Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 922 SCRA 518, October 09, 2019

2/22/22, 8:48 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 922

G.R. No. 214546. October 9, 2019.*

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. CITI APPLIANCE M.C.
CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction

over the Remedy; Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from
jurisdiction over the subject matter; Generally, jurisdiction over
the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court.—Jurisdiction over
the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court’s competence
over the process. This should not be confused with the relief, that
which the party filing the case wants the court to declare, and
which addresses the breach of the right or obligation. The source
of jurisdiction is important. Generally, jurisdiction over the
remedy is provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a
procedural matter which this Court — the authority that
promulgates the Rules of Court — may change ad hoc, or clarify
the application or interpretation of, in proper cases.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter;
“Subject matter” in jurisdiction over the subject matter can refer to:
(a) the cause of action, or the breach of legal right or legal duty; or
(b) the res, or the thing over which the legal right or duty breached
subsists.—The source of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
generally conferred by law. This is why the doctrine is that this
type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. Laws can
only be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do
in any case can change it. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over
the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal,
not simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but
mainly because it is the law that prescribes it. Parenthetically,
“subject matter” in jurisdiction over the subject matter can refer
to: (a) the cause of action, or the breach of legal right or legal
duty; or (b) the res, or the thing over which the legal right or duty
breached subsists. In forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions,
the subject matter refers to a breach of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f2179191ff0b632a3000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/41

519
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 519

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi
Appliance M.C. Corporation
the general right to actual possession, which is an attribute of

ownership and the res which is always real property.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Unlawful
Detainer; Under Rule 70, Section 1, a party may file a complaint
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer “at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
. . against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession[.]”—In cases of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, the Rules of Court provides the one-
year prescriptive period. Under Rule 70, Section 1, a party may
file a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful detainer “at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. . . against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession[.]” The Civil Code also provides the prescriptive period
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits. Particularly, Article
1147 provides that an action must be filed within one (1) year.
Nonetheless, as supported in a line of cases starting from Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968), the equity doctrine provides
that despite the rule that these types of jurisdiction cannot be
waived, the party that should benefit from the dismissal will be
estopped — in equity — from raising it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for ejectment is a
summary proceeding meant “to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right of possession of property.”—
An action for ejectment is a summary proceeding meant “to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
right of possession of property.” In this special civil action, the
title to the property is not involved. The only matter resolved is
the question as to “who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto.” Ejectment suits
are designed “to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder
and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to
the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.” They discourage
the parties deprived of possession of property to take the law into
their own hands. Thus, ejectment proceedings are summary in
nature to provide for a speedy settlement and action to recover

possession, and quell social disturbances.

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520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; Same; Possession in ejectment cases

means nothing more than physical or material possession, not
legal possession.—Possession in ejectment cases means nothing
more than physical or material possession, not legal possession. It
is not required that the complainant is the owner of the property.
If the issue of ownership is raised, the court may resolve this
question only to determine the question of possession.
Same; Same; Same; An allegation of prior physical possession
must be clearly stated in a complaint for forcible entry.—In
claiming that it had prior physical possession by virtue of its
absolute ownership over the land, respondent is mistaken. An
allegation of prior physical possession must be clearly stated in a
complaint for forcible entry. It cannot equate possession as an
attribute of ownership to the fact of actual prior physical
possession.
Same; Same; Same; The one (1)-year time bar in forcible entry
cases is reckoned from the date of discovery of the encroachment,
not from the date of the last demand to vacate.—Respondent
insists on the Court of Appeals’ ruling that based on Elane,
Ganancial, and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications, the one-
year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of the
last demand to vacate. A judicious review of these cases and
jurisprudence, both old and recent, reveals that the one-year time
bar in forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery
of the encroachment, not from the date of the last demand to
vacate.
Same; Same; Same; Unlawful Detainer; The one (1)-year
prescriptive period is a jurisdictional requirement consistent with
the summary nature of ejectment suits.—The one-year prescriptive
period is a jurisdictional requirement consistent with the
summary nature of ejectment suits. In Sarona v. Villegas, 22
SCRA 1257 (1968), this Court made a distinction between
unlawful detainer and forcible entry in discussing the implication
of the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry cases. It
stated: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the

speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules.
If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is
filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek

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VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 521

relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in

the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years,
then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can
really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature, and that the one-year time bar
to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action
Civil Law; Property; Rights over Lands; The owner of a parcel
of land has rights not only to the land’s surface, but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height.—In this case, petitioner’s assertion of right
over the property is not in the concept of an owner. In contrast,
petitioner claims that the property is owned either by the
government or a certain Teofilo Pilapil when it installed the lines
and cables. Thus, petitioner’s argument that it should be allowed
to exercise its right under Article 448 is untenable. Moreover,
squarely raised in this case is whether the subterranean portion
of a titled property is included in the rights of the surface owner.
Rights over lands are indivisible. It is well-settled that the owner
of a parcel of land has rights not only to the land’s surface, but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. Article 437 of the Civil Code states: AR- TICLE
437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and
of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or
make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation. This principle is embodied in

several rules pertaining to land rights. For instance, Article 438 of
the Civil Code determines that hidden treasure underground
belongs to the owner of the land, building, or property. Moreover,
mining rights may be given to a mining applicant despite the
surface being titled to another by government, subject only to
compensation.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of petitioner’s cables
affected the right of the surface owner to make use of its right to
possess. This

