LABOR (W1-W2)

On Article XIII, Sec. 3 (1987 Constitution):

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. QUISIMBING
FACTS:
 In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court granted the petition
and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996
and December 28, 1996 are set aside.The parties are directed to execute a
Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions
contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of August
19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The
retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of
evidence and determination of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement
fund.
 Among those modified are: Wage, from 1.9k to 2.2.k. Christmas bonus from one
month to two months. Retirees, lone to coops, GHSIP, HMP, and housing loand,
signing bonus, are all granted. Union leave is modified from 40 to 30 days. CBU
includes confidential employees. Contracting out need to consult union first,
retroactivity is from Dec 28, 1996 to Dec. 27, 1999. Modified to from Dec 1 1995.
 Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for
brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
 separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's union (FLAMES 2) of petitioner
corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.
 Court required the "proper parties" to file a comment to the three motions for reconsideration
but the Solicitor-General asked that he be excused from filing the comment because the
"petition filed in the instant case was granted" by the Court.
 Consequently, petitioner filed its own consolidated comment. An "Appeal Seeking Immediate
Reconsideration" was also filed by the alleged newly elected president of the Union. Other
subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties and intervenors.
 The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by
the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for
consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein,
particularly those involving... the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
ISSUES:
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers
through an increase in the rate of electricity.
RULING:
This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be... threatened with such a misleading argument.
An increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument... presupposes that petitioner is capable of
meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support
its position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase.
Section 45 of Rule130 Rules of Evidence provides:
"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so... stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein."
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted
only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision
datedJanuary 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight
for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did
anybody... testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news
items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is
generally regarded as... trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy,
these reports are not admissible.[6] In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available.[7]
With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In
particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that
the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.
  MERALCO and MEWA, in its re-negotiation of the 1992-1997 CBA covering the
remaining period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997, failed to arrive at "terms and conditions acceptable to both of them."
 MEWA filed a Notice of Strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair
labor practices.
 The NCMB then conducted a series of conciliation meetings but the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement.
 Faced with the imminence of a strike, MERALCO filed an Urgent Petition with
DOLE praying that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
to enjoin the striking employees to go back to work.
 The Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order which awarded wage
increase and benefits.
 MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September
18, 1995, alleging that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the
effect of the awarded wages and benefits on MERALCO’s financial viability.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in the
awards he gave to the employees of Meralco?
HELD:
 Every legal power of the Secretary of Labor under the Labor Code that is
attended by grave abuse of discretion is subject to review by the Supreme Court
in an appropriate proceeding.
 Extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor’s award is not limited to a
determination of grave abuse in the manner of secretary’s exercise of powers.
The Supreme Court is entitled to review the substance of the Secretary’s award
when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award.
 Constitutional questions are only answered when the resolution to such
Constitutional question is required. In this case, the question could simply be
answered by asking the reasonableness of the award.
 Thus, the question we have to answer in deciding this case is whether the
Secretary’s actions have been reasonable in light of the parties’ positions and the
evidence they presented. The court found that the Secretary of Labor
disregarded and misappreciated MERALCO’s evidence, in favor of claims that do
not have evidentiary support. MERALCO’s projection had every reason to be
reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first six
months of 1996. On the other hand, the union projection was based on a
speculation of Yuletide consumption that the union failed to substantiate.
 The middle ground approach by the Secretary of Labor for wage awards
constitutes Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack or Excess Jurisdiction
(GADALEJ). The Secretary of Labor disregarded the Meralco projections which
is more reliable than the All-Asia Capital Report which was nothing more than a
newspaper report that did not show any specific breakdown or computations.
 As regards the award of the Christmas Bonus, it is proper. As a general rule, a
bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation but it may granted on
equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been the
company’s long and regular practice. To be a regular practice, the giving of the
bonus should be done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have
been consistent and deliberate.
o The giving of Christmas Bonus has been established as a company
practice since 1988 and the removal thereof constitutes as diminution of
benefits
o The two month special bonus was given only during 1995, hence the
award of the two month special bonus is improper
 The retirement fund is a separate and independent trust fund and these
retirement funds are beyond the scope of collective bargaining.
 Formation of a cooperative is a purely voluntary act and no party is required by
law to set up a cooperative and provide funds therefor. Hence, the Secretary has
no basis to order the grant of a 1.5 million loan to employees.
 GHSIP, HMP amd Housing Equity Loans are benefits that are included in
bargaining matters. These benefits have been extended to employees for a long
period and have become part of the terms and conditions of employment.
 Signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill that
existed in the negotiations that culminated the signing of a CBA. Hence without
goodwill, the ordering of the paying of signing bonus constitutes GADALEJ.
 The integration of the RCR allowance as part of basic salary in past CBAs also
means there is no reason why it would be integrated in the current CBA.
 There is no GADALEJ in reducing sick leave reserve benefit from 25 days to 15
days with any excess convertible to cash at the end of the year. This ruling is
actually more beneficial to MERALCO
 30 days union leave is already sufficient time within which the union can carry out
its union activities
 Increase in High voltage, High pole, and towing allowance is justified because of
the heavy risk the employees concerned are exposed to. It should not be granted
to those who are not exposed.
 Employees holding a confidential position are prohibited from joining the union of
rank and file employees
 Contracting out of work is not unlimited; rather, it is a prerogative that
management enjoys subject to limitations. The employer should act in good faith
and contracting out must not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not be the
result of malicious or arbitrary action.
 Participation and Representation of union members must be present in
committees such as Safety Committee, Uniform Committee, and other
Committees of a similar nature and purpose involving personnel welfare, rights,
benefits, and duties.
  Benefits awarded which are not part of the CBA constitutes GADALEJ
 In the absence of a new CBA, parties must maintain the status quo and must
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement until a news agreement is reached.

