SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
75, but the right to compel the the rule-making power of the Supreme
Rule 62
1. Makati Development Corp. v.
Tanjuatco, 27 SCRA 401 (1969)
Facts: Plaintiff Makati Dev’t Corp and
defendant Tanjuatco entered into a contract
whereby the latter bound himself to
construct a reinforced concrete covered
water reservoir, office and pump house and
water main at Forbes Park, furnishing the
materials necessary therefor. Before making
the final payment of the consideration
agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the
suppliers of materials, who had called its
attention to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco,
whether the latter had settled his accounts
with them. In response to this inquiry,
Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (supplier) made a
claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing
the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly
delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent,
plaintiff withheld said amount from the final
payment made to him and, in view of his
subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon
with the Supplier, plaintiff instituted the
present action against Tanjuatco and the
Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their
conflicting claims."
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon
the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the litigation, the
amount involved therein being less than
P10,000.00. The lower court granted the
same and dismissed the case. Hence, this
appeal. Plaintiff contends that the CFI has
jurisdiction because the subject-matter of
this litigation is not the aforementioned sum
of P5,198.
defendants "to litigate among themselves".
Issue: Does the MTC have jurisdiction over
the case?
Held: No. Plaintiff may compel the
defendants to interplead among themselves
concerning the aforementioned sum of
P5,198.75. The issue of who among the
defendants is entitled to collect the same is
the object of the action and is not within the
jurisdiction of the MTC.
The plaintiff in asserting the jurisdiction of
the CFI relies upon Rule 63 of the present
Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in
cases of interpleading, and section 19 of
Rule 5, which omits the Rules on
Interpleading among those made applicable
to inferior courts. However, the jurisdiction
of our courts over the subject-matter of
justiciable controversies is governed by Rep.
Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to
which municipal courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or
the value of the property in controversy",
amounts to not more than PHP10,000.
Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts" belongs to Congress  and is beyond
Court, which is limited to matters
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said
section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of
Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading,
applicable to inferior courts, merely implies
that the same are not bound to follow Rule
63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but
may apply thereto the general rules on
procedure applicable to ordinary civil action
in said courts.
The MTC has no jurisdiction over the case
since the amount subject of the interpleader
does not exceed 400,000. Under Batas
Pambasa Blg. 129, MTC has no jurisdiction
over civil actions where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed 400k.
However, where the subject of the
interpleader is not the possession or title of
real or personal property but the
performance of a service, it is the RTC that
has jurisdiction being a subject incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

2. Bliss Development Corp v. Diaz,
August 5, 2015
Facts: Bliss Development Corporation is the
owner of a housing complex located in
Quezon City. It instituted before RTC
Makati an interpleader case against Arreza
and Diaz who were conflicting claimants of
the property (Civil Case No. 94-2086). The
RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of
said decision, Bliss executed a contract to
sell the property to Arreza and Diaz was
constrained to transfer possession together
with all improvements to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz filed a case against Arreza
and Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost
of his acquisition and improvements on the
property (Civil Case No. 96-1372). Arreza
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
res judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC
denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Arreza appealed to CA which dismissed the
petition saying that res judicata does not
apply because the interpleader case only
settled the issue on who had a better right. It
did not determine the parties‘ respective
rights and obligations.
The action filed by Diaz seeks principally
the collection of damages in the form of the
payments Diaz made to Bliss and the value
of the improvements he introduced on the
property matters that were not adjudicated
upon in the previous case for interpleader.  matter and the parties; (4) there must be,
BDC also argued in its respective answer
that Diaz’s complaint for reimbursement is
barred by res judicata since it should have
been raised in the interpleader suit.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA
APPLIES. Res judicata (action is barred by
prior judgment)
RULING:
As to Diaz’s complaint for reimbursement,
such is barred by res judicata as her
complaint is in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which should have been raised
in the interpleader suit. Not having been
raised, the same is barred pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 9. Therfore, Arreza is
correct in his argument that Diaz’s
complaint is barred by res judicata.
However, BDC’s argument that Diaz’s
complaint for reimbursement is barred by
res judicata is not correct. The elements of
res judicata are not present.
The elements of res judicata are as follows:
(1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject
between the first and the second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter and
cause of action.
In the case at bar, such elements are not
present. First, the interpleader case was
between Arreza and Diaz. While it is BDC
that initiated the interpleader case, the
opposing parties in that prior case are Arreza
and Diaz.
Second, the issues resolved in the
interpleader case revolved around the
conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and
not whatever claim either of them may have
against BDC.
Therefore, there is no identity of parties, nor
identity of subject matter between the
interpleader case and complaint for sum of
money.

3. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig, March 12,
2014
Facts:
 Petitioner Lui Enterprises, Inc. and
respondent Zuellig Pharma Corporation
entered into a 10-year lease contract over a
parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto,
Buhangin, Davao City. During the pendency
of the lease, respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM) contacted
Zuellig to inform them that it was the new
owner of the property, and asked the latter to
pay rent directly to it. Zuellig subsequently
informed petitioner of PBCOM’s letter, and
petitioner insisted on its right to collect rent.
As a result of this, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the Makati
Regional Trial Court of Makati, consigned
its current (P604,024.35) and future rental
payments to the court, and prayed to for Zui
Enterprises and PBCOM be ordered to
litigate their conflicting claims. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss, stating that it had a
pending nullification of deed of dation in
payment case with the Regional Trial Court
of Davao, which barred the filing of the
current interpleader case as the dation case
involved the proper that Zuelling was
leasing. Zuellig responded that the pendency
of the nullification case did not bar the filing
of the interpleader, as it (Zuellig) was not a
party to the nullification case.
Petitioner had also filed its motion to
dismiss beyond the 15-day period to file an
answer, and Zuellig subsequently moved
that petitioner be declared in default. In its
subsequent motion to set aside the order of
default – filed one year after being declared
in default - Lui invoked the ground of
excusable negligence, alleging that its
failure to file a motion to dismiss on time
"was caused by the negligence of its former
counsel”. For meritorious defense, petitioner
alleged that the earlier filed nullification of
deed of dation in payment case (Davao
RTC) barred the filing of the interpleader
case (Makati RTC). The two actions
allegedly involved the same parties and the
same issue of which corporation had the
better right over the rental payments (aka,
Litis Pendentia).  better
The Makati RTC ruled that Lui Enterprises
was "barred from any claim in respect of the
rental payments" since it was declared in
default, awarded the rental fees to PBCOM,
and ordered the petitioner to pay Zuellig
Pharma P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.  of Makati on grounds of litis pendentia.
Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the
Court of Appeals, which on the matter of the
motion to set aside the order of default
found that petitioner failed to show the
excusable negligence that prevented it from
filing its motion to dismiss on time. The CA
further ruled that the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case did not bar the filing
of the interpleader case, since Zuellig was
not a party to the aforementioned case. In its
subsequent petition before the SC, petitioner
argued that the pending nullification of deed
of dation in payment case barred the filing
of the interpleader case. The nullification of
deed of dation in payment case and the
interpleader case allegedly involved the
same issue of which corporation had the
right to the rent. 
Issue:
 Whether or not the annulment of deed of
dation in payment pending in Davao RTC
barred the subsequent filing of the
interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court
Held: 
No. Petition denied, CA ruling affirmed with
modification.
Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending
suit." It exists when "another action is
pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action The subsequent action
is "unnecessary and vexatious" and is
instituted to "harass the respondent [in the
subsequent action]." The requisites of litis
pendentia are:
  Identity of parties or at least such as the defaulted claimant from any claim in
represent the same interest in both respect to the subject matter.
actions;
 Identity of rights asserted and reliefs The Rules would not have allowed claimants
prayed for, the reliefs being founded in interpleader cases to be declared in
on the same facts; and default if it would ironically defeat the very
 The identity in the two cases should purpose of the suit.
be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.