522

can be considered a burden, which may be removed by forcible

entry or unlawful detainer actions.—In this case, the existence of
petitioner’s cables affected the right of the surface owner to make
use of its right to possess. This can be considered a burden, which
may be removed by forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions. As
to petitioner’s assertion of its right of eminent domain, this Court
finds that this claim cannot be properly resolved in a complaint
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. “Eminent domain or
expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation.” This
power is exercised by the legislature and may be delegated to local
governments, other public entities, and public utilities. In
exercising the power of eminent domain, the following
requirements must concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be
for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise
informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property.
Expropriation Proceedings; Inverse Expropriation; Words and
Phrases; Inverse expropriation is a claim for compensation by the
deprived landowner as a complaint or as a counterclaim.—
Expropriation may be judicially claimed only by filing a complaint
for expropriation. Inverse expropriation is a claim for
compensation by the deprived landowner as a complaint or as a

counterclaim. It seeks to recover the value of property taken, even
though there is no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Normally, it is the expropriator — the State — that files
the complaint.
Same; Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts; An expropriation
suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court because
it is a case incapable of pecuniary estimation.—An expropriation
suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court because
it is a case incapable of pecuniary estimation. It deals with the
government’s exercise of its authority and right to take property
for public use. The right of an expropriator to file a complaint for
expropriation is not allowed in an action such as a forcible entry
or unlawful detainer suit. These actions are summary in nature.
Therefore, in this case,

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this Court cannot award expropriation. Nevertheless, the

resolution of this case is without prejudice to the filing of a
separate case for expropriation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
LEONEN, J.:

An action for forcible entry must be filed within one (1)
year from the date of actual entry on the land. However,
when the entry was done through stealth, the one-year
time bar is reckoned from the time the entry was
discovered.1 In contrast to unlawful detainer suits, no
previous demand to vacate is required before an action for
forcible entry may be filed.2
This Court resolves a Petition for Review3 filed by
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
assailing the Decision4 and Resolution5 of the Court of
Appeals, which ordered PLDT to realign its transmission
lines and restitute the premises to Citi Appliance M.C.
Corporation (Citi Appliance).
_______________
1 See Diaz v. Punzalan, 783 Phil. 456; 787 SCRA 531 (2016) [Per J.
Peralta, Third Division].
2 Dikit v. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44, 48 (1951) [Per J. Feria, First Division].
3 Rollo, pp. 14-46.
4 Id., at pp. 48-61. The Decision dated January 14, 2014 was penned by
Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Maria Luisa Quijano Padilla of the
Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
5 Id., at pp. 65-68. The Resolution dated July 21, 2014 was penned by
Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano Padilla of the Former
Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.

524

Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in

Cebu City. Sometime in 2003, it decided to construct a 16-
storey commercial building on it.6
The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi Appliance to
construct a one-level parking area consisting of 26 parking
slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had
to make a deep excavation to lay the foundation of the
parking lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines,
cables, and manholes underground, which had been placed
there by PLDT sometime in 1983. These encroached on Citi
Appliance’s property, preventing it from excavating the
land.7
In April 2003, Citi Appliance applied for exemption from
the parking requirement, which the Cebu City Zoning
Board initially granted on May 22, 2003.8 However, upon
reconsideration, the Cebu City Zoning Board denied the
exemption and required Citi Appliance to pay the parking
exemption fee of P3,753,600.00.9
On April 26, 2004, Citi Appliance wrote PLDT,
demanding that it remove the underground telephone
lines, cables, and manholes, or to shoulder the parking
exemption fee. On May 28, 2004, Citi Appliance made a
final demand on PLDT to comply until June 15, 2004;
otherwise, it would file an appropriate action in court.10
When PLDT still refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed

a complaint for ejectment against PLDT.11
In its Answer, PLDT alleged that its telephone lines,
cables, and manholes did not encroach on Citi Appliance’s
property as they were properly positioned alongside and
under-
_______________
6 Id., at p. 78.
7 Id., at pp. 15-17.
8 Id., at p. 17.
9 Id., at p. 49.
10 Id., at p. 57.
11 Id., at p. 49.

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VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 525

neath a public sidewalk.12 It later filed an Amended

Answer, arguing that the case should be dismissed since
the action for forcible entry had prescribed.13 It expounded
in its Position Paper that the one-year prescriptive period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry based on
stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the
alleged unlawful entry, not the last demand to vacate.14
Moreover, PLDT argued that the area in question was
part of public domain, it being a sidewalk.15 Assuming that
the property did belong to Citi Appliance, PLDT averred
that it had the right of eminent domain.16
In its December 6, 2010 Decision,17 the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities granted Citi Appliance’s ejectment
complaint. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this complaint for

EJECTMENT is hereby GRANTED. Defendants are (sic)
hereby ordered to comply with the demand of the plaintiff to
either realign its transmission lines as to allow the plaintiff
to be able to implement its planned construction works on
its own land or to pay the rent to the plaintiffs (sic) at the
rate of P15,000.00 per month. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.18

After comparing the relocation plan submitted by PLDT
with the geographical boundaries of Citi Appliance’s
property,
_______________
12 Id., at p. 125, MTCC’s Decision.

13 Id., at p. 101, PLDT’s Position Paper.
14 Id., at pp. 104-105.
15 Id., at p. 106.
16 Id., at pp. 109-110.
17 Id., at pp. 124-132. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge
Monalila S. Tecson of Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu
City.
18 Id., at p. 132.

526

the Municipal Trial Court in Cities found that PLDT’s

telephone lines, cables, and manholes were located within
Citi Appliance’s property.19
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities also ruled that the
complaint for forcible entry was timely filed. Relying on
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications v. Gutierrez,20 it
held that when unlawful entry was made clandestinely,
the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the
last demand to vacate.21
As to PLDT’s argument that the property was part of
public domain, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities ruled
that PLDT failed to proffer any evidence showing that
these areas have been expropriated by the National
Government and/or the City Government of Cebu. As to
PLDT’s claim of eminent domain, it ruled that PLDT failed
to show it properly exercised this right.22
In its May 13, 2011 Resolution,23 the Regional Trial
Court affirmed with modification the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities’ Decision. The dispositive portion of its Resolution
read:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

decision of the first level court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 1 is UPHELD with MODIFICATION.
Defendant-appellant is ordered to realign its transmission
to allow plaintiff-appellee to implement its planned
construction works on its own land; pending the said
realignment, defendant-appellant is ordered to pay plain-
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 130-131, MTCC’s Decision.

