Esteves v.

Sarmiento
G.R. No. 182374, November 11, 2008

Private respondent and petitioner ran for municipal mayor in Casiguran, Aurora. Private
respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor,
having garnered 3,342 votes or with a margin of 48 votes over petitioner, who obtained 3,294
votes. Thus, petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC. Private respondent filed a motion
to dismiss the election protest, arguing that it was defective in form and substance as it did not
specify the precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The COMELEC (Second Division) issued the assailed resolution, nullifying the
order of the RTC which denied the motion to dismiss. As a result, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper

Held: No.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly states:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Also, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must
first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en
banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court.
Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. t is settled that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the tribunal,
board or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale therefore is that the law intends to
afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have
lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.

In the present case, the filing of the action under Rule 65 is premature since there is no allegation
that the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The
unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of
petitioner's own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration.
Pates v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009

On 1 February 2008, the COMELEC First Division issued its resolution, which the petitioner
received on 4 February 2008. On 8 February 2008, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration
of the resolution. On 18 September 2008, COMELEC en banc denied the motion for
reconsideration. It was on 22 September that petitioner received the en banc resolution of
COMELEC. Petitioner had 30 days from notice to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
Since the last day fell on the Saturday, the last day of filing was on 22 October 2008. However,
petitioner was only able to file the same on 22 October 2008.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, arguing that the petition was seasonably
filed under the fresh period rule. The "fresh period" refers to the original period provided under
the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the
tribunal below, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing of the motion for
reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner timely filed his motion for reconsideration

Held: No.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this
reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause –
"except as hereinafter provided."

However, Rule 64 cannot be equated to Rule 65. They exist as separate rules for substantive
reasons. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that
Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of
petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30
days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the
intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

In the present case, petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to
warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his
filing was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain
why we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
City of Manila v. Grecia - Cuerdo
G.R. NO. 175723, February 4, 2014

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the
taxable period from January to December 2002 against private. respondents. In addition to the
taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Sections 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes
petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of
the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private
respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

Thereafter, private respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for “Refund or Recovery of
Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” arguing double taxation. the RTC granted private
respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its Order dated October 15, 2004. Petitioners then filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA, however, dismissed the
petition, ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic
Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

Held: No.

On the onset, petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA
which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of
such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a
final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the
instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which
is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case

Republic Act No. 9282 expanded the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

 3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;

While it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders
or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA
1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed
before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

While there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power
of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory
order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows
that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered
as partial, not total.
Montes v. CA
G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006

An administrative complaint was filed by complainants therein Imelda D. Rodriguez and

Elizabeth Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes, Chief of the Legal Division of DOST, for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. Rodriguez and Fontanilla
alleged that while Montes was in the process of adducing evidence against Rodriguez and the
DOST Secretary in the complaint for misconduct he had filed against them before the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, Montes produced a tape recording of a
private conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped the
conversation at the DOST Secretary’s Office without the DOST Secretary’s knowledge and
consent. Montes publicly played the illegal tape recording during the hearing and subsequently
marked it as Exhibit "VV."

The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct and suspended him for one (1) year
without pay. Montes' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, Montes filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed outright Montes’
petition for being procedurally infirm. Specifically, the appellate court noted that Montes failed:
a) to state the specific date when he received a copy of the Ombudsman’s Decision; b) to attach
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the challenged Decision and Order; and c) to
provide an explanation why the copy of his petition was not served personally upon therein
respondent DOST Secretary.

Meanwhile, on 28 June 2000, the DOST Secretary issued the assailed suspension order. Montes
now argues in his petition for prohibition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court that the
implementation of the suspension order is premature considering the pendency of his petition
before the appellate court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct remedy

Held: No.

For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency. In
the present case, Montes failed to adequately show that there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.
When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order on 28 June 2000, Montes’ motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the appellate court. Montes thus had the remedy of filing
a petition for prohibition before the appellate court as an incident of the petition for certiorari and
motion for reconsideration he had previously filed therewith. Had Montes brought the instant
petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been consolidated with his
petition for certiorari, thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative
to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Evidently too, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants
and lawyers to strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
Gios-Samar Inc v. DOTC
G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019

The DOTC and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP),
posted and invitation to pre-qualify and bid on the airport development operations, and
maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and
Puerto Princesa Airports, with the total cost at around 116 billion pesos. The Invitation stated
that the Projects aim to improve services and enhance the airside and landside facilities of the
key regional airports through concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects will be
awarded through competitive bidding, following the procurement rules and procedure.

