2019 Torts Higuit Case Digests

CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER.
1. Umali vs. Bacani, et al. | 69 SCRA 263 and he subsequently died. It was only after the
electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary
foresight in taking necessary precaution to eliminate tall ISSUE: WON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH IS DUE TO
banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind A FORTUITOUS EVENT I.E. THE STORM?
could trigger danger, vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after
a storm and foreseeable damage to its lines that could HELD: NO. A careful examination of the records convinces
endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants'
its plant; and which, after being made aware, thru one of employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by
its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of
of the storm, did not take precaution to prevent anybody the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of
from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by
damages for death of 3½ year old boy who went to the banana plants being blown down.
place where live wire is located and got into contact with
it. 2. Picart vs. Smith | 37 Phil 809
Where negligence of electric utility plant was proximate The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
cause of death of child, parental negligence in allowing the doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
child to go to place where fallen live wire was located is person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
merely contributory. man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
Negligence of employee is presumed to be negligence of reasonable consequence of the course about to be
his employer who may escape liability only by proof that it pursued.
exercised diligence of good father of family to prevent
damage not only in selection of employees but in If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
adequately supervising their work. that course or to take precaution against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
This liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact, Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive f
may escape liability is to prove that he exercised the act in negligence.
diligence of the good father of the family to prevent
damage not only in the selection of his employees but also Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
in adequately supervising them over their work. negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. FACTS: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing
an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse
it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was
do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. killed by the passing car.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy by the name of Manuel ISSUE: WON SMITH WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
P. Saynes, went to the place where the broken line wire GIVES RISE TO A CIVIL OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE
was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted DAMAGE DONE?
LAGASCA.RE: NOTES THE SAME IS INTENDED MERELY AS A REVIEWER. READ THE GIVEN MATERIALS FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. | 2019 | VERSION 7 1
CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the

HELD: YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of complaint, it denies each and every allegation thereof and,
negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and
damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from
opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the the complaint.
situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and
failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed
plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position said decision, each assigning errors on said judgement.
of greater safety.
ISSUE: WON MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY IS LIABLE
3. Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company | 59 Phil 758 FOR DAMAGES
A railroad company which does not install a semaphore at HELD: YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the
a crossing and does not see to it that its flagman and documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion that the
switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at accident was due to negligence on the part of the
the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on
is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a
family who cross its line without negligence on their part. warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they
might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
In order that a husband may recover damages for railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman
deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the
an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching
of such assistance and his wife's willingness to continue train
rendering the same had she not been prevented from so
doing by her illness. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity
employed the diligence of a good father of a family in
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not
sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the employ such diligence in supervising their work and the
area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of
of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage,
railroad crossing. is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their
Before reaching the crossing in question, there was work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to
see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters 4. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company | 27 SCRA 674
from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on
the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to The Civil Code making clear .that whoever by act or
have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the omission causes damage to another, there being
opposite side. negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.
(Art. 2176) Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,
He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of
get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did negligence, then it could not be held liable.
not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles.
Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling Negligence is want of the care required by the
itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
of the MRC’s train. The locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car absolute, term and its application depends upon the
right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
hospitalized. which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the
failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew
circumstances. members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed.
Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against
May be attributed to a person who does not exercise Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled for Culion Ice.
precaution and control in crossing railroads. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not due to
the fault of Quest.
FACTS: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to
midnight at the railroad crossing in Pampanga on February ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT QUEST WAS NEGLIGENT?
21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s
siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not HELD: YES. When a person holds himself out as being
make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will
engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work
for damages for the death of her husband. which he attempts to do.
ISSUE: WON THE PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER DAMAGES? The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in
fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does
HELD: NO. A person in control of an automobile who not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar
crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
does not exercise that precaution and that control over it mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, impression of the danger of fire.
providing a collision occurs and injury results.
But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would,
The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s we think have been sufficiently warned from those
husband and she was not allowed to recover. circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and
adequate precautions against the danger. In other words
5. Culion Ice vs. Phil. Motors Corp. | 55 Phil 129 Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited
by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
A person who holds himself out as being competent to do boats.
work requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care a prudent person would exhibit who is There was here on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
reasonably well skilled in the particular work undertaken. antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this
constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline
FACTS: Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would
trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack of
decided to have the engine changed from gasoline skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in blame.
machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job.
6. Vergara vs. CA | 154 SCRA 564
Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a
carburetor needed to be installed. In the course of the These requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1) damages to the
work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
that the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damages.
During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon
being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered (c) Connection of cause and effect between the fault or
as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were negligence of the defendant and the damage
curable and the accident preventable. incurred by the plaintiff.
Presumption of negligence must be overcome by evidence. FACTS: A Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by FILCAR driven by
a Danish tourist Peter Dahl-Jensen collided with another
FACTS: A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by Lydia Soriano driven by
when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck Benjamin Jacildone. The accident took place at EDSA. The
belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
store-residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, side of the car of Soriano. At that time, Dahl-Jensen did not
causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court possess a Philippine driver‘s license. FGU Insurance
rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering Corporation, in view of its contact with Soriano, paid
the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller’s Soriano.
Insurance and Surety Corporation.
By way of subrogation, FGU sued Dahl-Jensen and FILCAR
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, and Fortune Insurance Corporation. Dahl-Jensen was
this instant petition for certiorari. dropped in the complaint because summons was not
served to him. TC dismissed the case for failure to
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF substantiate the claim of subrogation. CA affirmed the TC‘s
QUASI-DELICT? ruling based on another ground, i.e. only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proceed but not
HELD: YES. It was established by competent evidence that that of FILCAR.
the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at
bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) ISSUE: WON ON THE ACTION BASED ON QUASI-DELICT
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or PROSPER AGAINST A RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, AND
some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; CONSEQUENTLY, IT’S INSURER FOR FAULT OR
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAR LEASE IN DRIVING THE RENTED
negligence and the damages. VEHICLE.
The fact of negligence may be deduced from the HELD: NO. To sustain a claim based on Article 2176 CC, the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the following requisites must concur: a) damage suffered by
police report, "the cargo truck was traveling on the right the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by
bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said the plaintiff.
cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other
brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any
defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap participation therein.
caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as
fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable Par. 5 of Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2184 of the same Code
and the accident preventable. provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
7. FGU Insurance vs. CA | 287 SCRA 718 could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
To sustain a claim for damages based on quasi-delict, the the provisions of article 2180 are applicable."
following requisites must concur:
(a) Damage suffered by the plaintiff; Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable
(b) Fault or negligence of the defendant; and, because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly,
petitioner has no cause of action against respondent and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. No
against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. man or entity may be condemned without a day in court.
8. Singson vs. BPI | 132 Phil 597 FACTS: On June 8, 1925, there occurred a collision between
a car owned by Meralco and driven by Sixto Eustaquio, and
Existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar to a truck belonging to the City of Manila. Eustaquio was
the commission of a, tort by the one against the other. prosecuted and found guilty of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
FACTS: Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case sentenced to pay P1788.27 plus fine of P900 and costs,
filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was rendered with subsidiary imprisonment. Not being able to collect
sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and from the convict, the City of Manila proceeded against
Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to Meralco for subsidiary liability. Meralco set up the defense
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, of a good father of a family.
while the decision became final and executory as to Villa-
Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the The trial judge thought it unnecessary to present the
Villa-Abrille’s account. witnesses offered by the fiscal, and took cognizance of the
records of the criminal case decision and the record in the
The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s criminal case which convicted the motorman, all against
name and, without reading the full text, wrote a letter for the protest of counsel for the Manila Electric Company.
the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of
the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson issued two checks. The adverse judgment is now contested on the ground that
The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was the trial court committed two errors, the first in admitting
dishonored, and so petitioner’s account with the latter was in evidence the records in the case of the People of the
closed. Philippine Islands vs. Sixto Eustaquio; and the second in not
absolving the appellant from the complaint.
Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his
account is not included in the writ of garnishment. Having ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RELY ON THE
confirmed so, the bank President Santiago Friexas RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL CASE TO RENDER JUDGMENT
apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson ON THE CIVIL CASE?
filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled that
damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the HELD: AS A GENERAL RULE, a record in a criminal action
relationship between the parties is contractual. Petitioner cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action EXCEPT by
and his wife appealed the case. way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very
obvious reason is that the parties and the issues in a
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES BASED ON TORTS criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is
CAN BE AWARDED BASED ON A CONTRACT? rudimentary that due process must be followed in the trial
of all causes. No man or entity may be condemned without
HELD: YES. The existence of a contract between the parties a day in court. The Manila Electric Company was not a party
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against at the trial of the criminal case.
the order and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be a ISSUE: WHETHER MERALCO SHOULD BE ABSOLVED FROM
tort. THE LIABILITY?
9. City of Manila vs. Meralco | 52 Phil 586 HELD: NO. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which
civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
AS A GENERAL RULE, a record in a criminal action cannot
be admitted in evidence in a civil action EXCEPT by way of Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different
inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by
reason is that the parties and the issues in a criminal action alleging and proving that the master had exercised all
diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be good defense to a It is the manifest duty of a motorman operating an electric
strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil street car on a public thoroughfare in a thickly settled
action or misdemeanor. district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear
immediately in front of his car before setting it in motion
10. United States vs. Barias | 23 Phil 586 from a stand-still, and for that purpose to incline his body
slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of track immediately in front of his car within his line of vision.
the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly FACTS: This is an appeal from a sentence imposed by the
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Court of First Instance of Manila, for homicide resulting
from reckless negligence.
If a moment's attention and reflection would have shown
a person that the act which he was about to perform was On November 2, 1911, Segundo Barias, a motorman of
liable to have the harmful consequences which it had, such Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was driving his
person acted with temerity and may be guilty of vehicle car along Rizal Avenue and stopped in near the
imprudencia temeraria intersection of Calle Requesen Street, upon stopping, he
took some passengers and looked backward presumably to
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at take not whether all the passengers were aboard. At that
all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the moment, Fermina Jose, a child about 3 years old, walked or
situation in which he is placed and with the importance of ran in front of the car.
the act which he is to perform.
She was knocked down and dragged some little distance
A motorman operating a street car on a public street in a underneath the car, which caused her death. Barias
densely populated section of the city of Manila is bound to proceeded with his car some distance from the place of the
know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in accident, and apparently knew nothing of it until his return,
observing the track over which he is running his car may when he was informed of what happened.
result in fatal accidents. – He has no right, when he starts
from a standstill, to assume that the track before his car is One witness testified that Barias started the car without
clear. It is his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping turning his head over the track immediately in front of the
a sharp lookout and doing everything in his power to avoid car. After which, a case was filed against him in the Trial
the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of Court of Manila, holding him guilty of Reckless Negligence.
heavy street cars on thoroughfares in populous sections of
the city. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS CARELESSNESS OR
WANT OF ORDINARY CARE?
In the absence of some regulation of his employers, a
motorman who has brought his car to a standstill is not HELD: YES. The place on which the incident occurred was a
bound to keep his eyes directly to the front while the car is public street in a densely populated section of the city at
stopped, but before setting it again in motion it is his duty about six in the morning, the time when the residents of
to satisfy himself that the track is clear, and for that such streets begins to move about. Under such conditions
purpose to look and to see the track just in front of his car. a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged
with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his
The reasons of public policy which impose upon street car duties.
companies and their employees the duty of exercising the
utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of Barias did not exercise that degree of diligence required of
passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding him. Having brought his car to a standstill it was his
infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others upon the bounden duty to keep his eyes directed to the front. It was
public streets and thoroughfares over which such his duty to satisfy himself that the track was clear, and, for
companies are authorized to run their cars. that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of
his car. This the defendant did not do, and the result of his
negligence was the death of the child.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court convicting and