DUE PROCESS IN LABOR CASES:

AGABON v. NLRC
DOCTRINE:
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself.
FACTS:
 Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed spouses Virgilio
and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers.
 Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent
refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a "pakyaw"
basis. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing
benefits as Social Security System members.
 Private respondent maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last
known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. Private
respondent's manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone to
tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers involving 40,000
square meters of cornice installation work.
 However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to
perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an
increase in their wage to P280.00 per day.
 When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private
respondent to pay the monetary claims.
 On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals in turn
ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had
abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal valid?
Whether the dismissal violates their right to due process?

DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Yes, the dismissal shall be upheld despite the failure to give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and defend himself. To dismiss an employee, the law
requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

 JUST AND VALID CAUSE

o Yes, the dismissal is valid. It was found that the Agabons did in fact abandoned their
work, said situation is a termination for just and authorized cause under Article 279 of
the Labor Code. ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. — An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and (e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
 Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume
his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination
of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two
factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is
manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has
no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be
shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
 In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an
installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another company
clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship with
private respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they
did not report for work because they were working for another company. Private
respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would be dismissed if this
happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear
intention to sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an
employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be
meted out to him.
 The terminations were for a just and valid cause.
  However, private respondents failed to comply with the due process requirement of notice. In
such a case, the dismissal should be upheld but the employer is liable for non-compliance with
the procedural requirements of due process. Even if the sending of the notice is useless because
the Agabons did not reside in the last known address anymore, such is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address,
which is a written notice specifying the ground of termination and another one indicating the
justification of their termination.

 DUE PROCESS:
 Due Process under the labor code has both substantive and procedural due
process.
 Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment
termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.
Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the
Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department
Order Nos. 9 and 10.27 Breaches of these due process requirements violate the
Labor Code. Therefore, statutory due process should be differentiated from
failure to comply with constitutional due process
 Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while
statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules
protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice
and hearing
 Standards of due process: requirements of notice. - In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed
 I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
of the Code:
o (a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side;
o (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity
to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him;
o c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
 Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
 employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days
prior to the effectivity of his separation
 The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however,
did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to
the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside
there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid
excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the
employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process.

 Review of relevant legal principles:

 The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did
not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be
penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
Due Process Rule.
 In Serrano, the rule on the extent of the sanction was changed. We held that the violation by the
employer of the notice requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a
denial of due process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is ineffectual and
the employer must pay full backwages from the time of termination until it is judicially declared
that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
 After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of
the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine
and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing
so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees,
but to employers as well
 Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights.

ABBOT LABORATORIES V. ALCARAZ

DOCTRINE:
Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that "if
the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the
standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that
a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date
of termination.”
FACTS:
 Petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the publication in a
major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs
Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager), it included the duties and responsibilities.
 Alcaraz - who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at Aventis
Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like Abbott)
– showed interest and submitted her application.
 Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the position which was an item under the
company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department. In
Abbott’s offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a
probationary basis. Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an
electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbott’s Recruitment Officer, petitioner Teresita C.
Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same. petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa
(Misa),
 Her responsibilities were discussed to her during her pre-orientation, including
the handling of some staffs in the company and handling the evaluation of the
probationary staffs in coordination with the HR director. She was also given
copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards
and Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules
(Performance Modules) which she have to apply in her task of evaluating the
staffs.
 Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a probationary
employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least
twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth month from the date of
employment.The necessary Performance Improvement Plan should also be
made during the third-month review in case of a gap between the employee’s
performance and the standards set.
 She was accorded too strict by her immediate supervisor in handling the
behaviours of the staffs when reprimanding them of their misbehaviours, dress
code, moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott officers. On May 15, She was
informed that that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position
of Regulatory Affairs Manager. Next day  she was told that Walsh and Terrible
already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz already resigned
due to health reasons. A week later, she was handed a letter stating that her
services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005. 
 She was given the following reason through a letter: a.) did not manage her time
effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport
 with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain
the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and
article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties.

