U.S.

WAR CRIMES IN THE PHILIPPINES

❖ The U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands came about as a result of military operation
against the Spanish Empire during the Spanish-American war of 1898-99. The
seizure/sakupin of the Philippines by the United States, however, was not unplanned.
❖ American eyes had been set on the Philippines since before the outbreak of war.
❖ To many prominent Americans, establishing a colony in the Philippines was a logical
extension of the nation's "manifest destiny" to play a leading role on the world stage. An
expanded American presence in Asia was also thought to have significant commercial
advantages for the nation, since American companies could then participate directly in
large Asian markets.
❖ For all the alleged advantages to possessing the Philippines, no thought was given to whether
or not native Filipinos would welcome American as opposed to Spanish rule. The Filipinos
were of course never informed of American intentions to stay in the Philippines. This turned
out to be a serious error. By 1898 Filipinos had already shed a considerable amount of blood
since rising up in 1896 to free themselves from Spanish domination. They would not take
kindly to a change in colonial administration from Spain to the United States.

The First Philippine Republic and the End of Spanish Rule

❖ May 1, 1898 - an American fleet under Dewey sailed into Manila harbor and quickly
destroyed a small force of Spanish ships anchored there.
❖ Assistant Secretary for the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, had cabled Dewey to say "Your duty
will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast ... start offensive
operations in Philippine Islands."
❖ Because a considerable number of Spanish troops remained stationed throughout the
Philippines, including a large force in Manila itself, American diplomats urged resistance
leader Emilio Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines from exile in Hong Kong. Before
journeying to his homeland, Aguinaldo, who was overjoyed at the American declaration of
war on Spain, cabled resistance members the following message, which clearly expresses his
belief that the Americans had come to liberate his people:
 ❖ Energized by the seemingly fortunate turn of events, the Filipinos immediately went on the
offensive. Within weeks Aguinaldo's insurgents had pushed the Spanish back to Manila.
Fighting would continue for another two months, until American forces arrived in enough
numbers to complete the defeat of Spanish troops holed up in Manila. Aguinaldo and his
men were ecstatic with their victory and on June 12, 1898 they proclaimed Filipino
independence. The First Philippine Republic had been founded.

WHAT THE AMERICANS PROMISED THE FILIPINOS

❖ No American military commander or politician had formally promised the Filipinos

independence after the end of fighting, but this is not the impression that motivated Emilio
Aguinaldo and his men.
❖ Statements made by several of the participants in these events suggest that by supporting the
armed resistance of Filipinos to the Spanish, the United States was de facto guaranteeing the
Filipinos their independence.
❖ For example, American Consul Wildman in Hong Kong wrote at the time, "the United
States undertook this war [against Spain] for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans
from the cruelties under which they were suffering and not for the love of conquests or
the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings for the Filipinos."
❖ Admiral Dewey emphasized that during the liberation of the islands the Filipinos had
cooperated directly with every American request, as if they were working with an ally and
not a ruler. To quote the admiral, "Up to the time the army came he (i.e. Aguinaldo) did
everything I requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I saw him
almost daily." Finally, as General T.M. Anderson, commander of U.S. forces in the
Philippines, later concluded, "Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt (of
Singapore), Wildman ( Hong Kong) and Williams ( Manila) did or did not give
Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos
certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their
statements."
AMERICAN FORCES ARRIVE

❖ The first American soldiers under General Anderson had landed in the Philippines in June
1898 as part of an expeditionary force sent by President William McKinley to secure the
archipelago for the United States.
❖ Once the Spanish signaled their desire to surrender. General Anderson ordered Aguinaldo to
keep his men outside of Manila while American troops marched into the city. After Manila
was secured, Anderson then told Aguinaldo that his men could not enter Manila. The
Filipinos were stunned by this and tensions began to rise between the Americans and
Filipinos.

THE AMERICANS DOUBLE-CROSS AGUINALDO

❖ The United States never entered the Philippines with the intention of "liberating" the native
population and then withdrawing.
❖ Nevertheless, President McKinley made it explicit in Washington that he did not intend to
give up the Philippines once the war with Spain had been concluded: "Incidental to our
tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship
cannot be indifferent. ... The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right
and sovereignty of the island of Luzon."
❖ 4 MOTIVES:
➢ Not give up to Spain - that would be cowardly and dishonorable
➢ Not turn them over to France and Germany - that would be bad business and
dicretable / shameful
➢ Could not leave them to themselves - were unfit for self-government and they would
soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse
➢ To educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them

Anarchy - self governing synonym for chaos and the breakdown of civil order.
DOUBLE-CROSS COMPLETE: THE TREATY OF PARIS

❖ Tensions between the Aguinaldo government and the U.S. Army in the Philippines simmered
between August 1898 and February 1899.
❖ With the formal signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. One of the treaty's
provisions was that the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain for $20 million,
this despite the fact that Spain no longer controlled the Philippines and the Filipinos had
formed their own republican government months earlier.