sentencing the appellant is affirmed. The penalty should be HELD: YES. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly
reduced. So ordered. finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be
11. GAN vs. CA | 165 SCRA 378 adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
The test for determining whether or not a person is reflection may appear to have been a better method,
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
to the person or property of another is this: Would a about by his own negligence.
prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to resulting in Homicide.
take precaution against its mischievous results and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. 12. People vs. De Los Santos | 355 SCRA 415
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the Instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a safe place the
emergency rule. Under that rule, one who suddenly finds moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without avoid bumping or killing the same,” and more so if the one
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to on the road is a person.
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
may appear to have been a better method, unless the doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man,
his own negligence. in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
FACTS: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?
Gan was driving along Manila. There were two vehicles
parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane part of the person performing or failing to perform such
of the car driven by Gan. act, taking into consideration:
(1) His employment or occupation;
To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and (2) His degree of intelligence;
as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross (3) His physical condition; and
the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the (4) Other circumstances regarding persons, time and
parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked place.
vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in
front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the FACTS: Around 10:30pm, herein respondent Glenn de los
two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was Santos was asked by a friend and a fellow band member to
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. provide them with transportation since they were to
participate in the San Miguel sponsored Sabado Nights of
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. the Lanzones festival. Before travelling on the highway he
On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting drank 3 bottles of beer. Glenn was the one driving the Isuzu
Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence. elf.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for The guards waived at the defendant when they saw the
Homicide thru simple imprudence. truck fast approaching but the latter kept going and ran
over several members of the PNP who were jogging at the The fact that a driver smelled of liquor does not necessarily
time. They fell like dominos, one after the other, some mean he is drunk.
were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle.
The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable risk
The RTC convicted Glenn of the complex crime of murder, for anyone driving on that street for which the truck driver
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted should be held responsible as the negligence of a car driver
murder with the use of a motor vehicle as qualifying bumping that truck was no more than a foreseeable
circumstance. He was sentenced to death, thus this consequence of the risk created by the truck driver.
automatic review.
The negligence of car driver who bumps an improperly
ISSUE: WHETHER GLENN SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF parked truck is merely contributory.
MURDER OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE?
Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law theory
HELD: Glenn should be convicted of reckless imprudence. adopted to mitigate the harshness of the "contributory
Considering that the incident was not a product of negligence of the plaintiff rule under which in common-law
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of countries plaintiff is barred from any recovery, unlike in our
reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple will merely reduce the amount to be recovered.
homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries. Doctrine of last clear chance in common law cannot be
applied as a general rule in negligence cases in our civil law
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court system.
should be more scrupulous in weighing the evidence.
Employer's failure to exercise vigilance over its employee
From the circumstances, the Court believed that the tragic evident from the improper parking of the truck on the
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of street at night along employee's residence.
a malicious intent.
 PAGASA‘s observed weather report: sky was Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of
overcast – absolutely no break in the thick clouds. damages.
 The joggers were wearing black – no reflectorized
vests or gloves. FACTS: In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about
 Joggers were facing the same direction as Glenn who 1:30am, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
was driving at the correct lane. way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
 Instinct, to stop or swerve when something on the boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation,
road is seen. It would be inconceivable for Glenn, a where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
then young college graduate with a pregnant wife
and 3 very young children who were dependent on He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down
him for support, to have deliberately hit the group the street, his headlights were turned off. When he
with his truck. switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a
 Glenn failed to apply the brakes or to swerve his Ford dump truck some 2 ½ meters away from his
vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a
heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Glenn curfew pass that night.
showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and
13. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC | 148 SCRA 353 was parked there by the company’ driver, co-petitioner
Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane
Information gathered by a traffic investigator from persons that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the
who saw how the accident took place is admissible as part oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it was sticking out
of the res gestae. onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor were there any “early
warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on
front or rear the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which
was scheduled to be used the next morning. Dionisio, upon We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
the left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck. cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent recover damages though such damages are subject to
facial scars, “a nervous breakdown” and loss of two gold mitigation by the courts.
bridge dentures. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix. The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has
to respondent’s own negligence in driving at a high speed found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated.
It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the The doctrine was applied by Common Law because they
Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any
having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines
own injuries alone. we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the
Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus,
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the court in this case stated that it does not believe so that
private respondent. the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized
in our jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COLLISION WAS BROUGHT BY
RESPONDENT’S OWN NEGLIGENCE? Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise
in chronology or physics but what is important is the
HELD: NO. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but negligent act or omission of each party and the character
the legal and proximate cause of the collision was brought and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
about by the way the truck was parked. the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be
absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of fundamental law that a man must respond for the
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and our jurisdiction.
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
14. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. | 7 Phil 329
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, The test is simple. Distinction must be between the
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are which there could have been no accident, and those acts
within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that contributing under review was the displacement of the
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
supersede the defendant's responsibility.
In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries
Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be be first prosecuted against the employer or his
exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No
the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
proceed to judgment. section 2372.
The responsibility of an employer to his employee arises Article 1304 of the Austrian Code, the victim who is partly
out of the contractual relations between them and is changeable with the accident shall stand his damages in
regulated by article 1101 and the following articles of the proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is
Civil Code. incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability
equally with the person principally responsible. The
The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," principle of proportional damages appears to be also
exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code.
through the negligence of a fellow servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence. The Court found the theory of damages laid down in the
judgment the most consistent with the history and the
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE — The negligence of the principals of our law in these Islands and with its logical
injured person contributing to his injury but not being one development.
of the determining causes of the principal accident, does
not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts
his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
proportion to his fault. of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event
FACTS: Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the itself, without which there could have been no accident,
employment of Atlantic Gulf, was at work transporting iron and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard. The independent of it, but contributing under review was the
men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. Some displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
of them were also in front, hauling by a rope.
This produced the event giving occasion for damages, that
At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the
rails slid off and caught Rakes, breaking his leg, which was To this event, the act of Rakes in walking by the side of the
afterwards amputated at about the knee. In two car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
particulars, Rakes is charged with carelessness: First. That damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been
having noticed the depression in the track he continued his out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission
work; and Second. of duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have
That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it. occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RAKES’ CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE BARS HIM FROM RECOVERING? Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
HELD: NO. In Fance, the carelessness of the victim did not defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
could not have happened, but that the contributory imprudence.
negligence of the injured man had the effect only of
reducing the damages. 15. Alba vs. Bulaong | 101 Phil 434, 437
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, if in the case of Where the injured employee is offered, by the third party,
damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the compensation which he deems insufficient, he may reject
person injured or in the part of someone else, the it and thereafter litigate with such party; or choose instead
indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in the to complain against his employer; or accept such
second case it shall be appropriated in proportion to such
insufficient compensation but expressly reserving at the and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
same time his right to recover additional damages from his paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
employer. In the latter case the amount received from the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
third party shall be deducted from the amount payable by recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That
the employer. in case the employer recovers from such third person
damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act,
FACTS: The case revolves around a claim for compensation such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or
from Dr. Bulaong, the petitioners being his employees and any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of at the
their dependents. expenses of the employer and the costs of the
proceedings.”
Early morning of that day, upon the specific orders of Dr.
Bulaong, the five employees were went to Bulacan to
thresh palay. Suddenly, the thresher collided with a ISSUE: WHETHER THE EMPLOYEES CAN RECOVER FROM
speeding bus of the Victory Liner, Inc., thereby hitting the DR. BULAONG DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A WAIVER
tractor the employees are riding. The employees were BETWEEN THEM AND VICTORY LINER?
violently thrown out.
HELD: YES. The plain intent of the law is that they shall not
Two of them died and three of them sustained physical receive payment twice for the same injuries (from the third
injuries. With that, five separate claims were filed. Dr. party and from the employer). Hence, if without suing they
Bulaong’s defenses were: (a) claimants were not his receive full damages from the third party, they should be
employees, but industrial partners, (b) the injuries were deemed to have practically made the election under the
not sustained in the course of employment and (c) the law, and should be prevented from thereafter suing the
claims, if any, had been extinguished by virtue of the employer.
monetary settlements which petitioners had concluded
with the Victory Liner Inc. Full damages means, of course what they would have
demanded in a suit against the third party or what they
The referee overruled the defenses, having found the five would receive in a compensation as complete settlement.
to be employees who had died or were injured in the Needless to say, where the injured employee is offered, by
course of employment. Consequently, he required the the third party, compensation which he deems insufficient,
employer to make compensation. On appeal, the he may reject it and thereafter litigate with such third
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr. party. Or choose instead to complain against his employer.
Bulaong from all liability, because he found that the
claimants had received, after the mishap, various amounts There is nothing in the law to prevent him from accepting
of money from Victory Liner Inc., each of them having such insufficient compensation but expressly reserving at
executed a written release or waiver in favor of said Liner. the same time his right to recover additional damages from
A portion of it read: “And I likewise freely and completely his employer. If the third party agrees to the reservation,
cede and transfer into said Victory Liner Inc. any right given such partial payment may legally be made and accepted.
to me by law against any person or company that should The employer cannot validly object to such reservation by
be liable for the said accident except my right to claim the employee, because in effect the settlement helps to
against Dr. Horacio Bulaong. reduce the amount he will have to pay.
Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to hold In the case, the five employees' acceptance of the Victory
the Liner responsible for the accident, and could not Liner's offer of compensation showed they were not
thereafter turn around to recover their employer. He cited content with the amount received — they did not consider
section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which it sufficient — so they reserved their right to require
states: “In case an employee suffers an injury for which additional compensation from their employer. Hence their
compensation is due under this Act by any other person action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by section 6. He
besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured may in turn demand reimbursement from Victory Liner Inc.
employee either to claim compensation from his employer,
under this Act, or sue such other person for damages in There are advantages that Victory Liner may gain from the
accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed settlement. Its driver would not be prosecuted by
petitioners; besides earning such driver's gratitude, the