On March 10, 2015, the DOTC and the CAAP issued the Instructions to Prospective Bidders
(ITPB),[9] which provided that prospective bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the
development, operations, and maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two
groups (collectively, the Bundled Projects), namely: Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo; and
Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol (Panglao). The costs of Bundle 1 and Bundle 2
are P50.66 Billion and P59.66 Billion, respectively. The Puerto Princesa Airport project was not
included in the bundling.

On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., a non-governmental organization composed

of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon
Yolanda relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood,
and suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed a petition
for prohibition. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin
the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same. Petitioner raises the
following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy
and the grant of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities. Second, bundling
violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airports,
thus establishing a monopoly. Third, bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of
trade." Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction when it bundled the projects without legal authority. Fifth, bundling made a
mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher than what it
would have been, had the projects been bidded out separately.

DOTC counters that: (1) the petition is premature because there has been no actual bidding yet,
hence there is no Justiciable controversy to speak of; (2) petitioner has no legal standing to file
the suit whether as a taxpayer or as a private individual; (3) petitioner's allegation on the
violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity clauses of the Constitution are speculative and
conjectural; (4) Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is not applicable to the bidding
process assailed by petitioner; (5) the bundling of the Projects does not violate the prohibitions
on monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade; and (6) the DOTC and the CAAP did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of
hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to
seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court, because
it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court is proper.

Held: No.

Litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to
resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental
importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering
mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks
assigned to it by the highest law of the land.

In the present case, petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of
the Projects are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the
determination of which require the reception of evidence. This Court, however, is not a
trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance.
Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank

G.R. No. 205128, August 09, 2017

Petitioners voluntarily brought under the coverage of CARP their land area. It was subsequently
valued by LBP but was rejected. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). However, since the amount exceeded the jurisdiction of
the PARAD, it was forwarded to the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). The
RARAD then fixed the just compensation to Php8.9M. not satisfied with the amount, LBP filed a
petition for just compensation with the RTC as SAC. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment before the RARAD. The motion was granted. However, the writ of
execution was returned unsatisfied prompting the RARAD to issue an alias writ. The following
day, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Notice of
Garnishment and Notice of Levy on Personal Property. Unable to obtain relief from the SAC,
LBP filed before the DARAB a petition for certiorari pursuant to paragraph 2. Section 3, Rule
VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. LBP ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RARAD in issuing the writ of
execution and alias writ. The DARAB granted LBPs petition. The petitioners then filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA
alleging that DARAB exceeded its authority when it granted LBP’s petition. The CA however
sustained the decision of the DARAB citing the latter’s supervisory authority and appellate
jurisdiction over the rulings of RARADs and PARADs. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative agencies may issue writs of certiorari

Held: No.

Jurisprudence has settled that DARAB possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari. There was
no law that vested DARAB with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. Rather than finding
constitutional or statutory basis, DARAB's supposed certiorari power was provided only by its
own rules of procedure:

It is true that the lack of an express constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction disables
DARAB from exercising certiorari powers. Apart from this, however, is a more fundamental
reason for DARAB's disability.

As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial power,

DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of
statutorily stipulated competence but a question that hearkens to the separation of government's
tripartite powers: executive, legislative, and judicial.
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after
the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued
Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already
filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for
appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it
was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of
Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in
Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the
secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which
according to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right
to speedy disposition of the cases.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari and prohibition may be directed to branches
exercising their administrative function

Held: No.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard,
mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.9
The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

In the present case, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with,
they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not
exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were
ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was
purely executive or administrative.
Clark Investors v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 200670, July 06, 2015

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. 7227 which mandated the accelerated conversion
of the Clark and Subic military reservations into special economic zones. Section 12 thereof
provides for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. Based on such law, and in lieu of
national and local taxes, all businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross income tax rate of five percent (5%). Further
businesses and enterprises shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties on the
importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2007, Congress enacted RA No. 9400 which extended the
aforementioned tax and fiscal incentives under RA No. 7227 to the Clark Freeport Zone.

Thus, the businesses and enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone are similarly exempt from
the payment of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment.
On February 17, 2012, the DOF, upon recommendation of the BIR, issued Revenue Regulations
No. 2-2012 which imposed VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum
products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic Zones.

