Evidence Digests 6

Manonsong v.
Estimo 2
Datalift Movers v. Belgravia Realty 5
Davao Light v. Operia 7
Bautista v. Sarmiento 9
People v. Navaja 11
Manila Bay Club v. CA 13
People v. Sendaydiego 15
DM Consunji v. CA 18
Ramos v. CA 19
Estate of Ong v. Diaz 21
Del Carmen v. Bacoy 24
People v. Caranto 27
Rosete v. Lim 30
People v. Ayson 32
Capitol Subd. v. Province of Negros Occ. 33
ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

BATCH 2017 1 OF 34 ATTY. EUGENIO VILLAREAL
MANONSONG V. ESTIMO
G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003
Digest Author: Rofil Carpeso
DOCTRINE
‣ A document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie evidence of its
authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Otherwise the authenticity and due
execution of the document should be upheld.
‣ Ancient document is presumed to be authentic
‣ Impermissible change of theory: When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his
theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.
PARTIES
‣ Agatona Guevarra – alleged owner of contested property
‣ Sps Agatona Guevarra and Ciraco Lopez – parents of parties
‣ Milagros Manongsong – daughter of Vicente Lopez (son of Sps), claiming her father’s legitime be representation
‣ Jumaquio sisters – Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio (one of the children of Sps)
FACTS
‣ Spouses Agatona Guevarra and Ciriaco Lopez had 6 children
‣ The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila with an area of
approximately 152 square meters
‣ Tax Declaration was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias in the name of Benigna Lopez,
et al (children of owner)
‣ However, the improvements on the portion of the Property were separately declared in the name of Filomena J.
Estimo under another Tax Declaration
‣ Milagros and Carlito Manongsong filed a Complaint alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro
indiviso of the property.
‣ They invoked Article 494 of the Civil Code praying for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to
one-fifth (1/5) of the property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.
‣ They alleged that Agaton was the original owner of the property and her children inherited the property upon
her death
‣ Since 1 heir died without offspring, there were only 5 children left as heirs of Guevarra.
‣ Each of the 5 children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong and his only heir, was entitled to a
fifth of the Property.
‣ Respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras children and their offspring, have been in possession of
the Property for as long as they can remember.
‣ Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the Property.
‣ Ortiz family as well as Dela Cruz family (families of children of sps), entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners.
‣ On said agreement petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive
an equal share in the Property.
‣ The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and prayed
further that those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have less and those
who have none shall get the correct and proper portion.
‣ Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the
Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement.

‣ They contended that Justina Navarro (mother of Guevarra) sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta
Lopez Jumaquio. They presented provincial Tax Declaration for the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro
‣ The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA evidencing the sale, this was
also certified by RTC of Manila.
‣ Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for more than 30
years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners
were guilty of laches.
‣ RTC ruled in favor of petitioners saying that the Kasulatan was void since the conveyance made by Justina Navarro
is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character. The sale deprived the compulsory
heirs, which is not permitted by law.
‣ MR was denied by RTC
‣ CA reversed the RTC’s ruling. CA also denied petitioner’s MR
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the
Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition – NO
RATIO
‣ To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the testimonies of
witnesses.
‣ Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, which controverted petitioners
claim of co-ownership.
‣ The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Otherwise the
authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld. The trial court itself held that no
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
‣ Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be
authentic. The Kasulatan is:
1. More than 30 years old,
2. Found in the proper custody, and
3. Unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.
‣ RTC’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
‣ Presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
‣ No evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. On the contrary, Tax
Declaration showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros name supporting the
argument that the Property was not conjugal.
‣ The Kasulatan did not deprived the the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes.
‣ As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does
not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of
the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration.
‣ Elements of a valid contract of sale were apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself.
‣ IMPORTANT PART:
‣ CA’s decision refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. was correct.

‣ Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief but they could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the RTC. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first
time on appeal without any explanation. They did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the
trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. To admit these documents now is contrary
to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.
‣ Even if admitted, they would not controvert Navarros ownership of the Property. These documents do not
prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
1. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not
personally acquainted with her.
2. Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of
Guevarra.
‣ Petitioners admitted before the RTC that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before
the CA that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra.
‣ This constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive
to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
‣ If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners case. Absent any
hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to
Guevarra, and then to the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for
petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra.
‣ On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on the sale
under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
‣ Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and
convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
the Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition
of the Property.

DATALIFT MOVERS V. BELGRAVIA REALTY
“Lessor-Lessee Relationship”; G.R. No. 144268
Digest Author: Amber Gagajena
DOCTRINE
‣ The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.
‣ Conclusive presumptions have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not
allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
PARTIES
‣ PNR – owner and lessor of the land
‣ Sampaguita – lessee of the land; co-plaintiff
‣ Belgravia – sister company of Sampaguita; builder and lessor of the warehouse; co-plaintiff
‣ Datalift – lessee of the warehouse erected on the land
FACTS
‣ The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc. for its cargoes
in connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse stands on a lot owned by the Philippine National
Railways (PNR) and located in Manila.
‣ Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc., pursuant to a written contract
commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a monthly rental of P6,282.49, subject to a ten
(10%) percent increase every year.
‣ Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty &
Development Corporation whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. True enough,
Belgravia did put up a warehouse.
‣ However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift, represented by its
president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease dated October 2, 1990, commencing on
October 5, 1990 and ending on October 5, 1991, subject to extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. By
the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental of P40,000.
‣ After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased
warehouse, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties.
‣ Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000 starting June 1994 to October 1994.
‣ Monthly rental was again increased from P60,000 to P130,000 beginning November 1994 onwards, allegedly in
view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latter’s lease of the former’s lot whereon the
warehouse in question stands.
‣ Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse.
‣ Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of
P4,120,000 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute.
‣ The demands having proved futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint
for ejectment against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.
‣ MeTC, RTC and CA all decided against Datalift.
CONTENTIONS
‣ Datalift faults the CA for affirming the RTC and the MeTC which ruled that the subject warehouse and the land and
area which it occupies rightfully belong to respondent Belgravia, not Datalift, for an implied new lease was
created between PNR, the acknowledged owner of the lot, and Sampaguita, Belgravia's sister company, which, by
virtue of a special arrangement, Sampaguita allowed Belgravia to construct a warehouse on the leased lot and sub-
leased the same to Datalift.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Datalift can question the title of lessor Belgravia – NO

RATIO
‣ The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the
petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the
existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better
right of possession as their lessor.
‣ Conclusive Presumption - The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
‣ Conclusive presumptions have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not
allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
‣ As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as
lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to
or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
‣ Moreover, it was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title or right of
possession over the leased premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at all, Belgravia's title or
right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case between PNR and Belgravia, but not in
the present case. Any ruling which the court may render on this issue will, at the very least, be an obiter dictum, if
not outrightly ultra vires.