Liner thereby avoided losses in time and services. And ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE TRUCK
another, even if it be liable to the employer for whatever DRIVER AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
the latter might have to satisfy, the Liner could expect the WHICH NEGATES PETITIONER’S LIABILITY?
settlement between employer and employees to be
reasonable considering their relationship, more HELD: NO. First, the issue in this case is the liability under
reasonable perhaps than a settlement between itself and contract of carriage.
the injured employees.
In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
The Court further ruled that the moneys received from safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of
Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were his
employees, and they were injured by reason of and in the There is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It
course of their employment, he must pay compensation to is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was
be fixed in accordance with law. Bearing in mind, however, the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
the law's intention not to give double compensation, the applies only to cases of quasi-delict.
amounts they have received from the Victory Liner shall be
deducted from the sums so determined. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him
16. Calalas vs. CA | 332 SCRA 356 and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-
existing relation between petitioner and respondent in
FACTS: Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas. accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on
As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.
“extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the
vehicle. 17. PCIB vs CA | 350 SCRA 464
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. FACTS: Ford Philippines filed actions to recover from the
Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she gave way to drawee bank Citibank and collecting bank PCIB the value of
the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal
Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Revenue which were embezzled allegedly by an organized
Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This syndicate.
incident cause injury to Sunga.
What prompted this action was the drawing of a check by
She filed a complaint for damages against Calalas on the Ford, which it deposited to PCIB as payment and was
ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the other debited from their Citibank account. It later on found out
hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, that the payment wasn’t received by the Commissioner.
the owner of the truck.
Meanwhile, according to the NBI report, one of the checks
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and issued by petitioner was withdrawn from PCIB for alleged
absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was the truck mistake in the amount to be paid. This was replaced with
owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi- manager’s check by PCIB, which were allegedly stolen by
delict. the syndicate and deposited in their own account.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the The trial court decided in favor of Ford.
appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on the ground
that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HAS FORD THE RIGHT TO
contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict. RECOVER THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS INTENDED AS
PAYMENT TO CIR?
Hence, this appeal from Calalas.
HELD: YES. The checks were drawn against the drawee attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
bank but the title of the person negotiating the same was reasonable consequence of the course about to be
allegedly defective because the instrument was obtained pursued.
by fraud and unlawful means, and the proceeds of the
checks were not remitted to the payee. It was established If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that instead paying the Commissioner, the checks were that course or to take precaution against its mischievous
diverted and encashed for the eventual distribution among results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
members of the syndicate. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive f
Pursuant to this, it is vital to show that the negotiation is act in negligence.
made by the perpetrator in breach of faith amounting to
fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
beyond the authority given by his principal. If the principal negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
could prove that there was no negligence in the appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
performance of his duties, he may set up the personal reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
defense to escape liability and recover from other parties fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
who, through their own negligence, allowed the reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
commission of the crime.
FACTS: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing
It should be resolved if Ford is guilty of the imputed an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
contributory negligence that would defeat its claim for to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees were however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
among the members of the syndicate. It appears although diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
the employees of Ford initiated the transactions then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse
attributable to the organized syndicate, their actions were that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was
not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable killed by the passing car.
to CIR.
ISSUE: WON SMITH WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
The degree of Ford’s negligence couldn’t be characterized GIVES RISE TO A CIVIL OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE
as the proximate cause of the injury to parties. The mere DAMAGE DONE?
fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor’s
confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his HELD: YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of
position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, doesn’t defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal
entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the
drawer. situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and
failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the
Note: not only PCIB but also Citibank is responsible for plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position
negligence. Citibank was negligent in the performance of of greater safety.
its duties as a drawee bank. It failed to establish its
payments of Ford’s checks were made in due course and 19. Del Prado vs. Meralco | 52 Phil 901
legally in order.
FACTS: Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was
18. Picart vs. Smith | 37 Phil 809 driving the company’s street car along Hidalgo Street.
Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the complete stop.
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot HELD: It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in
when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate
and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the
of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual. injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on
the power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is
ISSUE: WHETHER THE MOTORMAN WAS NEGLIGENT? one where the negligent act of the company's servant
succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the
HELD: We may observe at the outset that there is no negligence of the company must be considered the
obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop proximate cause of the injury.
its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than
those appointed for stoppage. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not
identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this
bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured
no act that would have the effect of increasing the will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
a breach of this duty. injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however,
contributory to the accident and must be considered as a
ISSUE: WHETHER MERALCO IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF mitigating circumstance.
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
20. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad | 16 Phil 8
HELD: The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire
and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a failure on FACTS: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye
the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual). his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway
to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The
as to those alighting therefrom. plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received
the injuries complained of, 15 years of age.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana),
not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, On the 30th of September, 1905 David together with his
or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had companion Manuel Claparols went to the company’s
exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas premises and found some twenty or thirty brass
this defense is not available if the liability of the master fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They tried to
arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so they
contractual). opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was
filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match
In the case before us the company pleaded as a special and explosion followed causing them more or less injuries
defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father and to the removal of the right eye of David. So this action
of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
and to establish this contention the company introduced
testimony showing that due care had been used in training RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: The claim of the plaintiff
and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his shows that evidence in the record sufficiently establishes
art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the
liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation. reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises
were its property. Thus, applying the provisions of the
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS CONTRIBUTORY Articles 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF? 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is liable
for the damage which was occurred.
On November 4, 1967, typhoon “Welming” hit Central