On March 8, 2012, petitioner, which represents the businesses and enterprises within the Clark
Freeport Zone, filed a petition for certiorari alleging that respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT and excise tax on the
importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic
Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA No.
9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone and
Clark Freeport Zone.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari was proper

Held: No.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is a
special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other
hand, is "a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies x x x required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."

In the present case, respondents do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They issued RR 2-2012 in the exercise of their
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers, and not judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily,
respondents did not adjudicate or determine the rights of the parties.
Rosales v. Energy Regulatory Commission
G.R. No. 200670, July 06, 2015

The Energy Regulatory Commission issued Rules for Setting the Electric Cooperatives’
Wheeling Rates and Resolution No. 14 which set the electric cooperatives’ wheeling rates and
allowed the collection of contribution from members for capital contributions. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the rules as well as
resolution No. 14.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari was proper

Held: No.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules mandates:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties.

In the present case, the rules and the resolution were issued by the ERC in its quasi-legislative
power. ERC exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and implementing
the RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it was not called upon to adjudicate the rights of
contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
Instead, RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were done in the exercise of the ERC's quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated in the exercise of its delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers flowing from the separation of
the branches of the government.16 Particularly, the ERC applied its rule-making power as
expressly granted by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136
Villanueva v. Judicial Bar Council
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region
XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18,
2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he
was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner
sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of
considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a
letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en
banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among
others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and
since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
This caused the petitioner to take recourse to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition

Held: Yes

The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation
of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power
of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power
of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that
the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are
being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to
inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Araullo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

The case involves consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. The respondents
aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for directly
assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive
issuances implementing the DAP.

Issue: Whether or not the petitions under Rule 65 are the proper remedies

Held: Yes

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but
also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has
thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional
ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials
Private Hospitals Association v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 702 entitled in 1984, An Act Prohibiting the Demand of Deposits
or Advance Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in Hospitals and Medical
Clinics in Certain Cases was enacted. BP 702 was described as a landmark legislative measure
that aimed to stop the practice of hospitals and medical clinics of asking for deposits or advance
payments for treatment or confinement of patients in emergency and serious cases. It makes it is
unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical clinic to demand
any deposit or any other form of advance payment for confinement or treatment in such hospital
or medical clinic in emergency or serious cases. It penalizes such erring director, manager or any
other officer of a hospital or medical clinic with a fine of not less than one thousand pesos but
not more than two thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less than fifteen days but not more
than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment. BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344
which makes it unlawful not only to demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit
or advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency or
serious cases. R.A. No. 8344 further makes the refusal to administer medical treatment and
support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death or permanent disability
unlawful. In case the hospital or the medical clinic has no adequate medical capabilities, R.A.
No. 8344 outlines the procedure for the transfer of the patient to a facility where appropriate care
can be given. Under a new provision, R.A. No. 8344 allows the transfer of the patient to an
appropriate hospital consistent with the latter’s needs after the hospital or medical clinic has
administered medical treatment and support.

On grounds of denial of substantive due process, repugnancy to the constitutional presumption of

innocence, violation of the equal protection and involuntary servitude clauses, petitioner, an
organization of privately-owned clinics, hospitals, and other health facilities, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, seeks to declare as unconstitutional and void the duty imposed upon
hospitals, medical practitioners and employees to prevent actual death or injury under Section 1;
the penal provisions under Section 4; the presumption of liability clause under Section 5; and the
reimbursement and tax deduction clause under Sections 7 and 8, all of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
109321 otherwise known as an Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932

Held: Yes

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and prohibition is grave
abuse of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional questions.

As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when invoked
permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the legislative and the
executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigation against Former Governor Reyes for the death of Dr. Gerardo
Ortega. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed
the affidavit-complaint of Dr. Ortega's wife, implicating former Governor Reyes.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-
Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone
communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel. In
the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of
investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all accused.

Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of
Palawan. The CA ruled in favor of Reyes and held that the department order directing the
reinvestigation is null and void.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority when she
issued Department Order No. 710. They argue that her issuance was a purely executive function
and not a quasi-judicial function that could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or
prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the question on whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming, reversing or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors be the subject of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65

Held: Yes

Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."50 A quasi-judicial function is "the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an
administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the
rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.
However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an
allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions
of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime
in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability
to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their
conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she
had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. The RTC ruled in respondent’s favor.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the same. The
petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before the Court. petitioner contends that
certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It
maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able
under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review
on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper

Held: Yes

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall
be immediately final and executory. With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it
is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become
immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.
Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final
and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal.

