01 BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN
KNITTING CORPORATION — SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR CORPORATION — SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al. v. CA
G.R. No. 158158, January 17, 2015, Ortega
Doctrine/s: [BOLD in Held]
Facts:
1. Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic
corporation engaged in knitting/textiles.
2. Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting
Corporation — Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (Bukluran; herein
petitioner union) is one of the LLOs (union) of the rank
and file employees of CKC
3. March 2, 2001 - Pending the resolution of a petition for
CE filed by Bukluran, a Memo was issued by CKC,
informing the employees of the change in schedule
brought about by the decrease in the orders of the
customers
4. March 10 – another Memo was issued by CKC
informing the employees of the Dyeing and Finishing
Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations
therein would be effected for one week (March 12 – 17)
5. However, since CKC was unable to solve its financial
problems, it decided to temporarily shut-down its
operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division, until
further notice. It notified the DOLE of the said shutdown
on May 26, 2001. Note, however, that the operations of
the OTHER divisions of the CKC remained normal.
6. June 11 - While CKC’s service truck was about to
deliver fabric in Bulaca, the group of Raymond
Tomaray (also petitioners here; Tamoray is the
president of Bukluran) approached the truck and
blocked its wat. As a result, he driver of the service
truck decided to return to the respondent's compound.
7. Later that day, the Tomaroy group staged a picket in
front of CKC’s compound, carrying placards with
slogans (Containing: “Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing
Department; “Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th
month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-
SUPER”, etc.)
8. June 14 - 23 members of Bukuran gathered in front of
CKC’s compound carrying the same placards
 They also did this from June 15 – 18, with other
supporters of Bukluran
9. So, CKC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal
before the arbitration branch of the NLRC, alleging that
the above-mentioned acts of Bukluran’s members
constituted an illegal strike, because it was not able
accomplish the requirements needed to conduct a
strike, and also because their acts resulted in losses
for CKC.
10. LA Ruling: For CKC; the strike was illegal, and the
union officers who participated therein as named in the
complaint should rightly be terminated.
11. NLRC Ruling: Dismissed the appeal; ruled for CKC
12. CA Ruling: Dismissed the appeal; ruled for CKC
13. Contention of Bukluran, et al: THAT it could not have
staged a strike because the operations at the Dyeing
and Finishing Division were temporarily stopped (that it
could not have caused a stoppage of work since its
operations were already stopped)
Issue/s:
1. W/N this petition by Bukluran should be dismissed
because the certification for non-forum shopping was
only signed by Tomaray? (YES. Tomaray had no
authority to sign the certification in behalf of the other
petitioner officers of Bukluran)
2. W/N Bukluran, et al. staged an illegal strike? – YES
Held:
1. YES. Bukluran, along with its supporters (like those
from the knitting department), staged a strike without
complying with the requirements in LC and its IRR.
2. A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes
any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.
3. Their act caused a temporary work stoppage as a
result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced in the
spot reports of the Atlantic Security & Investigation
Agency for June 12 – 18 (talked about how the strike
was conducted and about the blockage done)
4. The allegation that there can be no work stoppage
because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing
Division had been shut-down is of no consequence. It
bears stressing that the other divisions were fully
operational. There is nothing on record showing that
the union members and the supporters who formed a
picket line in front of the CKC's compound were
assigned to the finishing department. As can be clearly
inferred from the spot reports, employees from the
knitting department also joined in picket. The blockade
of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of
employees from the other departments of the
respondent meant work stoppage. The placards that
the picketers caused to be displayed arose from
matters concerning terms or conditions of employment
as well as the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment.
Clearly, Bukluran, its officers, members and supporters
staged a strike.
5. In order for a strike to be valid, the following
requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of
Article 263 [now 178] of the Labor Code must be
complied with:
(a) a notice of strike must be filed;
(b) a strike-vote must be taken; and
(c) the results of the strike-vote must be
reported to the DOLE.
It bears stressing that these requirements are
mandatory, meaning, noncompliance therewith makes
the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in
requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is
essential to the attainment of legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law. Considering that the
petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid
requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to 18 is
illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who
participated therein are deemed to have lost their
employment status
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
[Dispositive Portion]
G.R. Nos. 169829-30 April 16, 2008
STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
v. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS, respondent.

