Title: Re: Arundhati Roy.... ...

vs --- on 6 March, 2002

Citation: AIR 2002 SC 1375, Suo Motu Contempt Petition

(Crl.) No. 10 of 2001

Date of Judgment: 06 March, 2002

Bench: Honourable Mr. Justice G.B. Pattanaik

Honourable Mr. Justice R.P. Sethi

Advocates: For the Contemnor: Shanti Bhushan, Sr. Adv.,(Prashant

Bhushan, Sanjeev K. Kapoor, Narender Verma, Vishal Gupta,
Sanjay Pathak and Anil Mittal, with him); For Union of
India: Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, (Sanjay R.
Hegde, P. Parmeswaran, with him).

Laws Involved: • Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Section – 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,12,14,15;

• Constitution of India, Article – 32, 19(1)(a), 19(2), 129, 215;

• Indian Penal Code, Section - 499.

Facts – The facts of the case are stated as follows:

• An organization, namely, Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, being Writ Petition No. 319 of 1994 in the Hon’ble Court. The Petitioner in
the case was a movement, which was concerned about the adverse environmental affect that could
occur in the valley, in addition to the displacement of thousands of people, due to submerging of
vast areas of land, as a result of construction of Sardar Sarovar Dam in the state of Gujarat.
• During the pendency of the writ petition, the Hon’ble Court passed various order relating to the
aforementioned case. By one such order, the Court permitted to increase the height of the dam to
RL 85 meters which was resented to and protested by the writ petitioners and others including the
respondent herein. The respondent, Smt. Arundhati Roy, not a party to the writ proceedings,

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 published an article entitled “The Greater Common Good” which was published in Outlook
Magazine and in some portion of a book written by her.
• However, after the judgment was pronounced in IA No. 14 of 1999 on 15th October, 1999, an
incident took place on 30th December, 2000, regarding which Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2001 was
filed by J.R. Parashar, Advocate and others. According to the contents of the petition, the
respondents led a huge crowd and held a dharna in front of the Court and shouted abusive slogans
against the Court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the institution. This
led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police But in view of the denial
of the alleged contemnors to the effect that they had never shouted such slogans and used such
abusive words as stated in the contempt petition, instead of holding an inquiry and permitting the
parties to lead evidence in respect of their respective stand, to find out which version is correct, the
court thought it fit not to adopt that course and decided to drop the proceedings.
• However, the same could not be said for the show cause that had been filed by respondent 3(Smt.
Arundhati Roy) wherein, three paragraphs in particular, were found to be contemptuous, resulting in
the suo-motu proceedings having been initiated and fresh notice issued for the present proceedings.
For the reasons so recorded, the Hon’ble Court issued notice in the prescribed form to the
respondent, asking her to show cause as to why she should not be proceeded against for contempt
for the statements in the offending three paragraphs of her affidavit.
• In her reply affidavit to the contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and stressed her
continuous dissent against the decision of the Supreme Court and its proceedings in the primary
case. She stated that her actions were protected under the Fundamental right of Expression granted
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. She conclusively stated that she stands by every
word that has been expressed by her even if they constitute contempt of the Hon’ble Court.

Issues – The quintessential issues that encircled the entire case were:

• Whether, by her conduct in her articles, as well as in her affidavit, especially the three paragraphs in
question, Smt. Arundhati Roy had scandalized or lowered the authority of the Hon’ble Court as
defined under Section 2(c) (i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?
• Whether her actions were in consonance with the Fundamental Right of Expression enshrined
under Article 19(1) (a) of the Indian Constitution?
• Whether any defenses so enumerated under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 could be attracted in
favour of the petitioner?

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Judgment

• Honourable Mr. Justice R.P Sethi pronounced the judgment on behalf of the bench, wherein he
reiterated the the concept of Rule of law and its significance in the modern democratic model of
governance in India. The Court stated that the “confidence in the courts of justice, which the people
possess, cannot in any way, be allowed to be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by contumacious
behavior of any person”. He further stated that the only weapon of protecting itself from the
onslaught to the institution is the long hand of the contempt of court left in the armory of the judicial
repository which, when needed can reach any neck howsoever high or far away it might be.
• Quoting Vinay Chandra Mishra’s case, the Court opined that the judiciary is not only the guardian
of the rule of law and the third pillar, but in fact, is the central pillar of a democratic state. The Court
stated that freedoms of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution are subject to
reasonable restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the Contempt of Courts Act which,
amongst other objectives, is directed at maintaining the dignity and the integrity of the courts and the
Judiciary. The Court further stated that the rights granted under Part III of the Indian Constitution
were not infinite in their application but their use were to be regulated by reasonable restrictions for
the preservation of the sovereignty of the state and the rule of law as well as the integrity and the
authority of the Courts. The Court emphasized that no person can flout the mandate of law of
respecting the courts for establishment of rule of law under the cloak of freedoms of speech and
expression guaranteed by the Constitution.
• Such a freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law as is itself enumerated under
various Articles of the Indian Constitution. The Court further emphasized that no citizen can take the
liberty of scandalizing the authority of the institution of judiciary, under the garb of expressing his
freedom of expression when the same has been restricted by the law under reasonable restrictions
under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. Freedom of speech and expression, so far as they do
not contravene the statutory limits as contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, are to prevail without
any hindrance. However, it must be remembered that the maintenance of dignity of courts is one of
the cardinal principles of rule of law in a democratic setup and any criticism of the judicial
institution couched in language that apparently appears to be mere criticism but ultimately results in
undermining the dignity of the courts cannot be permitted when found having crossed the limits and
has to be punished.
• The Court also opined that, in a democracy judges and courts, alike are subject to criticism and if
reasonable argument or criticism in respectful language and tempered with moderation is offered
against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good, no court would treat criticism as a