DAVAO LIGHT V. OPERIA
G.R. No. 129807 December 9, 2005
Digest Author: Alvin Garces
DOCTRINE
‣ The rule is that he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff ’s prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff
‣ However, the proof of the existence of the prima facie evidence is still the burden of the plaintiff.
FACTS
‣ DAVAO LIGHT is the franchise holder authorized to operate an electric and power plant in Davao City
‣ OPENA and RAMOS are customers of DAVAO LIGHT. OPENA, the mother in law of RAMOS, is the account holder. (2
electric meters)
‣ Sometime in 1988:
‣ DAVAO LIGHT inspected the electric meters of OPENA and RAMOS because there is a report that the Davao
Light seal therein was broken
‣ The electric meters were removed and replaced. OPENA and RAMOS consumption was the same so the electric
meters were taken aback.
‣ DAVAO LIGHT then charged OPENA and RAMOS the amount of 7.8k for one billing month. The amount was
adjusted to 5.6k after OPENA and RAMOS complained about its excessive amount.
‣ In MAY 1989:
‣ DAVAO charged O & R for alleged unbilled electric consumption of 84.3k from SEPT 1983 – SEPT 1988. The
amount was based on the highest recorded consumption.
‣ O & R refused to pay. Demand letter was sent for a lower amount of 49.5k with the threat of suit if they still
refuse to pay.
‣ O & R filed a complaint alleging that the demand has not proper and correct basis, that they had paid all their
electric bills on the said period, and that the charges could have emanated from fraudulent manipulations by
DAVAO itself. They prayed for injunction to restrain DAVAO from disconnecting them.
‣ Counterclaim was also filed by DAVAO saying that O & R tampered the electric meters and should be punished
under Anti-electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 (Rep. Act No. 7832)
‣ During trial, DAVAO’s representatives went to O & R. They found out that the outer seal of DAVAO in the electric
meter was deformed and the inner seal of the government was already missing. Meter testing conducted by ERB
(energy regulatory board) also showed that the meters record only 27.57% and 33.53% consumption.
‣ Trial Court ruled in favor of O & R
‣ Court of Appeals ruled in favor of O & R
‣ DAVAO insists that the CA erred when it did not apply the presumption of meter tampering in this case. It argues
that the broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence of meter tampering and, when taken
together with the significant drop in the registered electric consumption of respondents, establishes that the
latter clearly benefited from the inaccuracy of electric meters.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Whether DAVAO made a prima facie case of tampering so that the burden of proof will be shifted to O & R – No
RATIO
‣ First, is it allowed that the statute provides for the “prima facie”? – yes. The Court recognized "that no
constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts
shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose
of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.”
‣ The rule is that he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a

prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff ’s prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence"
refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.
‣ However, the proof of the existence of the prima facie evidence is still the burden of the plaintiff.
‣ Also, the rule broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence as provided in Rep. Act No. 7832
cannot apply because such law was only approved after the institution of the case; hence, the general rules on
evidence as regards prima facie must be applied.
‣ In this case, the Court ruled that the petitioner’s claim of meter tampering on the result of the examination
conducted by its inspection team is insufficient to establish prima facie proof.
‣ While it is true that RAMOS merely offered a categorical denial of the accusation hurled against them,
nevertheless, the records of this case present other factors which should tilt the scale of evidence in their favour
‣ As established by DAVAO’s witnesses Sardinia and Lucero, in their cross-examination, the allegedly tampered
electric meters were installed in conspicuous portions. Thus, it becomes highly inconceivable that no one
witnessed the alleged tampering of the subject electric meters considering the surroundings where they were set
up. Indeed, any person tinkering with the meters could have easily attracted the attention and suspicion of
neighbors and passers-by.
‣ SC ruled in favor of O & R.

BAUTISTA V. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985
Digest Author: Bel Gervasio
DOCTRINE
‣ When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of
proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the
prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the
case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances
that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.
FACTS
‣ An information charging Bautista, Corpus and Vergere with estafa was filed before the sala of Judge Sarmiento.
Vergere was granted a separate trial.
‣ To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant Dr. Yap as its only witness.
Thereafter, Bautista and Corpus, believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.
‣ The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss:
‣ The information alleges that the two accused received jewelries from Dr. Yap on consignment. The defense'
contention is that the jewelries were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and sale. The defense
overlooks the other allegation in the Information, such as:
‣ That these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the accused on commission basis and to pay or to deliver the
proceeds thereof to Dr. Yap if sold, and if not sold to return said jewelries.
‣ The meaning of consignment is not a sale. It means that the goods sent by one person to another, to be sold
or disposed of by the latter for and on account of the former. The transmission of the goods.
‣ That the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove misappropriation on the part of the accused.
‣ The court believed that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information against
said accused on the evidence presented so far on record.
‣ Judge Sarmiento then denied said motion. Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration was duly filed but was
likewise denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Judge Sarmiento lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the case and was duty bound to acquit the
Bautista and Corpus considering his findings in denying their motion to dismiss that “the prosecution established
a prima facie case of estafa.” (This is because Bautista and Corpus argue that in a criminal case, conviction can only
be had upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case) – NO, Judge Sarmiento still has
jurisdiction and is not duty bound to acquit.
RATIO
‣ A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the general
presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to
contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a
prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of the jury be such as
to rebut and control it.
‣ There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
‣ But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes
incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against
them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem
to believe.
‣ When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of
proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the
prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the

case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances
that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.
‣ A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight.
Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff 's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.
As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of
evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of
proof, he cannot prevail.
‣ In the case at bar, the order denying Bautista and Corpus’ motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was
that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt.
‣ Bautista and Corpus likewise, assign as error the order of Judge Sarmiento directing them to present their evidence
after the denial of their motion to dismiss. They contend that Judge Sarmiento would, in effect, be relying on the
possible weakness of the defense' evidence, rather than on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence in
resolving their guilt or innocence. This is utterly devoid of merit.
‣ Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy (Sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has
rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to
hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its
right to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied The reason is that it is the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused
has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but to decide
the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
‣ The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga where the case was assigned was ordered to continue
immediately with the trial of Criminal Case until its final disposition.

