UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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Industrial Limitations and Strategic Issues for the Navv

by

William T. Huebner

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College

in partial satisfaction of the program requirements for:

ADVANCED NAVAL STRATEGIST PROGRAM

(ANSP)

1June2016

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the
U.S. Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
 UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

ADVANCED STUDIES IN NAVAL STRATEGY PROGRAM

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LCDR William T. Huebner, U.S. Navy

Title of Thesis:
Industrial Limitations and Strategic Issues for the Navy
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the requirements of the Advanced Naval Strategist Program. The contents of this paper reflect my
own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.
14. ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the ability of the USN to surge and regenerate forces in response to a
potential crisis in the Western Pacific. A number of potential scenarios are identified as well
as some problems with previous discussions regarding employment of ships in enforcing economic
restrictions in the context of the crisis. Options available to surge forces are examined as are
options to regenerate forces should repair or replacement of platforms be needed. From the
issues identified in surging or regenerating forces implications are identified for both the USN
and u. s. industrial base. Recommendations are then presented to address these implications for
USN investigation into force structure, platform options and industrial base concerns.

1S. SUBJECT TERMS

Shipbuilding, Platforms, Force Generation, Blockade, South China Sea, China

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 Contents Page

Background 1

Employment Construct 8

Surge Options 12

Regeneration Options 20

Implications 33

Recommendations 43

Bibliography 53

iii
 Paper Abstract

This paper investigates the ability of the USN to surge and regenerate forces in

response to a potential crisis in the Western Pacific. A number of potential scenarios are

identified as well as some problems with previous discussions regarding employment of

ships in enforcing economic restrictions in the context of the crisis. Options available to

surge forces are examined as are options to regenerate forces should repair or replacement of

platforms be needed. From the issues identified in surging or regenerating forces

implications are identified for both the USN and U.S. industrial base. Recommendations are

then presented to address these implications for USN investigation into force structure,

platform options and industrial base concerns.

IV
 Background

The United States Navy (USN) has the ability to project power in the Western Pacific

Ocean and China's "near seas." 1 While a seemingly obvious statement, it begs some

questions. The questions are can China challenge that ability, to what end, and when does

the challenge become serious? One of the fundamental and longstanding missions of the

USN has been to protect the sea lines of communications (SLOCs ). This mission is of the

greatest importance in the age of globalization and especially with the recent United States

(U.S.) focus on the Trans Pacific Partnership. 2 With SLOCs as a focus, the natural point of

departure is looking at roles and missions for the USN in relation to its ability to protect and

conversely stop trade in and around the near seas and greater Western Pacific. Though the

U.S. is economically intertwined with China, and war would prove disastrous for both

countries, China's military modernization (and activity especially in the South China Sea)

makes imperative an investigation of the ability of the USN to carry out traditional strategic

missions.

The RAND Corporation has recently published a "scorecard" comparing military

capabilities of the U.S. and China over time and in various scenarios. 3 In this scorecard,

while there are differences between the areas evaluated, a trend is clear: China is catching up

to the U.S. militarily. This should not be surprising, nor necessarily threatening as military

capability to defend national interests logically grows along with a growing economy and

associated national interests. The question that is not yet settled is how China may use its

1
The "near seas" are the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea
2 Rebecca Howard, "Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of negotiations still to come,"
Reuters, February 4, 2016, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-
idUSKCNOVD08S/.
3
Eric Heginbotham et al., The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of
Power, 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015)

1
military to protect national interests, especially if those national interests are not in line with

international norms. The issue of competing claims between the Philippines and China in the

South China Sea now in arbitration 4 may shed some light on how China will respond.

Should China respond militarily to any decision, or perceived provocation, the

responses available to the U.S. are varied. Those responses must be tied to assessments of

the existing balance of power. In the near term, the balance of power significantly favors the

U.S. As the time horizon for this potential military response draws out, China's potential to

shift the balance of power grows. Based on 2015 projections of China's potential fleet in

2030, the balance appears to be at least quantitatively in China's favor. 5 The qualitative piece

of the revised balance of forces, however, would likely remain with the U.S. The RAND

analysis is helpful because it does not strictly limit the assessment to naval forces. To limit

comparison of military power to naval forces alone ignores broader aspects of military power

like air forces and, specifically with regard to Chinese power, artillery and missile forces.

The fact that China is able to project power into the maritime domain through forces

complimentary to the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is balanced by a corresponding

U.S. ability to deploy airpower to the region as well.

Beyond the ability to operate forces in the region, which is not in doubt on either side,

how those forces are used will matter, and there is a broad spectrum of possibilities. The first

possibility is that diplomacy will prevail following relatively low level military posturing

from one or both sides. Any diplomatic agreement will be influenced by the perception of

4
Shannon Tiezzi, "Arguments Open in Philippine Case Against China's South China Sea Claims," The
Diplomat, November 25, 2015, accessed March 14, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/arguments-open-in-
philippine-case-against-chinas-south-china-sea-claims/.
5
Cristopher P. Cavas, "China's Navy Makes Strides, Work Remains To Be Done," Defense News, May 24,
2015, accessed March 17, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/05/24/chinese-china-
navy-naval-plan-warships-shipbuilding-construction-propulsion-power-plant-submarine-aircraft-carrier-
destroyer-frigate/2 7725 00 3I.

2
military strength, and the associated will to use it, by each party in the dispute. The

perceived capability of forces in relation to each other in the region thus matters.

Unfortunately, perceptions of military strength may not be enough to resolve any

confrontation and the escalation to engagement must be considered. Part of this escalation

consideration is how much additional force could be employed in the region quickly, what

will be discussed as surge forces. How any engagement begins matters, but of the scenarios

that follow there remain constants: naval forces will take losses; losses will change the

perceived balance of forces; and how those losses can be reconstituted matters to the longer

term conflict, including perceptions regarding likelihood of success.

One possibility is that following a period of tensions there is a military engagement.

Even if it were as simple as a misunderstanding of intentions between two relatively

insignificant units and the engagement does not immediate.ly escalate, losses must be

considered. An example from the past is illustrative. Imagine a modem equivalent of the

Iraqi attack on USS Stark. It is entirely possible that a pilot under stress could attack an

unsuspecting ship. In this scenario recovering and regenerating would require significant lift

and repair efforts, much like efforts associated with USS Cole following the bombing in

Yemen.

A second possibility is that, should arbitration fail, China could attempt to impose

economic controls in areas it claims in the South China Sea (SCS) with military power. This

position would be counter to U.S. positions and established international norms; it would also

likely drive other countries in Southeast Asia to protest and align with the US. Given this

likely regional alignment with the U.S. against China, military options to restore the status

quo are a possibility. In this scenario China could attempt several options to impose

3
economic restrictions. While there are many options, the difference is primarily between

controlling and destroying shipping. Control necessitates presence and interaction via

surface ships, while destroying shipping by air, missile or submarine attacks does not. Either

potential Chinese course of action presents problems. Surface ships, even the most advanced

PLAN destroyers, are vulnerable to attack by USN as well as regional neighbors' submarine

and air assets should the confrontation escalate. Prior to attacking PLAN ships there would

likely be a proportional response: USN and coalition ships defending shipping, either

geographically or via convoys. This potential situation then reverts to the first possibility, an

unintentional military engagement. Again, like the first possibility, losses in this scenario are

likely. Beyond likely losses the perception of the enduring capability of USN forces to

prevent Chinese control matters, so USN ability to regenerate forces logically does as well.

Consequently, if enough naval power can be surged to the theater is a question of the utmost

concern.

The second part of preventing Chinese control must go beyond defeating that control,

The USN effort must respond t? attacks and potentially be prepared to counterattack to

remove threats to shipping and economic control. Chinese attacks on shipping by any

method risk significant diplomatic objection. In addition, an engagement must consider

potential environmental effects. These environmental effects are likely to impact long term

Chinese interests in the region, and could serve as a deterrent to direct attacks. USN and

allied military forces can project enough power into the SCS to defeat air and submarine

attacks on shipping in the near term. 6 Defeating missile attacks launched from mainland

China, should China accept the consequences, is problematic because of both targeting and

6
This is my opinion, the RAND scorecard assesses a US advantage in conflict around the Spratly's which is
likely analogous.

4
escalation issues. Finding, let alone attacking a mobile transporter-erector-launcher, is

problematic and necessitates some level of penetration of Chinese integrated air defense

systems. The risk of escalation is also significant. While proof that Chinese attacks on

shipping originate from shore may be easy to obtain, the consequences of attacking China

directly are hard to know. While power projection into the SCS, and possibly ashore, is

achievable it comes with risk to platforms of all varieties. Beyond losses, the ability to

generate and sustain forces to defend against attack is a question of concern.

A third possibility is that the US, with or without coalition naval support, may try to

restrict Chinese economic activity. This contingency has in fact been proposed as a strategy

called "Offshore Control" 7 and assessed by multiple authors. While the efficacy of such a

strategy is questionable, as Collins and Murray argue, 8 implementing it still requires

investigation. Beyond a couple of ambiguous mentions, nothing is fleshed out in the offshore

control construct regarding "rented commercial platforms" 9 and "commercial shipping and

helicopters could be contracted to support the distant efforts ... " 10 These concepts must be

investigated as they are crucial to the strategy. If the ability to control Chinese economic

activity is in doubt without these platforms, and there is no recognizable plan to obtain or

employ them, the perception of the plausibility of the strategy may suffer. There are

historical precedents for repurposing commercial vessels, and this expedient may be more

viable as technology matures. Beyond the potential of modified commercial ships, their

defense, as well as any amphibious shipping or other surface platforms, will be required as

7
Thomas X. Hammes, "Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict," Strategic Forum. No.
278. National Defense University Press, 2012.
8
Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, "No oil for the lamps of China?" Naval War College Review 61.2
(2008): 79.
9
Hammes, p 5.
10
Hammes, p 11.

5
China would likely not sit idly by and allow its economic activity to be strangled. The USN

ability to surge and sustain forces for this strategy requires in-depth investigation. Beyond

generating platforms required for offshore control, whether engaged in the actual controlling

or defense of platforms enforcing control, all forces will still face some level of risk and may

take losses.

A final scenario is that of a surprise, or preemptive, attack. Should China perceive a

threat it is within the realm of possibility that a sudden attack could follow in a confrontation.