President McKinley finally disabused Aguinaldo of his hopes on December 21, 1898 when he
issued the so-called "Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation".

❖ This proclamation, which McKinley ordered broadcast all over the Philippines signaled once
and for all that the United States had no intention of leaving.
❖ "The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States squadron
commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender
of the Spanish forces practically effected the conquest of the Philippine islands and the
suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant,
and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and
government of the Philippine islands are ceded/surrender to the United States. In the
fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations thus
assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine
Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained
by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible
dispatch to the whole surrendered territory.

The authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the
people of the Islands and for the confirmation of all private rights and relations. It will be the duty of
the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that
we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their
employment, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by
honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these
beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought
within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as may
be possible. ... it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the
confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every
possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free
people, and by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and
liberties which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United
States is one of the benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for
arbitrary rule."

The Philippines would thus not receive the independence that they had fought so hard to achieve.
Instead, it was made apparent to Aguinaldo and his followers that they had simply assisted the
transition of rule in the Philippines from one foreign power to another.

WAR BREAKS OUT BY MISTAKE: THE AMERICANS DELIBERATELY

ESCALATE

❖ Hostilities in Manila between Aguinaldo's resistance fighters and American troops erupted on
February 4, 1899.
❖ That day, U.S. troops were extending the American perimeter around Manila when a Filipino
man who approached U.S. lines was shot by a sentry.
❖ Studies have since established conclusively that although the Battle of Manila was
deliberately brought on by General Otis. In this context it is worth quoting from one study.
According to Lichauco and Storey's, The Conquest of the Philippines,
❖ The next day (Feb. 5) General Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff under a flag of truce to
interview General Otis and to tell him that the firing of the night before had been against his
orders and that he wished to stop further hostilities. To bring this about he proposed to
establish a neutral zone wide enough to keep the opposing armies apart. But to this request
Otis replied that the fighting having begun must go on 'to the grim end'. This refusal
was followed by an attack on the Filipino forces which lasted all day and resulted in
killing some three thousand natives."
 ❖ The battle was an initial defeat for the Filipinos, but it started a war that lasted until 1913.

THE PACIFICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

❖ At the outset of the fighting, American troops in the Philippines numbered around 40,000,
but by 1902 this number had risen to 126,000. During the first phase of the war, Aguinaldo's
men fought and lost a succession of formal battles against the U.S. Army.
❖ In 1900, however, Aguinaldo abandoned head-on conflicts with the Americans and resorted
to the guerrilla warfare tactics that had served him and his men so well against the Spanish.
❖ For all the talk of bringing "civilization" to the Philippines, American commanders
responded to the Filipino insurgency with the utmost brutality. Over the course of the next
decade, and especially in the first few years of the conflict, it became commonplace for entire
villages to be burned and whole populations to be imprisoned in concentration camps. No
mercy was accorded to Filipino prisoner, a large number of whom were shot. This certainly
was not in keeping with the spirit of "benevolent assimilation" proclaimed by President
McKinley.

FROM LIBERATORS TO KILLERS: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FILIPINOS

❖ The attitudes of American commanders involved in pacifying/calming the Philippines are

remarkable for both their disdain/disrespect for the people they had allegedly "liberated" and
their willingness to resort to the most ruthless methods in suppressing resistance. For
example, General J.M. Bell, wrote in December 1901:

I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be used in columns of about fifty
men each. I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley
and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of
towns. All able bodied men will be killed or captured. ... These people need a thrashing to teach
them some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all concerned.

That same month, General Bell issued Circular Order No. 3 to all American commanders in the
field:
Batangas, Dec. 9, 1901.

To All Station Commanders:

A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares, appears to exist, that the insurrection in
this brigade continues because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, pretend to
desire, but in reality do not want, peace; that, when all really want peace, we can have it promptly.
Under such circumstances it is clearly indicated that a policy should be adopted that will as soon as
possible make the people want peace, and want it badly.

