
• in all situations, e.g. low wind or sun
• other methods for starting protection must be considered (e.g. U-I-starting, under-impedance)
• HV neutral displacement voltage protection: additional decoupling protection in order to avoid the risk
of islanding in case of phase faults at HV level.
• islanding detection (tale-decoupling): detection of the opening of the MV feeder and communication
to the DER facility decoupling protection
• directional phase protection: protection which detects the sense of the fault current, in order to locate
the fault and avoid unintentional tripping (i.e. when the fault occurs on another MV feeder)
• DER facility protection: protection against faults occurring within the installation
• DER facility decoupling protection: disconnection of the DER facility from the network when a MV
network fault occurs.
Fig. 19.8
19.11 TRENDS IN PROTECTION SYSTEMS
19.11.1 Use of Nested Settings and Custom Curves
Many manufacturers of numerical protection relays have provided the ability to implement different relay
settings on the same relay and to be selected by remote means. This functionality is little used and yet
provides the ability to re-protect the affected network after a circuit reconfiguration or in different operating
conditions of DERs like wind speed or solar insolation. If the facility is used then normally manual selection
is required by an operative at the device. These facilities could provide the first step in pseudo adaptive
protection if used in an automated manner for example if controlled islanding is allowed to adapt the settings
to the different conditions during island operation. The custom curves are usually in the form of a points
table that can be input to create a user configurable curve. This will make the protection relays more flexible
and adaptable to possible future solutions for adaptive protection and to meet the many current customer
specific curves for fault ride through protection for example.
19.11.2 Adaptive Protection
Today it can be clearly stated that adaptive protection is not available on a commercial basis. The more
adventurous designers of future protection devices are considering the use of real-time adaptive protection
curves that could adapt to different network conditions. E.g. to manage wind farms in a micro-grid application,
to keep generation connected even during a fault condition would require protection to “hold-off” while fault-
ride through and other network actions are tried before disconnection of the generation. Similarly in extra
large solar plant the fault current contribution proportional to solar insolation is a requirement. This application
would lend itself to real-time adaptive protection.
19.11.3 Dynamic Thermal Protection
Wind & solar farms tend to be located at the extremes of the distribution system where overhead lines may
not be rated to carry the full output of the wind farm in all circumstances. Often a line has been designed
originally to supply a relatively small load, and the installation of new wind generation may cause a large
reverse power flow, causing the standard winter and summer line ratings to be exceeded. The worst case
in this respect is with maximum wind generation and minimum local load which is a common phenomenon
in Indian monsoons season. Rather than applying fixed summer and winter line ratings, load management
based on a dynamically derived line rating can be adopted. Use of a dynamic thermal rating or a real time
thermal rating of transmission lines can avoid unnecessary and costly network reinforcement and add
extra capacity to the DER project. Some methods that could be used to determine the real time rating are
described below.
The line thermal rating can be calculated dynamically in real time from the local weather measurements such
as wind speed and ambient temperature to co-ordinate allowed generation automatically. As this method
takes into account the cooling effect of the wind it is expected that such a dynamic line rating method could
facilitate connection of up to 30% more generation as compared to fixed winter/summer ratings. As a back-
up system, in case for some reason the wind farm power output is not reduced on command by the control
system, tripping of the overhead lines can be initiated.
19.11.4 Islanding
There is an increased need for high performance anti-islanding protection. The greater capability to withstand
external faults without nuisance tripping should not affect the sensitivity for the islanding detection, so a
compromise between sensitivity for islanding detection and stability under external disturbances is required.
Growing DER penetration levels of all sizes and connection voltages causes an increased need for high
performance anti-islanding protection.
Both intended and unintended islanding situations must be detected by a loss of mains protection reliable
islanding detection method of the DER units. The most onerous situation is during an island operation
(i.e. in micro grid mode), where the fault current could assimilate the load current. In these circumstances,
over current protection could become insufficient. In islanded micro grids, load current and inverter current
capabilities cannot be neglected in the design of the protection system. The change of fault levels introduces
a change in protection philosophy where the faults are less likely to damage network components but are still
a danger to individuals. Moreover, the fault behavior of the network will change over time if the distributed
generators are switched or if the topology is altered to minimize the losses or prevent voltage problems. In
a micro grid, the change of fault behavior is very large when the micro grid switches from the grid-connected
mode to the islanded mode of operation. The inertia and short-circuit capacity of these islanded systems is
much lower. Permanent relay settings will become less effective in some situations and methods for adaptive
resetting of protection characteristics may be needed.
In a micro grid, most of the sources are connected via power electronic converters. These converters do
not supply sufficient currents to operate current based protective devices in islanded mode because they
have been designed to limit the fault current. Therefore protecting a converter dominated micro grid is a
challenging technical issue under the current limited environment.
As mentioned above, due to the low thermal inertia of semiconductor switches, inverters are actively current
limited and, because of their small fault current contribution, they lead unavoidably to various problems that
have to be considered by the protection system:
• Characteristics of the inverters under fault conditions may not be consistent with the existing protection
devices;
• Throughout the whole micro grid, there may be different inverters with different characteristics;
• Even in the case of an individual inverter, its basic characteristics may differ depending on its design
or application;
• There may be difficulties in characterizing inverter behavior for short-circuit studies, since this depends
on the control strategy applied;
• There may be a significantly reduced fault current level when changed from grid connected to islanded
mode of operation.
Based on the above, one of the most important issues is to ensure that the behavior required from DER
units, including fault-ride-through needs, is compatible with the developed LV micro grid protection system
during faults in micro grid. In other words this means that when the protection of a microgrid operated in
island mode is designed, one of the most important questions to answer is how converter based DER units
will contribute to the fault current
19.12 PROTECTION SCHEMES FOR FUTURE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS WITH DER
The purpose of this section is to highlight in a few words the new challenges of distribution network protection
related to new grid code requirements, active network management schemes and island operation. Medium-
voltage (MV) and low-voltage (LV) distribution networks as well as both directly connected rotating generator
based DER units and converter interfaced DG units are covered.
19.12.1 New Challenges for Protection
One of the key protection functionalities in the Smart Grids will be reliable detection of islanding. Although
the trend in new grid codes is to require fault-ride-through (FRT) capability from DER units and possibly
also to allow island operation, there is still a need to reliably detect the islanding situation in order for the
operator to make the correct decisions, e.g. change the setting group of DER interconnection IED or change
the control principles and parameters of DER.
It is now evolving idea that islanding detection should not be based only on the network operator’s switchgear
opening/closing position signals. Moreover, if high-speed communication is used as a primary islanding
detection method, the passive local islanding detection method is still needed as a back-up.
Larger non-detection zone (NDZ) and unwanted DER trips due to other network events (nuisance tripping)
have been the major challenges with traditional, passive local islanding detection methods based on frequency
(f), df/dt, vector shift (VS) or voltage (U).
If the number of DER units in distribution networks increases, as expected, in the future, the possibility of
achieving power balance in the distribution network will also increase. Therefore, the risk of distribution
system segments operating in the NDZ of the traditional passive islanding detection methods will increase,
too. In addition, the use of f, U and rate-of change-of-frequency (ROCOF) for defining DER units’ FRT
requirements in the new grid codes, to enable utility grid stability supporting functionalities from DER units,
will increase.
Recent and forthcoming grid code requirements, such as the active power/frequency (P/f) may become
important. Regulation during over-frequency for all DER units and during under-frequency for larger
DER units will enable DER units connected to MV and LV networks to control their active power even
after islanding. This means that frequency deviations are instantly corrected and islanding may not be
detected with the traditional, passive islanding detection methods. Therefore, the use of the traditional
parameters for reliable and selective islanding detection may become even more difficult in the future
than it is today.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, a new, future-proof, passive islanding detection algorithm and scheme
has been proposed by many application engineers, which is able to detect very fast and selectively islanding
situations even in a perfect power balance without NDZ, and is also applicable to different type of DER units.
In the future, it is possible that different active network management functionalities, like voltage control,
island operation coordination, minimization of losses, etc. will be realized through centralized solutions at
primary (HV/MV) and secondary (MV/LV) substations. Active network management may simultaneously
affect to protection settings if for instance network topology is changed. Therefore, adaptive protection may
be required.
Traditionally, active network management and adaptive protection functionalities have been developed and
operated independently. However, in the future increasing attention should be paid to understand the level
of active network management and protection functions coupling to be able to create future-proof solutions
for the Smart Grids.
19.12.2 New Applications of Teleportation, Use of Communication
The new communication technologies are providing new opportunities for the development of the Smart
Grids. In order to define the requirements for these technologies it’s important to notice that protection
schemes are also designed in order to protect the network from unsolicited islanding. In general it’s possible
to distinguish between wired technologies and radio technologies.
Prominent Wired technologies:
• Copper Pair communications technologies
• Power Line communications technologies
• Fibre Optic communications technologies
Promising Upcoming Radio technologies:
• VHF/UHF
• TETRA
• WIFI
• ZigBee
• Z-WAVE
• WIMAX
• Cellular data services and Satellite

Brief Summary of advantages-disadvantages of wired technologies
PLCC Existent infrastructure with TSOs Possible interference Hostile communication
Massive coverage in TSO networks channel (attenuation, fading, noise)
Shared channel for multicast Multiple Repeaters needed Possible coupling
services. problems.
Copper Good transmission characteristics No full coverage in Rural sector Connection
communication Efficient bandwidth use IP technologies availability not guaranteed no point-to-
(xDSL) well extended and tested High penetration multipoint protocols Costly.
in Urban areas Multiple service providers
Open standards.
Fibre optic Good transmission specifications Point-to-point links (demanding for
(bandwidth, attenuation, …) Mature communication with LV consumers)
technology Open standards Scalable Gateways required for medium change If
Multiple services. not available, costly deployment.
xDSL: High bit rate Digital Subscriber Line (HDSL), Single-Pair High-speed Digital Subscriber Line (SHDSL),
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), Very high bit rate DSL (VDSL).
Future Communication technologies – comparative evaluation
Technology Operator/ Cost Frequency Data rate Area Applications

owner band Network
Licensed 150 MHz / Narrow
VHF/UHF radio low RAN Voice, DA, AD
agency 400 MHz band
PMR (TETRA) Utility high 400 MHz Narrow RAN
Voice; DA, AD
band
Utility low (only) 2,4 GHz Broadband (NAN) AMR, Home
WiFi consumer
HAN Automation
ZigBee Narrow HAN Home
Utility low (only) 2,4 Ghz
consumer band AMR, Automation
WiMAX utility 3rd party low 5 – 60 GHz Broadband RAN DA, AD, AMR
Public cellular 900/ 1800 Narrow/ WAN, Voice; DA, AD,
3rd party Medium
data services MHz GSM broadband NAN AMR
Satellite low/ 2, 6, 12 Narrow
3rd party WAN AD, AMR
communication medium GHz band
RAN: Radio Area Network; NAN Neighbourhood Area Network; HAN home Area Network; WAN: Wide Area
network
With the assumption that, in case of islanding, the protection system has to act in the minimum possible
time, the table below shows the appropriate technology to use in MV network.
Appropriate technology to use in MV networks
VHF/ Public
Data Copper PLC Fiber Optic
Delay UHF TETRA WiFi ZigBee Wimax data Satellite
Rate Pair Technology Technology
Radio Service
>1Mbps – Yes No Yes Yes* No * No Yes Yes no
With the assumption that, in case of islanding, the protection system have to act in a time up to 100ms, the
table below show the appropriate technology to use in LV network.
VHF/ Public
Data Copper PLC Fiber Optic
Delay UHF TETRA WiFi ZigBee Wimax data Satellite
Rate Pair Technology Technology
Radio Service
Yes/
1Mbps 100ms No Yes No No No No Yes Yes yes
no**
WiFi does not apply to long range links between DSO to HV/MV Substation (MV/LV Substation) and between
HV/MV substations and MV/LV substations since for these links, very high power is used, compared to other
wireless technologies such as VHF/UHF radios. WiFi is applicable in the scenario NAN of the architecture,
especially in those areas where there are high concentrations of nodes. In areas like cities where there are
a moderate concentration of nodes, deployment of a wireless mesh network based on WiFi can be a great
solution. WiFi is also applicable in the scenario HAN architecture.
19.12.3 Protection Schemes for Future Distribution Networks with DER
One of the key protection functionalities in the Smart Grids will be reliable detection of islanding. Although
the trend in new grid codes is to require fault-ride-through (FRT) capability from DER units and possibly
also to allow island operation, there is still a need to reliably detect the islanding situation in order for the
operator to make the correct decisions, e.g. change the setting group of DER interconnection IED or change
the control principles and parameters of DER unit.
In the forthcoming grid codes for DER generators it will be there that islanding detection should not be based
only on the network operator’s switchgear opening/closing position signals. High-speed communication are
expected to be used as a primary islanding detection method, the passive local islanding detection method
may still be needed as a back-up. Larger non-detection zone (NDZ) and unwanted DER trips due to other
network events (nuisance tripping) have been the major challenges with traditional, passive local islanding
detection methods based on frequency (f), df/dt, vector shift (VS) or voltage (U).
If the number of DER units in distribution networks increases, as expected, in the future, the possibility of
achieving power balance in the distribution network will also increase. Therefore, the risk of distribution
system segments operating in the NDZ of the traditional passive islanding detection methods will increase,
too. In addition, the use of f, U and rate-of change- of-frequency (ROCOF) for defining DER units’ FRT
requirements in the new grid codes, to enable utility grid stability supporting functionalities from DER units,
will increase. Recent and forthcoming grid code requirements, such as the active power/frequency (P/f)
regulation during over-frequency for all DER units and during under-frequency for larger DER units will
enable DER units connected to MV and LV networks to control their active power even after islanding.
This means that frequency deviations are instantly corrected and islanding may not be detected with the
traditional, passive islanding detection methods. Therefore, the use of the traditional parameters for reliable
and selective islanding detection may become even more difficult in the future than it is today.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, a new, future-proof, passive islanding detection algorithm and scheme
has been proposed by many application groups in utilities, which is able to detect very fast and selectively
islanding situations even in a perfect power balance without NDZ, and is also applicable to different type
of DER units.
In the future, it is possible that different active network management functionalities, like voltage control,
island operation coordination, minimization of losses, etc. will be realized through centralized solutions at
primary (HV/MV) and secondary (MV/LV) substations. Active network management may simultaneously
affect to protection settings if for instance network topology is changed. Therefore, adaptive protection may
be required.
Traditionally, active network management and adaptive protection functionalities have been developed and
operated independently. However, in the future increasing attention should be paid to understand the level
of active network management and protection functions coupling to be able to create future-proof solutions
for the Smart Grids.
19.12.4 Standardized Communication and Adaptive Protection for Islands
The present trend is for more standardized communications between protection relays of different
manufacturers and refers to the IEC 61850 communications standards. Furthermore, it suggests that
intelligent protection schemes which can adapt their protection settings will play an important role in enabling
stable operation and protection especially for island concepts. Currently protection settings are seen to be
very rigid for the changing conditions in the network so new adaptive solutions will be required in the future
for DERs. Various protection considerations in relation to intentional islanding will be evolved in future with
possible need for adaptive protection when transition to islanded operation takes place. It has also happen
that the technology used in anti-islanding protection will also be used to activate the appropriate change of
protection settings.
The usage of IEC61850 in protection circuits as well as adaptive protection schemes will gradually increase,
because in the future both short-circuit and earth-fault protection settings of MV feeder Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IED) may need to adapt to changes in network topology resulting from increased utilization of
active distribution network management schemes to support improved supply reliability. The protection
has to deal with topology changes and to disconnect faulted sections rapidly, directional OC, distance and
differential protection with high-speed communication based blocking schemes will be utilized increasingly
in the short-circuit protection of future Smart Grids. The required future performance for transmitting blocking
signals and voltage and current data from sensors could be achieved by utilization of IEC 61850 GOOSE
and sampled value (SV) services, with increased usage of wireless 4G technologies in addition to fiber-optic
based communication.
19.13 CONCLUSION
The chapter has presented a review of the issues surrounding the impact of increasing levels of DER on
the generator and network protection and the resulting necessary improvements in protection practices.
Particular focus was placed on ever increasing inverter-interfaced DER installations and the challenges of
utility network integration. In terms of practices emphasis was made on the understanding importance of
dynamic behavior of DER equipments for which development of real time simulators will be challenge in
future. Integrated substation automation infrastructure and flexible, inverter-equipped microgrid needs to
be integrated in future for islanding operations. The combination of the emerging flexible network operation
and new DER technologies underline the importance of utilizing the existing assets for Excellence. This not
only informs the shaping of new protection testing and network integration practices by end users but also
enables the process of de-risking new DER protection technologies.
This chapter only highlights the difficulties associated with standardization and approval mechanisms to be
adopted by different utilities for grid connections of DERs. It reinforces the need for better standardization
solutions in the near future.
Chapter 20
DC AUXILIARY SUPPLY SYSTEMS
In substations and power plants, DC batteries are used to provide back-up to control power supply to all
the protection, control and automation equipment for fail safe operation of the plant. They form a reliable,
dependable and secured DC Power Supply Block and form essential part of the protection and control system
in the substation or the power plant and are essential for the reliability of fault clearance.
20.1 CHARACTRISTICS OF DC AUXILIARY SOURCES
Redundantbatteries, usually of 220 DC voltage are used for protection and control of all 220 kV and above
substations and plant (while 48 volt Battery system is used for communication purposes) are connected via
dedicated chargers fed by secure, dedicated duplicated auxiliary system AC power supply. The auxiliary
supply system is often provided with duplicated feeders (from different auxiliary transformers). The charger
feeds the DC load and the battery (in float / boost mode). The battery instantly takes over the load on failure
of charger or AC supply. The main parameters of sizing the battery are:
• The required autonomy in case of unavailability of the charger varies considerably. This can be 1-10
hours in a power plant to several days in inaccessible or remote substations. It depends a lot on the
intervention delay of the maintenance team in charge of the auxiliary supply system.
• The maximum discharge current required related with 10-hour discharge rate.
• Maximum current drawn by all the equipment functioning together and connected simultaneously to
the same battery in normal service conditions.
• It is always desirable to have the load profile indicating the various loads related with the hours of
service when the AC supply is not available
• The voltage of the cell at the end of discharge that corresponds to the lowest voltage permitted by the
various equipment for their proper operation after taking in to account the voltage drop in the leads.
This voltage is often taken equal to 80% of the rated voltage Un.
• The maximal charge voltage with recommended charge rate and boost charge rate up to gassing
voltage: This value is linked to the maximum voltage acceptable to the various equipment connected,
before they start malfunctioning.
Two classes of battery voltage are mainly used: 110-127 V and 220-250 V. Generally the 48-52 V supply is
used only for telecommunication system.
20.2 STATION BATTERY TECHNOLOGY USED IN SUBSTATIONS
20.2.1 Non-sealed Lead Batteries
There are three types of batteries that are normally used:
• Accumulators with long life duration plates (Plante plate).
• Accumulators with pasted plates (Faure type).
• Accumulators with tubular positive plates (Ironclad plates).