The effectiveness and severity of an attack may vary, but like the previous scenarios, it is

worth identifying how the United States would be able to regenerate forces after receiving

such an assault. There are a number of potential different attack possibilities, from a

traditional airborne or submarine attack to the relatively recent anti-ship ballistic missile

(ASBM). Assuming an attack works, the spectrum of outcomes varies significantly as well.

One pole of the argument is encapsulated in "How the United States Lost the Naval War of

2015." 11 In this hypothetical scenario, the war is over as soon as it began with the sinking of

one carrier. China creates a fait-accompli following the attack by denying the attack and then

skillfully manipulating public perceptions and the United Nations. While this scenario is

fanciful and implausible, the question of what the U.S. could do following an effective attack

on an aircraft carrier is important because China has the ability to attack a carrier, and may

do so successfully. In what might be termed a worst case scenario, a coordinated attack on

multiple carriers is a possibility. A west coast based carrier approaching the Strait of

Malacca on the way to relieve an east coast based carrier operating in the Middle East and

the forward deployed carrier in the Western Pacific could be attacked simultaneously. This

scenario is within China's capability and could reduce a significant portion of U.S. naval

11 James Kraska, "How the United States Lost the Naval War of2015," Orbis 54.1 (2010): 35-45.

6
capability in the Pacific Ocean in short order. Clearly, how these losses could be replaced

both in the near and long term deserves serious investigation.

These potential scenarios lead to several questions that will be investigated. Broadly

the questions fall into two categories. Those two categories are how to surge forces,

applicable in a scenario where more platforms are required or for short term replacement and

how to generate forces, both new platforms for the longer term and regenerating platforms by

repairing platforms that have been damaged. Problems in both of these categories will lead

to an assessment of implications and associated recommendations.

7
 Employment Construct

In any naval conflict in or around the SCS significant forces will be required. What

those forces entail is the question that must be asked before the follow-on question of "are

the current forces enough?" The graphic above, from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessment's AirSea Battle concept, is illustrative because it highlights the multiple

approaches to China. These multiple approaches are important because they highlight where

forces could potentially be used relatively far from China, to avoid the significant threat

presented by China's land based missile and air forces.

12
Jan Van Tol. et al.. A.irSea battle: A point-of-departure operational conc:ept. Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments Washington DC, 2010, p 77.

8
 The Strait of Malacca is hugely important as a classic "choke point" as so much

international trade flows through it. The ability to control that flow is vital. Should flow to

China through the Strait of Malacca be controlled the next step is to assess where else it

could go, and there are two generic answers. The first is any of the other straits through the

Indonesian Archipelago and the second is around Australia to approach China from the east

rather than the south. 13 These three generic approaches will each require forces to control

flow and by extension combat forces to protect those control forces.

Control forces to deal with any form of trade flow require putting sailors on other

ships in the form of Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). This is manpower intensive

and investigations of the subject drastically underestimates the manpower requirements.

Beyond underestimating the manpower, there are tactical limitations of MIO that rapidly

evolve into higher level factors. Collins and Murray estimated that thirteen surface ships

would be required to board the fifty two tankers passing through the Strait of Malacca every

day. 14 This assumes that each ship could board four tankers in a twenty four hour period.

This assumption is high based on training and the realities of operations from a surface

warship.

USN surface combatants do train to MIO missions to board and inspect vessels, but

the highest level they train to is non-compliant, low freeboard. 15 In trying to control trade in

the Strait of Malacca, or anywhere else around the SCS, neither of those two requirements

are likely to be met in all circumstances which necessitates forces, beyond USN surface

13
Also generically described by Mirski. Sean Mirski, "Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences
of an American Naval Blockade of China," Journal of Strutegic Studies 36.3 (2013 ): 385-421.
14
Collins and Murray, "No oil for the lamps of China?"
15
Non-compliant involves the ship refusing, but not actively opposing. Low freeboard refers to the height a
boarding team would have to climb to board the vessel and low is below 25 feet, a "high freeboard" boarding is
beyond the scope of surface combatant capability. Definitions are from NTTP 3-07.1 IM.

9
combatants. Further, boarding the four tankers per day per ship would exhaust both the

boarding team and the ship supporting the effort. Boarding two tankers per day per ship

would be a more reasonable estimate, if the requirements for a ship supported boarding could

even be met. Halving the number of boardings then logically doubles the number of ships,

thus making a more accurate estimate of twenty six ships, just for the Strait of Malacca.

Maintaining twenty six surface ships on station for this task is already unrealistic and does

not address ships to escort potentially seized shipping, nor does it address the effects of the

manpower drain on a ship if sailors are required to stay on a merchant as a prize crew or even

simple security. Clearly more than the resources of the USN surface combatant fleet would

be needed to enforce any kind of trade control.

A possible solution for these control forces resides in an Amphibious Ready Group

(ARG) 16 , or what has been termed an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB). The Marine

Corps trains to MIO missions with capabilities beyond the scope of shipboard boarding

teams like helicopter insertion. An ARG as the control force in each of the three approaches

to China discussed here is a rough approximation of the ships and manpower that would be

required to control trade initially. As Mirski assessed, the requirement would likely decrease

as time goes on due to streamlining and system normalization. 17 Contrary to Mirski' s

assessment, which was built on the sixteen ship assumption from Collins and Murray, a

sustained effort of three ARGs would tax the resources of the USN.

An acknowledgement that all the authors discussing a blockade have come to is that

forces doing the controlling would require protection. That requirement for defense may

16
An ARG is usually composed of three amphibious ships: one LHA or LHD, one LPD and one LSD along
with the embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (l\tfEU)
17 Sean Mirski, "Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of

China," p. 408 .

10
necessitate offensive action against opposing forces. As currently constituted the striking

power of the USN resides primarily in the carrier air wing (CVW) embarked in the nuclear

aircraft carrier CVN at the center of a carrier strike group (CSG). CSGs as the training and

deployment construct bring the defense required for the control forces as well as the ability to

conduct offensive operations should an opponent attempt to contest at any of the three

approaches to China. Following the ARG construct, this leads to a force of three CSGs

deployed at least initially to ensure protection and allow for offensive action if required.

Three CSGs in three distinct geographic areas aligns with recent force structure analysis

along a "Three Hub" model, and analysis of the three hub model leads to a requirement for

sixteen CVNs. 18 Applying the same construct to ARGs leads to a requirement of forty eight

amphibious ships. Forty eight is far beyond the current USN inventory, but is close to a

recurring number of fifty or greater cited as the number needed to meet worldwide demand. 19

Taken together a 16 CVN and 48 amphibious ship requirement is a huge increase in

required fleet size to maintain three hubs. Even with previous lower assessments, sustaining

the forces required involves a significant number of ships. For example, if you use the same

ratio of CVNs to hubs and try to maintain the sixteen ships Collins and Murray identify as

required, at least eighty-five ships are required to maintain sixteen continuously deployed.

Those eighty-five ships are exclusive of the combat forces associated with CSGs defending

them. Even with a too low estimate of forces, USN assets required should control of trade be

required are significant and likely beyond what is sustainable by the extant fleet.

18
Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton, "Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint
Force, and High-End Conflict," Hudson Institute, October 2015, p. 98.
19
Ronald O'Rourke, Navy LX(R) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues/or Congress,
Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., January 8, 2016, p. 3.

11
 Surge Options

In the scenarios presented in this study, a surge of forces will be necessary. A surge is

different from generating or regenerating combat power primarily in duration: a surge is for a

shorter period of time and temporary, instead of a more permanent buildup of forces. A

surge could result from a number of different actions, ranging from surging USN forces

based on current employment concept, shifting forces from other fleets, employing the U.S.

Coast Guard (USCG) pursuant to the National Fleet Policy, 20 and finally utilization of

inactive ships.

USN surge capability is designed into the operating concept known as the Optimized

Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). 21 The nominal OFRP cycle is 36 months. These 36 months

are broken into maintenance, training, and sustainment. Sustainment, which includes the

scheduled deployment, in each OFRP cycle varies based on the length of the preceding

maintenance and training. In an effort to surge forces, a second deployment within the

sustainment period is possible. 22 Repeated multiple deployments in the OFRP cycle, while

possible, run the risk of returning to a model of deployment that OFRP was designed to

replace. OFRP was designed to enable and require supply based deployments instead of

demand based deployments. Demand based deployments resulted in unsustainable

operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for the USN in what was often referred to as a "tipping

point" 23 of readiness and credible combat power. The USN deployed ships too often, for too

20
ADM John M. Greenert. and ADM Robert J. Papp Jr. The National Fleet: A Joint United States Navy and
United States Coast Guard Policy Statement. June 25, 2013
21
OFRP policy is derived from navy instruction OPNAVINST 3000.ISA and USFFC/CPFINST 300.ISA
22
OPNAVINST 3000. ISA p. 6.
23
Daniel Whiteneck, et al. The Nai:v at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? Center For Naval
Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 20 l 0.

12
long and wore them down. This does not directly translate to a wartime scenario but is

illustrative of a possible risk associated with surging forces. This recent experience diverges

from the extended forward operations that were possible in World War Two. Ultimately the

current USN could surge forces but for a limited duration before wear would degrade

operations, forcing extended maintenance and taking those forces out of the fight.

To limit wear and surge requirements, the USN could draw forces from one deployed

fleet to support another. In a Western Pacific or near seas scenario, the primary fleets for

U.S. to draw forces from would be 4th Fleet, 5th Fleet, and 6th Fleet. 7th Fleet is already

forward deployed in the Western Pacific and 3rd Fleet, while also a Pacific fleet, is primarily

responsible for the training and preparation of forces for deployment. 3rd Fleet's Atlantic

counterpart is United States Fleet Forces Command, which took over the role of the former

2nd Fleet. 4th Fleet and 6th Fleet would be targets for force reduction in support of the

Western Pacific, but would not contribute significantly. Of these Fleets, only 5th Fleet is a

source of significant potential combat power.

4th Fleet has no forces permanently assigned and has recently struggled for platforms,

even lower end platforms, to perform relatively simple missions. 24 This shortfall, primarily

from a lack of USN assets, has been mitigated to some extent by additional USCG

deployments. In the event of surge forces being required in the Western Pacific, 4th Fleet

would likely be the first fleet to lose USN assets and would also likely lose the majority of

the USCG assets assigned as well. The shift of USN assets from 4th Fleet would be

negligible in raising the number of deployable USN assets. The shift of USCG assets, while

significant to 4th Fleet, is dealt with in the construct of employing the USCG as the National

24
GEN John F. Kelly, "Testimony," Senate. Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly United States Marine
Corps, Commander, United States Southern Command. 1141h Cong., March 12, 2015, p. 14.