Commanding officers are urged and enjoined to use their discretion freely in adopting any or all
measures of warfare authorized by this order which will contribute, in their judgment, toward
enforcing the policy or accomplishing the purpose above announced. ... No person should be given
credit for loyalty solely on account of his having done nothing for or against us, so far as known.
Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of this brigade should either be an active friend or
be classed as an enemy....

Another dangerous class of enemies are wealthy sympathizers and contributors, who, though holding
no official positions, use all their influence in support of the insurrection, and, while enjoying
American protection for themselves, their families and property, secretly aid, protect, and contribute
to insurgents. Chief and most important among this class of disloyal persons are native priests.

The same course should be pursued with all of this class; for, to arrest anyone believed to be guilty
of giving aid or assistance to the insurrection in any way or of giving food or comfort to the
enemies of the government, it is not necessary to wait for sufficient evidence to lead to
conviction by a court, but those strongly suspected of complicity with the insurrection may be
arrested and confined as a military necessity, and may be held indefinitely as prisoners of war,
in the discretion of the station commander or until the receipt of other orders from higher
authority. It will frequently be found impossible to obtain any evidence against persons of influence
as long as they are at liberty; but, once confined, evidence is easily obtainable."
Even worse, perhaps, is the fact that the policies instituted by General Bell and other American
commanders were endorsed by Secretary of War Elihu Root. In an amazing letter to the Senate
dated May 7, 1902, Root argued that

"The War Department saw no reason to doubt that the policy embodied in the abovementioned
orders was at once the most effective and the most humane which could possibly be followed;
and so, indeed, it has proved, guerrilla warfare in Batangas and Laguna and the adjacent regions has
been ended, the authority of the United States has been asserted and acquiesced in, and the people
who had been collected and protected in the camps of concentration have been permitted to return to
their homes and resume their customary pursuits in peace. The War Department has not disapproved
or interfered in any way with the orders giving effect to this policy; but has aided in their
enforcement by directing an increase of food supply to the Philippines for the purpose of caring for
the natives in the concentration camps."

Like many of their officers, American troops also showed incredible callousness toward the
Philippine civilian population. A man named Clarence Clowe described the situation as follows in a
letter he wrote to Senator Hoar. The methods employed by American troops against civilians in an
effort to find insurgent "arms and ammunition" include torture, beating, and outright killing.

At any time I am liable to be called upon to go out and bind/tying and gag helpless prisoners, to
strike them in the face, to knock them down when so bound, to bear them away from wife and
children, at their very door, who are shrieking pitifully the while, or kneeling and kissing the hands
of our officers, imploring mercy from those who seem not to know what it is, and then, with a crowd
of soldiers, hold our helpless victim head downward in a tub of water in his own yard, or bind him
hand and foot, attaching ropes to head and feet, and then lowering him into the depths of a well of
water till life is well-nigh choked out, and the bitterness of a death is tasted, and our poor, gasping
victims ask us for the poor boon of being finished off, in mercy to themselves.

All these things have been done at one time or another by our men, generally in cases of trying to
obtain information as to the location of arms and ammunition.
Nor can it be said that there is any general repulsion on the part of the enlisted men to taking part in
these doings. I regret to have to say that, on the contrary, the majority of soldiers take a keen delight
in them, and rush with joy to the making of this latest development of a Roman holiday.

Another soldier, L. F. Adams, with the Washington regiment, described what he saw after the
Battle of Manila on February 4-5, 1899:

In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth Artillery there were 1,008 dead
niggers, and a great many wounded. We burned all their houses. I don't know how many men,
women, and children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any prisoners.

Similarly, Sergeant Howard McFarland of the 43rd Infantry, wrote to the Fairfield Journal of
Maine:

I am now stationed in a small town in charge of twenty-five men, and have a territory of twenty
miles to patrol.... At the best, this is a very rich country; and we want it. My way of getting it would
be to put a regiment into a skirmish line, and blow every nigger into a nigger heaven. On Thursday,
March 29, eighteen of my company killed seventy-five nigger bolo men and ten of the nigger
gunners. When we find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.

These methods were condoned by some back at home in the U.S., as exemplified by the statement of
a Republican Congressman in 1909:

You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the secret of its pacification is, in my
opinion, the secret of pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in northern Luzon because
there isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned in a most resolute
manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under
ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country,
and wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and
children were spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that part of the island.
THE EXAMPLE OF SAMAR: A "HOWLING WILDERNESS"

Early in the morning on September 28, 1901 the residents of the small village of Balangiga (located
in the Samar Province) attacked the men of U.S. Army Company C, Ninth U.S. Infantry, who were
stationed in the area. While the Americans ate breakfast, church bells in the town began to peal.
This was the signal for hundreds of Filipinos armed with machetes and bolos to attack the garrison.