20 537 Phil. 682; 507 SCRA 526 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
First Division].
21 Rollo, p. 129.
22 Id., at pp. 129-132.
23 Id., at pp. 136-143. The May 13, 2011 Resolution was penned by
Presiding Judge Raphael R. Yrastorza, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cebu City.

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VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 527

tiff-appellee rent at the monthly rate of FIFTEEN

THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS.
Defendant-appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.24

As with the lower court, the Regional Trial Court also
relied on Philippine Overseas Telecommunications and
ruled that the one-year prescriptive period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry based on stealth should be
counted from the demand to vacate.25
PLDT then filed a Petition for Review.26 However, in its
January 14, 2014 Decision,27 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower tribunals’ findings. It further ruled that both
restitution of the premises and payment of rents in arrears
must be awarded to Citi Appliance. The dispositive portion
of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the May 13, 2011 Resolution of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The petitioner Philippine Long

Distance and Telephone and (sic) Company (PLDT) is
ordered to realign its transmission lines and restitute to the
respondent Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, the premises
where these transmission lines are located on Lot No. 806-
I. The petitioner is likewise ordered to pay monthly rental
of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) pesos to the respondent
from the date of the last demand that was made on May 28,
2004.
SO ORDERED.28
_______________
24 Id., at p. 143.

25 Id., at pp. 136-143.
26 Id., at p. 48.
27 Id., at pp. 48-61.
28 Id., at p. 60.

528

Citing Elane v. Court of Appeals,29 Ganancial v. Atillo,30

and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications, the Court of
Appeals held that the one-year period within which to file a
forcible entry case based on stealth should be counted from
the time when demand to vacate was made.31
PLDT moved for reconsideration of the Decision. Later,
it moved that a public survey be conducted to determine
the exact location of the underground telephone lines,
cables, and manholes. The Court of Appeals, however,
denied both motions in its July 21, 2014 Resolution.32
Aggrieved, PLDT filed before this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari33 assailing the Court of Appeals’
Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner maintains that the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities had no jurisdiction over the case since respondent
Citi Appliance’s action for forcible entry had prescribed. It
contends that the one-year prescriptive period for forcible
entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the
discovery of the unlawful entry, not from the last demand
to vacate.34
According to petitioner, while there is no exact date

when respondent discovered the underground telephone
lines, cables, and manholes, it may be inferred that
respondent made the discovery sometime before it applied
for the parking exemption. Petitioner contends that the
date of respondent’s discovery should at least be reckoned
from May 22, 2003, when the Cebu City Zoning Board
initially granted respondent’s application for exemption.
Since respondent filed the
_______________
29 254 Phil. 826; 172 SCRA 822 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second
Division].
30 121 Phil. 1249; 14 SCRA 460 (1965) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].
31 Rollo, p. 57.
32 Id., at pp. 65-68.
33 Id., at pp. 14-46.
34 Id., at p. 28.

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VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 529

ejectment suit on October 1, 2004, roughly one (1) year and

four (4) months after it had discovered petitioner’s alleged
encroachment, the action had already prescribed.35
Further arguing that the lower tribunals misconstrued
Elane, Ganancial, and Philippine Overseas
Telecommunica- tions, petitioner asserts that in a forcible
entry case, based on stealth, it is illogical to reckon the
prescriptive period from the date of demand, as it would
render the summary nature of ejectment proceedings
futile.36 It submits that nothing in the cases cited tells that
the one-year prescriptive period must be reckoned from the
date of the last demand to vacate.37 It adds that it cannot be
ejected without being given a chance to exercise its right of
eminent domain or to exercise its rights as a builder in
good faith.38
Petitioner avers that under Article 448 of the Civil Code,
respondent may choose to acquire the installed lines and
cables upon payment of indemnity, but until then,
petitioner has the right to retain the land.39 Hence, it
should neither be ordered to pay rentals nor be

immediately ejected from the premises.40
Lastly, petitioner contends that its lines and cables are
under the sidewalk, not on respondent’s property. It asserts
that a public survey will prove its claim, which was why it
had moved for the conduct of a public survey. Thus, it
submits before this Court that a public survey must be first
be conducted to settle the issue.41
_______________
35 Id., at p. 22.
36 Id., at p. 28.
37 Id., at pp. 24-26.
38 Id., at pp. 29-34.
39 Id., at p. 31.
40 Id., at p. 34.
41 Id., at pp. 37-39.

530

In its Comment,42 respondent argues that petitioner can

no longer raise the Municipal Trial Court in Cities’ lack of
jurisdiction as an issue at this stage of the proceedings.43 It
points out that petitioner, in its Answer before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, only raised the issue of
jurisdiction over its person, not the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.44
Assuming that petitioner’s belated defense may be
entertained, respondent contends that the lower tribunals
correctly ruled on the reckoning point of the one-year
prescriptive period.45 Since respondent filed the ejectment
suit within five (5) months after its last demand to vacate,
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities had jurisdiction over
the subject matter.46
Moreover, respondent argues that petitioner’s claim of
right as a builder in good faith and right of eminent domain
are raised belatedly only on appeal.47
In its Reply,48 petitioner argues that there is no cause of
action for ejectment because the element of prior physical
possession of respondent is absent.49 Contrarily, it is
petitioner who has prior physical possession since 1983,

nine (9) years before respondent became the property
owner.50 Respondent’s Certificate of Title was only issued
on December 22, 1992, and the land had previously been
owned by one Teofilo Pilapil.51
Petitioner stresses that the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities lack jurisdiction as the case was filed by respondent
more
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 182-190.

43 Id., at p. 185.
44 Id., at pp. 185-186.
45 Id., at p. 186.
46 Id., at pp. 186-187.
47 Id., at p. 187.
48 Id., at pp. 221-230.
49 Id., at p. 221.
50 Id., at pp. 221-222.
51 Id., at p. 221.