Not satisfied with the decision of lower court, counsel for Luzon, passing through NCP’s Angat Hydro-electric project
defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his and Dam at Ipo, Norzaragay, Bulacan. Due to the heavy
contention that the facts proven at the trial do not downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam,
establish the liability of the company under the provisions was rising perilously at the rate of 60 cm per hour. To
of these articles. prevent an overflow of water from the dam since the water
level has reached danger heights, the NPC caused the
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DAVID IS ENTITLED TO opening of the spillway gates.
DAMAGES?
ECI filed a case against NPC. The trial court established the
HELD: NO. The Court held that the plaintiff in this case had fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the spillway gates of the dam were opened, an extraordinary
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the
match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in installations and constructions of ECI at the Ipo Site, as a
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to result, of which the latter's stockpile of materials and
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and
of that degree of caution which would have avoided the accessories were washed away, lost or destroyed.
injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct CA sustained the factual findings of the trial court. NPC
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so assailed the CA decision as being erroneous on the ground
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have that the destruction and loss of ECI's equipment and
been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in facilities were due to force majeure.
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause ISSUE: WON THE DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF THE ECI'S
of the accident which inflicted the injury. The Court held EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES WERE DUE TO FORCE
that it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the MAJEURE?
explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury,
was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the HELD: NO. NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it
cap, and that having “contributed to the principal opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that
recover”. it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier,
as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming
21. NAPOCOR vs. CA | 161 SCRA 334 typhoon at least four days before it actually struck.
FACTS: On August 4, 1964, ECI being a successful bidder, Even though the typhoon was an act of God or force
executed a contract in Manila with the National majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) to furnish negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
all the tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not damage.
furnished by the owner) and to construct the proposed 2nd
Ipo-Bicti Tunnel at Norzaragay, Bulacan within 800 22. LBC Air Cargo vs. CA | 241 SCRA 619
calendar days. The tunnel would be passing through the
mountain, from the Ipo river, a part of Norzaragay where FACTS: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio
the Ipo Dam of NPC is located. Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle
towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in
By September 1967, ECI already completed the tunnel Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van
excavation work. All the equipment not needed at the Bicti of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming
site were then transferred to the Ipo site, where some from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport.
projects were not yet completed.
When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his
left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for