13
Fleet. What is clear though, is that should forces be needed in the Western Pacific, 4th fleet

will likely lose all USN and USCG assets as the primary threat in the region is narcotics

smuggling, which would be accorded a lower strategic priority in a major confrontation or

wartime.

6th Fleet may be able to provide more forces than 4th Fleet, but with more risk based

on employment of assigned ships. 6th Fleet has five forward deployed ships assigned, 25 but

of those the four DDGs that provide credible combat power are specifically tasked with

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missions. These BMD missions are politically and

strategically important, which in tum means that shifting forces would likely be more

problematic than shifting from 4th Fleet. The strategic difficulty coupled with the minimal

number of assigned ships means that in a Westem Pacific scenario direct contributions from

6th Fleet would likely be negligible. Any expected increase in force availability by trimming

6th Fleet deployments is also small. While 6th Fleet is assigned forces for deployment that

number is generally small. Most forces assigned to 6th Fleet are transitory, either heading to,

or returning from 5th Fleet, 26 where most of a combat power shift would come from.

5th Fleet, as part of United States Central Command has no major naval combat forces

permanently assigned, but has been the focus of deployment for the last several decades

while U.S. forces have been engaged in operations in the greater Middle East. In 2014 the

USN completed a homeport shift of Patrol Coastal (PC) ships 27 to bring the total number of

25
One Command Ship and Four DDGs from: John H Pendleton., et al. Nat)' Force Structure: Sustainable Plan
and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas
Homeports. No. GA0-15-329. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., 2015, p. 84.
26
There is no notional deployment schedule to USEUCOM or USAFRICOM, a deploying or returning strike
group is allocated to USEUCOM for 20 days, of which 10 days is a port visit. USFFC/CPFINST 3001.ISA, p.
32.
27
Sam LaGrone, "Navy Moves More Patrol Craft to 5th Fleet," USN! News, July 10, 2014, accessed March 4,
2016, http://news.usni.org/2014/07/1 O/navy-moves-patrol-craft-5th-tleet/.

14
permanently assigned ships to 14. 28 Those 14 ships include ten PCs and four Mine

Countermeasure (MCM) ships. The remainder of forces assigned to 5th Fleet are rotational,

deploying from either U.S. coast. Generally this has included one CSO and one ARO on a

nearly continuous basis. At the peak of operations CSGs were deployed continuously to the

region. Recently, however, due to maintenance requirements from running CSGs at a higher

than planned OPTEMPO for years, gaps between deployments are developing. 29 These gaps

would be only the beginning in a W estem Pacific scenario requiring more combat assets. 5th

Fleet is the only regular recipient of rotationally deployed CS Gs. 7th fleet has one CSG

assigned, but this is made up of forward deployed forces, a different employment construct.

In a surge situation, the first ability to dramatically increase combat power will come from

the CSG deployed, or scheduled to be deployed, to 5th Fleet. As with 6th Fleet, there will be

strategic consequences for drawing combat power from 5th Fleet, but the increase in power a

CSG deployment shift yields leads to a significant change in the balance of forces. 5th Fleet

will likely be forced to do without a CSG in the near term of a surge scenario. The same

logic applies to the ARO, also usually deployed to 5th Fleet. It is the only viable asset

available to be shifted in the near term surge scenario.

Another option in surging forces is to employ the USCG as part of the National Fleet

concept. USCG ships, while pushing for commonality with USN forces, 30 are not primarily

combat forces, so their methods of employment must be considered. Maritime law

enforcement capability will remain useful through all scenarios, including as part of a major

war but especially in a contested SCS scenario. USCG assets would be viable as both escort

28
John H Pendleton., et al. Navy Force Structure p. 84.
29
Megan Eckstein, "Navy: Half the Carrier Fleet Tied Up In Maintenance, Other 5 Strained to Meet Demands,"
USN/ News, November 4, 2015, accessed March 4, 2016, http://news.usni.org/2015/l l/04/navy-half-the-carrier-
fleet-tied-up-in-maintenance-other-5-strained-to-meet-demands/.
30
ADM Greenert and ADM Papp, The National Fleet

15
and MIO forces in areas where the primary threat is a similar force in either the China Coast

Guard or China's maritime militia. In these usage scenarios, the primary benefit is likely

freeing up USN combatants for higher end combat operations or providing platforms for

enforcement of or protection from economic restrictions.

Within these restrictions, USCG platform numbers matter just like the USN. The

USCG is in the midst of a significant recapitalization program. Older assets are being retired

and replaced by newer and more capable platforms. The older construct of High Endurance

Cutter (WHEC), Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) and Patrol Boat (WPB) is being

replaced by a corresponding construct of National Security Cutter (WMSL), Offshore Patrol

Cutter ( 0 PC) 31 and Fast Response Cutter (WPC).

The highest end USCG capability lies in the WHECs now being replaced by WMSLs.

Of twelve WHECs procured, five remain in service, all based on the west coast. 32 The

WHECs are not being replaced on a one-for-one basis by WMSLs; rather, WMSLs were

expected to achieve more operational availability via rotational crewing. 33 As WMS Ls come

into the force the ability to cover all previous WHEC missions will be tested as the total

procurement of WMS Ls is planned to be eight, of which three are in service. 34 The WHEC

and WMSL classes are roughly equivalent to a low end USN combatant. They have the

ability to protect themselves as well as operate helicopters and boats to perform MIO

missions.

31
The first Offshore Patrol Cutter is not yet under construction and has no designation while all other USCG
assets discussed have official designation, I will use OPC.
32
USCG, "378-foot High Endurance Cutter (WHEC)," April 26, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016,
https://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/378whec.asp/.
33
Ronald O'Rourke, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., January 27, 2016, p. 24.
34
USCG, "National Security Cutter: Program Profile," May 4, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016,
https://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/nsc/features.asp/.

16
 The next tier is USCG platforms are the WMECs which will be replaced by the OPC.

28 WMECs of three distinct types are in service. The first to be replaced by the OPC are

likely the Reliance class of 210 foot cutters built in the mid- l 960s. 35 The remaining 14

WMECs are newer but will require replacement as OPCs are built. Like the larger class of

platforms, slightly fewer of the replacement class are to be built. In this case 25 OPCs are

planned to replace the current 28 WMECs. 36 The OPC should be a significant capability

upgrade as they will be able to embark helicopters, which not all WMECs can do, and

subsequently operate helicopters and boats to perform MIO missions like WMSLs, but with

less capacity. One drawback is that they lack the ability to defend themselves from anything

beyond basic threats.

The final tier of potential USCG employment involves the WPB and replacement

WPC classes. 58 WPCs are planned as direct replacements for WPC's, of which 27 are still

listed as active. 37 15 WPCs are now in service 38 with 58 planned 39 which, in the near term,

will result in additional operational capability. In a SCS scenario, WPCs would be useful in

patrolling and to some extent enforcing economic restrictions. But, like WMECs, they lack

the ability to defend themselves. Further compromising WPC usefulness are the lack of

helicopter facilities, which could limit employment. More critically, their relatively small

size limits range and likely immediate deployment ability. Like PCs, MCMs and WPBs

35
USCG, "210-foot Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC)-Reliance Class," September 1, 2015, accessed
March 4, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/2 lOwmec.asp/.
36
Ronald O'Rourke, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, p. 4.
37
USCG, "110-foot Patrol Boat (WPB)-Island Class," April 21, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016,
http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/l l Owpb.asp/.
38
USCG, "Acquisition Update: Coast Guard Commissions 15th Fast Response Cutter," February I, 2016,
accessed March 6, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/ACQUISITION/newsroom/updates/frc012916.asp/.
39
USCG, "FRC Fact Sheet," October 2015, accessed March 6, 2015,
http://www.uscg.mil/Acquisition/FRC/pdf/FRC. pdf

17
transported to the Persian Gulf, WPCs would likely need to be shipped aboard a larger

vessel. 40

The final way to surge is to reactivate inactive ships. This option is more involved

than any of the previous three but allows for more forces on a relatively short timeframe.

The timeframe is short only in relation to obtaining new construction, which will be

discussed later as part of generating forces, and implies a level of national mobilization. The

USN maintains a force of inactive ships designated as retention assets, specifically as" ... a

reserve of sea power available for future reactivation." 41 Beyond retention assets, there are

other classes of inactive ships which may be of use in a surge situation, specifically ships

designated for Foreign Military Sales (FMS). FMS ships, should the need arise, are also

likely candidates for surge forces as they have been maintained in a condition to transfer and

have been shielded from being stripped to support current fleet operations. 42 Other classes of

inactive ships exist, but as they are already designated for scrap or exercise sinking will not

be addressed as viable surge assets.

Retention assets as of August 2015 43 include one conventional aircraft carrier, one

replenishment ship, three amphibious assault ships, and five amphibious transport docks.

FMS assets include nine frigates. In a SCS scenario, these ships will be useful, at a cost for

reactivation, but they do not provide significant combat power in the absence of other assets,

and they will require significant manpower for activation.

40
Sam LaGrone, "U.S. Navy Trading Destroyers for PCs in 5th Fleet," USN! News, July 3, 2013, accessed
March 5, 2016, http:!/news. usni.org/2013/07/03/u-s-navy-trading-destroyers-for-pcs-in-Sth-fleet/.
41
OPNAVINST 4770.SH, p. 2.
42
OPNAVINST 4770.SH, p. 6-3.
43
This is the latest list available from Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA). NA VSEA, "Inactive Fleet
Inventory," August 18, 2015, accessed March 4, 2016,
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/TeamShips/NA VSEA2 l /lnactiveShips.aspx/.

18
 The manpower is likely the easiest to assess in a surge scenario, based on previous

manning numbers, though developing a crew with all of the specific training required would

likely be difficult. Manpower would likely come from shore and reserve forces and to fully

man these retention assets would require approximately 10,000 Sailors. 44 10,000 Sailors

with relative experience from a total reserve force of over 100,000 45 is possible, but specific

skill sets may be problematic. This implies that a study of skill requirements and those

available in the reserve force, should surge requirements necessitate mobilizing reservists, is

a worthwhile endeavor before the requirement becomes urgent.