531
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 531

than one (1) year after the discovery of the alleged

encroachment. Respondent discovered the manhole,
telephone lines, and cables sometime in May 2003; thus,
when it filed the complaint in October 2004, the one-year
prescriptive period had already lapsed.52
As to the reckoning period, petitioner reiterates that
respondent’s argument is illogical and renders the
summary nature of ejectment meaningless, since a plaintiff
can simply make a demand to vacate long after the
discovery to circumvent the one-year time bar.53
Moreover, petitioner again insists on the lower courts’
misinterpretation of the cited cases and on its power of
expropriation and rights as a builder in good faith.54
The issues for this Court’s resolution are the following:
First, whether or not the issue on lack of jurisdiction
was deemed waived by petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company;
Second, whether or not the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities has jurisdiction over the case, subsumed under
which are the issues of: (1) whether or not the element of
prior physical possession is present; and (2) whether the
one-year prescriptive period of an action for forcible entry
through stealth should be reckoned from the time the
unlawful entry is discovered or from the last demand to
vacate; and
Finally, whether or not petitioner may exercise its right
of eminent domain and its right as a builder in good faith.
_______________
52 Id., at p. 223.
53 Id., at p. 224.
54 Id., at p. 226.

532

I

Respondent calls attention to petitioner’s failure to raise
the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter in its
Answer. Such failure, respondent claims, bars petitioner
from questioning the Municipal Trial Court in Cities’
jurisdiction on appeal.
This Court disagrees.
Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and
jurisdiction over the subject matter. These types of
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the
remedy pertains to the court’s competence over the process.
This should not be confused with the relief, that which the
party filing the case wants the court to declare, and which
addresses the breach of the right or obligation.
The source of jurisdiction is important. Generally,
jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of
Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this
Court — the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court
— may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or

interpretation of, in proper cases.55
_______________
55 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) provides:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
. . . .
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure

533
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 533

Meanwhile, the source of jurisdiction over the subject

matter is generally conferred by law.56 This is why the
doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived
by the parties. Laws can only be amended by a subsequent
law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it.
Thus, the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter
can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not simply
because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but
mainly because it is the law that prescribes it.
Parenthetically, “subject matter” in jurisdiction over the
subject matter can refer to: (a) the cause of action, or the
breach of legal right or legal duty; or (b) the res, or the
thing over which the legal right or duty breached subsists.
In forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions, the subject
matter refers to a breach of the general right to actual
possession, which is an attribute of ownership and the res
which is always real property.57
The key to the first issue in this case is, therefore, deter-
mining whether the one-year requirement within which to
file forcible entry or unlawful detainer is provided only by
the Rules of Court rather than by law. Certainly, this
pertains to jurisdiction over the remedy. Generally,
therefore, objections to this type of jurisdiction must be

seasonably made.
In cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Rules
of Court provides the one-year prescriptive period. Under
Rule 70, Section 1, a party may file a complaint for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer “at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession,. . . against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of
_______________
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective

unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
56 Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018, 878 SCRA 1
[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
57 Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814, April 4,
2018, 860 SCRA 283 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

534

possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,

for the restitution of such possession[.]”
The Civil Code also provides the prescriptive period for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits. Particularly,
Article 1147 provides that an action must be filed within
one (1) year.
Nonetheless, as supported in a line of cases starting
from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,58 the equity doctrine provides
that despite the rule that these types of jurisdiction cannot
be waived, the party that should benefit from the dismissal
will be estopped — in equity — from raising it.
In Tijam, this Court held that even though questions on
jurisdiction may not be waived, estoppel by laches
precludes a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when it
actively participated during trial. Thus:
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based

upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of

permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further
said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can-
_______________
58 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].

535
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 535

not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.59

(Citation omitted)

Nevertheless, this Court pronounced in Amoguis v.
Ballado60 that the precedent set in Tijam is based on the
doctrine of equity, which applies only in cases “where
jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the
parties have already gone through long years of
litigation.”61 This Court further held:
Thus, Tijam will only apply when given the

circumstances of a case, allowing the belated objection to
the jurisdiction of the court will additionally cause
irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other
party that relied on the forum and the implicit waiver.
In Tijam, this Court ruled that long delay in raising lack
of jurisdiction is unfair to the party pleading laches because
he or she was misled into believing that this defense would
no longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years in raising
questions on subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by
this Court as estoppel by laches.62

In this case, petitioner is not barred from raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction. It raised the issue when it filed
its Amended Answer with leave of court before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Thus, the issue of the
court’s jurisdiction was seasonably raised.
Nevertheless, even if this Court disregards the Amended
Answer, petitioner’s contention is not deemed barred by
laches since it immediately questioned the court’s
jurisdiction without allowing trial to stretch into years. The
unique circumstances in Tijam are absent in this case. As
we have
_______________
59 Id., at pp. 563-564; pp. 35-36.

60 Supra note 56.
61 Id.
62 Id.

536

noted in Amoguis, raising the lack of jurisdiction a little

under a year, or even after the lapse of four (4) years, will
not operate as estoppel against a party. Thus, as petitioner
seasonably raised the court’s lack of jurisdiction, there is
neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue nor estoppel
against petitioner.