DC Auxiliary Supply Systems 311
20.2.2 Sealed Lead Batteries with Recombination of Gas
Sealed lead batteries with recombination of gas are sometimes called glass-mat Valve Regulated Lead
Accumulator (VRLA). These accumulators need less maintenance since the emitted gasses (02 and H2)
are recombined to reform the electrolysed water.
These batteries have to be operated within certain temperature range in order to have longer operating
life.
20.2.3 Nickel-cadmium Battery
These batteries are lighter than lead batteries for the same capacity and have better performance with
respect to variations in external temperature. Their life duration is superior to the lead batteries. They require
reduced maintenance. However these are expensive compared to other types of batteries. These batteries
are of two types.
• Accumulators with “pockets” type plates, an old technology.
• Accumulators with sintered plates, new technology, whose life duration is superior to the old
technology.
20.2.4 Types of Batteries and their Selection
Selection of battery is governed by several factors. Key factors, which generally decide the type of battery
set to be used, are as follows.
• Application and its criticality
• Type of load, its duration and its nature (Cyclic, continuous, intermittent)
• Location, manned or unmanned
The practices vary from utility to utility.
20.3 DUPLICATION OF AUXILIARY DC SUPPLY SYSTEMS
With high quality DC batteries and good supervision the availability and reliability of the batteries are
satisfactory during their life cycle. The replacement of the battery is essential when the symptoms defined
for the end of their life cycle are observed.
Each battery is connected to a dedicated charger. The failure of these chargers is another cause for loss of
auxiliary supply. Generally it is supervised and when a charger fault occurs, an alarm is sent out to control
room to inform the maintenance staff. The current technology trend is towards the use of microprocessor for
the control of battery chargers. In the long term, data on charging rates and self-diagnostics shall be available
via control system of the substation. This shall then increase the availability of the auxiliary supply.
The following combinations are used for charging the batteries :
• Single Charger with each Battery
• Two chargers with each Battery (redundancy in charger considering higher failure rate)
• Twin sets of charger and battery.
The battery capacity is often sufficient to allow the charger replacement or repairing in time. Thereby the
probability of DC auxiliary supply lost by malfunction of charger is generally very low. The duplicated DC
supply is considered essential for all the substations at 220 kV and above.
Other causes of loss of auxiliary DC supply such as unwanted opening of DC circuit breaker or human error
during manual intervention exist and its consequences should be considered while planning the system
despite of their low probability.
Generally duplication is used on high voltage substations of 220 kV and above (and some times at 132
kV substations of strategic importance and in 132 kV substations in generating stations), where redundant
protection schemes, each powered by independent aux power supply are provided. This arrangement rules
out common mode failures.
20.4 DUPLICATION OF DC FUSES ON AUXILIARY SUPPLY
At voltage levels below 220kV, where only one battery is used, the general practice is to provide at least two
DC circuits individually protected by supervised fuse (or suitably rated DC MCB) to supply the main protection
and back-up protection; each supplying its own trip coil separately. Other arrangements, where more DC
feeders are provided, are described below. Each of these feeders is protected by fuse or a miniature circuit
breaker (MCB).
• One circuit for Main-1 protection.
• One circuit for back-up protection or Main-2 protection.
• One circuit for the trip coil 1
• One circuit for trip coil 2
The reliability of fuses, when their rating is chosen correctly with respect to the load and grading required, is
quite high. The blowing of fuses is often induced by human error during an intervention. It is a good practice
to supervise each separately fused circuit with a no volt relay and an alarm sent to the control room.
Even though reliability of fuses is high, availability of the right fuse element when replacement is required
could be a problem and for this reason use of miniature circuit breakers of adequate breaking capacity
instead of fuses is recommended.
The auxiliary contact of such MCBs should be used to send alarm to control room to indicate their operation.
If an auxiliary contact is not available use of no volt relay shall be made for this purpose.
20.5 DUPLICATION OF TRIP COILS
The battery duplication associated with two main systems of protection completely independent of each
other, implies most of the time, the duplication of trip coils in order to ensure the complete redundancy of
the protection system. This means each primary system is associated with its own circuit breaker trip coil.
Even when the relay system consists of a high-speed main protection and a low speed back-up protection,
normal practice is to energize one set of trip coils with the main relaying system and second set with the
back-up protection.
In order to avoid an unwanted breaker failure relay operation, possible solutions are:
• The breakerfailure protection relay reissuesthetrip signal through instantaneous trip feature to both
the trip coils.
• Both trip coils are energized from each relay system i.e., Main-1 and Main-2 trip both trip coils (cross
tripping)
In case of modern circuit breakers the probability of trip coil failure is low and its contribution in total failure
rate of the circuit breaker is generally negligible.
Energising the trip coil for too long a time can cause this failure. Human error and auxiliary contact failures
are the main causes for this. The human error is generally detected and the damaged trip coil is replaced.
DC Auxiliary Supply Systems 313
To take care of failures due to other causes it is necessary to supervise the trip coil circuit continuously by
providing a trip circuit supervision relay. If there is no supervision of the trip coil circuit, and such failures are
not detected, it might lead to circuit breaker failure.
In EHV/UHV circuit breakers, though this failure risk is low, it is recommended to duplicate trip coil on each
circuit breaker, with each trip coil being supplied from different batteries or from a separately fused common
battery. Monitoring and supervision of both trip coils should also be carried out.
20.6 BATTERY GROUND FAULT DETECTORS
Battery ground fault detectors are often used to detect ground faults on either bus/rail of the battery. The battery
ground detector reduces the likelihood of simultaneous ground faults on both the negative and positive rails,
and consequent loss of the battery supply due to operation of fuse or MCB. Very effective digital protection
and supervision schemes are available for detection of ground faults in DC system.
20.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUPLICATION OF DC SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND DC DISTRIBUTION

SCHEMES
The following guidelines for designing a suitable DC distribution system have been set forth.
20.7.1 For 400 kV stations there shall be two separate battery systems available for protection, control and
tripping/closing operations. For 220 kV stations where only one set of battery source is available
segregation of protection and trip circuits in two groups may be considered by giving DC supplies
through separate fuses.
Manual on Power System Protection
20.7.2 Distribution of DC supply shall be done bay wise to feed the following
(a) Protection
(b) CB functions
(c) Isolator/earth switch functions
(d) Annunciation/Indications
(e) Monitoring functions(Disturbance Recorder, Fault Locator, Event Logger etc.) when these are not
integral part of protection
20.7.3 (a) Protection Function
For each group of protectionfie Group A and Group B relays) separate DC sources are
recommended.
(b) CB Functions
Trip coil 1&2 shall be fed from separate sources. Closing coil can be from either of these two
sources.
(c) Isolator/Earth switch
These associated with any one circuit shall be fed from one of the two DC sources. In the case of a
1 & 1/2 CB arrangement, the Isolator/Earth switch associated with the tie CB can be fed from either
Source 1 or 2.
(d) Annunciation & Indication
For each bay, these functions can be fed from either one of the 2 sources. Each function shall be fed
however through separate feeds.
(e) Monitoring Functions if not part of the protection relay, can be grouped in 3 groups
(i) Disturbance Recorders
(ii) Fault Locators
(iii) Event Loggers
All the three groups shall be fed through separate feeds from either of the two sources. This is to enable the
full availability of these equipment irrespective of that of the protections.
Chapter 21
DISTURBANCE RECORDER, ALARMS AND EVENT

LOGGING
21.1 Introduction
21.1.1 Disturbance Recorders
Recording devices have existed for many years, from the first ink chart recorders to the digital recording
equipment available today. Modern digital equipment has the capability to monitor a larger number of analog
and binary inputs that could not be monitored in the earlier disturbance recording devices. The introduction
of microprocessor relays provided another method of disturbance recording. The increased capability of
disturbance recording capability of modern numerical microprocessor relays offers significant advantage of
quick analysis of events and faults and is valuable tool for operational decisions subsequent to an event.
This chapter discusses the application of Integrated Disturbance recording functionality.
21.2 Definitions
Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) - records instantaneous values (waveforms) of current and voltages, sampled
many times per cycle, for time periods on the order of a second. DFR may also record computed quantities,
specifically developed for the purpose of analyzing system protection operations and circuit breaker
performance.
Sequence-of-Events Recorder (SER) - records sequence and time-of-day of digital events, such as contact
operations. Developed for the purpose of analyzing operations of control and protection systems.
Dynamic Swing Recorder (DSR) – records frequency, phase angle, and or rms values of power system
quantities such as voltage magnitude, current, MW, MVAR, etc., sampled or calculated many times per
second, e.g. 6 to 60 samples per second or more. Record duration is generally on the order of a minute or
more. Developed for the purpose of analyzing complex power system events and for recording the dynamic
response of power systems to disturbances.
Due to the many terms that have been applied to such devices, it has been found necessary to include the
word “swing” to insure understanding.
Trend Recorder (TR) – A long term recorder of the system parameters of interest.
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) – Device that records phasor quantities and accurately references them
to a standard time signal. (See IEEE Standard 1344-2006 for more details).
21.3 Types of Disturbances
There are typically four types of disturbance or event records of interest to a protection engineer. These are
categorized by the event duration as follows:
Transient - These are very short in duration and typically include faults that are cleared immediately by
circuit breaker operation. These events are generally no longer than 8 cycles for high speed clearing and
16 cycles for sequential line clearing. These events are usually analyzed to determine correct protection
operation, fault location, or verification of system model parameters.
Short Term – These generally include all other time-delayed fault clearing and reclosing events where the
system operation (stability) is not affected. These events are typically 20 to 60 cycles in length but may be
longer if multiple protection operations are required to clear the fault. These events are usually analyzed to
determine correct protection operation, fault location or verification of system model parameters.
Long Term – These include those events that affect system stability such as power swings, frequency
variations and abnormal voltage problems. These events are usually analyzed to determine causes of
incorrect system operations. Data management techniques are employed to process a number of samples
and record the value for the parameter of interest. Record length parameters may be defined.
Steady State – There are steady state disturbances where system operation is not threatened, but power
quality is affected. This may include harmonics or sub-harmonics produced by the load and/or the interaction
between power system’s components. Depending upon the type of phenomena being analyzed, higher
sample rates may be required to capture the events and data of interest. Record length parameters may
be defined.
21.4 Disturbance Recording Considerations
Protective relays monitor current(s) and voltage(s) to make decisions based on the settings to clear faults
on the power system by opening associated protection equipment. The microprocessor relay of today is
also capable of recording the fault and event data.
Issues relating to the application of disturbance recording equipment are:
• The specific event to capture
• The available data sources; analog and binary
• Required sampling rate to capture desired events

• Application of triggers necessary to capture the desired event
• The storage capacity of each device.
• Communication method associated with each recording device.
• Frequency of record retrieval necessary to minimize losing records.
• Time synchronization
21.4.1 High Speed Recording
High-speed recording is used to capture the individual samples of the currents and voltages measured by the
device with a sampling frequency high enough to display power system faults and transients. A recording is
typically initiated when the magnitude of an analog quantity increases above or decreases below a specific
value. High-speed recording is used to capture transient events, which are short in duration, with the recorder
record length typically set for one to two seconds. Sampling frequency is important when selecting a high-
speed recording device.
High-speed recording is available in disturbance recorders, and microprocessor based protective relays.
Microprocessor based protective relays with recording capabilities are being used for fault analysis. These
records provide valuable information about the protective functions of the relay.
Figure 21.1 is a transient event captured by high-speed recording, showing analog voltage and current
waveforms and the change of state information for selected equipment operations as signified by a contact
transition.
Disturbance Recorder, Alarms and Event Logging 317
Fig. 21.1
21.5 Types of Records
21.5.1 Fault Recorder (FR)
A fault recorder typically contains directly measured analog channels, as well as event or binary channels.
This allows the recorder to capture the time sequence of analog power system quantities, along with breaker
contacts, logic state changes, event contacts, etc. Modern recorders typically include calculated analog
quantities and logic functions to ensure pertinent power system information is captured during an event.
Triggering to start the capture of data can typically be directly based on changes in analog quantities, digital
inputs, or logic.
Information from fault recorders can be used to confirm the occurrence of a fault, determine the duration of
a fault, measure the magnitude of fault quantities of current and voltage, determine the location of a fault,
define the nature or type of fault, assess performance of relays, and assess circuit breaker performance. An
engineer experienced with fault recorder records can often recognize faults due to lightning strikes, insulator
contamination, tree faults, restrikes and other common faults causes, from their distinctive “signature” on
a fault record.
Triggering of the fault recorder may be by internal triggering measurements, contact inputs or Boolean
expressions of a combination of direct, or calculated measurements, and the status of the contact inputs.
21.5.2 Sequence of Event Recorder (SER)
A Sequence of Event Recorder’s function is to gather and time tag operational data from substation equipment
(e.g., relays, circuit breakers, transformers), control schemes (manual and automatic) as they react to a
system event. This series of sequential, individual events can be from a switching operation, fault, or mis-
operation. This data allows the chain of events to be studied for the cause (or causes) of the mis-operation
and the linkages between individual actions and effects.
Time tagging has improved with the widespread use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) and Universal
Time Code (UTC).
21.5.3 Fault Locator (FL)

DRs can calculate and output fault location details similar to the function of Numerical IEDs.
21.6 Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)
21.6.1 Introduction to Synchrophasor Measurement (PMU) Functionality

Definition: A Phasor measurement unit (PMU) measures the electrical waves on an electricity grid to
determine the health of the power system. In power engineering, these are also commonly referred to as
synchro phasors and are considered one of the most important measuring devices in the future of power
systems.
A phasor is a complex number that represents both the magnitude and phase angle of the sine waves
found in electricity. Phasor measurements that occur at the same time are called a “synchro phasors”, as
are the PMU devices that allow their measurement. In typical applications, phasor measurement units are
sampled from widely dispersed locations in the power system network and synchronized from the common
time source of a Global Positioning System (GPS) Radio Clock. Synchrophasor technology provides a
tool for system operators and planners to measure the state of the electrical system and helps in the grid
management. Synchrophasors measure voltages and currents, at diverse locations on a power grid, and can
output accurately time-stamped voltage and current phasors. Because these phasors are truly synchronized,
synchronized comparison of two quantities in real time is possible. These comparisons can be used to assess
system conditions. The technology has the potential to change the economics of power system & the way we
operate them. For example, by understanding the limits of stability of the multiple interconnected systems &
ensuring the optimized power transfer over the existing networks thereby resulting in cost savings.
Phasor Network: A phasor network consists of phasor measurement units (PMUs) dispersed throughout
the electricity system, Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) to collect the information and a SCADA system
at the central control facility. Such a network is used in Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS). The
complete network requires rapid data transfer within the frequency of sampling of the phasor data. GPS time
stamping can provide a theoretical accuracy of synchronization better than 1mico second “Clocks need to
be accurate to ± 500 nanoseconds to provide the one microsecond time standard needed by each device
performing synchrophasor measurement & is possible with IRIG-B Time code synchronization. PMUs must
deliver between 10 and 50 synchronous reports (frames) per second depending on the application. The PDC
correlates the data, and controls and monitors the PMUs. At the central control facility, the real time Wide
Area Monitoring & Measurements System presents system wide data and visualization in real time.
Applications of PMU
• Provide early warning for potential unstable conditions in the power system, through power system
automation as in Smart Grids.
• Load Shedding & Other load control techniques such as demand response mechanisms to manage
a power system. (i.e. Directing power where it is needed in real-time)
• Increase the reliability of the power grid by detecting faults early, allowing for isolation of operative
system, and the prevention of power outages.
• Intelligent islanding to maximize customer continuity.
• Increase power quality by precise analysis and automated correction of sources of system
degradation.
• Improve system planning through real-time state estimation.
• Wide Area measurement and control, in very wide area super grids, regional transmission networks,
and local distribution grids.
Standard
The IEEE 1344 standard for synchrophasors was completed in 1995, and reaffirmed in 2001. In 2005, it was
replaced by IEEE Standard C37.118-2005, which was a complete revision and dealt with issues concerning
use of PMU’s in electric power systems. The specification describes standards for measurement, the
method of quantifying the measurements, testing & certification requirements for verifying accuracy, and
data transmission format and protocol for real-time data communication.
The above described synchophasor measurements (PMU) function can also be an integral part of
the modern power system recorders.
21.7 Protective Relays with Fault Disturbance Recording and Event