All of the requisites must be present. Absent

one requisite, there is no litis pendentia. 

In the current case, there is no litis

pendentia since there is no identity of parties
in the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case and the interpleader case.
Zuellig is not a party to the nullification case
filed in the Davao trial court. There is also
no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for. Petitioner filed the first case to
nullify the deed of dation in payment it
executed in favor of PBCOM. Zuellig
subsequently filed the interpleader case to
consign in court the rental payments and
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The
interpleader case was necessary and was not
instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or
PBCOM.

At any rate, an adverse claimant in an

interpleader case who fails to answer within
the required period may, on motion, be
declared in default pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 62. The consequence of the default is
that the court may render judgment barring

4. Bank of Commerce v. Planters
Development Bank. September 24,
2012
Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45,1 on pure
questions of law, filed by the petitioners
Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). They assail the
January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 Orders
(assailed orders) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil
Case Nos. 94-3233 and 94-3254. These
orders dismissed * (i) the petition filed by
the Planters Development Bank (PDB), *(ii)
the "counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and
*(iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader filed bythe BSP; and denied the
BOC’s and the BSP’s motions for
reconsideration. In the case, 7 Central Bank
Bills with the value of 70 million were
issued to RCBC, then RCBC sold the same
to BOC, later BOC transferred the same top
PDB. On April 15, 1994, the PDB, in turn,
sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70
million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994,
as evidenced by a Trading Order8 and a
Confirmation of Sale. However, instead of
delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB
delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as
evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery
Receipt.
Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession
of the Detached Assignments. It is basically
the nature of this April 15 transaction that
the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.
These CB Bills were transferred to other
banks and finance institutions but were all
later taken back by the BOC. PDB then filed
a case to BSP to to give notification that
those CB bills have been tainted fraudulent
transactions and to record its claim in the
BSP’s books, explaining that its non-
possession of the CB bills is "on account of
imperfect negotiations thereof and/or
subsequent setoff or transfer. However, BSP
officer Nugui declined invoking Section 8 of
CB Circular No. 28.
In light of these BSP responses and the
impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB
filed29 with the RTC two separate petitions
for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order which was
later granted. Then BSP asked that an
interpleader suit be allowed between and
among the claimants to the subject CB bills
on the position that while it is able and
willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face
value, it is duty bound to ensure that
payment is made to the rightful owner. The
PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative
response for an interpleader.
Later, BOC and PDB agreed to have an
escrow agreement. The application for
interpleader was granted but PDB
questioned the counterclaim posed by BOC.
Then the court issued the questions orders.
ISSUE:
ON CONFLICTING CLAIMS SUBJECT
OF THE INTERPLEADER SUIT, WHO
PAYS THE DOCKET FEES?
RULING:
The conflicting claimants.
Regardless of the nature of the BOC’s
"counterclaims," for purposes of payment of
filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB,
properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must
be assessed the payment of the correct
docket fee arising from their respective
claims. The seminal case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion150 provides us
guidance in the payment of docket fees, to
wit:
1. x x x Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to
permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which
 shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. [underscoring
ours]

This must be the rule considering that

Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:

SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs

and litigation expenses as liens. – The
docket and other lawful fees paid by the
party who filed a complaint under this Rule,
as well as the costs and litigation expenses,
shall constitute a lien or charge upon the
subject matter of the action unless the court
shall order otherwise.

 Since the defendants-in-interpleader are

actually the ones who make a claim - only
that it was extraordinarily done through the
procedural device of interpleader - then to
them devolves the duty to pay the docket
fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended

Rule 63
5. Santiago v. Commissioner of
Immigration, January 31, 1963
On June 15, 1957 Ricardo Santiago filed in
the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition praying that he be
declared a Philippine citizen and that an
order be issued cancelling his alien
certificate of registration, alleged by him to
have been erroneously entered in the Bureau
of Immigration. The petition was
subsequently amended to make the
Commissioner of Immigration a Respondent.
During the hearing petitioner presented
evidence to prove the following: On
September 28, 1904, in La Carlota, Negros
Occidental, he was born out of wedlock to
Apolonia Andrade, Filipina, and Tomas
Santiago, Chinese, who could not marry
each other because the latter had a lawfully
wedded wife in China. When he was four,
his father sent him on a vacation to China.
Upon return to the Philippines in 1915 he
was issued Landing Certificate of Residence
No. 13939 (Exhibit G) wherein it appears
that he is a Filipino. In 1924 he went back to
China and there married a Chinese woman,
Ty Sek Nio, whom he brought to the
Philippines in 1925 and who was granted
Landing Certificate of Residence No. 69033
(Exhibit
H), wherein it appears that she is the wife of
a Filipino citizen. Petitioner and his family
lived in Himamaylan, where he operated a
sari-sari store. During the Japanese
occupation, he and his family evacuated to
the swamps. After liberation they stayed for
a short time in Andangan, Quezon, where
they engaged in the copra business. In 1956
he and his family returned to Bacolod. In
August 1957 they transferred to Sipalay,
Negros Occidental, where they had been
living up to the time of the hearing. Aside
from the son born to him and his wife in
China, they have five other children born in
the Philippines. In spite of petitioner’s
alleged Filipino citizenship, his father,
before the latter’s death in 1928, erroneously
registered him as an alien. The registration
was periodically renewed thereafter, the last
being in 1950, when Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 97013, Exhibit M, the one
now sought to be cancelled, was issued to
him.
Based on the above evidence, the lower
court, on March 19, 1958, issued an order,
the dispositive part of which
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Wherefore, the Court finds that the
petitioner has established the allegations
contained in his amended petition and
following the ruling in U.S. v. Ong Tian Se,
29 Phil. 352; Santos Ko v. P.P.I. 52 Phil.
562; and in the case of Luis Serra, G.R. No.
L-4223, May 12, 1952, it is hereby declared
that the petitioner Ricardo Santiago is a
Filipino citizen,
and it is hereby ordered that the
Commissioner of Immigration cancel the
Alien Certificate of Registration of
Residence No. 197013 of the petitioner
Ricardo Santiago in the files of the
Immigration Office, without pronouncement
as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
The provincial fiscal, in representation of the
Solicitor- General, moved for
reconsideration on the ground that an action
for declaratory relief is not the proper
remedy for removing doubts as to
citizenship. Finding this motion to be well-
founded, the court, on June 14, 1958, set
aside its order of March 19. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of this second
order and for reinstatement of the first,
amending it, however, by having the
declaration of his Filipino citizenship
eliminated.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY
RELIEF IS THE PROPER REMEDY IN
SEEKING A DECLARATION OF
ONE’S STATUS OR CITIZENSHIP
RULING:
NO.
Appellant contends that appellee’s petition is
one for declaratory relief, a remedy not
available in seeking a declaration of one’s
status or citizenship. On the other hand,
appellee argues that his suit is merely for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration.
In his original petition appellee prayed, inter
alia, that the court "declare him as a Filipino
citizen." This portion of the prayer was,
however, omitted from his amended petition,
leaving only that asking for cancellation of
his alien certificate of registration. The
original petition appears to be in the nature
of a proceeding for declaratory relief,
although it is not captioned as such. And
while the amended petition does not ask for
declaration of Filipino citizenship, the plea
is implicit in the prayer for cancellation of
the appellee’s alien certificate of
registration, for the cancellation cannot be
based on any other ground other than that
appellee is a Filipino citizen.
The lower court itself, in its original order,
made such a declaration of appellee’s
citizenship, although when it reinstated the
order after having first set it aside, the
declaration was eliminated, thereby leaving
without support its order for cancellation of
appellee’s alien certificate of registration.
In any event, whether or not appellee’s suit
is interpreted as one for declaratory relief,
what seems clear is that, directly or
indirectly, he seeks a declaration of his
supposed Philippine citizenship.
There is no proceeding, by declaratory relief
1 or otherwise 2 available for the express
purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration to
that effect. This was the ruling of this Court
in Eleuteria Feliseta Tan v. Republic (G. R.
No. L-16108, October 31,
1961):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a
special civil action which may lie only when
‘any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by statute or
ordinance,’ demands construction thereof for
a declaration of his rights thereunder. None
of the above circumstances exists in the case
under consideration. And this Court has
already held that there is no proceeding
established by law or the rules by which any
person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect
or in regard to his citizenship.
‘Under our laws, there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice
exist for the settlement of justifiable
controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right. As an accident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the parties to
a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to, their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power.
Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding
may be instituted for a declaration to the
effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married,
or single, or a legitimate child, although a
finding thereon may be made as a necessary
premise to justify a given relief available
only to one enjoying said status. At times,
the law permits the acquisition of a given
status, such as naturalization, by judicial
decree. But, there is no similar legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is
part of our citizenry.’ (Tan v. Republic, G.R.
No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated on
G.R. No. L-15775 April 29, 1961)."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The lower court based the appealed order on
the cases of U.S. v. Ong Tian Se, 29 Jur. Fil.
352; Santos Co v. P.P.I., 52 Jur. Fil. 562;
Luis Serra contra Republica de Filipinas,
G.R. No. L-4223, May 12, 1952, which
appellee now invokes. The cited cases are
inapplicable herein. The Ong Tian Se case
was for the deportation of one who,
however, successfully alleged that he was a
Filipino citizen. The Santos Co and Serra
cases were both for naturalization of person
whose evidence showed they were born
Filipinos and therefore need not be
naturalized. The nature of action or
proceeding in each of said cases is entirely
different from the present one.
Thus, sufficiency or probative value of
evidence, declaration of Philippine
citizenship, determination of Hereditary rihts
and status, court decision and resolutions
may not be the subject matter of an action
for declaratory relief.
Having concluded that the remedy sought by
appellee is not proper, it is unnecessary to
determine whether or not the evidence
proves that he is a Filipino.