II

An action for ejectment is a summary proceeding meant
“to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right of possession of property.”63 In this
special civil action, the title to the property is not involved.
The only matter resolved is the question as to “who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto.”64
Ejectment suits are designed “to prevent breach of the
peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of
possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain
what he claims is his.”65 They discourage the parties

deprived of possession of property to take the law into their
own hands. Thus, ejectment proceedings are summary in
nature to provide for a speedy settlement and action to
recover possession, and quell social disturbances.66
Pitargue v. Sorilla67 is instructive:
The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants

to public lands is different from the determination of
_______________
63 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 183-184; 362 SCRA 755,
766 (2001) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
64 Id., at p. 184; p. 766.
65 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 580-581; 430 SCRA 492,
512 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
66 Id.
67 92 Phil. 5 (1952) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

537
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 537

who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a

view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and
breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering
restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual
occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another
through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can
never be “prejudicial interference” with the disposition or
alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were
deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of
possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of
the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated,
and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced
between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or
might, not right or justice, would rule.
It must be borne in mind that the action that would be
used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or
conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than
that of forcible entry. This action, both in England and the
United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and
expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet

possession may recover the possession of which he has been
deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its
ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and
criminal disorder. The basis of the remedy is mere
possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal
possession. The title or right to possession is never in issue
in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence
thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of
the possession.68 (Citations omitted)

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governs actions for
ejectment. Section 1 of this Rule provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land
_______________
68 Id., at pp. 12-13.

538

or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or

stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.
There are two (2) kinds of actions that fall under

summary ejectment, namely: (1) forcible entry; and (2)
unlawful detainer.
In the earlier case of Dikit v. Ycasiano,69 this Court made
the distinction between the two (2) actions:
[F]orcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the

material or actual possession of a land or building or of
taking possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, against the will or without the consent
of the possessor; while unlawful detainer is the act of
unlawfully withholding the possession of a land or building
against or from a landlord, vendor, vendee or other persons,
after the expiration or termination of the detainer’s right to
hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied.70
_______________
69 89 Phil. 44 (1951) [Per J. Feria, First Division]. See also

Buenaventura v. Halili Uy, 233 Phil. 20; 149 SCRA 22 (1987) [Per J.
Paras, Second Division]; Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil. 1001; 214
SCRA 216 (1992) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division]; and Cajayon v.
Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648; 482 SCRA 461 (2006) [Per J. Tiñga, Third
Division].
70 Dikit v. Ycasiano, id., at p. 48.

539
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 539

With respect to possession, in forcible entry, the

possession of the intruder is illegal at the outset because
his or her “possession thereof is made against the will or
without the consent of the former possessor.”71 In unlawful
detainer, by contrast, the possession is previously legal but
becomes unlawful upon the expiration of one’s right to
possess the property after, for instance, the termination or
violation of a lease contract.72
Another difference rests in terms of a demand to vacate:
“in an action of forcible entry, no previous demand to
vacate is required by law before the filing of the action,”73
while such demand is required in unlawful detainer.74
This Court reiterated these differences in Sumulong v.

Court of Appeals,75 adding that “in forcible entry, the
plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he
was in prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant,
but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have prior
physical possession of the property[.]”76
For forcible entry, the one-year prescriptive period is
generally reckoned from the date of actual entry on the
land.77 However, if forcible entry is done through stealth,
the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered
the entry.78
_______________
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id., at p. 49.
74 Id.
75 302 Phil. 392; 232 SCRA 372 (1994) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division].
76 Id., at p. 405; p. 383.
77 Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053; 355 SCRA 691, 696 (2001) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
78 Id., citing Elane v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29.

540

In marked contrast, the one-year period in unlawful

detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to
vacate.79
Thus, the three (3) elements that must be alleged and
proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper are the following:
(a) that they have prior physical possession of the property;

(b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the
action was filed within one (1) year from the time the
owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of
the physical possession of the property.80 (Citation omitted)

In this case, petitioner contends that two (2) elements of
forcible entry are absent: first, respondent has no prior
physical possession of the property; and second, the action
was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
This Court agrees with petitioner.

II(A)

In Quizon v. Juan,81 this Court emphasized that the “fact
of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in
forcible entry cases.”82 For an action for forcible entry to
prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove that it was in
prior physical possession of the property before the
defendant encroached on the property.83
_______________
79 Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, 581 Phil. 337, 349; 559 SCRA 363,
371 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
80 Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, 381; 744 SCRA 13, 23-24 (2014)
[Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
81 577 Phil. 470; 554 SCRA 601 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third
Division].
82 Id., at p. 480; p. 611.
83 Id.

541
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 541

Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than

physical or material possession, not legal possession.84 It is
not required that the complainant is the owner of the
property.85 If the issue of ownership is raised, the court may
resolve this question only to determine the question of
possession.86
Here, petitioner claims that when it installed the lines
and cables beneath the property, the property was not yet
owned by respondent. Hence, it concludes that respondent
had no prior physical possession of the property.
However, in ruling that there was prior physical
possession, the Court of Appeals held that the complaint
“contains specific allegations of possession and ownership”87

and referred to respondent’s allegation:
Antecedent Facts

3. The Plaintiff is the lawful, absolute, and registered
owner of a parcel of land, Lot No. 806-I, situated
along cor. Osmeña Blvd. and Sanciangko Street, Cebu
City, covered by TCT No. 123072[.]88

A cursory reading of the complaint shows that
respondent failed to allege its prior physical possession
over the property. It merely submitted proof of ownership
over the property,
_______________
84 Tirona v. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 299; 367 SCRA 17, 29 (2001) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].
85 Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 304, 309; 314 SCRA 525, 529
(1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
86 Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, 449 Phil. 181, 186;
401 SCRA 181, 184-185 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
87 Rollo, p. 52.
88 Id., at p. 53.

542

which is not sufficient to prove prior physical possession.89

As held in Dela Cruz v. Spouses Hermano:90
To prove their claim of having a better right to

possession, respondents submitted their title thereto and
the latest Tax Declaration prior to the initiation of the
ejectment suit. As the CA correctly observed, petitioner
failed to controvert these documents with competent
evidence. It erred, however, in considering those documents
sufficient to prove respondents’ prior physical possession.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but
the possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that
which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a
forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or

actual or material possession, and not one flow- ing out of
ownership. These are different legal concepts under which
the law provides different remedies for recovery of
possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover the possession even
against the owner. Whatever may be the character of the
possession, the present occupant of the property has the
security to remain on that property if the occupant has the
advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a
better right lawfully causes eviction.
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are
not conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the
presumption that no one in one’s right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual or
constructive possession.91 (Citations omitted)

Hence, in claiming that it had prior physical possession
by virtue of its absolute ownership over the land,
respondent is
_______________
89 Dela Cruz v. Hermano, 757 Phil. 9, 21; 754 SCRA 231, 242 (2015)
[Per CJ. Sereno, First Division].
90 Id.
91 Id., at p. 21; p. 243.