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 contempt of court. The Court concluded that the courts of justice are, by their constitution, entrusted
with functions directly connected with the administration of justice, and it is the expectation and
confidence of all those who have or likely to have business therein that the court perform all their
functions on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Commenting on the
present case, the Court went on to say that the affidavit as a whole was not being considered for
contempt but that part which made allegations questioning the integrity of the Court, that is, the three
paragraphs were in question as to whether the case can be made out as a contempt of the Court. The
Court stated that earlier contempt proceedings under which Smt. Arundhati Roy was one of the
respondents, the Hon’ble Court dropped the proceedings, giving due course to the right of expression
of the respondents. However, the show cause filed by Smt. Arundhati Roy, particularly the three
paragraphs in question, were in opinion of the court were found to be Contemptuous.
• Additionally, the Court while referring to the case, P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar, stated that the
benefit granted to P. Shiv Shankar in the aforementioned case cannot be granted to Smt. Arundhati
Roy, wherein the criticism of the judicial system was made by a person who himself had been the
Judge of the High Court and was the Minister at the relevant time. He had made studies about the
system and expressed his opinion which, under the circumstances, was held to be not defamatory. In
the present case, Smt. Arundhati Roy had not made any claim of possessing any special knowledge
about law and the proceedings and working of judicial institutions. Furthermore, in her affidavit, she
mentioned herself to be a writer of repute and that as an ordinary citizen she could not differentiate
between the judicial procedures. The Court also stated that her case cannot be taken to be in any
manner similar to E.M.S Namboodripad case as well. The Court stated that in the three paragraphs
in question, the respondent had accused the court of being prejudiced and arbitrary towards an
absurd willingness to issue notice. She further accused the court of silencing others who spoke
against the Court’s working and decision making process.
• The Court brought attention to the affidavit filed by Smt. Arundhati Roy and noted that she had
reiterated what she had stated in an earlier affidavit filed in the Hon’ble Court. The Court further
stated that her actions were to malign the image of the central pillar of the democracy and the
democratic setup itself. The Court stated that the conduct and behavior of Smt. Arundhati Roy is
insufficient to prove that her actions were fair and in due course of exercising her fundamental right
of expression. Furthermore, refuting the benefit of second exception to Section 499 of the Indian
Penal Code, the Court stated that the opinion of Smt. Arundhati Roy could not be construed of being
in good faith and was not respectful of the character of the Judiciary as was ruled by the Hon’ble
Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras.

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 • The Court Stated that “When a scurrilous attack is made in relation to a pending proceeding and the
noticee states that the issuance of notice to show cause was intended to silence criticism and muzzle
dissent, to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it, is a direct attack on the institution itself,
rather than the conduct of an individual Judge. The meaning of the expressions used cannot come
within the extended concept of fair criticism or expression of opinion, particularly to the case of the
contemnor in the present case, who on her own right is an acclaimed writer in English.” The Court
concluded that the respondent had committed the criminal contempt of the Court by scandalizing its
authority with mala fide intentions and was held guilty for the contempt of court punishable under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. While convicting the respondent for the contempt of the
Court, the Court sentenced her to simple imprisonment for one day which was to be symbolic in
nature and to pay a fine of Rs. 2, 000/-, failing the payment of which, she would undergo
imprisonment for three months as penalty for default in payment of fine.

Critical analysis – Giving a reading to section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is
quintessential that the term ‘scandalized’, used often in the judgment by the Honourable Court be brought
into light and properly defined for an analysis of the case. Section 2(c) of the said Act defines Criminal
Contempt as –

“Criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which—

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
other manner;

It is to be mentioned here that the Court, herein, interpreted the term, in accordance with its meaning as so
propounded in D.C. Saxena’s case. It is noteworthy that the Court itself laid a liberal expression to bona fide
criticism of the judiciary, commenting that ‘healthy and constructive criticism is tools for augmenting
forensic tools to improving its functions’. It is true to the essence of freedom of expression itself that it
cannot be allowed to run rampant irresponsibly and it is the duty of the society itself to lay down reasonable
restrictions so that a harmonized state of being can be achieved. Noting the above points, the Court itself
used a constricted and narrow interpretation of the term and its essentials while constituting the charge of the
offence. However, it is also essential that a narrow meaning to the said fundamental right should not be

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construed if expressed in a fair and reasonable manner. The Court failed to realize the fundamental relation
between the authority of any institution, and the respect and trust of the people that such institution
commands.

The trust in the honesty and integrity of the judges is inspired by their work. If such a fundamental rule is
respected and is actually practiced, then certainly the Courts can do without exercise of powers of contempt
of court The approach of the highest court of the country in dealing with this particular instance of contempt
proceeding was criticized on all fronts. Another fact that calls for concern was that the Court accused Smt.
Arundhati Roy of imputing motives to the Court by terming some of its actions as hasty. The Court had
made such an interpretation from the language of the affidavit which stated that, “It indicates a disquieting
inclination on the part of the court to silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who
disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to
act upon, the Supreme Court is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm.”

However, it seems that it is not obsolete in India despite the fact that Article 19(2) of the Constitution
permits, on the ground of contempt of court, only ‘reasonable restrictions’ on the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a). It is clear to any reasonable mind, from
the words used in the affidavit that the allegation was not that the Court was motivated, but that the court
allowed itself to be used as an agent to stifle criticism and dissent, by external elements who are motivated. It
is clear from the context that Smt. Arundhati Roy had not tried to impute motives to the court, and any harm
to its reputation if any, was unintentional. Admission of the contempt proceeding and subsequent conviction
of Smt. Arundhati Roy on these grounds brought the contempt powers of the court under severe scrutiny.

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