The order appealed from is hereby reversed

and the petition is dismissed, with costs.

6. Edades v. Edades, 52 OG 5149
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking a
declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights
in the property of his alleged father and
incidentally the recognition of his status as
an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades.
In his complaint, he alleges that he is an
illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades with
Maria de Venecia, having been born when
said Emigdio Edades was legally married to
Maxima Edades with whom Emigdio had
eight legitimate children; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he had always
enjoyed the continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the status of illegitimate child
by direct and positive acts of his father and
of the legitimate children of the latter; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat as such
illegitimate child he is entitled to share in
the inheritance of his father under the
law; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that as
the legitimate children of his father will
deny, as in fact they have denied his right to
inherit, and such denial may ripen into a
costly litigation, he brought the present
action for the determination of his hereditary
rights.
Defendants, instead of answering, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
The court sustained the motion holding that
“An action for declaratory relief just for the
purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty,
or insecurity to the Plaintiff’s status or rights
would seem to be improper and outside the
purview of a declaratory relief. Neither can
it be availed of for the purpose of
compelling recognition of such rights, if
disputed or objected to.” Consequently, the
court dismissed the complaint, without costs.
From the order of dismissal, Plaintiff has
appealed and the case was certified to this
court because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS
PROPER.
RULING:
NO.
Under the law, an action for declaratory
relief is proper when any person is interested
“under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute or ordinance” in order to determine
any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument or statute, or to
declare his rights or duties thereunder
(section 1, Rule 66). Moreover, the action
should be predicated on the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interest are
adverse; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) the issue
involved must be ripened for judicial
determination. (Tolentino vs. Board of
Accountancy, 90 Phil., 83).
The present case does not come within the
purview of the law authorizing an action for
declaratory relief for it neither concerns a
deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, nor does it affect a statute or
ordinance, the construction or validity of
which is involved. Nor is it predicated on
any justiciable controversy for admittedly
the alleged rights of inheritance
which Plaintiff desires to assert against
the Defendants as basis of the relief he is
seeking for have not yet accrued for the
simple reason that his alleged father
Emigdio Edades has not yet died. In fact, he
is one of the herein Defendants. And the law
is clear that “the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent” (Article 777, new Civil Code).
Up to that moment, the right to succession is
merely speculative for, in the meantime, the
law may change, the will of the testator may
vary, or the circumstances may be modified
to such an extent that he who expects to
receive property may be deprived of it.
Indeed, the moment of death is the
determining point when an heir acquires a
definite right to the inheritance (5 Manresa,
5th ed., 324). This action therefore cannot be
maintained if considered strictly as one for
declaratory relief.
But the present action, though captioned as
one for declaratory relief, is not merely
aimed at determining the hereditary right of
the Plaintiff to eventually preserve his right
to the property of his alleged father, but
rather to establish his status as illegitimate
child in order that, should his father die, his
right to inherit may, not be disputed, as at
present, by the other Defendants who are the
legitimate children of his father.
Thus, sufficiency or probative value of
evidence, declaration of Philippine
citizenship, determination of Hereditary rihts
and status, court decision and resolutions
may not be the subject matter of an action
for declaratory relief.
This right is impliedly recognized by Article
289 which permits the investigation of the
paternity or maternity of an illegitimate
child in the same manner as in the case of a
natural child. Considering that the rules of
procedure shall be liberally construed to
promote their object and avoid an expensive
litigation (section 2, Rule 1), we hold that
the present action may be maintained in the
light of the view herein expressed.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is
revoked. The case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in connection
with the determination of the alleged status
of the Plaintiff as an illegitimate son of
Emigdio Edades, without pronouncements
as to costs.

In fact, in paragraph 2 of complainant’s

prayer he asks that Defendants be ordered to
recognize his status as illegitimate child with
right to inherit. It is true that there is no
express provision in the new Civil Code
which prescribe the step that may be taken
to establish such status as in case of a natural
child who can bring an action for
recognition (Article 285), but this silence
notwithstanding, we declare that a similar
action may be brought under similar
circumstances considering that an
illegitimate child other than natural is now
given successional rights and there is need to
establish his status before such rights can be
asserted and enforced.