the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A BREACH IN THE
extremely bad. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn HELD: YES. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
and when he was about to reach the center of the right confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a
lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right
emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
LBC van. Monterola died.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in
ISSUE: WON THE NEGLIGENCE OF MONTEROLA IS THE possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT? airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it
constituted a breach of contract of carriage.
HELD: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE THERE WAS BAD FAITH?
hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to
settle. HELD: NO. Bad faith should always be established by clear
and convincing evidence since the law always presumes
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear good faith.
chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along
the lane where he was right supposed to be. The incident In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled
occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of
that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in
to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the
contributorily negligent in evidently speeding. absence of the correct contact numbers of private
respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other
negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation passengers.
of petitioner's liability for damages.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CLAIMS
23. China Airlines vs. CA | 45985 | 1990 FOR DAMAGES?
Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned HELD: NO. Not entitled to moral damages because not
to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the
business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. award of moral damages.
Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with
China Airlines (CAL). Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not
in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton,
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the
services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did
Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents
to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued would have been entitled to the price difference between
previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking. the tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more
than the former but this was not the case.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented
them from boarding because their names were not in the Evidence shows that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less
passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when than CAL tickets ($629). The court cannot order
Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this
able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines. would have enabled respondents to fly for free. The cost of
the tickets were a necessary expense that private The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
respondents could not pass on to CAL. mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff
suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable
award of actual damages. for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody."
24. Exconde vs. Capuno | 10134 | June 29, 1957
It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
FACTS: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
School he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon their custody", but this provision only applies to an
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the educational institution
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove
it while the driver sat on his left side. Here Dante was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
The jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiiia, died as a consequence. upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
Dante Capuno, was found guilty of double homicide The civil liability which the law impose upon the father for
through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro any damages that may be caused by the minor children
Caperina and Amado Ticzon. Dante Capuno was only who live with them, is obvious.
fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime.
This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
Herein petitioner, Sabina Exconde filed action against they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents
Delfin Capuno and his son Dante asking for damages for the the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
death of her son, Isidoro Caperina. Defendants set up the company, educating them and instructing them in
defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
of Isidoro, it should be Dante and not his father Delfin them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation"
because at the time of the accident, the former was not
under the control, supervision and custody of the latter. 25. First Malayan vs. CA | GR 91378 | June 9 1992
The defense was sustained by the lower court and the FACTS: The case revolves around the determination of
Court of Appeals, hence this case. liability when motor vehicle registration comes into play.
ISSUE: WHETHER DEFENDANT DELFIN CAPUNO CAN BE Crisostomo Vitug filed a civil case against First Malayan
HELD CIVILLY LIABLE, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY WITH HIS Leasing to recover damages mainly for physical injuries,
SON DANTE, FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT loss of personal effects and the wreck of his car resulting
ACT OF MINOR DANTE CAPUNO? from a three-car collision involving an Isuzu cargo truck
belonging to FMLFC driven by Crispin Sicat, his car and
HELD: The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish another car.
Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop
"Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding at the intersection of New York St. and EDSA, northbound,
articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a Ford Granada
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another car behind him with such force that the Ford car was
is responsible. thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing its roof.
The cargo truck then struck Vitug's car in the rear causing who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of
the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze. Vitug the driver is. Granting that, in this case, the father of the
was fortunately carried out of his car by bystanders before driver is the actual owner and that he is the actual
the vehicle exploded. However, two of his passengers were employer, following the well-settled principle that the
burned to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total operator of record continues to be the operator of the
loss. vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and
third persons, and as such is responsible for the
When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug consequences incident to its operation, we must hold and
discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued consider such owner-operator of record as the employer,
at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a in contemplation of law, of the driver. The actual operator
GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses, a gold Cross and employer is the agent of the operator of record. The
pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also suffered injuries registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for
producing recurring pains in his neck and back. Upon his damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any alleged sale
physician's advice, he received further medical treatment or lease made thereon.
in the US which cost him US$8,000.00
Were the registered owner allowed to evade responsibility
At the time of the accident, the Isuzu cargo truck was by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
registered in the name of FMLFC. However, FMLFC denied would be easy for him by collusion with others or
any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck, otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the
neither the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad, after the latter had property with which to respond financially for the damage
paid all his monthly amortizations under the financing or injury done.
lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad.
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to
The Estate of Trinidad admitted that the truck was be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the
operated by Trinidad during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between
raised the defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad was the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely
no longer existing because the same had long been settled on the public registration of the motor vehicle as
and partitioned extra judicially by his heirs. The trial court conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the
then ruled in favor of Vitug, ordering FMLFC to indemnify owner and operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully
Vitug. liable to third parties injured by its operation due to the
fault or negligence of the driver thereof.
FMLFC then appealed to the CA, which modified the
Decision of the lower court by by ordering the Estate of 26. Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SRCA 388
Trinidad to indemnify FMLFC for whatever amount the
latter may pay Vitug. FACTS: Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered
into a contract where the former hired the truck of Gelisan
ISSUE: WHETHER FMLFC SHOULD BE SOLELY LIABLE TO for the purpose of transporting goods at the price of
VITUG? P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that regardless of who the be hauled by him. Benito Alday, a trucking operator, had a
actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer
owner is the operator of the same with respect to the Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily Mandaluyong.
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9
being considered merely as his agent. centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was accepted by
plaintiff Alday and he instructed his checker Celso Henson
It is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer.
employed by the operator. It is even not necessary to prove
Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between

Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. the contracting parties.
The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of
Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and 27. CARIAGA vs. LTB Co. | 11037 | 101 PHIL 346 | 1960
B. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the
Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. An obligor guilty of a breach of contract in good faith is
liable under Art. 2201, NCC for such damages which are the
Subsequently, plaintiff Alday saw the truck in question on “natural and probable consequences of the breach and
Sto. Cristo St. and he notified the Manila Police which the parties had foreseen at the time the obligation
Department, and it was impounded by the police. It was was constituted,” provided such damages, according to
claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan. As a result of the Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. This
impounding of the truck according to Gelisan and that for would be the premise for the award of actual damages.
the release of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the
surety company. However, in increasing the award for compensatory
damages, the Court also took in consideration the income
Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 Cariaga would have earned had he been able to finish his
bags of fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas studies and pass the Board because they could have
Fertilizer Corporation so that, on 12 February 1962, he reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he
(Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB.
Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI Manila
FACTS: Cariaga was a passenger of the LTB bus bound for
Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other hand, claimed that he Lilio, Laguna which left Manila at 1:00 pm. At about 3:00
had no contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday. p.m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay,
Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad
ISSUE: WHETHER GELISAN BEING A REGISTERED OWNER track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES? by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the
latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the
HELD: YES. The Court has invariably held in several body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died
decisions that the registered owner of a public service instantly, while many of its passengers were injured.
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be Cariaga was severely injured – he was hospitalized from
caused to any of the passengers therein. June 18, 1952 to January 15, 1953 in four different
hospitals; unconscious for the first 35 days after the
The claim of the petitioner that he is not able in view of the incident; that he underwent two operations to remove the
lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of
Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, his brain and to cover the big hole on his head with
cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease titanium plate.
contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public
Service Commission. It is settled in our jurisprudence that LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical
if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952
leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, to April, 1953. From January to April 1953, he stayed at a
the transfer is not binding upon the public and third private residence in Quezon City wherein LTB provided him
persons. with a subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his
convalescence, having spent in this connection the total
Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however sum of P775.
without recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by
Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required A suit was filed against the LTB and MRR for P312,000.00
to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
since the lease contract in question, although not effective and for his parents, the sum of P18,00.00 in the same
against the public for not having been approved by the concepts. LTB disclaimed liability by arguing that it was the
train driver who’s negligent by not giving any warning at a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quiet and retired
the crossing. It filed a cross-claim against MRR to recover o life because if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it
recover the total sum of P18,194.75 representing the would cause his death.
expenses paid to Cariaga.
While his scholastic may not be first rate, it is sufficient to
The trial court held LTB liable and ordered it to pay justify the assumption that he could have passed the board
P10,490.00 as compensatory damages, with interest at the test in due time. As regards the income that he could
legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and dismissing possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that,
the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the
amount of P300.00 could easily be expected.
Both Cariaga and LTB appealed from the decision. Cariaga
said the TC erred in only awarding said sum as ISSUE: WHETHER THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND
compensatory damages and for not awarding actual and ATTORNEY’S FEES IS PROPER?
moral damages.
HELD: NO. As for the moral damages – Article 2219 of the
ISSUE: WHETHER LTB’S CROSS-CLAIM SHOULD BE Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages
GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT? may be covered and the case under consideration does not
fall under any one of them. The present action cannot
HELD: No. The trial court relied upon the testimony of the come under paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one
witness for MRR who testified that the whistle of of the quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such
locomotive was sounded four times — two long and two because of the pre-existing contractual relation between
short — "as the train was approximately 300 meters from the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Edgardo Cariaga.
the crossing"; and that another LTB bus which arrived at
the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was As for the attorney’s fees – this case does not fall under any
a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before of the instances enumerated in Article 2208.
the "crossing", while — as the LTB itself now admits — the
driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the The Court also cited Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
warning. Inc. which discussed how an action for damages arising
from a breach of contract of carriage, like in this case,
LTB claimed that MRR violated section 91 of Article 1459 of cannot give rise to moral damages.
its charter by not making any warning sounds, but, the
Court held that LTB failed to discharge the burden of The claim made by said spouses for actual and
proving that MRR violated the law. compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held
by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AWARD OF P10,000 AS present action is based upon a breach of contract of
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES WAS ADEQUATE? carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and
neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence
HELD: No. From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a or quasi-delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they
neurosurgeon, as a result of the injuries suffered by were not themselves injured.
Edgardo, his right forehead was fractured necessitating the
removal of practically all of the right frontal lobe of his 28. VILLA REY TRANSIT vs. CA | 25499 | 1970
brain. According to the testimony of Dr. Jose Fernandez, a
psychiatrist, due to his physical injuries, his mentality has The determination of the amount of damages resulting
been so reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as from a death of a passenger due to breach of contract of
a medical student; that he has become completely misfit carriage recoverable by private respondents, heirs of the
for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around deceased, depends, mainly upon two factors, namely: (1)
without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on the number of years on the basis of which the damages
his left leg and feet. shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by said respondents should be fixed.
His injuries reduced his intelligence by 50% and that due to
the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with
Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and
important element in fixing the amount recoverable by customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed
private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason breach of the contract of carriage between them when it
has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.
in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard such as a
four-year rule. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. The business
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages
Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation
moral and material damages involved, and so it has been attended with a public duty.
said that" (t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the measure of Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous
whichever is shorter, is an important factor. conduct on the part of these employees toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
29. KOREAN AIRLINES CO. vs. CA | 114061| 1994 the carrier.
FACTS: Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when,
Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific Recruiting Services, Inc. instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-
He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down!
initially listed as a “chance passenger”. Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him
embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in
cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to at the departure counter, passed through customs and
the airplane, a KAL officer pointed at him and shouted, immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to
“Down! Down!” and he was barred from taking the flight. the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
When he asked for another booking, his ticket was
cancelled. In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's
aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of
He was unable to report for work and so he lost his carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was when he was summarily and insolently prevented from
informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave boarding the aircraft.
priority to Perico, while the other seat was won by Lapuz
through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available, ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable SHOULD BE AWARDED, AND TO WHAT EXTENT?
for damages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded. HELD: The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary
damages because:
ISSUES: WHETHER THERE IS ALREADY A CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE BETWEEN KAL AND LAPUZ TO HOLD KAL a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-
LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT? appellant has committed breach of contract of
carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of
HELD: The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was plaintiff-appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis
changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name and justification of an award for moral damages.
was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent, negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
"bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
1980, and in addition treated him rudely and thereof.
arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker
fighting Korean Air Lines," which clearly shows In Ong v. Metropolitan Water District (104 Phil. 397, 1958):
malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff- The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff
appellant to moral damages. was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all
to moral damages has been fully established by oral the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the
and documentary evidence, exemplary damages prior negligence of the plaintiff.
may be awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be
awarded, even though not so expressly pleaded in The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
the complaint. By the same token, to provide an exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
example for the public good, an award of exemplary the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
damages is also proper. intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
A review of the record of this case shows that the injury liable to the plaintiff.
suffered by Lapuz is not so serious or extensive as to
warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
in our view, reasonable and realistic. guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may
also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.
30. MCKEE vs. IAC | 114061| 1994
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it was the truck driver's
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
International cargo truck, Loadstar and a Ford Escort car collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
driven by Jose Koh. When the northbound car was about collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and
10m away from the southern approach of the bridge, two Manalo, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, are directly
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
into the lane of the car.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Koh blew is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
lane of the truck, he then switched on the headlights of the father of a family to prevent the damage.
car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the 31. WASSMER vs. VELEZ | 20089 | 1964
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. RTC
convicted Galang. CA affirmed. FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
CHANCE IS APPLICABLE? Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone
their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore,
HELD: YES. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual defendant to bring him "safely and without mishaps" to his
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of
P2,500 as attorney’s fees. defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used when he received
the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was been made a party defendant to this case.
given chance but failed, thereby rendered judgment hence
this appeal. The defendant herein has not committed in connection
with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BREACH OF PROMISE TO injuries". The one that committed the offense against the
MARRY IS AN ACTIONABLE WRONG IN THIS CASE? plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been
already prosecuted and punished therefor.
HELD: Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come
through all the necessary preparations and publicity and within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the
only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be Civil Code. In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and awarded as moral damages by the trial Court has to be
unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in eliminated, for under the law it is not a compensation
accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code. awardable in a case like the one at bar.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the 33. FORES vs. MIRANDA | 12163 | 1959
same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded
when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in FACTS: Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending
the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost
32. CACHERO vs. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB | 8721 | 1957 control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall.
Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant.
FACTS: On December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino Cachero
boarded a Yellow Taxi driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion. The The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
taxicab bumped a Meralco post. The plaintiff fell out of the through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea
vehicle to the ground and sustained slight physical injuries. of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies
liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending that
On January 6, 1953, plaintiff wrote a letter to the a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain
defendant, demanding payment for the sum of P79, 245.65 Carmen Sackerman.
covering actual transportation and medical expenses,
monetary loss, compensatory and exemplary damages. ISSUE: IS THE APPROVAL OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
Defendant offered to settle the case amicably, but the COMMISSION NECESSARY FOR THE SALE OF A PUBLIC
parties were not able to agree on the settlement amount. SERVICE VEHICLE EVEN WITHOUT CONVEYING
Plaintiff instituted an action for damages on February 2, THEREWITH THE AUTHORITY TO OPERATE THE SAME?
1953.
HELD: Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of
The Court of First Instance awarded: (1) P700 for medical Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling
and transportation expenses, (2) P3,200 unearned should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear
professional fees, and (3) P2,000 moral damages. The and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of
plaintiff filed this instant appeal. the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or
any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public
ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED? service Commission.
HELD: A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that The law was designed primarily for the protection of the
his action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged public interest; and until the approval of the public Service
breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of
law, still under the service of the owner or operator FACTS: On May 31, 1994, Priscilla Tan and Connie Tan
standing in the records of the Commission which the public boarded a Northwest Airlines plane in Chicago bound to
has a right to rely upon. the Philippines with a stop-over at Detroit. Upon their
arrival, they found out that their baggage was missing. On
ISSUE: TO WHAT DAMAGES IS THE RESPONDENT June 3, they recovered the baggage and discovered that
ENTITLED? some were destroyed and soiled. They filed an action for
damages, claiming that they suffered mental anguish,
HELD: The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court sleepless nights and great damage.
of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of
Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the Northwest offered to reimburse the cost of repairs of the
records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial bags or purchase price of new bags. The trial court awarded
court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this actual, moral and exemplary damages, and also attorney’s
point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his fees. The Court of Appeals partially affirmed the decision
expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. by deleting moral and exemplary damages. Hence, Tan
filed this instant petition.
On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court
said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT AIRLINE IS LIABLE FOR
well to note further that respondent was a painter by MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL
profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount MISCONDUCT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive.
HELD: We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent
The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct
the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court to exist there must be a showing that the acts complained
of First Instance did not provided for the same, and since of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were
no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was in persistent disregard of one's rights.
allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award them
motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong
are included in the concept of actual damages under the or improper conduct." Contrary to petitioner's contention,
Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems there was nothing in the conduct of respondent which
it is just and equitable. We see no reason to alter these showed that they were motivated by malice or bad faith in
awards. loading her baggage on another plane.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the Due to weight and balance restrictions, as a safety
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have measure, respondent airline had to transport the baggage
repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable on a different flight, but with the same expected date and
in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of time of arrival in the Philippines. It is admitted that
transportation. Where the injured passenger does not die, respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggage on time.
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that However, there was no showing of malice in such failure.
the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. By its concern for safety, respondent had to ship the
baggage in another flight with the same date of arrival.
We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the
carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an 35. ALITALIA vs. IAC | 71929 | 1990
inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier;
and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such FACTS: Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in the
malice to support the award of moral damages by the University of the Philippines and a research grantee of the
Court of Appeals. Philippine Atomic Energy Agency, was invited to take part
at a meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes
34. TAN vs. NORTHWEST AIRLINES | 135802 | 2000 in Italy in view of her specialized knowledge in “foreign
substances in food and the agriculture environment”. She
would be the second speaker on the first day of the
meeting. Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner Alitalia. In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting, but conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner
was told that her luggage was delayed and was in a airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to
succeeding flight from Rome to Milan. The luggage her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage.
included her materials for the presentation.
The fact is, nevertheless, that some species of injury was
The succeeding flights did not carry her luggage. caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced
Desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate the luggage her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time
herself, but to no avail. She returned to Manila without appointed - a breach of its contract of carriage. Certainly,
attending the meeting. She demanded reparation for the the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
damages. She rejected Alitalia’s offer of free airline tickets cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that
and commenced an action for damages. prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the
transport of baggage.
As it turned out, the luggage was actually forwarded to
Ispra, but only a day after the scheduled appearance. It was ISSUE: WHETHER DR. PABLO IS ENTITLED TO NOMINAL
returned to her after 11 months. The trial court ruled in DAMAGES?
favor of Dr. Pablo, and this was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. HELD: NO. She is however entitled to nominal damages
which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right
ISSUES: WHETHER THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHOULD of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
BE APPLIED TO LIMIT ALITALIA’S LIABILITY? defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff that for any loss
HELD: Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is suffered and this Court agrees that the respondent Court
made liable for damages for: of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at PhP
a. The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a 40,000.00.
passenger if the accident causing it took place on
board the aircraft or I the course of its operations The Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals
of embarking or disembarking; correctly awarded attorney’s fees to Dr. Pablo and the
b. The destruction or loss of, or damage to, any amount of PhP 5,000.00 set by it is reasonable in the
registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence premises. The law authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees
causing it took place during the carriage by air; and inter alia where, as here, the defendant’s act or omission
c. Delay in the transportation by air of passengers, has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
luggage or goods. to incur expenses to protect his interest or where the court
deems it just and equitable.
The convention however denies to the carrier availment of
the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the 36. SALUDO vs. CA | 95536 | 1992
damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by such
default on his part as is considered to be equivalent to The carrier has the right to accept shipper's marks as to the
willful misconduct. The Convention does not thus operate contents of the package offered for transportation and is
as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's not bound to inquire particularly about them in order to
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper
expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a
It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases designated character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask
where the cause of the death or injury to person, or for a repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its the box and see for itself.
transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful
misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper FACTS: Petitioners herein together with Pomierski and Son
conduct on the part of any official or employee for which Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains of
the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special petitioners’ mother to Continental Mortuary Air Services
or extraordinary form of resulting injury. (CMAS) which booked the shipment of the remains from
Chicago to San Francisco by Trans World Airways (TWA) Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier to make inquiry
and from San Francisco to Manila with Philippine Airlines as to the general nature of the articles shipped and of their
(PAL). value before it consents to carry them; and its failure to do
so cannot defeat the shipper's right to recovery of the full
The remains were taken to the Chicago Airport, but it value of the package if lost, in the absence of showing of
turned out that there were two (2) bodies in the said fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper.
airport. Somehow the two (2) bodies were switched, and
the remains of petitioners’ mother was shipped to Mexico In the absence of more definite information, the carrier has
instead. a the right to accept shipper's marks as to the contents of
the package offered for transportation and is not bound to
The shipment was immediately loaded on another PAL inquire particularly about them in order to take advantage
flight and it arrived the day after the expected arrival. of a false classification and where a shipper expressly
Petitioners filed a claim for damages in court. Petitioners represents the contents of a package to be of a designated
consider TWA's statement that "it had to rely on the character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a
information furnished by the shipper" a lame excuse and repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open the
that its failure to prove that its personnel verified and box and see for itself.
identified the contents of the casket before loading the
same constituted negligence on the part of TWA. However, where a common carrier has reasonable ground