PEOPLE V. NAVAJA
G.R. No. 104044, Mar 30 1993
Digest Author: Bea Gutierrez
DOCTRINE
‣ There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific number of witnesses to sustain a
conviction. It is the prosecutor’s prerogative to determine who or how many witneeses are to be presented in order
to establish the quantum of proof necessary.
‣ The adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when:
1. The suppression is not wilful
2. The evidence suppressed is merely corroborative / cumulative
3. The evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and
4. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
PARTIES
‣ Accused Appellant: Alexander Navaja alias “Sindak”
‣ Respondent: People of the Philippines
‣ Private Claimant: Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section (ANDDRUS)
FACTS
‣ This concerns a criminal case filed by ANDDRUS (Anti-Narocits and Dangerous Drugs Sec) against Navaja for violation
of Dangerous Drugs Act.
‣ According to the Prosecution (dispense with if necessary):
‣ The ANDDRUS received information on a marijuana seller called “Alex” (NAVAJA). They decided to execite a
buy-bust operation.
‣ The buy-bust team arrived at the area at 1:00pm, and potitioned themselves 8 to 10 meters away from the
marijuana transaction.
‣ The poseur buyer bought the marijuana from Navaja and gave the marked money. Upon the signal, the buy
bust team approached them but Navaja was able to run away.
‣ However, they got the marijuana leaves, buds, seeds sold to the poseur buyer.
‣ They submitted the evidence submitted and was found posititve for marijuana.
‣ ANDDRUS filed a case for violation of Sec 4 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). After a year of not being able to
apprehend Navaja, he was arrested when he was discovered in a Habeas Corpus proceeding in connection to
another case against him.
‣ During the trial, prosecution presented (1) Pfc. Espina, a member of the team, (2) the regional chemist of NBI and
the (3) Chief of Chemistry and Physical Identification Section of the crime lab.
‣ Navaja was convicted. He appealed, assailing the decision based on the lone testimony of Espina which was not
corroborated by any other members of the buy-bust operation.
‣ Navaja contends that the non-presentation of the other buy-bust members’ testimonies is considered as
‘supression of evidence’ which evidence would have been adverse if presented. He also stated the People v Ardiza
canno be relied upon since in that case, TWO officers testified.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the Navaja’s contentions are correct—that the non-presentation of corroborating testimonies are considered
suppression of evidence. NO. NOT CORRECT
RATIO
‣ The non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to
prosecution’s case.
‣ The adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when:

‣ (1) the suppression is not willful, (2) the evidence suppressed is merely corroborative / cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
‣ There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific number of witnesses to sustain a
conviction. It is the prosecutor’s prerogative to determine who or how many witneeses are to be presented in order
to establish the quantum of proof necessary.
‣ The testimony of Espino is enough, as long as it is credible. The other buy-bust team members’ testimonies would
be merely corroborative in nature.
‣ Addtl Info (if ever lang tanungin):
‣ With regard to Navaja’s contention that Espina’s testimony is not credible and reliable since he was 8-10 meters
away, and there was a chicken fence hindering him to see the view clearly, the court rejected such contention
since it was 1pm so even if he was far, he can be able to see clearly. Plus, the chicken fence is made of wire… (-
_-)

MANILA BAY CLUB V. CA
G.R. No. 110015 (1995)
Digest Author: Ange Ibuna
DOCTRINE
‣ The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his obvious advantage, if he possesses the means,
supplies a most important test for judging of the comparative weight of evidence . . . If, on the supposition that a
charge or claim is unfounded, the party against whom it is made has evidence within his reach by which he may
repel that which is offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so supplies a strong presumption that the charge or
claim is well founded; it would be contrary to every principle of reason, and to all experience of human conduct, to
form any other conclusion. (Starkie on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
FACTS
‣ There were no facts presented but this is what I could gather from the case
‣ This is an MR from the court’s July 11, 1995 decision.
‣ It seems the controversy arose from a certain insurance policy.
‣ What happened was petitioner Manila Bay Club Corp. did not designate private respondents, the Sabenianos, as
beneficiaries of the insurance policies, which the court held is a violation of the “insurance clause” amounting to a
“substantial” and not a mere “slight or casual” breach entitling private respondents to rescind the lease contract.
‣ Also for reconsideration was the amount of rentals/damages petitioner was bound to pay as adjudged by the
respondent court of appeals.
‣ With regard to the amount of rentals/damages, petitioner avers that the “decision awards excessive damages”
since the court held petitioner to pay the total sum of P12,029,800, a staggering sum by any calculation “that will
probably reduce petitioner to utter bankruptcy”
‣ It is likewise maintained that private respondents would be unjustly enriched simply because petitioner failed to
present controverting evidence, or rebut Mrs. Sabeniano’s testimony which, according to petitioner, is mere
speculation.
‣ We need to stress the one decisive fact that petitioner had all the opportunity at its disposal before the trial court
to refute, with all allowable pieces of evidence it can produce, Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony or any other evidence of
private respondents, and there is nothing to indicate that petitioner was ever denied such opportunity/
opportunities by the trial court.
‣ Motion for Reconsideration
‣ The rentals in dispute arose from a 10 year lease contract over a building in Roxas Blvd. owned by the
Sabenianos (respondents) and leased by Manila Bay Corp. (petitioner) But the Sabenianos unilaterally
terminated the contract and asked that Manila Bay vacate the premises and surrender its possession. But
Manila Bay refused to do so and instead filed a case for specific performance with prayer for preliminary
injunction against Sabenianos alleging that the unilateral cancellation was arbitrary and capricious and that
they did not violate any of its provisions.
‣ Sabeniano alleged in their answer that Manila Bay failed to pay monthly rentals so CA affirming the RTC held in
favor of Sabeniano. Ordering Manila Bay to return possession of the building and pay monthly rentals of
P250,000 starting May 28, 1990.
‣ With respect to the amount of the rentals (which is the main issue in the MR) Manila Bay is assailing the
P250,000 rental value.
‣ The Factors that the CA took into consideration in arriving at P250,000:
‣ Prevailing rates in vicinity
‣ Location of property
‣ Use of property
‣ Inflation rate
‣ Testimony of Sabeniano that a japanese-filipino investor offered her P400,000 to lease the premises (This is
the point in dispute in the MR)