Secondary to identifying skills needed is the maintenance the ship would inevitably

require to be viable, and then time to train a crew for operational employment. The time

requirement is notionally six months for an active ship and crew with previous experience. 46

In a surge scenario, a reasonable assumption can be made that some training could be

accelerated. Still, for the case of reactivating a ship with a new crew, six months of crew

training is a reasonable estimate. Six months of training, coupled with maintenance, which

could easily take months, leads to a practicable timeline of eight months to a year until

reactivated ships would be ready for employment.

44
10,000 is estimated from crew requirements of similar ships
45
US Navy data as of May 2016. USN, "Status of the Navy," May 18, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=l46/.
46
CNSP/CNSLINST 3502.3, p. 3-1.

19
 Regeneration Options

Beyond the issue of surging forces in the short term, the problem of how the USN

could generate, or regenerate combat power matters. There are some naval stories that have

worked their way into nearly mythological status and prevent an unbiased view of reality.

The story of the battle of Midway always involves a discussion of how USS Yorktown was

damaged at Coral Sea then heroically repaired in days to make it in time for Midway. That

story ignores the fact that Yorktown was " ... more patched than repaired ... " 47 and as it is

retold ignores that this short timeline was far from the norm. A much longer timeline was the

norm. One illustrative example of many is the battle of Tassafaronga, a part of the

Guadalcanal campaign. Three cruisers were damaged, and all were repaired over a period

spanning nine months to a year, a far cry from the days needed for Yorktown. 48

The second story is that American industrial might was the deciding factor. Like the

first story, this second story ignores significant portions of the historical record, especially

when the assumption is that American industrial effort began following the declaration of

war in December 1941. This ignores significant prewar planning and preparation. This

preparation is often associated with the Two Ocean Navy Act that was passed in mid-1940,

nearly eighteen months before Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war. The Two Ocean

Navy Act increased the" ... authorized strength of the Navy by approximately 70 percent in

the combatant categories." 49 Today that would ~mount to roughly 190 new ships. 50 These

47
Dwight Jon Zimmerman, "Battle of Midway: Repairing the Yorktown After the Battle of the Coral Sea,"
Defene Media Network, May 26, 2012, accessed April 13, 2016,
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/youve-got-three-days-repairing-the-yorktown-after-coral-sea/.
48
Mark Stille, The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013) p. 90.
49 Senate, The Decline and Renaissance of the Navy 1922-1944, Ser 10862, 7gth Cong., 2"d Sess., 1944.

Accessed April 12, 2016 at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/USN/77-2s202.html/.

so 70% of the Battle force count of272 as of April 151 , 2016 is 190 ships

20
authorizations as America was headed toward war were enabled by a conscious " ... prewar

cultivation of a large number of shipyards ... " 51 and still took time to pay dividends. The

significant portion of newly authorized ships did not start reaching the fleet until years later

because of the time it took to build the ships. Until those new ships reached the USN fleets

the relative power of forces and the time line for those new ships was a factor in decisions

made by both sides.

This history, and how it is often misunderstood today, necessitates discussion of the

current capabilities to generate, or regenerate forces. Generation involves the production of

new ships, and regeneration is the repairing of combat losses. Both require significant

industrial capability and in the past have impacted each other. As one example, following

striking a mine USS Samuel B. Roberts returned to Bath Iron Works (BIW) for repair, but the

yard was at capacity for new production so the repair was completed at the secondary yard. 52

Regeneration, as exemplified by repairing Samuel B. Roberts, is complex as well as

time and resource intensive. Several other relatively recent examples from USN history also

illuminate concerns for regeneration of USN assets. Repairing USS Stark following missile

hits, USS Cole following explosive boat attack and even more recently USS Hue City

following a shipboard fire. These repairs span the spectrum from major to relatively minor

but all illuminate aspects of how the USN can regenerate forces.

Samuel B. Roberts was a nearly new ship when she struck a mine in the Arabian Gulf.

She was commissioned in April of 1986 and almost exactly two years later struck the Iranian

mine. 53 Following the mine strike, Samuel B. Roberts was towed into Dubai by Hunter, an

51
George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) p. 182.
52
Bradley Peniston, No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf, (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2006) p. 208.
53
Ibid. p. xiv-xvi.

21
oceangoing, minesweeping tug. 54 Following two months of work in a Dubai dry-dock,

Samuel B. Roberts was loaded onto Mighty Servant 2 a chartered heavy lift ship for a month

long return trip to Newport, RI. Following her return home Samuel B. Roberts required six

months in a BIW dry-dock as part of repair work that took over a year. 55 This time line for

Samuel B. Roberts, eighteen months from combat damage to completion of repairs is long,

but not out of the ordinary. Stark, following Iraqi missile attack, followed a similar timeline

as did Samuel B. Roberts. Stark was hit by two missiles May 17th, 1987 56 and was towed into

Bahrain where repairs began with work by destroyer tender USS Acadia. 57 Following weeks

of repairs in theater, Stark returned to the U.S. under her own power August 5th, 1987 and

then went into the dockyard. Like Samuel B. Roberts, Stark took roughly a year to repair. 58

This trend of at least a year for major repairs continues even in more recent history.

Cole, from the day of her damage in Aden, October 12th 2000, 59 took eighteen months to

rejoin the fleet, and she sailed from her repair period April 19th 2002. 60 Much like Samuel B.

Roberts, Cole dealt with immediate maintenance needs before being transported for final

repair via heavy lift ship. A more recent parallel with Stark is Hue City, following a fire

onboard April 14th 2014. Hue City returned to port under her own power and had to conduct

54
Ibid p. 172.
55
Ibid p. xvi.
56
Jeffrey L. Levinson and Randy L. Edwards, Missile inbound: The attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf,
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 2.
57
Ibid. p. 56.
58
Stark repairs were completed in August 1988. US Navy photos compiled at Navsource Online: Frigate Photo
Archive, accessed April 2, 2016, http://www.navsource.org/archives/07/073 l.htm/.
59
USN, "Cole (DDG-67) 1996-," June 30, 2015, accessed April 11, 2016
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/cole--ddg-67--1996-.html/.
60
USN, "USS Cole (DDG 67) Command History for Calendar Year 2002," accessed April 10, 2016,
http://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/archives/command-operation-reports/ship-command-
operation-reports/c/cole-ddg-67-i/pdf/2002.pdf/.

22
extensive repairs. 61 Those repairs took over nine months 62 and led to Hue City missing her

next planned deployment over eighteen months after the fire. 63

These examples are just a few from the last several decades. Unfortunately there are

more, like USS Princeton and USS Porter, over the same time span and they further

reinforce the conclusion that significant damage to a ship will necessitate lengthy,

complicated and expensive repairs. A related revelation is that in cases of significant damage

repairs on the spot were required even if the ultimate decision was to transport the ship home

by heavy lift for complete repairs. Repairs on the spot were enabled by forward assets, either

available commercial dry docks, or USN repair assets like Acadia.

With the extensive and time consuming repair work involved in regeneration

following damage to a modem surface combatant another question is obvious: how quickly

can new forces be generated? The best option for new forces would be to accelerate current

production; in fact, it may be the only option in the near term as "[t]he 'iron law' of

mobilization is that only equipment already in production can pass into mass production ... " 64

There are two illustrative current USN production lines for this generation: the Arleigh Burke

destroyer production line, which was stopped and then restarted; and, the Virginia attack

submarine line, which was purposely doubled in production.

Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) are the mainstay of the current

USN surface force. They were procured in bulk from 1985 through 2005, before the

61
USN, "Hue City (CG-66) 1991-." July 20, 2015, accessed April 10, 2016,
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/h/HueCity.html/.
62
David Larter, "Report: Cruiser's frightening blaze caused by rags," Navy Times, February 24, 2015, accessed
April 9, 2016, http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2015/02/24/hue-city-fire-at-sea/23747141/.
63
Personal experience from my last command, Carrier Strike Group Eight. USS Hue City had to be reassigned
and was replaced by USS Anzio due to the continuing repair efforts and follow on effects that prevented
required training to deploy on time in October 2015.
64
Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers Revised Edition: An Illustrated Design Hist01y, (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2004) p. 111.

23
production line was stopped in favor of the next destroyer, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class. 65

Following a reassessment, the USN opted to begin procuring Arleigh Burke class ships again

in 2008, which was first reflected in the fiscal year 2010 budget. 66 The lead ship of the

"restart" Arleigh Burkes is USS John Finn and, though authorized in the 2010 budget, is still

under construction. John Finn is nearing delivery to the Navy as she was launched and

christened in the spring of 2015. 67 John Finn will likely be delivered to the USN in 2016

and, following training and certification, be ready to deploy in 2017. While considerable

effort went into the studies and assessments that went into the USN decision to restart

Arleigh Burke production, the timeline is still long: nine years from decision to a ship ready

for tasking.

If the time line for restarting production is nearly a decade, another question is how

long might it take to increase production? The Virginia class is illustrative here. The

original plan was to begin procurement in the middle of the 1990s and shift to more rapid

production in the early 2000s. The shift to more rapid production, however, was delayed

until 2011. 68 From 2011, Congress has funded two Virginia class submarines per year, and

those submarines are still not in service. They are not in service because, even with more

rapid procurement, construction takes nearly a decade. Even using different funding

methods, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has consistently assessed that building a

Virginia class submarine takes " ... about two years of advance work on long-leadtime

65
Ronald O'Rourke, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and issues for
Congress, Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2015, p. 1.
66
Ibid. p. 2.
67
Huntington Ingalls Industries, "John Finn (DDG-113) Christening Information," accessed April 12, 2016,
http://ingalls.huntingtoningalls.com/events/ddg 113 christening/info/.
68
John D. Butler, "The Sweet Smell of Acquisition Success-The Virginia-class procurement program is
surpassing its cost and schedule goals. Here are lessons other programs can learn." United States Naval Institute
Proceedings. Vol. 137. No. 6. 2011.

24
components, and an additional six years or so of construction work on the ship itself." 69 Part

of the cost savings reduction that allowed for producing Virginia class submarines at two per

year was a focused effort at reducing time in construction. A key portion of this reduction

was the shortening of production time in the shipyard to five years. 70 This is much like the

Arleigh Burke class, where the timeline from the decision to fund construction to having the

platform ready to deploy approaches a decade.

A peculiarity in shipbuilding touched on above is "long-leadtime" material (LL TM).