Respondent felt that she was unjustly terminated and thus filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages. She contended that she should have already been considered
as a regular and not a probationary employee given Abbott’s failure to inform her of the
reasonable standards for her regularization . Labor Arbiter Dismissed Alcaraz’s complaint
for lack of merit. NLRC reversed LA decision, Abbot have committed illegal dismissal.
CA:  Affirmed the ruling of the NLRC

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment.
2. Whether or not Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it
failed to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a
probationary employee.
HELD:

1. Yes. Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment. A probationary

employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. The services of an employee
who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:
a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. Article 295 of the
Labor Code. (b)              Provided that: the employer shall make known to the employee
the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his
engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall
be deemed a regular employee. Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code.

A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the

usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that "if the termination is brought
about by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer
in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is
served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of
termination." As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a
letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on
May 27, 2005. Abbott indicated the job description in the newspaper were they offered
the job to interested applicants. Received employment contract, underwent to pre-
employment contract, training, received code of conduct manual, Alcaraz had previously
 worked for another pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have an "extensive
training and background" to acquire the necessary skills for her job, thus the fact that she
was well-aware of her duties and responsibilities and that her failure to adequately
perform the same would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her termination.

2. Yes. Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed to abide
by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.
The existence of the company policy that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia,
that the job performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the
fifth month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap
between the employee’s performance and the standards set, if any.  In addition, a signed
copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as
basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary
employment.

In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz’s probationary employment
for her failure to meet the standards required for her regularization, and while it must
be further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve a written
notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure rend BBers
the termination of Alcaraz’s employment procedural infirm, warranting the payment of
nominal damages.

The reason that an employer’s contractual breach of its own company procedure – albeit
not statutory in source – has the parallel effect of violating the laborer’s rights. Suffice
it to state, the contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of
the same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been
violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz
because a valid cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on account of Abbott’s
contractual breach is warranted in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code.

On EQUAL PROTECTION:
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION V. GLAXO
DOCTRINES:
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to
when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after
Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
 Later, he signed an employment contract and he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
 Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area and subsequently he entered a romantic relationship
with Betts, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, branch coordinator of Astra in
Albay, a competitor of Glaxo. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives
of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. The two married even
with the several reminders given by the District Manager to Tecson.
 In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave
rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy
should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs.
 Despite several reminders and time allowances, Tecson was not able to resolve the issue on
conflicting interest. This situation eventually led to his alleged constructive dismissal. This is a
petition for review on certiorari assailing CA’s decision and resolution

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an
employee of a competitor company is valid.

2. Whether or not Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was transferred to

a new sales territory and deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars
and training sessions.
HELD:
1. Yes. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy
prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company
is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information
from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships
with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise
 the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company
will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect
its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every
labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management
has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play Also,
Tecson was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract
and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations
therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in
good faith. He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy. Indeed, while
our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in
favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

2. No, constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation

resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present in the case at bar. Glaxo gave
Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial stage,
Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his
employment with the company and on the company’s interests. After Tecson
married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning
from the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed
its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance
and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo
likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of
interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting,
Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province,
Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any
suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo

YRASUEGUI V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

DOCTRINE:
Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection
guarantee.
FACTS:
 Armando Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward for the Philippine
Airlines.
 As mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL, the proper
weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the
ideal weight being 166 pounds.
 In 1984, his weight problem started, which prompted PAL to give him time to
comply with the weight requirement.
 On November 1985, he was allowed to return to work as he lost all the excess
weight. However, the problem recurred and PAL, again, allowed him time to
address his weight. Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given by PAL, he
failed to meet the weight requirement.
 In 1990, he was informed of the decision for him to remain grounded until such
time that he complies with the weight standards. He was directed to report for
weight checks, which he failed to undergo. Petitioner was, then, formally warned
that a repeated refusal to report for weight checks would be dealt with
accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates which he did not
report to.
 In 1992, PAL served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same as some
were even granted promotions.
 In 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain
his ideal weight, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.
 The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view
of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties. Such decision was affirmed by the National Labor
Relation Commission.
 The case was raised to the Court of Appeals ruled that the weight standards of
PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. Hence, petitioner
appealed to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was
illegally dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner was not unduly discriminated
against when he was dismissed while other overweight cabin attendants were either
given flying duties or promoted.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner pointed out names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants but petitioner
failed to indicate their respective ideal weights, weights over their ideal weights, the
periods they were allowed to fly despite being overweight, the particular flights assigned
to them, the discriminating treatment they got from PAL, and other relevant data that
would have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL.
Petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in
the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot
violate the equal protection guarantee

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.[79] We
are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into
play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal
that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of
dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondent's failure to comply."] It
is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his
allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to
indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of
the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."[82]

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are
accorded respect, even finality.[83] The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their
specific and specialized jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of
facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be
reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the
test of arbitrariness.[85]
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty[86] of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.[88] Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which is the source of our equal
protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection
guarantee.[91]