ISSUE/HELD
‣ Whether or not the uncontroverted evidence of private respondents and testimony of Mrs. Sabeniano can “stand”
simply because petitioners failed to present controverting evidence or rebut said testimony? YES, the court
answers in the affirmative.
RATIO
‣ The trial court, respondent court and this Court cannot be faulted for taking private respondents' uncontroverted
evidence below vis-a-vis the monthly rentals on its face value — no matter how "staggering" it may appear — for
petitioner's omission to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive and stiff
opposition from petitioner created an adverse inference that either the controverting evidences to be presented by
petitioner will only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence of private respondents indeed speaks of
the truth.
‣ [so basically its saying that if petitioners really had the evidence to controvert the evidence of private respondents, then
they should have presented such evidence. The fact that they did not, then inference can be made that either (1) If they
did present the evidence, it would actually be prejudicial to its case; or (2) that the uncontroverted evidence of private
respondents does indeed speak of the truth.]
‣ The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's sake, that Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony is improbable
or weak, for it has likewise been said that:
‣ Even if a party's testimony is improbable, the failure of the opposite party to contradict it, although it was
entirely within his power to do so if it were false, fully entitles it to belief. (Nutting v. El. R. Co., 21 N.Y. App. Div.
72, 47 N.Y. Supp. 327, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572)
‣ Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the party against whom it is put in, in not showing by means
within the easy control of that party that the conclusion drawn from such evidence is untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc.,
R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 678, 681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572)
‣ As weak evidence is often strengthened by failure of an opposing party to contradict by evidence within his
power, so the trier of facts may infer that testimony in chief is worth its full face value when the other party is
content to let it stand without cross-examination or contradiction by other evidence. (Moore on Facts, Vol. II, p.
1417)
‣ As petitioner seemed willing to admit private respondents' evidence bearing on the fair rental value without
question, the trial court was well-justified in having done the same — exhibiting, still, due consideration when it
reduced the monthly rental value from P400,000.00 as per Mrs. Sabeniano's uncontroverted testimony, to
P250,000.00.
‣ In answer, therefore, to petitioner's questions, i.e., ". . . does Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony cease to be speculation
because the petitioner failed to present 'controverting evidence'?", and "The fact that Mrs. Sabeniano could have
testified that she was offered P1 Million, indeed, P10 Million, indeed, P100 Million but would that, too, 'stand'
simply because the petitioner failed to rebut it?", the Court is compelled, quite regrettably, to answer in the
affirmative.

PEOPLE V. SENDAYDIEGO
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
Digest Author: Lizzie Lecaroz
DOCTRINE
‣ The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. In the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or
uttered it is presumed to be the forger
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff-appellees: People of the Philippines and Province of Pangasinan
‣ Defendant-Appellants: Licerio P. Sendaydiego, Juan Samson, Anastacio Quirimit, Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego
FACTS
‣ This case involves three cases of malversation through falsification.
‣ Prosecution's theory: In 1969, Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used 6 forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and
bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
‣ According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words:
"Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
‣ The falsity of the provincial vouchers is proven by the following intances:
‣ That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad
‣ That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official
receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
‣ That the lumber and materials were never delivered by the company to the provincial government
‣ That in the provincial vouchers had forged signatures.
‣ That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. containing a description and the prices of
the lumber and hardware material is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant
manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College.
‣ That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher were also forged. Those documents: are the
taxpayer's certificate) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two
certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co.
‣ (BASICALLY THE CASE INVOLVES A NUMBER OF FORGED VOUCHERS AND THE CASE GOES ON TO DISCUSS
THE FORGERIES IN DETAIL. REFER TO THE CASE FOR THE DETAILS!)
‣ As in the case of voucher No. 10724, Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five
vouchers are not their genuine signatures.
‣ Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office
the papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting
papers could not be presented in evidence.
‣ Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber
and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial
government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain
Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.
‣ The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and hardware
materials. The receipts evidencing payments are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the
genuine official receipts bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to
transactions with the provincial government.
‣ Samson used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing
business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He

represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and
provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their offices.
‣ The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson.
He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording
and for her signature.
‣ The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic.
Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the
provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
‣ After trial, the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty of
malversation through falsification of public or official documents.
‣ Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. However, Sendaydiego died and thus his appeal as to his criminal
liability was dismissed.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.
RATIO
‣ Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert
testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and
received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
‣ Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime
laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures.
‣ Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson
have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar
signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person.
‣ The expert also admitted that a person may have two forms of signature
‣ After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the
parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical
differences between the questioned and authentic signatures. But the expert is in error in concluding that
Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing
thereof.
‣ The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature.
‣ His supposed genuine signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office
receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname
Samson is encircled.
‣ On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government
are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and
horizontal strokes.
‣ Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used
therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He used
his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the
amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him.
‣ Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when necessary.
‣ Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's
signatures. Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers
were written by only one person.
‣ The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer
and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under
those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
‣ The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

‣ This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have
close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
‣ In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or
uttered it is presumed to be the forger
‣ Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another
form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in
these cases.

DM CONSUNJI V. CA
Digest Author: Elwell Mariano
FACTS
‣ A construction worker (Jose Juego) of DMCI fell 14 floors from Renaissance Tower, Pasig to his death. He was
pronounced dead on arrival.
‣ According to the investigation of the police:
‣ The victim together with two other companions was working as a carpenter at the Tower.
‣ They were on board a platform made of channel beam with plywood as the flooring and cable wires attached to
its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block got loose causing the whole platform and the victim to fall down.
‣ The two companions luckily jumped out of safety.
‣ Juego’s widow filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against DMCI. RTC decided in favor of the widow.
‣ CA affirmed.
‣ DMCI argued that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to prove the negligence on the part of petitioner.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N res ipsa loquitur applicable? YES
RATIO
‣ Res Ipsa Loquitur: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for
itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
‣ It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of
care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
‣ Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
following requisites are present:
1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged
with negligence; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
‣ The defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden
then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or
inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances
for the application of the doctrine has been established.