543
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 543

mistaken.92 An allegation of prior physical possession must

be clearly stated in a complaint for forcible entry. It cannot
equate possession as an attribute of ownership to the fact
of actual prior physical possession.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to rule that
respondent’s allegation of prior physical possession is
sufficient, the action for forcible entry must still fail for
being filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.

II(B)

Respondent insists on the Court of Appeals’ ruling that
based on Elane, Ganancial, and Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications, the one-year prescriptive period
should be reckoned from the date of the last demand to
vacate.
A judicious review of these cases and jurisprudence,
both old and recent, reveals that the one-year time bar in
forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery
of the encroachment, not from the date of the last demand
to vacate.
In the 1965 case of Ganancial,93 Hilario Ganancial
(Ganancial) filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Leonardo Atillo (Atillo) on April 24, 1961. He alleged that
on February 6, 1960, Atillo occupied his property through
strategy, stealth, and force. When the Municipal Court’s
jurisdiction was questioned, Ganancial argued that the
one-year prescriptive period should be counted from
February 3, 1961, the date when he sent the notice to
vacate.
In resolving the case, this Court ruled that the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment suit
because the reckoning point of the prescriptive period is the
date of dispossession, not the date of demand to vacate. In
so ruling:
_______________
92 Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 130, 140; 546 SCRA 532, 542
(2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
93 See Ganancial v. Atillo, supra note 30.

544

The stand of plaintiffs-appellants that the commencement

of the period, within which to bring the action in the
municipal court, should be from the date of demand to
vacate the premises, is untenable under the facts obtaining
in the case at bar. It is clear from the pleadings that
plaintiffs knew of the dispossession or illegal entry since
February 6, 1960, and they offered no alibi for not knowing

it. . . . Having knowledge of this fact, it stands to reason
that the commencement of the one (1)-year period should
be, as it is, the very date of illegal entry.94

The subsequent case of Elane is not as straightforward.
This case involves an action for forcible entry through
stealth. In ruling that prescriptive period had not lapsed
when the complaint was filed, this stated:
Where forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-

year prescriptive period should be counted from the time
private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from
such dispossession when the former learned thereof. The
records reflect that such discovery and prohibition took
place on February 15, 1980, reiterated thereafter in the
demand letter of March 1, 1980, both to no avail.
Consequently, the one-year period had not expired on
March 6, 1980 when private respondent filed the ejectment
suit with the then City Court of Olongapo City.95 (Emphasis
supplied)

This Court seemed to have been indecisive on the basis
of its ruling in Elane. This was because whether the
reckoning period was from the date discovery (i.e.,
February 15, 1980) or the date of demand to vacate (i.e.,
March 1, 1980), the suit filed on March 6, 1980 was well
within the one-year prescrip-
_______________
94 Id., at pp. 1252-1253; p. 464.

95 Elane v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at pp. 834-835; pp. 830-831.

545
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 545

tive period. Citing Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes,96 this Court

stated the reckoning period should be “from the time
private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist
from such dispossession when the former thereof.”97 This

pronouncement seemingly caused this confusion.
A careful reading of Vda. de Prieto will explain the
inconsistency. In this 1965 case, Consuelo Vda. de Prieto
filed a case for “illegal detainer”98 against Paciencia Reyes
(Reyes). She alleged that Reyes built a house on her lot
through stealth, strategy, and misrepresentation. Upon
discovering the encroachment in January 1952, she sent
Reyes letters to vacate the following month. But Reyes
averred that there was no jurisdiction over the case
because she had been in possession of the lot since
December 1948; hence, when the action was filed in April
1952, the action had already prescribed.99
In ruling that there was jurisdiction, this Court held
that because the intrusion was done through stealth, the
action’s prescriptive period could not be counted from the
date of encroachment in 1948. The ratio of the decision
reads:
It is insisted now that both trial courts lacked

jurisdiction to entertain the illegal detainer suit, because
[Reyes] had been in possession since December 1948, and
the action was started only in 1952; and that it was an error
to consider that the year for the summary action
_______________
96 121 Phil. 1218; 14 SCRA 430 (1965) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
97 This Court in Elane also cited City Mayor v. Chief of Phil.
Constabulary, 128 Phil. 674; 21 SCRA 665 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En
Banc], but City Mayor v. Chief of Phil. Constabulary is not a case of
ejectment, but a case on police jurisdiction.
98 The ejectment case in Vda. de Prieto was an action for forcible entry
through stealth because the defendant’s possession of the property was
unlawful from the start, although the action was erroneously labeled as
“illegal detainer” by the complainant.
99 Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, supra at p. 1219; pp. 431-432.

546

should be counted only from the time the owner learned of

[Reyes’] encroachment.
The contention is unmeritorious. There is a natural
difference between an entry secured by force or violence and
one obtained by stealth, as in the case before us. The owner
or possessor of the land could not be expected to enforce his
right to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue
the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And
to deprive the lawful possessor of the benefit of the
summary action, under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply
because the stealthy intruder manages to conceal the
trespass for more than a year would be to reward
clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful.100
(Emphasis supplied)

In concluding the Decision, however, this Court
erroneously remarked that since there can be “possession
by tolerance,” the prescriptive period must be counted from
the time that there was a demand to vacate. At the very
end of the Decision, it noted:
Besides, since there can be possession by tolerance, this

Court has repeatedly held that possession or detainer
becomes illegal only from the time that there is a demand to
vacate. Hence, the year for bringing the action for illegal
detainer should be counted only from such demand. Since in
the case before us the first demand to vacate was made in
February of 1952 and the complaint was filed in April of the
same year, the plea of lack of jurisdiction has nothing to
support it.101 (Citation omitted)

The carelessness of injecting the concept of “possession
by tolerance” led this Court in Vda. de Prieto to erroneously
mix up rules on forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
_______________
100 Id., at p. 1220; p. 432.