LLTM refers to items funded in advance of the production of the actual platform. These are

often nuclear related or specialty items like main reduction gears. LL TM often also comes

from one manufacturer a "sole-source" of material. Sole-source material makes up a

significant portion of shipbuilding. The aggregate percentage of sole source suppliers for

Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) is over 50%. 71 The Virginia class specifically is at an

even higher percentage as it relies on sole sources for over 75% of suppliers. 72 Sole sources

in any industry are inherently fragile and specifically in shipbuilding" ... has led to increased

prices and longer lead times for some critical commodities." 73 These two related

shipbuilding issues affect both increasing production and starting production as they create a

significant time delay between any decision to increase shipbuilding production and the

effect of that decision. The other side of the coin is that, should production stop, the sole

source suppliers have few options to stay viable.

69
Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues
for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2015, p. 20.
70
Butler and O'Rourke cite different timelines, Butler mentions 84 months, O'Rourke discusses 72 but all point
to reducing to 60 months
71
Information Dissemination, "How long would it take the shipbuilding industry to grow capacity and
throughput if the nation faced a naval crisis or conflict?" June 5, 2012, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/06/how-long-would-it-take-shipbuilding.html/.
72
Mark V. Arena, et al., Why has the cost of Navy ships risen? : A macroscopic examination of the trend~· in US
Naval ship costs over the past several decades. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006) p. 54.
73
Ibid. p. 54.

25
 This material peculiarity of shipbuilding would affect any decision to start new

production, as would another, the workforce. The workforce for building ships draws from

the same pool as repairing ships. HII for example builds new ships and repairs existing

ships, as does National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), a subsidiary of General

Dynamics. The workforce, especially for nuclear work, is limited and cannot be expanded

quickly. It takes between three and five years to develop a journeyman level worker and an

average of eight years for a "fully certified nuclear pipefitter." 74 Once workers are lost, it

takes years to rebuild the capability. For example, following hurricane Katrina, it took HII

several years to return to" ... pre-storm 'normal operations"' 75 due to workforce issues.

With all of these considerations in repairing platforms or building new platforms,

another question is how many ships could be produced by the current shipyards? CRS

attacked this decades ago in Arleigh Burke class research and assessed the maximum

production rate, based on shipyard capacity, is around six Arleigh Burkes per year. This is

divided between both BIW and HII' s Pascagoula yard, with each shipyard able to build three

per year, as well as HII having some excess capacity at that rate. 76 This rate of six per year

excludes the possibility of production at other shipyards, though there is some capability, and

it also does not account for other work at HII at Pascagoula, which consists of amphibious

ship construction.

This maximum production rate ignores the potential need for different kinds of ships.

Which ships to build is a difficult decision and, as identified in the shifting between modern

74
Information Dissemination, "How long would it take the shipbuilding industry to grow capacity and
throughput if the nation faced a naval crisis or conflict?" June 5, 2012, accessed March 30, 2016,
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/06/how-long-would-it-take-shipbuilding.html/
75
Ibid
76
Ronald O'Rourke, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress,
Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1994, p. 58.

26
destroyer types, takes nearly a decade to bear fruit. This long time horizon has strategic

consequences. If any decision is wrong, it takes a long time to adjust the process. This

process length coupled with so few viable shipbuilding companies means that naval

shipbuilding today must be looked at holistically because it is not realistic to expect that a

shipbuilder can survive with a pause in the process of building ships. In.effect the USN and

U.S. shipbuilding industry are at a point where they have to keep building what is in

production until the next design is ready or the entire industry may implode.

The implosion of the industry may sound alarming, but the Navy has realized it and is

sounding the alarm. Some have gone further. the respected analyst Dr. Eric Labs has termed

it a "fiscal Pearl Harbor" noting that" ... hard choices are coming and the Congress and the

nation must be prepared to make them." 77 Those choices included what to design, then build,

along with where to do it. All of these choices have to be made with the survival of the

industry in mind. These decisions, in turn, will affect both the generation and regeneration of

forces as the shipyard capabilities are intertwined. Beyond the "fiscal Pearl Harbor"

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Sean Stackley testified that some shipyards are" ... about a

single contract away from being what I would call 'not viable. "' 78 With these gloomy

assessments of the future, the criticality of active Navy participation in decisions of what to

build, and where, becomes obvious.

With the relative fragility of U.S. shipbuilding and long lead times, should the need to

regenerate forces arise other options would be to utilize foreign yards for repair or purchase

ships from other countries. The political limitations on this potential course of action are

77
Eric J. Labs, "A Fiscal Pearl Harbor." United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 142. No. 2. 2016.
78
Sydney J. Freedburg Jr. "Half Of Shipbuilders 'l Contract Away' From Bust: Stackley," Breaking Defense,
March 18, 2015, accessed April 4, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/half-of-shipbuilders-l-contract-
away-from-bust-stackley/.

27
problematic to assess for multiple reasons. First and foremost, the domestic political arena

drives production and repair to U.S. yards. Not only must the yards be American, but they

must be American owned which drives creative arrangements. For example BAE Systems

Inc. is an American subsidiary of BAE Systems, a British company. This arrangement, in

conjunction with a "Special Security Agreement," allows BAE Systems Inc. to operate as a

subsidiary, but effectively independent part of BAE Systems. 79 Austal USA is another

example of a creative arrangement. Austal, an Australian shipbuilder, began operations in

the U.S. in 1999 and first expanded concurrently with the USN selecting Austal to design a

variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 80 Austal was a shipbuilding company with a

history of work in aluminum high speed ferries, and so a natural fit for a potential LCS

variant. Austal USA was a way to have an American company do work in an American

shipyard.

Austal and BAE are both examples of using creative arrangements to harness foreign

expertise and comply with American political requirements to build ships entirely in the US.

A potential option for the USN used by other navies is to split construction, with most

fabrication completed in a foreign shipyard and finished domestically. Australia is using this

option to build two amphibious ships in Spain and finish them in Australia. 81 The shipyard

Australia used, Navantia, has also completed full ships for foreign buyers. Norway used this

option for the Fridjtof Nansen class frigates. 82 In any stenario requiring regeneration, these

options may need to be considered. Navantia built the Fridjtof Nansen class ships to a design

79
BAE Systems, "Special Security Agreement," accessed April 5, 2016, http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/our-
company/about-us/bae-systems--inc-/special-security-agreement/.
80
Austal USA, "Our History," accessed April 5, 2016, http://usa.austal.com/our-history/.
81
Royal Australian Navy, "Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD)," accessed April 6, 2016,
http://www.navy.gov .au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd/.
82
Norwegian Armed Forces, "Fridtjof Nansen-class," accessed April 6, 2016,
https ://forsvaret.no/en/facts/equipment/fridtj o f-nansen-class/.

28
similar to the Spanish Alvaro de Bazan class frigates, which incorporate the Aegis system

used in all USN large surface combatants. N avantia would thus be a potentially appealing

builder.

The capability to build a ship for the USN is perhaps the lowest bar in actually

obtaining the capability in a generation scenario. While it is a potential option, it is not likely

because several hurdles would have to be overcome. First, getting U.S. Congressional

appropriations to spend potentially billions of dollars overseas when there is an equivalent

U.S. industry would likely require an existential threat to the survival of the U.S. To threaten

the survival of the U.S. in anything other than an unlimited war is unlikely. Secondly,

wherever the U.S. were to pursue building ships would have its own political concerns.

Those concerns drive the scenario to one of two conclusions, either a reluctance to be

involved in the scenario and risk reprisal, or a commitment alongside the U.S. in which case

shipyard capacity would likely already be utilized for domestic use. This logic applies not

only to the potential construction but also to potential U.S. acquisition of extant ships, they

would likely be unavailable, or already utilized.

With the previously identified difficulties in both U.S. and foreign shipyards.

Alternate options to generate naval forces must be considered. One likely potential option

for alternate forces lies in containerized modular systems. These systems have been trialed

in the past, and to some extent are in use today. Some examples are the Arapaho system

from the early 1980s and today's LCS in the USN or similar efforts in the Danish Navy. The

LCS was built around the concept of modularity, with much of its specific capability

designed to be quickly swapped in or out via containerized systems.

29
 The Arapaho system was designed to allow helicopter operations from any container

ship. It was trialed in the early 1980s by the USN then the Royal Navy leased it in 1983 and

operated it in RF A Reliant through the mid 1980s. 83 Arapaho consisted of 59 containers and

could be loaded in under twelve hours with everything needed to operate helicopters. The

installation included" ... the flight deck, hangars. Crew quarters, galley, aviation fuel,

ordnance, power supply, maintenance shops, and even administrative offices." 84 While this

sounds similar to the infamous Atlantic Conveyor, the intent was different. The intent with

Arapaho was for continued operation whereas the intent for Atlantic Conveyor was a

transport for ferrying aircraft. 85

Using the logic of Arapaho and Atlantic Conveyor, a full conversion of a commercial
•
ship might have potential. Again this has been investigated in the past. In this case, the

conversion of a container ship to an AFSB. Following the successful use of USS Kitty Hawk

as an AFSB Maersk was contracted to explore the idea of creating an AFSB .86 The AFSB

design Maersk and the USN pursued has impressive specifications and was designed to be

installed in a contracted S-class container ship in approximately twelve months. 87 It allowed

for significant sustained aviation operations and support of embarked personnel through

containerized systems. This AFSB concept was not pursued beyond the design stage.

The current USN implementation of containerization is arguably less successful than

the previous experiments, though it is already in serial production as the LCS. The idea

83
Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Vol II
1946-2005, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007) p. 391-392.
84
Ibid. p. 391.
85
Think Defence, "The Atlantic Conveyor," accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/the-
atlantic-conveyor/.
86
Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A Hist01y of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Vol 111946-
2005, p. 390.
87
Stephen M. Carmel, "A Commercial Approach to Sea Basing-Afloat Forward Staging Bases" United States
Naval lnstilllte Proceedings. Vol. 130. No. 6. 2004

30
behind LCS was to have a relatively inexpensive ship in which added capability could be

embarked via mission packages. Continued problems with mission packages have led to

questions regarding the whole LCS program and have resulted in the USN backing away

from full modularity, with a late 2014 decision to move from a focus on modular capabilities

to a focus on organic multi-mission capability. 88

While the USN has had trouble integrating modular concepts, it does not mean the

idea is without merit. It has been executed effectively by the Royal Danish Navy (RDN) in

the form of the "Standard Flex" (STANFLEX) concept. 89 The RDN STANFLEX concept

and associated platforms, especially in the form of the related Absalon and Iver Huitfeldt

frigate sized vessels, have often been held up as examples the USN could learn from. 90

While there are significant differences between the RDN and USN concepts, modularity

itself presents interesting options especially when coupled with proven commercial

technology.

