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Metaphorical Iconoclasm
Metaphorical Iconoclasm
Metaphorical Iconoclasm
and the Reflective Power of Metaphor
A glance at the history of the natural and human sciences shows that their
development has been bound up with a broad critique of colloquial language as
imprecise and figurative, and therefore unsuited to the new demands of clear
and distinct cognition. Metaphor and analogy became seen as an expression of
mistaken and magic thinking, as religious and scholastic atavism, and as
improper use of language. Thus Bacon criticised the mythic-mimetic principle of
similarity and the 'idols' arising from it as pure illusions of perception that only
fuddle the mind. As Foucault has shown, Bacon's criticism was taken up by
Cartesian rationalism and transformed into a general debasement of the
principle of similarity:
The similar, which was for a long time a fundamental category of knowledge at
once form and content of cognition found itself dissociated in an analysis
based on terms of identity and difference. [ ] Similarity is no longer the form of
knowledge, but instead the occasion of error, the danger to which one exposes
oneself when one does not examine the poorly-illuminated place of confusions.5
In order to restrain the discourse of similarity, rationalistic discourse employs
the principle of identity as well as processes of elimination, control and
discipline. Thus the endless proliferation of discourse based on countless
analogical and metaphorical links can be tamed and cut back. For this reason,
rationalistic discourse has been embedded in criticism of language from its very
beginning: the discovery of the 'naked truth' calls for the un-covering of things,
for stripping away their linguistic veil, so that the 'light of truth' can shine.
Precisely during the baroque age, when metaphorical and allusive language
reached its apogee, modern rationalism tried to eliminate the imprecision of
natural language by developing an unambiguous terminology of its own, with
literal, definite and proper meaning. For this reason, Thomas Hobbes declared
metaphor, together with ambiguity, deception and insult, to be 'abuses of
speech': In Leviathan he argued that metaphor necessarily misleads cognition
since it uses absurd conclusions. Therefore Hobbes demanded that language
be cleansed of persuasive and figurative elements. Only by using nothing but
unambiguous, literal language could knowledge be gained and communicated
properly:
For this reason, science must use words as precisely and clearly as possible
and must avoid all kinds of linguistic abuse, such as expressions that are
unclear or without content; unstable or ambiguous meanings; confusion of
words and things; mispredications; and finally rhetorical and metaphorical
speech. Only then can scientific language offer strict definitions that correspond
to things and are based on constant meaning. Thus Locke not only denied the
possibility that rhetoric and metaphor can convey truth, he also blamed them for
being the actual causes of deception and untruthfulness: "It is evident how
much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful
instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught
and has always been held in great reputation."8
Emphatic iconoclasm and the call for a literal, metaphor-free language remain
central claims of modern philosophy of language and linguistics: fixation on an
ideal of literal definiteness and clarity, and criticism of the ambiguity of figurative
language have not only become basic tenets of philosophy; they have also
been persistent motifs in the attempt to replace natural language by ideal
language and a semantics of literal meaning. In this way, the difference
between scientific and natural language is equated with the difference between
proper and improper language and with the difference between literal and
metaphorical speech.
From the perspective of metaphor theory, it has often been remarked that the
opponents of metaphor are completely unable to implement any kind of
metaphor-free language and that their arguments are therefore inconsistent.12 In
fact, the language of the opponents of metaphor is no less rich in metaphor than
is the language of its supporters. For instance, the philosophy of truth,
knowledge and cognition is based on an irreducible and metaphysical root
metaphor: the metaphor of light. As Derrida and Blumenberg have shown, this
metaphor cannot be transcended because it constitutes its object in the first
place:13 truth and cognition are unthinkable without the light metaphor. There
can be no metaphor-free realm within which the discourse of truth and cognition
could develop independently of this root metaphor. Such irreducible, 'absolute
metaphors', as Blumenberg calls them, cannot be translated into non-figurative
language; they are 'basic elements' [Grundbestände] of philosophical language
and therefore an 'inexhaustible catalytic sphere' for the formation of concepts.