DOCTRINE: Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that
they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their
termination from employment.

FACTS:

Petitioner SCP is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying approximately 50% of the
domestic needs for roofing materials. On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders –
General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) – National Federation
of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same
was denied for having been filed out of time.

A consent election was conducted between FUEL GAS and NO UNION, but said election was declared a
failure due to number voters not being the majority. FUEL GAS filed an ELECTION PROTEST and was denied
by the MED ARBITER. On the other hand, SCPEU-NAFLU’s petition for certification election was granted.
The election between SCPEU, FUELGAS and NO UNION was pushed through. FUELGAS participated without
prejudice to the decision on the appeal it filed to the CA. Respondent SCPEU NAFLU emerged as winner and
a second election protest was filed by FUELGAS.

The MED ARBITER dismissed the second election protest but deferred the declaration of SCPEU NAFLU as
winner of the said election.

As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion
for reconsideration.

Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of
unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latter's refusal to bargain with it.

The labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.Again, on April 2, 2001, another Notice of
Strikewas filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination
against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later
consolidated with the certified case.

NLRC DECISION ON Cert. Case No. 000200-01:

declaring petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining
agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and
declaring the loss of employment of the officers of the union.

Respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner's refusal to bargain and union
busting. The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.

On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union
busting. Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003.

The Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. The
second certified case was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. The NLRC rendered a Decision ordering
petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it
ordered the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003
strike, without loss of seniority rights and diminution of salary.

Petitioner filed separate appeals for each certification case.

The CA nullified the second certification election where SCPEU NAFLU won. It is to be noted that FUEL-GAS
participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA added that since
it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as
the duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim
and it has no right to demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.

Petitioner filed an MR for its appeal arguing that: “PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD
CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.”

The MR was denied by the CA, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WN the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union is valid;
2. WN the termination from employment by such officers is valid;

HELD:

1. No, the strike was illegal. Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is
illegal. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike
was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-
strike, it is illegal. Furthermore, Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for
it was in gross violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264, which expressly prohibits the
declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration between the parties. Since the
labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still pending compulsory
arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based
substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the
strike is illegal by express provision of the law.

We agree. The strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the
following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws;
Meaning the strike was conducted to force the employer to recognize the union as the bargaining
representative; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory
arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.

Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It
thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent,
making it a union-recognition-strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is
calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as
the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite
the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal
certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.

The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having
been recognized as valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner.
Thus, it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject
of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality, petitioner cannot, therefore,
be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of
unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot
sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.

Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a
strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the
Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory
arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by
respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds – petitioner's
continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
 


When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
 industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.

2. Yes, the dismissal was valid.


Petitioner contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to
have lost their employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that
the employer prove that they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an
illegal strike warrants their termination from employment. Consequently, since the strike was
illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the union officers was warranted.

We agree. Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
 


Art. 264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
 
 Any workers whose employment has been terminated as
a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.


It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A
worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only
when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment
status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union
officers from service. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause
a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and
preventing management from filling up their positions.
Biflex Phils Labor Union vs Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corp.

Petitioners are officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Labor Union. Unions are respective collective bargaining agents of
Biflex and Filflex. Companies are sister companies in one big compound with a
common entrance.

On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the
accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions staged a work stoppage,
lasted for several days, prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition
to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural
requirements.

On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations. Petitioners, claiming

that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact
that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that
violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities,
respondents’ workers were prevented from reporting for work.

Petitioners further assert that respondents were “slighted” by the workers’ no-
show, and as a punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from
entering the company premises.

On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of
respondents’ premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on
October 31, 1990, explain that those were for the convenience of union members
who reported every morning to check if the management would allow them to
report for work.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since
the following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with:
(1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report
of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.

LArbiter: strike illegal, petitioners-officers were declared to have lost employment

status
NLRC: Reverse. No strike as no labor dispute between parties.
CA: Reverse. Re-instated LA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the work stoppage/strike is legal.

SC: Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do
not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of
employment.
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they
are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an
illegal work stoppage.

There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or

that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24,
1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.

Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with
legal formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the company premises (tents, tables chairs at main gate),
they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person
engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.”

Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of petitioners’ act of
“physically blocking and preventing the entry of complainant’s customers, supplies
and even other employees who were not on strike.”

In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its
legal formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is illegal lockout.

SC: None. If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest
with the management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor
Arbiter observed, “[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their
contention for normally a locked-out union will immediately bring management
before the bar of justice.”

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal is legal.

SC: Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts
of knowingly participating in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph
of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code.

Petition Denied.
ELIZABETH C. BASCON and NOEMI V. COLE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
METRO CEBU COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., and GREGORIO IYOY
http://docshare.tips/labor-cd-06-ed_5890f56eb6d87f8e868b45fb.html

G.R. No. 144899 February 5, 2004

Facts:
The petitioners were employees of private respondent Hospital and members of the
NAMA-MCCH, a labor union of MCCH employees. The instant controversy arose from an intra-
union confict between the NAMA-MCCH and the National Labor Federation (NFL), the mother
federation of NAMA-MCCH. NAMA-MCCH asked MCCH to renew their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). NFL, however, opposed this move by its local afliate. Mindful of the apparent
intra-union dispute, MCCH decided to defer the CBA negotiations until there was a
determination as to which of said unions had the right to negotiate a new CBA. Believing that
their union was the certifed collective bargaining agent, the members and officers of NAMA-
MCCH staged a series of mass actions inside MCCH’s premises.

The DOLE issued certifications stating that NAMA-MCCH was not a registered labor
organization. This fnding, however, did not deter NAMA-MCCH from fling a notice of strike. Said
notice was, however, disregarded by the NCMB for want of legal personality of the union. The
MCCH management received reports that petitioners participated in NAMA-MCCH’s mass
actions. Consequently, notices were served on all union members, petitioners included, asking
them to explain in writing why they were wearing red and black ribbons and roaming around the
hospital with placards.
Petitioner was dismissed from employment because of her participation in the mass
action. Bascon and Cole filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. They denied having participated
in said mass actions or having received the notices (1) enjoining them from wearing armbands
and putting up placards, with warning that disciplinary measure would be imposed, and (2)
informing them of the schedule of hearing.
They admit, however, to wearing armbands for union identity while nursing patients as
per instruction of their union leaders. The Labor Arbiter found the termination complained to be
valid and legal, and dismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were justly
dismissed because they actually participated in the illegal mass action. It also concluded that
petitioners received the notices of hearing, but deliberately refused to attend the scheduled
investigation. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. But the CA
reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were validly terminated for (1) allegedly participating in an
illegal strike.

Held: The Supreme Court said that petitioner was not validly terminated. While a union ofcer
can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee, like
petitioners herein, must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike. But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required.
Substantial evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may
suffice. In case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners’ actual participation
in the illegal strike was limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards. There was no
fnding that the armbands or the placards contained ofensive words or symbols. Thus, neither
such wearing of armbands nor said putting up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. In
fact, per se, they are within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech.
Evidence on record shows that various illegal acts were committed by unidentifed union
members in the course of the protracted mass action. But it cannot hold petitioners responsible
for acts they did not commit. The law, obviously solicitous of the welfare of the common worker,
requires, before termination may be considered, that an ordinary union member must have
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during a strike.
Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99 19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees. After the
holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via
appeal to the DOLE Secretary. Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said
appeal. The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case.

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the
votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day The Union requested
that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied. Despite said denal, more than
200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to
protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota. Due to the loss of the said number of employees,
Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals. Soon thereafter, Toyota sent
individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not
be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives. The letters specifically cited the
Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or
concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a
strike/picket and to abandon their posts. The Union members explained that their refusal to work on
their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right
to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. On 16 March 2001,
Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of
Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In reaction to the dismissal of its
union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter
dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.
The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2. Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal
strikes.
HELD:

Yes. The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota
plants constituted illegal strikes. Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a
lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-
day walk-out. Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work
perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work
on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila. It
is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the
Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of
assembly and to demand redress of grievance. A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under
Article 263 of the Labor Code. These requisites were not complied with by the Union. Furthermore, the
February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its
members are bound to. To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes
are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion,
or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.