Recording
Numerical digital relays can also generate sequence of events based on their individual relay elements and
digital or contact inputs. They may also be programmed to recognize and record events in situations where
they do not initiate a trip.
A drawback to relays as recording devices is having the data distributed in many devices instead of combined
in one device. Time synchronization of all the relays, and other recording devices, is a significant, gathering
and combining all data from these individual sources is a manual activity. There are likely also differences
in the triggering method, sampling rate, and record length to consider.
Triggering of the recording function within the relay is programmable and based on the internal measuring
elements within the device. Typically, these records are limited to the “zone of protection” associated with
the device.
21.8 Time Synchronization
Several vendors manufacture master time devices (GPS clocks) which support different standardized time
synchronization protocols. IRIG-B is the more commonly supported standard time code format that has been
widely accepted by the electric utilities and is supported by most modern electronic devices with recording
capability.
There are two common ways of synchronizing various devices to the same GPS clock source:
• Synchronization over direct connection
• Network synchronization
Synchronization of IEDs utilizing a direct connection requires each device to have a GPS or IRIG-B
communications port in order to connect it to the master clock. Having a permanently connected GPS/IRIG-B
source provides an accurate reference for the device’s internal clock
In the past, GPS clocks with uncertainties of 1 millisecond were common, but at the time of this report, GPS
clocks with accuracies of 1 microsecond are the standard offering. At the 1 microsecond level, the uncertainty
introduced by the GPS clock is negligible compared to other uncertainties. However, an IRIG-B network can
introduce an uncertainty (delay) of up to 1 millisecond. With careful design the uncertainty of the IRIG-B
network can be kept to a minimum. The largest contributor to uncertainty and delay in recorded observations
is the response of the recording devices themselves. Internal device delays are primarily due to filtering,
and may be 4 milliseconds or more. At the time this report was being written, the PSRC working group I11
Timing Considerations for Event Reconstruction is investigating this area and will produce a report.
The network synchronization method eliminates the problem of dedicated interconnection with the master
clock by allowing the individual device’s internal time clock to be synchronized over the substation LAN with
the network time-synch master using the methods specified by the protocol. This method however introduces
a potential error due to the processing delays within the LAN.
21.9 Processing
21.9.1 Sampling Rate
The sampling rate of the recording device impacts the accuracy of the data captured for later analysis. The
sampling rate also affects the performance of the analog and digital filters, and the input magnetics, of the
recording device. DFRs typically use a sampling rate of 64-128 samples/cycle, with some devices permitting
sampling rates of up to 384 samples/cycle.
21.9.2 Triggering Methods
Triggers cause a disturbance recorder to capture waveforms for specific power system conditions. Recording
events may be triggered by changes in measured analog values, calculated analog values, Rate of change
of analog values, internal logic statements, operation of protection elements, or by the change in state of an
external input. Triggers typically include both a threshold setting to indicate an operating condition to start a
recording, and a time delay setting to ensure this event is truly a power system condition to record.
Triggers can also be caused by subscribing to GOOSE signals in Disturbance Recorder with IEC 61850-8-1
Station Bus Protocol Compliance
21.9.3 Storage
There are a variety of methods for storing data on recording devices, retrieving data from recording devices,
and storing this data for the system. Consideration needs to be given to the type and size of memory at the
recording device and at a central archiving location. The type of memory may impact the decision on the
power supply for the recorder, and the size of the memory may dictate the retrieval method and timing.
Disturbance recorder memory is designed to store records on the recorder, to give users adequate time to
retrieve the records. Writing records to memory uses one of two methods. One method is to use a first-in,
first-out buffer. Once the memory is full, the recorder begins over-writing the oldest records as new triggers
occur. The second method is to stop writing to memory, once the memory is full. This method requires the
issuing of storage limit alarms, and requires users to manually remove stored records to permit the creation
of records on new triggers. DRs tend to allow user choice between methods.
21.9.4 Records Extraction
Data retrieval from recording devices can be performed locally, by directly communicating to the device while
in the substation, or remotely, by using telecommunications access to the device from a central location.
21.9.5 Comtrade
COMTRADE defines a common format for the data files and exchange medium needed for the interchange
of various types of fault, test, and simulation data.
The COMTRADE standard C37.111 defines a format for files containing transient waveform and event data
collected from power systems or power system models. Equipment manufacturers typically use a proprietary
file format to manage several issues. The most important of these is the need to compress the file size to
maximize storage capabilities of the device, and to reduce the transmission time when retrieving records
from the device, and to ensure the reliable transmission of data. The COMTRADE format is intended to
provide an easily interpretable form for use in exchanging data.
21.10 Present day Disturbance Record and recorded signals

To facilitate the Fault Analysis/System Disturbance Analysis and verify the Protection System performance,
the following inputs are usually connected to the Disturbance Recorders.
1. Three phase currents and voltages of each bay (Additional derived channels like residual current/
Voltage and sequence quantities are calculated from the measured currents/Voltages)
2. Digital inputs in the form of contacts from the Substation Equipments like Circuit Breakers, Isolators,
Main/Auxiliary contacts, Pilot channels (Carrier send/Receive, Direct Trip send/Receive etc)
3. Goose virtual Inputs
Table 21.1 : Showing typical comparative specs of DRs and Numerical relays (IED)
Description Typical Recorder Typical Relay

Sampling Rate 32-384 samples/Cycle 4-96 Samples/Cycle
CDR (Continuous Digital Yes No
Recording)
Record Quantity Very High Limited
Harmonics Typically till 100th Typically till 16th
Recorder Memory Size Typically, over 3Gb Limited
Frequency Response 23.06KHz 3.6KHz
Trigger Options V, I, P, Q, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2, V0, V, I, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2, V0, df/dt,
Summations, dv/dt, dp/dt, dq/dt, df/ THD, Harmonics, External inputs
dt, THD, Harmonics (All spectrum),
Extension inputs, Relay activation etc.
Analog Channels 0-144 0-12
Digital Channels 0-288 0-30
PQ Monitoring Yes No
Record Length
• Pre-Trigger 60 Cycles 10 Cycles
• Post-Trigger 1800 Cycles 30 Cycles
Record Length (Swing)
• Pre-Trigger 60 Secs 30 Secs
• Post-Trigger 1800 Secs 120 Secs
Recording:
• Edge type Yes Yes (Typical)
• Duration type Yes Comparatively less
• Record Extension Yes No
• Transient Yes Yes
• Swing Yes No (To very limited)
PMU Channels 10 (Minimum) 2
21.11 Recommended Digital Signals (Typical) & trigger options for DRs
21.11.1 Recommended Digital signals
All Trip signals from the Line protection (Main-1, Main-2, Back up), Reactor Protection, Stub Protection,
Transformer Protection (Group I/Group II)/Bus Section Protection Trip/Bus Coupler Protection Trip, Generator
trip etc. as applicable .
All Trip Relay Operations
All Carrier Send/Receive/Direct Trip Send/Receive signals (Main-1 & Main-2/Channel A/B as the case may
be)
• All CB LBB Trip signal
• Bus Protection Trip Signal
• O/V Stage I/Stage II, tapped from all Line VT/CVT, Bus VT/CVT
• All CB, Line & Bus disconnector Status in the Substation
• GOOSE Virtual Inputs
Note: The above are general requirement, modification in choosing digital signals for a particular Substation
depend upon site requirement.
21.11.2 Recommended Trigger Options
All Trip signals and recommended trip signals as per site requirement.
All Analog Trigger signals (Including sequence & derived signals) or recommended analog trigger signals
as per site requirement.
Note: The above are general requirement, modification in choosing trigger options for a particular
Substation depend upon site requirement.
21.12 Special Comments
All Generation, Transmission & Distributed Substations should be provided with Numerical relays. The
foremost task of the Relays is to detect, operate and expeditiously send the signal to the trip relay or the
Circuit Breaker as the case may be. These relays are built-in with required accuracy and intelligence at
designated sampling frequency, time stamping accuracy and time synchronization
The Relays capture the Fault data (Pre-fault & Post-fault), SER, Alarm & Fault location (If the Relay action
is pertaining to Transmission Lines) and records the same at designed sampling frequency, time stamping
accuracy and time synchronization accuracy.
With the present available IEDs, Majority of faults occurring/occurred in a Substation are being resolved with
built-in DR function of the IED. Disturbance records captured by the DR should get automatically downloaded
to a central PC (DR PC). It shall also be possible to access the DR records from remote control center, if
required.
However, there are and there will arise situations in Power System where Records, Events & Alarms from
the Relays in the Substation of interest alone will not be sufficient to analyze the complex Occurrences,
Disturbances & Quality of Power Flow detected in that Substation (Described in point iii below). This is due
to the fact that the relay recording system respond only when they detect a fault and not for a disturbance.
It should also be noted, as the relay memory capacity is limited, triggering functions are limited, types of
recording & sampling rate is limited compared to Stand-alone fault recorders.
To analyze such events, the Stand-alone Fault recorders offer superior alternative compared to the Relay
record information, in terms of time taken and logical conclusion.
The reason for the same is clear from the design and function of the Fault recorders as described in above
sections, in this chapter.
Analysis of Faults/Disturbances of the following requiring Fault Recorders:
• Disturbance/Shutdown in a Substation due to mal-operation in remote station or multiple remote

Substations
• Events that affect system stability such as power swings, frequency variations and abnormal voltage
problems.
• Response of the Generators (Excitation system, Governor, AVR, PSS etc.) for faults & abnormal
system conditions in the Transmission network.
• Mechanical disturbances in a Generating plant which can cause instability in the Power System
• Long term slow disturbance which may be transmitted from far away Substation
• Major disturbance causing blackouts
• Quality of Power (In terms of Harmonic content & distortion) from Renewable energy source, HVDC
link flowing into a Substation.
• Analysis of Generator, Transformer, Circuit Breaker performance by knowing the through fault
current flow from them for faults (Since Fault recorder triggering will capture all the bay details in a
substation).
• Complete Fault Records of major events captured in the Fault Recorder (Sampled at much higher
sampling rate compared to relays) converted to COMTRADE form will be good tool to play back and
analyze Relay performance.
(i) All substations of 132kV or above voltage level shall have Disturbance recorder on each line
feeders.
(ii) Disturbance recorder as built-in feature of Protection relay (IED) shall be acceptable.
(iii) In view of the transients associated with the 765 kV networks, dedicated Standalone disturbance
recorder shall be provided on each line feeder of 765 kV substations. This is in addition to the DR
function built-in the line protection relay (IED)
(iv) For Transformer feeders, Disturbance recorder function as built in function of Transformer Protection
relay (IED) shall be provided.
(v) Sequential event record shall be available as part of modern day IEC61850 substation automation
system.
(v) PMU may be installed on all important EHV links and preferably on all 400 kV, 765 KV lines.
Chapter 22
VALIDATION, ACCEPTANCE AND FIELD TESTING

TECHNIQUES FOR TESTING OF PROTECTION
RELAYS
22.1 Introduction
Modern numerical relays and systems can have a large number of integrated functions and impose additional
test requirements over older, more traditional and simpler static and electromechanical relays. Such systems
and relays would be difficult and time consuming to test using traditional test equipments. At the same
time, test equipments have also become much more sophisticated and higher functionality software driven,
enabling much faster and comprehensive testing. New communication capabilities added to the numerical
relays and the data that must be sent to Substation control system systems under fault conditions adds
new possibilities for relay testing.
22.2 Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT)
Factory Acceptance Tests are done at the factory to make sure that requirements are met as specified.. The
tests are normally done in presence of customer, and also, in certain more demanding cases, with a third
party inspection agency. These tests are part of the customer inspection plan where the product quality and
performance can be validated in front of customer/user. One of the objective of the FAT is the problems
found during FAT shall be corrected before despatch of product to site sothat problems at site during site
acceptance/site testing can be minimised.
Pre-requisits before conducting FAT as listed below;
• FAT document
• Drawing and Layout (specially in case of relay along with C&R panels/Automation system)
• I/O lists and control circuit drawing
• Progress report (in case of medium and large size project)

• Instruction manual & Catalogue
• Technical specification of product versa require specification from user/customer
• Application software
At a FAT, installations are checked to match the drawings for the specific project. Functions that should work
when cabinets are installed at site are also simulated to check the automation functionality.
22.3 SAT/Commissioning Tests
Site acceptance tests / commissioning tests are performed before the protection scheme is put into service at
site/field. These tests are designed to prove that a particular protection scheme has been installed correctly
prior to taking it in service.
It involves all aspects linked with the specific use of the relay: verification of all inputs and outputs (also
alarms), verification of application conformance, verification of the protection functioning, breaker control
Validation, Acceptance and Field Testing Techniques for Testing of Protection Relays 325
schemes & logics functioning, communication scheme functioning. Testing at this stage provide the base
line data for trouble shooting & periodic maintenance stage.
There are two test methods during commissioning stage;
Primary injection: High current is injected to primary side of the CT. Test carried out covers CT, conductors,
relay and circuit breaker circuitry. Primary side of CT/CVT require to be disconnect from rest of the network
during test. This verifies full functional integrity including CT/PT circuits.
Secondary injection: Relay is disconnected from CT/CVT/CB and the stepped down current (secondary
current) is directly injected to relay. Therefore no need the primary side of CT to be disconnected from the
rest of the system. This verifies the functionalities of the relay and scheme.
Tests to be conduct during commissioning stage: Primary Injection test, CT polarity check, station battery
healthiness check, Secondary injection test (protection function test, programmable logic test used for
tripping/closing circuit/interlocks, protection scheme stability check, integrated scheme test inclusive of trial
tripping of CB, LED indicators & Metering parameter, event & disturbance recording checks etc.), IEC61850
interoperability test, SCADA communication etc.
Pre-requisits for conducting SAT as listed below;
• Commissioning check list & format
• Electrical scheme
• Catalogue & Manuals for relay/circuit breaker operation etc.
• Application software
22.4 Periodic Maintenance Tests
Periodic tests are the tests performed on the protection at specific intervals during its lifetime. Since no
deviation in characteristics of relay is expected in digital technology, the test objective is to verify of the
scheme performance, verification of the supervision system, verification of the setting conformance and
verification of those components that are not supervised.
Example: Visual inspection, Spot test of protection function and it’s calibration, digital input & output checks,
LED operation & pushbutton checks etc.
22.5 Application Tests
Application tests are carried out at discretion of user and it is the user’s decision to perform a customised
test. They depend on many user-specific parameters: the type of network, network operation and reliability
requirements (protection demands). With the emphasis on the application, the test programme consists
mainly of performance tests.
The user generally requests these tests and the results are application dependent (i.e. Verification of
Protection Setting based on power system conditions). Sometimes, the user/customer used to call Dynamic
tests on power system scenarios.
Sometimes, this test can also be conducted as a part of trouble shooting subsequent to an incident This kind
of test comes in to effect after a power system disturbance had occurred and relay acted in an undesired
manner.
22.5.1 Example of Application Tests
87T element trip during transformer energization, 87T element trip during external fault and one of the CT gets
saturated. Wrong operation of distance protection on CVT transient, Behaviour on arcing faults or evolving
faults, directional determination and relay co-ordination problem, relay operation slower, co-ordination of
protection functions of motor protection etc.
Type Tests on Relays and relevant standards;
The objectives of type tests can be divided in three main parts;
22.5.1.1 Hardware Type Tests as per relevant standards
• Test of all hardware modules and the complete device
• Accuracy tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Functional tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• EMI / EMC type tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Radio frequency tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Safety test as per IEC60255
• CE conformity (require in Europe, but not mandatory in Indian subcontinents)
• Environmental tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Bump and Vibration tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Surge and Immunity tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Insulation tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Thermal and mechanical durability tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
22.5.1.2 Functional Type Tests
Test of one function independent from other functions
• Individual Protection functions (Detail testing of each and every parameter and block)
• Control functions (Detail testing of each function block)
• Communication functions (front communication / rear communication, protocol verifications)
• Data acquisition functions
• Measurement functions (Front HMI / Through application software)
• Programmable scheme logic
• HMI (Human Machine Interface)
22.5.1.3 System Type Tests
• Test of the protection device as black box in case of realistic network situations (Application tests)
• Test of the interaction of functions
• Test of the accuracy of the measurement system in case of transient phenomena
• Test of the real-time behaviour depending on different microprocessor load situations
• Test with steady state and dynamic faults (Application tests)
• Test with faults superimposed by transient phenomena (Application tests