This means that underneath the surface level of obvious pedagogical-illustrative
imagery there is always a deeper layer of fundamental metaphors, which control
even the logic of seemingly non-metaphorical discourse and therefore lie in the
blind spot of theoretical reflection.
To this end, the obvious surface imagery is separated from language that is
based on hidden, fundament al metaphors and projected into the margins of
academic discourse. Precisely this strategy of dissociating and excluding
surface metaphors constitutes the basic distinction by which rationalistic
discourse gains its ostensible literal essentiality in the first place. The visible
level of surface metaphors thus functions as a protective layer that obscures the
underlying deeper level of fundamental metaphors. That is why the struggle
against metaphor is actually less about banishing all metaphor from academic
discourse, than about controlling and disciplining surface metaphor, taming its
suggestive power, and cutting back its proliferation. Only with this disciplinary
procedure can metaphor be used as a criterion of difference between natural
and academic language. As Derrida points out, all theoretical discourse on
metaphor can be interpreted as a disciplinary process which, ever since
Aristotle, has continuously classified and limited metaphor.14 Metaphorological
discourse has ritually repeated, confirmed, and inscribed the difference between
literal and figurative language onto the discursive praxis of human, natural, and
social sciences. Through this process, a dichotomous scheme of parallel
polarities emerged and has remained effective until today:
academic
literal proper rational philosophy masculine
language
natural
metaphor improper irrational rhetoric / poetics feminine
language
A resolution of the paradox first emerges with the ascertainment of the reflective
function of metaphor, namely with its redefinition from a disruptive factor that
threatens the order of literal discourse as a semantic anomaly or as a
categorical mistake, to a reflective factor that permits the order of language to
be reflected and recategorised. Only in this reflective function can metaphor
become what Christian Strub calls the "linguistic kernel of a post-analogical
ontology of modernity", in which the contingency of ontological distinctions and
categories becomes known and can be reflected by means of metaphor.18 The
difference between literal and metaphorical speech then remains a pragmatic
one, which can be determined only from concrete contexts. Metaphor
introduces a meta-linguistic level in opposition to the ostensibly literal level of
linguistic reference to objects, which reflects this literal level in a specific way.
By transgressing the boundaries of the literal and thus reflectively thematising
them, metaphor can be said to have a reflective structure.19
The usage of a metaphor with validity claims thus implies both the possibility
and the necessity of metaphor reflection. Here, the difference 'literal versus
metaphorical' is less decisive than the difference 'mythical versus metaphorical'
insofar as myth results from taking a metaphor too literally and thus reifying
language. Metaphor becomes myth when it is considered to be the one and
only invariable truth, instead of a possible, fallible truth. That is, metaphor
becomes myth when it is anchored so deeply in conviction that it can no longer
be called into question.22
Thus reflection upon metaphor does not entail converting metaphorical speech
into literal speech. Instead it requires a determination of the difference between
myth and metaphor; this means distinguishing the 'as-if' status of metaphor from
the unquestionable certainty of myth even where metaphor is unavoidable and
irreducible, as in the case of absolute metaphor. Only metaphor reflection that is
both self-referential and context-referential and that reflects the broader sense
of a metaphorical expression can prove the truth of metaphor and thus rationally
legitimise its use.23 In the same way that every actual consensus about truth
remains open to revision without losing its unconditional validity claim, the
metaphorical redescription has the status of an 'as-if' predication and
nevertheless can assert a truth claim: As Berggren points out, metaphor is a
"counterfactual statement" that possesses a "possible or counterfactual truth".24
The rationality of the metaphorical redescription has to be measured by its
adequacy. Adequacy can be determined by comparing the new metaphorical
description with previous descriptions of the object and by interrogating it for
new perspectives and insights. However, this reflective process of catching up
with the metaphor's implications is possible only retrospectively and within
argumentative discourse concerning the reflection of both metaphorical
anticipation and metaphorical myth. Thus metaphor must prove itself in the
language-game of truth.25
The idea of assessing the rationality and truth of metaphor through critical
reflection upon metaphor, however, is itself based on the fundamental optical
metaphors of light, mirror and observation. The metaphorical roots of reflection
thus deserve closer consideration. One could say that the light of truth cannot
be recognised directly but needs to be refracted and mirrored from different
angles.26 This indirect recognition is necessary not because the light of truth is
too bright (as Plato believed) but because the mirror allows selection and
comparison. Reflecting a metaphor from different angles means creating new
views on this metaphor, and thus introducing both new distinctions into
interpretation and more distance from the metaphor. Although the blind spot of
observation, as such, remains insuperable, it is possible to overcome the blind
spot of a particular observation by changing the position and the basic
distinction of the observer.