101 Id., at pp. 1220-1221; pp. 432-433.

547
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 547

The discussion on possession by tolerance, which is only

applicable in unlawful detainer cases, was a patent error.
In cases of forcible entry through stealth, there can be no
possession by tolerance precisely because the owner could
not have known beforehand that someone else possessed
his or her property; thus, he or she could not have
tolerated the possession of the intruder. As held in Canlas
v. Tubil,102 possession by tolerance falls under unlawful
detainer because it is a possession that was initially
lawful but later became unlawful when the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with the owner’s demand to
vacate. Thus, in Vda. de Prieto, the reckoning point for
actions for forcible entry through stealth should be the date
of the discovery of the entry, not the date of demand to
vacate.
Unfortunately, this error was replicated in subsequent
cases, including Philippine Overseas Telecommunications.
Nonetheless, subsequent cases have already clarified the
rules on forcible entry.
In Spouses Barnachea v. Court of Appeals,103 this Court
ruled that in forcible entry suits, “the law does not require
a previous demand. . . to vacate the premises, and. . . the
action can be brought only within one-year from the date
the defendant actually and illegally entered the
property.”104
In Dela Cruz,105 this Court held that the prescriptive
period in a forcible entry case is generally counted from the
date of actual entry into the land — except when this entry
was made through stealth, in which case, the period is
reckoned from
_______________
102 616 Phil. 915; 601 SCRA 147 (2009) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third
Division].
103 Supra note 79.
104 Id., at p. 346; p. 371.
105 Supra note 89.

548

the time of discovery.106 Similarly, in Diaz v. Spouses

Punzalan:107
[I]n an action for forcible entry, the following requisites are

essential for the MTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case:
(1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property; (2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (3) the
action must be filed within one (1) year from the date of
actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is
through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the
deprivation of the physical possession of the property. It is
not necessary, however, for the complaint to expressly use
the exact language of the law. For as long as it is shown
that the dispossession took place under said conditions, it is
considered as sufficient compliance with the
requirements.108 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The one-year prescriptive period is a jurisdictional
requirement109 consistent with the summary nature of
ejectment suits.110 In Sarona v. Villegas,111 this Court made
a distinction between unlawful detainer and forcible entry
in discussing the implication of the one-year prescriptive
period for forcible entry cases. It stated:
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to

the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes
the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry
_______________
106 Id., at p. 18; p. 239.

107 Supra note 1.
108 Id., at p. 462; p. 537.
109 Supra note 79 at p. 349; p. 374.
110 Supra note 1 at p. 462; p. 539.
111 131 Phil. 365; 22 SCRA 1257 (1968) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].

549
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 549


is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy

ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.
If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No
matter how long such defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if
we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and
that the one-year time bar to the suit is but in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action.112 (Citation omitted)

Here, a review of respondent’s own narration of facts
reveals that it discovered the underground cables and lines
in April 2003 when it applied for exemption from the
parking slot requirement with the Cebu City Zoning Board.
Respondent’s complaint is telling:
Causes of Action
....
10. In its honest effort to remedy the situation and in
order to immediately start its construction of the building
without removing defendant’s underground telephone lines,
cables and manholes, the plaintiff had applied for
exemption of the required number of parking slots but was
denied[.]113

Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive
period to file the forcible entry suit had already lapsed
sometime in
_______________
112 Id., at p. 373; p. 1265.

113 Rollo, p. 79.

550

April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for forcible

entry was filed on October 1, 2004, the period had already
prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, therefore,
no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the case.

III

Petitioner argues that it should be allowed to exercise its
right of eminent domain under its franchise or its right as a
builder in good faith. In claiming so, petitioner avers that
when it installed the cables and lines underground, it was
acting in good faith, believing that the land was
underneath the public sidewalk. Moreover, transferring the
cables and lines would cost millions of pesos and
inconvenience its subscribers.114 On the other hand,
respondent contends that these arguments were raised
only on appeal.115
The records show that these arguments were already
raised by petitioner in its Answer and Position Paper,116
and were even addressed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities’ Decision.117 Thus, this Court may proceed to resolve
the substantive issues.
On asserting its right as a builder in good faith,
petitioner cited Article 448 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ARTICLE 448. The owner of the land on which anything

has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is
_______________
114 Id., at pp. 29-31.

115 Id., at p. 187.
116 Id., at p. 157.
117 Id., at pp. 129-132.

551
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 551

considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such

case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.

This provision refers to a land owned by two (2) or more
parties, one (1) of whom has built some works, sown, or
planted something.118 Under Article 526 of the Civil Code,
the rule on good faith is used in determining whether a
builder, sower, or planter acted in good faith.119
In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,120 this Court ruled that a
person claiming to be a builder in good faith must be a
possessor in the concept of an owner. Thus:
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a

person assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that
he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be
unaware “that there exists in his title or mode of acquisi-
tion any flaw which invalidates it.” It is such a builder in
good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as
against the real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full
not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful
expenses. On the other hand, unlike the builder in good
faith, a lessee who “makes in good faith useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of
the property leased,” can only claim payment of “one- half of
the value of the improvements” or, “should the lessor refuse
to reimburse said, amount. . . remove the
_______________
118 Pecson v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 313, 322; 244 SCRA 407, 414
(1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
119 Id.
120 245 Phil. 49; 162 SCRA 75 (1988) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

552

improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer

damage thereby.”121 (Citations omitted)

In this case, petitioner’s assertion of right over the
property is not in the concept of an owner. In contrast,
petitioner claims that the property is owned either by the
government or a certain Teofilo Pilapil when it installed
the lines and cables. Thus, petitioner’s argument that it
should be allowed to exercise its right under Article 448 is
untenable.
Moreover, squarely raised in this case is whether the
subterranean portion of a titled property is included in the
rights of the surface owner.
Rights over lands are indivisible. It is well-settled that
the owner of a parcel of land has rights not only to the
land’s surface, but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height.122 Article 437 of
the Civil Code states:
ARTICLE 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner

of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment
to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation.