Forty-eight U.S. soldiers, two-thirds of the garrison, were butchered, in what is called the Balangiga
Massacre. Of the Filipinos who attacked, as many as 150 were killed.

American troops began retaliating as soon as the next day by returning to Balangiga in force and
burning the now abandoned village. General Jacob H. Smith, however, sought to punish the entire
civilian population of the Samar province. Arriving in Samar himself toward the end of October,
Smith charged Major Littleton Waller with responsibility for punishing the inhabitants of Samar.
Smith issued Waller oral instructions concerning his duties. These were recounted as follows (see
below) in Smith and Waller's court martial proceedings the following year in 1902. These
proceedings, indeed attention to the entire matter of U.S. Army conduct in the Philippines, were
driven by the appearance of an interview with General Smith in the Manila Times on November 4,
1901. During this interview, Smith confirmed that these had truly been his orders to Major Waller.

"'I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn: the more you kill and burn, the better you
will please me,' and, further, that he wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and
in actual hostilities against the United States, and did, in reply to a question by Major Waller asking
for an age limit, designate the limit as ten years of age. ... General Smith did give instructions to
Major Waller to 'kill and burn' and 'make Samar a howling wilderness,' and he admits that he
wanted everybody killed capable of bearing arms, and that he did specify all over ten years of age, as
the Samar boys of that age were equally as dangerous as their elders."

Smith carried out his mission by having U.S. troops concentrate the local population into camps and
towns. Areas outside of these camps and towns were designated "dead zones" in which those who
were found would be considered insurgents and summarily executed. Tens of thousands of people
were herded into these concentration camps. Disease was the biggest killer in the camps, although
precisely how many lives were lost during Smith's pacification operations is not known. For his
part, Major Waller reported that over eleven days between the end of October and the middle of
November 1901 his men burned 255 dwellings and killed 39 people. Other officers under Smith's
command reported similar figures. Concerning the overall number of dead, one scholar estimates
that 8,344 people perished between January and April 1902.[

THE DEATH TOLL OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION

❖ "In the fifteen years that followed the defeat of the Spanish in Manila Bay in 1898, more
Filipinos were killed by U.S. forces than by the Spanish in 300 years of colonization. Over
1.5 million died out of a total population of 6 million."
❖ A detailed estimate of both civilian and American military dead is offered by historian John
Gates, who sums up the subject as follows:
➢ Of some 125,000 Americans who fought in the Islands at one time or another, almost
4,000 died there.
➢ Of the non-Muslim Filipino population, which numbered approximately 6,700,000, at
least 34,000 lost their lives as a direct result of the war, and as many as 200,000 may
have died as a result of the cholera epidemic at the war's end.
➢ The U. S. Army's death rate in the Philippine-American War (32/1000) was the
equivalent of the nation having lost over 86,000 (of roughly 2,700,000 engaged)
during the Vietnam war instead of approximately 58,000 who were lost in that
conflict.
➢ For the Filipinos, the loss of 34,000 lives was equivalent to the United States losing
over a million people from a population of roughly 250 million, and if the cholera
deaths are also attributed to the war, the equivalent death toll for the United States
would be over 8,000,000.
➢ Yet another estimate states, "Philippine military deaths are estimated at 20,000 with
16,000 actually counted, while civilian deaths numbered between 250,000 and
1,000,000 Filipinos. These numbers take into account those killed by war,
malnutrition, and a cholera epidemic that raged during the war."
INVESTIGATING WAR CRIMES: THE U.S. SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE

IMPERIALISM - a policy of extending a country's power and influence through diplomacy or military
force

❖ The United States Senate Investigating Committee on the Philippines was convened /
summoned from January 31, 1902 after word of the Army's Samar pacification campaign
reached Washington via the Manila Times story of November 4, 1901. Chaired by Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, the committee heard testimony concerning crimes that had allegedly
been committed by U.S. troops and officers in the Philippines. The policies behind the U.S.
occupation were also examined.
❖ For six months officers and political figures involved in the Philippine adventure, both pro
and anti-imperialists, testified as to the brutal nature of American anti-insurgent operations.
Although attempts were made to justify the amount of damage U.S. troops were doing, as
well as the number of Filipino lives lost, the evidence provided by several individuals was
damning. Major Cornelius Gardener, for example, a West Point graduate and the U.S.
Army's Provincial Governor of the Tayabas province in the Philippines, submitted the
following evidence via letter on April 10, 1902:

"Of late by reason of the conduct of the troops, such as the

❖ extensive burning of the barrios in trying to lay waste the country so that the
insurgents/revolutionary cannot occupy it,
❖ the torturing of natives by so-called water cure and other methods, in order to obtain
information,
❖ the harsh treatment of natives generally,
❖ and the failure of inexperienced, lately appointed Lieutenants commanding posts, to
distinguish between those who are friendly and those unfriendly and to treat every native as
if he were, whether or no, an insurrection at heart, this favorable sentiment above referred to
is being fast destroyed and a deep hatred toward us engendered.
The course now being pursued in this province and in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Samar
is in my opinion sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution against us hereafter whenever a good
opportunity offers. Under present conditions the political situation in this province is slowly
retrograding/moving in backwards, and the American sentiment is decreasing and we are daily
making permanent enemies."

The letters of American troops home to the U.S. were also introduced as evidence of war crimes. In
this case, a letter written in November 1900 by one Sergeant Riley described an interrogation torture
procedure used on Filipino captives:

"Arriving at Igbaras at daylight, we found everything peaceful; but it shortly developed that we were
really "treading on a volcano." The Presidente (or chief), the priest, and another leading man were
assembled, and put on the rack of inquiry. The presidente evaded some questions, and was soon
bound and given the "water cure". This was done by throwing him on his back beneath a tank of
water and running a stream into his mouth, a man kneading his stomach meanwhile to prevent
his drowning. The ordeal proved a tongue-loosener, and the crafty old fellow soon begged for
mercy and made full confession. ... The presidente was asked for more information, and had to
take a second dose of "water cure" before he would divulge/reveal."

Committee proceedings adjourned on June 28, 1902. For two months after this the legal team
presenting evidence for the committee compiled its report. This report was released on August 29,
1902 under the title Secretary Root's Record: "Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare, An
Analysis of the Law and Facts Bearing on the Action and Utterances of President Roosevelt and
Secretary Root. The report was a damning indictment/accusation of U.S. policy in the Philippines
and the almost criminal conduct of the war by War Secretary Elihu Root, who multiple times had
expressed support for the extreme measures implemented by the U.S. Army.

Altogether thirteen conclusions were drawn from the evidence, the most significant of which were:
That the destruction of Filipino life during the war has been so frightful that it cannot be explained as
the result of ordinary civilized warfare.

1. That at the very outset of the war there was strong reason to believe that our troops were
ordered by some officers to give no quarter, and that no investigation was had because it was
reported by Lieut.-Colonel Crowder that the evidence "would implicate many others,"
General Elwell Otis saying that the charge was "not very grievous under the circumstances."
2. That from that time on, as is shown by the reports of killed and wounded and by direct
testimony, the practice continued.
3. That the War Department has never made any earnest effort to investigate charges of
this offense or to stop the practice.
4. That from the beginning of the war the practice of burning native towns and villages and
laying waste the country has continued.
5. That the Secretary of War never made any attempt to check, or punish this method of
war.
6. That from a very early day torture has been employed systematically to obtain
information.
7. That no one has ever been seriously punished for this, and that since the first officers were
reprimanded for hanging up prisoners no one has been punished at all until Major Glenn, in
obedience to an imperative public sentiment, was tried for one of many offences, and
received a farcical sentence.
8. That the Secretary of War never made any attempt to stop this barbarous practice while
the war was in progress.
9. That the statements of Mr. Root’s, whether as to the origin of the war, its progress, or the
methods by which it has been prosecuted, have been untrue.
10. That Mr. Root has shown a desire not to investigate, and, on the other hand, to conceal the
truth touching the war and to shield the guilty, and by censorship and otherwise has largely
succeeded.
11. That Mr. Root, then, is the real defendant in this case. The responsibility for what has
disgraced the American name lies at his door. He is conspicuously the person to be
investigated. The records of the War Department should be laid bare, that we may see what
orders, what cablegrams, what reports, are there. His standard of humanity, his attitude
toward witnesses, the position which he has taken, the statements which he has made, all
prove that he is the last person to be charged with the duty of investigating charges which, if
proved, recoil on him."