7. DILG v. Gatuz, October 14, 2015
In 2008, the respondent, Raul Gatuz, was the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Tabang,
Plaridel, Bulacan.
On February 21, 2008, Felicitas L. Domingo
filed an administrative complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against the
respondent for Abuse of Authority and
Dishonesty. The complaint was docketed
as Administrative Case No. OMB-L-A-08-
0126-C.
In a decision dated November 17, 2008, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found the respondent guilty of Dishonesty
and imposed the penalty of three months
suspension without pay.3
On May 20, 2009, the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon indorsed its decision to the
Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government for immediate implementation.
The Department received the indorsement
on May 29, 2009.
On June 30, 2009, the respondent received a
copy of the Deputy Ombudsman's decision.
The respondent moved for reconsideration
on July 7, 2009.
The Department deferred the
implementation of the decision in view of
the respondent's pending motion for
reconsideration.
The Department also inquired with the
Ombudsman about the effect of this Court's
ruling in the then recent case of Office of the
Ombudsman v. Samaniego.4Samaniego held
that in administrative cases where the
Ombudsman imposes a penalty other than
public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the filing of
an appeal stays the execution of the
decision.
On July 10, 2009, the Ombudsman denied
the reconsideration prayed for.
On September 22, 2009, the Office of the
Ombudsman answered the Department's
inquiry and pointed out its Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 1, Series of 2006. The
MC states that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review of
the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
Ombudsman does not stay its
implementation unless a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or a writ of
injunction is in force.
On October 22, 2009, the Department issued
a memorandum5 addressed to the DILG
Regional Director for Region III, directing
him to implement the respondent's
suspension.
On November 17, 2009, the respondent filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary
Injunction
before the RTC. The respondent asked the
RTC to explain his rights pending the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration
and to restrain the Department from
implementing his suspension. The
respondent argued that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal
automatically stays the execution of the
Ombudsman's decisions in administrative
cases pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v.
Court of Appeals.6 The petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 808-M-2009.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS
PROPER.
RULING:
NO
The respondent cites the cases of Office of
the Ombudsman v. Hon. Ibay7 and Marquez
v. Ombudsman Desierto8 to support his
argument that the RTC has jurisdiction over
actions for declaratory relief with injunction
against the Office of the Ombudsman.9 The
respondent maintains that the controversy
concerns the extent of the Department's
power to implement the decision of the
Ombudsman pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration in the light of this
Court's rulings in Lapid and Samaniego. He
posits that the controversy was a proper
subject of declaratory relief.
We disagree with the respondent as the facts
of Marquez and Ibay are considerably
different from the present case.
Marquez and Ibay both involved Lourdes
Marquez, a bank manager, who was ordered
by the Ombudsman to produce bank
documents in relation with certain bank
accounts under investigation. Faced with the
dilemma of violating the Bank Secrecy Law,
on one hand, and the threat of being cited in
direct contempt by the Ombudsman on the
other, Marquez filed a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC. In both
cases, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the action for declaratory relief and
injunction. However, our rulings in
Marquez and Ibay only related to the
investigatory power of the Ombudsman.
As the respondent himself admits, the DILG
Memorandum subject of his petition for
declaratory relief was an implementation of
the Ombudsman's decision in OMB-L-A-08-
0126-C: the memorandum was in the nature
of a writ of execution. Therefore, the
declaratory relief action was essentially
against a quasi-judicial action of the
Ombudsman - a subject matter beyond the
RTC's declaratory relief jurisdiction.
Court orders or decisions cannot be the
subject matter of declaratory relief. 10 They
are not included within the purview of the
words "other written instrument."11 The
same principle applies to orders, resolutions,
or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies.
The fundamental rationale for this is the
principle of res judicata.12 Parties are not
permitted to litigate the same issue more in disciplinary cases.
than once. Judgment rendered by a court or a
quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the Finally, we already reconsidered the 2008
parties subject only to appellate authority. Samaniego decision in our
The losing party cannot modify or escape
the effects of judgment under the guise of an resolution dated October 5, 2010.18 We
action for declaratory relief. unanimously held en bane that the decisions
of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are
Another reason why judicial or quasi- immediately executory and cannot be stayed
judicial orders or decisions cannot be the by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of
subject matter of declaratory relief is the an injunctive writ.19 This legal question has
doctrine of judicial stability or been settled with finality.
noninterference. Courts and tribunals with
the same or equal authority - even those All things considered, the RTC clearly erred
exercising concurrent and coordinate in taking cognizance of the petition for
jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere declaratory relief and in restraining the
with each other's respective cases, much less execution of the Ombudsman's decision.
their orders or judgments.13 This is an
elementary principle of higher importance WHEREFORE, the petition
essential to the orderly administration of is GRANTED. We
justice.14 Its observance is not required on hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy decision of the Regional Trial Court of
alone; it is enforced to prevent unseemly, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19 in Civil Case
expensive, and dangerous conflicts of No. 808-M-2009.
jurisdiction and of processes.15
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Where the decisions of certain
administrative bodies are appealable to the
Court of Appeals, these adjudicative bodies
are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts
in terms of rank and stature; their actions are
logically beyond the control of the RTC, a
co-equal body.16 Notably, the decisions of
the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are
appealable to the CA via a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.17 As a co-equal body, the RTC has no
jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain
the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions

8. Tambunting v. Baello, September
16, 2015
FACTS: Facts: Spouses Sumabat and
Baello were the registered land owners of a
parcel of land in Caloocan. In May 1973,
and in order to obtain a P7,727.95 loan from
petitioner Tambunting, the spouses
mortgaged said land to the former.
Subsequently, Tambunting assigned his
rights to the mortgaged to Commercial
House Finance (CHFI). And because
respondent spouses have not been paying
their monthly amortizations, they were
informed that their indebtedness has
ballooned to P15k.
And so, CHFI and Tambunting filed a case
for foreclosure but was restrained by Branch
33 of the RTC of Caloocan. The reason for
the restraint was because the respondents
were able to file an action for declaratory
relief with said RTC. In their action,
respondents were praying that the court rule
on the extent or amount of their actual
indebtedness.
In said RTC case, which was filed March
1979, herein petitioners were declared in
default. Thus, even when the Tambunting, et
al moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that “mortgaged deed/contract had
already been breached prior to the action”,
said motion was denied for having been filed
out of time.
On Jan. 1981, the RTC rendered a decision
finding that respondents liability, by virtue
of their mortgage deed/contract, was
P15,743.83. Pursuant to this decision, the
respondents made a consignation with the
RTC in said amount.
After almost 14 years, or on Feb 1995, CHFI
again foreclosed on the contested land. The
respondents came to know of this because
they received a notice of foreclosure sale, to
be conducted by the sheriff, of the land in
question
This time, the petitioners filed an action with
Branch 120 of the RTC of Caloocan for
injunction against the foreclosure sale. But,
the sale still pushed thru, with CHFI being
declared the highest bidder. A new TCT was
then issued to CHFI. Thus, respondent
spouses amended their complaint to an
action for nullification of the
foreclosure/sheriff’s sale, the new TCT of
CHFI, as well as reconveyance.
On Feb 2000, Branch 120 of the RTC
declared the foreclosure sale as void. It
likewise ruled that reconveyance of the
property should be made to the respondents.
This decision was grounded on the fact that
consignation of P15k has already been made
by CHFI pursuant to the earlier decision of
the Branch 33 of the RTC.
After a denial of petitioner’Si MR, they
filed petition for review on certiorari with
the SC.
The petitioners argued that RTC, Branch 33,
erred when it ordered the consignation of
P15k. As earlier pointed out, the action in
first case was for declaratory relief. But
petitioner points out the fact that
respondents are not entitled anymore to file
an action for declaratory relief because there
had already been a violation of the
mortgaged contract when the spouses
defaulted on their amortizations.
Furthermore the action for foreclosure by
CHFI on 1995 has already prescribed
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WAS
BARRED BY THE JUDGMENT IN THE
DECLARATORY RELIEF CASE.
RULING:
NO.
An action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order, regulation or ordinance
before breach or violation thereof. The
purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach. It may
be entertained only before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to
which it refers. Where the law or contract
has already been contravened prior to the
filing of an action for declaratory relief, the
court can no longer assume jurisdiction over
the action.
Nonetheless, the petition must fail.

Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A

mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
Here, petitioners’ right of action accrued in
May 1977 when respondents defaulted in
their obligation to pay their loan
amortizations. It was from that time that the
ten-year period to enforce the right under the
mortgage started to run. The period was
interrupted when respondents filed Civil
Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977
and the CFI restrained the intended
foreclosure of the property. However, the
period commenced to run again on
November 9, 1977 when the case was
dismissed.
A. Nature of Declaratory Relief:
An action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order, regulation or ordinance
before breach or violation thereof.
B. Purpose of Declaratory Relief:
The purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach.2 It
may be entertained only before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to
which it refers.

9. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay –
Aklan, September 29, 2014
Petitioner is the president and chief
executive officer of Boracay Island West
Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
(Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010,
the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government
of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was
already operating a resort in the area, and the
application sought the issuance of a building
permit covering the construction of a three-
storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring
998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay
Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,
which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of
Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated
January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application
on the ground that the proposed construction
site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the RULING:
Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
no action was ever taken by the respondent NO.
mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued
by the municipal government, enjoining the An action for DR presupposes that there has
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, been an actual breach of the instruments
the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan involved or of the rights arising thereunder.
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Since in the case, the petition for DR
Cove’s hotel. became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement
and implementation to which the closure and
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with demolition of the hotel rendered futile any
prayer for injunctive relief with the CA possible guidelines that may be issued by the
Alleging that the order was issued and trial court for carrying out the directives in
executed with grave abuse of discretion. the challenged EO. Therefore, the CA erred
that DR is the proper remedy.
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in
the exercise of executive functions,
certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper
remedy according to the CA is to file a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION
FOR DECLATORY RELIEF IS
PROPER.

10. Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay,
GR No. 137538, September 3, 2001
Sometime in 1998, petitioner conducted an
investigation on the alleged "scam" on the
Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation. The case, entitled
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau v.
Amadeo Lagdameo, Et Al., was docketed as
OMB-0-97-0411. Initial result of the
investigation revealed that the alleged
anomaly was committed through the
issuance of checks which were subsequently
deposited in several financial institutions.
On April 29, 1998, petitioner issued an
Order directing private respondent Lourdes
Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of
the Philippines branch at Julia Vargas
Avenue, Pasig City, to produce several bank
documents for inspection relative to Account
Nos. 011-37270-5, 240-020718, 245-30317-
3 and 245-30318-1, reportedly maintained in
the said branch. The documents referred to
include bank account application forms,
signature cards, transactions history, bank
statements, bank ledgers, debit and credit
memos, deposit and withdrawal slips,
application for purchase of manager’s
checks, used manager’s checks and check
microfilms. The inspection would be done
"in camera" wherein the bank records would
be examined without bringing the
documents outside the bank premises. Its
purpose was to identify the
specific bank records prior to the issuance of
the required information not in any manner
needed in or relevant to the investigation. 1
Private respondent failed to comply with
petitioner’s order. She explained that the
subject accounts pertain to International
Corporate Bank (Interbank) which merged
with Union Bank in 1994. She added that
despite diligent efforts, the bank could not
identify these accounts since the checks
were issued in cash or bearer forms. She
informed petitioner that she had to first
verify from the Interbank records in its
archives the whereabouts of said accounts. 2
Petitioner found private respondent’s
explanation unacceptable. Petitioner
reminded private respondent that her acts
constitute disobedience or resistance to a
lawful order and is punishable as indirect
contempt under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 15 (9) of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989). The same might also
constitute willful obstruction of the lawful
exercise of the functions of the Ombudsman,
which is punishable under Section 36 of
R.A. 6770. On June 16, 1998, petitioner
issued an order to private respondent to
produce the requested bank documents for
"in camera" inspection. In the event of her
failure to
comply as directed, private respondent was
ordered to show cause why she should not
be cited for contempt and why she should
not be charged for obstruction. 3
Instead of complying with the order of
petitioner, private respondent filed a petition
for declaratory relief with an application for
temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135,
presided by respondent Judge Francisco
Ibay. The petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-1585. In her petition, private
respondent averred that under Sections 2 and
3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits), she had the legal obligation not to
divulge any information relative to all
deposits of whatever nature with banks in
the Philippines. But petitioner’s Order cited
Section 15(8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the
Ombudsman had the power to examine and
have access to bank accounts and records.
Private respondent, therefore, sought a
definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards
her rights as well as petitioner’s power to
inspect bank deposits under the cited
provisions of law. Meanwhile, private
respondent filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, assailing
petitioner’s order to institute indirect
contempt proceedings against her. 4
Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid
petition for declaratory relief on the ground
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.
RULING:
Yes.
In an order dated August 19, 1998, now
being assailed, public respondent denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner
then filed an ex-parte motion for extended
ruling. On December 22, 1998, public
respondent issued an order declaring that it
has jurisdiction over the case since it is an
action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Seasonably, petitioner filed before this Court
the instant petition assailing the Orders
dated August 19, 1998 and December 22,
1998 of public respondent on the ground that
public respondent assumed jurisdiction over
the case and issued orders with grave abuse
of discretion and clear lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought the nullification of the
impugned orders the immediate dismissal of
Civil Case No. 98-1585, and the prohibition
of it lacks jurisdiction over public
respondent from exercising jurisdiction on
the investigation being conducted by
petitioner in the alleged PEA-AMARI land
"scam" . are involved. 6
The only question raised by petitioner for
resolution public whether or not public
respondent acted without jurisdiction and
discretion in entertaining the cited petition
for declaratory relief.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Makati
City lacks jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief. It asserts that respondent
judge should have dismissed the petition
outright in view of Section 14 of R.A. 6770.
Section 14 of R.A. 6770
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall
be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.
Petitioner’s invocation of the aforequoted
statutory provision is misplaced. The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts. 5 It is not among the actions
within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court even if only questions of law
Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that
such action shall be brought before the
appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
x         x        x
The requisites of an action for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. 7 In this case, the controversy
concerns the extent of the power of
petitioner to examine bank accounts under
Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis-a-vis the
duty of banks under Republic Act 1405 not
to divulge any information relative to
deposits of whatever nature. The interests of
the parties are adverse considering the
antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one
hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to
examine bank deposits, and on the other, the
denial thereof apparently by private before a court of competent authority, but
respondent who refused to allow petitioner only an investigation by the Ombudsman on
to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. the so-called "scam", any order for the
The party seeking relief, private respondent opening of the bank account for inspection is
herein, asserts a legal interest in the clearly premature and legally
controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for unjustified.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
judicial determination as litigation is
inevitable. Note that the petitioner has BEING AN ACTION INCAPABLE OF
threatened private respondent with "indirect PECUNIARY ESTIMATION, THE RTC
contempt" and "obstruction" charges should HAS JURISDICTION.
the latter not comply with its
order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
Circumstances considered, we hold that DISMISSED.
public respondent has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for declaratory SO ORDERED.
relief. Nor can it be said that public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in
doing so. We are thus constrained to dismiss
the instant petition for lack of merit.