This principle is embodied in several rules pertaining to
land rights. For instance, Article 438 of the Civil Code
determines that hidden treasure underground belongs to
the owner of the land, building, or property.123 Moreover,
mining rights
_______________
121 Id., at p. 60; p. 85.

122 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 381, 390-391; 160 SCRA 228,
238 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
123 Civil Code, Art. 438 provides:
ARTICLE 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the

land, building, or other property on which it is found.

553
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 553

may be given to a mining applicant despite the surface

being titled to another by government, subject only to
compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim:124
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership

and possession of their properties in the event the latter are
reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.125
(Citation omitted)

In this case, the existence of petitioner’s cables affected
the right of the surface owner to make use of its right to
possess. This can be considered a burden, which may be
removed by forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions.
As to petitioner’s assertion of its right of eminent
domain, this Court finds that this claim cannot be properly
resolved in a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.
“Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right
of the state to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.”126 This power is exercised
by
_______________
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of

another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half
thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall
not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State
may acquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity
with the rule stated.
124 553 Phil. 136; 526 SCRA 149 (2007) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division].
125 Id., at p. 147; p. 160.
126 Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo v. Air Transportation

Office (ATO), 552 Phil. 48, 55; 524 SCRA 679, 686 (2007) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

554

the legislature and may be delegated to local governments,

other public entities, and public utilities.127
In exercising the power of eminent domain, the following
requirements must concur:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the

entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be
under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise
informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.128 (Citation omitted)

Expropriation may be judicially claimed only by filing a
complaint for expropriation. Inverse expropriation is a
claim for compensation by the deprived landowner as a
complaint or as a counterclaim. It seeks to recover the
value of property taken, even though there is no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain.129 Normally, it is
the expropriator — the State — that files the complaint.
Expropriation is a special civil action with a special
bifurcated trial. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson:130
The first is concerned with the determination of

the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the
_______________
127 Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National

Railways, 594 Phil. 10, 27; 573 SCRA 350, 365 (2008) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Third Division].
128 Id.
129 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 671

Phil. 569, 591; 656 SCRA 60, 82 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
130 283 Phil. 446; 206 SCRA 520 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

555
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 555

propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts

involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since
it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing
more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,
would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard.’
The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of
‘the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance
of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order
fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners
would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be
done by the Court regarding the issue[.]131 (Citations
omitted)

An expropriation suit falls under the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court because it is a case incapable of
pecuniary
_______________
131 Id., at p. 465; p. 536.

556

estimation. It deals with the government’s exercise of its

authority and right to take property for public use.132
The right of an expropriator to file a complaint for
expropriation is not allowed in an action such as a forcible
entry or unlawful detainer suit. These actions are
summary in nature. Therefore, in this case, this Court
cannot award expropriation.
Nevertheless, the resolution of this case is without
prejudice to the filing of a separate case for expropriation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
January 14, 2014 Decision and July 21, 2014 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 06366 are
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr. and Hernando, JJ.,

concur.
Inting, J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
Notes.—It is the courts, not the litigants, who decide on

the proper interpretation or application of the law and,
thus, only the courts may determine the rightful
compensation in accordance with the law and evidence
presented by the parties. (National Power Corporation vs.
Manalastas, 782 SCRA 363 [2016])
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means
of
_______________
132 Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, 450 Phil. 521,

528; 402 SCRA 440, 444 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

557
VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 557

protecting actual possession or the right to possession of

the property involved; Thus, as a consequence of the
defendant’s failure to file an answer, the court is simply
tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein. (Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Loo Po, 782
SCRA 465 [2016])

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Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 922 SCRA 518, October 09, 2019

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Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 922 SCRA 518, October 09, 2019

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2/22/22, 8:48 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 922

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 519

the general right to actual possession, which is an attribute of

nature to provide for a speedy settlement and action to recover

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; Same; Possession in ejectment cases

the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 521

relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in

requirements of aerial navigation. This principle is embodied in

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

can be considered a burden, which may be removed by forcible

compensation by the deprived landowner as a complaint or as a

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 523

this Court cannot award expropriation. Nevertheless, the

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in

When PLDT still refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 525

neath a public sidewalk.12 It later filed an Amended

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this complaint for

12 Id., at p. 125, MTCC’s Decision.

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the Municipal Trial Court in Cities found that PLDT’s

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

19 Id., at pp. 130-131, MTCC’s Decision.

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 527

tiff-appellee rent at the monthly rate of FIFTEEN

WHEREFORE, the May 13, 2011 Resolution of the

with MODIFICATION. The petitioner Philippine Long

24 Id., at p. 143.

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Citing Elane v. Court of Appeals,29 Ganancial v. Atillo,30

According to petitioner, while there is no exact date

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 529

ejectment suit on October 1, 2004, roughly one (1) year and

should neither be ordered to pay rentals nor be

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In its Comment,42 respondent argues that petitioner can

petitioner who has prior physical possession since 1983,

42 Id., at pp. 182-190.

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 531

than one (1) year after the discovery of the alleged

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

— may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or

55 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) provides:

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 533

Meanwhile, the source of jurisdiction over the subject

therefore, objections to this type of jurisdiction must be

of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based

is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of

58 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].

VOL. 922, OCTOBER 9, 2019 535

not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.59

Thus, Tijam will only apply when given the

59 Id., at pp. 563-564; pp. 35-36.

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

noted in Amoguis, raising the lack of jurisdiction a little

what he claims is his.”65 They discourage the parties