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
Leyte IV Electric Cooperative v. Leyeco IV Employees Union
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

On April 6, 1998, petitioner and respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
covering petitioner rank-and-file employees, for a period of five (5) years effective January 1,
1998. Respondent demanded for a holiday pay for all employees, as provided for in the CBA.
Petitioner, on the other hand, insisted payment of the holiday pay in compliance with the CBA
provisions.

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. He

reasoned that petitioner miserably failed to show that it complied with the CBA mandate that
holiday pay be reflected during any payroll period of occurrence since the payroll slips did not
reflect any payment of the paid holidays. He found unacceptable not only petitioner's
presumption of payment of holiday pay based on a formula used in determining and computing
the daily rate of each covered employee, but also petitioner's further submission that the rate of
its employees is not less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days and divided by
twelve. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied.

Thirty days later, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the Voluntary Arbitrator.
The CA dismissed outright the petition for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper despite the non-filing of an appeal
within the reglementary period

Held: Yes

It has long been settled in the landmark case Luzon Development Bank that a voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency;
hence, his decisions and awards are appealable to the CA. This is so because the awards of
voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; and
since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a
petition for review to the CA, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which
provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial
entities, which is now embodied in Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the general rule is that the proper remedy from decisions of voluntary arbitrators is a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy for one who complains that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acted in total disregard of evidence material to or decisive of the controversy.
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of
only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a few significant
exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the
availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null;
and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In this case, while the petition was filed on July 27, 2002,40 15 days after July 12, 2002, the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, the broader
interests of justice warrant relaxation of the rules on procedure. Besides, petitioner alleges that
the Voluntary Arbitrator’s conclusions have no basis in fact and in law; hence, the petition
should not be dismissed on procedural grounds.

The Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in giving a strict or literal interpretation of
the CBA provisions that the holiday pay be reflected in the payroll slips. Such literal
interpretation ignores the admission of respondent in its Position Paper that the employees were
paid all the days of the month even if not worked. As such, the petition for certiorari is proper
under the exceptions.
Balangcad v. CA
G.R. No. 84888. February 12, 1992

Civil Case No. 1411 was filed by the private respondents on May 19, 1980, for quieting of title
to a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 2858, which they alleged had been illegally registered
in the name of Lunesa Balangcad. After trial , judgment was rendered annulling the defendant’s
OCT No. P-152, Free Patent Title No. 213712 with respect to the land in suit, which the
defendant was ordered to vacate. The appeal to the Court of Appeals was made on time but was
dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. Thus, the petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper despite the non-filing of an appeal
within the reglementary period

Held: Yes

The decision of the Regional Trial court of Bangued, Abra, in Civil Case No. 1411 was appealed
on time to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for non-payment of the docket fee. That
dismissal became final and executory and entry of judgment was made in due course. It was only
after nine months that the petitioner went back to the respondent court, this time to ask for the
"annulment and/or reformation or novation" of the decision of the trial court for lack of
jurisdiction. This petition was obviously filed as a substitute for her lost appeal and, quite as
obviously, could not be allowed. The respondent court was therefore correct in rejecting it.

According to People v. Pareja, a judgment which has become final and executory may be set
aside in any of the three ways allowed by the Revised Rules of Court, viz., (1) by petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38: (2) by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of
the judgment where the alleged defect is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in
the judgment; and (3) by direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the
challenged judgment which is void upon its face or where the nullity of the judgment is a parent
from its own recitals. This case does not come under any of these methods
Ong v. CA, Sarmiento
G.R. No. 92241 October 17, 1991

Virginia Sarmiento sued Eligio Dee, and later the complaint was amended to include Lilia Ong
as defendant, for the collection of P121,759, representing the value of construction materials
which were delivered to the piggery of Ong, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Allegedly, the checks issued by Dee and Ong bounced. Sarmiento also prayed for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment (WPA). The writ of attachment was issued and served on Ong,
and certain hogs were levied. On November 4, 1988, RTC rendered a decision, which was
received by Ong on Nov. 29, 1988 finding Dee and Ong solidarily liable for P121,759.00.Dee
and Ong filed a notice of appeal (NOA) on December 2, 1988

Later, Sarmiento filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal," dated December 9,
1988, alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous .Ong opposed, claiming that RTC no
longer had any jurisdiction to act on said motion since the appeal had clearly been perfected, and
besides, there was already a writ of attachment to secure the court's judgment. RTC granted
Sarmiento's motion for execution pending appeal, conditioned upon a bond in the amount of
P121,759.00.