22.6 Methods to Test Protection Devices
22.6.1 Testing Equipment required for secondary injection tests
A good set of testing equipment and relay tools are important. Computerized relay testing kits are available
that can do the steady state, dynamic & transient testing of relays. Normally, the computerized relay test kit
should have 4 Voltages & 6 Currents outputs (Analogue outputs) to conduct test for protection functions. 3
Voltages and 3 Currents use for three phase injection and 6 Currents use for three phase differential relay
testing purpose.
Fig. 22.1
Computerized relay testing kit should have capability to conduct automated testing and validate the relay
in effective way. Amplifiers should have capability to inject the current without distortion. There are basic
capabilities to have in computerized relay testing kit;
(1) AUTO/MANUAL RAMPING for Pick up and Dropout test of various protection functions
(2) State sequence / State simulation for Dynamic state testing and operating time test of various protection
functions. It should have a capability to simulate DC OFFSET in state sequence
(3) Test module for Directional/non-directional over current characteristic operating time of curve. Forward/
reverse Directional fault test
(4) Test module for differential protection relay testing (pick up test/slope test/harmonic blocking test/
stability test etc.)
(5) Test module for distance protection relay testing (zone reach test, zone time test, power swing test,
SOTF test, Auto reclose test etc.)
(6) Test module for transient testing (Playback software/module to replay waveform). Playback software
should have capability to replay six current for three phase differential relay testing .
22.6.2 Testing Precautions
Before starting to test any relay on equipment in service, the person testing should become familiar with
the relays/protection scheme & logic. Where test blocks are used, the person testing must make sure that
in removing or inserting plugs that a current transformer circuit will not be opened, resulting in a voltage
being built up which may be dangerous to personnel, property, or equipment, or cause an important circuit
to trip out. In old installations where test block are not available, current transformer circuits must be short
circuited by jumper having reliable clamping devices which will not come loose, before the relay current
circuit is opened.
22.6.3 Grounding CT and VT circuits
The CT and VT circuits should be grounded at only one point. Relay misoperation can be caused by
grounding the neutral at two points, such as one ground at the switchyard and another at the relay panel. At
least once three years with the primary deenergized, the known ground should be removed and the overall
circuit should be checked for additional grounds and simulation breakdowns.
22.6.4 Test Records
A complete record should be kept/manage of all test data and observations made during tests and inspections,
including identifying numbers of test equipment used. Test records can be store either in soft form or hard
form. It can also stored in some application software (Database management software) in proper way.
22.7 Recommendation of before start to test relaying scheme by using

computerized relay testing kit
• Prepare proper and adequate test plan for each function to be under test
• Ensure the correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relay
• Ensure voltage of auxiliary power supply of relay
• Ensure the correct wiring of trip or other signals, used in scheme
• Test procedure/plan can be prepared by vender/user/customer as per their time schedule and practice,
but in general, methods to test protection devices can be identified:
22.7.1 Steady State Testing
Steady state testing simulate protection devices using voltages and currents represented by sine variables
using the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network only. One signal/phasor (either voltage or
current) shall be varying at time. Amplitude and phase angle of voltages and currents are defined for a fixed
test period. Different test periods can be combined to a test sequence. Steady state tests consist typically
of pre-fault, fault and post fault periods.
Points to be noted
(1) Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal components.
(2) A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
(3) A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
(4) The DC-component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result of a network
simulation.
(5) No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or Peterson coil
grounded networks.
It is not mandatory to do automated tests, but still it is recommended several benifits that to do with automated
tests against manual tests by using computerized relay testing kit. It can be stated that steady state tests
calculate voltages and currents using linear ramp. Such equations cannot take into account the transient
behaviour of electrical power networks.
Steady state tests can be used to test the behaviour of the protection device e.g. accuracy of pickup/dropout
tests, operating time test, etc. But transient phenomena cannot be taken into account. On this point of view
steady state tests are only a poor representation of electrical power networks.
Steady state testing can be applied for production tests, FAT, SAT/Commissioning tests, Periodic maintenance
tests, Functional type tests etc.
Steady state testing can be conducted by using Ramping module in modern computerized relay test kits.
Example shows pickup & drop out test for differential current element by using linear RAMP:
Fig. 22.2
22.7.2 Dynamic Steady State Testing
Dynamic Steady state testing simulate protection devices using voltages and currents represented by sine
variables using the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network. Both the signals/phasors (voltage
& current) are varying at simultaneously on fundamental frequency. Number of power system states can be
created sequentially and evaluate performance of protection relay.
Fig. 22.3 : State1 set as a prefault, State2 set as a AB fault
Fig. 22.4 : Pre-fault, Fault & Post fault condition applied for Dynamic steady state tests
Evolving faults
Performance of protection relay is very important on evolving faults occurs in EHV lines. Sometimes, it can be
operated in wrong manner or sometimes it may not detect faults if the relay algorithms are not properly works.
Evolving faults (shown in below figure) can be simulated on relay by using dynamic state simulation.
Example:
State Procedure:
State 1: Pre-fault duration (i.e. 1s)
State 2: Phase to Ground fault for 1cycle duration
State 3: Three phase to Ground fault (i.e. 3cycles)
Fig. 22.5
Dynamic state testing can be applied for Application tests (i.e. power swing test, steady state fault current
apply to relay and check performance, Evolving faults, Power system scenario on fundamental frequency
etc.), Functional type tests & Commissioning Tests.
Dynamic state testing can be conducted by using State sequence/State simulation module or Steady state
power system model (simulate faults on fundamental frequency) in modern computerized relay test kits
Points to be noted for Dynamic state Testing
(1) Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal components.
(2) A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
(3) A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
(4) The DC-component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result of a network
simulation.
(5) No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or Peterson coil
grounded networks.
22.7.3 Transient Testing (Dynamic Testing)
Transient testing are based on network simulation systems. It simulates fundamental and non-fundamental
components simultaneously based on network configurations. A network simulation system calculates
voltages and currents by solving the differential equations of the electrical network. This method takes into
account the dynamic characteristic of the electrical network. Transient phenomena e.g. mutual coupling are
taken into account, too.
(1) Voltages and currents contain transient signal components

(2) Amplitudes and phases will be changed continuously on fundamental and non-fundamental
frequency
(3) Voltages and currents depend on the characteristic of the electrical power network.
A transient testing consists of voltages and currents using components of the power frequency and high
order frequencies experienced during system operating conditions. The signals used in these tests can be
calculated analyzing computer models of a electrical power systems using electromagnetic transient analysis
programs (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS).
Different dynamic network and fault situations can be simulated depending on the structure of model of the
electrical network like:
• Insulated and Peterson Coil Grounded Networks
• Networks with Two Infeeds
• CT Saturation with Hysteresis and Remanence
• Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVT)
• Transformers with Overfluxing, Saturation, etc.
• Evolving Faults
• High Impedance Faults
• Faults with Arc Resistance
• EHV Lines with Series Compensation
• Underground Cables
• Untransposed Lines
• Double-Circuit Lines with Mutual Coupling in the Zero Sequence System
Transient testing shall be conducted in following methods;
(1) By using network simulation program (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS etc.)
Create Electric Network in ATP
Simulate faults
Create COMTRADE
(.cfg/.dat)/PL4 file
Import in to Playback software
Apply to relay by using numerical

relay test kit
Example shows Network simulation done in ATP software:
Step1:
Create & modelling of power system network in ATPDraw
Fig. 22.6
Step2:
Simulate faults on various contingencies. Oscillography (waveform) of fault.
Fig. 22.7
Step3:
Import fault waveform in playback software (.PL4 / IEEE COMTRADE file)
Fig. 22.8
Comments: This method requires expert power system engineer who has correct understanding of power
system network & modelled network with accurate power system data. Wrong data or error in modelling
may result in wrong or misleading results..
(2) By replaying disturbance recorded file (IEEE COMTRADE file)
Disturbance recorded file save as a IEEE COMTRADE file
Import COMTRADE file in Playback software
Replay same file on relay by using numerical relay test kit

Example shows imported disturbance recorded file (DR) in playback software
Fig. 22.9
In this case, the relay should have adequate functionality to record disturbances and save/export in IEEE
COMTRADE format.
Transient testing can be applied for System type tests, Application tests (i.e. specially in case where the
relay wrong operate on disturbance and need to verify it’s performance) & Relay development tests (i.e. to
develop relay internal algorithms).
Further the dynamic/transient testing can be carried by following way;
Open loop automated relay testing: Open loop automated testing is widely popular and shall be done by
using computerized relay testing kit along with their application software. Open loop testing can be use for
production tests, FAT, SAT, periodic maintenance tests, application tests, functional type tests & system type
tests. Manufacturer & user can validate protection relay on various power system scenarios with the help of
electromagnetic transient program (EMTP/ATP/PSCAD). Such types of application testing are also known as
dynamic/transient testing of relay. Protection engineer can create power system network in electromagnetic
transient program and generate number of faults on various contingencies. Now, same waveform shall be
replayed by computerized relay testing kit. Method to test transient testing of relay has explained on page
Close loop automated relay testing by using RTDS: Close loop real time digital simulator testing (dynamic/
transient testing) is also one of the fastest way to evaluate the protection relays on various power system
scenarios. More than 50 nos. of contingencies on protection relays shall be simulating faster by using RTDS.
It is also call it as an application tests. Functional and System type tests (refer type tests section) shall be
done effectively faster by using close loop RTDS testing. It uses high speed processors to solve system
performance equations, advancing time by a few microseconds in each iteration. It is highly recommended
to precisely validate dedicated controller through RTDS like HVDC link controller, Generator excitation
controller, Load shedding/Sharing and Grid islanding scheme of generator, Generator ramp up and down
scheme, special protection scheme etc.
Fig. 22.10
Disadvantage: There are no such major limitations for RTDS testing, but by knowing RTDS operation will not
help to conduct testing in effective way. It requires high skill power system engineer who can have correct
understanding of power system network & modelled network precisely with accurate power system data.
22.7.4 Application NoteS
(a) All protection relays, IEDs used shall have valid type test reports as per relevant standards.
(b) Dynamic RTDS test shall be specified as type test for Line distance relay, transformer Differential
relay.
(c) Relay Functional tests shall be carried out as Routine / production tests.
(d) As part of Pre-commissioning tests, all relay functional test & scheme checks shall be carried out at
site.
(e) During operation stage, routine testing of Main protection relays shall be carried out one year after
commissioning and thereafter every four year or as and when some maloperation is suspected.
(f) Typical functional test details of some relays are given in Appendix.
Appendix-A
Example for tests to validate distance protection relay scheme at site/field:
User/Customer can conduct tests in their way but some of the following tests can be conducted at site;
(1) Physical inspection
(2) Ensure voltage of auxiliary power supply of relay
(3) Ensure correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relay through primary or secondary injection test
(4) Ensure correct wiring of Inputs, Outputs and Interlocks to relay. Ensure closing and tripping circuit
according to engineering scheme
(5) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power etc.)
(6) Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency
(7) Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency
(8) Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 70% of rated
(9) Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 120% of rated
(10) Zone reach tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
(11) Zone time tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
(12) Zone reach tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5
(13) Zone time tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5
(14) Power swing detection and blocking zone test
(15) Power swing detection and tripping test
(16) Switch on to fault test
(17) Auto reclose test
(18) Load encroachment and zone blocking test
(19) VT supervision test (i.e. Verify conditions like real VTS, real under voltage of network, under voltage
during faults, distance zone blocking when VT fuse failed etc.)
(20) Broken conductor test
(21) PUTT/POTT scheme test
(22) Back up protection (Directional phase & ground over current) test
(23) Time delay/System protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
(24) Verification of Distance protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, communication

scheme etc.)
(25) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line model and simulate faults-AN/BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC/
Cross country faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(26) Disturbance recording test (i.e. remove internal battery and see DR is available in relay or erase!,
Analogue and digital channel recording, Analysis functions etc.)
(27) Event recording in proper way (i.e. proper tagging of sequence of events etc)
(28) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Zone1 trip on AN fault etc.)
(29) IEC61850 interoperability test
(30) Check communication with SCADA

Appendix-B
Example for tests to validate differential protection relay scheme at site/field:
(3) Ensure the correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relays through primary or secondary injection test.
Do CT polarity test to ensure the correct operation of differential protection
(4) Ensure correct wiring of Inputs, Outputs and Interlocks to relay. Ensure closing and tripping circuit
according to engineering scheme
(5) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Restrain and
Differential Currents etc.)
(6) Differential element - Winding pick up & Dropout tests on 50Hz frequency
(7) Operating time test on 50Hz frequency
(8) Restrain characteristic (Slope characteristic) test
(9) 2nd & 5th Harmonic blocking test
(10) Stability test (External faults and Internal faults create through power system model)
(11) On load verification of stability (i.e. charge transformer & take 10 to 20% loads and check restrain /
differential currents)
(12) High set (Unrestrained) Differential element – Pick up & Dropout tests
(13) High set (Unrestrained) Differential element – Operating time test
(14) Over fluxing test
(15) REF function – Pick up & Dropout test
(16) REF function – Operating time test
(17) REF function – Slope characteristic test
(18) REF function – Stability test on secondary circuit
(19) Back up protection (Phase & ground over current) test for each winding
(20) Time delay protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
(21) Verification of Differential/REF protection scheme logic (i.e. Primary injection, stability test on primary,
inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips etc.)
(22) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line & transformer model and simulate faults-AN/BN/CN/AB/
BC/CA/ABC in zone/out zone faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(25) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Differential trip on A phase etc.)
Fig. 22.11
Appendix-C
Example for tests to validate feeder protection relay at site/field:
(3) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Restrain and
Differential Currents etc.)
(4) Directional/Non-directional over current pick up & Dropout test on 50Hz frequency
(5) Directional test for Directional over current function
(6) Directional/Non-directional over current minimum operating time test
(7) Directional/Non-directional over current operating time test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve
(8) Over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(9) Over voltage function – Operating time test
(10) Zero sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(11) Zero sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(12) Negative sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(13) Negative sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(14) Under voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(15) Under voltage function – Operating time test
(16) Under frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(17) Under frequency function – Operating time test
(18) Over frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(19) Over frequency function – Operating time test
(20) Directional power function – Pick up & Dropout test
(21) Directional power function – Operating time test
(22) Broken conductor function – Pick up & Dropout test
(23) Broken conductor function – Operating time test
(24) Negative sequence over current function – Pick & Dropout test
(25) Negative sequence over current function – Operating time test according to inverse curve, if inverse
curve set for this function in relay
(26) Zero sequence over current function – Pick up & Dropout test
(17) Zero sequence over current function – Operating time test

(28) Verification of over current protection scheme logic (i.e. Relay co-ordination verification test, inputs/
outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips etc.)
(29) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line/under ground cable feeder model and simulate faults-AN/
BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(32) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. I> trip on A phase etc.)

Appendix-D
Example for tests to validate Generator protection relay at site/field:
Typical generator protection scheme shown in figure
(3) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Active/Reactive Power,
Power factor, Frequency, Restrain and Differential Currents etc.)
(4) Directional/Non-directional over current pick up & Dropout test on 50Hz frequency
(5) Directional test for Directional over current function
(6) Directional/Non-directional over current minimum operating time test
(7) Directional/Non-directional over current operating time test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve
(8) Over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(9) Over voltage function – Operating time test
(10) Zero sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(11) Zero sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(12) Negative sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(13) Negative sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(14) Under voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(15) Under voltage function – Operating time test
(16) Under frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(17) Under frequency function – Operating time test
(18) Over frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(19) Over frequency function – Operating time test
(20) Over flux function – Pick up
(21) Over flux function – Operating time test
(22) Directional power function – Pick up & Dropout test
(23) Directional power function – Operating time test
(24) Negative sequence over current function – Pick & Dropout test
(25) Negative sequence over current function – Operating time test according to inverse curve, if inverse
curve set for this function in relay
(26) Zero sequence over current function – Pick up & Dropout test
(27) Zero sequence over current function – Operating time test
(28) Voltage control over current function – Pick up and Dropout test
(29) Voltage control over current function – Operating test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve set in to
relay
(30) REF function – Pick up and Dropout test

(31) REF function – Operating time test
(32) Phase Differential function – Pick up and Dropout test
(33) Phase Differential function – Operating time test
(34) Phase Differential function – Slope characteristic test (for Low impedance scheme)
(35) High set Differential function – Pick up test and Operating time test
(36) Back up impedance function – Impedance zone reach test
(37) Back up impedance function – Impedance zone operating time test
(38) Loss of excitation function – Impedance zone reach test
(39) Loss of excitation function – Impedance zone operating time test
(40) Pole slip function – Power swing detection and tripping test (i.e. detection will be done through dz/dt
or dr/dt in blinder scheme)
(41) VT fuse fail / VT loss of potential scheme verification
(42) Verification of generator protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips,
inter locks etc.)
Fig. 22.12 : Example of Generator protection scheme

Fig. 22.13 : Example of GT protection
Fig. 22.14 : High impedance generator differential protection scheme