One area where modular commercial technology stands out is in the offshore

industry. Proven modular solutions that fit the standard container footprint range from

berthing and sustainment modules to workshops, control centers and data centers. 91 Beyond

the offshore industry similar solutions were used in the Maersk AFSB concept and

containerized solutions have been standard in U.S. efforts ashore in both Iraq and

88
Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2016, p. 40.
89
Naval Team Denmark, "Standard Flex Concept," accessed April 11, 2016
http://www.navalteam.dk/index.php?id=8/.
90
Megan Eckstein, "What the U.S. Navy Could Learn from Danish Frigate Design," USN/ News, March 5,
2015, accessed April 11, 2016, https://news. usni.org/2015/03/05/what-the-u-s-navy-could-learn-from-danish-
frigate-design/.
91
Think Defence, "A Ship that Still Isn't a Frigate, Roles and Modules," accessed April 11, 2016,
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/a-ship-that-still-isnt-a-frigate/roles-and-modules/.

31
Afghanistan. Containerization is a proven concept and has already been adapted for use

afloat.

The second piece of the puzzle in an alternate platform option based on

containerization is the platform on which to mount it. Again the offshore industry has

already pioneered these vessels. The generic term Offshore Support Vessel (OSV) covers

many specific vessel subtypes, but in general they are ubiquitous and reconfigurable.

Installing modular capabilities on such an OSV is already common practice for the industry

and has been leveraged by firms employed in naval training. 92 Given the proven capabilities,

more development along this line could easily lead to formalized naval implementation.

92
Sea Owl Group, "Navy Training," accessed April 11, 2016, http://www.seaowlgroup.com/navy/navy-
training-solutions.html/.

32
 Implications

Given the.problems identified in the potential employment environment and those

identified in how the U.S. could surge or regenerate forces, some implications become clear

that should frame USN thinking going forward. A potential near seas conflict with China

would stress the USN as it is constituted today, especially as today's force is not necessarily

trained or equipped for some of the mission. Today's force also lacks organic capability for

forward repair that has been critical in past conflicts. Repair at home is also challenging,

given competition for resources in shipbuilding tied to force generation, and both aspects of

shipyard employment take significant time. These problems imply that, in a sudden conflict,

the time line will be on the order of years to repair any initial damage. This factor then leads

to questions of risk in employing the fleet and questions of how to bridge the gap that the

industrial requirements of naval war impose, or if it is even possible to repair damage in a

timely way. All of these factors ultimately lead to worldwide political implications.

As today's USN is constituted, it would certainly be stressed, and may not be capable

of imposing economic restrictions around the SCS should it be tasked to do so. Previous

assessments of how the USN may impose these restrictions did not adequately assess the

realities of the tactical execution. Those realities imply that, should the USN be tasked to do

so, it likely could not effectively impose economic restrictions on China for any length of

time around the SCS. It cannot do this because surface combatants are not manned, trained,

or equipped to conduct extensive MIO missions against the likely required targets. A

potential source of the manpower to do this, the USMC, is not broadly trained for the mission

and is further limited by the traditional constraint of employment from amphibious ships.

Even should the training for potential MIO operations be overcome on the military side, there

33
would also be a downstream requirement to operate large commercial vessels, which neither

the USN nor the USMC train to operate. This requirement would in turn likely mean a

reliance on civilian mariners (CIVMARs). Those CIVMARs are already in short supply and

concern exists about their future. 93 A potential need for CIVMARs could result in a need

going unmet, with repercussions in the military naval forces or the overall scenario planning.

A second implication is that, should any sort of damage be taken by ships in the

Western Pacific, forward repair assets would be important for repair and subsequent

regeneration of forces. In the most recent U.S. experiences tenders, tugs and heavy lift ships

have played critical roles as have dry docks. In the 1980s in the Persian Gulf, the destroyer

tender Acadia was a critical enabler for both Stark and Princeton. Though Acadia was

clearly valuable, no destroyer tenders remain in USN service and only two submarine tenders

remain, USS Emory S. Land and USS Frank Cable in Deigo Garcia and Guam respectively. 94

Tugs were also critical in moving damaged ships, as exemplified by leased tug

Hunter towing Samuel B. Roberts. 95 One important conclusion is that tugs would be

necessary should any form of damage be encountered in the Western Pacific, and today the

USN has four ocean-going tugs operated by Military Sealift Command (MSC). 96 Another

potential platform are the four rescue and salvage ships in MSC service. 97 This total force of

eight is insufficient for any scenario involving heavy combat and losses. Using leased tugs

93
Robbin Laird et al., "Challenges for Military Sealift Command: The Distributed Fleet," Breaking Defense,
February 18, 2016, accessed April 17, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/challenges-for-military-
seali ft-command-the-distributed-fleet/.
94
USN, "United States Navy Fact File- Submarine Tenders-AS," November 19, 2014, accessed April 16,
2016, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display .asp?cid=4200&tid=2400&ct=4/.
95
Harold Wise, Inside the danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-1988 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2007) p. 78-79.
96
USN, "United States Navy Fact File- Fleet Ocean Tugs -T-ATF," March 20, 2012, accessed April 16, 2016,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display .asp?cid=4625&tid= 1OO&ct=4/.
97
USN, "United States Navy Fact File - Rescue and Salvage Ships - T-ARS," March 22, 2012, accessed April
16, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4625&tid=150&ct=4/.

34
has worked in the past, but is a potential vulnerability that should be considered in planning

for a Western Pacific scenario.

Heavy lift ships have routinely been involved in modern naval repair efforts as well.

Both Samuel B. Roberts and Cole were returned to the U.S. for ultimate repair on heavy lift

ships. Should a ship suffer extensive damage, it is likely that heavy lift would be required to

get the damaged ship back to the US. Beyond lifts for repair, heavy lift ships have been used

to move smaller ships like PCs to forward deployed locations. In a Western Pacific scenario,

should PCs be needed, or USCG WPCs as part of the National Fleet, it is likely that they

would be moved by heavy lift as in the past. This continued dependency on heavy lift ships

implies that they will be needed again in the future, but unlike tugs they are not ubiquitous.

Heavy lift ships are not nearly as available as tugs and may be far from a potential conflict so

should be another planning factor for a Western Pacific Scenario.

Commercial dry docks were also utilized in the Persian Gulf and, while that option

may be available in the Western Pacific, the scale of the theater is drastically different.

Getting a damaged ship hundreds of miles in a relatively protected body of water is different

than the thousands of miles that may be required in the Pacific. Beyond the problem of

getting ships to commercial dry docks, there is also a political factor in that expecting

commercial docks to be available assumes that the interests of companies and countries are

aligned with U.S. interests.

These last two forward repair assets, heavy lift ships and dry docks pose a potential

problem in that while there are relatively few of them, the USN relies on them. More

specifically the USN relies on the ability to contract them on relatively short notice. This is a

potential vulnerability as it is entirely possible that the assets could be contracted elsewhere

35
when the USN would require their service, either by happenstance or a coordinated effort.

Agents not aligned with U.S. interests could contract these assets to limit their availability to

the USN prior to a potential conflict. This implies a need for the USN to work with other

branches of the U.S. government to prepare a legal case to seize these assets. Beyond just

identifying and acquiring these assets they will need to be protected as, given their criticality,

they would likely become targets in a conflict scenario.

A third implication is that, assuming damaged ships can get back to the US, a

relatively small number of damaged ships· would increase the demand on shipyards quickly.

This potential spike in demand on the shipyards could not be met immediately by the extant

workforce, nor could the workforce be grown quickly. The inability to rapidly grow shipyard

capacity means that absent a change in policy significantly before a conflict, the capacity of

the shipbuilding and repair industry will be lagging demand. This lag will present tough

choices for the USN writ large. It is possible that a form of triage will be required to

determine not just if a ship is worth repairing, but a second tier decision of whether the ship

is worth repairing in the context of the limited shipyard capacity. This second tier question

may lead to answers like a ship is worth repairing, when the shipyard has the capacity, but it

is not worth repairing now at the expense of completing a new construction ship on time.

Another answer may be identifying the minimal level of repair to accomplish in the shipyard

to get any damaged ship back as a functioning part of the fleet at reduced capability. This

limitation imposed by the time required to expand shipyard capacity will require active

management of when and where to repair damaged ships assuming the first tier decision that

repair is a worthwhile option.

36
 These time limitations in both construction and repair lead to a fourth implication. In

the event of a conflict, the USN will likely fight with the extant inventory of ships for the

duration of the conflict. This is unlike World War Two in that then, as result of

congressional action before the U.S. entered the war, the industrial base was already in action

and expanding. Today the industrial base is barely hanging on and cannot expand quickly.

This means that, in the context of a major conflict, the USN will not be getting any new high

end platforms like DDGs soon. Not having an option for rapidly replacing significant losses,

if at all, leads to questions about the level of risk that the USN will be willing to take in

employing any platform.

As one example, DD Gs have been procured at a rate of two per year and the USN

continues to plan to the standard of two large surface combatants per year. 98 Given that

projection, assuming no extant ships are decommissioned, a reasonable question is what

missions are worth the potential loss of a DDG or two, the entire yearly procurement? This

threshold is likely fairly high. When the timeline is longer, like for a CVN where the

measure is years per CVN vice ships per year, the missions assigned and associated risk

calculations could lead to an even higher threshold. As history has shown, significant

damage will take a ship out of the fight for a year or more, so what missions are worth

risking not having a ship available for the next year? It is likely that should tensions rise,

commanders wary of this inability to replace ships would avoid risking ships of any kind and

husband resources in the form of ships. Should a commander lose a ship, and be unable to

replace it, risk avoidance will likely become a priority, entailing a reprioritization of ship

employment and shedding missions.

98
U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction ofNaval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016," Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, CNO, March
2015, p. 6.

37
 Risk avoidance with platforms that are hard to replace leads to another question: what

platforms could be risked? It seems that barring an exceptionally worthwhile target or very

low probability of incurring damage, extant ships may not be risked. This realization may

call the entire concept of using surface combatants to enforce economic restrictions via MIO

into question, or alternately drive a requirement to launch significant attacks to attrite any

potential opposition first which drives further risk and escalation assessments. This situation

could be described as a brittle fleet instead of a resilient fleet. This brittleness leads to a need

for alternate platforms that could be risked in the near term, or alternate concepts of operating

the fleet that institutionalize risk and the possibility of losing ships for extended periods of

time.