No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just
to attend DOLE hearings. The Union members should know from common sense that the company will
incur substantial amounts of losses. In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation
pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their
participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.
NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER v. CA
FACTS:
• The Union submitted its CBA negotiation proposal to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable
terms and conditions.
• Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the NCMB.
• The conciliation hearings proved unsuccessful.
• A strike vote was conducted by the Union on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.
• The Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotel’s basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or
cleanly shaven heads.
• The next day, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style.
• The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel’s Grooming Standards.
• The Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises.
• Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket.
• The Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in 3 restaurants.
• The Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and charging them with the following offenses:
o Violation of the duty to bargain in good faith;
o Illegal picket;
o Unfair labor practice;
o Violation of the Hotel’s Grooming Standards.
o Illegal strike; and
o Commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike
• The Union filed with the NCMB a 2nd Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and violation of Art. 248 (a) of the Labor Code
on illegal lockout.
• In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they continued
to stage a picket just inside the Hotel’s compound.
• The Hotel terminated the services of 29 Union officers and 61 members and suspended 81 employees for 30 days, 48 employees for 15
days, 4 employees for 10 days, and 3 employees for 5 days.
• The Union declared a strike. They engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members
unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.
• The Union filed its 3rd Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting.
• The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
o The Hotel is given the option, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to merely reinstate the dismissed or suspended workers in the payroll in
light of the special circumstances attendant to their reinstatement.
• The Hotel issued an Inter-Office Memorandum directing some of the employees to return to work while advising others not to do so, as
they were placed under payroll reinstatement.
• NLRC ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. It also held that the concerted
action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed by the Union. The strike violated the “No Strike, No Lockout” provision of
the CBA, which thereby caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61 Union members. It ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed
Union members financial assistance in the amount of ½ month’s pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits under their
retirement plan whichever was higher.
• CA affirmed the rulings of NLRC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Secretary of Labor has discretion to impose payroll reinstatement when he assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes. – YES.
2. Whether the acts of the Union (reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair and picketing of the Hotel premises) were illegal. – YES.

RULING:
1. In assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should impose actual reinstatement in accordance with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g)
of the Labor Code. As with most rules, however, this one is subject to exceptions. Payroll reinstatement is a departure from the rule, and
special circumstances which make actual reinstatement impracticable must be shown.

It is obviously impracticable for the Hotel to actually reinstate the employees who shaved their heads or cropped their hair because this
was exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the first place. Further, as with most labor disputes which have resulted in
strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity, and animosity between the union and the management. Payroll reinstatement, most especially
in this case, would have been the only avenue where further incidents and damages could be avoided.

2. The Union’s violation of the Hotel’s Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and
to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character
and well-being of the Hotel, being a 5-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does
not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of
the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is
amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems
with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records that the Union officers and members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their
heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact that after coming to work, some Union members even had their heads shaved or
their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotel’s basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed
and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union’s proposals.

In view of the Union’s collaborative effort to violate the Hotel’s Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel to choose between
allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its reputation, or to refuse them work, even if it
had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in either way would disrupt the Hotel operations. The act of the
Union was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious
damage to the Hotel’s finances or its reputation. The Union’s concerted violation of the Hotel’s Grooming Standards which resulted in the
temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel’s operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.

The Union’s concerted action which disrupted the Hotel’s operations clearly violated the CBA’s “No Strike, No Lockout” provision. The strike
arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-
quoted “no strike/work stoppage and lockout” prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding. The Union officers and members’
concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotel’s Grooming Standards but also violated the Union’s
duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated
then Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will
disrupt or impede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Since the bargaining deadlock is being conciliated
by the NCMB, the Union’s action to have their officers and members’ heads shaved was manifestly calculated to antagonize and embarrass
the Hotel management and in doing so effectively disrupted the operations of the Hotel and violated their duty to bargain collectively in
good faith.

The Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike.

The Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures
presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.

Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which imposes the penalty of dismissal on
“any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike.” The Court, however, is of the opinion that there is room for leniency
with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel was able to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the
ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the
Union members in the commission of illegal acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment or diligence, the Court is
constrained to reinstate the 61 Union members.