Appendix-E
Example for Tests to Validate Motor Protection Relay at site/field

(3) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Frequency,
Thermal states/contents etc.)
(4) Thermal over load function – Pick up test
(5) Thermal over load function – Operating time test according to thermal over load curve set in to
relay
(6) Prolong start function – Pick up test and operating time test
(7) Locked rotor (load jam) function – Pick up test and operating time test
(8) Short circuit over current function – Pick up test and operating time test
(9) Ground over current function – Pick up test and operating time test
(10) Negative sequence function – Pick up test and operating time test
(11) Phase reversal function – Operating time test
(12) Cold load pick up function – Pick up test (i.e. starting current and CB status close)
(13) Under voltage function – Pick up test and operating time test
(14) Loss of excitation function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(15) Under frequency function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(16) Directional power function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(17) Phase Differential function – Pick up and Dropout test
(18) Phase Differential function – Operating time test
(19) Phase Differential function – Slope characteristic test (for Low impedance scheme)
(20) VT fuse fail / VT loss of potential scheme verification
(21) Verification of motor protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips, inter
locks etc.)
(24) Motor start report
Chapter 23
CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
23.1 Introduction
Current Transformers can be defined as an instrument transformer in which the secondary current, under
normal conditions of use, is substantially proportional to the primary current and differs in phase from it by
an angle which is approximately zero for an appropriate direction of the connections.
The main tasks of current transformers are:
(i) To transform currents, from a high value to a value easy to handle for relays and instruments.
(ii) To insulate the metering circuit from the primary high voltage.
(iii) To provide possibilities of a standardizing rated currents of meters and relays.
For a short circuited transformer:
I1 N2
=
I2 N1
The current transformer is based on above equation and is ideally a short-circuited transformer where the
secondary terminal voltage is zero and the magnetizing current is negligible.
In practice, the ideal conditions are not fulfilled as the current transformers have a burden in the form of relays,
instruments and cables. This causes a measuring error in the current transformer due to the magnetizing
current.
23.2 Current transformer output
The output required of a current transformer core is dependent of the application and the type of load
connected.
23.2.1 Metering or Instruments
Measuring current transformers are intended to transmit an information signal to measuring instruments and
meters. Equipment like kW, kVAr and A instruments or kWh and kVArh meters measure under normal load
conditions. For metering cores a high accuracy for currents up to the rated current (5-120%), is required.
Accuracy classes for metering cores are 0.1 (laboratory), 0.2, 0.5 and 1. These are described in IEC 61869-2
and also in IS2705 (Part2).
23.2.2 Protection and Disturbance Recording
Protective current transformer is intended to transmit an information signal to protective and control devices. In
Protection relays and Disturbance recorders the information about a primary disturbance must be transferred
to the secondary side. For these cores a lower accuracy is required but also a high capability to transform
high fault currents and to allow protection relays to measure and disconnect the fault.
Protection classes are 5P and 10P according to IEC 61869-2. Cores for transient behaviour are defined in
IEC 61869-2.
Protection classes as per IS are also 5P and 10P and are described in IS 2705(Part 3) . IS2705 (Part 4)
describe protective transformer cores used for special purpose application.
In each current transformer a number of cores can be contained. Three to six cores are normally available
and the cores are then one or two for measuring purposes, and two to four for protection purposes. CTs are
outdoor mounted type in air insulated switch yard or are housed in the SF6 chamber in GIS. The requirements
on these cores are identical in both AIS and GIS substations.
23.3 Metering cores
To protect instruments and meters from high fault currents, the metering cores must saturate for 10-40
times the rated current depending on the type of burden. Normally the energy meters have the lowest
withstand capability. Typical values are 12-20 times the rated current. The instrument security factor
FS, indicates the overcurrent as a multiple of rated current at which the metering core will saturate. This
is given as a maximum n =value and is
x Fvalid
s only at rated burden. At lower burdens the saturation value
increases approximately to n.
The equivalent circuit of a typical fault loop can be represented by an inductance and a resistance in
series as shown in Fig1.
Where Sn is the rated burden in VA, S is the actual burden in VA, In is the rated secondary current in A and
Rct is the internal resistance in Ω, at 75°C. Standard values of FS are 5 and
L 10. ThisR should be decided by
agreement between the purchaser and the supplier.
23.3.1 Measuring Current Transformers as per IEC Standards
For measuring current transformers, the accuracy class is gdesignated by the highest permissible percentage
of the ratio error at rated primary current and rated output. The standard accuracy classes are:
0.1-0.2-0.2S-0.5-0.5S-1-3-5.
Table 23.1 shows the requirement in IEC 61869-2 for limits of ratio and angle errors for different classes from
Figure1: Equivalent circuit of a short circuit lop
0.1 to 1of a metering core at In. The burden can assume any value from 25% to 100% of the rated output. To
fulfill the accuracy class and to secure saturation for a lower current than instrument/meter thermal capability
the rated burden of the core must be relatively well matched to the burden connected.
There are additional requirements at currents from 5 and 20% of rated current. For limits of errors pertaining
to other accuracy classes 0.2S, 0.5S, 3 and 5, IEC61869-2 may be referred.
Where
Table is the
23.1 : The instantaneous
accuracy classesvalue
for aof the fault current,
measuring is the rms value of primary symmetrical
current transformer
short circuit current, θ is the phase angle at the fault inception and Tp = L/R is primary time constant.
Accuracy class Ratio error at rated Phase displacement error in Purpose
current In minutes at rated current In
±% ± % minutes
i1 i2
0.1 0,1 5 Revenue metering
0.2 0.2 10 Revenue metering
0.5 0.5 30 Metering
UL
1 1 60 L2 Instrument
23.3.2 Measuring Current Transformers as per U

Indian
1
L0
Standards
R2
These are defined in IS 2705 (Part 2). The requirements are similar to those defined in IEC standard.
UR
23.4 Protection cores
Figure2: Equivalent circuit of a current transformer
The DC component will build up a DC flux in the core and an interposed AC flux as shown in Fig3.
The flux will increase and decrease according to the time constants. The rise is dependent on the
network time constant Tp (L/R) and the decay follows the current transformer secondary time consta
Current Transformers 349
The main characteristics of protection CT cores are:
(i) Lower accuracy than for measuring transformers.
(ii) High saturation voltage.
(iii) Little or no turn correction at all.
23.5 Over dimensioning of current transformers and transient performance
The basic theory for over dimensioning of current transformer is given in Appendix 1. Some details are also
given
n = below. x F s n= x Fs
23.5.1 Transient Behaviour
The equivalent circuit of a typical fault loop can be represented by an inductance and a resistance in series
asThe equivalent
shown in Fig. circuit
Theof
23.1. a typical circuit
equivalent fault loop
of acan be represented
typical by an
fault loop can be inductance
representedand
by aanresistance
inductancein and a resistance in
series as shown in series
Fig1. as shown in Fig1.
L R L R
g g
Figure1: EquivalentFigure1:
circuit
Fig. 23.1 : Equivalent
ofofaashort
circuit Equivalent
circuit
circuit
short circuit
lop
lopof a short circuit lop
Assuming a sinusoidal emf. The short-circuit current can be expressed as:
Wherei is is
Where thethe instantaneous
instantaneous isvalue
Where valuetheof of
thethe fault
fault
instantaneous current,
current,
value theisfault
ipscofisthe thevalue
rms rms value of is
of primary
current, primary
rmssymmetrical
symmetrical
the valueshort circuit symmetrical
of primary
current, θ is the phase angle at the fault inception and Tp = L/R is primary time constant.
short circuit current, θ iscircuit
short the phase angleθ at
current, is the
the fault
phaseinception andfault
angle at the Tp = L/R is primary
inception and Ttime constant.
p = L/R is primary time constant
A CT can be represented by the equivalent circuit shown in Fig 23.2.
In this
i1 i2 i i2
1
Ts = (L0 + L2)/R2 ≈ L0/R2 is the secondary time constant of the CT
q = L2/(L0 + L2)/≈ L2/L0 is the ratio of inductances.

UL UL
L0 is the main inductance L2 L2
L2 is the total inductance of the
U1secondary
L0 circuitU L0
1
R2 is the total resistance of the secondary circuit R2
URR2 UR
Figure2: EquivalentFigure2:
circuit of a currentcircuit
Equivalent transformer
of a current transformer
The DC componentThe willDC

build up a DC will
component fluxbuild
in theup
core
a DCandflux
an interposed
in the core ACandflux as shown in
an interposed ACFig3.
flux as shown in Fig3
network time constant Tp (L/R)
network time and the decay
constant follows
Tp (L/R) and the
the current transformer
decay follows secondary
the current time constant
transformer secondary time const
TS. Tsis the currentTtransformer
S. Tsis the secondary
current time
transformerconstant L
secondary /R
0 time
2 , where L0
constantis the
L 0 /Rinductance
2, where L0ofisthe
the inductance of the
secondary windingsecondary
and R2 is the resistance of the CT secondary circuit. The quotient between the
winding and R2 is the resistance of the CT secondary circuit. The quotient between the
Where is the instantaneous value of the fault current, is the rms value of primary symmetrical
350short circuit current, θ is the phaseManual
angle on
at the fault
Power inception
System and Tp = L/R is primary time constant.
Protection
i1 i2
UL
L2
U1 L0
R2
UR
Fig. 23.2Equivalent
Figure2: : Equivalentcircuit of aa current
circuit of currenttransformer
transformer
The DC component will build up a DC flux in the core and an interposed AC flux as shown in Fig 23.3. The
flux will increase and decrease according to the time constants. The rise is dependent on the network time
constant
The DC Tpcomponent
(L/R) and the
willdecay
buildfollows
up a DC thefluxcurrent transformer
in the core and an secondary
interposed time
ACconstant
flux as Tshown
S
. Ts isin
theFig3.
current
transformer secondary time constant L /R
The flux will increase and decrease according
0 2
, where L
to the
0
is time constants. The rise is dependent on the R2 is
the inductance of the secondary winding and
the resistance of the CT secondary circuit. The quotient between the maximum value of the DC component
andnetwork time constant
the maximum value ofTp
the(L/R) and the decay
AC component follows
is called thethe current factor
transient transformer
Ktf. secondary time constant
TS. Tsis the current transformer secondary time constant L0/R2, where L0 is the inductance of the
secondary winding and R2 is the resistance of the CT secondary circuit. The quotient between the
maximum value of the DC component and the maximum value of the AC component is called the
transient factor Ktf.
Current [A]
Flux [Vs]
Saturation flux
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Time [ms]
Fig. 23.3Wave
Figure3: forms
: Wave ofofPrimary
forms Primaryand
andSecondary
Secondarycurrents
currentsand
andthe
theflux
flux
23.5.2 Symmetrical Short Circuit Current Factor
The emf to be developed by the CT to pass the rated current Isn through a CT can be given by
(Rct+ Rb) x Isn

Where
Rct is the CT secondary winding resistance and
Rb is the burden of the relay and the leads.
Ktf
20
=0
max DC
15
 = 45
Cur
Current [A]
Flux [Vs]
If a short circuit current Ipsc is to pass through the CT, Saturation
the CT needsflux
to be over dimensioned. Purely on the
symmetrical short circuit basis, without any transient component, the over dimensioning factor of the CT
depends on the magnitude of the symmetrical short circuit current and the rated current Ipn.
Flux [Vs]
The symmetrical short circuit current factor Kssc is defined as the ratio of the rms value of the rated primary
short circuit current Ipsc and the rated primary current Ipn
I 0 20 40 60 80Saturation
100 flux120 140
Kssc = psc/I
pn Time [ms]
23.5.3 Transient Dimensioning Factor
Figure3: Wave forms of Primary and Secondary currents and the flux
If the short circuit current is asymmetrical 0compared20 to the40
case of 60
symmetrical
80 short100
circuit current
120 and
140
due to the DC component, saturation in the core will be reached much earlier. If saturation must not occur
Time [ms]
during the period a protective relay is carrying out the measurement, the transformer will have to be over
dimensioned. This over dimensioning factor is defined by Ktf. The transient factor Ktf is the ratio of the
Figure3: Wave forms of Primary and Secondary currents and the flux
theoretical total secondary linked flux to the peak instantaneous value of the AC component flux. Since flux
values are proportional to the corresponding magnetizing currents, Ktf can be given by
I
Ktf = 0/I
0~max
By Mathematical derivation it can be shown that the transient dimensioning factor Ktf is as given below:
Detailed derivation
K of this equation is given in Appendix I.
tf
20given below shows an example of transient factor Ktf as a function of time and different switching
Figure 23.4
angles. =0
max DC
Ktf
15
20
 = 45 =0
max DC
15
10
 = 45
5 10
 = 90
5 no DC
50 100 150 200

 = 90
Time in ms
no DC
Figure4: The simplified and50complete100 as functions

150 of the
200time and different degree of DC
Time in ms
Fig. 23.4 : The simplified and complete Ktf as functions of the time and different degree of DC
Figure4: The simplified and complete as functions of the time and different degree of DC
23.5.4 Remanence Factor
The remanence factor Kr is defined as the ratio of ψr/ψs where ψr is the remnant flux and ψs is the saturation
flux. If the remanence factor is taken into account, the transient dimensioning factor increases by remanence
dimensioning factor Krem where
Krem = I/(I – Kr)

23.5.5 Transient Dimensioning Factor
The total over dimensioning factor depends on the value of the three factors described above, namely the
Symmetrical short circuit factor Kssc, the Transient dimensioning factor Ktf and the Remanence dimensioning
factor Krem. Thus the total over dimensioning factor can be defined as
Ktot = Ktf . Krem .Kssc.
If maximum values of Ktf . Krem and Kssc are considered, the total over dimensioning factor becomes too high
and the CT sizes will be unrealistically large.
Therefore when it comes to high speed protections like distance relays, line differential relays, the
manufacturers perform extensive tests and recommends over dimensioning factors that are optimal after
considering effects of Ktf and Kremand this factor is called Ktd.
The transient dimensioning factor defined as function of time Ktd is the definitive dimensioning parameter.
It is derived from the current transient transformer requirement given by the relay manufacturer based on
tests carried out by him.
23.5.6 Rated Equivalent Limiting Secondary emf Eal
In a protection core, Eal is that rms value of the equivalent secondary circuit emf at rated frequency necessary
to meet the requirements of the specified duty cycle:
Eal = Kssc x Ktd x (Rct + Rb) x Isr
The paras 23.5.1 to 23.5.5 describe transient behavior of the protection CT taking into account DC component
present in the fault current. The relationship between DC component and amplitude of the AC component of
the magnetizing current is a decisive factor as regards the transient behaviour of a CT. This ratio essentially
determines the extent to which a CT must be oversized as compared to normal design.
If the CT is not to saturate in the presence of fully asymmetrical short circuit current, the minimum secondary
circuit emf Eal it should produce should be
Eal = Kssc x Ktd x (Rct + Rb) x Isr
Where
Kssc is ratio of rms value of short circuit current and rated current (Kssc = Ipsc/Ipn)
Ktd is transient dimensioning factor for a specified duty cycle
Rct is CT secondary resistance
Rb is burden of the relay including lead.
For more details on this reference may be made to IEC61869-2.
23.6 Protective current transformers as per IEC standards
These are described in IEC61889-2. Following are different classes of protective current transformers.
23.6.1 Defining a Current Transformers to meet the Composite Error Requirements of a Short Circuit
Current under Symmetrical Steady State Conditions
23.6.1.1 Class P Protective Current Transformer

These are Protective current transformers without remnant flux limit for which the saturation behaviour in
the case of asymmetrical short circuit is specified.
23.6.1.2 Class PR Protective Current Transformer
These are Protective current transformers with remnant flux limit for which the saturation behaviour in the
case of a symmetrical short circuit is specified.
23.6.2 Defining a Current Transformers by Specifying its Magnetization Characteristic
23.6.2.1 Class PX Protective Current Transformer
These are Protective current transformers of low leakage reactance without remnant flux limit for which
knowledge of the excitation characteristic and of the secondary winding resistance, secondary burden
resistance and turns ratio is sufficient to assess its performance in relation to the protective relay system
with which it is to be used.
23.6.2.2 Class PXR Current Transformer
These are Protective current transformers with remnant flux limit for which knowledge of the excitation
characteristic and of the secondary winding resistance, secondary burden resistance and turns ratio, is
sufficient to assess its performance in relation to the protective relay system with which it is to be used.
These are particularly meant for situations where low DC currents are continuously flowing through current
transformer. Therefore in order to stop the CT from saturating, current transformers with gaps but with
the same performance as class PX is used. For more details of class PX CTs the IEC standard may be
referred.
23.6.3 Defining a Current Transformer to meet the Transient Error Requirements under the Conditions
of an Asymmetrical Short Circuit Current.
23.6.3.1 Class TPX Protective Current Transformer for Transient Performance
These are Protective current transformers with remnant flux limit for which the saturation behaviour in case
of a transient short circuit current is specified by the peak value of the instantaneous error.
23.6.3.2 Class TPY Protective Current Transformer for Transient Performance
These are Protective current transformers with remnant flux limit, for which the saturation behaviour in case
of a transient short circuit current is specified by the peak value of the instantaneous error.
23.6.3.3 Class TPZ Protective Current Transformer for Transient Performance
These are Protective current transformers with a specified secondary time constant for which the saturation
behavior in case of a transient short circuit current is specified by the peak value of the alternating error
component.
23.6.4 Accuracy Limit factors of Class P Protective Current Transformer
The standard accuracy limit factors (ALF) are: 5-10-15-20-30.
The accuracy class is designated using the highest permissible percentage of the composite error
followed by the letter (standing for protection) and the ALF value. The standard accuracy classes are 5P
and 10P.
Table 23.2 : Error limits for protective current transformers class P
Class Ratio error at rated Phase displacement at Composite error at rated

primary current rated primary current accuracy limit primary
±% ± minutes current ±%
5P 1 60 5
10P 3 - 10
The ALF is given as a minimum value and in the same way as for FS for a metering core; the overcurrent
factor is changed when the burden is different to the rated burden.
The formula for the overcurrent factor n is achieved for a connected burden different from the rated burden
is similar to the formula for metering cores.
n= x ALF
Where Sn is the rated burden in VA, S is the actual burden in VA, In is the rated secondary current in A and
Rct is the internal resistance in Ω, at 75 °C.
Note that E al ≥burdens

the Ealreq = today are· agenerally
· pure resistive and much lower than the burdens, several years
ago, when electromagnetic relays and instruments were used.
Eal ≥ Eon
For more details = P CTs and
alreqclass · k ·similar details for PR, PX, PXR, TPX, TPT and TPZ CTs the IEC61869-2
standard may be referred.
23.7 Protection current transformers as per Indian Standards