With the realities of risk and the time lines associated with regeneration of forces via

the industrial base a question of how to bridge the near term gap, likely of years, before USN

fleet could be increased by traditional means becomes obvious. A potential answer to this

gap given the current fleet structure is militarization of commercial assets. This was

exercised primarily for shipping vice actual combat by the United Kingdom via the Ships

Taken Up From Trade program during the Falklands conflict. The United States Maritime

Administration tracks and maintains a similar capability for shipping, but does not deal with

potential combat tasking.

Another possibility is a return to a concept of a mix of high end and low end

platforms in the USN. The "high-low" concept was implemented by then CNO Admiral

Zumwalt for multiple reasons in the context of the times, but one argument that has parallels

99
with today's risk environment is that made specifically for the sea control ship (SCS). One

argument for the SCS was that" ... the Navy's most important ships could withdraw from the

99
ADM Elmo Zumwalt, "High-Low," United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. I 02. No. 4. 1976.

38
front lines and deploy out of the reach of an enemy first strike ... " 100 Though this was

focused toward aircraft carriers, this logic remains viable today as it appears that all ships

could be labelled "most important" because of their relative scarcity and the inability to

replace them. Today there do not seem to be any ships viable for risking via forward

presence. This shortfall argues for a potential new platform or concept of employment.

A further possibility to mitigate the risk of employment of extant naval forces is to

have a plan in place for short timeline replacement of combat damage. A mechanism to do

this if institutionalized in fleet planning may result in a different force structure. One way to

mitigate the timeline and associated risk of replacing a ship is to have a spare ship effectively

ready for employment. Something along the lines of building two ships with the intention of

operating one is clearly neither logical nor affordable, but there may be a potential middle

ground that builds resiliency back into the fleet. The seeds of this possibility are in the

current cruiser modernization plan. 101 Cruisers needing modernization are inducted into a

modernization period with much reduced manning while new systems are installed.

According to the Commander of Naval Surface Forces, this plan helps with" ... saving

money, preserving force structure, and generating options for leadership." 102 This is a middle

ground between keeping the cruisers fully manned through years in the shipyard and fully

divesting of the cruisers by shifting them to an inactive status. Instituting something like the

cruiser modernization plan for other portions of the fleet may be a way to build institutional

resiliency and surge capacity but would likely come at the expense of extant platforms in

front line deployable service.

100
Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Vo/ 111946-
2005, p. 294.
101
Tenets of cruiser modernization are from: OPNAVINST 9000.6.
102
MC2 Phil Ladouceur, "USS Cowpens Holds Cruiser Modernization Induction," September 28, 2015,
accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display .asp?sto~_id=9 l 258/.

39
 Any potential alternate design, force structure or employment of forces will be limited

by political realities both domestically and internationally. One of these realities is that the

first naval mission is to "defend the homeland." 103 An attack on the U.S. homeland by

maritime means, however, has not been a credible threat in decades. Should a threat against

the homeland become a possibility it will drive choices in resource allocation. This resource

allocation will extend beyond the USN, to include the USCG. Absent a credible threat, the

USN does not spend significant time planning to deploy forces to protect the homeland,

rather focusing on other missions like "defeating aggression" 104 and what has come to be

termed as power projection. Given the potential force requirements identified previously, a

question of risk that the USN has not grappled with recently comes to light: what level of risk

in defending the homeland is acceptable should forces be needed elsewhere to achieve

victory?

In a major scenario today, force requirements in the Western Pacific may force a

choice between projecting adequate power for the scenario and keeping forces available for

homeland defense. This choice goes beyond the USN and includes the employment of the

USCG in the National Fleet construct. What risks there may be in employing USCG assets

in a wartime scenario cannot simply be encapsulated in the opportunity cost of USCG cutters

being employed overseas vice in more traditional homeland missions. These risks in

employing both the USN and USCG in a demanding scenario and potentially accepting risk

in defending the homeland is a reality that the USN must articulate, but that decision will

necessarily be beyond the scope of military decision makers.

103
U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 2 t"' Centwy Seapower,
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, March 2015, p. 2.
104
Ibid.

40
 A second political scenario touched on previously is the relationship with enduring

allies, specifically North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. Should a major

scenario take place in the W estem Pacific, weighing the need for deploying permanent 6th

Fleet assets or reducing transitory presence in 6th Fleet against the potential for increasing

Western Pacific forces will be a politically sensitive decision. While there is a standard

argument that unimpeded use of the global commons is in the interests of NATO nations,

realities of the security situation closer to home also play a part. Decreasing U.S. forces

would likely require a corresponding increase in NATO forces, or an assumption of risk in

the Atlantic and Mediterranean. In the face of a recently more assertive Russia, these risks

cannot be taken lightly as a decrease in NATO forces may enable Russian adventurism.

NATO nations are doubly important if any consideration is to be given to employing an

allied multinational force in the W estem Pacific or potentially sourcing USN assets from

European naval inventories or shipyards. It is illogical to assume that European naval assets

would be available for a multinational force on the other side of the world if there is a

credible naval threat closer to home and recently Russia has been that credible threat close to

home. This threat closer to home implies that NA TO allies may already need more naval

platforms than they have available. This also leads to a conclusion that NA TO allies would

be unlikely to support USN efforts in a potential conflict far from European waters.

Finally the political environment in Southeast Asia must be a prime consideration,

especially as the USN is apparently accepting reliance on existing commercial assets in

forward dry docks, lift ships and tugs. Forward repair has always been a factor in prolonged

naval conflicts and with minimal organic USN assets the need to obtain this ability locally

will be crucial. This reliance on available forward repair assets to be contracted is obviously

41
important, but only part of the Southeast Asian political dynamic. A- scenario that involves
even potential conflict with China is manageable with Southeast Asian partners. Without

those same partners any Western Pacific scenario becomes vastly rriore problematic. Should

nations in the region align against the US, it is entirely possible that China could impose its

will in its near seas and deter the USN from intervening as the cost to do so would rise

significantly without local partners.

42
 Recommendations

These recommendations address the fleet itself, the industrial base, potential alternate

platforms and ultimately how these all interact and inform risk in employing the fleet. None

of these recommendations necessarily stand alone, since implementing a solution for one

may alleviate issues in another realm. However, until that happens, the makeup of today's

fleet and industrial base, especially in combination, leave the USN in a vulnerable and

potentially catastrophic position. That position, and why it is this way, along with the

associated risk must be studied. Once studied and understood, the current position of the

USN, specifically what it cannot do, must be communicated so that American leaders can

make informed decisions about the USN in the future.

The USN, and when the USCG is included, the national fleet, remains the most

powerful force afloat. How long it will maintain that title is an open question. Even as the

most powerful force afloat, the fleet cannot accomplish all of the taskings set out for it. From

"carrier gaps" in the Middle East to deployment extensions becoming routine, the signs are

already showing that the fleet is stretched too thin. In effect there is already no reserve

capacity, all of the capacity the USN can generate is used on a daily basis. This is in

peacetime.

To address this reserve capacity shortfall the Navy should investigate a fleet structure

keeping less ships fully active, a counterintuitive possibility to build resiliency back into the

fleet. Many navies, including the USN in the past, have traditions of keeping significant

fleets in an inactive status and reactivated them in preparation for or response to a crisis.

Instead of inactivating ships as is current practice something along the lines of the previously

discussed cruiser modernization, where ships are effectively taken out of service for a period

43
of years and minimally crewed while significant upgrades are conducted is a better template.

Having a reserve of ships in a similar status, while not paying for full crew and operations,

may allow for more scalable and sustainable options to surge forces. I acknowledge that to

execute this now would likely mean reducing commitments for ship employment so is

probably not politically viable but this architecture should be assessed, if only to identify the

potential usefulness and then used as an argument going into the future to keep a viable stock

of ships that would be available in a relatively short timeframe should a conflict come about.

While this is what the extant retention assets are for, the current assets available do not

provide a fleet that substantially adds to offensive power in a surge or enables regeneration in

the event of combat losses. It appears as if the extant retention assets woufd be only viable

for use as transports which may not be an actual need in a conflict. This current weakness in

the reserve of sea power that the retention assets make up argues for keeping a larger and

more capable reserve in the future.

This lack of reserve problem becomes even more pronounced when the discussion of

a potential course of action, imposing economic restrictions, is discussed. Some of the extant

literature examining this scenario uses a low estimate of the time and manpower required. In

my estimation, any form of long term economic restriction would require significant

manpower that is not available from most USN platforms. To address this problem, the USN

should investigate operating amphibious ships as AFSBs with a focus on implementing

economic restrictions. The extant ARG construct does not have the forces to do this. There

is potential in the USMC forces afloat in the ARG, but translating that potential into an

ability to conduct the mission would require significant training of Marines, Aviators and

Sailors.

44
 There is also the issue of who might operate a ship seized as part of economic

restrictions. This issue may go beyond the realm of uniformed personnel and involve

merchant mariners who are familiar with operating merchant ships, as there are significant

differences from the military platforms USN sailors are trained to operate. This is a

secondary part of the investigation of using amphibious ships as AFSBs. What personnel

would an AFSB need to transfer or support on seized ships to enforce economic restrictions?

Another path the USN should investigate, potentially in the same economic restriction

context, is the reactivation of inactive ships. I have estimated a timeline previously in this

paper, but it may well be optimistic. The USN should pursue a real investigation into what

would be required to bring designated retention or FMS assets back into active service. At a

minimum this should identify and recommend actions along three important lines: what

people are needed and where they would come from, what maintenance would be required to

get assets ready for service and how long it would take, then finally how long it would take

to turn the people and the ship into a credible unit capable of executing tasking.

A final recommendation with regard to the employment and structure of the fleet in

carrying out the mission of enforcing economic restrictions is for the USN to study how it

would deal with potential casualties. In every recent effort to deal with damaged naval forces

the availability of tugs, dry-docks and heavy lift ships has been crucial. Tugs would likely

not be an issue due to their ubiquity. The ability to repair a ship in the theater, at least to a

point at which it can return to the U.S. for ultimate repair, is far less available. Heavy lift

ships, should forward repair not be an option, are also far less available than tugs. It is naive

to assume that as a potential maritime conflict draws near, the U.S. could simply contract for

these assets at will. As both of these kinds of assets have proven crucial in the past, their

45
availability, specifically how the USN could guarantee it in the future, should be identified

ahead of a crisis.