In any event, the relief being sought by

private respondent in her action for
declaratory relief before the RTC of Makati
City has been squarely addressed by our
decision in Marquez v. Desierto 8 In that
case, we ruled that before an in camera
inspection of bank accounts may be allowed,
there must be a pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction. Further, the
account must be clearly identified, and the
inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to
be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case. In the present
case, since there is no pending litigation yet

11. Alliance of Government Workers
v. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 7
Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers
(AGW) is a registered labor federation while
the other petitioners are its affiliate unions
with members from among the employees of
the following offices, schools, or
government owned or controlled
corporations:
On February 28, 1983, the Philippine
Government Employees Association
(PGEA) filed a motion to come in as an
additional petitioner.
According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851
requires all employers to pay the 13th-month
pay to their employees with one sole
exception found in Section 2 which states
that "(E)mployers already paying their
employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent are not covered by this Decree. "
The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree No. 851 included other
types of employers not exempted by the
decree. They state that nowhere in the
decree is the secretary, now Minister of
Labor and Employment, authorized to
exempt other types of employers from the
requirement.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME
COURT CAN TAKE COGNIZANCE
OVER THE CASE.
RULING:
YES.
At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a
procedural barrier. The petition is one for
declaratory relief, an action not embraced
within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. (Remotigue v. Osmena,, Jr.,
21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v.
Commission of Land Registration, 102
SCRA 794; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA
294). There is no statutory or jurisprudential
basis for the petitioners' statement that the
Supreme Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits
where only questions of law are involved.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The
petitioners have not pointed to any provision
of the Constitution or statute which sustains
their sweeping assertion. On this ground
alone, the petition could have been
dismissed outright.
Following similar action taken
in Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista (85
Phil. 101) and Aquino v. Commission on
Elections (62 SCRA 275) we have, however,
decided to treat the petition as one for
mandamus. The petition has far reaching
implications and raises questions that should
be resolved. Have the respondents
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the
use and enjoyment of rights to which they
are entitled under the law?
An analysis of the "whereases" of P.D. No.
851 shows that the President had in mind
only workers in private employment when
he issued the decree. There was no intention
to cover persons working in the government
service.
Thus, if the petition has a far-reaching
implications and raises questions that should
be resolved, the Supreme Court may treat
the petition as one for prohibition or
mandamus and take cognizance thereof.

12. Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy,
GR No. L-3062, September 28, 1951
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was
enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 342, authorized
accountants to practice their profession
under a trade name. Assailing the
constitutionality of the aforementioned
provision, plaintiff, an accountant, filed an
action for declaratory relief in the CFI of
Manila on the ground advanced that the
assailed provision is a class legislation since
by its terms it excludes persons engaged in
other callings or professions from adopting,
acquiring or using a trade name in
connection with the practice of such callings
or professions. Included as defendants are
Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann,
foreign accountants practicing their
profession in the Philippines under the trade
name “Fleming and Williamson.”
its benefits only to those engaged in the
profession of accountancy.
It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory
relief not for his own personal benefit, or
because his rights or prerogatives as an
accountant, or as an individual, are
adversely affected, but rather for the benefit
of persons belonging to other professions or
callings, who are not parties to this case. He
does not claim having suffered any prejudice
or damage to him or to his rights or
prerogatives as an accountant by the use of
the disputed name by the defendants. His
complaint is rather addressed against the
propriety of the use of said trade name by
the defendants because it is misleading and
is liable to defraud the public.
law in question. In order that an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must
be predicated on the following requisite
facts or conditions: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination. These
requisite facts are wanting and, therefore,
the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient
cause of action.

Issue: Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause

of action to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342?

Held: No, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of

action.

Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable

controversy against the herein defendants
Plaintiff’s main objection centers on the which may give him the right to secure relief
exclusive character of the law which extends by asserting the unconstitutionality of the

13. City of Cagayan de Oro v.
CEPALCO, October 17, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner, through its local legislative
council, enacted Ordinance, which imposed
an annual Mayor's Permit Fee of Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00) on every electric
or telecommunications post belonging to
public utility companies operating in the
city.
Respondent, Cagayan Electric Power &
Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) is a public
utility engaged in the distribution of electric
power and the owner of utility poles erected
within Cagayan de Oro City. The ordinance
entailed them to pay an annual Mayor's
Permit Fee of P8,500,000.00.10.
CEPALCO thus filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Damages & Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order &
Preliminary Injunction before the Cagayan
RTC assailing the ordinance's validity.  revenue measure should be made to the
CEPALCO contended that the imposition, in
the guise of police power, was unlawful for
violating the fundamental principle that fees,
charges, and other impositions shall not be
unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory. Additionally, CEPALCO
argued that, assuming the imposition was a
valid regulatory fee, it violated the
legislative franchise that specifically
exempted the electricity distributor from
taxes or fees assessed by Cagayan de Oro
City.
RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory
relief due to CEPALCO's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies for its neglect to
appeal the ordinance to the Secretary of On account of the foregoing, it is clear
Justice. that the ordinance in this case serves a
regulatory purpose and is, hence, an
exercise of police power. Nowhere in the
ISSUE: text of the ordinance is it shown that it
was enacted to raise revenue.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL
WAS PROPER. Thus, it can be concluded without
argument that the ordinance imposes
RULING: a fee since it was enacted pursuant
to the city's police power and serves
No. to regulate, not to raise revenue.
Section 187 of the Local Government Proceeding to the question of non-
Code, which outlines the administrative exhaustion, the Court rules
procedure for questioning the that ordinances that impose
constitutionality or legality of a tax regulatory fees do not need to be
ordinance or revenue measure, does not challenged before the Secretary of
find application in cases where the Justice.
imposition is in the nature of a
regulatory fee.35 The provision requires
that an appeal of a tax ordinance or
Secretary of Justice within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity of the
ordinance.
In the case at bar, the purpose of the
ordinance is to regulate the
construction and maintenance of
electric and telecommunications
posts erected within Cagayan de Oro
City.