RAMOS V. CA
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999
Digest Author: Pearl Simbulan
PARTIES
‣ Spouses Ramos – petitioners; the wife, Erlinda is the one who had stones in her gall bladder
‣ Delos Santos Medical Center (DSMC) hospital; Dr. Hosaka is the main doctor; Dra. Gutierrez is the anesthesiologist
FACTS
‣ Erlinda underwent an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
‣ Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation and assured Rogelio (husband) that he
would get a good anesthesiologist for the procedure
‣ Dra. Gutierrez was chosen by Hosaka
‣ A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted at one of the rooms of the DLSMC
‣ Her sisterinlaw, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was
also there for moral support
‣ On the day of the operation, Dr. Hosaka arrived almost 3 hours late (arrived 12nn)
‣ Herminda Cruz (sister) then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez
say, “ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok.”
‣ She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr.
Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another
anaesthesiologist
‣ Patient’s nail bed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position—a position where the
head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of
blood supply to the patient’s brain
‣ Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months thereafter she was released from the hospital.
‣ During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25 which is the
subject of a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC.
‣ RTC – for spouses Ramos; CA reversed
ISSUE/HELD
1. Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case? - Yes
2. Who were liable? All – Hosaka, Gutierrez, DSMC
RATIO 1
‣ All the requisites for the application of res ipsa are met.
‣ Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
‣ The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff ’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
‣ It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. It is applied in conjunction
with the doctrine of common knowledge
‣ However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the
nature of a procedural rule
‣ The following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
‣ Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence
‣ Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care
‣ When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care
‣ Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object
in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under,
or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out
a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis
‣ In the case at bar, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation
presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
‣ Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her
gall bladder
‣ At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was
likewise physically fit in mind and body.
‣ However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered
irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already
decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which
does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.
‣ We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care
of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.
‣ Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is capable
of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one.This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where
the testimony of expert witnesses is not required.
RATIO 2
‣ All liable. (Just use your torts knowledge)
‣ Dr. Hosaka was in complete control of the operation and directly chose Dr. Gutierrez.
‣ Dr. Gutierrez was negligent as well
‣ Admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself
‣ The surgery is an elective procedure and these cases, the anesthesiologist possesses the luxury of time to make
a proper assessment, including the time to be at the patient’s bedside to do a proper interview and clinical
evaluation.
‣ We rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer- employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

ESTATE OF ONG V. DIAZ
G.R. No. 171713
Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy
PARTIES
‣ Complainant/Respondent: Joanne Rodgin Diaz- a minor represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz
‣ Defendant/ Petitioner: Estate of Rogelio Ong (Rogelio Ong died while case was pending with the CA)
FACTS
‣ Joanne Diaz, a minor represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz, filed a complaint for compulsory
recognition with prayer for support pending litigation against Rogelio Ong before the RTC.
‣ Allegations of Jinky in the complaint:
‣ In 1993 in Tarlac, she and Rogelio had a romantic relationship. At this time, Jinky was already married to a
Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding.
‣ From 1994 to 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol
Garden, Tarlac City. From this live-in relationship, Joanne was conceived and was born on 25 February 1998.
‣ Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the
hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of Joanne’s needs recognizing the child as his.
‣ In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting Joanne and refused to
acknowledge her as his daughter, alleging that he is not the father of the child.
‣ RTC held that Joanne is the child of Rogelio and ordered him to recognize Joanne as his natural child and to provide
her with a monthly support of P10,000.00.
‣ Rogelio filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. After trial, the RTC held that Joanne is the child of
Jinky and Rogelio and he should support her.
‣ Because Jinky was married at the time of the birth of Joanne, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child
of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate
even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167).
‣ The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the
same Code:
‣ There must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
1. Physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
2. Husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
3. Serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
1. The husband is a Japanese national living outside of the country and he comes home only once a year. No evidence
was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne.
2. While it may also be argued that Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the Rogelio, there is no
evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne. Joanne was her
second child, so her first child, a certain Nicole must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa.
3. Rogelio’s acts are evidence of admission that he is her real father.
‣ He admitted that:
‣ He paid the hospital bills from birth of Joanne
‣ He fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
‣ Even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996
‣ On some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne.

‣ Rogelio filed a MR, which was denied for lack of merit. He appealed to the CA. During the pendency of the case
with the CA, Rogelio died (substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong).
‣ The CA granted the appeal and remanded the case for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne.
‣ Rogelio volunteered and suggested that he and Jinky submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of
paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific
procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of Rogelio that he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as he
admitted having actual sexual relations with Jinky.
‣ CA believes that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute.
‣ Considering, however, the untimely demise of Rogelio during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court can possibly
avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the Rogelio.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N CA erred in remanding the case back to the RTC for DNA analysis given that Rogelio is already dead - No. Even
if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated in the Rules of DNA Evidence as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing.
RATIO
‣ The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
‣ A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
‣ Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
‣ The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. (Cabatania v. Court of Appeals)
‣ The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary.
‣ Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
‣ Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
‣ This physical impossibility may be caused:
1. By the impotence of the husband;
2. By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3. By the serious illness of the husband.
‣ Under the Family Code, filiation may be proven by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
‣ There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present
petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
‣ DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic makeup. DNA is found in all human cells and is
the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine
his identity.
‣ DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample
is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
‣ In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence, it is provided:

‣ “DNA evidence” constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
‣ “DNA profile” means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a
person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
‣ “DNA testing” means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from
biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the
DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not
the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if thebiological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
‣ “Probability of Parentage” means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent
compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
‣ Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the
order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has
already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to
the death of Rogelio.
‣ To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is
more ostensible than real.
‣ Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, thus: x x x
‣ From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
‣ As defined in §3(a) of the Rules of DNA Evidence, the term “biological sample” means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
‣ Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may
be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilised for the conduct of DNA testing.