S 
E 2max   n  I sn  R CT ALF
 I sn Current Transformer
23.7.1 Class P Protective
These are defined in IS 2705 (Part 3). Class P protective current transformer without remanant flux limit for
which the saturation behaviour in the case of asymmetrical short circuit is specified. Conventional CT
The standard accuracy limit factors (ALF) are: 5-10-15-20-30.
The accuracy class is designated using the highest permissible percentage of the composite error followed
by the letter (standing for protection) and the ALF value. The standard accuracy classes are 5P and 10P.
Conventional voltage and
In all respects these are identical to class P CTs defined in IEC61869-2 standard.
current sensor with
23.7.2 Class PS Protective Current Transformers for Special Purpose Applications digital output
These are defined in IS 2705 (Part 4). The class PS current transformers are of low reactance and their
Earthing switch
performance is specified in terms of the following characteristics.
Turns ratio: This is ratio of the number of turns on the secondary winding and the number of turns on the
primary. This shall be numerically same as the rated transformation ratio. This also means no turns ratio
correction should be done to compensate for the errors.
Conventional VT
Minimum Knee point voltage (VK): This is specified in accordance with a formula of the type:
VK= K.IS(Rct + Rb )
Where VK is the minimum knee point voltage in volts
CB and the
K is a parameter to be specified by the purchaser which depends on the system fault level
characteristics of the relay intended to be used.
IS is the rated secondary current of the current transformer (or the secondary current as derived from a
specified turns ratio and primary current)
Rct is the resistance of the secondary winding corrected to 75°C.
Rbis the impedance of the secondary circuit as specified by the purchaser.
Maximum Exciting Current : Maximum exciting current at the rated knee point voltage or at any specified
fraction of the rated knee point voltage.
23.7.3 Conversion of Class PS to Class P and Vice Versa
An example of converting class PS in to class P and vice versa is given below.
Class 5P20 converted to Class PS
Knee point voltage VK of a CT of 1000/1A, 40VA, 5P20, RCT = 6Ω
can be approximately arrived as
VK= (40 VA/1A + 1A ∙ 6Ω ) ∙ 20/1.3= 707V.
It means the CT is equivalent to Class PS CT of1000/1 A , VK = 710V , RCT =6Ω .

Class PS converted to Class 5P20
Rated burden of a CT 1000/1A, VK = 710V, RCT =6Ω
can be approximately arrived as
Sn = (1.3 ∙700V/ 20 - 1A ∙6 Ω) ∙1A = 40VA.
It means the CT is equivalent to Class P CT of1000/1A, 40VA, 5P20, RCT = 6Ω.
23.8 Selection of CT cores
Some general guidelines for selecting current transformer cores, for metering and protection purposes, are
given below.
23.8.1 The Rated Current
Select the primary rated current of the CT to be 10-40% higher than the rated current of the equipment. This
gives a high resolution of the metering equipment when accuracy class 0.2 is used. Of course a too high a
rated current of CT will mean higher cost and therefore should be avoided. With accuracy class of 0.2S if
the extended current is 120% wide band of from 20% to 120% is covered for precision accuracy.
For the protection cores it can be of interest to have highest possible ratio. This gives a smaller core size.
The modern relays have wide measuring ranges.
A primary or secondary tap to get several ratios can be useful in metering cores. It should however be
remembered that the output is reduced when fewer turns are used.
The secondary rated current can be 1 or 5A. 1A is predominately used as the protection and metering
equipment have so low burdens. The cable burden is I2R which means a 1A circuit has 25 times lower
cable burden, measured in VA, than a 5A circuit. This means that cores can be of smaller size and thus
cost less.
23.8.2 Burden
Do not use core with rated burden more than necessary. A too high rated burden compared to actual burden
can mean that the metering equipment is destroyed as the Security factor FS factor is valid at rated burden.
The manufacturer tunes the CT for accuracy at rated burden and at 25% of the rated burden and the accuracy
is guaranteed between 25% & 100% burden. Therefore an over specified burden will give inferior accuracy.
Specifying too high a accuracy also means higher cost and bad accuracy which is not good for the user.
For relay cores an extra margin in the rated burden should be arrived at after considering transient dimension
factor Ktd.
23.8.3 Factors FS and ALF
Select the correct Security factor Fs and Accuracy Limit Factors ALF, depending on the type of equipment
connected. Always check the overcurrent capability of instruments and meters and the VA requirement of
the meters connected.
The meters are generally capable of carrying 22 times rated current for 1 sec and therefore ISF up 20
should be acceptable.
It should be remembered that the extra margins considered for the burden will influence the real Overcurrent
factor.
23.8.4 Over Dimensioning
In practice all current transformer cores should be specially adapted for their application in each station.
23.8.5 Accuracy
Do not specify higher requirements than is necessary. For metering cores especially with ampere turns less
than about 400-500 too high a requirement can mean use of expensive core material.
23.8.6 Some Rules of Thumb
The secondary resistance RCT is important for the CT output and should be limited, especially for 1A high
ratio CT’s, to give an efficient use of the current transformers. Otherwise the core output gets used to support
the connected burden and not the internal resistance. A good goal could be to have internal resistance lower
than rated burden, preferably much lower.
For the secondary resistance following rule of thumb can be used:
RCT ≤ 0.2 – 0.5 Ω per 100 turns. Bigger values for big cores and small values for small cores. A value of
RCT less than 0.5 Ohms could be challenging in some cases. In such cases CT manufacturer should be
contacted to optimize the core size considering suitable RCT and VK required.
23.9 CT requirements
The performance of a protection function will depend on the quality of the measured current signal. Saturation
of the current transformer (CT) will cause distortion of the current signal and can result in a failure to operate
or cause unwanted operations of some functions. Consequently CT saturation can have an influence on both
the dependability and the security of the protection. The protection IEDs normally are designed to permit
heavy CT saturation with maintained correct operation.
23.10 Current transformer classification
To guarantee correct operation, the current transformers (CTs) must be able to correctly reproduce the
current for a minimum time before the CT will begin to saturate. To fulfil the requirement on a specified time
to saturation the CTs must fulfil the requirements of a minimum secondary e.m.f. that is specified below.
(i) High remanence type CT
(ii) Low remanence type CT
(iii) Non remanence type CT
23.10.1 The High Remanence Type
There is no limit for the remanent flux. This CT has a magnetic core without any airgap and a remanent flux
might remain for almost infinite time. In this type of transformers the remanence can be up to around 80%
of the saturation flux. Typical examples of high remanence type CT are class P, PX, TPS, TPX according to
IEC61869-2, class P, PS according to IS2705 (Part 4).
23.10.2 The Low Remanence Type
This has a specified limit for the remanent flux. This CT is made with a small airgap to reduce the remanence
to a level that does not exceed 10% of the saturation flux. The small airgap has only very limited influence
on the other properties of the CT. Class PR, TPY according to IEC61869-2 are low remanence type CTs.
23.10.3 The Non Remanence Type CT
This has practically negligible level of remanent flux. This type of CT has relatively big airgaps in order to
reduce the remanence to practically zero level. In the same time, these airgaps reduce the influence of the
DC-component from the primary fault current. The airgaps will also decrease the measuring accuracy in the
non-saturated region of operation. Class TPZ according to IEC is a non-remanence type CT.
Different standards and classes specify the saturation emf in different ways but it is possible to approximately
compare values from different classes. The rated equivalent limiting secondary emf Eal according to the
IEC61869-2 standard is one way to specify the CT requirements. The requirements can also be specified
according to other standards.
The requirements are recommended by the manufacturer often as a result of extensive investigations as
for example in network simulator. Generally the current transformer models are representative for current
transformers of high remanence and low remanence type.
23.11 Typical example of arriving at Eal for a Numerical Distance Relay
An example of arriving at Rated equivalent secondary e.m.f requirement Eal according to the IEC 61869-2
standard for a numerical IED for line consisting of distance function is given below.
n= x ALF
The CTs must have a rated equivalent secondary emf Eal that is larger than or equal to the maximum of the
required secondary emf Ealreq below:
Eal ≥ Ealreq = ·a·
Eal ≥ Ealreq = ·k·
S 
 I sn 
Where
Ik max Maximum primary fundamental frequency current for close-in forward and reverse faults (A)
Ikzone1 Maximum primary fundamental frequency current for faults at the end of zone 1 reach (A)
Ipn The rated primary CT current (A)
Isn The rated secondary CT current (A)
Ir The rated current of the protection IED (A)
RCT The secondary resistance of the CT (Ω)
RL The resistance of the secondary wire and additional load (Ω). In solidly earthed systems the loop
resistance containing the phase and neutral wires should be used for phase-to-earth faults and the
resistance of the phase wire should be used for three phase faults.
SR The burden of current input channel (VA)
= 0.020VA/channel for Ir =1A and SR = 0. 15VA/channel for Ir =5A
a This factor is a function of the primary time constant for the dc component in the fault current
a = 2 for the primary time constant Tp ≤ 50 ms

a = 3 for the primary time constant Tp> 50 ms
k A factor of the primary time constant for the dc component in the fault current for a three-phase fault
at the set reach of zone 1.
k =4 for the primary time constant Tp ≤ 30 ms
k =6 for the primary time constant Tp> 30 ms
For CT requirements of various types of IEDs of different manufacturers the recommended method by them
should be followed.
23.12 Current transformer requirements for CTs according to class P and PX of

IEC and class P and PS of IS
From the available data for relaying applications it is possible to approximately calculate a secondary emf of
the CT comparable with Eal. By comparing this with the required secondary emf Ealreq it is possible to judge
if the CT fulfills the requirements.
23.12.1 Current Transformers According to IEC 61869-2 Class P and IS2705 (Part 3) Class P
n= x ALF
These CTs have following details marked on the rating plate in addition to others.
• Rated primary and secondary currents
• Rated
Eal ≥ accuracy
Ealreq = limit factor
· a · with the corresponding output and accuracy class (e.g. : 30 VA class
5P10)
• Secondary
Eal ≥ Ealreq winding
= resistance
·k· at 750C
From the above data the saturation voltage of class P CTs can be calculated by :
S 
 I sn 
Conventional CT

current sensor with
digital output
where
E2max Secondary excitation limiting voltage
Isn Rated secondary current
Rct Resistance in CT secondary winding
Sn Rated burden in VA
The difference between E2max for 5P and 10 P CTs can be ignored. The value of the E2max is approximately
equal to the corresponding Eal according to IEC 61869-2. Therefore, the CTs according to class P and PR
must have a secondary limiting emf E2max that fulfills the following:
E2max> maximum of Ealreq
23.12.2 Current Transformers According to IEC 61869-2 class PX and IS 2705 (Part 3) Class PS
These CTs have following details marked on the rating plate in addition to others.
• Rated primary and secondary currents
• Rated knee point emf in volts at maximum secondary turns
• Secondary winding resistance at 750 C

It should be noted that it is defining a secondary terminal knee point voltage, which is terminal voltage.
However, it can be used as a secondary limiting voltage due to the fact that voltages drop over the secondary
impedance at the magnetizing current is limited and can be ignored.
The knee point voltage is lower than the Eal value due to the drop in the secondary impedance. Therefore
the knee point voltage can be increased by a factor of 1.2 to 1.3 to bring it in line with IEC with grain-oriented
iron and closed core or core with small air gap.
CTs according to these classes are specified approximately in the same way by a rated knee-point emf
Ek for class PX ,VK for class PS. The value of the Ek or VK is lower than the corresponding Eal according to
IEC 61869-2. It is not possible to give a general relation between the Ek or VK and the Eal but normally it is
approximately 80% of the Eal. Therefore, the CTs according to class PX and PS must have a rated knee-
point e.m.f. that fulfills the following:
Ek ≈ Vk> 0.8 ∙ (maximum of Ealreq).
23.13 Optical current and voltage transducers
Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCIT) as these are called are now being used by some utilities
in different parts of the world. The new IEC 61869 replaces and modernizes the well-known IEC 60044
series. There are multiple parts roughly divided between in to conventional and low power instrument
transformers.
Expected benefits are:
• Reduced cabling
• Reduced engineering time
• Reduced commissioning time
• Increased reliability
• Improved safety
Eal ≥ Ealreq = ·a·
Eal ≥ Ealreq = ·k·

S  integrated switchgear showing conventional current transformer, conventional voltage

E 2max  Ann example
 I sn  R CTofALF
transformer,
 I sn combined
 voltage and current sensor with digital output is shown in Figure 23.5.
Conventional CT

current sensor with
digital output
Earthing switch
Conventional VT
CB
Fig. 23.5 : Integrated switchgear showing conventional and non-conventional instrument transformers
References
1. IEC 61869-1:Instrument Transformers - General requirements
2. IEC61869-2:InstrumentTransformersPart 2 : Additional Requirements for Current Transformers.
3. IS 2705 (Part 2): Current Transformers - Specification for Measuring Current Transformers.
4. IS 2705 (Part 3): Current Transformers - Specification for Protective Current Transformers.
5. IS 2705 (Part 4): Current Transformers - Specification for Protective Current Transformers for special
purpose applications.
Appendix-I
Basic theory for over dimensioning of current

transformers
The basic theoretical equations for the transient dimensioning of the current transformer considering the
impact of switching angle apart from other factors are described in this chapter. These may be taken as
extension to the theoretical equations given in IEC60044-6 and IEC61869-2.
Short circuit current
The equivalent circuit

The equivalent of a of
Thecircuit
typical fault
a typical
equivalent
loop
circuitfault
of a loop
can be
berepresented
canfault
typical represented by
loop can be by
aninductance
an inductance
represented
and
by anand
a resistance
a resistance
inductance
in
and ainresistance
series in
(Fig. A).
series (Fig-A). series (Fig-A).
L R L R
The equivalent circuit of a typical fault loop can be represented by an inductance and a resistance in
series (Fig-A). g g
L R
Figure-A: Equivalent circuit of a short circuit lop.

Figure-A:
Fig.Equivalent circuit
A : Equivalent circuit of
of aashort
short circuit
circuit lop. lop.
Assuming a sinusoidal emf from the generator g G when the breaker closes, the short circuit current (i) may
be written as
 t 
 t i  2  I psc
e Tp
cos      cos
 t      ...(1) (1)
 
i I psce cos     cos t    
2 where Tp

Figure-A: Equivalent
 circuit of a short circuit lop. (1)
 
 Φ = Angle of switching on the voltage
 curve
Ipsc = Vm / √(R2 + ωL 
t
Tp ) is the rms value of primary symmetrical short circuit current
2
i  2  I psc t e cos   cos t   (2)
  
 Tti p= L/R is the Tpprimary time constant 
2  I e cos     cos  t      (1)
i 2  I psce Tpα =cos
tan
psc
cos
-1(ωL/R) is t thephase angle difference  between voltage and current (2)
 di 0 1  di1 1 
    i  q   i (3)
Substituting θdtfor (Φ – α) Ts the expression
0
dt Ts (1) can be written as
1
di 0 1 di 1 t
  i 0  q 1   Tp i1  (3)
dt e cos   cos t  
Ts i  2dt I pscTs (2)
  ...(2)
 
i1 i2
The second di 0term in

1 this expression
di 1 is the steady state sinusoidal variation and the first term is the transient

part, which theoretically q 1  after
 i 0 vanishes  i1 infinite time. U (3) L
dt Ts dt Ts L 2
i i
At t = 0 it can be seen that transient component
1 U
equals
L
the steady state component and since both have
12 0
opposing polarities the current is zero at t = 0. R

U 2
R
UL
L2
The transient component will be zero when θ = ± π/2 and will have maximum value when θ = 0. Making an
U L
assumption that the network is predominantlyi inductive, this
1 0 i corresponds to switching taking place on the
1 2
R
voltage wave, when it is passing through maximum and zero respectively.
U 2
R
UL
L2
  
U L t t
 Tp  qTs
1 0

i 0  2  I psc   cos    e Tp  e Ts 
R2
UR
 Tp  Ts   
 1 
 2  I psc  2 2t   t 
 Tp  qTs   Tp  1  Ts 
i 0  2  I psc   cos   Ts
e e 
 Tp  Ts   t
series (Fig-A).
Figure-A: Equivalent circuit of a short circuit lop.
L R
 t 
i  2  I psce Tp cos      cos t      (1)
362  Manual on Power System Protection
 
 t  g
 2  I psc e cos      cos t     
 Tp (1)