Ong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with CA. However, CA upheld
the writ of execution pending appeal, saying that RTC had duly noted the presence of the
circumstances laid down by Section 2, Rule 39 ROC, allowing execution as an exception, or
pending appeal, even before final judgment which are: a) motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; b) good reasons for issuing execution; and c) the good reasons be
stated in a Special Order. Likewise, it accepted as "good reasons" Sarmiento's statements that
"the appeal of Ong is … frivolous and dilatory… considering that they have not adduced
substantial valid and meritorious defenses ...". CA also ruled that "the filing of the bond
constitutes special ground authorizing the court to issue writ of execution pending appeal.”

Issue: Whether or not the mere posting of a bond is a good ground for the issuance of
discretionary execution

Held: No.

To consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely make immediate
execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments
would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing
party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is
a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law.
Presbitero v. Judge Rodas
G.R. No. 48121. October 11, 1941

In civil case No. 8466 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, entitled "Financing
Corporation of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Jacinto Presbitero Et. Al., Defendants," said court
rendered its decision on November 7, 1940.

After the defendants had filed a notice of appeal from said decision, the court, upon motion of
the plaintiff, entered an order on December 17, 1940, in which it stated that the appeal was taken
"for the sole purpose of delaying the proceeding to the great damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff herein," and ordered that writ of execution issue unless the defendants gave a
supersedeas bond in the sum of P92,000 within thirty days.

On January 14, 1941, the defendants moved the court to reduce the bond from P92,000 to
P80,000 and to grant them an extension of thirty days within which to file it. The motion to
reduce was denied but the court granted the defendants ten days from January 22, 1941, within
which to file the bond. However, on March 26, 1941, the lower court entered an order allowing
the writ of execution.

Petitioner (who were the defendants) filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not petition for prohibition is proper

Held: No.

The proper remedy for the petitioners, if any, is certiorari to annul or modify the order of the
respondent judge for the filing of a supersedeas bond, and not prohibition to require the
respondent judge to desist from enforcing said order.
St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against
St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due
to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St.
Martin’s monthly payroll.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-
employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a
situation.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the
case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the
NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Where to file an appeal from a decision of the NLRC?

Held: Court of Appeals.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition
for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty
days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor
Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule
65.

All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Sps. Crisologo v. JERM Agro-Industrial Corporation
G.R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014

The controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So
Keng Kok, the owner of various properties including two (2) parcels of land which were attached
by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated
on the back of the said titles.

Spouses Crisologo were the plaintiffs in two collection cases before the RTC Davao. The RTC
rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, between the parties wherein the
defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben.
The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same
to JEWM. A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed
before RTC against So Ken Koc.

When this decision attained finality, they moved for execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was
eventually issued. Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an
auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale included, among others, the subject properties in
the name of JEWM.

To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action before RTC-Br. 14 for cancellation of lien
with prayer for thei ssuance of a preliminary injunction, cancellation of all the annotations on the
back of the pertinent TCTs; and theissuance of a permanent injunction order after trial on the
merits. The counsel then of spouses Crisologo questioned the authority of the said court to
restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. But JEWM opposed it on the ground that
Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as
the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and
Jane Does named in the complaint of JEWM.

On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27, 2010, October 7,
2010 and November 9, 2010, all of which denied their motion to be recognized as parties.
However, the CA eventually denied the petition filed by petitioners for lack of merit. It held that
the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65
inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.

Issue: Whether the CA the filing of the petition for certiorari was proper

Held: Yes.

The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any
plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except
resorting to Rule 65.

Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy
should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on
joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to
intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse
rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs.

Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can
appeal. Here, Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized
appeal as they never possessed the required legal standing in the first place.

And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to appeal, it must be
remembered that the questioned orders were interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses
Crisologo would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until the rendition of the judgment on
the merits, which at that time may not be coming as speedy as practicable. While waiting,
Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as indispensable parties, to
participate in a proceeding in which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannot
constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.

The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 is made since this
remedy presupposes a final judgment already rendered by a trial court.

At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.

The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels
injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions. The ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil
action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a
quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous and
endless litigations.

Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal
standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s
recourse via Rule 65.

This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of
procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are
tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid
application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by,
the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause.

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the
judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled
that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.
Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed
orders, which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.