DEL CARMEN V. BACOY
G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012
Digest Author: Clarence Tiu
DOCTRINE
‣ Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.It recognizes that
parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby
place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.
‣ The doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms.
‣ The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
4. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
5. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
6. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
FACTS
‣ At dawn on New Year’s Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, her spouse Leonardo Sr. and their daughter Glenda,
were on their way home from a Christmas party. They were run over by a passenger jeep driven by Allan
Maglasang, registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. and used as a public utility vehicle.
‣ A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan, in which he was
found guilty. During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia’s father, respondent Geronimo Bacoy, in behalf of
the minor children of the Monsaluds, filed an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana against
Allan, his alleged employers, spouses Norma and Oscar del Carmen, Sr. and the registered owner of the jeep, their
son Oscar Jr
‣ Oscar Sr. averred no cause of action because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were never the
employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself, alleging that Allan and his friends stole
for a joyride his jeep, which can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key but without any headlights
on. Oscar Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan and his companions, but was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. He clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latter’s brother, Rodrigo, who was
employed as the driver and that Allan’s employment was already severed before the mishap. Oscar Jr. testified that
it was routinary that after a day’s trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigo’s rented house for the next early-
morning operation.
‣ RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar
Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa
loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused
an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things, the accident would not
have happened had there been an exercise of care.
‣ RTC ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through
his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well
aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have
taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The
RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence making
the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same
‣ Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration contending that the provision on vicarious liability of the employer under
Article 2180 requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and that the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee,
he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he
drove the jeep.
‣ Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at the time of the
accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not have been

taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in the carnapping case, based on his experience, the jeep cannot
be pushed by only one person but by at least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles
mass and the deep canal which separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a house
‣ Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability, agreeing that Allan was not
acting in the discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep. It then adjudged that only Allan should
bear the consequences.
‣ The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner cannot be made
responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged
that only Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts.
‣ Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, determining that an Allan was an employee of Allan. The CA adjudged Oscar
Jr. liable based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the
injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the
jeep was stolen because Oscar Jr. is deemed to have impliedly permitted the use of the jeep.
‣ To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both
employees assigned to the said jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house
where Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking
area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key.
‣ Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should have been done within the
scope of his assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched
upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his
previous employment as conductor.
‣ Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a
vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts that
although Allan and his companions were not found to have committed the crime of carnapping beyond
reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken by them from a well secured
area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its headlights on at the time of the accident, a
proof that it was started without the ignition key.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Oscar Jr. is vicariously liable with Allan.- YES
RATIO
‣ Oscar Jr.’s own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts.
‣ The fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting
the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or that they were
simply turned off; at the time of the incident, the ignition key was not in possession of Rodrigo and it was
turned over to the police for reasons unexplained; and the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his
brother Rodrigo since, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific/strict instructions on matters regarding its
use. Rodrigo is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicle’s operation, including
allowing Allan to use it.
‣ Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the
thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants;
and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation
by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.
‣ Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.It recognizes that
parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby
place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.
‣ The doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms.
‣ The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:

7. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
8. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
9. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
‣ The requisites of res ipsa loquitur are all present in this case.The requisites having been met, there now arises a
presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care
and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
‣ First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing
vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent.
‣ Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar
Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific
restrictions of the jeep’s use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run
without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver
Rodrigo to observe the same precaution.
‣ Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on
their part.
‣ The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent
to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his
employment.
‣ Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employer’s vicarious liability for
the employee’s fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
‣ The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, the car of therein respondent bank caused
the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still
held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning
accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while
the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
‣ Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen, which are valid defenses
available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use.

PEOPLE V. CARANTO
G.R No. 193768; March 5, 2014
Digest Author: Helen Toledo
DOCTRINE
‣ The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is precisely just
that – a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth.
FACTS
‣ Version of the Prosecution
‣ PO2 Arago was inside the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) of the PNP in Taguig City when his
informant approached him and reported that there was widespread selling of shabu by a certain Jojo at the
latter’s residence. PO2 Arago immediately reported the information to his superior, P/Supt. Ramirez, who in
turn organized a “buy–bust” operation to apprehend Jerry. 
 
The team agreed that the informant would accompany the team to Jerry’s residence where PO2 Arago would
act as the poseur buyer while the rest of the team would serve as his back up. P/Supt. Ramirez thereafter
provided the “buy–bust” money of P500.00, which PO2 Arago marked with his initials, “DBA.” 
 
At around 12:00 noon of the same day, the team proceeded to Jerry’s residence. When they were about 10 to 20
meters when they got near him, from the house, the informant pointed PO2 Arago to Jerry and the informant
introduced PO2 Arago to Jerry as a balikbayan who was looking for some shabu. Jerry then asked them how
much worth of shabu they planned to buy, to which informant answered P500.00 worth. PO2 Arago then
handed Jerry the marked money. 
 
Upon receiving the money, Jerry went inside his house and after around 30 seconds to 1 minute, he returned
and handed PO2 Arago a plastic sachet, which PO2 Arago suspected to be shabu. 
 
After the transaction, Jerry saw the “buy–bust” team approaching them and tried to flee but was stopped by
PO2 Arago. After Jerry was subdued, PO2 Arago recovered the marked money inside Jerry’s right pocket.
Thereafter, the team introduced themselves as police officers, informed Jerry of his constitutional rights in
Filipino and then returned to their station in Taguig City where Jerry was duly investigated.
‣ Version of the Defense
‣ Jerry said that he went through his route as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until he went home around 12:00
noon to have lunch. He was at the rooftop of their house feeding the dog when policemen arrived looking for
his father Cesar Caranto. The policemen kicked the door and forced it open. They held Jerry and told him that
they would have to bring him in unless they get his father. Jerry told the policemen that he was not aware of
his father’s whereabouts because his father did not live with them anymore. The policemen frisked him and
took his wallet. He was brought to the DEU and was thereafter hit by P/Supt. Ramirez on the chest. He denied
that he sold any shabu. 
 
A month after the incident, Jerry’s mother Teresita, together with his two siblings and a housemaid, were
arrested in Baclaran. A drug related case was also filed against them. They were incarcerated for about two
years but they were eventually acquitted. Teresita filed a case against the policemen who arrested them and is
also planning to file a case against the law officers who arrested her son Jerry.
‣ At the pre–trial, the parties stipulated:
1. That a request has been made by the arresting officers for examination of the specimens confiscated;
2. That the forensic chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural (P/Insp. Gural) examined the specimens submitted and
thereafter issued her initial and final laboratory report;
3. That P/Insp. Gural has no personal knowledge from whom the alleged specimens were taken and that the test
conducted on the alleged specimen yielded positive to metamphetamine hydrochloride.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the trial court erred in applying the presumption of regularity in convicting Jerry – YES. In this case, the
presumption is unavailable due to serious procedural lapses.