Transmission of asymmetrical short circuit
 t
 current through a CT
 
2  I psce Tp by
i  represented
A CT can be costhe cos t  circuit
 equivalent  shown in Fig B. From this circuit we can derive the following(2)
 
differential equation.  Figure-A:
 Equivalent circuit of a short circuit lop.
di 0 1 di 1
 t
  i 0  q 1   i1 ...(3)(3)
 2 e Tp cos dt
I pscwhere   cos Ts
 
t  dt Ts (2)
  t  
 i = (L
Ts 2 +I psc
L )/R
e Tp ≈cos
L    is
/R  the
 cos   constant of the CT
t    time
secondary (1)
0 2 2 0 2 
 
di 0 1 q = L /(L
di 2 0 1 2 + L ) ≈ L /L
2 0
is the ratio of inductances.
i i
 i0  q 1  (3)
1 2
  i1
dt Ts dtthe main
L0 is Ts inductance
 t  L2
UL
Li2is the  inductance

2  Itotal
psc e
Tp of
cos   cos the U
t secondary circuit
L 1 0 (2)
  R2
R is the total  resistance of the secondary

 circuit.
UR
di 0 1 di 1
  i0  q 1   i1 (3)
dt Ts dt Tsi1 i2
  Tp 
t t UL
 Tp  qTs L2
i 0  2  I psc   cos   e  e Ts
UTp  Ts L0 i  i

1
 1 2

R2
 1  U
UR
 2  I psc  2 2  L2
L
  Ts  1  U L1 0
t
   
R2
UR
 1  q   Fig.
Ts sin  q 2 Ts2 circuit
B :Equivalent  1 cosofa ecurrent transformer
Ts
By substituting the asymmetrical short circuit current in the system equation for i1, we obtain the following
equation for the magnetizing  1 i0 forthe case Tp ≠ Ts.
 2  I psccurrent
 2 2 t
  Ts   1  t 
 Tp  qTs 
 1  q cos
  
2  t 2
 
i 0  2  I psc  Ts
 Tp  et    qe TpTs  1Ts t cos
sin
qTs
Tp Ts  t  
 (4)
i  2  I  cos   e  e
 Tp0  Ts psc  Tp Ts   
   

 1   1 
 2  I psc  2  2 2  I psc   2 Ts2  1 
  Ts  1  t
   2 2
  t 
 1  q  Ts sin   q Ts  1 cos  e Ts
 
 1  q   Ts sin   q 2 Ts2  1 cos  e Ts  
 1 
 2  I psc  2 2 
  Ts  1 
 2  I psc  2  21  q  Ts sint    q Ts  1 cos t  
 1  2 2
(4)
  Ts  1  ...(4)
In 
 the
1 above 
q  equation 
t    q 2 Ts2
Ts sin substituting,   
 1 cos t    (4)
g = (qω2 Ts2 + 1)/(ω2 Ts2 + 1)
and assuming
ω2 Ts2 + 1 = ω2 Ts2
Equation (4) can be simplified as
t
 Tp  qTs 
i 0  2 I psc  cos  e Tp
Tp
 Tp  qTs  Ts  Tp
t
t
i 0  2 I psc  Tp  qTs cos  etTp
i 0  2 I psc  Tp Tp  qTs Ts cos e
i 0  2 I psc   Tp  Tscos  e Tp t
 2 I psc  Tp g
 Ts 1  q
cos   sin  
Tp  qTs
cos 
 Ts
e (5)
  t
 Ts  Tp  Ts  Tst
1 q Tp  qTs
 2 I psc g cos   1  q sin   Tp  qTs cos  etTs (5)
 2 I psc   g cos   Ts
1 Tsq  sin  
TpTpTp 
 qTs Ts cos  e
  Ts (5)
 2 I psc g cos   sin    Tscos  e (5)
 2 I psc 
1  q  sin Tst    g Tp cosTs

t   
 Ts 
1  q  ...(5)
 2 I psc  1  q  sint    g cos t  
The flux in the  2 core I psc 1 Ts  sinproportional
q  t    g cos t i and 
 CT 2 I psc   isTsdirectly sint    g cos to t  0   the proportionality constant is dependent upon the
dimensions of the core  Ts and  its permeability t 
 Tp  qTs  Tp
i
From the equation0  2 I
above psc  it can be seen cos  e
 that t the magnetizing current consists of a DC component
 TpTp  qTs
Ts  Tpt
i  2 I psc  Tp  qTs cos  etTp (6)
i 00  2 I psc  Tp Tp  Ts cos  e
 qTs
i 0  2 I psc   Tp  Tscos  e Tp t
 Tp   Ts 1  q Tp  qTs  (6)
 2 I psc g cos   sin   cos  e Ts (6)
 Ts
1 q  Tp 
Tp  qTsTs t
  t (6)
 2 I psc g cos   1  q sin   Tp  qTs cos  etTs Ts
 2 I psc  g cos  1 Tsq  sin  TpTp  Ts cos  e
 qTs
and an 2AC I psccomponent
g cos   Ts sin   Tp  Tscos  e
Ts
 Ts  Tp  Ts  ...(6)
and an AC component  1  q  
and an AC componentsint    g cos t  
icomponent (7)
and an ACand 0~   2 I psc  
an AC component  Ts 
1  q 
i   2 I psc  1  q  sint    g cos t   (7)
i 00~~   2 I psc  1  q 
Ts  sin  t     g cos   t   
 
...(7) (7)
i 0~   2 I psc   Ts sint    g cos t    (7)
 Ts  1 
The maximum value  1ofthe 2AC component
2 i0~max can be given by
q
i 0 ~ max     g 2  11 (8)
Ts q 22  2
1 
i max   1  q2  g222 2
1
(8)
i 00~~max 1 Tsq     2g  ...(8) (8)
i0~K maxssc 
  TsI
 Ipsc   g    (8)
Ts  pn 
 
SymmetricalK Kshort
ssc (9) I circuit I
ssc  I psc
psc pnI pn current factor
K ssc  I psc
(9) I pn
(9)
The emf to be developed by the CT to pass the rated current Isn through a CT can be given by:

(9) 
t
(Rct + Rb).ITp sn
 qTs
cos  e Tp
Tp  Ts t

K tf   Tp Tp  qTs  Tp t
Where cos  etTp
  qTs cos
 
1
1Tp
 Tp Ts2 gTp
Ts
qqTs e2 2
K tfthe
Rct is  CT 
Tp  Ts
secondary cos  e 1 winding resistance and
K tf  Tp  Ts
   
2 
11  qq Ts  relay 2 12
RbKistf the
 burden Ts ofthe g and the leads.
22  2g 21 2 t
1 g qcosTsI  is togpass

If a short circuit current
1  q 2 Tp  qTs
through the CT
 Ts
 psc
sin   cos    t CT needs to be overdimensioned. Purely on the
the
e
symmetrical short   circuit Ts  withoutTp
basis, any  Ts transient  component, the overdimensioning factor of the CT (11)
1  q
  g cos   1  q sin   Tp  qTs Tp  qTs Tst

1 cos  etTs
 
depends on the magnitude g cos   of thesin symmetrical
  short
cos  circuit
e current and the rated current Ipn
 1 Ts
1qsin 2Tp Ts2
g2Ts
  Tp
Tp  qTs
   Ts
g cos   Ts q Ts cos   e
 (11)
as the ratio of the r.m.s. value of the short circuit (11)
   
The symmetricalshort circuit Ts current factor Tp2  Ts
K2ssc11 is defined

11  qq current
Ts  I g 21 2
current Ipsc andthe rated primary 2 (11)
Ts 2  png
 1  q  1  q Ts 2  g 2 2 
Kssc = Ipsc/ Ipn sint    g cos t  
Ts  ...(9)
  11  qq sint    g cos 1t  
 
 t    g gcos 
 1 Tsq  1sin 2 2t   
  Ts sin qt Ts2g cos  1t   
   
 Ts 
 
11  qq Ts Ts 22  g 221 22
1
2  2g
1  q Ts   g 2t  t  t
 TpTs  Ts   sin  e Ts  sint  
K tf  cos   e Tp  e (12)
Tp  Ts  tt t 
 t
 TpTs  Tp 
K   TpTs cos  etTp  e Ts   sin  e Ts  sint  
 t  t
(12)
K tftf Tp TpTs  Ts cos  Tp e  etTs   sin  etTs  sint   (12)
K tf  Tp  Tscos  e  e Ts  sin  e  sint  
Ts (12)
i 0  2 I psc  cos  e
 Tp  Ts  (6)
 1 q Tp  qTs 
t (6)
 2 I psc g cos   sin    t cos  e Ts
 1 q Ts 
Tp  qTs Tp  Ts
 2 I psc g cos    sin   cos  e Ts 
 Ts  Tp  Ts 
364 and an AC componentManual on Power System Protection
and an AC component
 1  q  
i 0~   2 I psc  sint    g cos t   (7)
Transient Dimensioning  1  q  Factor Ts  
i 0~   2 I psc  sint    g cos t    (7)
If the short circuit current  Ts  is asymmetrical compared  to the case of symmetrical short circuit current, due
to the DC component, saturation in the core will be reached much earlier. If saturation must not occur
1
during the period a protective 2relay is2 carrying out the measurement, the transformer will have to be over
 1 1 q  
dimensioned. This over dimensioning
  g 2  factor is defined by Ktf. The transient dimensioning factor Ktf is the
 1i 0~ max 2  (8)
ratio of the theoretical  2Ts
q  total  
 2secondary  linked flux to the peak instantaneous value of the AC component flux.
Sincei 0 ~flux  
max values  g 
are proportional to

the corresponding magnetizing currents Ktf can be given by (8)
 Ts   
 
Ktf. = i0/Ki0~max I psc I pn
ssc  ...(10)
K ssc  I psc I pn
(9)for i and i
Substituting expressions 0 0~max
the transient dimensioning factor can be written as
(9)
t
 Tp  qTs  Tp
  t cos  e
 Tp  qTs  Tp Ts Tp 
 K tf  cos  e
 
Tp  Ts 1
K tf  1  q Ts1 2  g 2 2

1  q Ts 2  g 2 2 
t
 1 q Tp  qTs  Ts
g cos   sin    t cos  e
 1 q TsTp qTs Tp Ts 
g cos   sin   cos  e Ts (11)
  Ts 
Tp  Ts 2  2 1
1  q Ts1   g 2 (11)

1  q Ts 2  g 2 2 
 1  q  
 sint    g cos t  
 1  q  Ts  
  t    g cos t   1
sin 

Ts 
 
1  q Ts1 2  g 2 2 ...(11)

1  q Ts 2  g 2 2 
If the burden is purely resistive as in the case of static or numerical protection, L2 =0 and thus q = 0 and g
can be ignored. Therefore equation (11) can  bet simplified
t  and tthe transient dimensioning factor becomes
 TpTs  Tp 
K tf    t cost e  e  t  sin  e Ts  sint  
Ts (12)
 TpTs Tp Ts  
K tf  cos   e Tp  e Ts   sin  e Ts  sint   (12)
Tp  Ts   ...(12)
 
For calculating the transient factor necessary for dimensioning purpose, equation (12) can be simplified by
writing sin (ωt +θ) = -1. The transient dimensioning factor Ktf will then become
 t t  t
 TpTs  

K tf  cos   e Tp  e Ts   sin  e Ts  1 (13)
...(13)
Tp  Ts  
 
Chapter 24
VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS
24.1 Introduction
Voltage transformers can be of two types, magnetic voltage transformers (VT) and capacitive voltage
transformers (CVT). The magnetic voltage transformers are most economical for voltages up to about 145
kV and the capacitive voltage transformers for voltages above this. A CVT can also be combined with the
PLC equipment used for communication over the high voltage transmission lines. Voltage transformers are
in most cases connected between phase and earth. The standards covering the voltage transformers are
IEC 61869- 3and 5, IS 3156 parts 1 to 4.
The main tasks of voltage transformers are:
• To transform voltages from a usually high value to a value easy to handle for relays and
instruments.
• To insulate the metering circuit from the primary high voltage.
• To provide possibilities of a standardization of instruments and relays to a few rated voltages.
For a voltage transformer in no load the following formula is valid:
E1 N1
=
E2 N2
The voltage transformer is ideally a transformer under no load condition where the load current is zero and
the voltage drop is only caused by the magnetizing current and is thus negligible.
In practice the ideal conditions are not fulfilled as the voltage transformers are loaded with burden in the
form of relays, instruments and cables. This causes a measuring error in the voltage transformer due to the
load current voltage drop.
24.2 Measuring error
The voltage transformer is normally loaded by an impedance consisting of relays, instruments and, perhaps
most important, the cables. The induced emf required to achieve the secondary current through the total
burden, requires a magnetizing current which is taken from the primary side voltage. This magnetizing current
introduces errors in the voltage transformer.
E1
= Nominal ratio Kn
E2
We will get the real voltage ratio Kd:
U1 – ∆U
= Real ratio Kd
U2
Where
U1 is the primary rated voltage
U2 is the secondary rated voltage

The measuring error Ɛ is defined as:

𝐸1
= Nominal ratio Kn
𝐸2
∆U
x 100 = Ɛ
U1 will get the real voltage ratio Kd:
We
The error
𝑈1 − ∆𝑈 in the reproduction will appear both in amplitude and phase.
= Real ratio K d
𝑈2
The error in amplitude is called voltage or ratio error. According to the definition, the voltage error is positive
Where
if the secondary voltage is higher than what the rated voltage ratio would give.
The is theinprimary
U1error rated voltage
phase angle is called phase error or phase displacement error. The phase error is positive if
the secondary voltage is leading the primary.
U2 is the secondary rated voltage
Turns correction is often used on voltage transformers to achieve a high accuracy. The high number of turns
Theameasuring
gives possibility error Ɛ is defined
to regulate in smallas:
steps. According to the standards a voltage transformer is required to
fulfil
∆𝑈 its accuracy class for burdens between 25 and 100% of rated burden.
x 100 = Ɛ
𝑈1
A turns correction is mostly selected to give a positive error + Ɛmax at a burden of 25% of rated burden and
–Ɛmax at a burden of 100% of rated burden. This is shown in Figure 24.1.
Fig. 24.1 : The measuringFigure 1.The

error as measuring
a factor errorburden
of secondary as a factor of secondary
at a constant primary burden
voltage. at a constant
primary voltage.
24.3 Voltage transformers with several secondary windings
The voltage transformers can be designed with more than one secondary windings. This is done when
secondary windings for different purposes are needed. Each loaded secondary winding will take load current
from the primary winding and the total voltage drop is caused by the sum of the secondary burdens.
The most common design is to provide one Y-connected winding and one extra secondary winding for open
delta connection, used for earth fault protection relays. This winding is not loaded during normal service
and will thus not influence the measuring accuracy. The open delta winding is normally provided with 110
V secondary for solidly earthed systems and for 110/3 V for unearthed, reactance or resistance earthed
systems. This will give an open delta output of 110 V during a solid earth fault in both systems.
Voltage Transformers 367
Fig. 24.2 : A
Figure Voltage transformer with two secondary windings, onewindings,
Y-connected andY-connected
one Open deltaand
connected
Figure 2. A2.Voltage
A Voltage transformer
transformer with with
two two secondary
secondary windings, one one
Y-connected and one one
OpenOpen
deltadelta
connected.
connected.
Figure
Figure 3. The
3. The principle
principle for anforopen
an open
deltadelta winding.
winding. Occurring
Occurring voltages
voltages at anatearth
an earth
faultfault in adirect
in adirect earthed
earthed
Fig.system.
system.24.3 : The principle for an open delta winding. Occurring voltages at an earth fault in a direct earthed system
Fig. 24.4 : The principle for an open delta winding. Occurring voltages at an earth fault in an unearthed
or high resistive/resonance earthed system
24.4 Voltage factor
Voltage transformers are normally connected phase to earth. In the event of a disturbance in the network
the voltage across the VT’s (CVT’s) will be increased in the healthy phases. The voltage factors as specified
by the standards are:
1.9 For systems that are non-effectively earthed.
1.5 For solidly earthed systems.
The saturation is specified to be 30 sec for systems with tripping for an earth fault and 8 hours if no earth
fault tripping protection is used. The VT’s must not saturate at the voltage factor.
1 Short circuit of UP (t)
24.5 Inductive voltage transformers as per IEC 61869-3
2 Aperiodic damping of US (t)
The standard values of rated output at a3power factor
Periodic of 0.8 of
damping lagging
US (t)are:
10, 25, 50, 100VA
Figure 5:for
24.5.1 Accuracy Class Designations Transient response
Measuring of aTransformers
Voltage capacitor voltage transformer
is decided by the fault inception angle. Higher capacitances in the voltage divider gives lower amplitude of
For measuring voltage transformers, the accuracy class is designated by the highest permissible percentage
voltage the low
error at frequency oscillation.
rated voltage and with rated burden, prescribed for the accuracy class concerned.
The IS3156
The standard (part4)
accuracy states
classes forthat following inductive
single-phase a short circuit of thevoltage
measuring supply transformers
between the high
are: voltage terminal and
the low voltage terminal connected to earth, the secondary output voltage of a capacitive voltage transformer
0.1 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 3.0
shall decay , within one cycle or rated frequency to a value of less than 10% of the peak value before short
circuit.
The voltage error and phase displacement at rated frequency shall not exceed the values given in Table
24.1 at any voltage between 80% and 120% of rated voltage and with burdens between 25% and 100% of
rated burden at a power factor of 0.8 lagging for rated burden.
For transformers with tappings on the secondary winding, the accuracy requirements refer to the highest
transformation ratio, unless otherwise specified.
Table 24.1 : Limits of voltage error and phase displacement for measuring voltage transformers
Voltage (ratio) error Ɛu Phase displacement ∆φ