Assets crucial in the past apply beyond just forward repair, they apply in the repair

and construction of all naval platforms. The efforts of repair and construction associated

with World War II have passed into mythology. That mythology, combined with a lack of

significant naval threats for decades, has allowed the USN and the U.S. shipbuilding industry

to drift into a precarious position. As mentioned previously, some shipbuilders are in

tenuous positions and may be forced out of business. 105 A recent example of this is at HII,

which has had to lay off over I 000 workers because of contract timing. Though HII intends

to hire them back in 2017 that is a significant disruption in the lives of the workers. 106 While

HII will remain viable, there is a reasonable chance that many of those workers may not

come back and a new cycle of training unskilled workers will begin.

Whether laid off workers come back or not is but one of the problems in the

shipbuilding industry. It takes years to train a skilled shipyard worker, assuming that they

have places to work. Should the nation decide for a major shipbuilding program, like World

War II, the shipyard capability no longer exists in the US. While there are still shipyards in

the US, only a few have experience, or facilities, to build warships. There are four shipyards

building surface combatants. BIW and HII are the largest by far and have the most

experience. Austal and Fincantieri build variants of the LCS. They have limitations,

however. Austal is primarily an aluminum fabrication yard and so would have to investing in

105
Sydney J. Freedburg Jr. "Half Of Shipbuilders 'l Contract Away' From Bust: Stackley," Breaking Defense,
March 18, 2015, accessed Aprii 4, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/half-of-shipbuilders- l-contract-
away-from-bust-stackley/.
106
Christopher P. Cavas, "Interview: Mike Petters, President and CEO of Huntington Ingalls Industries,"
Defense News, May 17, 2016, accessed May 18, 2016,
http://www.defensenews.com/storyI defense/naval/ships/20 16/05I15 /ship building-newport-news-huntington-
ingalls-industries-hi i-m ike-petters-submarine-aircraft-carriers/84259232/.

46
both training and facilities to build ships out steel. Fincantieri, because of its location in the

Great Lakes, has potential difficulties with building larger ships. Both of these problems

could be overcome, but not without time and expense.

These four yards are nowhere near the capability that U.S. industry had before World

War IL Destroyers procured in 1938 were from four private and five government owned

yards. 107 A follow on procurement of 25 Fletcher class destroyers in 1941 stressed even this

capability and " ... required the expansion of shipbuilding facilities in both naval and private

shipyards, as well as the addition of new private yards." 108 Today no government yards build

ships, warship construction is far more limited, and to make matters worse there are very few

yards that build anything comparable to modern warships. This current situation is

drastically different than World War II, when the U.S. still had a robust shipbuilding industry

and warships were far less complicated. Beyond the shipyard workers and physical

shipyards, the whole shipbuilding production chain is specialized. With sole source and

LLTM issues, there is the distinct possibility that even if the shipyard capacity could be

improved the ability of subcontractors could not keep up.

These restrictions on capacity throughout the shipbuilding industry, including

subcontractors, should be the focus of a study to determine how quickly the shipbuilding

industry could expand to meet USN orders should a significant increase in building be

required. This study will likely find that without prior planning and investment it would take

years to expand the industry, and some subcontractors would not be able to keep up. Those

contractors who could not keep up should be the focus of investment, or potentially drive

investment to the creation of a redundant or competing capability, to enable the potential

107
Robert F. Sumrall, Sumner-Gearing-Class Destroyers: Their Design, Weapons, and Equipment, (Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press, 1995) p. 23.
108
Ibid., p. 27.

47
increase in capacity. This study of the industry should be used to guide a follow on

mobilization study. A study of what is possible, given the current U.S. industrial base, in the

near and longer term futures would be useful to guide force structure and budget discussions,

as well as the risks associated with decisions in this sphere.

As discussed previously with regard to the timelines in DOG production that these

recommended studies would clarify, should the need for more platforms be identified there

will be a lag of some years following the decision to build. I have touched on some possible

methods to increase platform numbers previously. More work, however, needs to be done.

An extant option that has not been executed is the identified conversion of a Maersk

container ship to an AFSB. The USN should move forward with executing one of these

conversions. While it entails cost, it is a low risk option and a specified part of the

conversion process should include capturing lessons learned. These lessons learned will then

inform further decisions regarding actual cost, timelines, and potential employment

constructs. All of these lessons will allow decisions, should the need to expand platform

numbers arise, based on hard data instead of speculation.

A second option the USN should pursue in the near term to identify potential

capabilities is the naval employment of modular, or containerized systems on extant vessels.

Like pursuing the AFSB conversion the focus should be on capturing lessons learned and

what is possible to enable decisions based on actual experience. This option fits well with

the times and has a high potential upside for low cost. Part of the low cost is tied to the

extant markets where OSV s are being laid up in large numbers as demand remains weak. 109

Suppliers of OSV s have even been trying to capitalize on the market and assist in converting

109
Marcus Hand, "Large-scale OSV lay-ups not enough to stabilize market," Seatrade Maritime News,
September 22, 2015, accessed May 11, 2016, http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/large-scale-osv-lay-
ups-not-enough-to-stabilise-market.html/.

48
extant OSVs for other uses. 110 OSVs are available now at relatively low cost and provide an

excellent platform to begin experimenting with. Experimentation now will be able to

identify what is viable going forward, what is not, and what investments could enable more

viability.

The AFSB and OSV possibilities are both in the same vein of identifying what is

possible with extant vessels and technology to allow informed decisions. Together they are

the path forward for the shortest term increase. Another path should be investigated focusing

on a slightly longer timeframe, but still before production of high end naval platforms could

increase dramatically. For lack of a better term, and because this suggestion is analogous to

previous studies, the USN should study a "mobilization platform." This mobilization

platform study should tie to the industrial study as the mobilization platform would have to

be built in what are now commercial yards with no experience in warship construction.

While a mobilization platform would obviously be of lesser capability than a DDG, having

sufficient numbers of any platform is always an issue. A mobilization platform to execute

lower level missions would reduce tasking on high end platforms, like DDGs, that may take

them away for missions they are best suited for and allowing the overall force to be more

effective.

Studying what potential there is in commercial yards, and then studying a potential

mobilization platform tie to understanding what is possible with the extant industrial base.

The cost of these studies in negligible in the overall context of the USN budget. They will be

worthwhile in the returns in the form of a better informed discussion and plan. Following

the studies, an actual design for a mobilization platform is another effort the USN should

110
Offshore Support Journal, "OSV players venturing into new markets," April 7, 20I6, accessed May I I,
2016, http://www.osjonline.com/news/view,osv-players-venturing-into-new-markets_ 4248 I .htm/.

49
pursue. For a limited investment now, the design could be completed and ready for

production. Admittedly, there is a possibility that this would never be used and the money

spent could be declared a waste. That is a risk that the USN should accept as the alternative

of not having an option could be disastrous. The time savings achieved by having a design

ready to go may be decisive. While this dances around Friedman's "iron law" of

mobilization referenced previously, it would mitigate problems the LCS program has dealt

with in starting to build before the design was complete.

Ultimately all of these recommendations revolve around mitigating risk. What I have

identified throughout this thesis is that the extant USN and national fleet, while extremely

capable, is stretched in its day to day operations. If more were asked in a wartime scenario it

would be even further stretched and may not be appropriately trained to execute some

missions. Beyond the extant fleet there is very little ability to surge forces, and the industrial

base has a limited capability to regenerate forces should more be needed and the timeline to

do so would be on the order of years, even if it were not stressed by repairing ships at the

same time.

All of this leads me to see the extant USN fleet as brittle. Brittle in the sense that it is

not tolerant of damage and so will lose effectiveness quickly in a conflict. This has serious

ramifications in how the force is structured and employed. For the structure, the

recommendations above will help to identify paths forward in what decisions need to be

made, aIJd what costs the USN should pay now to mitigate risk if a conflict becomes more

likely. Further they help to establish the framework of a plan should the USN have to

increase platform numbers rapidly in or out of a conflict, as building more platforms will take

years.

50
 What the recommendations have not yet addressed is the risk in employing the fleet.

Risk exists in everything a navy does. Managing risk is fundamental in employing the fleet.

A fleet, or any part of it, cannot be employed in a potential combat scenario without risk.

What level of risk is acceptable in employment depends on a multitude of factors that are

related to each other. Employing the fleet in defense of the U.S. homeland against an

existential threat would necessarily result in accepting higher risk than for employing _that

same fleet in pursuit of ambiguous goals only tangentially related to U.S. interests.

With a brittle fleet, as I see the USN currently, casualties and the risk associated with

those losses should be a significant factor in all employment decisions. Without the ability to

recapitalize platforms rapidly, there is likely a higher bar for risking them, or at least there

should be. To this end, the USN needs to investigate the amount of attrition it can take,

relative to any adversary, and still achieve victory at sea. A recent study identified that even

with six CVW s flying in support of a Taiwan scenario, they would not be able to match

numerically the air forces that might be sent against them. 111 While this necessarily ignores

many other factors in generating airpower, this scenario illustrates that, even deploying six

CVW s and the carriers to support them, is likely beyond the capability of the USN.

If I am correct and six CVWs are beyond the capability of the USN, the question is

what level of risk, both to forces deployed in a conflict scenario and to actually achieving

U.S. national ends in the conflict, is acceptable? Even to begin answering these questions,

the USN should pursue studies and wargames into potential conflict scenarios, as I have

looked at briefly here in the SCS and more broadly. These games should focus on risk.

What missions might mean losing a DDG is an acceptable risk? When is losing a carrier an

111
Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton, "Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint
Force, and High-End Conflict," Hudson Institute, October 2015, p. 44.

51
acceptable risk, or is it? Beyond the platforms, conditions of inability to win a conflict must

be investigated. In the scenario I presented involving a successful ASBM attack on multiple

carriers, what risk does the USN, and the nation as a whole face in responding?

While the results of these studies, and why those results occurred, would likely be

classified, the USN must be able to identify what it can and cannot do with the current and

projected fleet. Beyond the identification, these limits must be communicated to decision

makers. Without communication of risks, the USN is allowing the nation to continue to

expect what may no longer be possible.

52
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