Changing position and distance does not imply a reduction of the evocative and
imaginative power of metaphor. In other words: metaphor reflection is not meant
to be a procedure of metaphor control and surveillance but instead an operation
that broadens understanding by opening up new perspectives and points of
comparison. This requires that reason act not as a Foucaultian observer in the
centre of a cognitive panopticon27 but rather as a Socratic traveller who
constantly changes position and perspective by wandering through the network
of metaphorical associations and connections and by creating new relationships
or abolishing old ones.28 Metaphor reflection is in itself a metaphorical process
of transference and interference.
Footnotes
3 For the general discussion, see Ortony, Andrew (1979)(ed.): Metaphor and
thought, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. <back>
4 For a broader and more detailed discussion of the rationality of metaphor, see
also Debatin, Bernhard (1995): Die Rationalität der Metapher. Eine
sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung,
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. <back>
5 Foucault, Michel (1966): Les mots et les choses, Paris: Gallimard, p. 68 and
65, my translation. <back>
12 See e.g. Moore, F.C.T (1982): On taking metaphor literally, in: David Miall
(ed.), Metaphor: problems and perspectives, Brighton: The Harvester Press, pp.
113, de Man, Paul (1978): The epistemology of metaphor, Critical Inquiry 5, 15-
30, Nieraad, Jürgen (1977): "Bildgesegnet und Bildverflucht" Forschungen zur
sprachlichen Metaphorik, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp.
88ff., and Ledanff, Susanne (1979): Die 'nackte Wahrheit' in metaphorischer
Beleuchtung, Sprache im technischen Zeitalter 68, 282289. <back>
17 De Man (1979): Allegories of Reading, New Haven/ London: Yale UP, pp.
110 and 115. <back>
22 See Berggren (1963), Ricoeur (1975: 310ff.), Shibles (1974), Bühl (1984:
151ff.) Köller (1975: 224ff.) and Nieraad (1977: 26ff.). <back>
25 Bühl, Walter L. (1984): Die Ordnung des Wissens, Berlin: Duncker und
Humblot, p. 158. As in the operational pragmatic notion of truth, the
determination of a metaphor's truth is retrospectively oriented, a process of
explaining it hermeneutically. We can say only in retrospect to what extent a
truth claim be it literal or metaphorical can be sustained in the long run. <back>
26 Here one could ask, too, what mirror is used and then, as philosophy has
traditionally done, un-cover the epistemological paradoxes: that language is
both the mirror and mirrored, that reason is both the mirror and the observer,
and that reason and language then enter into a paradoxical constellation.
Moreover, does not reflection lead to the paradox of doubling its object, thus not
only multiplying things but also creating an infinite regress of reflecting each
reflection yet again? I hold the 'view' that this paradoxical structure, as
epistemological constructivism has shown, is actually the condition of possibility
of reflection. <back>
27 See Foucault, Michel (1979): Discipline and Punish, New York: Vintage
Books. <back>
28 See Trabert, Lukas (1997): Metaphor, rational discourse, and the beginning
of philosophy in Plato's 'Theaetetus', in: Debatin, Bernhard/ Timothy R.
Jackson/Daniel Steuer: Metaphor and Rational Discourse. Tübingen, pp. 25-37.
<back>