Class
±% ±Minutes ±Centiradians
0.1 0.1 5 0.15
0.2 0.2 10 0.3
0.5 0.5 20 0.6
1.0 1.0 40 1.2
3.0 3.0 Not Specified Not Specified
24.5.2 Accuracy Class Designation for Protective Voltage Transformers
All voltage transformers intended for protective purposes, with the exception of residual voltage windings,
shall be assigned a measuring accuracy class similar to that of measuring voltage transformers .The accuracy
class for a protective voltage transformer is designated by the highest permissible percentage voltage error
prescribed for the accuracy class concerned, from 5% of rated voltage to a voltage corresponding to the
rated voltage factor. This expression is followed by the letter P. The standard accuracy classes for protective
voltage transformers are 3P and 6P, and the same limits of voltage error and phase displacement will normally
apply at both 5% of rated voltage and at the voltage corresponding to the rated voltage factor. At 2% of rated
voltage, the error limits will be twice as high as those at 5% of rated voltage.
The voltage error and phase displacement at rated frequency shall not exceed the values in Table 24.2 at
5% of rated voltage and at rated voltage multiplied by the rated voltage factor (1.2, 1.5 or 1.9) with burdens
between 25% and 100% of rated burden at a power factor of 0.8 lagging. At 2% of rated voltage, the limits
of voltage error and phase displacement will be twice as high as those given in Table 24.2.
Table 24.2 : Limits of voltage error and phase displacement for protective voltage transformers
Voltage (ratio) error Ɛu Phase displacement ∆φ

Class
±% ± Minutes ± Centiradians
3P 3 120 3.5
6P 6 240 7
24.5.3 Accuracy Class for Residual Voltage Windings
The accuracy class for a residual voltage winding shall be 6P or better.
24.6 Capacitive voltage transformers as per IEC61869-5
24.6.1 Rated Output

The preferred values of rated output at a power factor of 0.8 lagging, expressed in volt-amperes, are:
10 - 25 - 50 - 100VA
where the accuracy is specified from 25% to 100% of the rated burden.
The rated output of windings intended to be connected in broken delta with similar windings to produce a
residual voltage shall be specified in volt-amperes and the value shall be chosen from the values specified
as above.
24.6.2 Accuracy Requirements for Measuring Capacitor Voltage Transformer
For measuring capacitor voltage transformers, the accuracy class is designated by the highest permissible
percentage voltage error at rated voltage and with rated burden, prescribed for the accuracy class
concerned.
The standard accuracy classes for single-phase metering capacitor voltage transformers are:
0.2 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 3.0
The voltage error and phase displacement shall not exceed the values given in Table 24.3 for the appropriate
accuracy class at any value of temperature and frequency within the reference ranges and with burdens
from 25% to 100% of rated value given above.
Table 24.3 : Limits of voltage error and phase displacement
Accuracy Voltage (ratio) error Ɛu Phase displacement ∆φ

Class ±% ±Minutes ±Centiradians
0.2 0.2 10 0.3
0.5 0.5 20 0.6
1.0 1.0 40 1.2
3.0 3.0 Not specified Not specified
24.6.3 Accuracy Requirements for Protective Capacitor Voltage Transformers
The accuracy class for a protective capacitor voltage transformer is designated by the highest permissible
percentage voltage error prescribed for the accuracy class concerned, from 5% of rated voltage to a voltage
corresponding to the rated voltage factor. This expression is followed by the letter “P”.
Three additional classes for transient performance are introduced: T1, T2 and T3. This designation shall
follow the designation of the accuracy class. Class 3PT1, for example, incorporates the performance of
accuracy class 3P and transient performance class T1.
The standard accuracy classes for protective capacitor voltage transformers are “3P” and “6P”.
The voltage error and phase displacement shall not exceed the values given in Table 24.4 for the appropriate
accuracy class at 2% and 5% of rated voltage and at rated voltage multiplied by the rated voltage factor
(1.2, 1.5 or 1.9), and at any value of temperature and frequency within the reference ranges a with burdens
from 25% to 100% of rated value for burden given above.
Table 24.4 : Limits of voltage error and phase displacement for protective capacitor voltage transformers
% of rated voltage
2 5 100 X 2 5 100 X 2 5 100 X
Protection
Classes Voltage (ratio) error Ɛu Phase displacement Phase displacement ∆φ
±% ∆φ ±Centiradians
±Minutes
3P 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 240 120 120 120 7.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
6P 12.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 480 240 240 240 14.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Note: X=FV ·100 (rated voltage factor multiplied by 100).
24.6.4 Accuracy Class for Secondary Windings of Protective Cvt Intended to Produce Residual
Voltage
The accuracy class for a residual voltage winding shall be 3P or 6P as defined in 6.3 earlier.
24.6.5 Transient Response of Capacitive Voltage Transformers
The characteristic of the transient response is given by the ratio of the secondary voltage US (t) at a specified
time TS after application of the primary short circuit to the peak value of the secondary voltage FV·√2± %·USr
before the application of the primary short circuit. The secondary voltage US = US (t) after a short circuit of
the primary voltage UP = UP (t) can be represented as follows.
Following a short circuit of the supply between the high-voltage terminal A and the low voltage terminal
N connected to earth, the secondary voltage of a capacitor voltage transformer shall decay within a
specified time Ts to a specified value of the peak voltage before application ofthe short circuit as shown in
Figure 24.5.
1UShort
1. Short circuit of P
(t) circuit of damping
2. Aperiodic UP (t) of US (t) 3. Periodic damping of US (t)
Fig. 24.5 : Transient response of a capacitor voltage transformer

2 Aperiodic damping of US (t)
24.7 Inductive voltage transformers as per IS
3 Periodic damping of US (t)
24.7.1 Rated Burden
A number of standard rated outputs are given in IS3156 (part 1). Following are the preferred values.
Figure 5: Transient response of a capacitor voltage transformer
10, 25, 50,100, 200, 500 VA.
s decided by the fault inception angle. Higher capacitances in the voltage divider gives lower amplitude of
24.7.2 Accuracy Classes of Measuring Voltage Transformers at Power Factor of 0.8 Lagging
he low frequency oscillation.
The measuring voltage transformers as per Indian Standard are dealt in IS 3156 (Part 2). For measuring
The IS3156 (part4)
voltage states that following
transformers, the accuracyaclass
short circuit ofbythe
is designated thesupply between the
highest permissible high voltage
percentage terminal and
voltage error
he low voltageat terminal connected
rated voltage to earth,
and with rated burden the secondary
prescribed for the output
accuracyvoltage of a capacitive
class concerned. voltage
The standard transformer
accuracy
classes for measuring voltage transformers are
hall decay , within one cycle or rated frequency to a value of less than 10% of the peak value before short
0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 and 3.
ircuit.
The voltage error and phase displacement at rated frequency shall not exceed the value given in Table 24.5
at any voltage between 80 percent and 120 percent of rated voltage and with burden between 25 percent
and 100 percent of rated burden, at a power factor of 0.8 lagging.
Table 24.5 : Limits of voltage Errors and phase Displacement
Class Percentage Voltage (Ratio) Error Phase Displacement (Minutes)

0.1 ±0.1 ±5
0.2 ±0.2 ±10
0.5 ±0.5 ±20
1.0 ±1.0 ±40
3 ±3.0 -
24.7.3 Accuracy Classes of Inductive Protective Voltage Transformers
The inductive protective voltage transformers are dealt in IS 3156 (Part 3). All voltage transformers intended
for protective purposes, shall be assigned one of the accuracy classes specified below.
The accuracy class for a protective voltage transformer is designated by the highest permissiblepercentage
voltage error prescribed for the accuracy class concerned, from 5% of rated voltage to a voltage corresponding
to the rated voltage factor. This expression is followed by the letter “P” for protective voltage transformers
and “PR” for 3-phase residual voltage transformers.
The standard accuracy classes for protective voltage transformers are “3P” and “6P”.
The standard accuracy classes for 3-phase residual voltage transformers are ‘5PR’ and “10PR”.
The voltage error and phase displacement at rated frequency shall not exceed the values in Table 24.6 at
5% of rated voltage, and at rated voltage multiplied by the rated voltage factor (1.2, 1.5 or 1.9) with burdens
between 25% and 100% of rated burden at a power factor of 0.8 lagging.
At 2 percent of the rated voltage, the limits of error and phase displacement with burdens between 25% and
100% of rated burden at a power factor of 0.8 lagging shall be twice as high as those given in Table 24.6.
Table 24.6 : Limits of Voltage Error and Phase Displacement
Accuracy Class Percentage Voltage (Ratio) Error Phase Displacement (Minutes)

3P ±3.0 ±120
6P ±6.0 ±240
24.7.4 Dual Purpose Voltage Transformers
Where the transformer has one secondary winding which is intended to serve a dual purpose, that is, both
for measurement as well as protection, it shall comply with the requirements of both measuring as well as
protective voltage transformer.
Where the transformer has two or more separate secondary windings, one of measurement and the others
for protection, having the same or different transformation ratios, they shall respectively comply requirements
as laid out for respective type of voltage transformer in the standard.
For Transformers having two or more separate secondary windings (other than residual voltage winding),
because of their interdependence, the user should specify for each winding the simultaneous output
ranges of the other windings at which it must fulfill the requirements of its designated accuracy class.
Each winding should fulfill its respective accuracy requirement within its output range whilst at the same
time the other winding has an output of any value from zero to 100% of the output range specified for the
other winding.
24.8 Capacitive voltage transformers as per IS

Capacitive voltage transformers are dealt in IS3156 (part 4)
24.8.1 Standard Values of Rated Output

These are given in IS 3156 (Part 1). The preferred values of rated output are10, 25, 50,100, 200, 500 VA
at a power factor of 0.8 lagging.
24.8.2 Standard Accuracy Classes

The standard accuracy classes for capacitor voltage transformers are:
• For measurement: 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, and 3.0 as described above for magnetic measuring transformers
and
• For protection :3P and 6Pas described above for magnetic protective transformers.
The voltage error and phase displacement shall not exceed the values as given for measuring and protective
transformers.
24.8.3 Transient Response of Capacitive Voltage Transformers
For protective relays and disturbance recorders information about a primary disturbance must be transferred
to the secondary side. For such windings a lower accuracy is required but a high capability to transform
voltages from 5% to full rated voltage to allow protection relays measure and disconnect the fault. The
Protection class is 3P.
Further a good transient response is required for the protection transformers and this is a problem for CVT´s
where the energy stored in the capacitive voltage divider and in the interposing voltage transformer (IVT)
will result in a transient voltage oscillation on the secondary side. The transient oscillation consists of a low
frequency component (2-15 Hz) and a high frequency oscillation (900-4000 Hz). The time constant for the
high frequency part is short (<10 ms) whereas the low frequency part has long time constants. The amplitude
is decided by the fault inception angle. Higher capacitances in the voltage divider gives lower amplitude of
the low frequency oscillation.
The IS3156 (Part 4) states that following a short circuit of the supply between the high voltage terminal and
the low voltage terminal connected to earth, the secondary output voltage of a capacitive voltage transformer
shall decay, within one cycle or rated frequency to a value of less than 10% of the peak value before short
circuit.
Fig. 24.6 : The transient voltage at a solid short circuit on the terminals of a Capacitive voltage transformer
24.9 Ferro-resonance
Ferro resonance can occur in circuits containing a capacitor and a reactor incorporating an iron core (a non-
linear inductance). Both the CVT and a magnetic VT can be involved in Ferro-resonance phenomenon.
24.9.1 Ferro-resonance in a Magnetic VT
The ferro-resonance for a magnetic VT is an oscillation between the inductance of the VT and the capacitance
of the network. Ferro-resonance can only occur at ungrounded networks, but note the risk that some part
becomes ungrounded under certain circumstances. An oscillation is normally triggered by a sudden change
in the network voltage. Ferro-resonance phenomenon can occur both with sub-harmonic frequencies and
with harmonic frequencies.
Generally it is difficult to state when a risk of ferro-resonance occurs but as soon a system with a voltage
transformer is left ungrounded under some circumstances, preventive actions should be taken (also consider
the risk of capacitive charged systems with a VT). The damping of ferro-resonance is normally done with a
27-60Ω, 200 W resistor connected across the open delta winding. The resistor value should give a current
as high as possible but a current below the thermal rating of the voltage transformer.
24.9.2 Ferro-resonance in a Capacitive VT
The CVT with its capacitor and IVT is by itself a ferro-resonance circuit. The phenomena is started by a
sudden voltage change. A subharmonic oscillation can be started and must be damped to prevent damage
of the transformer. The capacitor voltage transformer shall be designed and constructed to prevent sustained
ferro-resonance oscillations.
24.10 Fusing of secondary circuits
Secondary fuses should be provided at the first box where the three phases are brought together. The circuit
before the first box from the terminal box is constructed to minimize the risk of faults in the circuit. Any fuse
in the terminal box preferably not used as the voltage transformer supervision is difficult to perform. The
fuses in the terminal box are still provided to enable a fusing of the circuits to different loads like protection
and metering circuit.
The fuses must be selected to give a fast and reliable fault clearance also for a fault at the end of the cabling.
Earth faults and two-phase faults should be checked.
24.11 Voltage drop in secondary cabling
The accuracy of a voltage transformer is specified on the secondary terminal. The voltage drop and angle
error in the secondary cabling must thus be checked in order to confirm the total accuracy of the circuit.
Fig. 24.7 : The voltage drop for a voltage transformer secondary circuit.
Figure 7.The voltage drop for a voltage transformer secondary circuit.
The voltage drop and angle error in the secondary cabling should be lower than the error given by the class
specification of the transformer.
1)
24.12 Non-conventional instrument transformers
Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCIT) as these are called are now being used by some utilities
in different parts of the world. The new IEC 61869 replaces and modernizes the well-known IEC 60044
series. There are multiple parts roughly divided between in to conventional and low power instrument
transformers.
Expected benefits are:
• Reduced cabling
• Reduced engineering time
• Reduced commissioning time
• Increased reliability
• Improved safety
References
1. IEC 61869-1:Instrument Transformers -General requirements
2. IEC 61869-3 :Instrument Transformers- Additional Requirements for Inductive Voltage

Transformers.
3. IEC 61869-5 :Instrument Transformers- Additional Requirements for Capacitor Voltage

Transformers.
4. IS 3156 (Part1) : Voltage Transformers-Specification for General requirements
5. IS 3156 (Part 2) :Voltage Transformers-Specification for Measuring Voltage Transformers.
6. IS 3156 (Part 3) :Voltage Transformers - Specification for Protective Voltage Transformers
7. IS 3156 (Part 4) :Voltage Transformers -Specification for Capacitor Voltage Transformers

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Research Report / Publication No.

CENTRAL BOARD OF IRRIGATION & POWER

Central Board of Irrigation & Power

Designed and Published by : Shri V.K. Kanjlia, Secretary

Protection and Automation systems play an important role in meeting the

Shri Sanjay Patki

Shri Subhash Thakur Shri P.P. Francis

Shri Abhay Kumar Ms. C. Saroj

Shri Biswajit Bandhu Mukherjee Shri H. B. Mukund

Shri Rajiv Krishnan Shri M.V. Kini

Shri Ritesh Bharat Shri Saurabh Makwana

Shri Shaik Nadeem Shri G.S. Papneja

Shri Deepak Kumar Saxena Shri M.V. Girish

Shri V.K. Kanjlia Shri Uday Trivedi

Shri P.P. Wahi Shri S.K Batra

The disturbance costs include the following

• Costs associated with the customer outages

• Costs associated with the customer’s complaints and ill will.

The manual is structured as under.

• Chapter 20 covers DC Auxiliary power supply system.

• Chapter 22 deals with validation, acceptance and siteTesting of protection schemes

Requirements for the protection relays

(1) Fault clearance performance in respect of

(2) Reliability; and

• metering, oscillography, sequence of events capture with time tagging,

• remote setting and monitoring through communications,

• user configurability of tripping schemes and other control logic.

• Multiple setting groups for easy adaptability to network changes

• the burden on the VTs and CTs is substantially reduced

• the systems have an ability for continuous self-checking.

There are three kinds of arrangement of CTs.

Main I and main II protection is therefore provided using:

• two independent CT cores at the same location

• two independent trip coils in a common circuit breaker

• System requirement and the system design criteria

• The plant specifications

• The failure rates of the protected plant

• The requirements of performance indices of the fault clearance system

• The requirements of reliability of protection equipment

2.1 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS

Fig. 2.1 : The fault clearance system

2.2 BACK-UP PROTECTION

The back up protections can be classified as under.

The local back up protections can be further classified as under.

Circuit local back-up protection

Substation local back-up protection

2.3 REMOTE BACK-UP PROTECTION

2.4 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION

2.5 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION

2.6 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS

Fig. 2.2 : Duplicated main protections

• Block-1 in Figure presents the first main protection, Main-1

• Block-2 represents the second main protection, Main-2.

2.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION

Fig. 2.3 : Flow diagram for breaker failure protection

2.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION

Open conductor or broken conductor fault

Loss of input from a voltage transformer,