14. GSIS v. Daymiel, March 11, 2019
On August 18, 1969, Apolinario K. Daymiel
(respondent) served as a casual laborer of
the Provincial Engineering Office of the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del
Norte. Eventually, respondent assumed the
position of Accounting Clerk III until his
retirement on July 1, 2003.3
Thereupon, respondent applied for
retirement benefits before the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). A
Tentative Computation was made pursuant
to respondent's application. Initially, GSIS
granted respondent a total of 33.65678 years
of creditable service. The lump sum
payment was equivalent to P542,325.00 and
the monthly pension amounted to
P9,038.75,4viz.:
However, a re-computation was made
wherein GSIS credited respondent only with
23.85082 years of service instead of the
initial 33.65678. Accordingly, respondent's
lump sum payment was decreased to
P384,295.80 and his monthly pension was
pegged at P5,886.77.5
Unsatisfied with the computation,
respondent wrote a letter to the GSIS and
inquired as to the legal basis for such
computation.
It appears that the re-computation was made
as a result of the implementation of Policy
and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-03 (PPG
No. 171-03) dated March 24, 2003 issued by
then GSIS President and General Manager
Winston F. Garcia. PPG No. 171-03 was
subsequently approved by the GSIS Board
of Trustees in Resolution No. 90 dated April
2, 2003.6
Respondent filed a Declaratory Relief,
Mandamus, and Damages.7 In his petition,
respondent interpreted the provisions of PPG
No. 171-03 as gravely prejudicial to him
since the starting point in the computation of
the creditable service of a retiree shall be the
date of the payment of monthly
contributions,8 whereas the starting point as
regards Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291 or
The Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997 is the date of original
appointment.9
Instead of filing an answer, GSIS filed a
Motion to Dismiss, citing the grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. GSIS
argued that respondent failed to establish
how his right was violated and that R.A. No.
8291 vests in the GSIS Board of Trustees
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear disputes on laws administered by it.10
Proceedings before the RTC
The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss in a
Resolution dated November 8, 2004.11
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL
WAS PROPER.
RULING:
NO.
The core issue in this case is whether the
regular court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
The Court's Ruling
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or the law, and
rules of procedure yield to substantive law.
Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a
matter of law. Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies.22 Administrative agencies may be
bestowed with quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative powers.
In the exercise of an administrative agency's
quasi-judicial powers, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction may be invoked. In the
case of Smart Communications, Inc. v.
National Telecommunications
Commission,  we explained the import of
23
this doctrine, to wit:
Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the
same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. x x x
In this case, Section 30 of R.A. No. 8291
vests upon the GSIS the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes
arising from said law or related issuances.
Section 14.3 (now Section 27.1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of R.A. No. 8291 provides that such quasi-
judicial power lies with the GSIS Board of
Trustees, thus:
SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes. — The
GSIS shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under this Act and any other laws
administered by the GSIS.
The Board may designate any member of the
Board, or official of the GSIS who is a
lawyer, to act as hearing officer to receive
evidence, make findings of fact and submit
recommendations thereon. The hearing
officer shall submit his findings and
recommendations, together with all
documentary and testimonial evidence to the
[B]oard within thirty (30) working days
from the time the parties have closed their
respective evidence and filed their last
pleading. The Board shall decide the case
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of
the hearing officer's findings and
recommendations. The cases heard directly
by the Board shall be decided within thirty
(30) working days from the time they are
submitted by the parties for decision.
xxxx
SEC. 14.3. Body Vested with Quasi-Judicial
Functions. — The quasi-judicial function of
the GSIS shall be vested in its Board of
Trustees.
Section 14.1 (now Section 21) of the IRR
provides in detail the coverage of such
quasi-judicial power, to wit:
SEC. 14.1. Quasi-Judicial Functions of the
GSIS. — x x x settle any dispute arising
under Republic Act No. 8291,
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended,
and other laws administered by the GSIS
with respect to:
xxxx
2. Entitlement of members to the following
benefits under these Rules:
(a) Separation benefits
(b) Unemployment or involuntary separation
benefits
(c) Retirement benefits
(d) Disability benefits
xxxx
An appeal of the decision of the GSIS Board
of Trustees may be filed with the
CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.24
However, the records of the case reveal that
what the respondent is seeking for is the
nullification of PPG No. 171-03 and
Resolution No. 90 on the ground of
illegality. While respondent's contention
deals with a dispute as to the computation of
his retirement benefits, his petition mainly
attacks the legality of the assailed issuances,
to wit:
xxxx
Consistent with the petition filed, the
allegations partake of a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for
declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.26 Certainly, it is the RTC
which is vested with jurisdiction to try such
petition. In the case of Commissioner of
Customs v. Hypermix Feeds
Corporation,27 we reiterated that the
determination of whether a rule is issued by
an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the Constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
We find that respondent's petition is
sufficient to meet all the requirements.
Firstly, there is justiciable controversy as
respondent questions the legality and
constitutionality of PPG No. 171-03 and
Resolution No. 90, both of which were
issued by the GSIS. On this note, we
emphasize that the courts are vested by the
Constitution with the power of judicial
review, including the authority of the regular
courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of political
departments.28
Secondly, the issue is between the GSIS,
which implements the assailed issuances and
the respondent who seeks to claim his
retirement benefits.
Thirdly, respondent has legal interest over
the case since the amount he seeks to claim
would differ because the implementation of
R.A. No. 8291 and PPG No. 171-03 and
Regulation No. 90 provide for different
starting point for the computation of
retirement benefits. Application of the latter
would decrease his retirement benefits from
P542,325.00 to P342,295.80 considering the
varying starting point for the computation of
retirement benefits. Under R.A. No. 8291,
the reckoning period is the date of original
appointment while in PPG No. 171-03 and
Resolution No. 90, the starting point is the
date of the payment of monthly
contributions by a member who was
receiving a fixed basic monthly
compensation for his services rendered.
Finally, the issue is ripe for judicial
determination because litigation is inevitable
for the reason that respondent's retirement
benefits would be substantially reduced by
the implementation of the assailed
issuances.29
GSIS tried to brush aside the issue of
legality of the assailed issuances by focusing
on the ultimate consequence should such
issuances be declared invalid, i.e., the re-
computation of the retirement benefits.
However, this is pure incidental to the
outcome of the relief prayed for in the action
for declaratory relief. It is so precisely
because the primary issue was the starting
point of the computation of the retirement
benefits.
As to the invalidity of the issuances, we
affirm the ruling of the CA.
Administrative issuances may be classified
into two, i.e., legislative rule and
administrative rule. The former is in the
matter of subordinate legislation, designed
to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. On the other
hand, the latter is designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.30
As to the import of these issuances, the case
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.31 is
instructive:
When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance,
for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law
but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law.
Clearly, PPG No. 171-03 is a legislative Considering that PPG No. 171-03 and the
rule. It does not merely provide guidelines to subsequent Resolution No. 90 are legislative
R.A. No. 8291, but in fact creates a burden issuances, necessitating publication for their
upon those who are governed in its effectivity and the undisputed fact of their
implementation. Specifically, PPG No. 171- non-publication, the assailed issuances must
03 supplies the conditions for the starting be struck down for being unconstitutional.
point when services are rendered, for the
purposes of computing all benefits under WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
R.A. No. 8291 and the same requires: (a) the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
member was receiving a fixed basic monthly Accordingly, the Decision dated February
compensation; and (b) monthly 25, 2014 and the Resolution dated April 28,
contributions were timely and correctly paid 2015 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de
or remitted. However, there was no Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 01773-MIN
condition and definition provided under are AFFIRMED.
R.A. No. 8291; "services" was neither
defined nor delineated for the purposes of SO ORDERED.
computing benefits. In other words, PPG
No. 171-03 provides the details for the
starting point of the computation of GSIS
benefits. It effectively supplants the period
prescribed under R.A. No. 8291.
Parenthetically, Regulation No. 90, which
approved PPG No. 171-03 is, likewise, of
the same character.

As PPG No. 171-03 and the subsequent

Resolution No. 90 are legislative rules,
publication is indispensable.

Publication of statutes satisfies the

constitutional right of the people to due
process. It keeps the citizenry informed and
notified of various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct. Without
such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of
the ignorantia legis non excusat.32
 15. Reterta v. Mores, August 17, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners commenced an action with the
RTC for quieting of title and reconveyance
averring that they are the true and real
owners of the land in Tanza, having
inherited it from their father who had died,
who had been in open, exclusive, notorious,
and continuous possession of the land for
more than 30 years.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss,
insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case due to the land
being friar land.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
RULING:
No.
because an action for reconveyance or to
remove a cloud on one’s title involves the
title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action pertained to the
RTC, unless the assessed value of the
property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in
which instance the MTC having territorial
jurisdiction would have exclusive original
jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular
court had jurisdiction would be the
allegations of the complaint (on the assessed
value of the property) and the principal relief
thereby sought.
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in
detail that the Government has agreed to sell
to such settler and occupant the amount of
land so held by him, at the price so fixed,
payable as provided in this Act at the office
of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx
and that upon the payment of the final
installment together with all accrued interest
the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and
twenty-two of the Land Registration Act
xxx.
Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.1awphi1
As the provisions indicate, the authority of
LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar
lands, did not include the petitioners’ action
for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have
jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of
in favor of a private person and title duly
issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the
petitioners’ showing of its plain error in
dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by
disregarding the allegations of the
complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and
capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.