to suspect that the offered goods are of a dangerous or
The lower court absolved both airlines and upon appeal it illegal character, the carrier has the right to know the
was affirmed by the court. character of such goods and to insist on an inspection, if
reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS condition of receiving and transporting such goods.
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE SWITCHING OF THE TWO
CASKETS? It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled
to fair representation of the nature and value of the goods
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court concluded that the to be carried, with the concomitant right to rely thereon,
switching occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on and further noting at this juncture that a carrier has no
October 27, 1976; and based on the above findings of the obligation to inquire into the correctness or sufficiency of
Court of appeals, it happened while the cargo was still with such information. The consequent duty to conduct an
CMAS, well before the same was place in the custody of inspection thereof arises in the event that there should be
private respondents. reason to doubt the veracity of such representations.
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline Therefore, to be subjected to unusual search, other than
companies could have guarded against the switching that the routinary inspection procedure customarily
had already taken place. Or, granting that they could have undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify cause
opened the casket to inspect its contents, private for apprehension that the baggage is dangerous as to
respondents had no means of ascertaining whether the warrant exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to accept
body therein contained was indeed that of Crispina Saludo carriage of the same; and it is the failure of the carrier to
except, possibly, if the body was that of a male person and act accordingly in the face of such proof that constitutes
such fact was visually apparent upon opening the casket. the basis of the common carrier's liability.
However, to repeat, private respondents had no authority
to unseal and open the same nor did they have any reason In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason
or justification to resort thereto. whatsoever to doubt the truth of the shipper's
representations. The airway bill expressly providing that
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part "carrier certifies goods received below were received for
of those persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter carriage," and that the cargo contained "casketed human
into contracts with it, and inasmuch as the freight may remains of Crispina Saludo," was issued on the basis of such
depend on the value of the article to be carried, the carrier representations.
ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value.
The reliance thereon by private respondents was taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of the accident
reasonable and, for so doing, they cannot be said to have in question.
acted negligently. Likewise, no evidence was adduced to
suggest even an iota of suspicion that the cargo presented On the other hand, defendant Alliance failed to prove to
for transportation was anything other than what it was the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the
declared to be, as would require more than routine required diligence of a good father of the family in the
inspection or call for the carrier to insist that the same be selection, supervision and control of its employees
opened for scrutiny of its contents per declaration. including defendant Leyson.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners' right to be Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and
treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the
of diligence required by law to be exercised by every plaintiff Dra. Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her
common carrier was violated by TWA and this entitles car, in addition to the other consequential damages prayed
them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone. for, by ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally,
Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual
nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of
loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as
right violated of invaded. exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of
P40,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages is hereby The CA concedes that a concussion of the brain was
granted in favor of petitioners to be paid by respondent suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to how serious was the
Trans World Airlines, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in concussion or how it had later become, and the disastrous
all other respects. extent of the injuries which she alleges to have sustained
as a result of the accident, are seriously doubted by said
37. PRUDENCIADO vs. ALLIANCE | 33836 | 1987 Appellate Court thus reducing the amount of moral
damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the
FACTS: At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees but
Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car granting actual damages of P2,451.27.
along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft
Ave. in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REDUCING THE
College Compound where she would hold classes. She AMOUNT OF DAMAGES?
claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph;
that before crossing Taft Ave. HELD: There is no argument that moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
She stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
she was almost at the center, near the island thereof, if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act
Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and or omission.
operated by Alliance, suddenly bumped and struck Dra.
Prudenciado's car, thereby causing physical injuries in In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial courts
different parts of her body, suffering more particularly are given discretion to determine the amount of moral
brain concussion which subjected her to several physical damages and that the CA can only modify or change the
examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
was damaged to the extent of P2,451.27. excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190.00. After due
hearing, the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, found Jose Leyson But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and
guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the,
actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court
ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable While the damages sought to be recovered were not
amounts. satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the
petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an
Thus, in the case of San Andres v. CA the SC ruled that while accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain
sound discretion of a court, the same when found concussion which although mild can admittedly produce
excessive should be reduced to more reasonable amounts, the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms
considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral can develop after several years and can lead to some,
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other
the category of an award designed to compensate the sickness.
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real
and intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she
In a much later case, the SC, reiterating the above ruling, is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which
reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages are proportionate to her suffering.
which were far too excessive compared to the actual losses
sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the records As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code
show that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and, provides: In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence.
generously awarded by the trial court.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is,
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are as the name implies, to provide an example or correction
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the for the public good. The findings of the trial court in the
expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable case at bar which became the basis of the award of
the injured party to obtain means, diversion or exemplary damages are to the effect that it is more
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering apparent from the facts, conditions and circumstances
he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable obtaining in the record of the case that respondent driver
action." was running at high speed after turning to the right along
Taft Ave. Coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that
The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the the traffic was clear. Failing to notice petitioner's car, he
suffering inflicted. Coming back to the case at bar, a careful failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the
review of the records makes it readily apparent that the right to avoid the collision
injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as serious or
extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the The CA conforms to aforesaid findings of the trial court but
damages awarded by the trial court. is not prepared to accept that there was gross negligence
on the part of the driver to justify the imposition of
In fact, a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate exemplary damages.
damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination
produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on
the accident sought to be established, actually took place, a slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to life
not to mention the fact that such were not supported by and limb of other people cannot be said to be acting in
the medical findings presented. Unquestionably, anything less than gross negligence. The frequent
therefore, the damages imposed' by the lower court incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers
should be reduced to more reasonable levels. indeed demands corrective measures.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction The Supreme Court modified its judgment insofar as the
of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too award of damages is concerned; and respondents are
drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the
which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost
reduction. of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant,
and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs
believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such
38. LOPEZ vs. PAN AMERICAN | 22415 | 1966 willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that
the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not simply the
FACTS: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is
American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco was made attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as
by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad
company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The faith.
party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled.
ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego to contact the SHOULD BE AWARDED?
airlines regarding their accommodation. However, they
were informed that there was no accommodation for HELD: First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate
them. Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts
Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation,
“under protest”. wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by
ISSUES: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT ACTED IN BAD FAITH defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class.
FOR DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-
CONTRACT TO PROVIDE FIRST-CLASS ACCOMMODATION class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only
TO THE PLAINTIFF? to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be
humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating
HELD: From the evidence of defendant it is in effect to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
admitted that defendant - through its agents - first rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter
deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is,
their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them as the name implies, to provide an example or correction
go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in
and confirmed. bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award
exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In view
In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to
in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts
the same, when in fact they had none, defendant willfully in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we
and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective
breach it’s a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there damages.
be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before
flight time, as it turned out in this case.
Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been

prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-
interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as
passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to
seek the services of other airlines that may have been able
to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in
legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to
action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.

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CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court convicting and

petitioners; besides earning such driver's gratitude, the

On November 4, 1967, typhoon “Welming” hit Central

opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for

Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between

Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been

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