RATIO
‣ The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
‣ (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non–compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
‣ Courts recognize the possible occurrence of procedural lapses for the exception. However, these lapses must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to
present any explanation to justify the non–observance of the prescribed procedures. Therefore, the non–
observance by the police of the required procedure cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted.
‣ Chain of Custody
‣ To secure a conviction for the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: (a) the identities of
the buyer and seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the transaction actually took place, and to bring to the
court the corpus delicti as evidence.
‣ The “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
‣ The records show that the procedure of preserving the chain of custody as laid down by jurisprudence was not
observed. This is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution from whose testimonies it
is clear that the evidence was not “marked” in front of the accused or his representative. It was merely seized
by PO2 Arago and placed inside his pocket or wallet. Other than the allegation that a marking was done at the
police station, there was no proof that such marking was actually undertaken at all. There was no statement
from any of the witnesses that markings were made on the seized item in the presence of any of the persons
mentioned in Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules.
‣ Another gap in the chain of custody is apparent from the lack of evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove that the sachet of shabu, which was entrusted by PO2 Arago to the investigator, is the same sachet that
was delivered to the forensic chemist.
‣ Also, there was no information on what happened to the drugs after P/Insp. Gural examined it. The
stipulations did not cover the manner on how the specimens were handled after her examination. Without this
testimony, there is no way for this Court to be assured that the substances produced in court are the same
specimens the forensic chemist found positive for shabu. Furthermore, the prosecution even stipulated that
the forensic chemist had no knowledge from whom the alleged specimens were taken.
‣ Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence is wanting, deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous drug
recovered from the accused is the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, or
the same drug presented to the court, an essential element in cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is absent.
‣ Negation of Presumption of Regularity
‣ The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police
officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his
testimony. The regularity of the performance of the police officers’ duties leaves much to be desired in this case
given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly confiscated shabu. The totality of all the aforementioned
procedural lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of frame–up. These lapses negate the presumption that official duties

have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable.
‣ The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption
of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is
precisely just that – a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as
binding truth.
‣ Thus even though the defense of denial or frame–up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor, these weaknesses
do not add any strength to the prosecution’s cause as evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. We therefore resolve to ACQUIT
the accused for failure of the prosecution – due to the gap–induced weakness of the case – to prove the appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ROSETE V. LIM
G.R. No. 136051, Jun. 8, 2006
Digest Author: Anna Villanoza
DOCTRINE
‣ GR:
1. Only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand.
2. For ordinary witnesses, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether.
‣ Exception: As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness
stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
PARTIES
‣ Rosete and Mapalo - wants to prevent the taking of their deposition on the grounds of the right against self-
incrimination.
‣ Lim - they want their land back. Wants to take the deposition of Rosete and Mapalo.
FACTS
‣ This is a petition for review on certiorari that seeks to set aside the decision allowing the taking of deposition
upon oral examination of petitioners Oscar P. Mapalo and Chito Rosete.
‣ Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed a complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages
against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, Espreme, Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar maple, Chito P.
Rosete, BPI and the Register of Deeds of Mindoro Occidental.
‣ It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFPRSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor
of Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the AFPRSBS and
Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands to
respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the name of Espreme
Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.
‣ Petitioners filed an MTD, but it was denied. Hence they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
‣ Still, Petitioner Chito Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex Abudanti Cautela). - Respondents filed a Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause
the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete.
‣ Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. They had
two reasons why the objected:
1. (unimportant) They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no answer has yet
been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela, pending
resolution of the Petition for Certiorari.
2. (important) They contend that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of
Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the present case wherein respondent
Juliano Lim is the private complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of the
deposition would be violative of their right against self incrimination because by means of the oral
deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the
allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
‣ In particular, these cases are criminal cases of BP. 22 and Estafa, Petitioners allege that their answers would
expose them to criminal action or liability since they would be furnishing evidence against themselves in said
criminal cases.
‣ Moreover, they explain that while an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege against self incrimination as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused
may altogether refuse to answer any and all questions because the right against self incrimination includes the
right to refuse to testify.

‣ The lower court denied petitioners’ motion and objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled
the taking thereof.
‣ Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and upheld the Orders of the lower court
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Would the taking of the petitioner’s depositions violate their right against self-incrimination? NO. Dismissed for
lack of merit.
RATIO
‣ The right against self incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.
‣ The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or
not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
‣ However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time.
‣ It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether.
‣ As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand as a witness. This is
because an accused “occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.”
‣ An exception may apply if the civil case is criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party
thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the
nature of the proceedings that controls.
‣ However, the case is a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. It is civil in nature. Thus, they
cannot refuse to take the witness stand. They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary
witness, they can invoke the right against self incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually
asked of them.
‣ Extra:
‣ Petitioners contend that they did not yet file an answer. Thus Depositions cannot yet be taken. NOPE.
‣ In the case before us, petitioners contend they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the
answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not
consider the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers contemplated by the Rules of
Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela. This is untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means
"out of abundant caution" or "to be on the safe side."An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer
less of an answer.