16. Multi-Realty Development
Corporation v. Makati Tuscany,
GR No. 146726, June 16, 2006
Petitioner is a real estate developer and
constructed the Makati Tuscany
CondominiumRespondent is a corporation
established to manage the condominium
units
270 rking slots were made, 164
allotted. 98 units were left retained
by petitioner to be put on sale to unit
owners who would want more
parking
The Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions did not reflect or specify the
ownership of the 98 parking slots.
Nevertheless, petitioner sold 26 of them to
unit buyers in 1977-1986.
SEC. 5. Accessories to Units. To be
considered as part of each unit and reserved
for the exclusive use of its owner are the
balconies adjacent thereto and the parking
lot or lots which are to be assigned to each
unit. SEC. 7. The Common Areas. The
common elements or areas of the Makati
Tuscany shall comprise of all the parts of the
project other than the units, including
without limitation the following:  determinative of the rights of the parties to the
(d) All driveways, playgrounds, garden areas
and PARKING AREAS OTHER THAN
THOSE ASSIGNED TO EACH UNIT
UNDER SEC. 5 ABOVE  HAS CAUSE OF ACTION
Respondent did not object, and Certificates
of Title were issued. In September 1989,
Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry
Sy, who was also a member of the Board of
Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two
Multi-Realty executives be allowed to park
their cars in two of Makati Tuscanys
remaining 72 unallocated parking slots  right of the petitioner to file such action
In its Answer with counterclaim, MATUSCO
alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of
action against it for reformation of their
contract. By its own admission, Multi-Realty
sold various parking slots to third parties
despite its knowledge that the parking areas,
other than those mentioned in Sec. 5 of the
Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO.  affected by a statute, executive order or
The trial court ruled that Multi-Realty failed to
prove any ground for the reformation of its
agreement with MATUSCO relative to the
ownership of the common areas. 
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT MULTI-REALTY
RULING:
YES.
To determine when all the facts which
constitute a cause of action for reformation of
an instrument may be brought and when the
accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 63, must be considered because an
action for the reformation of an instrument
may be brought under said Rule:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument,
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule (emphasis supplied).
Such a petition is a special civil action
case. It is permitted on the theory that courts
should be allowed to act, not only when harm
is actually done and rights jeopardized by
physical wrongs or physical attack upon
existing legal relations, but also when
challenge, refusal, dispute or denial thereof is
made amounting to a live controversy.

The concept and meaning of the term cause

of action in proceedings for declaratory relief,
vis-à-vis an ordinary civil action, is broadened.
It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong
or delict by which the plaintiff’s rights are
violated, but it is extended to a mere denial,
refusal or challenge raising at least an
uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious to
plaintiff’s rights.
Rule 64
Dario v. Mison, GR No. 81954, August 8,
1989
In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 3, which is the mandate of
the people to Completely reorganize the
government. Two years later, President
Aquino promulgated EO 127, which
provides for the reorganization of the
Ministry of Finance and along with it the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and
prescribes a new staffing pattern for the
abovementioned office.  Following the
adoption of the new Constitution, On
January 1988 the incumbent Commissioner
of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
memorandum “Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive
Orders which prescribes the procedure in
personnel placement. Such memorandum
provides that by February of 1988, all of the
employees covered by EO 127 shall be
informed of their re-appointment and also
offered another position in the same
department or agency and to be informed of
their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various
Customs officials stating that they shall
continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity,
and that those incumbents whose positions
are not carried in the new reorganization
pattern, or who are not re-appointed, shall be
deemed separated from the service.
A total of 394 officials and employees of the
Bureau of Customs were given individual ISSUE:
notices of separation. They filed appeals
with the CSC. On June 1988, the CSC WHAT IS THE BASIS OF RULE 64?
promulgated its ruling ordering the
reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279 RULING:
private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Commissioner Mison, represented by the Art. IX, sec, 7. The provision reads: "Sec. 7.
Solicitor General, filed a motion for Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
reconsideration, which was denied. or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
proceedings. On June 10, 1988, Republic party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
Act No. 6656, was signed into law and thereof.”
according to the provisions of the
aforementioned Act, the process in which THE WORD “certiorari”refers to the special
terminated employees in violation of RA civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and not
6656 shall be reinstated or reappointed. On under rule 45.
June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and
William Dionisio, customs examiners
appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant
to the ostensible reorganization subject of
this controversy, petitioned the Court to
contest the validity of the statute.

271 Esteves v. Sarmiento, GR
No. 182374, November 11, 2008
In the national and local elections conducted
last 14 May 2007, petitioner and private
respondent both ran for the position of
municipal mayor of the Municipality of
Casiguran, Aurora. On 15 May 2007, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Casiguran on the basis of the
results of the canvassing, which showed him
having garnered 3,342 votes or with a
margin of 48 votes over petitioner, who
obtained 3,294 votes.4
On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election
protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Baler, Aurora. The protest was docketed as
Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 99 and
raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge
Corazon D. Soluren.5
The RTC then issued a precautionary
protection order directing the Municipal
Treasurer and Election Officer of Casiguran
to take immediate steps to safeguard the
integrity of all the ballot boxes, lists of
voters and other paraphernalia used in the
elections and thereafter directed that all the
election paraphernalia, including the ballot
boxes and
lists of voters, subject of the protest be
brought before the court.6
Private respondent then filed an answer,
which the RTC admitted in an Order dated 2
August 2007. In the same order, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of private respondent's counter-
protest on the ground of non-payment of
filing fee. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the
creation of the revision committees.7
On 6 September 2007, private respondent
filed a motion to dismiss the election protest,
arguing that it was defective in form and
substance as it did not specify the precincts
where fraud and irregularities were
committed. On 8 September 2007, the RTC
issued the order denying private
respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.8
Thus, private respondent filed before the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.9 The petition sought
to nullify the RTC Order dated 8 September
2007 denying private respondent's motion to
dismiss. It also prayed that the election
protest filed by petitioner be dismissed and
the proceedings thereon enjoined on the
ground that the election protest failed to
comply with the requirements of Section
11(f), Rule 210 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
Petitioner filed an answer on 5 December
2007.
After hearing private respondent's
application, the COMELEC (Second
Division) issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) on 06 December 2007, which
directed Judge Soluren to desist from further
proceeding with Election Protest Case No.
96 until further orders from the
COMELEC.11
Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court
a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 180792, prayed that a
temporary restraining order be issued
enjoining the COMELEC (Second Division)
from taking cognizance of SPR Case No.
46-2007 and that the TRO issued by the
COMELEC be ordered lifted.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION
FILED BY ESTEVES BE DISMISSED.
RULING:
YES.
Under Article IX- C, an aggrieved party
must first file a motion for reconsideration
of a resolution of the Division to the
COMELEC en banc is mandatory and
jurisdictional in invoking the power of
review of the Supreme Court. Failure to
abide by this procedural requirement
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.16
Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
allows the review of a resolution of the
Division by the COMELEC en banc, the
filing of the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is premature. The petition does
not allege that petitioner indeed filed a
motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. The unquestioned rule
in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie
only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against the acts of public
respondent.21 Certiorari cannot be resorted to
as a shield from the adverse consequences of
petitioner's own omission to file the required
motion for reconsideration.22 A litigant
should first exhaust the administrative
remedies provided by law before seeking
judicial intervention in order to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to
decide correctly the matter and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the
court.23 The premature invocation of judicial
intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action.24