PEOPLE V. AYSON 

CAPITOL SUBD. V. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCC.
G.R. No. L-6204 July 31, 1956
Aziza Bacay
FACTS
‣ The Provincial Hospital of Occidental Negros, located in the City of Bacolod, capital of the province, was built in
1924 at a cost of about P200,000. But subsequent improvements brought the total cost to more than half a million
pesos.
‣ The Hospital was erected on a parcel of land of more than 22,000 square meters identified as lot No. 378 of the
Bacolod Cadastre and claimed by the province of Occidental Negros as its property by virtue of a deed of sale with
donation executed in its favor by Jose Benares, former owner, as a result of expropriation proceedings. No TCT
issued but there a record of assessment that showed that it was property of the Province and is exempt from real
property tax.
‣ In 1949, the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., a real estate company, claiming to be the owner of the lot, questioned the
right of the Hospital to occupy it, and when its claim of ownership was rejected, it filed for recovery of possession.
‣ The lot in question was part of a large tract of land known as the Hacienda Mandalagan, formerly owned by
Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. The land consisted of several lots. In 1926 the lots were purchased by Jose
Benares, who later mortgaged them to the Philippine National Bank. The mortgage having been foreclosed, the
Bank bought the lots at a foreclosure sale and had transfer certificates of title issued to it in 1934.
‣ In 135 the Bank sold the lots to Carlos Benares in ten equal installments with the condition that the Bank shall
hold the title until fully paid. Carlos Benares then assigned his rights in favor of Capitol Subdivision, who
continued paying for the installments, and upon completion, TCT was issued in favor of Capitol Subdivision.
‣ Province of Negros Occidental, on the other hand, claimed that it has acquired the lot in question from its former
owner, Jose Benares, and that the subdivision was aware of that fact when it bought the hacienda.
‣ In support of this defense, the province stated:
‣ that it instituted condemnation proceedings in 1924 or 1925 against Jose Benares for the acquirement of the
lot in question, took possession of the same and began the construction of the hospital;
‣ that pending trial the case was amicably settled, with the Province paying to Benares the assessed value of the
lot and Benares donating to the Province so much of the purchase price as was in excess of the assessed value;
‣ that a deed of sale with donation was executed by Jose Benares in favor of the Province;
‣ that the court record of the case, including the deed of sale and donation, was totally destroyed during the last
war;
‣ that the subdivision had constructive notice of those facts and was therefore not an innocent purchaser,
knowing fully well that at the time it bought the lot this was already occupied by the Hospital and the Hospital
had been in full operation as a public institution for many years prior to the date of the alleged acquisition;
‣ that Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder and president and general manager of the
subdivision, had knowledge of those facts because during his incumbency as first city mayor of Bacolod, the
city was contributing a large sum yearly for the support, operation, and maintenance of the Hospital.
‣ RTC: In favor of Capitol; ordered Province of Negros Occidental to pay rent
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Who is then the real owner of the property – REMAND; Case cannot be determined because of limited evidence
presented
RATIO
‣ With the record of expropriation proceedings destroyed together with the deed of sale and donation attached
thereto, secondary proof of such proceedings and deed should have been allowed.
‣ But presentation of that proof was effectively barred when the trial court refused to give the provincial fiscal
sufficient time to resubpoena two important witnesses, who had failed to come on the day of the continuation of
the trial for lack of notice. Those witnesses were Mr. Jose Benares (the person from whom the Province allegedly
acquired the lot) and Mr. Ildefonso Coscolluela, who, as former treasurer of the Province, had knowledge of such
acquisition. Considering the amount of the public funds and the public interest involved, the trial court should
have granted the fiscal sufficient time to produce the said witnesses.

‣ Other evidence of vital importance to the case also appears to have barred.
‣ On the question of the subdivision’s good or bad faith, Mr. Montelibano, the president and general manager and
controlling stockholder of the Subdivision, pretends that the Subdivision had no knowledge of the expropriation
or deed of sale with donation at the time it bought the land. The fiscal’s efforts to cross-examine him on those
matters were frustrated by Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections and the trial court’s rulings sustaining those objections.
‣ The court reasoned that Mr. Montelibano was then on the stand as Plaintiff’s own witness and could not be
questioned in such a way as to make him to the Defendant’s witness. But the fact alone that Mr. Montelibano was
then testifying as Plaintiff’s witness is no justification for not permitting the fiscal to cross-examine him on any
matter that would elicit all important facts bearing on the issue.
‣ In this jurisdiction, section 87 above quoted provided that the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for
the purpose among others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue. From this provision it may
clearly be inferred that a party may cross- examine a witness on matters not embraced in his direct
examination. But this does not mean that a party by doing so is making the witness his own accordance with
section 83.” (III Moran, Rules of Court, 3rd ed. 587.)
‣ The loss of the records of said expropriation proceeding had already been established, and section 51, Rule 123,
expressly permits proof by secondary evidence.
‣ The trial court, after thus preventing Defendant from proving the existence of the expropriation case through the
testimony of Jose Marco, willingly acceded to the presentation in rebuttal of a witness who testified to the non-
existence of the said expropriation case, thus permitting Plaintiff to prove in rebuttal what he had
refused Defendant to substantiate in defense.
‣ The trial court appears to have had no justification in refusing to admit most of the exhibits offered in evidence
for the Defendant. Those exhibits have direct bearing on the issue of ownership.
‣ Case Remanded.


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Manonsong v.

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Rofil Carpeso

‣ Ancient document is presumed to be authentic

‣ Sps Agatona Guevarra and Ciraco Lopez – parents of parties

‣ Jumaquio sisters – Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio (one of the children of Sps)

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ MR was denied by RTC

‣ CA reversed the RTC’s ruling. CA also denied petitioner’s MR

1. More than 30 years old,

2. Found in the proper custody, and

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Amber Gagajena

‣ Sampaguita – lessee of the land; co-plaintiff

‣ Datalift – lessee of the warehouse erected on the land

‣ MeTC, RTC and CA all decided against Datalift.

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Alvin Garces

‣ Trial Court ruled in favor of O & R

‣ Court of Appeals ruled in favor of O & R

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ SC ruled in favor of O & R.

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Bel Gervasio

‣ The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss:

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Bea Gutierrez

‣ The adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when:

1. The suppression is not wilful

2. The evidence suppressed is merely corroborative / cumulative

3. The evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and

4. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

‣ Respondent: People of the Philippines

‣ Private Claimant: Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section (ANDDRUS)

‣ According to the Prosecution (dispense with if necessary):

‣ The adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when:

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ Addtl Info (if ever lang tanungin):

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Ange Ibuna

‣ This is an MR from the court’s July 11, 1995 decision.

‣ It seems the controversy arose from a certain insurance policy.

‣ Motion for Reconsideration

‣ The Factors that the CA took into consideration in arriving at P250,000:

‣ Prevailing rates in vicinity

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Lizzie Lecaroz

‣ The falsity of the provincial vouchers is proven by the following intances:

‣ That in the provincial vouchers had forged signatures.

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature.

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ According to the investigation of the police: