G.R. No.
202860 Brito, who was then the Regional Director for Region V
LEE T. ARROYO, Petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
ULYSSES A. BRITO, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, A., JR., J.:
Factual Antecedents
This case arose from the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8371, otherwise known as "The Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997,"  which resulted in the
5
reorganization of two (2) offices: (1) the Office for
Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC);  and (2) the
6
Office of Southern Cultural Communities
(OSCC).  Pursuant to the passage of R.A. No. 8371, the
7
ONCC and OSCC were merged as the organic offices of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The reorganization likewise entailed the creation
of several offices subsumed under the NCIP, which are
tasked to implement its policies: (a) the Ancestral
Domains Office; (b) the Office on Policy, Planning and
Research; (c) the Office of Education, Culture and
Health; (d) the Office on Socio-Economic Services and
Special Concerns; (e) the Office of Empowerment and
Human Rights; (f) the Administrative Office; and (g) the
Legal Affairs Office.  Meanwhile, the functions of the
8
regional and field offices of the ONCC and OSCC were
retained under the new organizational structure of the
NCIP. 9
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8371, the positions of
Staff Directors, Bureau Directors, Deputy Executive
Directors and Executive Directors, except the positions
of Regional Directors and below, were phased-
out.  Absorbed personnel were nonetheless subject to
10
the qualifications set by the Civil Service Commission
and the Placement Committee created pursuant to
Section 77 of R.A. No. 8371.11
The CA held that since Section 74 of R.A. No. 8371 did
of the OSCC, was temporarily appointed to the same not phase-out the Regional Director positions, the
position pursuant to the NCIP Executive Director's incumbent Regional Directors were retained, subject to
Memorandum Order No. 01-98 dated May 23, 1998. 12
the qualifications prescribed under Civil Service Rules
and the standards set by the newly-created Placement
On August 31, 2000, a list of appointees to the positions Committee.  Since Brito held a Career Executive
24
of Regional Directors and Bureau Directors of the NCIP Service Officer (CESO) Rank III eligibility, with a
was transmitted to the NCIP Executive Director. Among percentage score of 85.10 from the Placement
them was Arroyo, who was appointed as the Regional Committee, he possessed the necessary qualifications
Director of Region V. 13 as Regional Director for Region V. Consequently, the
CA found that Brito should not have been removed from
Unsatisfied with the appointment of Arroyo and three (3) office and replaced with Arroyo. 25
other appointees,  Brito, together with several other
14
individuals formerly holding the positions of Bureau On September 24, 2004, Arroyo moved for the
reconsideration of this decision by arguing that the
Director and Regional Director,  initiated a petition
15
CESO Rank III eligibility of Brito is void. According to
for quo warranto to challenge their appointment before
Arroyo, Brito falsified his bachelor's degree from the
the CA.  Brito invoked his right to security of tenure
16
Naga College Foundation (NCF) and there are
under R.A. No. 6656,  and argued that Arroyo does not
17
numerous administrative complaints against Brito
possess the required Career Executive Service (CBS)
regarding this matter. She explained that the argument
eligibility for the position of Regional Director.
18
was raised at that stage of the proceedings because the
complaints were filed only after the appointment of Brito
Arroyo accordingly refuted these arguments in her
comment to the petition for quo warranto.  She argued
19 as the Officer-In-Charge of the NCIP Regional Office in
Region IV, or after the CA rendered its decision in
that Brito cannot invoke the right to security of tenure
because his appointment was made in a temporary the quo warranto petition.26
capacity.  Arroyo also questioned the standing of Brito to
20
initiate the quo warranto petition, and argued that Brito Pending the resolution of her motion, Arroyo filed a
was not qualified to be a Regional Director of the NCIP. 21 Manifestation on February 24, 2006 with the CA. She
cited newly discovered evidence supporting her claim
In a Decision  dated August 30, 2004, the CA partially that Brito did not obtain a bachelor's degree, which is an
22
granted the petition for quo warranto insofar as Brito and academic qualification for the position of Regional
his co-petitioner Amador P. Batay-an (Batay-an) were Director.  Attached to her manifestation is a certified true
27
concerned, to wit: copy of the Decision dated December 15, 2005,
rendered by the Office of the President (OP) in O.P.
Case No. 05-F-175, entitled "Timuay Langhap Rio
WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is PARTLY
Olimpio A. Lingating v. Ulysses A. Brito." In this decision,
GRANTED. [Batay-an] and [Brito] are hereby
the OP affirmed the recommendation of the Presidential
reinstated to their former positions as Regional
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) to hold Brito liable for
Director, NCIP for the Cordillera Administrative Region
falsifying his scholastic records, or specifically, his
(CAR) and Region V. respectively. However, the petition
bachelor's degree from NCF, viz.: 28
of Rudita Blanco and Ben Tandoyog is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and as
recommended by the [PAGC], [Brito] is hereby found
SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis Ours)
23
guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Document and correspondingly imposed the penalty of
Dismissal from Government Service including the
accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification for reemployment in the government
service, without prejudice to civil and criminal liability.
SO ORDERED. 29
However, the CA remained unmoved by these
arguments. Arroyo's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Resolution  dated June 30, 2006, thus:
30
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration
or clarification or affirmation filed by petitioners [Batay-
an] and Brito is DENIED for lack of merit. The separate
motions for reconsideration of respondents San Juan
and Arroyo are likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 31
Following the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration, Arroyo did not elevate the matter to this
Court for review.  This prompted Brito to file a Motion for
32
Entry of Judgment and for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution dated March 26, 2007, praying for the CA to
execute the judgment granting his quo
warranto petition. 33
On May 3, 2007, Arroyo opposed this motion and
argued that the petition for quo warranto was rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the decision of the OP in
O.P. Case No. 05-F-175, which dismissed Brito from
government service for falsifying his college academic
records. This OP decision allegedly became final and
executory because Brito failed to appeal to the CA. 34
Brito, on the other hand, countered that the OP decision
dismissing him from service was not yet final and
executory. He posited that there is an existing appeal
from the OP decision, lodged before the CA. 35
Ruling of the CA
In the first assailed Resolution  dated December 7,
36
2010, the granted Brito's motion for execution. The CA
found that the Decision dated August 30, 2004 of the
CA, granting the quo warranto petition of Brito against
Arroyo, had become final and executory, thus warranting
the enforcement of the decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant motion is
GRANTED. For purposes of paragraph 2, Section 11,
Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, let two (2)
photocopies of the Decision rendered by this Court on
August 30, 2004 and the partial entry of judgment made
therein be transmitted to the [NCIP] for the issuance of
the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED. 37
Consequently, Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 29, 2010.  Arroyo insisted that Brito
38
was dismissed from government service and disqualified
from holding government office. In order to further
bolster her claim, she attached a certified true copy of
the OP's Order dated October 20, 2007, which attested
to the finality of its Decision dated December 15, 2005 in
O.P. Case No. 05-F-175. 39
The CA found Arroyo's argument unmeritorious and
denied her motion for reconsideration. Hence, in its
second assailed Resolution  dated June 8, 2012, the CA
40
held that "upon verification from the concerned offices of
this Court," Brito indeed appealed the OP decision to the
CA.41
Aggrieved, Arroyo filed the present petition
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated December
7, 2010 and June 8, 2012 of the CA for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Arroyo insists that Brito is not
qualified to hold the position of Regional Director
because he falsified his bachelor's degree from NCF.
For this reason, Arroyo argues that Brito is not the
proper party to initiate the quo warranto petition pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. 42
As regards the finality of the OP's Decision dated
December 15, 2005, Arroyo argues that Brito was
unable to establish the existence of his appeal before
the CA. Arroyo also alleges that the CA's independent
verification of the appeal with its offices was an arbitrary
exercise of its jurisdiction.
43
The Court is therefore asked to resolve whether the CA
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in directing the execution of its
Decision dated August 30, 2004 granting the quo
warranto petition of Brito.
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXECUTION OF THE CA’S
DECISION GRANTING THE QUO WARRANTO WAS
PROPER – No.
Ruling of the Court
The Court grants the petition.
Courts may modify a final
and executory decision when
circumstances transpire that render
the execution unjust or inequitable.
It is true that the execution of a court's judgment
becomes a matter of right upon the expiration of the
period to appeal and no appeal was duly
perfected.  Generally, therefore, courts may no longer
44
review or modify a final and executory judgment. This is
otherwise referred to as the principle of immutability of
judgments, which dictates that once a decision becomes
final, the enforcement or execution of the judgment
becomes a purely ministerial act. 45
This notwithstanding, the doctrine on immutability of
judgments admits of the following exceptions: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the judgments rendering
execution unjust and inequitable.  The Court applies
46
these exceptions in order to serve the interests of
justice. 47
In this case, Arroyo invoked the last exception, which
relates to supervening events. According to Arroyo, the
OP's Decision dated December 15, 2005 in O.P. Case
No. 05-F-175, which found Brito liable for dishonesty
because he falsified his college degree, changed the
situation of the parties in such a manner that renders the
execution of the quo warranto judgment unjust and
inequitable.  Thus, in granting the enforcement of
48
the quo warranto decision, she argues that the CA
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
49
A supervening event, in order to apply, must rest on
proven or certain facts.  Hence, Arroyo should establish
50
through competent evidence there are events, which
transpired after the finality of the decision altered or
modified the parties' situation in such manner that
renders execution of the judgment inequitable,
impossible, or unfair.  It should directly affect the matter
51
already litigated and settled, or substantially change the
rights or relations of the parties.
52
While Arroyo raised the fact that Brito falsified his
college degree in her motion for the reconsideration of
the quo warranto decision, it was only on October 30,
2007 that the OP declared final its decision to dismiss
and disqualify Brito from government service. By then,
the period to appeal to the Court has lapsed without
Arroyo filing an appeal,  and Brito has commenced the
53
execution of the quo warranto decision in his
favor.  Verily, the supervening event referred to in the
54
present case transpired after the finality of the
judgment that Brito sought to execute.
More importantly, the OP's Decision dated December
15, 2005 found that Brito falsified his bachelor's degree
from NCF. The following factual findings of the PAGC,
which the OP affirmed on appeal, resulted in the
judgment holding Brito liable for Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Document:
Since Brito was found, by final judgment, liable for
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents,
the Court agrees that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in directing the execution of its judgment
on the quo warranto petition. The subsequent ruling
finding Brito administratively liable for Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Documents, substantially
changed the situation of the parties in the present case.
By falsifying his scholastic records, Brito became
ineligible for admission into the career service. This
holds especially true for positions falling within the third
level of the career service, which has more stringent
eligibility requirements.
65
Furthermore, the OP decision finding Brito liable for
Falsification of Official Document also necessarily
invalidated any CES examination that he took for
purposes of obtaining the CESO eligibility. As a result,
Brito is no longer qualified to become a Regional
Director of the NCIP.
By virtue of his ineligibility and disqualification, neither
can Brito claim a better right to the Regional Director
position in a quo warranto proceeding. Only a person
entitled to the controverted position may initiate a quo
warranto proceeding in his or her own name, in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court. In effect, the Court may no longer inquire on
Arroyo's qualifications and eligibility to the contested
position
In any case, the offenses of Dishonesty and Falsification
of Official Documents are both classified as grave
offenses, respectively punishable by dismissal from the
service oil the first offense.  Dismissal from the service,
66
in turn, carries the accessory penalty of disqualification
for reemployment in the government service, among
others.  Clearly, Brito may not be appointed to any
67
position in the government, much less to the Regional
Director position of the NCIP Region V. The execution of
the judgment granting the quo warranto petition of Brito
would therefore be impossible, as this would result in the
violation of the relevant civil service laws, rules and
regulations. To proceed with the enforcement of the quo
warranto judgment would not obviously serve the
interests of justice.
Conclusion
In sum, Brito himself is not eligible to hold the contested
position, and for this reason, he may not inquire on the
qualifications of Arroyo through a petition for quo
warranto. Furthermore, the final and executory judgment
of the OP, finding Brito liable for falsification of his
bachelor's degree, has effectively rendered the
execution of the quo warranto judgment impossible,
inequitable, and unjust. The CA therefore gravely
abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in directing the execution of its quo
warranto decision.
Had the NCIP implemented the CA's decision pending
the resolution of this petition, and Brito was actually
reinstated to the contested position, his actions as a
Regional Director of the NCIP Region V are deemed
valid pursuant to the de facto officer doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot allow Brito to retain the
salaries and emoluments he received as a de
facto Regional Director, especially since the finding of
falsification contradicts the presence of good faith on his
part. He is, thus, required to account to Arroyo all the
amounts he received by virtue of his position as a de
facto officer, if there are any.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The Decision dated August 30, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-6.R. SP No. 60768 is
hereby MODIFIED to direct the dismissal of the petition
for quo warranto insofar as petitioner Lee T. Arroyo is
concerned.
Accordingly, the Resolutions dated December 7, 2010
and June 8, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in the same
case are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Ulysses A. Brito is directed to account for
the salaries and emoluments he received during his
tenure as a de facto Regional Director at the NCIP
Region V, if any.
[G.R. No. 48797. July 30, 1943.]
FUA CAM LU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YAP
FAUCO and YAP SINGCO, Defendants-
Appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for Petitioner.
M. H. de Joya for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
The plaintiff-appellee, Fua Cam Lu, obtained in
civil case No. 42125 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila a judgment sentencing the defendants-
appellants, Yap Fauco and Yap Singco, to pay
P1,538.04, with legal interest and costs. By
virtue of a writ of execution, a certain parcel of
land belonging to the appellants, assessed at
P3,550 and situated in Donsol, Sorsogon, was
levied upon by the provincial sheriff of Sorsogon
who, on November 15, 1933, made a notice, duly
posted in three conspicuous places in the
municipalities of Donsol and Sorsogon and
published in the Mamera Press, that said land
would be sold at public auction on December 12,
1933. On December 16, 1933, the appellants
executed a mortgage in favor of the appellee,
wherein it was stipulated that their obligation
under the judgment in civil case No. 42125 was
reduced to P1,200 which was made payable in
four installments of P300 during the period
commencing on February 8, 1934, and ending on
August 8, 1935; that to secure the payment of
the said P1,200, a camarin belonging to the
appellants and built on the above-mentioned
land, was mortgaged to the appellee; that in case
the appellants defaulted in the payment of any of
the installments, they would pay ten per cent of
the unpaid balance as attorney’s fees, plus the
costs of the action to be brought by the appellee
by reason of such default, and the further
amount of P338, representing the discount
conceded to the appellants. As a result of the
agreement thus reached by the parties, the sale
of the land advertised by the provincial sheriff did
not take place. However, pursuant to an alias
writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila in civil case No. 42125 on
March 31, 1934, the provincial sheriff, without
publishing a new notice, sold said land at a public
auction held on May 28, 1934, to the appellee for
P1,923.32. On June 13, 1935, the provincial
sheriff executed a final deed in favor of the
appellee. On August 29, 1939, the appellee
instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon against the appellants in
view of their refusal to recognize appellee’s title
and to vacate the land. The appellants relied on
the legal defenses that their obligation under the
judgment in civil case No. 42125 was novated by
the mortgage executed by them in favor of the
appellee and that the sheriff’s sale was void for
lack of necessary publication. These contentions
were overruled by the lower court which
rendered judgment declaring the appellee to be
the owner of the land and ordering the appellants
to deliver the same to him, without special
pronouncement as to costs. The appellants seek
the reversal of this judgment.
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT OF CIVIL
CASE NO. 42125 CAN NO LONGER BE
EXECUTED BY VIRTUE OF THE MORTGAGE
ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES – Yes.
We concur in the theory that appellants’ liability
under the judgment in civil case No. 42125 had
been extinguished by the settlement evidenced
by the mortgage executed by them in favor of
the appellee on December 16, 1933. Although
said mortgage did not expressly cancel the old
obligation, this was impliedly novated by reason
of incompatibility resulting from the fact that,
whereas the judgment was for P1,538.04 payable
at one time, did not provide for attorney’s fees,
and was not secured, the new obligation is for
P1,200 payable in installments, stipulates for
attorney’s fees, and is secured by a mortgage.
The appellee, however, argues that the later
agreement merely extended the time of payment
and did not take away his concurrent right to
have the judgment executed. This could not have
been the purpose for executing the mortgage,
because it was therein recited that the appellants
promised to pay P1,200 to the appellee as a
settlement of the judgment in civil case No.
42125 (en forma de transaccion de la
decision . . . en el asunto civil No. 42125). Said
judgment cannot be said to have been settled,
unless it was extinguished.
Moreover, the sheriff’s sale in favor of the
appellee is void because no notice thereof was
published other than that which appeared in the
Mamera Press regarding the sale to be held on
December 12, 1933. Lack of new publication is
shown by appellee’s own evidence and the issue,
though not raised in the pleadings, was thereby
tried by implied consent of the parties,
emphasized by the appellants in the
memorandum filed by them in the lower court,
and squarely threshed out in this Court by both
the appellants and the appellee. The latter had,
besides, admitted that there was no new
publication, and so much so that in his brief he
merely resorted to the argument that "section
460 of Act 190 authorized the sheriff to adjourn
any sale upon execution to any date agreed upon
in writing by the parties . . . and does not require
the sheriff to publish anew the public sale which
was adjourned." The appellee has correctly
stated the law but has failed to show that it
supports his side, for it is not pretended that
there was any written agreement between the
parties to adjourn the sale advertised for
December 12, 1933, to May 28, 1934. Neither
may it be pretended that the sale in favor of the
appellee was by virtue of a mere adjournment, it
appearing that it was made pursuant to an alias
writ of execution. Appellee’s admission has thus
destroyed the legal presumption that official duty
was regularly performed`.

The appealed judgment is; therefore, reversed

and the defendants- appellants, who are hereby
declared to be the owners of the land in question,
are absolved from the complaint, with costs
against the appellee. So ordered.

Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

October 14, 2015
G.R. Nos. 153745-46
NEMENCIO C. PULUMBARIT, Petitioner
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division Composed
of JUSTICE BIENVENIDO L. REYES, Ponente;
JUSTICE ROBERTO A. BARRIOS, Chairman; and
JUSTICE EDGARDO F. SUNDIAM, Acting Third
Member), LOURDES S. PASCUAL, LEONILA F.
ACASIO, and SAN JUAN MACIAS MEMORIAL PARK,
INC., Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 166573
LOURDES S. PASCUAL, LEONILA F. ACASIO and
SAN JUAN MACIAS MEMORIAL PARK,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
NEMECIO C. PULUMBARIT, Sr., Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Facts and Case Antecedents
Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park,
Inc. (SJMMPI), through its President Lourdes S.
Pascual, authorized Atty. Soledad de Jesus to look for a
buyer for the San Juan Memorial Park (Memorial Park)
for P1,500,000.00.  Thereafter, Lourdes Pascual, Leonila
4
F. Acasio, and the other officers of SJMMPI (Pascual et
al.) were introduced to Nemencio Pulumbarit
(Pulumbarit). The parties eventually came to an
agreement, with Pulumbarit issuing eighteen (18) checks
in the name of SJMMPI SecretaryTreasurer Leonila
Acasio. Pulumbarit and/or his lawyer took charge of
reducing the agreement into writing and securing the
signatures of all concerned parties.
5
On June 13, 1983, Pascual et al. sent a letter to
Pulumbarit requesting for a copy of their written
agreement. In another letter of even date, they also
asked Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace the
ones he previously issued.  Failing to get a favorable
6
response, Pascual et al. filed a Complaint for Rescission
of Contract, Damages and Accounting with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Receivership against
Pulumbarit.7
Proceedings before the Trial Court
In their Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 7250-M
before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos,
Bulacan, Pascual et al. Alleged that they entered into a
contract of management with option to buy the Memorial
Park with Pulumbarit, with the latter allegedly agreeing
to pay Pascual et al. a sum of P750,000.00 on
staggered installments.  Under this alleged agreement,
8
Pulumbarit's failure to make good on these installments
would cause the cancellation of their contract, forfeiture
of any payment already made, and surrender by
Pulumbarit of possession over the Memorial Park. 9
Pascual et al. claimed that they requested new checks
from Pulumbarit to replace the previous ones he issued,
the latter having been made payable to SJMMPI 's
Secretary-Treasurer Leonila Acasio, who has since then
resigned from the company. Due to his refusal to issue
the requested replacement checks, Pulumbarit was in
breach of his obligations under their contract.
Pascual et al. also asse1ied that Pulumbarit further
violated their management contract by (1) destroying the
original fence surrounding the Memorial Park, (2)
annexing the adjacent lots and (3) operating these and
the Memorial Park under the name "Infinito Memorial
Park" using the permit issued to SJMMPI without its
consent and the proper governmental
clearances.  Thus, Pascual et al. prayed that the court
10
declare, among others, (1) the rescission of their
agreement, (2) forfeiture of all sums paid by Pulumbarit
to SJMMPI, and (3) an obligation on Pulumbarit's part to
render accounting. 11
On February 3, 1984, Pulumbarit filed a Motion praying
for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of
action, attaching a copy of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA).  Pascual et al. amended their
12
Complaint on June 5, 1984.  Therein, they alleged that
13
Pulumbarit falsified their agreement, as the MOA
provided did not reflect the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the parties. They disputed the statement in the
MOA that the agreement was a sale of all the paid-up
stocks of SJMMPI and not a management agreement
with option to buy. Pascual et al. argued that the falsified
MOA was a nullity and therefore without force and effect.
In a motion filed on July 5, 1984, and pending resolution
of Pulumbarit's Motion to Dismiss, Pascual et al. sought
to have Pulumbarit declared in default.  The trial court
14
granted this motion and allowed Pascual et al. to present
their evidence ex parte. 15
On September 5, 1984, the trial court rendered a default
judgment in favor of Pascual et al.  This judgment of
16
default was reversed by the CA on January 15, 1989
and the case was remanded to the trial co mi for
reception of Pulumbarit's evidence. 17 Prior to the
reversal of the trial court's default judgment, however,
Pascual et al. applied for the appointment of a receiver
to take possession of the Memorial Park and all its
records and business transactions during the pendency
of the case.  This application was denied by the trial
18
court in an Order dated October 10, 1991. 19
With the reversal of the earlier judgment of default, the
trial court admitted Pulumbarit's Answer.  Therein, 20
Pulumbarit denied ever having offered to manage the
Memorial Park for Pascual et al. Presenting the signed
MOA as evidence, Pulumbarit countered that SJMMPI
and its officers/stockholders sold all of the subscribed
capital stock of SJMMPI to him for P750,000.00 payable
in installments.  As sole owner, Pulumbarit claimed he
21
had no obligation to Pascual et al. to render accounting.
During the trial, Pascual et al. presented, among others,
Eliodoro Constantino, a Document Examiner from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), to prove that
Pulumbarit falsified the MOA, which caused it to not
reflect their true agreement. Constantino examined the
contested MOA and testified that the second page was
typed from a typewriter different from the one used in
typing pages one, three and four. 22
On July 15, 2000, the trial court promulgated its
questioned Decision  in favor of Pascual et al. The
23
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
a) Declaring null and void the Memorandum of
Agreement dated November 1982 between Lourdes S.
Pascual and Nemencio Pulumbarit, Sr. (marked exhibit
"J" for the plaintiffs and Exhibit "l" for the defendants);
b) Rescinding the Management Contract entered into by
Nemencio C. Pulumbarit, Sr. with the plaintiffs for the
management of the San Juan Macias [Memorial] Park,
Inc., and declaring the same to have no force and effect;
c) Directing Nemencio Pulumbarit, Sr. to render an
accounting of his operation of the San Juan Macias
Memorial Park, Inc. from the time he took over the
operation thereof in 1982 up to the date of this decision;
and
d) Ordering Nemencio C. Pulumbarit, Sr. to pay the San
Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. the sums of
Pl00,000.00 as actual damages and Pl00,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The Court also orders Nemencio Pulumbarit, Sr., as well
as any and all persons acting for and in his behalf, to
forthwith cease and desist from operating and engaging
in the business of the San Juan Macias Memorial Park,
Inc., including that being operated under the name of
Infinito Memorial Park, and from engaging, in any
manner whatsoever, in acts of management, ownership
and administration of the aforesaid corporation. He is
also directed to immediately surrender to the plaintiffs all
documents, papers, deeds, accounts and sums of
money relating to or the business and operation of the
corporation.
SO ORDERED. 24
Pulumbarit filed a Notice of Appeal dated August 19,
2000.25 His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
69931.
Meanwhile, and before the transmittal of the records of
Civil Case No. 7250-M to the CA, Pascual et al. filed
with the trial court motions praying for (1) the issuance of
a writ of injunction against Pulumbarit  and (2) the
26
execution of the decision pending appeal.  The trial
27
court granted these motions on September 13,
2000  pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of
28
Court  Pulumbarit's
29
subsequent motion for
reconsideration30 of this Order (directing discretionary
execution) was denied on October 3, 2000. 31
Aggrieved, Pulumbarit filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA to nullify the writs of execution and injunction
issued by the trial court, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.  This case was docketed as CA-
32
G.R. SP No. 61873.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
After the conduct of oral arguments, the CA in CA G.R.
SP No. 61873 issued a TRO on January 26, 2001  and 33
thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction on March 28,
2001.  Despite this, however, Pascual et al., on May 11,
34
2001, filed a motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 seeking
execution of the trial court's Decision pending
Pulumbarit's appeal. 35
Meanwhile, CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 and CA-G.R. CV No.
69931 were ordered consolidated on November 5,
2001. 36
Thereafter, the CA, in its questioned Resolution dated
May 30, 2002, granted Pascual et al.' s motion for
execution pending appeal and, as a consequence,
dismissed CA-G .R. SP No. 61873 for being moot and
academic.  On July 12, 2002, Pulumbarit filed a Petition
37
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 (with Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65) seeking a review of the May
30, 2002 Resolution.  This is presently docketed as G.R.
38
Nos. 153745-46.
As a result of the filing of G.R. Nos. 153745-46 with this
Court, the CA, on September 11, 2002, resolved to
suspend its May 30, 2002.
Resolution granting Pascual's motion for execution
pending appeal.  CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 was
39
neve1iheless declared submitted for decision on
November 25, 2002. 40
On September 28, 2004, the CA issued its Decision
reversing the trial court's ruling in Civil Case No. 7250-
M. Pascual et al. 's motion for reconsideration  dated
41
October 19, 2004 was denied by the CA in
its Resolution  dated January 12, 2005. Aggrieved,
42
Pascual et al. filed a petition  seeking the review of this
43
Decision, hence, G.R. No. 166573.
G.R Nos. 153745-46 were consolidated with G.R. No.
166573 by virtue of this Court's Resolution dated
February 7, 2007. 44
Issues
We find the issues, as raised in the consolidated
petitions, to be as follows:
(1) WHETHER PASCUAL ET AL.' S FILING OF AN
URGENT MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69931, DESPITE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF CA-G.R. SP
NO. 61873, CONSTITUTED FORUM SHOPPING; - ‘NO
(2) Whether the consolidation of CA-G.R. CV No. 69931
with CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 violated the internal rules of
the CA, resulting to an infringement of Pulumbarit's right
to due process;
(3) Whether the filing of the motion for execution
pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 rendered CA-
G.R. SP No. 61873 moot and academic;
(4) WHETHER THE GRANT OF THE MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY THE CA WAS
PROPER; - No.
(5) WHETHER THE FINDING OF FACT IN THE
APPLICATION FOR RECEIVERSHIP CONSTITUTED
RES JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE TRUE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES; - No
(6) Whether the agreement between the parties was one
for sale or management of the memorial park.
We rule on the issues.
Ruling of the Court
Pascual et al. committed abuse of court processes.
The trial court, upon Pascual et al.'s motion, allowed the
execution of its Decision pending Pulumbarit's appeal of
the same with the CA.  When the CA (in CA-G.R. SP
45
No. 61873) issued writs against said discretionary
execution, Pascual et al. filed a motion seeking to do
exactly that what the court has already enjoined, albeit
this time before the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931. This
act, according to Pulumbarit, constitutes "a specie (sic)
of deliberate and willful forum-shopping"  which should
46
not be countenanced by this Court.
Strictly speaking, Pascual et al. did not commit forum
shopping.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.
47
Here, any action by the CA on Pascual et al. 's motion in
CA-G.R. CV No. 6993 1 is provisional in nature, such
that it can in no way constitute as res judicata in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61873. Moreover, forum shopping requires
the identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought in two or more pending cases.48 Here,
there is no identity of relief and/or cause of action. CA-
G.R. SP No. 61873 is limited to a determination of
whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
trial court in granting execution pending appeal while
Pascual et al.'s motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931
involves a determination by the CA whether there are
"good reasons" warranting the grant of discretionary
execution.
We, however, note with disapproval the circumstances
surrounding Pascual et al. 's filing of said motion.
Here, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 issued the TRO
and the writ of preliminary injunction against the
discretionary execution on January 26, 2001 and March
28, 2001, respectively.  On April 16, 2001, Pulumbarit
51
posted the required bond amounting to
PS00,000.00.  Pascual et al., on the other hand, filed
52
their motion for execution pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69931 on May 11, 2001, nearly four months after the
issuance of the TRO, two months after the writ of
injunction and almost a month from Pulumbarit's posting
of the bond.
Said motion is clearly an attempt on Pascual et al. 's part
to undermine the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 in Pulumbarit's
favor. (Notably, Pascual et al. do not appear to have
sought the reconsideration of the issuance of said
injunctive orders.) Not unlike Ducat, therefore, Pascual's
filing of the motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931
demonstrates defiance of, if not lack of due respect for,
the authority of the CA which earlier issued injunctive
writs against the execution by the trial court of the
appealed Decision.
CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 not rendered moot and
academic by the filing of the
motion for execution pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
69931.
To reiterate, Pascual et al. 's motion in CA-G.R. CV No.
69931 seeks the CA's approval to execute the trial
court's Decision pending final disposition of Pulumbarit's
appeal. CA-G.R. SP No. 61873, on the other hand, is an
action to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the trial court when it allowed
execution pending appeal. The subjects of Pascual et al.
's motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 and Pulumbarit's
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 concern two different,
albeit closely related, issues. Furthermore, any action on
a motion for execution pending appeal is only provisional
in nature. The grant or denial (as the case may be) of
such a motion is always without prejudice to the court's
final disposition of the case and the issues raised
therein. In fact, Section 3, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
allows the party against whom the execution of a
decision pending appeal is directed to stay the execution
by posting a supersedeas bond.  Section 5 of the same
64
rule also provides that where the executed judgment is
reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such
orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity
and justice may warrant under the circumstances. 65
For these reasons, the grant by the CA of a motion for
execution pending appeal, being provisional in nature,
could therefore not have rendered CA-G.R. SP No.
61873 moot and academic. In the same way, if not
arguably more so, much less can the mere filing of such
a motion warrant the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 61873
on the ground of mootness. Thus, the CA committed a
reversible error when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
61873.
WHETHER THE GRANT OF THE MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY THE CA WAS
PROPER; - No.
Reasons cited are insufficient to justify grant of
execution pending appeal.
Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides, in
part, that discretionary execution (or execution pending
appeal) may only issue "upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order after due hearing." Good reason must
consist of superior or exceptional circumstances of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the
losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment
be reversed later.
66
Our ruling in Diesel Construction Company, Inc. (DCCI)
v. Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC)  is particularly
67
instructive. Citing possible financial distress to be
caused by a "protracted delay in the reimbursement" of
the costs prayed for, DCCI moved for the discretionary
execution of the trial court's decision awarding escalated
construction costs in its favor.  The CA, however,
68
allowed a stay of execution upon the JFC's posting of a
supersedeas bond.  When the matter was brought
69
before this Court for resolution, we ruled against said
discretionary execution, thus:
The financial distress of a juridical entity is not
comparable to a case involving a natural person - such
as a very old and sickly one without any means of
livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support and
monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who dies.
Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation
does not outweigh the long standing general policy of
enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly,
a juridical entity like petitioner corporation, has other
than extraordinary execution, alternative remedies like
loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to
address its precarious financial condition.
70
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
G.R. Nos. 153745-46 & 166573
In this case, the grant by the CA of Pascual et al. 's
motion for discretionary/extraordinary execution was
founded on the following reasons:
(I) to stop Pulumbarit from continuing to receive money
from the sale of the lots and (2) to save the property
from distraint and public auction.  We find the foregoing
71
reasons insufficient to justify the execution of the trial
court's Decision pending final resolution of Pulumbarit's
appeal.
For one, there is no urgent and pressing need for the
immediate execution of the Decision considering that, as
noted by the CA itself, Pulumbarit had been in
possession of the subject Memorial Park for the past
twenty years.  Assuming the affirmance of the trial
72
court's Decision in Pascual et al. 's favor, Pulumbarit
would still have to surrender possession of the Park and
account for all of its finances.
73
Secondly, and as in the case of DCCI v. JFC, there are
alternative remedies (i.e. re-application for receivership,
loans and redemption, among others) available to
Pascual et al. that may more appropriately address their
concerns arising from the possible distraint and auction
of the Memorial Park. The existence of these remedies,
in our view, negates the claim of urgency necessary to
justify execution of the trial court's Decision pending final
resolution of Pulumbarit's appeal.
WHETHER THE FINDING OF FACT IN THE
APPLICATION FOR RECEIVERSHIP CONSTITUTED
RES JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE TRUE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES; - No
The finding of fact in the application for receivership
did not constitute res judicata as to the issue of the
true agreement between Pulumbarit and Pascual et
al.
Res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment does not
apply in this case.
In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and
Livestock Association,  we laid down the requirements
75
of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of
judgment," to wit:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same. 76
xxx
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The application of the doctrine of res judicata either in
the concept of bar by prior judgment or conclusiveness
of judgment requires or presupposes the existence of
two independent actions.
Since receivership may be resorted to either as a
principal action or an ancillary remedy,  it is imperative
77
to first determine the nature of the application for
receivership in this case. If, for example, it is found that
Pascual et al. filed a separate action for receivership, the
findings of fact made by the court therein may be held to
be conclusive as to the "true" nature of the patties'
agreement in the action for rescission of contract,
damages and accounting. If, on the other hand, the
application was made ancillary to the principal action f(Jr
rescission, a finding made in the course of the resolution
of said application would not bar the same court, after an
exhaustive litigation of the main issues before it, from
later on arriving at a different finding of fact.

The records show that Pascual et al. 's "petition for

receivership" was filed with the same court and under
Civil Case No. 7250-M,  specifically, for the appointment
78

of a receiver to preserve their rights over the Memorial

Park during the pendency of the suit with Pulumbarit. It
is thus an application for an ancillary remedy made
during the course of the main action for
rescission.  Being
79
a provisional remedy, the
appointment of a receiver would always be without
prejudice to the final outcome of the main case. A finding
of fact made in the course of the resolution of said
application cannot therefore constitute resjudicata for
purposes of the issues implicated in the main case. As in
fact, the trial court in this case, in the end, found for
Pascual et al. and ruled that the agreement between the
parties was not a sale, but a management contract.

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, we resolve

to:

(1) GRANT G.R. Nos. 153745-46. The Court of

Appeals' Resolution dated May 30, 2002 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61873 is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and

(2) DENY G.R. No. 166573 for lack of merit

and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 with
the MODIFICATION that the agreement between
herein parties is a contract to sell (not a contract
of sale of) SJMMPI shares.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 185746, January 20, 2016
LUCITA TIOROSIO-
ESPINOSA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-
EUROPA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 11, 11TH JUDICIAL
REGION, DAVAO CITY, NICOLAS L.
SUMAPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF IV
OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
11TH JUDICIAL REGION, DAVAO CITY AND
NECEFERO JOVERO, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
I petition for certiorari, and that they disclosed this
Private respondent Necefero Jovero (Jovero) filed
an action for damages against spouses
Pompiniano Espinosa1 and petitioner Lucita
Tiorosio-Espinosa2 (Spouses Espinosa) before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC). In the
complaint, Jovero alleged that Spouses Espinosa
maliciously filed several cases for
theft, estafa and perjury against him for the sole
purpose of vexing, harassing, and humiliating
him. Accordingly, Jovero prayed that Spouses
Espinosa be ordered to pay compensatory
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. 3
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision4 dated
November 21, 2005 in favor of Jovero. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Necefero Jovero, ordering defendants to
pay Jovero:
1. The sum of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as
compensatory damages;
2. The sum of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral
damages;
3. The sum of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
4. The sum of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) for and as
attorney's fees; and
5. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Consequently, Jovero moved for execution
pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
failing health.6 Meanwhile, Spouses Espinosa
moved for reconsideration of the RTC
7
decision.  On April 12, 2007, the RTC granted
Jovero's motion for execution pending appeal and
denied Spouses Espinosa's motion for
reconsideration.8 The RTC subsequently issued a
writ of execution pending appeal on April 19,
2007 which covered the entire amount stated in
the decision.9
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, Spouses Espinosa filed their
notice of appeal of the main RTC decision.10
They also filed a separate motion to stay
execution pending appeal and to approve/fix
the supersedeas bond. They contended that
execution pending appeal involving awards of
moral and exemplary damages is improper
because it is contrary to the decisions of the
Supreme Court.11 The RTC denied the motion to
stay execution pending appeal in an order dated
September 14, 2007.12
On November 19, 2007,13 Spouses Espinosa filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the September 14, 2007 order.14 in
a resolution dated December 14, 2007, the CA
dismissed outright the petition for certiorari for
failure to state the date when the assailed order
was received.15 Spouses Espinosa filed their
motion for reconsideration alleging that their
previous counsel received the assailed order on
October 4, 2007, attaching as proof a certified
photocopy of postal registry return card. 16 Thus,
they filed the petition for certiorari on time. They
explained that the return card was not yet
available with the RTC at the time they filed the
fact to the CA in the petition with an undertaking
to submit it as soon as it was available. On
November 18, 2008, however, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration. This time, it cited
Spouses Espinosa's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC's September 14, 2007
order to sustain its earlier dismissal of the
petition for certiorari.17
Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa (Lucita) filed this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to appeal
the CA's dismissal of the case.18 
WHETHER OR NOT THE OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY THE CA IS
PROPER – No.
The CA erred in dismissing outright the petition
for certiorari on tenuous procedural grounds.
A

Under Section 3 of Rule 4625 of the Rules of
Court, the CA has the prerogative to dismiss the
case outright for failure to comply with the formal
requirements of an action filed under Rule 65.
The formal requirements include, among others,
a statement by the petitioner indicating the
material dates when the order or resolution
subject of the petition was received. The CA
identified Spouses Espinosa's failure to comply
with this requirement as the primary ground for
dismissing the petition outright.
An examination of the petition for certiorari filed
with the CA shows that the CA is technically
correct with respect to its finding that Spouses
Espinosa failed to indicate the exact date of
receipt of the assailed RTC order. However, the
CA should have considered Spouses Espinosa's
explanation regarding this omission, which was
apparent on the face of the petition. In
paragraph 8(g), Spouses Espinosa stated:
On 18 September 2007, the Regional Trial Court.
Branch II, Davao City, has released for mailing to
petitioners' former counsel, Atty. Eufracio
Dayaday, the Order dated 14 September 2007,
denying their "Motion To Stay Execution Pending
Appeal and to Approve/Fix Supersedeas Bond"...
The records surrendered by Atty. Eufracio
Dayaday to petitioners after he withdrew his
appearance as counsel for the latter does not
bear the Order dated 14 September 2007. Upon
verification made by petitioners, the records of
the said case with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Davao City, do not have the Postal
Registry Return Card for the mailing of the Order
dated 14 September 2007. Nevertheless,
petitioners herein undertake lo submit a certified
photocopy of the postal registry return card, as
soon as the same be made available in the
records of the case.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Spouses Espinosa likewise executed a "Joint-
Affidavit of Material Dates,"27 which was attached
to the petition for certiorari filed with the CA,
attesting to the fact that the September 14, 2007
order was not among the documents turned over
to them by their former counsel, and that the
registry return card had not been returned to the
RTC.28
It is therefore apparent that Spouses Espinosa
attempted to comply with the material date
requirement. Unfortunately, they themselves
could not ascertain when the subject order was
received by their former counsel and thereby
make an accurate statement as to such fact.
Moreover, the best evidence to prove receipt of
the RTC order, i.e., the registry return card, was
not yet available when they elevated the case to
the CA. But, as a sign of good faith, Spouses
Espinosa undertook to submit the return card as
soon as it was available—which they
subsequently did on January 30, 2008. 29 Given
the foregoing circumstances, it may be deduced
that the basic reason why no precise date of
receipt was given by Spouses Espinosa is
because they did not want to misrepresent the
date in their petition. In fine, we find Spouses
Espinosa's failure to indicate the date of receipt
excusable; the CA's outright dismissal of their
petition is not commensurate with the degree of
their non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure. In any case, the return card showed
that the order was received on October 4, 2007,
which means that when Spouses Espinosa filed
the petition for certiorari on November 19, 2007,
they did so well within the sixty (60) day
reglementary period.
Although it is true that procedural rules should be
treated with utmost respect and due regard,
since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims
and in the administration of justice, this is not an
inflexible tenet. After all, rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application
especially on technical matters, which tends to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must be avoided.30
WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION TO STAY
THE EXECUTION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – Yes.
B
In denying Spouses Espinosa's motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition
for certiorari, the CA held that their failure to first
file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order,
which denied their motion to stay execution, was
fatal to their petition. While the CA's legal
proposition is correct, the rule was misapplied in
the present case.
A petition for certiorari before a higher court will
generally not prosper unless the inferior court
has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This is because a motion for
reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.31 A motion for reconsideration
is required in order to grant the lower court an
opportunity to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case.32 
IN THE PRESENT CASE, Contrary to the CA's
findings, however, Spouses Espinosa already
complied with this requirement. Their motion to
stay execution is, in fact, a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12,
2007 which granted Jovero's motion for
execution pending appeal.
Although not captioned as a "motion for
reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa's motion to
stay execution directly challenged the RTC's
order of execution pending appeal insofar as it
allowed the inclusion of the awards for moral and
exemplary damages.33 Thus, when the RTC
denied Spouses Espinosa's motion to stay
execution on September 14, 2007, it was already
the second time the trial court had passed upon
the issue of execution pending appeal. Both the
April 12, 2007 and September 14, 2007 orders
dealt with the same issue, i.e., the propriety of
execution pending appeal. In the first instance,
the RFC allowed the execution pending appeal; in
the latter, it denied Spouses Espinosa's motion to
stay execution and, thus, sustained its earlier
ruling. On both occasions, the parties had been
accorded ample opportunity to squarely argue
their positions and the RTC more than enough
opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate
upon the issues raised by the parties. Under
these circumstances, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the stay of
execution pending appeal by Spouses Espinosa
could not be considered a plain and adequate
remedy but a mere superfluity.34
WHETHER THE AWARDS OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES, MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL – No.
The resolution of this issue is straightforward.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements
that execution pending appeal of awards of moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees is
not allowed. In Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Lantin;36 we explained WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
why these cannot be the subject of execution GRANTED. The resolutions dated December 14,
pending appeal: 2007 and November 18, 2008 of the Court of
...The execution of any award for moral and Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02061-MIN are SET
exemplary damages is dependent on the ASIDE. The orders dated April 12, 2007 and
outcome of the main case. Unlike actual September 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court,
damages for which the petitioners may Branch 11, Davao City are MODIFIED to exclude
clearly be held liable if they breach a moral damages, exemplary damages, and
specific contract and the amounts of which attorney's fees in the execution pending appeal.
are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect The temporary restraining order issued on
to moral and exemplary damages as well as February 9, 2009 is LIFTED.
the exact amounts remain uncertain and
indefinite pending resolution by the SO ORDERED.
Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually
the Supreme Court. The existence of the
factual bases of these types of damages and
their causal relation to the petitioners' act
will have to be determined in the light of the
assignments of errors on appeal. It is
possible that the petitioners, alter all, while liable
for actual damages may not be liable for moral
and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases
elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may
be reduced.37 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Engineering Construct ion Inc. v. National
Power Corporation,38 we expanded the RCPI
doctrine to likewise exclude consequential
damages and attorney's fees from execution
pending appeal.39 The doctrine has since been
reiterated in Heirs of Santiago C. Divinagracia v.
Ruiz,40International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court
of Appeals,41Echauz v. Court of
Appeals,42 and Valencia v. Court of
Appeals.43 Clearly, the RTC committed legal error
when it ordered the premature execution of the
awards of moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. Nonetheless, we recognize
that the RTC had the power to order the
execution pending appeal of actual or
compensatory damages in accordance with the
cited authorities.
[G.R. No. 74975. January 12, 1987.]
TOMASA L. BELGADO, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the estate of the late
AMADA T. LAIZ, Petitioner,
v.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FRANCISCO LAIZ, REMEDIOS LAIZ, and LAIZ
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
Arturo E. Balbastro for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The present controversy addresses itself mainly
to the proper interpretation of Section 23 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines promulgated by this
Court, providing:
"Sec. 23. Perfection of appeal. — In cases where
appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall
be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by
any party.”
Particularly, the timeliness of a Motion for
Immediate Partial Execution is involved.
On September 1, 1984, in an action for
annulment with damages filed by petitioner-
plaintiff against private respondent-defendant,
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch XXIII, rendered a Decision in petitioner’s
favor declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Deed of Conveyance of Real Properties, subject
matter of the annulment action, as null and void
and, in so far as pertinent to this case, "ordering
defendants (private respondents herein) upon
receipt of this decision to deposit to this Court
the rentals and/or income due the properties
subject of this case from the date of filing" (par.
4, Dispositive portion).
The Decision was received by private
respondents on September 25, 1984. They had,
therefore, until October 10, 1984 within which to
appeal.
On October 2, 1984, or, on the seventh (7th) day
from receipt of the Decision, private respondents
filed a Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, petitioner was served with
copy of the Decision on October 1, 1984. Her last
day to appeal, therefore, fell on October 16,
1984.
On October 11, 1984, or, on the tenth (10th) day
after receipt of the judgment, petitioner filed a
Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending
appeal of that portion of the judgment, among
others, requiring the deposit of rentals in Court
on the ground that it "necessitates immediate
implementation." Private respondents opposed
the Motion alleging that the Motion for Partial
Execution was filed after the perfection of their
appeal and that no mention was made of any
good reason to warrant execution pending
appeal.
The Trial Court initially denied execution pending
appeal on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction
over the case with the perfection of private
respondents’ appeal. Subsequently, however, it
reconsidered, not by way of granting execution
pending appeal, but on the theory that the
decretal portion of the judgment directing the
deposit of rentals in Court was, in effect, an order
of accounting of the rentals due so that pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 1
execution may not be stayed by the perfection of
an appeal. On January 11, 1985, the Trial Court
issued an Order requiring the lessees of the
properties, subject of the action, to deposit the
rentals in Court.
On Certiorari, respondent Appellate Court found
the Orders of the Trial Court devoid of legal
justification on the ground that the judgment
directing the deposit of rentals in Court is not an
order of accounting within the contemplation of
Section 4 of Rule 39. It further opined that the
appeal was perfected on October 10, 1984, so
that when petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate
Partial Execution pending appeal on October 11,
the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules,
supra. Thus, it allowed private respondents to
withdraw whatever rentals had been deposited in
Court "either in obedience to the nullified orders
of respondent Court or by way of consignation
thereof." The authorization to withdraw was
reiterated in a Resolution, dated October 23,
1985, while petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was denied on June 13,
1986.
WHEN IS AN APPEAL DEEMED PERFECTED?
We find that Section 23 of the Interim Rules has
been misread. The period to perfect an appeal
should be reckoned not only from the date one
party receives a copy of the Decision but also
from the date the other party had notice hereof.
In this case, the "last day to appeal by any party"
is October 16. The appeal can be deemed to be
perfected only upon the expiration of that last
day to appeal, which is later than the period to
appeal of private respondents. 2 Consequently,
when petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate
Partial Execution on October 11, the Trial Court
still retained jurisdiction over the case. To rule
otherwise would be to allow a party litigant to
deprive the adverse party of the latter’s right to
move for new trial or for reconsideration or even
for execution pending appeal by the simple
expedient of immediately perfecting his appeal by
filing a Notice of Appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review is

hereby SET ASIDE and this case is hereby
ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch XXIII, for
determination, on the merits, of petitioner’s
Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending
appeal. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015
REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL
AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOELJAMILI,
MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA,
RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL,
AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN, AND
ENRIQUE LEDESMA,
JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING &
ALLIED SERVICES, NORMAN
LACSAMANA,*** JONAS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judicially approved compromise agreement has
the effect and authority of res judicata.2 It is
final, binding on the parties, and enforceable
through a writ of execution. Article 2041 of the
Civil Code, however, allows the aggrieved party
to rescind the compromise agreement and insist
upon his original demand upon failure and refusal
of the other party to abide by the compromise
agreement.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners Inutan, Carte, Ayson, Cabarle, Jamili,
Hular, Azucena, Tunog, Bernal, Estre, Sagun, and
Ledesma were employees of respondent Napar, a
recruitment agency owned and managed by
respondent Lacsamana. Napar assigned
petitioners at respondent Jonas, a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of various food
products with respondent Young as its President,
to work as factory workers, machine operator,
quality control inspector, selector, mixer, and
warehouseman.
Sometime in September of 2002, petitioners and
other co-workers (complainants) filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC three separate
complaints for wage differentials, 13 th month pay,
overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay,
and unpaid emergency cost of living allowance
(ECOLA) against respondents, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case Nos. 09-76698-2002, 09-08152-2002,
and 09-08046-2002, which complaints were
consolidated before Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno
(LA Reyno).
On January 13, 2003, complainants and
respondents entered into a Joint Compromise
Agreement7 which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
JOINT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COMPLAINANTS and the RESPONDENTS, through
their' respective counsel, respectfully submit the
following Compromise Agreement.
WHEREAS, the parties (except Susana Larga)
deciding to finally write "finis" to the instant case,
have agreed to settle the instant case and to
enter into a Compromise Agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
terms and conditions herein below stipulated, the
parties do hereby agree:
1. That the complainants should be
considered regular employees of
Napar Contracting and Allied
Services reckoned from their date
of hire and are entitled to all the
benefits under the law due to
regular employees;
2. That the complainants shall be re-
assigned by Napar Contracting and
Allied Services and shall ensure that
they will be given work within forty
five days (45) or until February
26,2002;
3. That in case Napar Contracting and
Allied Services failed to re assign or
provide them work, complainants
shall be reinstated in their payroll
or be given their salary equivalent
to the existing minimum wage x x
x;
4. That the complainants shall each
receive the amount of SEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS as payment for
their monetary claims and which
amount shall be considered in any
future litigation;
5. That upon signing of this agreement
and compliance with the
stipulations herein provided, the
cases shall be deemed and
considered fully and completely
satisfied and the complainants
hereby release, remiss and forever
discharge the herein respondents,
from any and all claims arising from
the above cases;
6. The parties herein respectfully pray
unto this Honorable Commission to
approve this Compromise
Agreement and thereafter an Order
be issued declaring the judgment in
the above-entitled cases fully and
completely satisfied.
IN WITNESS WHEREFORE, the parties have against respondents, docketed as NLRC NCR
hereunto set their hands this 13th day of January Case Nos. 00-0505557-2003, 00-05-06187-
2003.8
cralawlawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 2003, 00-05-06605-2003,11 and 00-07-07792- Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
2003. These complaints were consolidated.
In their Petition for Certiorari22 filed before the
In an Order9 dated January 16, 2003, LA Reyno 14
In a Decision  dated July 29, 2004, Labor Arbiter CA, complainants insisted on their right to
approved the Joint Compromise Agreement,
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. (LA Espiritu) held that the rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement under
enjoined the parties to fully comply with its terms
conditions of the Joint Compromise Agreement Article 204123 of the Civil Code and on their right
and dismissed the case without prejudice.
particularly regarding to re-file their complaints under Section 16, Rule
reinstatement/reassignment of complainants V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. 24
In accordance with the Joint Compromise
were violated thereby justifying rescission of the
Agreement, complainants, on several instances,
Joint Compromise Agreement. LA Espiritu noted Napar and Lacsamana filed a Comment25 on the
reported to Napar. They were paid P7,000.00
that complainants were correct in re-filing the Petition. Jonas and Young, however, failed to file
each as part of the agreement but were required
complaints as this was an available remedy under a comment. As the CA did not acquire jurisdiction
by Napar; (1) to submit their respective bio-
the NLRC Rules of Procedure when their previous over Jonas and Young and on the basis of
data/resume and several documents such as
complaints were dismissed without prejudice. He complainants' manifestation that Jonas and
Police Clearance, NBI
struck down respondents' contention that a Young had already ceased operation, Jonas and
Clearance, Barangay Clearance, Mayor's Permit,
motion for execution of the compromise Young were dropped as party respondents by the
Health Certificate, drug test results, community
agreement was the proper remedy, ratiocinating CA in its Resolution26 of December 16, 2009.
tax certificate, eye test results and
that the dismissal of the cases was approved
medical/physical examination results; (2) to
without prejudice and therefore cannot be the On August 27, 2010, the CA rendered a
attend orientation seminars; (3) to undergo
subject of an execution. Decision27 affirming the NLRC. The CA considered
series of interviews; and (4) to take and pass
the January 16, 2003 Order of LA Reyno, which
qualifying examinations, before they could be
approved the Joint Compromise Agreement, as a
posted to their new assignments. These
Proceedings before the National Labor judgment on the merits, and held that the second
requirements, according to Napar, are needed to
Relations Commission set of complaints was barred by res
properly assess complainants' skills for new
judicata. According to the C A, the complainants,
placement with the agency's other clients.
All parties appealed to the NLRC. in re-filing their complaints due to respondents'
unwarranted refusal to provide them work, were
Complainants failed to fully comply, hence they
In a Decision17 dated June 26, 2008, the NLRC essentially seeking to enforce the compromise
were not given new assignments.
granted respondents' appeal. It ruled that the agreement and were not insisting on their
approval of the Joint Compromise Agreement by original demands that do not even include a
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
LA Reyno operates as res judicata between the claim for illegal dismissal. Thus, the CA ruled that
parties and renders it unappealable and complainants should have moved for the
Sensing Napar's insincerity in discharging its
immediately executory. It held that complainants execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement
obligation in reassigning them, complainants filed
had no cause of action when they re-filed their instead of filing a separate and independent
anew before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
complaints for being barred by res judicata. The action for illegal dismissal. The CA dismissed the
four separate Complaints10 for illegal dismissal,
NLRC, in disposing of the case, ordered the Petition, viz.:
non-payment of 13th month pay, wage
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the

differentials, overtime pay, service incentive
Joint Compromise Agreement, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
leave pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of

and rest day, and moral and exemplary damages
merit. Accordingly, the June 26, 2008 Decision
and October 14, 2008 Resolution of public commenced. If judicially approved, it becomes
respondent National Labor Relations Commission more than a binding contract; it is a
are AFFIRMED. determination of a controversy and has the force
and effect of a judgment. 32 Article 227 of the
SO ORDERED.28 cralawlawlibrary Labor Code provides that any compromise
settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
Complainants filed a Motion for with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor
Reconsideration29 but it was likewise denied by Relations or the regional office of the Department
the CA in its Resolution 30 dated February 10, of Labor and Employment shall be final and
2011. binding upon the parties. Compromise
agreements between employers and workers
Twelve of the complainants, herein petitioners, have often been upheld as valid and accepted as
instituted the present Petition for Review a desirable means of settling disputes. 33
on Certiorari.
Thus, a compromise agreement, once approved,
has the effect of res judicata between the parties
Issues
and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and
Petitioners presented the following issues:
coercion.34 A judgment upon compromise is
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
therefore not appealable, immediately executory,
I
and can be enforced by a writ of
execution.35 However, this broad precept
WHETHER PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS
ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. enunciated under Article 203736 of the Civil Code
has been qualified by Article 2041 of the same
Code which recognizes the right of an aggrieved
and constitutes as res judicata between them.
party to either (1) enforce the compromise by a
Our Ruling writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand, upon the
The Petition has merit. Petitioners' right to other party's failure or refusal to abide by the
rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and compromise. In a plethora of cases,37 the Court
right to re-file their complaints must prevail. has recognized the option of rescinding a
compromise agreement due to non-compliance
Petitioners validly exercised the with its terms. We explained in Chavez v. Court
option of rescinding the Joint of Appeals:38
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Compromise Agreement under
Article 2041 of the Civil Code A compromise has upon the parties the effect
and authority of res judicata; but there shall be
no execution except in compliance with a judicial
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise. cralawlawlibrary
compromise agreement as a contract whereby
the parties make reciprocal concessions in order Thus, we have held that a compromise
to avoid litigation or put an end to one already agreement which is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs is a
valid contract which is the law between the
parties themselves. It has upon them the effect
and authority of  res judicata even if not judicially
approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or
disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al v. Santos, we
clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art,
2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code,
which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by
the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand.
We explained, viz.:
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there
was no right to rescind compromise agreements.
Where a party violated the terms of a
compromise agreement, the only recourse open
to the other party was to enforce the terms
thereof.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its
Article 2041 xxx created for the first time the
right of rescission. That provision gives to the
aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand." Article 2041 should
obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept
enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise
has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041,
the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the
suit contemplated or involved in his original
demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an
action for rescission. This is because he may
regard the compromise as already rescinded by
the breach thereof of the other party. cralawlawlibrary

To reiterate, Article 2041 confers upon the party
concerned the authority, not only to regard the
compromise agreement as rescinded but also, to
insist upon his original demand. We find that
petitioners validly exercised this option as there
was breach and non-compliance of the Joint
Compromise Agreement by respondents.
It is undisputed that Napar failed to reassign and
provide work to petitioners. Napar, however, puts
the blame on petitioners for their alleged
deliberate refusal to comply with the
requirements for reassignment to other clients.
Napar claims that the imposition of these so-
called "reassessment procedures" will efficiently
guide them on where to assign petitioners; it
likewise posits that it is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative to assign workers to
their principal employer.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that there
was no indication that petitioners deliberately
refused to comply with the procedures prior to
their purported reassignment. Petitioners alleged
that they reported to Napar several times waiting
for tlieir assignment and that Napar was giving
them a run-around even as they tried to comply
with the requirements. These matters were not
disputed by respondents. Thus, we cannot agree
with respondents were the ones who violated the
compromise agreement. Moreover, we are not
persuaded by Napar's assertion that petitioners'
reassignment cannot be effected without
compliance with the requirements set by it.
Petitioners are regular employees of Napar; thus,
their reassignment should not involve any
reduction in rank, status or salary.39 As aptly
noted by LA Espiritu, petitioners are not newly-
hired employees. Considering further that they
are ordinary factory workers, they do not need
special training or any skills assessment
procedures for proper placement. While we
consider Napar's decision to require petitioners to
submit documents and employment clearances,
to attend seminars and interviews and take
examinations, which according to Napar is
imperative in order for it to effectively carry out
its business objective, as falling within the ambit
of management prerogative, this undertaking
should not, however, deny petitioners their
constitutional right of tenure. Besides, there is no
evidence nor any allegation proffered that Napar
has no available clients where petitioners can be
assigned to work in the same position they
previously occupied. Plainly, Napar's scheme of
requiring petitioners to comply with
reassessment procedures only seeks to prevent
petitioners' immediate reassignment.
"We have held that management is free to
regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of
management prerogative, however, is not
absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and
with due regard to the rights of labor." 40 Such
"cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer
to rid himself of an undesirable worker." 41
Respondents' non-compliance with the strict
terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement of
reassigning petitioners and ensuring that they
will be given work within the required time
constitutes repudiation of the agreement. As
such, the agreement is considered rescinded in
accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners properly chose to rescind the
compromise agreement and exercised the option
of filing anew their complaints, pursuant to Art.
2041. It was error on the part of the CA to deny
petitioners the right of rescission.
Still, respondents insist that petitioners cannot
seek rescission for they have already enjoyed the
benefits of the Joint Compromise Agreement.
According to respondents, petitioners' acceptance
of the amount of P7,000.00 each bars them from
repudiating and rescinding the agreement.
The contention lacks merit for the following
reasons. First, petitioners never accepted the
meager amount of P7,000.00 as full satisfaction
of their claims as they also expected to be
reassigned and reinstated in their jobs. In other
words, their acceptance of the amount of
P7,000.00 each should not be interpreted as full
satisfaction of all their claims, which included
reinstatement in their jobs. The amount of
P7,000.00 is measly compared to the amount of
monetary award granted by LA Espiritu and
therefore makes the agreement unconscionable
and against public policy,42 At this point, it is
worth noting that even quitclaims are ineffective
in barring recovery for the full measure of the
worker's rights and that acceptance of benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel.43 Lastly,
it must be emphasized that the Joint Compromise
Agreement expressly provided that each of the
complainants shall receive P7,000.00 as payment
for their monetary claims and "which amount
shall be considered in any future litigation."44 By
virtue of this stipulation, the parties in entering
into the agreement did not rule out the possibility
of any future claims in the event of non-
compliance. As correctly ruled by LA Espiritu, this
proviso showed that petitioners were not barred
from raising their money claims in the future.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
August 27, 2010 Decision and February 10, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 106724 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The July 29, 2004 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-
05-05557-2003, 00-05-06187-2003, 00-05-
06605-2003 and 00-07-07792-2003
is REINSTATED. In addition, respondents Napar
Contracting & Allied Services and Norman
Lacsamana are held jointly and severally liable to
pay petitioners Reynaldo Inutan, Helen Carte,
Noel Ayson, Ivy Cabarle, Noel Jamili, Maritess
Hular, Rolito Azucena, Raymundo Tunog, Roger
Bernal, Agustin Estre, Marilou Sagun, and
Enrique Ledesma, Jr. full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and their other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from November
9, 2002 up to the date of finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, v. CITIBANK,
N.A. (FORMERLY FIRST NATIONAL CITY
BANK), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
In consideration for a loan obtained from
respondent First National City Bank of New York
(now Citibank, N.A.) (Citibank), on November 10,
1972, petitioner Douglas F. Anama (Anama)
executed a promissory note in the amount of
P418,000.00 in favor of Citibank. 4 To secure
payment of the obligation, Anama also executed
in favor of Citibank a chattel mortgage over
various industrial machineries and equipment
located on his property at No. 1302, E. de los
Santos Avenue, Quezon City.5 For Anama's failure
to pay the monthly installments due on the
promissory note starting January 1974, Citibank
filed a complaint for sum of money and
replevin6 dated November 13, 1974 (docketed as
Civil Case No. 95991) with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court),
Branch 11. Anama filed his answer with
counterclaim7 and his amended answer with
counterclaim,8 alleging, among others, that his
failure to pay the monthly installments was due
to the fault of Citibank as it refused to receive
the checks he issued, and that the chattel
mortgage was defective and void.9
On December 2, 1974, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), upon proof of default of Anama in the
payment of his loan, issued an Order of Replevin
over the machineries and equipment covered by
the chattel mortgage.10
On January 29, 1977, Citibank, alleging that the
properties subject of the Order of Replevin which
were taken by the Sheriff under his custody were
not delivered to it, filed a motion for [issuance
of] alias writ of seizure.11 Citibank prayed that an
alias writ of seizure be issued directing the
Sheriff to seize the properties and to dispose
them in accordance with Section 6, Rule 60 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC granted the
motion through its Resolution12 dated February
28, 1977. The  Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City
issued three receipts for the seized properties on
March 17, 18, and 19, 1977.13 Anama filed a
motion for reconsideration but this was denied by
the RTC in a Resolution14 dated March 18, 1977.
Anama then filed a petition for  certiorari  and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
with the CA on March 21, 1977 (docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 06499) on the ground that the above
resolutions of the trial court were issued in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion because of the lack of evidence proving
Citibank's right to possession over the properties
subject of the chattel mortgage.15
On July 30, 1982, the CA rendered a
Decision16 (July 30, 1982 Decision) granting
Anama's petition for certiorari and prohibition
and nullifying the RTC's orders of seizure, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
questioned resolutions issued by the respondent
judge in Civil Case No. 95991, dated February
28, 1977, and March 18, 1977, together with the
writs and processes emanating or deriving
therefrom, are hereby declared null and
void ab initio.
The respondent ex-of[f]icio sheriff of Quezon City
and the respondent First National City Bank are
hereby ordered to return all the machineries and
equipments with their accessories seized,
dismantled and hauled, to their original and
respective places and positions in the shop
flooring of the petitioner's premises where these
articles were, before they were dismantled,
seized and hauled at their own expense. The said
respondents are further ordered to cause the
repair of the concrete foundations destroyed by
them including the repair of the electrical wiring
and facilities affected during the seizure,
dismantling and hauling.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore in
effect is hereby made permanent. Costs against
the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.17
On August 25, 1982, Citibank filed its petition for
review on certiorari with this Court (docketed as
G.R. No. 61508) assailing the July 30, 1982
Decision of the CA.18 On March 17, 1999, we
promulgated a Decision19 dismissing Citibank's
petition for lack of merit and affirming the July
30, 1982 Decision of the CA. An Entry of
Judgment20 was subsequently issued on April 12,
1999.
Meanwhile, on November 19, 1981, during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 in the CA, the
fourth floor of the Manila City Hall, where Branch
11 of the RTC of Manila and its records, including
the records of Civil Case No. 95991 were located,
was destroyed by fire.21
On February 10, 1982, Anama filed a petition for
reconstruction of record22 in the RTC, which the
latter granted in an Order23 dated May 3, 1982.
On December 2, 1982, considering that G.R. No.
61508 was already pending before this Court, the
RTC issued an Order24 directing that all pending
incidents in Civil Case No. 95991 be suspended
until G.R. No. 61508 has been resolved.
On March 12, 2009, Anama filed a petition for
revival of judgment with the CA (docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 107748).25 Anama sought to revive
the CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 06499 and argued that Citibank's failure to
file an action for the reconstitution of the records
in the RTC in Civil Case No. 95991 constituted
abandonment of its cause of action and complaint
against Anama.26 In addition to the revival of the
CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
06499, Anama sought to remand the case to the
RTC for further proceedings in Civil Case No.
95991, particularly his counterclaims against
Citibank.27
In its comment, Citibank argued that the petition
should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that laches
has set in against Anama for having slept on his
rights for almost 10 years. Lastly, Citibank
claimed that it did not abandon its money claim
against Anama when it did not initiate the
reconstitution proceedings in the RTC.28
On November 19, 2009, the CA denied the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Pertinent portions
of the assailed Decision reads:
[W]e find that respondent bank correctly
question (sic) this Court's jurisdiction to entertain
the instant petition to revive the July 30, 1982
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499. While
concededly filed within 10 years from the April
12, 1999 entry of the decision rendered in G.R.
No. 61508, the petition should have been filed
with the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and/or all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi judicial functions. x x x 29
Anama filed his motion for reconsideration which
the CA denied through its assailed
Resolution30 dated April 20, 2010.
On June 10, 2010, Anama filed this petition31 and
argued that his petition for revival of judgment
should be filed in the court that issued the
judgment sought to be revived, the CA in this
case.32
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA HAS THE
JURISDICTION IN THE ACTION FOR
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT – Yes.
We deny the petition.
An action to revive a judgment is an action
whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by
mere motion.40 Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent
action. - A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statue of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes
final and executory, the prevailing party can have
it executed as a matter of right by mere motion
within five years from the date of entry of
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of
five years, the said judgment is reduced to a
right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court within
10 years from the time the judgment becomes
final.41
Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for
its cause of action the judgment sought to be
revived.42 It is different and distinct from the
original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced.43 It is a new and independent action,
wherein the cause of action is the decision itself
and not the merits of the action upon which the
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.
Revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either
by motion or by independent action, is already
final and executory.44
As an action for revival of judgment is a new
action with a new cause of action, the rules on
instituting and commencing actions apply,
including the rules on jurisdiction. Its
jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on
the previous action and the petition does not
necessarily have to be filed in the same court
which rendered judgment.45
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority
of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments
and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted.46
The principle is that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in
the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims
asserted.47 Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.48
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 and its amendments, is the law which
confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of
BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691,49 provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose
subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought
must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
amount of the claim. But, where the primary
issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, such are actions whose
subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation,
hence cognizable by the RTCs.50
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of
whether the petitioner has a right to have the
final and executory judgment revived and to
have that judgment enforced and does not
involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that
jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is
properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in
holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear
and decide Anama's action for revival of
judgment.
A reading of the CA's jurisdiction also highlights
the conclusion that an action for revival of
judgment is outside the scope of jurisdiction of
the CA. Section 9 of BP 129 provides:
Sec. 9.  Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus,
prohibition,  certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or
commission, including the
Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except
those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph
4 of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction
over petitions for issuance of writ
of amparo,51 writ of habeas data,52 and writ
of kalikasan.53
Not being one of the enumerated cases above, it
is clear that the CA is without jurisdiction to hear
and decide an action for revival of judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 19, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 20, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107748
are AFFIRMED.
We direct the trial court to proceed with the
hearing and disposition in Civil Case No. 95991
with all deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Infante versus Aran Builders Inc, August 24, 2007 covered by TCT No. 114015 for P500,000.00 in favor On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an
of the plaintiff; order which reads:

26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City
stamp taxes and other taxes which the Bureau of
(or "Muntinlupa RTC"; Branch 276), presided over by
Internal Revenue may assess in connection with the Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati
Hon. Norma C. Perello (or "respondent judge"), was
sale mentioned in the preceding paragraph and to Regional Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at
an action for revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001
submit to the plaintiff proof of such payment; that time there was still no Regional Trial Court in
by Aran Builders, Inc. (or "private respondent")
Muntinlupa City, then under the territorial jurisdiction
against Adelaida Infante (or "petitioner"), docketed as
26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of AYALA of the Makati Courts, so that cases from this City were
Civil Case No. 01-164.
CORPORATION to the said sale and to give such tried and heard at Makati City. With the creation of the
written conformity to the plaintiff; Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by
involving properties located in this City, and cases
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (or "Makati
26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the Registry involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered
RTC"; Branch 60) in an action for specific
of Deeds and deliver to AYALA CORPORATION the to be litigated before these Courts.
performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
certificate of title issued in the name of plaintiff
15563.
pursuant to such registration; The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which
declared the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land
The Makati RTC judgment, which became final and
26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the located in Muntinlupa City. It is this judgment which
executory on November 16, 1994, decreed as follows:
preceding directives, the plaintiff must immediately is sought to be enforced thru this action which
pay to the defendant the sum of P321,918.25; necessarily involves the interest, possession, title, and
26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa
judgment as follows: city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying
26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay
plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; that the complaint should be filed in the latter City
26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is where the property is located, as there are now
ordered to do the following within thirty (30) days Regional Trial Courts hereat.
26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages
from finality hereof:
is DISMISSED;
Defendant may answer the complaint within the
26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN BUILDERS, remaining period, but no less than five (5) days,
26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED;
INC. the following: (a) the complete plans (lot plan, otherwise a default judgment might be taken against
andcralawlibrary
location map and vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power her.
of Attorney; (c ) Real Estate Tax clearance; (d) tax
26.6 Cost is taxed against the defendant.
receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of It is SO ORDERED.
Subdivision Association dues referred to in the
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for
"CONTRACT TO SELL" dated November 10, 1986
revival of judgment) on the grounds that the Her motion for reconsideration having been denied per
(Exh. A or Exh. 1);
Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons order dated September 28, 2001, petitioner came to
of the parties and that venue was improperly laid. this Court [CA] via the instant special civil action
26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, for certiorari . She ascribes grave abuse of discretion
Private respondent opposed the motion.
Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent judge for "erroneously holding that
Civil Case No. 01-164 is a revival of judgment which
declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of
land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the
judgment rendered by the (Makati RTC) in Civil Case
No. 15563 sought to be enforced necessarily involves
the interest, possession, title and ownership of the
parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City."
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a
personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the
judgment therein is also personal in nature;
and that, consequently, the venue of the action for
revival of judgment is either Makati City or
Parañaque City where private respondent and
petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private
respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that
the subject action for revival judgment is "quasi in rem
because it involves and affects vested or adjudged
right on a real property"; and that, consequently, venue
lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.2
On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision
ruling in favor of herein private respondent. The CA
held that since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, the action for revival
of judgment is then an action in rem which should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where
the real property is located. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion
was denied per Resolution dated January 7, 2003.
Hence, herein petition. Petitioner claims that the CA
erred in finding that the complaint for revival of
judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed
with the RTC of the place where the disputed real
property is located.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RTC MUNTINLUPA IS
THE CORRECT VENUE OF FOR THE
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT RENDERED BY
RTC MAKATI.
RULING:
Yes.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner insists that the action for revival of
judgment is an action in personam; therefore, the
complaint should be filed with the RTC of the place
where either petitioner or private respondent resides.
Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the action
for revival of judgment with the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, the place where the disputed property is located,
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment
it is seeking to revive involves interest over real
property. As such, the present action for revival is a
real action, and venue was properly laid with the court
of the place where the realty is located.
Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is
the proper venue of the present action for revival of
judgment?cralaw library
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years
from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment
or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not
specify in which court the action for revival of
judgment should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,3 the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought
either in the same court where said judgment was
rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or
defendant resides, or in any other place designated
by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions
in general. (Emphasis supplied)4
but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of
procedure which fix the venue of actions in general
must be considered.5
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting
title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
xxx
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other
actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination
of whether the present action for revival of judgment
is a real action or a personal action. Applying the
afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival of
judgment affects title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be
filed with the court of the place where the real
property is located. If such action does not fall under
the category of real actions, it is then a personal action
that may be filed with the court of the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides.
In support of her contention that the action for revival
of judgment is a personal action and should be filed in
the court of the place where either the plaintiff or
defendant resides, petitioner cites the statements made
by the Court in Aldeguer v. Gemelo6 and Donnelly v.
Court of First Instance of Manila7 . Petitioner,
however, seriously misunderstood the Court's rulings
in said cases.
In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that "[t]he
action for the execution of a judgment for damages is
a personal one, and under section 377 [of the Code of
Civil Procedure], it should be brought in any province
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff" 8 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied). Petitioner apparently took such statement to
mean that any action for revival of judgment should be
considered as a personal one. This thinking is
incorrect. The Court specified that the judgment
sought to be revived in said case was a judgment
for damages. The judgment subject of the action for
revival did not involve or affect any title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein. The
complaint filed in the revival case did not fall under
the category of real actions and, thus, the action
necessarily fell under the category of personal actions.
In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied
upon by petitioner stated thus:
Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues,
namely: (a) whether an action for revival of judgment
is one quasi in rem and, therefore, service of summons
may be effected thru publication; and (b) whether the
second action for revival of judgment (Civil Case No.
76166) has already prescribed. To our mind, the first
is not a proper and justiciable issue in the present
proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it be said that an
action to revive a judgment is a personal one.
(Emphasis supplied)9
The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the
issue on whether an action for revival of judgment
is quasi in rem was not yet proper and justiciable.
Therefore, the foregoing statement cannot be used
as a precedent, as it was merely an obiter
dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer, the judgment
sought to be revived in Donnelly involved judgment
for a certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest
in real property was involved. It is then understandable
that the action for revival in said case was categorized
as a personal one.
Clearly, the Court's classification
in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the actions for revival of
judgment as being personal in character does not apply
to the present case.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of
judgment determine whether it is a real action or a
personal action.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a
final and executory judgment has ordered herein
petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein
private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in
connection with said sale; register the deed of sale
with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name
of private respondent. The same judgment ordered
private respondent to pay petitioner the sum
of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the
aforementioned order. It is further alleged that
petitioner refused to comply with her judgment
obligations despite private respondent's repeated
requests and demands, and that the latter was
compelled to file the action for revival of judgment.
Private respondent then prayed that the judgment be
revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce
said judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared
private respondent's right to have the title over the
disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore,
undeniable that private respondent has an established
interest over the lot in question; and to protect such
right or interest, private respondent brought suit to
revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the
present action to revive is the enforcement of private
respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty.
Verily, the action falls under the category of a real
action, for it affects private respondent's interest over
real property.chanrobles virtual law library
The present case for revival of judgment being a real
action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is
located.
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to dismiss; and the CA did not commit any error in
each branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the affirming the same.
territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial
Court shall exercise its authority. The territory
thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over
which the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts readily
accessible to the people of the different parts of the
region and making the attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis
supplied)chanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of

the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority
only over a particular territory defined by the
Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was
under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts.
However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled
An Act to Amend Section Fourteen
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect
on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the
creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa.

Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa

City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to
validly issue orders and processes concerning real
property within Muntinlupa City.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion

committed by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 276 when it denied petitioner's motion to

Rodil versus Benedicto 95 SCRA 137
In Cadastral Case No. 61, LRC Rec. No. 1369, Lot
Nos. 2417, 3423, 3424, 3753 and 3754 of the
Penaranda (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre were claimed and
applied for by the spouses Tomas Rodil and Catalina
Cruz. The claim was not contested, 1 and on October
11, 1958, the cadastral court adjudicated the aforesaid
lots in favor of the applicants. Pursuant to the decree
of registration, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1719
was issued to the applicants on December 10, 1958.
On February 26, 1959, the heirs of Alejandro Abes
filed a petition with the court for the review of the
registration decree upon the ground "that the
petitioners are the true owners and are the ones in
actual legal possession of the aforesaid land and that
the award of said lots to claimant-spouses was secured
thru fraud." The cadastral court gave due course to the
petition and set the case for hearing, where oral and
documentary evidence were presented by the
petitioning heirs of Alejandro Abes. On July 7, 1961,
the cadastral court denied the petition for review upon
the ground that the petitioners failed to overcome the
evidence of the claimants-adjudicatees. No appeal was
taken from this order of July 7, 1961. Instead, on
September 4, 1961, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed
an action against the registered owners for the
reconveyance of title, claiming that Tomas Rodil and
his wife procured registration of
the land "thru fraud, misrepresentation and the use of
falsified deeds of sale." Essentially, this is the same
ground of fraud they urged in their petition for review
of the cadastral decree. The defendants therein filed a
motion to dismiss the case upon the ground of res
adjudicata and on December 13, 1962, the court
dismissed the complaint with costs, The plaintiffs
therein filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order, but the court denied the motion on January 16,
1963. Hence, an appeal was interposed with this
Court, docketed herein as G.R. No. L-20996. On July
30, 1966, the Court rendered judgment, affirming the
orders complained of, with costs. 2
Upon the return of the records to the lower court,
Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession asking that they be
placed in possession of the lots and that the heirs of
Alejandro Abes be evicted therefrom. 3
On April 11, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an
order granting the petition only with respect to Alejo
Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes, and
Cornelio Abes and denied the same with respect to the
other respondents stating that he is completely at a loss
as to who, aside from Alejo Abes, Cornelio Abes,
Bienvenido Abes, and Teodora Abes, among the said
respondents. were parties to the original cadastral
proceeding or as to who were at least occupants of the
properties in question prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration. 4 Pursuant to said order, a writ
of possession was issued on April 19, 1967.5
On April 20, 1967, Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes,
Teodora Vda. de Abes and Cornelio Abes filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the order of April 11,
1967 upon the grounds that: (1) the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time;
and (2) there is no allegation in the petition, and
neither had it been proved, that the respondents were
defeated in a registration proceeding, that the
respondents were defeated in a registration
proceeding, or that they were adversely occupying the
land during the registration proceedings, or that they
were unlawfully and adversely occupying the land at
any time up to the issuance of the final decree, or that
they were one of those against whom a writ of
possession may be issued. 6
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession was filed out of time having been filed more
than five years after the issuance of the final decree of
registration.
RULING:
NO
Finding "that no allegation was made, neither was
evidence adduced to the effect that the herein
respondents have been d in default during the original
registration proceedings; neither was it alleged or
proved that the herein respondents were occupants of
the land during the registration proceedings, or prior to
the promulgation of the final decree of registration,
circumstances by the existence of which a writ of
possession may not be validly issued," the respondent
Judge set aside its order of April 11, 1967 and ordered
the dissolution of the writ of possession issued
pursuant thereto. 7
The spouses Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz filed a
motion for the reconsideration of said order, 8 but the
respondent Judge denied the motion on December 12,
1967. 9 Hence, the instant recourse.
After a careful study of the case We are convinced that
the respondent Judge committed an error in denying
the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The findings of the respondent Judge that a writ of
possession cannot be issued in the cadastral case
because the respondents were not parties in said
registration proceedings, or that they were not
occupants of the land during the registration
proceedings prior to the issuance of the final decree of
registration is not supported by the evidence and law.
The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot be said
to be strangers to the registration proceedings. A
cadastral proceeding is a proceeding in rem and
against everybody, including the respondents herein,
who are deemed included in the general order of
default entered in the case. Besides, it appears that the
said respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a
petition for the review of the decree of registration,
thereby becoming a direct party in the registration
proceedings by their voluntary appearance.
The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot also be
said to be not occupants of the land during the
registration proceeding prior to the issuance of the
final decree of registration. In their action for the
reconveyance of title to the land in question, Alejo
Abes and the other heirs of Alejandro Abes stated:
"that in the year 1914, said Alejandro Abes took
possession personally, occupied and cultivated the
aforementioned land, lived with his children and
grandchildren therein, and that Alejandro Abes'
children and grandchildren have continued in actual
possession, occupation, and cultivation of the
land.10 In said action, "Bienvenido Abes ... testified
that Alejandro Abes was his grandfather ... that he
knows the land in question because the same belongs
to his grandfather; that his grandfather died before the
war, probably in 1938; ... that during the lifetime of
his grandfather ... his possession of the lots in question
was peaceful and undisturbed; that after the death of
his grandfather, he was succeeded by his grandmother
and the children of his deceased grandfather ... that
after the death of his grandfather, the lands left by his
grandfather was divided between bis uncle Alejo and
the heirs of the deceased brothers of Alejo, who are in The law has not made applicable to the
possession of their respective shares." 11 writ of possession provided for in
section 17 of Act No. 496 and its
The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes, being in amendments, the provisions of the
possession of the lots in question, unlawfully and Code of Civil Procedure regarding
adversely, during the registration proceedings, may be execution of judgments.
judicially evicted by means of a writ of possession and
it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ It cannot be held to have been the
when asked for by the successful claimant. 12 intention of the law to permit after five
years the reinstitution of a registration
The respondents claim that the petition for the proceeding, whether ordinary or
issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time, cadastral, as the case may be, to revive
the said petition having been filed more than five years a decree, which on the other hand,
after the issuance of the final decree of registration. In according to Act No. 496, is to exist
support of their contention, the respondents cite the forever, as provided in various sections
case of Soroñgon vs. Makalintal, 13 wherein the of said Act, among which may be cited
following was stated: section 45 which says:
It is the law and well settled doctrine in this The obtaining of a
jurisdiction that a writ of possession must be issued decree of registration
within the same period of time in which a judgment in and the entry of a
ordinary civil actions may be summarily executed certificate of title shall
(section 17, Act 496, as amended), upon the petition of be regarded as an
the registered owner or his successors in interest and agreement running with
against all parties who claim a right to or interest in the land, and binding
the land registered prior to the registration proceeding. upon the applicant and
all successors in title
The better rule, however, is that enunciated in the case that the land shall be and
of Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Lorente, 14 which has always remain registered
not yet been abandoned, that the right of the applicant land, and subject to the
or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a provisions of this Act
writ of possession of the land never prescribes. The and all Acts amendatory
Court therein said: thereof.
The second point alleged by the Nor could the law make said provisions
petitioners has reference to the of the Code of Civil Procedure
prescription of the rights of the applicable to a decree of registration,
respondent corporation to ask for a writ since the property rights and possession
of possession. of a registered owner would be
 nugatory when they are imprescriptible
under the conclusive provisions of
Section 46 of said Act No. 496 which
says:
No title to registered
land in derogation to
that of the registered
owner shall be acquired
by prescription or
adverse possession.
In a later case,   the Court also ruled that the provision
15
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may
be enforced within five years by motion, and after five
years but within ten years by an action (Section 6,
Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as land registration cases.
The Court said:
The second assignment of error is as
follows:
That the lower court That the lower court erred in
ordering that the decision rendered in this land
registration registration case on November 28, 1931
or twenty six years ago, has not yet become final and
unenforceable.
We fail to understand the arguments of
the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision
in a land registration case has become
final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may action, upon the expiration of the
be enforced within 5 years by motion, period for perfecting an appear.
and after five years but within 10 years.
by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for
provision of the Rules refers to civil mandamus is hereby granted and the respondent Judge
actions and is not applicable to special or anyone acting in his stand is directed to issue said
proceedings, such as a land registration writ of possession over Lot Nos. 2417, 3423, 3424,
case. This is so because a party in a 3753, and 3754 of the Penaranda Cadastre in favor of
civil action must immediately enforce a the petitioners. With costs against the private
judgment that is secured as against the respondents.
adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable Barredo (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Santos and
time as provided in the Rules makes the Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person
or a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party
had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in
the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39. regarding the execution
of a judgment in a civil action, except
to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The
decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession adverse or losing party, on.
becomes final without any further

Republic versus Yap February 7, 2018
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a
petition3 for cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No.
99500 covering Lot No. 922 of the Carcar Cadastre, and for
the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. His petition
alleged the following:
1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34)
square meters is covered by Decree No. 99500
issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of
Juan Rodriguez;
2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon
Yap by virtue of inheritance and donation and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the said lot since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being
possessors in good faith in the concept of an owner
for more than thirty (30) years;
3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922,
based on the certification from the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu, there is no showing
or proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the
said lot;
4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes
in the name of Heirs of Porfirio Yap; and
5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind affecting Lot No. 922, or any other person
having any interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession, reversion or expectancy, other than
Yap.4
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC issued an Order5 dated August 3, 2010 setting the case
for hearing on August 3, 2011 and ordering the requisite
publication thereof. Since no oppositors appeared before
the court during the said scheduled hearing, the R TC
issued another Order6 setting the case for hearing on
petitioner's presentation of evidence.
During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap
presented the following documents, among others, as proof
of his claim:
1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the
authorized officer of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA);7
2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was
issued for Lot No. 922;8
3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no
certificate of title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been
issued;9
4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio
C. Yap with Deed of Donation;10
5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of
Carcar indicating that the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been
issued Tax Declarations for Lot No. 922 since 1948;
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to
2002;11
7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision
plan; and
8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is
no existing public land application for Lot No. 922.12
In its September 20, 2011 Order, 13 the RTC admitted
petitioner's evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision.
RTC Ruling
The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his
claims and was able to prove his ownership and possession
over Lot No. 922. As such, it granted the petition and
ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to
cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new copy thereof, and
on the basis of such new copy, issue an Original Certificate
of Title in the name of Andres Abellana, as administrator of
the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The dispositive portion of the
October 20, 2011 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of
the petitioner Claro Yap. The Land Registration Authority
thru the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu is
hereby directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on
November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new copy thereof in
the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the
Estate of Juan Rodriguez, and on the bases of the new copy
of Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original Certificate of
Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres
Abellana, as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.
Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the
petitioner, Claro Yap, with the re-issued copy of Decree
No. 99500 and the copy of its title upon payment of any
appropriate fees.
SO ORDERED.14
Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the
decree under the name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a
Partial Motion for Reconsideration15 stating that the new
decree and OCT should be issued under his name instead of
Andres Abellana.
On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment 16 mainly
arguing that Yap's petition and motion should be denied
since the Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.
In its Joint Order  dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied
17
Yap's motion ruling that the law provides that the decree,
which would be the basis for the issuance of the OCT,
should be issued under the name of the original adjudicate.
Likewise, the RTC also denied the OSG's motion finding
that the records of the case show that it was furnished with
copies of the Petition as well as the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.18
The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing
that Yap's petition should have been denied due to
insufficiency of evidence and failure to implead
indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez
and/or Andres Abellana.
CA Ruling
In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC's
ruling finding that the pieces of evidence submitted by Yap
were sufficient to support the petition. It ruled that since it
has been established that no certification of title or patent
had been issued over Lot No. 922, the RTC did not err in
ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500
in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the
Estate of Juan Rodriguez.19
As regards the OSG's argument on non-joinder of
indispensable parties, the CA highlighted that it is not a
ground for dismissal of an action. Nevertheless, it ruled that
the heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan Rodriguez were
not deprived of the opportunity to be heard as the
proceeding before the R TC was -an in rem proceeding.
Thus, when the petition was published, all persons
including the said heirs were deemed notified. 20
Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by
the OSG on appeal, it also noted that it was too late to raise
the same due to the latter's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC's decision or submit a comment
on the merits of Yap's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.21 The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated October 20, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, in LRC REC. NO. Lot No.
922, Cad. 30, Carcar City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially
the same arguments but this time also advancing the theory
that Yap's action had already prescribed.
ISSUE:
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the
R TC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No.
99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot
No. 922.
The Court's Ruling
YES.
We deny the petition.
At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; 23 the general rule
being that the appellate court is not authorized to consider
and resolve any question not properly raised in the courts
below.24
In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case.
There is nothing in the law that
limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree
The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied
due to Yap and his predecessors' failure to file the proper
motion to execute Decree No. 99500 as prescribed under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 25 It also
subscribes that the petition is now barred by the statute of
limitations26 since nine (9) decades had already passed after
the issuance of the said decree in November 1920 without
any action brought upon by Yap or his predecessors-in-
interest.27
Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that
Decree No. 99500 has attained finality and the decision
granting the issuance thereof was not appealed or modified.
The foregoing arguments are specious.
Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on
November 29, 1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province
of Cebu pursuant to the court's decision in Cadastral Case
No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 58. 28 The issuance of
the said decree creates a strong presumption that the
decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and
executory. Thus, it is incumbent upon the OSG to prove
otherwise. However, no evidence was presented to support
its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 and the
issuance of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality.
The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been
confirmed by judicial declaration several decades ago does
not, however, give room for the application of the statute of
limitations or laches, nor bars an application for the re-
issuance of the corresponding decree.
In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla,  the Court
29
elucidated the reason why the statue of limitations and
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court do not apply in
land registration proceedings, viz:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment, which may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration
Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse
or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION
IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES
BASED ON A DECISION WIDCH HAS ALLEGEDLY
NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY CASE ON A
DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is
nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is what is
stated in the consideration of the second assignment error,
that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse
party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been
filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar30 and reiterated by the
Court in the more recent Ting v. Heirs of Diego
Lirio31 wherein We ruled that a final judgment confirming
land title and ordering its registration constitutes res
judicata against the whole world and the adjudicate need
not file a motion to execute the same, thus:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of
a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of
the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor,
as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name
constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole
world. It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration
of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole
world including petitioner.
xx xx
The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light
of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-
in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.
For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the
inapplicability of the rules on prescription and lacl1es to
land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law32 from the time decisions in land
registration cases become final is complete in itself and
does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the
judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.33
The propriety of cancellation and reissuance
of Decree No. 99500, to
serve as basis for the issuance of an
OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been
sufficiently proven in the instant case
The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap's petition
is not barred by the statute of limitations, the re-issuance of
Decree No. 99500 is still improper due to the total lack of
evidence presented before the court.34
We disagree.
At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by
enumerating and discussing in detail, yet again, the pieces
of evidence proffered in the instant case. This matter had
already been passed upon and settled by the courts a
quo and it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence
all over again. Yet, even if We take a second look at the
facts of the case, the Court is still inclined to deny the
petition.
Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree
No. 99500 was issued on November 29, 1920 in the name
of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven during the
proceedings before the court that no OCT was ever issued
covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of
Presidential Decree No. 152935 or the "Property
Registration Decree" provides that the original certificate of
title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There
is, therefore, a need to cancel the old decree and a new one
issued in order for the decree and the OCT to be exact
replicas of each other.
In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez,36 the Court enunciated the
necessity of the petition for cancellation of the old decree
and its re-issuance, if no OCT had been issued pursuant to
the old decree:
1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition
for cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of decree
and for issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree.
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our
Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition
for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such
decree and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that
reissued decree.
"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court
to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to his Court (docketed
as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R.
No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower
court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and
to hear it as one for reissuance of decree under the
following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the lower court
findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to
reissue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance
of the titles and the respondents being heard in their
opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower
court to accept the amended petition subject to the private
respondent's being given the opportunity to answer and to
present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall
be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties."
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case,
a question may be asked: Why should a decree be canceled
and re-issued when the same is valid and intact? Within the
context of this discussion, there is no dispute that a decree
has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a
copy of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether
or not an OCT is issued pursuant to that decree. If such
decree is valid, why is there a need to have it cancelled and
re-issued?
Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of
Section 39 of PD 1529 which states that: "The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration." This provision is significant because it
contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the
decree. If the old decree will not be canceled and no new
decree issued, the corresponding OCT issued today will
bear the signature of the present Administrator while the
decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of
the past Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear
intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be true
copy of the decree of registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the
cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of a new one
is necessary.
xx xx
4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition
in representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree
shall still be under the name of the original adjudicate.
It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the
death of the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the
shoes of the decedent. The heirs shall have the legal interest
in the property, thus, they cannot be prohibited from filing
the necessary petition.
As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree
means that the new decree shall be issued which shall, in all
respects, be the same as that of the original decree. Nothing
in the said decree shall be amended nor modified; hence, it
must be under the name of the original adjudicate.
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Based from the foregoing, the R TC correctly ordered the

cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof,
and the issuance of the corresponding OCT covering Lot
No. 922 in the name of its original adjudicate, Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.

Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual

findings and the ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show
that the CA's decision was arbitrarily made or that evidence
on record was disregarded.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

The Decision dated March 16, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ting versus Heirs of Lirio G.R. No.
168913, March 4, 2007
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for
registration of title to the same lot. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora
A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L.
Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to
file an opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch 21
of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling attention to
the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which
had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and
which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s
application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21
of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed
petitioner’s application on the ground of res
judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét
ISSUE:
whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res
judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
RULING:
YES.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-
983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977,
no decree of registration has been issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26,
2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis
of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; 5 and
as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by
respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive
period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment
passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot
be the basis of res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause
issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land
registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration
of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of
notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the
judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall
devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of
a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of
the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor,
as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name
constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole
world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration
of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole
world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976
Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct,"
petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree
of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the
Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the
survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all
resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be
approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR,
Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in
court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the
said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a
mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the
alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such
claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or
reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under
the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the
record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However,
if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty
to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect,
as officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts
in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light
of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-
in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND
REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME
FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in perfecting an appeal.
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. discussions, DENIED.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, SO ORDERED.
by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately
enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration
Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse
Central Surety and Insurance Co. versus Planters
March 7, 2007
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership
agreement with respondent Planters Products, Inc. whereby
he agreed to purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and
agricultural chemicals from respondent for resale. To
secure Olson’s faithful compliance of his obligations, Vista
Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and petitioner
executed a surety undertaking in favor of respondent.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent
prompting the latter to claim the amount due from
petitioner and Vista Insurance. However, both refused to
settle their liabilities to respondent as Olson’s sureties.
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection
of sum of money1 against Olson, Vista Insurance and
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Branch 58. Summons were accordingly served (except as to
Olson whose address could not be located).
In a decision2 dated November 6, 1991, the trial court found
petitioner and Vista Insurance liable to respondent. They
were ordered to pay the following: (1) ₱372,502
representing the unpaid principal amount plus interest; (2)
25% of the total amount recoverable as attorney’s fees and
(3) cost of suit.
Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
December 7, 1992, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for
failure to pay the required docket fees. 3 On March 12,
1993, the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal became final and
executory; entry of judgment followed on May 27, 1993.4
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion
for execution of judgment following the CA’s dismissal of
petitioner’s appeal.5 The RTC issued the writ on October
21, 1993.6 The writ, however, was not implemented so
respondent filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution which the trial court granted on
February 24, 1994.
In the CA, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Set
Aside the CA Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-
Open Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order."  On March 3,
7
1994, the appellate court issued a resolution restraining the
RTC judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ
but, on motion of respondent, the CA lifted the TRO and
dismissed petitioner’s urgent motion on March 24, 1994.8
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner elevated the CA’s dismissal of its
urgent motion to this Court. In its petition, petitioner argued
that it failed to pay the docket fees only because the CA’s
judicial records division did not "re-send" the notice for it
to pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the
petition9 and this dismissal became final on September 14,
1994.10
On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of
the RTC’s decision,11 respondent filed another motion for
issuance of alias writ of execution in the trial court. 12 On
August 20, 1999, the trial court issued an order granting the
writ. Petitioner filed an MR of said order but the RTC
denied it.
Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge for
issuing the writ despite the fact that more than five years
had elapsed since the RTC’s decision of November 6, 1991
became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of
the Rules, petitioner insisted that the RTC decision could
no longer be enforced by mere motion but only by court
action.
The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit. 13 It
held that:
While it is true that the judgment sought to be executed
became final and executory on March 12, 1993, it bears
stressing that the delay was caused by petitioner’s dilatory
maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way to the
Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open the
Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order which resulted in the issuance of the
Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 3, 1994 enjoining
respondents from enforcing the subject decision; the
Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Court of Appeals
Resolution dated March 24, 1994; and Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court which was ultimately
dismissed by the High Court on July 11, 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, for patent lack of merit, the petition
is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 65, [S]ec. 8[,] 2nd par.[,]
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the
CA.14 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
The only relevant issue for our resolution is whether the
execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion
despite the lapse of five years.
RULING:
YES
Under Rule 39, Section 6,15 the rule is that a final judgment
may be executed by mere motion within five years from the
date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute
and admits one notable exception and that is when the
delay in enforcing the judgment is caused by the party
assailing the filing of the motion.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,16 we declared that, on
meritorious grounds, execution of final judgment by mere
motion may be allowed even after the lapse of five years
when delay in the execution is caused or occasioned by the
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his
benefit.
Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals,17 we ruled that
the five-year period allowed for enforcement of judgment
by mere action is deemed effectively interrupted or
suspended when the delay in the execution is occasioned by
the oppositor’s own initiatives in order to gain an undue
advantage.
Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within
the exception. Petitioner triggered the series of delays in the
execution of the RTC’s final decision by filing numerous
motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing
the CA’s issuance of the TRO enjoining the enforcement of
said decision. It cannot now debunk the filing of the motion
just so it can delay once more the payment of its obligation
to respondent. It is obvious that petitioner is merely
resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the
purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from
sleeping on his rights. Far from sleeping on its rights,
respondent pursued its claim by persistently seeking the
execution of the RTC’s final judgment of November 6,
1991. It would be unjust to frustrate respondent’s effort to
collect payment from petitioner on sheer technicality.
While strict compliance to the rules of procedure is desired,
liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
PNB versus Deloso March 30, 1970
Appeal on questions of law from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 6276
dismissing the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that the
action for revival of judgment has already been barred by
prescription.ual law library
On January 25, 1951, judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 1044
ordering the defendants-appellees Juan Deloso, Francisco
Imperial and Magno Jamito to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff Philippine National Bank, hereinafter referred to as
the PNB, the sum of P600.00 plus interest, attorney's fees
and costs. For one reason or another the said judgment was
not executed within five (5) years from the date of its
finality. On June 28, 1960, the PNB filed with the same
court an action (Civil Case No. 4953) against the same
defendants for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No.
1044. On September 30, 1964, the case was dismissed by
the court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
same being within the original jurisdiction of the City Court
of Naga in accordance with Republic Act No. 2613 (which
took effect on August 1, 1959), in view of the amount
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Accordingly, on January 11, 1965, the PNB filed with the
City Court of Naga a similar action for revival of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 1044. The same was, however,
on motion of the defendants, dismissed by the said court on
August 18, 1966, on the ground that the action was already
barred by prescription, more than ten (10) years having
elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044
became final. The PNB filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT THE ACTION
WAS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
RULING:
NO.
The PNB appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur; but that court, finding that
the judgment sought to be revived became final and
executory on February 26, 1951, or thirteen (13) years, ten
(10) months and fifteen (15) days before the filing of the
case with the City Court of Naga, dismissed the appeal on
the ground of prescription, pursuant to Articles 1144 and
1152 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(3) Upon a judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
ART. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to
demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a
judgment commences from the time the judgment became
final.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the PNB, but the
same was denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Plaintiff-appellant has come directly to this Court urging
the reversal of the dismissal order on the following legal
grounds: (1) The complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 - which
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction - should at least be
considered an extrajudicial demand under Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, which interrupted the running of ten-year
prescriptive period; consequently, deducting from the
period arrived at by the court below the period of four (4)
years, three (3) months and two (2) days from the filing of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 on June 28, 1960, to
its dismissal on September 30, 1964, it would result that the
present action had been instituted within the ten-year period
provided in Article 1144. (2) Assuming arguendo that the
filing of the complaint did not interrupt prescription, still
the present action should be considered as seasonably
instituted because the ten-year prescriptive period provided
for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code commences to run
only from the expiration of the five (5) years within which
a judgment may be executed by mere motion under Section
6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action.c
inasmuch as Article 1150 of the Civil Code provides that
the prescriptive period for all kinds of actions shall be
counted from the day they may be brought, and an action
for revival of a judgment can only be brought after the
lapse of five (5) years from finality thereof.

Plaintiff-appellant's contention that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 4953 which, as stated above, was dismissed by
the court a quo for want of jurisdiction, should be
considered a written extrajudicial demand which
interrupted the statute of limitations, is unmeritorious.
Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when
they are filed before the court, when there is a writer
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is
any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In Philippine National Bank vs. Osete, et al., G.R. No. L-
24997, July 18, 1968 (24 SCRA 63), this Court, in holding
that Article 1155 of the Civil Code refers to actions to
collect not based on a judgment sought to be revived,
said:chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the lower court expressed the view that said 'Art.
1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the tolling of the
period of prescription of the action to collect, not to the
action to enforce' or revive - a "judgment". Understandably,
either an 'extrajudicial demand' by the creditor or an
'acknowledgment of the debt' may interrupt the prescription
of the action to
collect, not based upon a judgment, since the demand
indicates that the creditor has not slept on his rights - and
removes the basis of the statute of limitations of actions -
but, was vigilant in the enforcement thereof, whereas an
acknowledgment by the debtor provides a tangible evidence
of the existence and validity of the debt. Who would,
however, make an "extrajudicial demand" for the payment
of a judgment, when the same may be enforced by a writ of
execution? And, how could an acknowledgment or partial
payment affect the rights of a creditor, when the same are
based, no longer upon his contract with the debtor or upon
the law, but upon no less than a judicial decree, which is
final and executory?chanrobles virtual law library
The doctrine in the Osete case was reiterated in Philippine
National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, G.R. No. L-
22675, March 28, 1969 (27 SCRA 766), where this Court
added:chanrobles virtual law library
Even under the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a
distinction was made between a debt based on contract and
one already confirmed by judgment insofar as the effect of
acknowledgment was concerned. Under Section 43 thereof
an action upon a contract or upon a judgment prescribed in
ten years; but under Section 50 the renovating effect of
payment or of a written acknowledgment of the debt is
limited to the first kind of action, thus: "when payment has
been made upon any demand founded upon contract, or a
written acknowledgment thereof or a promise to pay the
same has been made and signed by the party sought to be
charged, an action may be brought thereon within the time
herein limited, after such payment, acknowledgment or
promise."chanrobles virtual law library
The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that even if the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 be considered a written
extrajudicial demand, it could not have interrupted the
prescription of the action to revive the judgment in Civil
Case No. 1044.
The other question raised by plaintiff-appellant was
squarely ruled upon by this Court in Gutierrez Hermanos
vs. De la Riva, 46 Phil. 827 (1923), where it held that the
ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from the
date of finality of the judgment and not from the expiration
of five (5) years thereafter.
Three reasons were there advanced, to wit: (1) Section 447
of the Code of Civil Procedure (which is similar to the last
sentence of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court) should be construed in relation to Section 43, No. 1,
of the said Code (which is similar to Article 1144 of the
Civil Code); and as thus construed, "the conclusion one
arrives at is that after the expiration of the five years within
which execution can be issued upon a judgment, the
winning party can revive it only in the manner therein
provided so long as the period of ten years does not expire
from the date of said judgment, according to section 43,
No. 1, of the same Code." (2) The right of the winning
party to enforce the judgment against the defeated party
"begins to exist the moment the judgment is final; and this
right, according to our Code of Procedure, consists in
having an execution of the judgment issued during the first
five years next following, and in commencing after that
period the proceeding provided in section 447 to revive it,
and this latter remedy can be pursued only before the
judgment prescribes, that is to say, during the five years
next following. It is so much an action to ask for an
execution as it is to file a complaint for reviving it, because,
as we know by action is meant the legal demand of the
right or rights one may have." (3) if it is held that the
winning party has still ten (10) years within which to revive
the judgment after the expiration of five (5) years, then the
judgment would not prescribe until after fifteen (15) years,
which is against No. 1 of section 43 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "[a]nd it cannot be said that such is the letter,
and much less, the intention of the law, for there is nothing
in section 447 of the said Code, making this new period
different from the one prescribed in said section 43, No. 1,
or reconciling these two provisions, there being no other
way of reconciling them than to say that after the expiration
of the first five years next following the judgment, there
remain to the victorious party only another five years to
review it." The doctrine in Gutierrez Hermanos has tacitly,
yet consistently, been adhered to by this Court (Cf.
Asociacion Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs.
Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phil. 281 (1943); PNB vs. Silo, G.R.
No. L-3498, March 19, 1951; Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and
Surety Co., G.R. No. L-2378, April 27, 1951; Carrascozo
vs. Fuentebella, G.R. No. L-5888, April 22, 1953; Miciano
vs. Watiwat, et al., G.R. No. L-8769, November 21, 1957;
Lazaro, et al. vs. Gomez, et al., G.R. Nos. L-12664-65,
September 30, 1960; Potenciano vs. Gruenberg, et al., G.R.
No. L-16956, February 27, 1962; PNB vs. Monroy, G.R.
No. L-19374, June 30, 1964; PNB vs. Bondoc, G.R. No. L-
20236, July 30, 1965); so that it is now settled that the ten-
year period within which an action for revival of a
judgment should be brought, commences to run from
the date of finality of the judgment, and not from the
expiration of the five-year period within which the
judgment may be enforced by mere motion (Art. 1152,
Civil Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,

the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with
treble costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Board of Liquidators versus Zuleta 115 SCRA 548
On November 23, 1955, a decision was rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in
Civil Case No. 22237, entitled "Land Settlement and
Development Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Jose Zulueta,
Defendant", based on an amicable settlement between
the parties, pursuant to which defendant-appellee was
ordered to pay the Land Settlement and Development
Corporation the sum of P10,391.62 with interest at
four (4%) per cent per annum from January 13, 1948
until the same is fully paid in the manner stated in the
amicable settlement and subject to the terms thereof,
without pronouncement as to costs.
On March 5, 1965, herein plaintiff-appellant, as
trustee of the Land Settlement and Development
Corporation, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against defendant-appellee,
docketed as Civil Case No. 60112 to revive the
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 22237 which had
not been enforced by that time. Difficulty was
encountered in serving summons on defendant-
appellee, thereby prompting the trial court to dismiss
Civil Case No. 60112 in an order dated March 12,
1966, reading as follows:
It appearing that this case has long been pending with
this Court, the same having been filed way back on
March 5, 1965, and since then defendant has not yet
been served with summons, and notwithstanding such
fact, no further action has been taken by plaintiff; for
lack of interest to prosecute, the instant case is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice, and without
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 27.)
Plaintiff-appellant's motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal having been denied, plaintiff-
appellant filed a new complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 65341 which is the present action and which
is also for revival and enforcement of the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 22237.
Defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 65341 on the ground that
plaintiff-appellant's cause of action had already
prescribed. On January 12, 1967, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss for the reason that the filing of
Civil Case No. 60112 on March 5, 1965 interrupted
the running of the period of prescription, and it started
to run again only after its dismissal on March 12,
1966; and, therefore, when Civil Case No. 65341 was
filed on May 10, 1966, only 9 years, 5 months and 11
days had expired from the time that the judgment in
Civil Case No. 22237 had become final and executory.
Defendant-appellee's repeated attempts to secure a
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss
failed to achieve a favorable result. Defendant-
appellee filed an answer to the complaint with a
counterclaim.
On September 19, 1968, after plaintiff-appellant had
presented its evidence, the trial court reset the
continuation of the hearing on November 28, 1968 for
the presentation of the evidence of defendant-appellee.
On the last mentioned date, the defendant-appellee
failed to appear and the trial court declared the case
submitted for decision.
In a decision dated December 27, 1968, the trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 65341. The said dismissal
was reasoned out as follows:
The plaintiff contends that the filing on
March 5, 1965 of the first action for
revival of judgment interrupted the
period of prescription. Upon the other
hand, the defendant, arguing that the
dismissal of the said action for lack of
prosecution did not stop the period of
prescription, which is ten years from
November 23, 1955, has cited the
decision in Conspecto vs. Fruto, et
al., 31 Phil. 144, wherein it was held
that
In the opinion of the Court, the stand of the defendant
is well taken. It has not been intimated by the plaintiff
that the authorities relied upon by the defendant had
been overruled by any subsequent pronouncement of
the Supreme Court. As the decision sought to be
revived was rendered and became final and executory
on November 23, 1955, and the present action was
instituted on May 10, 1966, or more than the ten-year
period provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
the said action has already prescribed. As held
in Conspecto vs. Fruto, et al., cited, in Commercial
Co., Inc. vs. Jureidini, Inc., et al., the dismissal of the
action filed on March 5, 1965 left the parties in exactly
the same position as if no action had been commenced
at all, and took no time out of the period of
prescription.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for the reconsideration of the said decision
was denied by the trial court. On August 4, 1969,
plaintiff-appellant filed the present petition for review.
The petition was given due course in Our Resolution
of August 6, 1969 and the petitioner filed its brief as
plaintiff-appellant. No brief was filed in behalf of
defendant-appellee.
The only issue raised in this appeal is whether or not
plaintiff-appellant's cause of action in Civil Case No.
65341 had already prescribed.
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that an
action based upon a judgment "must
ISSUE:
whether or not prescription has set in to bar the
filing by petitioner of his second action to revive the
judgment in Civil Case No. 23466.
RULING:
NO.
An action for the revival of a judgment prescribes in
ten (10) years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code). The ten-year
period is counted either from the date the judgment
became final or from the date of its entry (Vda. de
Decena vs. De los Angeles, etc., et al., L-29317, May
29, 1971, 39 SCRA 95, 99). The prescription of an
action is interrupted, among others, by its filing before
the court (Art. 1155, Civil Code).
Applying the foregoing tenets to the case at bar, we
find that petitioner's filing of the first action for revival
of the judgment in Civil Case No. 23466 was well
within the ten-year prescriptive period. Final judgment
was entered by the Court of Appeals on August 5,
1957. Petitioners filed Civil Case No. 70028 (his first
action to revive the judgment) on July 8, 1967.
Therefore, as of the latter date, only nine (9) years,
eleven (11) months and three (3) days had elapsed.
The ten-year prescriptive period was effectively
suspended by the filing of Civil Case No. 70028.
As to the second complaint for revival of the same
judgment,
Let us now consider the second complaint (Civil Case
No. 76166) for revival of the same judgment in Civil
Case No. 23466, in which complaint petitioner also
alleged that final entry of the judgment was made on
August 5, 1957. The first such action (Civil Case No.
70028) was dismissed by the court without prejudice;
and copy of the dismissal order was received by
petitioner on March 19, 1969. On March 31, 1969,
petitioner filed the second action for revival of the
judgment. When a case is ordered dismissed without
prejudice, the plaintiff may file his complaint against
the same defendant in a separate action, even if the
order has already become final and executory
(Rapadaz Vda. de Rapisura vs. Nicolas, etc., et al., L-
22594, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 798, 801). As it is,
the second case to revive the judgment was filed even
before the order of dismissal in the first case could
become final, for only twelve (12) days had expired
between March 19, 1969, when petitioner received
notice of the dismissal order, and March 31, 1969,
when he filed the second motion. In any event, the
dismissal of the first case being without prejudice, the
filing of the second action was still within the original
period of ten (10) years.
At any rate, when the defendant's address cannot with
due diligence be ascertained and no property of his can
be found, the period of prescription is tolled under
article 1108(2) of the new Civil Code. In the premises,
our conclusion must necessarily be that the trial court
committed a reversible error in dismissing Civil Case
No. 76166 on the ground of prescription. (44 SCRA
pp. 383-384.)
As may be noted from the decision dismissing Civil
Case No. 65341, the trial court relied on the rulings
in Conspecto vs. Fruto, et al., 31 Phil. 148
and Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Jureidini, Inc.,
et al., 71 Phil. 25. Said reliance is misplaced, the facts
in the said cases being different from those appearing
in the one under consideration. In Fruto, it was held
that the running of the period of limitation was not
interrupted by an action filed within the said period
because the said action was discontinued by "its
dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff."
The decision went on to state that "the real reason for
the said dismissal does not clearly appear of record."
In the case under consideration, the first action for
revival, Civil Case No. 60112, was dismissed not by
reason of abandonment. As in the case of Marc
Donnelley, the dismissal of the first revival action as
due to the inability to serve summons on the
defendant-appellee. This was because, as stated in the
petition for review, the defendant-appellee was so
elusive that when summons was forwarded to his
address at Iloilo City, the same was returned unserved
because defendant-appellee was in Manila; and when
it was attempted to be served in Manila, he was
supposed to be in Iloilo City. (Rollo, p. 14.)
In Fruto, it is also recognized that the dismissal of an
action filed within the prescriptive period does not
necessarily result in the non-interruption of the period
of limitation. Thus, it was declared:
 Where a suit, commenced within the
period of limitation, is abandoned or
dismissed by reason of the death of the
plaintiff, the operation of the statute is
prevented if the suit is recommenced,
within a reasonable time, by the
representatives of the deceased (Martin
vs. Archer, 3 Hill, [S.C.] 211.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
The plaintiff-appellant may not be accused of having
abandoned Civil Case No. 60112. They asserted due
diligence in trying to serve summons on defendant-
appellee but unfortunately, their efforts were thwarted
due to the ability of the defendant-appellee to evade
service of such court process on him. Neither may
plaintiff-appellant be charged with failure to
recommence its suit within a reasonable time after its
dismissal. The record reveals that plaintiff-appellant
received notice of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
60112 on March 21, 1966. Four (4) days later, or on
March 25, 1966, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Plaintiff-
appellant received the order denying the motion for
reconsideration on April 26, 1966. On May 10, 1966,
plaintiff-appellant filed its second action for revival,
docketed as Civil Case No. 65341.
Nor may the ruling in Jureidini defeat herein plaintiff-
appellant's cause of action. In Jureidini, the plaintiff
filed three (3) cases within the period of prescription,
all of which were dismissed, the first on motion of the
plaintiff, and the other two (2) for failure to prosecute.
When the fourth action was filed beyond the
prescriptive period, it was held that the act of the
plaintiff in failing to prosecute his first three (3) cases
may not be interpreted except as a waiver on its part
and did not place the plaintiff on the same situation
where it was before the filing of the first of the three
actions; and, following the view expressed in the
analogous case of Conspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 150,
the fourth action should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. It is to be noted that as in Fruto, the filing
of the actions within the prescriptive period was
considered as not interrupting the running of the
period of limitation due to the circumstance that the
plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned or waived its
claim.
As already stated above, herein plaintiff-appellant may
not be faulted with having abandoned its claim against
the defendant-appellee which the former had asserted
in filing Civil Case No. 60112. The said case was
dismissed primarily due to the failure to serve
summons on defendant-appellee who had somehow
managed to evade being placed under the jurisdiction
of the Court. Subsequent acts of plaintiff-appellant
after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 60112 adequately
negated any supposed intention to waive or abandon
its claim against defendant-appellee.
It will be noted that the two cases relied upon by the
trial court were both decided when the statute of
limitations was contained in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190. In said law, there was no
specific provision, as that now contained in Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that " the prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed in court."
(Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483.) It is accordingly
extremely doubted if the rulings
in Fruto and Jureidini may still be availed of to
uphold the view that the period of prescription is not
interrupted by an action which the plaintiff shag
abandon or otherwise fail to prosecute. The language
of Article 1155 is unqualified and does not give room
for making a distinction as to the effect of the filing of
an action in court or the running of the period of
prescription.
The record further reveals that plaintiff-appellant
made written extra-judicial demands upon defendant-
appellee by means of letters marked as Exhibits "E-2"
and "F", respectively. Such written extrajudicial
demand also produced the result of interrupting the
period of prescription. (Art. 1155, Civil
Code; Marella vs. Agoncillo, 44 Phil. 844.)
We are accordingly of the considered view that the
trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 65341.
We do not find it necessary, however, to remand the
ease to the court of origin for further proceedings. In
the decision rendered by the trial court, it made a
finding of the material fact upon which the plaintiff's
cause of action is based. It stated the following:
It appears from the evidence presented by the plaintiff
(the defendant did not present any evidence) that
under date of November 23, 1965, a decision was
rendered in Civil Case No. 22237 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Land Settlement and Development
Corporation vs. Jose Zulueta, based on an amicable
settlement, ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P10,391.62, with interest at 4%
per annum from January 13, 1948 (Exhibit "A"); that
the said judgment has not as yet been satisfied; that as
of February 15, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the
defendant is P18,501.97 (Exhibit "E"); that demands
for payment were made on the defendant on January 6,
1956 (Exhibit "E-2") and on January 18, 1965 (Exhibit
"F").
There can be no serious dispute that the plaintiff Board
of Liquidators can prosecute this action as trustee of
the abolished Land Settlement and Development
Corporation, known for short as LASEDECO. The
principal issue is whether or not the action has
prescribed. (Decision, Rollo, pp. 79-80.)
The defendant-appellee presented no contradictory
evidence, he having failed to appear for the trial of the
case scheduled on November 28, 1968 despite notice,
thereby prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. The facts found by the trial
court suffice to justify the rendition of a decision on
the merits which the trial court failed to do in view of
its ruling that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
another one is rendered ordering defendant-appellee to
pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P10,391.62 with
interest at four (4%) per cent per annum from January
13, 1948 until full payment, with costs against
defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

Campit versus Gripa September 17, 2014
Subject of this case is a 2.7360-hectare agricultural land
situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, presently
occupied by  respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga,
and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando
Bardiaga, but covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the
petitioner’s name.5   The petitioner claimed to have
purchased the property from his father Jose Campit in
1977.
On the other hand, respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro
Bardiaga and Severino Bardiaga (as represented by his son,
Rolando Bardiaga) claimed to be the rightful owners of the
subject property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil
Case No. 11858 decided on June 12, 1961, and in Civil
Case No. 15357 decided on August 8,
1978. cralawlawlibrary
7 Juanario Campit had earlier been declared null and void in
The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the
petitioner and his father Jose because they were obtained
through the misrepresentation of the petitioner’s
grandfather, Isidro Campit.8   The respondents further
contended that they have long desired to divide the subject
property among themselves, but the petitioner adamantly
refused to surrender his title to the property to them, or to
the Register of Deeds, despite their formal demand.
Due to the petitioner’s continued refusal to surrender the
subject TCT, the respondents filed anew an action for
annulment and cancellation of title with the RTC on August
15, 2003, docketed as Civil Case No.
18421.10cralawlawlibrary
WHETHER OR NOT CAMPIT’S TRANSFER
The petitioner opposed the respondents’ action and argued
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS VALID.
that the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357,
which declared his title null and void, could no longer be
enforced because its execution was already barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as the said decision was never RULING:
executed within 10 years from July 19, 1979 - the date of
finality of the judgment.ary
NO.
Noting that the action filed by the respondents was not one
for revival of judgment, the RTC proceeded to hear the case
The issue on the validity of the petitioner’s title to the
and, in a decision dated August 13, 2008, ruled in the
subject property has long been settled in the past Civil case,
respondents’ favor, in this
where the court, in its decision had found and declared the
wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
petitioner’s title null and void by reason of fraud and
misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, considering that the Transfer of Certificate
of Title No. 122237 issued in the name of defendant A matter adjudged with finality by a competent court
having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan already constitutes res judicata in another action involving
(sic) Civil Case No. 15357, judgment is hereby rendered in the same cause of action, parties and subject matter. The
favor of the plaintiffs, as doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies
a) Ordering the defendant Juanario Campit to surrender the
and constitutes as an absolute bar to subsequent actions
said Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 122237 within a
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision
Thus, the validity of petitioner’s title, having been settled
to the Register of (sic) Pangasinan for its cancellation;
with finality could no longer be reviewed in the present
b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel case.
TCT No. 122237 in the event that Juanario Campit fails
to surrender the same within the period given to him,
and to revive the title issued in the name of Mariano Decision however, was not executed or enforced within the
Campit. time allowed under the law.
Costs against the defendant.
ISSUE: Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final and
executory judgment may be executed by the prevailing
party as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5)
years from the entry of judgment, failing which the
judgment is reduced to a mere right of action which must
be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular
court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment.
In the case at bar, no motion or action to revive judgment
was ever filed by the respondents. The court cannot,
however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and
benefit from the fruit of his and his predecessors’
fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents who are
the rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens
system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at
the expense of others.
Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to show that
his predecessor-in interest, Jose Campit, claimed ownership
or was ever in possession of the said land. The defendant-
appellant has admitted that he has paid realty tax covering
the subject land only once when he applied for the issuance
of title in his favor. The Court find the respondents’ filing
of Civil Case to be proper and not barred by the time
limitations set forth under the Rules of Court in enforcing
or executing a final and executory judgment.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the of title filed by the respondents is substantially in the nature
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 18   There is, of an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such constructive trust, combined with the fact that the
action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is respondents have always been in possession of the subject
in possession of the subject property, the action, being property, we shall treat Civil Case No. 18421 as an action
in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not to quiet title, the filing of which does not prescribe. 
prescribe.19cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of Civil Case
in Civil Case No. 18421 (the action for annulment and No.18421 to be proper and not barred by the time
cancellation of title filed in 2013), have always been in limitations set forth under the Rules of Court in enforcing
possession of the subject property. Worth noting are the or executing a final and executory judgment.
CA’s findings on this respect:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
present petition for review on certiorari and
consequently AFFIRM the decision dated May 13, 2010
xxx Of course, the defendant-appellant (petitioner herein)
and resolution dated January 27, 2011 of the Court of
has a certificate of title in his favor. But it cannot be denied
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92356.
that he has never been in possession of the subject property.
Neither did he exercise acts of ownership over the said land
Costs against petitioner Juanario G. Campit.
since the time he allegedly purchased it from his father in
1977. Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to
SO ORDERED.cralawred
show that his predecessor-in-interest, Jose Campit, claimed
ownership or was ever in possession of the said land. The
defendant-appellant has admitted that he has paid realty tax
covering the subject land only once when he applied for the
issuance of title in his favor.
xxxx
On the other hand, the continuous possession of the
subject premises by the plaintiffs-appellees has not been
denied or disputed by the defendants-appellants (sic).
The possession in the concept of an owner by the plaintiffs-
appellees has also been confirmed by witness Charlie
Martin.20 (Emphasis ours)
BAsilonia verus Villaruz 10 August 2015 suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 Arrest.11redarclaw
day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6 years, and 1
day of prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the costs. On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition
On June 19, 1987, a Decision  was promulgated against
4 [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, Vicente for Relief of Judgment praying to set aside the June 19,
petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of 1987 trial court Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA
dispositive portion of which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw evidence. Resolution.12 Further, on September 1, 2009, they filed
before the trial court a Manifestation and Supplemental
In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Opposition to private respondent Roblete's
Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency motion.13redarclaw
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing of evidence.
considerations, this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo The trial court granted the motion for execution on
Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John "Jojo" Basilonia, SO ORDERED. 5
December 3, 2009 and ordered the bondsmen to surrender
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as petitioners within ten (10) days from notice of the Order.
principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of The motion for reconsideration14 filed by petitioners was
Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987,
denied on January 4, 2010.
City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of the Revised which the trial court granted on August 3, 1987.6redarclaw
Penal Code of the Philippines, without any aggravating or Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the
mitigating circumstance, and sentences the said [accused] On January 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, 1 month the appeal for failure of petitioners to file their brief despite
for their provisional liberty was ordered forfeited on
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, extensions of time given.7redarclaw
January 25, 2010.15 On even date, the sheriff issued the writ
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and the of execution.w
accessory penalties thereto; to pay and [indemnify], jointly The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of
and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Judgment on September 18, 1989.8 Thereafter, the entire
Roblete the sum of 1!32,100.00 representing funeral case records were remanded to the trial court on October 4,
ISSUE:
expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake; the sum of 1989.9redarclaw
1!30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani
Roblete; the amount of lost income cannot be determined as Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on
May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF
the net income of the deceased cannot be ascertained; and
claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. IMPRISONMENT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory
Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment.10redarclaw
RULING:
He alleged, among others, that despite his request to the
In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment
finds the accused John "Jojo" Basilonia GUlLTY has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted NO.
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of upon his request.
Frustrated Homicide, as principal, committed against the
person of Rene Gonzales on September 15, 1983, defined Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City
under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for The Court's Ruling
Revised Penal Code and sentences the said accused to Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of

The determination of whether respondent trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution
which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment
in a criminal case became final and executory necessarily
calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the
penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil
liability arising from the crime already extinguished. In
both issues, petitioners vehemently assert that respondent
trial court has no more jurisdiction to order the execution of
judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules.
We consider the issues separately.
Prescription of Penalty
With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, Act No. 3815,
or the Revised Penal Code (RPC)17 governs. Articles 92 and
93 of which provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The
penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of
the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of
Penalties.- The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted
if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should
go to some foreign country with which this Government
has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription.
As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of
Negros Occidental,18 the Court already opined that evasion
of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription
of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et
al.19 expounded on the rule that the culprit should escape
during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of
penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x The period of prescription of penalties- so the
succeeding Article 93 provides - "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence."
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence?
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready
answer. Says Article 157:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade
service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if
such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum
period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the
offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he
"is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of
liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be
so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape
should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by
the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which
provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, * * *"
Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking."
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed.
The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 - from
whence Articles 92 and 93 of the present Revised Penal
Code originated- reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben: Las
de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.
* * *
Las leves, al año.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el
dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia
firme, o desde el quebrantamiento de la condena, si hubiera
esta comenzado a cumplirse. * * *" Note that in the present
Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que se notifique
personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the old
code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What
remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code is solely "quebrantamiento de Ia condena". And,
"quebrantamiento" or "evasion" means escape. Reason
dictates that one can escape only after he has started service
of sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the
penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only
begin to run when he escapes from confinement. Says
Viada:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el
dia en que ha tenido Iugar la notificacion personal de la
sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que
la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126
se consigna que el termino de Ia prescripcion se cuenta
desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria
en que se imponga le pena respectiva. Luego ausente el
reo, ya no podra prescribir hoy Ia pena, pues que Ia
notificacion personal no puede ser sup/ida por Ia
notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible
necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es
obvio que en las penas que consisten en privacion de
libertad solo podra existir Ia prescripcion quebrantando el
reo Ia condena, pues que si no se hallare ya preso pre-
ventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su
encerrarniento en el acto de serle notificada personalmente
la sentencia."
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to
run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.20
Following Tanega, Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo 21 held
that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom. We agree with the position
of the Solicitor General that "escape" in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means
unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody.
Of more recent vintage is Our pronouncements in Pangan
v. Hon. Gatbalite,22 which cited Tanega and Del Castillo,
that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the
RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final
judgment and are serving sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court,
therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time,
they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement
despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment.
Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in
their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction
over the motion for execution and in eventually granting
the same.
Extinction of Civil Liability
The treatment of petitioners' civil liability arising from the
offense committed is different.
Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. 23 We said in one
case:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes
two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired
thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the
second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the
crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru
indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v. Gonong, 72
SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this Court in US. v.
Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of
the accused is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x.
Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability
established in Articles 100,25 101,26 102,27 and 10328 of
the Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as
other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing
law, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39 thereof, is
applicable. It states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent
action. - A final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
(6a)
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in
conjunction with
Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which
provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
(3) Upon a judgment
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand
the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.

Based on the foregoing, there are two (2) modes of
enforcing a final and executory judgment or order: through
motion or by independent action.
These two modes of execution are available depending on
the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to
enforce the court's judgment. Execution by motion is only
available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. On the
other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if
the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion
had already elapsed. However, for execution by
independent action to prosper - the Rules impose another
limitation - the action must be filed before it is barred by
the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten
(10) years from the finality of the judgment.29
An action for revival of judgment is not intended to
reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. 30 The
purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already
decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of action
is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original
action.31 However, being a mere right of action, the
judgment sought to be revived is subject to defenses
and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and
those arising after the finality of the first judgment or
which may have arisen subsequent to the date it
became effective such as prescription, payment, or
counterclaims arising out of transactions not
connected with the former controversy.32redarclaw
Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the
issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty,
compellable by mandamus.33 Yet, a writ issued after
the expiration of the period is null and void. 34 The
limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution
within the stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy,
goes to the very jurisdiction of the court. Failure to
object to a writ issued after such period does not
validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is
solely conferred by law and not by express or implied
will of the parties.35redarclaw
Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a number of
exceptions wherein the Court, on meritorious grounds,
allowed execution of judgment despite non-
observance of the time bar. In Lancita, et al. v.
Magbanua, et al.36 it was held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution,
although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule
is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death
of a party, or otherwise.
Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will
extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias. x x x.37
Thus, the demands of justice and fairness were
contemplated in the following instances: dilatory tactics
and legal maneuverings of the judgment obligor which
redounded to its benefit;38 agreement of the parties to defer
or suspend the enforcement of the judgment;39 strict
application of the rules would result in injustice to the
prevailing party to whom no fault could be attributed but
relaxation thereof would cause no prejudice to the
judgment obligor who did not question the judgment sought
to be executed;40 and the satisfaction of the judgment was
already beyond the control of the prevailing party as he did
what he was supposed to do.41 Essentially, We allowed
execution even after the prescribed period elapsed when the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.42redarclaw
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty.
Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the five-
year period or an action to revive the judgment within the
ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that
the judgment has not been enforced because the public
prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for
execution, no persuasive and compelling reason was
presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant
case does not fall within the exceptions afore-stated.
It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was
entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any
hand in causing the same. 43 As regards the civil aspect of a
criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that —
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all
they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome
of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to
their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While
lawyers are expected to exercise a reasonable degree of
diligence and competence in handling cases for their
clients, the realities of law practice as well as certain
fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically fine is likewise imposed, the trial court should issue at once be REMANDED to the trial court for the immediate
impossible for lawyers to be immediately updated on a an order requiring the payment of fine within a reasonable issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-
particular client's case.44 period of time and, in case of nonpayment and subsidiary 2013, in relation to OCA Circular No. 4-92-A.
imprisonment is imposed, he should likewise serve the
subsidiary imprisonment. If, however, the penalty is only The Office of the Court Administrator is
Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs
fine and the judgment has become final and executory, an hereby DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the
and incidental expenses of the suit are part of the judgment
order should be issued by the trial court at once for the possible culpability of those responsible for the
and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose
payment of the fine. And in case of non-payment, the bail unreasonable delay in the execution of the judgment of
favor they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill
bond previously issued for his provisional liberty should be conviction.
to the clerk of court.45 Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete
cancelled and a warrant of arrest should be issued to serve
failed to do so. Their indifference, if not negligence, is
the subsidiary imprisonment, if there is any. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
indicative of lack of interest in executing the decision
rendered in their favor. To remind, the purpose of the law
In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e.,
in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments or
those convicted of capital offenses or convicted of non-
orders is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their
capital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail,
rights.46 Indeed, inaction may be construed as a
a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately
waiver.47redarclaw
issued after the promulgation of judgment by the trial court
as long as the penalty imposed requires the service of
To close, the Court cannot help but impress that this case
sentence in the National Penitentiary. The filing of a
could have been averted had the lower court been a
motion for reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice
competent dispenser of justice. It is opportune to remind
of appeal should not stop the lower court from performing
judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final
its ministerial duty in issuing the commitment order, unless
and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to
a special order has been issued by the Court in specific
immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or
cases - to the effect that the convicted accused shall remain
pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of
under detention in the provincial jail or city jail while the
conviction is not necessary. With respect to the penalty of
motion is being heard or resolved.
imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond
and issue a warrant of arrest, if the accused is not yet under
In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is
detention. If the convicted accused is already under
concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in
detention by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued, the trial
accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and
court should immediately issue the
existing jurisprudence.
corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the
immediate transfer of the accused to the National
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant
Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed
petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
requires the service of sentence in the National
Orders dated December 3, 2009 and January 25, 2010 of
Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an
Presiding Judge Delano F. Villaruz, Regional Trial Court,
appeal had been filed, but the same had been
Roxas City, Branch 16, are AFFIRMED IN PART only
withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.
insofar as to the execution of the penalty of imprisonment
is concerned. Let the records of this case
If aside from the penalty of imprisonment the penalty of
 Clidoro versus Jalmanzar 9 July 2014
The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for revival of
judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against
Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the Decision dated
November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 19831, which affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision dated March 10, 1988
in Civil Case No. T-98 for partition, be revived and
that the corresponding writ of execution be issued. The
dispositive portion ofthe CA Decision reads:
The estate of the late Mateo Clidoro, excepting that
described in paragraph (i) of the Complaint, is hereby
ordered partitioned in the following manner:
1. One-fifth portion to the Plaintiffs-Appellees, by
right of representation to the hereditary share of
Gregorio Clidoro, Sr.;
2. One-fifth portion to Defendant-Appellant Antonio
Clidoro or his legal heirs;
3. One-fifth portion to Appellant Josaphat Clidoro;
4. One-fifth portion to Appellant Aida Clidoro; 5.
One-tenth portion to Gregoria Clidoro, as her legitime
in the hereditary share of Onofre Clidoro; and
6. One-tenth portion to Catalino Morate, as successor-
ininterest to the legitime of Consorcia Clidoro.
SO ORDERED.
On September 3, 2003, defendants-appellees except
Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca, moved to dismiss the said
complaint on the following grounds: "1.) The petition,
not being brought up against the real partiesin-interest,
is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.) The
substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is
not in accordance with the rules; 3.) Even if the
decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be
executed since the legal requirements of Rule 69,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not
been complied with; and 4.) The Judgment of the
Honorable Court ordering partition is merely
interlocutory as it leaves something more to be done to
complete the disposition of the case."
After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants'
Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-appellants'
Rejoinder and defendants-interestedparties' Sur-
Rejoinder, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated
December 8, 2003 dismissing the instant complaint for
lack of cause of action, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
"xxx
The complaint shows that most of the parties-
plaintiffs, partiesdefendants and interested parties are
already deceased and have no more natural or material
existence. This is contrary to the provision of the
Rules (Sec. 1, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
They could no longer be considered as the real parties-
in-interest. Besides, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 3 (1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), where the action is allowed
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case. In the instant
case the beneficiaries are already deceased persons.
Also, the Complaint states thatthey were the original
parties in Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition, but this is
not so (paragraph 2). Some of the parties are actually
not parties to the original case, but representing the
original parties who are indicated as deceased.
From the foregoing, the Court finds the instant
complaint to be flawed in form and substance. The suit
is not brought by the real parties-ininterest, thus a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action is proper (Section 1(g), Rule
16).
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is ordered
DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.
SO ORDERED."
Plaintiffs-appellants moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing Order with prayer to admit the attached
Amended Complaint impleading the additional heirs
of the interested party Josaphat Clidoro and the
original plaintiffs Rizalina Clidoro-Jalmanzar, Cleneo
Clidoro and Aristoteles Clidoro. The same
was,however, denied in the second assailed order. x x
x3
Respondents then appealed to the CA, and on October
17, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision reversing
and setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and
remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of
the Decision was denied per Resolution dated
February 6, 2007.
ISSUE:
 Whether the complaint for revival of judgment
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it
was not brought by or against the real parties-in-
interest.
RULING:
NO
First of all, the Court emphasizes that lack of cause of
action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court as one of the grounds for the dismissal of a
complaint. As explained in Vitangcol v. New Vista
Properties, Inc.,5 to wit:
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a
dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the
determination of a lack of cause of action can only be
made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via
that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
provides that a motion may be made on the ground
"that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action."
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant
hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the
plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is
grounded on the failure tostate a cause of action, a
ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the
facts alleged in the complaint.x x x
xxxx
In a motion to dismiss for failureto state a cause of
action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity,
of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of
action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the
facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.x x x6
Again, in Manaloto v. Veloso III,7 the Court reiterated
as follows:
When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, such fact can be determined
only from the facts alleged in the complaint and
fromno other, and the court cannot consider other
matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether,
assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be
true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance
withthe prayer stated therein.8
In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival
of judgment that the parties therein were also the
parties inthe action for partition. Applying the
foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this
allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the
veracity of the same, it would then appear that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as the
plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of judgment
(hereinafter respondents), as the prevailing parties in
the action for partition, had a right to seek
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of
judgment is a totally separate and distinct case from
the original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As
explained in Saligumba v. Palanog,9 to wit:
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a
procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after
the passage of five years without it being executed
upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended
to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the
judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment. An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action, different
and distinct fromeither the recovery of property case
or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original
action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.
x x x10
With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that
there would be instances where the parties in the
original case and in the subsequent action for revival
of judgment would not be exactly the same. The mere
fact that the names appearing as parties in the the
complaint for revival of judgment are different from
the names of the parties in the original case would not
necessarily mean that theyare not the real parties-in-
interest. What is important is that, as provided in
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit." Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the
previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for
revival of judgment would be benefited by the
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
Moreover, it would appear that petitioners are
mistaken in alleging that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest. The complaint for revival of
judgment impleaded the following parties:
A comparison of the foregoing would show that
almost all of the plaintiffs in the original case for
partition, in whose favor the court adjudged certain
shares in the estate of deceased Mateo Clidoro, are
also the plaintiffs in the action for revival of judgment.
Meanwhile, the defendants impleaded in the action for
revival are allegedly the representatives of the
defendants in the original case, and this appears to
hold water, as Gregoria ClidoroPalanca, named as the
representative of defendant Onofre Clidoro in the
complaint for revival of judgment, was also mentioned
and awarded a portion of the estate in the judgment in
the original partition case. In fact, the trial court itself
stated in its Order11 of dismissal dated December 8,
2003, that "[s]ome of the parties are actually not
parties to the original case, but representing the
original parties who are indicated as deceased."
decision in the partition case executed or
implemented, sufficiently state a cause of action. The
question of whether respondents were the real
partiesin-interest who had the right to seek execution
of the final and executory judgment in the partition
case should have been threshed out in a full-blown
trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 2006, and
its Resolution dated February 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. No.
82209, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

In Basbas v. Sayson,12 the Court pointed out that even

just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring
an action for the recovery of the coowned property,
even through an action for revival of judgment,
because the enforcement of the judgment would result
in such recovery of property. Thus, as in Basbas, it is
not necessary in this case that all of the parties, in
whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be
made plaintiffs to the action for revival of judgment.
Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had an
interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file
the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by
himself.

Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint

for revival of judgment on the ground of lack of, or
failure to state a cause of action. The allegations in the
complaint, regarding the parties' interest in having the

PAL versus CA 181 SCRA 557
Behind the simple issue of validity of an alias writ of
execution in this case is a more fundamental question.
Should the Court allow a too literal interpretation of
the Rules with an open invitation to knavery to prevail
over a more discerning and just approach? Should we
not apply the ancient rule of statutory construction that
laws are to be interpreted by the spirit which vivifies
and not by the letter which killeth?
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07695
entitled "Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. Judge
Ricardo D. Galano, et al.", dismissing the petition for
certiorari against the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila which issued an alias writ of
execution against the petitioner.
The petition involving the alias writ of execution had
its beginnings on November 8, 1967, when respondent
Amelia Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing
Press commenced a complaint for damages before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 71307, entitled Amelia
Tan, et al. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch 13, then presided over by the late Judge Jesus
P. Morfe rendered judgment on June 29, 1972, in
favor of private respondent Amelia Tan and against
petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines:
1. On the first cause of action, to pay to
the plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00
as actual damages, with legal interest
thereon from plaintiffs extra-judicial
demand made by the letter of July 20,
1967;
2. On the third cause of action, to pay
to the plaintiff the amount of
P18,200.00, representing the unrealized
profit of 10% included in the contract
price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest
thereon from July 20,1967;
3. On the fourth cause of action, to pay
to the plaintiff the amount of
P20,000.00 as and for moral damages,
with legal interest thereon from July 20,
1 967;
4. On the sixth cause of action, to pay
to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00
damages as and for attorney's fee.
Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of action, and
defendant's counterclaim, are dismissed.
With costs against the defendant. (CA Rollo, p.
18)
On July 28, 1972, the petitioner filed its appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 51079-R.
On February 3, 1977, the appellate court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification
that PAL is condemned to pay plaintiff the sum
of P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as
attorney's fee, judgment is affirmed, with costs.
(CA Rollo, p. 29)
Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals
to the trial court and on dates subsequent thereto, a
motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent
Amelia Tan, duly opposed by petitioner PAL.
On May 23,1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its
resolution denying the respondent's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the
judgment became final and executory and on May 31,
1977, judgment was correspondingly entered in the
case.
The case was remanded to the trial court for execution
and on September 2,1977, respondent Amelia Tan
filed a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the judgment rendered by the Court of
Appeals. On October 11, 1977, the trial court, presided
over by Judge Galano, issued its order of execution
with the corresponding writ in favor of the respondent.
The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z.
Reyes of Branch 13 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila for enforcement.
Four months later, on February 11, 1978, respondent
Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution stating that the judgment rendered by the
lower court, and affirmed with modification by the
Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied.
On March 1, 1978, the petitioner filed an opposition to
the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution stating that it had already fully paid its
obligation to plaintiff through the deputy sheriff of the
respondent court, Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by
cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said
Emilio Z. Reyes.
On March 3,1978, the Court of Appeals denied the
issuance of the alias writ for being premature, ordering
the executing sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes to appear with
his return and explain the reason for his failure to
surrender the amounts paid to him by petitioner PAL.
However, the order could not be served upon Deputy
Sheriff Reyes who had absconded or disappeared.
On March 28, 1978, motion for the issuance of a
partial alias writ of execution was filed by respondent
Amelia Tan.
On April 19, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan filed a
motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of
Execution" with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of
Execution. On May 1, 1978, the respondent Judge
issued an order which reads:
As prayed for by counsel for the plaintiff, the
Motion to Withdraw 'Motion for Partial Alias
Writ of Execution with Substitute Motion for
Alias Writ of Execution is hereby granted, and
the motion for partial alias writ of execution is
considered withdrawn.
Let an Alias Writ of Execution issue against
the defendant for the fall satisfaction of the
judgment rendered. Deputy Sheriff Jaime K.
del Rosario is hereby appointed Special Sheriff
for the enforcement thereof. (CA Rollo, p. 34)
On May 18, 1978, the petitioner received a copy of the
first alias writ of execution issued on the same day
directing Special Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario to levy
on execution in the sum of P25,000.00 with legal
interest thereon from July 20,1967 when respondent
Amelia Tan made an extra-judicial demand through a
letter. Levy was also ordered for the further sum of
P5,000.00 awarded as attorney's fees.
On May 23, 1978, the petitioner filed an urgent motion
to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no
return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy
Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes and that the judgment debt
had already been fully satisfied by the petitioner as
evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and receipted
by the server of the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT AN ALIAS WRIT OF
EXECUTION CAN BE ISSUED WITHOUT
PRIOR RETURN OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT BY
THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER.
RULING:
YES.
On May 26,1978, the respondent Jaime K. del Rosario
served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank
of petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company,
Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila, through its manager
and garnished the petitioner's deposit in the said bank
in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., on the grounds that:
We rule in the affirmative and we quote the
respondent court's decision with approval:
In the case at bar, the issuance of the questioned alias
writ of execution under the circumstances here
obtaining is justified because even with the absence of
a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable
fact remains that such a return is incapable of being
obtained (sic) because the officer who is to make the
said return has absconded and cannot be brought to the
Court despite the earlier order of the court for him to
appear for this purpose. (Order of Feb. 21, 1978,
Annex C, Petition). Obviously, taking cognizance of
this circumstance, the order of May 11, 1978 directing
the issuance of an alias writ was therefore issued.
(Annex D. Petition). The need for such a return as a
condition precedent for the issuance of an alias writ
was justifiably dispensed with by the court below and
its action in this regard meets with our concurrence. A
contrary view will produce an abhorent situation
whereby the mischief of an erring officer of the court
could be utilized to impede indefinitely the undisputed
and awarded rights which a prevailing party rightfully
deserves to obtain and with dispatch. The final
judgment in this case should not indeed be permitted
to become illusory or incapable of execution for an
indefinite and over extended period, as had already
transpired. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum
habere debet (A judgment ought not to be illusory it
ought to have its proper effect).
Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat
the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit
and end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of
the law (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 8 SCRA 59 [1963]; Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA
697, 698 [1967]). A judgment cannot be rendered
nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict
rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended
to rest on the requirement of a return, the office of
which is merely to inform the court and the parties, of
any and all actions taken under the writ of execution.
Where such information can be established in some
other manner, the absence of an executing officer's
return will not preclude a judgment from being treated
as discharged or being executed through an alias writ
of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the
case at bar. Where the return cannot be expected to be
forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel
the enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on
an impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance
of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not
satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to other writs of
execution (Government of the Philippines v. Echaus
and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318). It is a well known legal
maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment
with effect, sues his case vainly.
More important in the determination of the propriety
of the trial court's issuance of an alias writ of
execution is the issue of satisfaction of judgment.
Under the peculiar circumstances surrounding this
case, did the payment made to the absconding sheriff
by check in his name operate to satisfy the judgment
debt? The Court rules that the plaintiff who has won
her case should not be adjudged as having sued in
vain. To decide otherwise would not only give her an
empty but a pyrrhic victory.
It should be emphasized that under the initial
judgment, Amelia Tan was found to have been
wronged by PAL.
She filed her complaint in 1967.
After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the
Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms.
Tan won her case.
It is now 1990.
Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not
seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly
declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely no
fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what,
technically, she should have been paid from the
start, before 1967, without need of her going to court
to enforce her rights. And all because PAL did not
issue the checks intended for her, in her name.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his
name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment
debt.
In general, a payment, in order to be effective to
discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper
person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides:
Payment shall be made to the person in whose
favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor in interest, or any person authorized
to receive it. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or
to an agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment (Ulen v. Knecttle 50
Wyo 94, 58 [2d] 446, 111 ALR 65). Payment made to
one having apparent authority to receive the money
will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority
had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is
made to one who by law is authorized to act for the
creditor, it will work a discharge (Hendry v. Benlisa
37 Fla. 609, 20 SO 800,34 LRA 283). The receipt of
money due on ajudgment by an officer authorized by
law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt (See 40
Am Jm 729, 25; Hendry v. Benlisa supra; Seattle v.
Stirrat 55 Wash. 104 p. 834,24 LRA [NS] 1275).
The theory is where payment is made to a person
authorized and recognized by the creditor, the
payment to such a person so authorized is deemed
payment to the creditor. Under ordinary
circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the
case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to
extinguish the judgment debt.
There are circumstances in this case, however, which
compel a different conclusion.
The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding
sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks.
The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able
Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff.
Did such payments extinguish the judgment debt?
Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
The payment of debts in money shall be made
in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the
currency which is legal tender in the
Philippines.
The delivery of promissory notes payable to
order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
 documents shall produce the effect of payment
only when they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been
impaired.
In the meantime, the action derived from the
original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
In the absence of an agreement, either express or
implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or
obligation in money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US]
641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the parties so agree, a
debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to
substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of
payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md.. 312,
29 A 527, 25 LRA 200,47 Am. St. Rep. 402).
Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by
consent of the obligee a public officer has no authority
to accept anything other than money in payment of an
obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly
speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the
petitioner's checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se,
operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for
money and not money, the delivery of such an
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment
(See. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil
Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil.
255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60,
61). A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary
cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and
may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the
obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not
extinguished and remains suspended until the payment
by commercial document is actually realized (Art.
1249, Civil Code, par. 3).
If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of
Amelia Tan and not the Sheriff's, there would have
been no payment. After dishonor of the checks, Ms.
Tan could have run after other properties of PAL. The
theory is that she has received no value for what had
been awarded her. Because the checks were drawn in
the name of Emilio Z. Reyes, neither has she received
anything. The same rule should apply.
It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff
Reyes, there would have been payment in full legal
contemplation. The reasoning is logical but is it valid
and proper? Logic has its limits in decision making.
We should not follow rulings to their logical extremes
if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.
In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in
cheeks.
And second, payment in cash always carries with it
certain cautions. Nobody hands over big amounts of
cash in a careless and inane manner. Mature thought is
given to the possibility of the cash being lost, of the
bearer being waylaid or running off with what he is
carrying for another. Payment in checks is precisely
intended to avoid the possibility of the money going to
the wrong party. The situation is entirely different
where a Sheriff seizes a car, a tractor, or a piece of
land. Logic often has to give way to experience and to
reality. Having paid with checks, PAL should have
done so properly.
Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer
may be deemed absolute payment of the judgment
debt but the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested
that judgment debtors should settle their obligations by
turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to
sheriffs and other executing officers. Payment in cash
would result in damage or interminable litigations
each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in his
hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, therefore, the courts
encourage the practice of payments by cheek provided
adequate controls are instituted to prevent wrongful
payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of
funds. If particularly big amounts are involved, escrow
arrangements with a bank and carefully supervised by
the court would be the safer procedure. Actual transfer
of funds takes place within the safety of bank
premises. These practices are perfectly legal. The
object is always the safe and incorrupt execution of the
judgment.
It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that checks intended
for a particular payee are made out in the name of
another. Making the checks payable to the judgment
creditor would have prevented the encashment or the
taking of undue advantage by the sheriff, or any
person into whose hands the checks may have fallen,
whether wrongfully or in behalf of the creditor. The
issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff
clearly made possible the misappropriation of the
funds that were withdrawn.
As explained and held by the respondent court:
... [K]nowing as it does that the intended
payment was for the private party respondent
Amelia Tan, the petitioner corporation,
utilizing the services of its personnel who are
or should be knowledgeable about the accepted
procedures and resulting consequences of the
checks drawn, nevertheless, in this instance,
without prudence, departed from what is
generally observed and done, and placed as
payee in the checks the name of the errant
Sheriff and not the name of the rightful payee.
 Petitioner thereby created a situation which
permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash
said checks and misappropriate the proceeds
thereof to his exclusive personal benefit. For
the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner
himself must bear the fault. The judicial
guideline which we take note of states as
follows:
As between two innocent persons, one of
whom must suffer the consequence of a breach
of trust, the one who made it possible by his
act of confidence must bear the loss.
(Blondeau, et al. v. Nano, et al., L-41377, July
26, 1935, 61 Phil. 625)
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to
protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act made
possible the loss had but itself to blame.
The attention of this Court has been called to the bad
practice of a number of executing officers, of requiring
checks in satisfaction of judgment debts to be made
out in their own names. If a sheriff directs a judgment
debtor to issue the checks in the sheriff's name,
claiming he must get his commission or fees, the
debtor must report the sheriff immediately to the court
which ordered the execution or to the Supreme Court
for appropriate disciplinary action. Fees, commissions,
and salaries are paid through regular channels. This
improper procedure also allows such officers, who
have sixty (60) days within which to make a return, to
treat the moneys as their personal finds and to deposit
the same in their private accounts to earn sixty (60)
days interest, before said finds are turned over to the
court or judgment creditor (See Balgos v. Velasco,
108 SCRA 525 [1981]). Quite as easily, such officers
could put up the defense that said checks had been
issued to them in their private or personal capacity.
Without a receipt evidencing payment of the judgment
debt, the misappropriation of finds by such officers
becomes clean and complete. The practice is ingenious
but evil as it unjustly enriches court personnel at the
expense of litigants and the proper administration of
justice. The temptation could be far greater, as proved
to be in this case of the absconding sheriff. The correct
and prudent thing for the petitioner was to have issued
the checks in the intended payee's name.
The pernicious effects of issuing checks in the name of
a person other than the intended payee, without the
latter's agreement or consent, are as many as the ways
that an artful mind could concoct to get around the
safeguards provided by the law on negotiable
instruments. An angry litigant who loses a case, as a
rule, would not want the winning party to get what he
won in the judgment. He would think of ways to delay
the winning party's getting what has been adjudged in
his favor. We cannot condone that practice especially
in cases where the courts and their officers are
involved.1âwphi1 We rule against the petitioner.
Anent the applicability of Section 15, Rule 39, as
follows:
Section 15. Execution of money judgments. —
The officer must enforce an execution of a
money judgment by levying on all the
property, real and personal of every name and
nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed
of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt
from execution, or on a sufficient amount of
such property, if they be sufficient, and selling
the same, and paying to the judgment creditor,
or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will
satisfy the judgment. ...
the respondent court held:
We are obliged to rule that the judgment debt
cannot be considered satisfied and therefore
the orders of the respondent judge granting the
alias writ of execution may not be pronounced
as a nullity.
x x x           x x x          x x x
It is clear and manifest that after levy or
garnishment, for a judgment to be executed
there is the requisite of payment by the officer
to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and none such payment had been
concededly made yet by the absconding Sheriff
to the private respondent Amelia Tan. The
ultimate and essential step to complete the
execution of the judgment not having been
performed by the City Sheriff, the judgment
debt legally and factually remains unsatisfied.
Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with
satisfaction of a judgment. Under unusual
circumstances as those obtaining in this petition, the
distinction comes out clearly.
Execution is the process which carries into effect a
decree or judgment (Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal. App.
2d. 63, 87 P 2d 360, 363; Miller v. London, 294 Mass
300, 1 NE 2d 198, 200; Black's Law Dictionary),
whereas the satisfaction of a judgment is the payment
of the amount of the writ, or a lawful tender thereof, or
the conversion by sale of the debtor's property into an
amount equal to that due, and, it may be done
otherwise than upon an execution (Section 47, Rule
39). Levy and delivery by an execution officer are not
prerequisites to the satisfaction of a judgment when
the same has already been realized in fact (Section 47,
Rule 39). Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish
while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to
achieve. Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides the
sheriff with his duties as executing officer including
delivery of the proceeds of his levy on the debtor's
property to satisfy the judgment debt. It is but to stress
that the implementing officer's duty should not stop at
his receipt of payments but must continue until
payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.

Finally, we find no error in the respondent court's

pronouncement on the inclusion of interests to be
recovered under the alias writ of execution. This
logically follows from our ruling that PAL is liable for
both the lost checks and interest. The respondent
court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 51079-R does not
totally supersede the trial court's judgment in Civil
Case No. 71307. It merely modified the same as to the
principal amount awarded as actual damages.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the

petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the
trial court's issuance of the alias writ of execution
against the petitioner is upheld without prejudice to
any action it should take against the errant sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes. The Court Administrator is ordered
to follow up the actions taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.
Caluag versus Pecson G.R. No. L-1403 October 9, 1948
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
the ground that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the
resolution dated April 1, 1947, which declares the
petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or
performing the order of the court of January 7, 1947, in the
case No. 5486 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
requiring the petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor
of plaintiff over one-half of the land pro indiviso in
question, within ten days from the receipt of copy of said
resolution, and which orders that the petitioners be
imprisoned until they perform the said act.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE PECSON ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT.
RULING:
YES.
The first ground on which the petition is based is that the
judgment of the court which the petitioners are ordered to
perform has not yet become final. This ground is
unfounded.
From the pleadings and annexes it appears that the
judgment of the lower court against the petitioners was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and was affirmed by the
latter in its decision promulgated on May 30, 1944; that the
petition to appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari filed
by the petitioners was denied on July 24, 1944; that a
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also
denied on August 21, 1944; that the record of the case,
having been destroyed during the liberation, was
reconstituted; that on September 24, 1945, the Deputy
Clerk of this Court wrote a letter to and notified the
petitioners of the resolution of the Court declaring said
record reconstituted, together with the copies of the
decision of the Court of Appeals and resolutions of the
Supreme Court during Japanese occupation of June 24 and
August 21, 1944; and that on October 23, 1946, the clerk of
Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified the attorneys for
both parties of the said decision of the Court of Appeals
and resolutions of the Supreme Court. There can be no
question, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance above mentioned, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, has become final and executory.
The other two grounds alleged by the petitioners in support
of the present petition for certiorari are: that plaintiff’s
action abated or was extinguished upon the death of the
plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal
redemption was a personal one,
and therefore not transferable to his successors in interest;
and that, even assuming that it is not a personal one and
therefore transferable, his successors in interest have failed
to secure the substitution of said deceased by his legal
representative under section 17, Rule 3. These reasons or
grounds do not deserve any serious consideration, not only
because they are without merits, but because the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, having jurisdiction to render that
judgment, the latter cannot be disobeyed however
erroneous it may be (Compañia General de Tabacos v.
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., 33 Phil., 503;
Golding v. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941). And this Court can not
in this proceeding correct any error which may have been
committed by the lower court.
However, although not alleged, we may properly take
judicial notice of the fact that the respondent Judges have
acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against and
declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt of court.
The contempt supposed to have been committed by the
petitioners is not a direct contempt under section 1, Rule
64, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. It
is an indirect contempt or disobedience of a lawful order of
the court, under section 3, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court.
According to sections 4 and 5 of said rule, where a
contempt under section 3 has been committed against a
superior court or judge the charge may be filed with such
superior court, and the accused put under custody; but if the
hearing is ordered to be had forthwith, the accused may be
released from custody upon filing a bond in an amount to
be fixed by the court for his appearance to answer the
charge. From the record it appears that no charge for
contempt was filed against the petitioners nor was a trial
held. The only proceeding had in this case which led to the
conviction of the defendants are: the order of January 7,
1947, issued by the lower court requiring the defendants to
execute the deed of conveyance as directed in the judgment
within ten days from the receipt of the copy of said order,
with the admonition that upon failure to do so said
petitioners will be dealt with for contempt of court; the
motion of March 21, 1947, filed by the attorney for the
respondent Leon Alejo, administrator of the estate of
Fortunato Alejo, that the petitioners be punished for
contempt; and the resolution of the court of April 1, 1947,
denying the second motion for reconsideration of March
17, 1947, of the order of January 7, 1947, filed by the
petitioners, and ordering the petitioners to be imprisoned in
the provincial jail until they have complied with the order
of the court above mentioned.
It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a
particular case is something more than the general power
conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases
of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It
is not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and
decide the class of litigations to which a case belongs; it is
necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called
into activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other
appropriate pleading. A Court of First Instance has an
abstract jurisdiction or power to try and decide criminal
cases for homicide committed within its territorial
jurisdiction; but it has no power to try and decide a criminal
case against a person for homicide committed within its
territory, unless a complaint or information against him be
filed with the said court. And it has also power to try civil
cases involving title to real estate situated within its district;
but it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a dispute or
controversy between two persons over title of real property
located in his province, unless a proper complaint be filed
with its court. So, although the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan has power conferred by law to punish as guilty of
indirect contempt a party who disobeys its order or
judgment, it did not have or acquire jurisdiction of the
particular case under consideration to declare the
petitioners guilty of indirect contempt, and order their
confinement until they have executed the deed of
conveyance in question, because neither a charge has been
filed against them nor a hearing thereof held as required by
law.
The respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted not only without
jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring the
petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the confinement of the petitioners,
because it had no power to impose such punishment upon
the latter.
The respondent judge has no power under the law to order
the confinement of the petitioners until they have complied
with the order of the court. Section 9, Rule 39, in
connection with section 7 of Rule 64, provides that if a
person is required by a judgment or order of the court to
perform any other act than the payment of money or sale or
delivery of real or personal property, and said person
disobeys such judgment or order while it is yet in his power
to perform it, he may be punished for contempt and
imprisoned until he performs said order. This provision is
applicable only to specific acts other than those provided
for or covered by section 10 of the same Rule, that is, it
refers to a specific act which the party or person must
personally do, because his personal qualification and
circumstances have been taken into consideration in
accordance with the provision of article 1161 of the Civil
Code. But if a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents
or to perform any specific act which may be performed by
some other person, or in some other way provided by law
with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and
not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the
provision of said section 10, the court may direct the act to
be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other
person appointed or designated by the court, and the act
when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party
himself.
It is also well settled by the authorities that a judgment may
be void for want of power to render the particular
judgment, though the court may have had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties. A wrong decision made
within the limits of the court’s authority is erroneous and
may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a
wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void, and
may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the
court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it.
Hence though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the particular case has been submitted
properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its
jurisdiction if it renders a judgment which it has no power
under the law to render. A sentence which imposes upon
the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty different
from or in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense of which the
defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of
jurisdiction, as to the excess in the latter case. And a
judgment of imprisonment which the court has no
constitutional or statutory power to impose, as in the
present case, may also be collaterally attacked for want or
rather in excess of jurisdiction.
In Cruz v. Director of Prisons (17 Phil., 269, 272, 273), this
Court said the following applicable to punishment imposed
for contempt of court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence
imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to
impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of
the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the
weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a
sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the
parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not
entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless
he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. (Ex
parte Erdmann, 88 Cal., 579; Lowrey v. Hogue, 85 Cal.,
600; Armstrong v. People, 37 Ill., 459; State v. Brannon, 34
La Ann., 942; People v. Liscomb, 19 Am. Rep., 211; In re
Taylor, 7 S. D., 382, 45 L. R. A., 136; Ex parte Mooney, 26
W. Va., 36, 53 Am. Rep., 59; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S.,
48; In re Graham, 133 U. S., 461.)."

In the present case, in view of the failure of the petitioners

to execute the deed of conveyance directed in the judgment
of the court, the respondent may, under section 10, Rule 39,
either order its execution by some other person appointed
or designated by the court at the expense of the petitioners,
or enter a judgment divesting the title of the petitioner over
the property in question and vesting it in Leon Alejo,
administrator of estate of the deceased Fortunato Alejo, and
such judgment has the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form of law.

In view of the foregoing, the order of the court of April 7,

1947, ordering the confinement of the petitioners in the
provincial jail until they have complied with the order of
the court, is set aside without costs. So ordered.
 Arcadio versus Ylagan A.M. No. 2734, July 30, 1986
Rosa Santiago Arcadio, Jose C. Santiago, Iris C. Santiago
and Guillerma C. Santiago filed a sworn letter-complaint on
February 15, 1985 praying that Atty. Cesar Z. Ylagan be
disbarred on the ground that he, together with the sheriffs
of Quezon City and two barangay officials, "used violence
to break open our domicile WITHOUT authority from the
court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Complainant Rosa Arcadio is the lessee of an apartment
bearing No. 26 situated at the corner of Judge Juan Luna
and Pitimini Streets, Barangay Paltok, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. The apartment is owned by Ernesto
Ylagan, brother of Respondent.
Sometime in 1983, respondent, as counsel for his brother,
instituted an ejectment suit against Arcadio before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, based on three
grounds: sublease by the lessee of the premises to another
without the consent of the lessor; need of the lessor/owner
to repossess the unit for his own use or for the use of any
immediate member of his family; and, ownership by the
lessee of another residential unit in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.
For failure to answer, Arcadio was declared in default.
Soon thereafter, a decision was rendered in favor of Ernesto
Ylagan. However, this decision was set aside upon motion
of Arcadio. On January 23, 1984, Arcadio was ordered to
vacate the apartment and to restore possession thereof to
the owner, as well as to pay P1,000.00 a month as damages
in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises, starting June, 1983 until it is
vacated and the sum of P1,000.00 by way of attorney’s
fees, in addition to the costs. The trial court found that all
three grounds were duly established, any of which was
sufficient to justify Arcadio’s ejectment.
Arcadio appealed to the Regional Trial Court but
respondent moved for execution pending appeal, which was
granted. The writ of execution was issued on May 10, 1984.
Thereupon, Arcadio filed a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court, which issued a temporary restraining
order on May 16, 1984. On June 5, 1984, the petition was
dismissed and accordingly, the restraining order was lifted,
thereby paving the way for execution.
Thus, pursuant to the writ of execution, Sheriffs Johnny
Reyes and Florencio Pangilinan, accompanied by Barangay
Secretary Teresita Magnaye, Kabataang Barangay
Chairman Marcelino Daligdig and
the respondent, proceeded to the subject premises in the
morning of June 7, 1984. It was the manner in which the
writ was carried out which led to the filing of the instant
administrative case.
Complainants alleged that Arcadio left the apartment in the
morning of June 7, 1984 to ask the help of her sister in
putting up a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the
judgment; that to ensure herself that nothing untoward
happens in her absence, Arcadio left her two young nieces
[herein complainants Iris C. Santiago and Guillerma C.
Santiago] in the next door apartment occupied by her
brother, then closed and padlocked the doors, windows and
the outer gate: that about 11:00 that morning, respondent,
together with the sheriffs and barangay officials, arrived
and when they found the gate padlocked, they shook and
banged it until the small padlock was "smashed" ; that the
group, under the leadership of respondent, used tools to
open the apartment door and once inside, they forced open
the doors of the rooms and ransacked the place; and that
before leaving the premises, respondent locked the doors
and gate with new padlocks, to the prejudice of the
complainants who were humiliated in the neighborhood
because it took them a long time to unlock the doors. It is
the contention of complainants that the enforcement of the
writ was irregular and illegal because the acts of violence
perpetrated by respondent and his group were without
authority from the court.
In his comment, respondent averred that the complainants,
in order to mislead the Court, conveniently omitted in their
entire narration, affidavits and documents, the fact that on
the date, time and place mentioned, he, the sheriffs of
Quezon City and the barangay officials were implementing
a writ of execution issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 43572, entitled "Ernesto
Z. Ylagan versus Rosa Arcadio." Respondent alleged that
when they arrived at the apartment, it was abandoned and
padlocked from the outside, which are indications that their
arrival was anticipated and that complainants intended to
frustrate the writ; that the service of the writ was carried out
in a most civil and orderly fashion notwithstanding the
belligerent attitude of persons purporting to be Arcadio’s
relatives, friends and counsel, who were present during
their entire stay in the premises; and that these people even
summoned a police patrol, but the policemen, after
checking the identification of the sheriffs and verifying the
writ, found everything in order and left. Respondent argued
that if complainants had a real case against him, they would
have filed the complaint immediately after June 7, 1984
and not wait for eight months before filing the same. In
addition, respondent claimed that the motive of
complainants in proceeding to disbar him was to harass him
and to set a leverage against an impending execution. He
explained that on January 21, 1985, shortly before the
present complaint was filed, the Regional Trial Court,
which had in the meantime affirmed the decision of the trial
court, had directed the issuance of a writ of execution for
failure of Arcadio to periodically deposit, during the
pendency of the appeal, the amount adjudged as the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the
premises. The complainants, who were again threatened by
eviction, wanted to retaliate against him.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT MUST BE
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF LEGAL BASIS.
RULING:
YES.
The complaint must be dismissed for lack of legal basis.
The case of Keith v. Johnson 1 summed up the rules on the
extent of the authority of an officer to enter a man’s house,
in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The common law, jealous of intrusion upon domestic
peace and security, did not permit an officer to break open
an outer door of the defendant’s dwelling house, for the
purpose of executing a ca. sa. upon a person, or of levying a
fi. fa. on the goods of the defendant, unless the king was
plaintiff. Every man’s house was deemed his castle, and an
ordinary judicial writ did not authorize the opening of the
outer door, lest the king’s enemies might enter; but the
officer, once legally in the house, had a right to open an
inner door: . . . But the executions in civil cases for specific
property might have authorized the breaking of the house,
if the officer could not otherwise execute the command of
the writ. Executions for the specific thing which had been
adjudged to be the property of the plaintiff, were of that
character, such, for example, as a writ of seisin, or an
habere facias possessionem; because, 1] If resisted, the
officer could not execute the writ, unless he employed force
to overcome resistance; 2] The thing had been judicially
ascertained to be the property of the plaintiff and not of the
defendant; 3] The defendant would be guilty of a contempt
of the court, and a prostitution of his sanctuary, by
concealing within his closed walls, that which he knew not
to be his, and which the law had commanded him to
surrender to the true owner. Hence when a writ of seisin
was resisted, the officer had a right to employ whatever
force the exigency made necessary to enable him to enter
the house, and to turn the defendant out and put the plaintiff
in."cralaw virtua1aw library
The name of the process commonly resorted to by the
successful party in an action of ejectment, for the purpose
of being placed by the sheriff in the actual possession of the
land recovered is called a habere facias possessionem. 2
The records show that the writ of execution issued by Judge
Gorospe, Jr. of the Metropolitan Trial Court on May 10,
1984 partakes of the nature of a habere facias
possessionem. It commanded the sheriff to cause the
defendant Arcadio to vacate the premises of the plaintiffs
bearing No. 26 situated at the corner of Judge Juan Luna
and Pitimini Streets, Barangay Paltok, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, as well as all persons claiming rights
under her and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff.
Since it is not disputed that no one was in the apartment at
the time execution was carried into effect and the doors,
windows and outer gate were padlocked, there was no need
for the sheriffs and the respondent to secure a "break-open"
order inasmuch as the character of the writ in their hands
authorized them to break open the apartment, if they could
not otherwise execute its command.
Moreover, there is merit in the position taken by the
respondent, manifested in a memorandum of authorities
submitted to supplement his comment, that there is only
one instance in the Rules of Court which requires a special
"break-open" order - that referred to in Section 14, Rule 39,
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 14. Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. — When the property subject of the execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment debtor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements except upon special
order of the court issued upon petition of the judgment
creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The situation contemplated under the foregoing section is
very much different from the case at bar since no building
or structure constructed by the tenant was demolished or
required to be demolished. The charge therefore cannot
prosper, in the absence of any rule which imposes upon the
officer the duty to obtain a break open order.
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature,
for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
restored as promptly as possible, and, accordingly,
technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. 3 Hence,
when an officer duly qualified to act under a writ of
execution in an ejectment case should be obstructed by a
lock or a latch, he is not expected to lie in wait around the
premises until such time as the tenants arrive. He has the
right to employ force necessary to enable him to enter the
house and enforce the judgment. If the rule were otherwise,
and as experience has shown, the prevailing party will be at
the mercy of his adversary who will stop at nothing to
thwart execution.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty. 4 that her actuations betrayed her intention to frustrate the
After a careful consideration of the allegations of the
complaint, supported by annexes, and the comment thereto,
likewise with annexes, We are convinced that the
complainants failed to meet the above standard to warrant
the disbarment of Respondent.
The incident complained of occurred on June 7, 1984. The
day after, June 8, 1984, complainants filed a supersedeas
bond. On January 10, 1985, respondent moved for
execution on the ground that Arcadio defaulted in the
payment of the mandatory deposit to stay execution
pending appeal. On January 21, 1985, the Regional Trial
Court favorably acted on the motion for execution. At this
point, complainants were threatened anew with eviction.
Twenty-five days later or eight months after June 7, 1984,
complainants initiated the present administrative case.
These circumstances cast a grave and serious doubt as to
the motive of complainants. We agree with the respondent SO ORDERED.
that if there was an irregularity in the enforcement of the
writ, complainants would have immediately proceeded
against him. It is in accord with human nature to assert a
right most strongly when it is first invaded. 5 The
unexplained delay gives rise to the inference that the
complaint is a mere afterthought. Undoubtedly, the
complaint is the product of resentment and bitterness of the
complainants who wanted to strike back at the respondent
for the defeat they suffered in his hands.
Also, the circumstance that no arrest was made by the
policemen summoned by Jose Santiago, one of the
complainants, bolsters the claim of respondent that, after a
verification of the writ and a check on the identification of
the sheriffs, the policemen found everything in order.
Furthermore, it is intriguing why Arcadio, whose brother
resided in the next door apartment, had to padlock the
windows, doors and outer gate before leaving the premises
that morning of June 7, 1984. There is reason to conclude
writ.
While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper
disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to
their sworn duties, they will, on the other hand, protect
them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants.
Private persons and particularly disgruntled opponents, may
not, therefore be permitted to use the courts as vehicle
through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar.
6
In view of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to
refer this complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, this administrative case is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
Republic versus Yahun June 16, 2014
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the
issuance of protection order under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in
January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any
child but respondent has a daughter with her previous
live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as
follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of
Protection Order to be sufficient in form and substance
and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the
petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER
is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES
A. YAHON directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to
commit or committing further acts of physical
abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500
meters from petitioner, her residence or her
place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying,
intimidating, contacting or communicating
with petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited
from using or possessing any firearm or deadly
weapon on occasions not related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal
support to the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials
through the Chairman in the area where the petitioner
and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis
Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental
are directed to respond to any request for assistance
from the petitioner for the implementation of this
order. They are also directed to accompany the
petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2,
Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her
personal belongings in order to insure the safety of the
petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to
immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and
obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents, if
needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth
implementation of this order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be
served upon the respondent for him to file an
OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from
receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference and
hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of
respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to
WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A.
YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the
court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance
Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG,
Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE
BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT
COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING
ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE
COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE
AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A
LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND
IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON
THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS
DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL
ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS
AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION
OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE
ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with
copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-
trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a
counsel and requested for time to hire his own
counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an
opposition or answer to the petition. Because of his
failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the
case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of
evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who
manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to
give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (
she claimed that she had no source of livelihood since
he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate
on keeping their house), the RTC issued another order
directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal
support in the amount of ₱4,000.00 per month and
fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which
shall be automatically deducted and given directly to
respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt.
Yahon never complied with the TPO as he continued
making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her
person, and failed to give her spousal support as
ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as
follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence
presented in this case, this court finds that there is a
need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R.
Yahon from further acts of violence that might be
committed by respondent against her. Evidences
showed that respondent who was a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the
Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro
City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal,
emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the
petitioner. Respondent in several instances had
slapped, mauled and punched petitioner causing her
physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical
certificates showing physical injuries suffered by
petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of
their marital altercations. Respondent at the height of
his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and
threatened to massacre her and her child causing them
to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other
people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an
unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and
when refused poked a gun at her. Several police
blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner
documenting the incidents when she was subjected to
respondent’s ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally,
petitioner was not spared from respondent’s abuses by
shouting at her that he was wishing she would die and
he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and
sending her threatening text messages. These incidents
had caused petitioner great psychological trauma
causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her to
seek refuge from the court for protection.
Economically, petitioner was also deprived by
respondent of her spousal support despite order of the
court directing him to give a monthly support of
Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds
a need to protect the life of the petitioner not only
physically but also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and
documentary, and there being no controverting
evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that
the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, thus,
pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued
immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES
A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R.
YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6,
2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed
to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement
benefits and other claims that may be due or released
to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner shall be automatically deducted from
respondent’s benefits and claims and be given directly
to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding
General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of
PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their
guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the
Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before
the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift
Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated
November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a
limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested
that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP Pension
and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the
TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on September
2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary
withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum
(MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October
29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of
Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on
the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the
propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon.
Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s
check representing his 36 MLS had been processed
and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date
said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially
discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had
not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution
due to lack of summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot
be bound by the said court order. Additionally,
petitioner contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-
interest and is a complete stranger to
the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of
TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner
lamented that it was not afforded due process and it
was thus improper to issue execution against the
AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized its
position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply
with the TPO without violating its right to procedural
due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC
denied the aforesaid motion for having been filed out
of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and
July 23, 2007 Decision granting Permanent Protection
Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied under the RTC’s Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of
the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs
the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly
give the same to respondent as spousal support,
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed her
Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as
to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his
retirement benefit and that the latter has repeatedly
violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of
spousal support.
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division
issued a Resolution11 granting respondent’s
application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the
parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondent’s application for the issuance of an
injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has
already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the
mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such
pension could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of
the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its
employees, agents, representatives, and any all persons
acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining
pension that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied
the petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed
orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is
whether petitioner military institution may be ordered
to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to
give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as
spousal support in compliance with a protection order
issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt
Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to
provide for the financial spousal support of
respondent.
RULING:
YES
A protection order is an order issued by the court to
prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the court
may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection
order that may be issued by the barangay shall be
known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that
may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another,
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no
property rights are violated, and if respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until
respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from
petitioner and any designated family or household
member at a distance specified by the court, and to
stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment, or any specified place frequented by the
petitioner and any designated family or household
member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner
of an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate
law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to
the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner
is safely restored to the possession of the automobile
and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the
petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court
shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by
the respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure
to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance
of support to the woman and/or her child without
justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to
use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender
to surrender his firearm and shall direct the
appropriate authority to investigate on the offender
and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to,
property damage, medical expenses, child care
expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to
provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social
services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court
deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety
of the petitioner and any designated family or
household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to
such relief. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s
directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from
S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be
given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an
explicit mandate under the law governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1638,15 which states: Section 31. The
benefits authorized under this Decree, except as
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to
any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted
man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
(Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291,
otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and
Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as
well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to
the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other
processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies
or administrative bodies including Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial
obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by
his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his
position or work except when his monetary liability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we
held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner
all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of
such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s
conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates
Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts
retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
governs execution of judgments and court orders.
Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those properties
which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or
property obtained as such support, or any pension or
gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 18 However, if
several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute
must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the
latest expression of the legislative will.19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a
later enactment, should be construed as laying down
an exception to the general rule above-stated that
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
law itself declares that the court shall order the
withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of
the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman
“[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary.”
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the
TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s
retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys
remain as public funds, citing the case of Pacific
Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the
CA when it held that the garnishment of the amount of
₱10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it
was still in the possession of the Bureau of
Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null
and void. The CA therein relied on the previous
rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et
al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the
garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared
in Pacific Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is
that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature,
and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long
as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of
the Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers
both of the foregoing is that every consideration of
public policy forbids it.23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term
“employer,” which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all
employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for
spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation.1âwphi1 In the United States, provisions of
the Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow
garnishment of certain federal funds where the
intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions were
designed “to avoid sovereign immunity problems” and
provide that “moneys payable by the Government to
any individual are subject to child support
enforcement proceedings,” the law is clearly intended
to “create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so
that state courts could issue valid orders directed
against Government agencies attaching funds in their
possession.”25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is
constitutional and does not violate the equal protection
clause. In Garcia v. Drilon 26 the issue of
constitutionality was raised by a husband after the
latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to
enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued
against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262
rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the
classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice
against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane
to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared
that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to
address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and
child support specifically address one form of violence
committed against women – economic abuse.
D. “Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or
attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims’ own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the
objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them
continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.
“The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened
to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded
all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the
victim and any designated family or household
member safety in the family residence, and to prevent
the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to
ensure their financial support.”29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-
MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 PSALM versus Maunlad Homes February 8, 2017
Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Malolos
City, Bulacan, an unlawful detainer case with damages
against National Power Corporation (NPC), raffled-
off to Branch 1.
After trial, the MTCC issued its Decision3 dated
October 26, 2009, ordering NPC to vacate the subject
premises and surrender physical possession thereof to
respondent; to pay reasonable compensation
equivalent to Php20.00 per square meter per month of
respondent's 25,896-sq. m. properties, reckoned from
the date of demand on October 6, 2008, until complete
vacation and surrender of the subject premises; and to
pay Php20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and cost
of suit.
The NPC appealed the decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, and was
raffled-off to Branch 78. The RTC rendered its
Decision4 dated May 18, 2010 affirming in toto the
MTCC decision.
Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which was
opposed by the NPC. The NPC also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC decision. In an Order dated
August 5, 2010, the RTC denied the NPC's motion for
reconsideration and granted respondent's motion for
execution.
On August 25, 2010, a Writ of Execution pending
appeal was issued.5 And on September 6, 2010, the
sheriff served a Notice of Demand6 of payment to the
NPC.
Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of
a Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to
implement the writ of execution, by serving the notice
of levy on the NPC Warehouse at Barangay Lagundi,
Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by the security
guards assigned therein. The NPC argued that the
warehouse is being used both by it and the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(herein petitioner PSALM), an entity created and
existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA
Law); that the said law provides that the ownership
and all generation assets, IPP contracts and other NPC
disposable assets are transferred to PSALM; and that
as of the moment, the ownership of the said items
stored in the said warehouse cannot be established
with certainty as they are in the process of determining
what properties may be retained by the latter.
On October 26, 2010, the RTC issued a Break Open
Order7 authorizing the sheriff and his deputies, police
officers/escorts, representatives from both parties to
enter/break open into the NPC's warehouse facilities
located at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga.
On November 4, 2010, the sheriff issued a Notice of
Levy8 on execution pending appeal of personal
properties/sale of seven (7) units transformer radiator
fins, one (1) unit power transformer with Serial No.
77740395, and four (4) pieces angle bars.
On November 9, 2010, petitioner filed an
Affidavit10 of third-party claim with the sheriff
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
and alleging that it is the owner of the levied
properties pursuant to the EPIRA Law. On November
10, 2010, petitioner filed a Manifestation11 with
Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Status
Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner
of the subject properties pulled out by the sheriff by
operation of law; that it is not a party to the instant
case and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment
therein; that the obligation to pay respondent had not
been transferred to it. Petitioner also prayed for the
nullification of the levy of its properties and restoring
their immediate possession to it.
On November 11, 2010, the RTC issued an
Order12 holding in abeyance the public sale of the
subject levied properties until further orders.
On February 1, 2011, the RTC issued an Order, 13 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the motion
for issuance of Status Quo Order is hereby DENIED.
The third-party claim filed by PSALM is likewise
denied.
Further PSALM's prayer to nullify the levy of seven
units transformers radiator fins, one unit power
transformer with serial number E-77740395 and four
pieces of angle bars and restoring its immediate
possession to the same is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of this Court is DIRECTED
to proceed with the implementation of the writ of
execution issued in this case in accordance with law
and without further delay.
SO ORDERED.14
On February 21, 2011, the sheriff issued a notice 15 of
sale on execution of personal properties.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari assailing the October 26, 2010 Break
Open Order, the November 4, 2010 notice of levy on
execution pending appeal, the Order dated February 1,
2011 denying the motion for issuance of Status
Quo Order and the third-party claim, and the February
21, 2011 notice of sale on execution of personal
properties. It alleged that it has no adequate remedy
available from the writs and processes issued by the
RTC, and that it acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders despite the
fact that petitioner is the owner of the subject
properties.
On July 30, 2012, the CA issued its assailed Decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari  for being an
incorrect remedy.
The CA found, among others, that contrary to the
allegation of petitioner that there exists no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy obtaining under the
circumstances, Section 16, Rule 3 9 of the Rules of
Court provides a more expeditious and encompassing
recourse in case a property belonging to a third person
is placed under the coverage of the writ of execution
and, thereafter, sold at public auction.
ISSUE:
whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's
petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the
latter's third party claim for being a wrong
remedy.
RULING:
NO.
The power of the court in executing judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone.17 An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court.18  plainly spurious claim.
The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the
judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the
saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for
another man's debts.19 Thus, if the property levied by
virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a third
person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for the remedy of such third party claimant, to wit:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third
person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any
person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto
or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds
of such right or title, and serves the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the
judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to
keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on
demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the
court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum
not less than the value of the property levied on. In
case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall
be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the
bond unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing
of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the
taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from
claiming damages in the same or a separate action
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is
sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be
represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court
shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such
funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
Under the above-quoted provision, the third-party
claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or right
to the possession of the property levied, and serve the
same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof
to the judgment creditor. This remedy is known as
terceria.
The officer shall not be bound to keep the property,
unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a
sum not less than the value of the property levied on.
An action for damages may be brought against the
officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond. The same section also
provides that a third-party claimant may file a proper
action to vindicate his claim to the levied property.
The proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have
for its object the recovery of ownership or possession
of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure
and detention thereof despite the third party claim and
it may be brought against the sheriff and such other
parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in
the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such
as the judgment creditor himself. If instituted by a
stranger to the suit in which execution has issued, such
proper action should be a totally separate and distinct
action from the former suit.21
In this case, petitioner had filed an affidavit of third-
party claim with the sheriff and a motion for issuance
of status quo  order with the RTC to prevent the sale of
the levied properties at public auction, nullification of
the levy and restoration of the subject properties to it,
which were denied by the RTC and, consequently, the
sheriff was directed to proceed with the
implementation of the issued writ of execution.
The RTC denied the third-party claim as follows:
As to the third-party claim by movant PSALM, this
Court also resolves to deny the same for lack of merit.
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
xxx
In this present case, aside from serving said affidavit
of third-party claim to the Sheriff of this Court,
claimant PSALM also filed this instant motion for
issuance of status quo order to prevent the sale of the
levied properties at public auction, nullification of the
levy and restoration of the subject properties in the
possession of PSALM. In effect, instead of the Sheriff
requiring the plaintiff-obligee to file an indemnity
bond, the Court is constrained to resolve the merit of
the third-party claim filed by PSALM.
However, it must be emphasized that the resolution of
this Court is limited only to a determination of
whether the Sheriff acted correctly in the performance
of his duties. It cannot pass upon the question of title
to the property, with any character of finality. It only
treats of that matter in so far as may be necessary to
decide if the sheriff acted correctly or not.
After giving an opportunity to vindicate their claim
and after a judicious examination of the arguments
posed by all of the parties, this Court finds that
PSALM has not been able to satisfactorily establish
their claim of ownership over the subject properties.
First, claimant PSALM has not presented sufficient
proof of ownership over the said levied
properties.1âwphi1 It merely claimed that the subject
properties were transferred by operation of law in
view of the passage of EPIRA in 2001. It did not
submit any document evidencing ownership. It even
failed to present any document that the levied property
is among those included in the inventoried property of
PSALM. The doctrine of "Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non qui negat" or "He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove" is applicable in this present case.
Second, a careful perusal of EPIRA, particularly
Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56, in relation to Section 1 of
Rule 21 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
would show that ownership of NPC's assets, herein
levied properties included, is not ipso jure or by
operation of law as there is the need to execute certain
documents evidencing transfer of ownership and
possession. This Court agrees with the plaintiff-
appellee that these documents are conditions precedent
that are needed to be performed and executed in order
to have a valid transfer.
Section 1, Rule 21 of the IRR provides:
NPC and PSALM shall take such measures and
execute such documents to effect the transfer of
ownership and possession of all assets, rights and
privileges, liabilities required by the Act to be
transferred by NPC to PSALM.
Third, even if the transfer is by operation of law, it
would be an injustice and inequitable, to say the least,
to interpret the aforesaid provision as to effect the
transfer only of the assets and properties of NPC but
not its obligation and liabilities. The assets and
properties transferred should also account for the
liabilities and obligations incurred by NPC. In fact,
Section 49 of the said law explicitly states that
PSALM should not only assume and take ownership
of all existing NPC generations assets, liabilities and
IPP contracts, real estate and other disposable assets.
In the instant case, plaintiff Maunlad Homes, Inc. is
already on the stage of reaping the fruits of its labor
after it had judiciously battled the case with the
court a quo and this Court. Injustice is manifest if they
would not be awarded what is due them merely on the
ground of technicalities and evasive measures
undertaken by its adversary.22
In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,23 We held that for the
remedy of terceria to prosper, the claim of ownership
or right of possession to the levied property by the
third-party claimant must first be unmistakably
established, thus:
x x x A third person whose property was seized by a
sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment
debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court
which authorized such execution. Upon due
application by the third person and after summary
hearing, the court may command that the property be
released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in
these instances, however, is limited to a determination
of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in
the performance of his duties in the execution of
judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken
hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor.
The court does not and cannot pass upon the question
of title to the property, with any character of
finality.1âwphi1 It can treat of the matter only insofar
as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the
property to the claimant's possession if warranted by
the evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not
persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of
possession thereto, the claim will be denied.24
Independent of the above-stated recourse, a third-party
claimant may also avail of the remedy known
as "terceria,  " provided in Section 17, Rule 39, by
serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of
his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor.
The officer shall not be bound to keep the property,
unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand
of the officer, indemnifies the officer against such
claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of
the property levied on. An action for damages may be
brought against the sheriff within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the filing of the bond.
The aforesaid remedies are nevertheless without
prejudice to "any proper action" that a third-party
claimant may deem suitable to vindicate "his claim to
the property." Such a "proper action" is, obviously,
entirely distinct from that explicitly prescribed in
Section 17 of Rule 39, which is an action for damages
brought by a third-party claimant against the officer
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
the filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of the
property subject of the "terceria."
Since the RTC denied the third-party claim for failure
of petitioner to satisfactorily establish its claim of
ownership over the subject properties, the latter filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing such
denial and claimed that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA for
being a wrong remedy.
We affirm the dismissal.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court may be filed when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. An adequate remedy has been defined
as a remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in
the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of
the lower court complained of in
the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior
court or tribunal.25
Notably, petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its
third-party claim since it is not one of the parties in the
action where the writ of execution was issued,26 as the
unlawful detainer case was between respondent and
the NPC. Also, the denial of the third-party claim is
not appealable as provided under the above-quoted
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court since the
remedy of a third party claimant is to file a separate
and independent action to vindicate his claim of
ownership or right of possession of the levied
properties against the judgment creditor or the
purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. It
is in this separate and independent action that the issue
of the third-party claimant's title to the levied
properties can be resolved with finality.
In Queblar v. Garduno,27 we declared:
The appeal interposed by the third-party claimant-
appellant is improper, because she was not one of the
parties in the action who were exclusively Venancio
Queblar as plaintiff and Leonardo Garduno as
defendant. Considering the provisions of said section
451 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 4108,28 the appealed order was not appealable.
The appeal that should have been interposed by her, if
the term "appeal" may properly be employed, is a
separate reinvidicatory action against the execution
creditor or the purchaser of her property after the sale
at public auction, or a complaint for damages to be
charged against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the sheriff.29
Hence, petitioner's claim in their jurisdictional
allegations in its petition for certiorari filed with the
CA that it was constrained to file the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to protect its rights and
interest over the subject properties because of the
absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, is
contradicted by the procedure laid down under Section
16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party claimant may file an
independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership
to the levied property. Where a specific remedy has
been laid down by our rules for the protection or
enforcement of rights, the same should be resorted to.
In Solidum v. CA,30 We held:
We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a
third-party claim. In the case of Northern Motors, Inc.
v. Coquia, the petitioner filed, among others, a third-
party claim which was denied by the respondent judge
in the disputed resolution. Northern Motors, Inc.
thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the
resolution and order of the respondent judge. In
resolving whether the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's third-
party claim, the Court held:
Pursuant to [Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court], a third-party claimant has two remedies,
such as, an action for damages against the sheriff to be
brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond,
and a separate and independent action to vindicate his
claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's
and intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be
unavailing because of the disputed order of the
respondent Judge canceling the indemnity bond. Such
an order as well as the order denying a motion to
reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the
third-party claims. What then would the remedy be of
the third-party claimants?
In the recent case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, xxx this
Court (First Division), thru Mr. Justice Makasiar,
ruled:
From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the
attachment caused to be levied by a creditor, neither
an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a
separate and independent action to determine the
ownership of the attached property or to file a
complaint for damages chargeable against the bond
filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the
provincial sheriff.
In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court,
thru Mr. Justice Concepcion, later Chief Justice, in
denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the
order of the lower court quashing the third-party claim
of a chattel mortgagee, held:
Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein
shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to
the property by any proper action." Neither does the
order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the
opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by
appropriate proceedings. In short, he has another
"plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law," and, hence is not entitled either to a
writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.
The Court further held that since the third-party
claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he
could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order
denying its claim, but should file a separate
reinvidicatory action against the execution creditor or
a complaint for damages against the bond filed by the
judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The rights of
a third-party claimant should be decided in a separate
action to be instituted by the third person. In fine, the
appeal that should be interposed, if the term appeal
may be properly employed, is a separate reinvidicatory
action against the execution creditor or complaint for
damages to be charged against the bond filed by the
judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.31
And in such separate action, the court may issue a writ
of preliminary injunction against the sheriff enjoining
him from proceeding with the execution sale,32 which
is a speedy and adequate remedy to immediately
relieve petitioner from the adverse effects of the lower
court's judgment.
Thus, the CA did not err in saying that Section 16 of
Rule 39 provides a more expeditious and
encompassing recourse from the denial of its third-
party claim.
Considering our foregoing discussions, We need not
address the other issues raised by petitioner regarding
its right to ownership and possession of the levied
properties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated
December 10, 2014 issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 118302 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO,
represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G.
CABALLERO, Respondents.
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the
registered owner of a residential lot designated as Lot
No. 3355, Ts-268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of
the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, containing an area
of 800 square meters and situated at Rizal Street,
Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a
residential/commercial building consisting of two (2)
stories.
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia
Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of
₱20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note.
Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate
mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the afore-
stated property as security.
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with
the GSIS. Hence, on January 20, 1973, the mortgage
covering the subject property was foreclosed, and on
March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a public auction
where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount
of ₱36,283.00. For failure of Fernando to redeem the
said property within
the designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership on September 5, 1975.
Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the name of
petitioner.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to
Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title
in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental
in view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the
subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that he
be allowed to repurchase the same through partial
payments. Negotiation as to the repurchase by
Fernando of the subject property went on for several
years, but no agreement was reached between the
parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject
property for public bidding. On the scheduled date of
bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn Caballero,
submitted a bid in the amount of ₱350,000.00, while
Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC)
submitted a bid in the amount of ₱450,000.00. Since
CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the
subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199
confirming the award of the subject property to CMTC
for a total consideration of ₱450,000.00.
Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
between petitioner and CMTC on July 27, 1989,
transferring the subject property to CMTC.
Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the name of GSIS
was cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in
the name of CMTC.
Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his
daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan,
Cotabato a Complaint3 against CMTC, the GSIS and
its responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of
Kidapawan, Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among
others, that judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS
Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16,
1989, null and void; declaring the Deed of Absolute
Sale between petitioner and CMTC null and void ab
initio; declaring TCT No. 76183 of the Register of
Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and
void ab initio; declaring the bid made by Fernando in
the amount of ₱350,000.00 for the repurchase of his
property as the winning bid; and ordering petitioner to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the subject
property in favor of Fernando. He also prayed for
payment of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were
irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC
misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino
citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior
authority from its board of directors in an appropriate
board resolution to participate in the bidding. The
corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or
invest its funds for purposes other than its primary
purpose. Fernando further alleged that the GSIS
allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said
corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also
disregarded Fernando's prior right to buy back his
family home and lot in violation of the laws. The
Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with abuse of
power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor
of CMTC without requiring the CMTC to submit its
supporting papers as required by the law.
Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.4 The GSIS
alleged that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He
was given the chance to repurchase the property;
however, he did not avail of such option compelling
the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding
as mandated by law. There is also no "prior right to
buy back" that can be exercised by Fernando. Further,
it averred that the articles of incorporation and other
papers of CMTC were all in order. In its counterclaim,
petitioner alleged that Fernando owed petitioner the
sum of ₱130,365.81, representing back rentals,
including additional interests from January 1973 to
February 1987, and the additional amount of
₱249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected
from Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to
February 1988.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision5 dated September
27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted
petitioner's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of
₱249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by
Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment
which was not turned over to petitioner, which was
entitled to receive the rent from the date of the
consolidation of its ownership over the subject
property.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S FAILURE
TO PAY THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES
RESULTS INTO THE DISMISSAL OF ITS
CLAIM
RULING:
YES
In their Memorandum, respondents’ claim that CMTC
cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in any
purpose other than its primary purpose for which it
was organized in the absence of a corporate board
resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and
TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC,
should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding
that GSIS personnel have regularly performed their
official duty when they conducted the public bidding;
Fernando, as former owner of the subject property and
former member of the GSIS, has the preemptive right
to repurchase the foreclosed property.
These additional averments cannot be taken
cognizance by the Court, because they were
substantially respondents’ arguments in their petition
for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and
docketed as G.R. No. 156609. Records show that said
petition was denied by the Court in a
Resolution9 dated April 23, 2003, for petitioners’
(respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that
the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by
this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.10 Said resolution became final and
executory on June 9, 2003.11 Respondents’ attempt to
re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved
with finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot
be allowed.
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner
submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected
by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim in the original action of
Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid
award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that
petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure
to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the
dismissal of its claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, the Court has devised the following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim
and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
that the counterclaim is compulsory.12
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court
agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's
counterclaim for the recovery of the amount
representing rentals collected by Fernando from the
CMTC is permissive.

The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the
annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and
TCT is different from that required to establish
petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity
of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in
favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in
the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to
receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject
property when petitioner became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the consolidation of
ownership of the property in its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant
is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.13 This,
petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim
for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket
fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by
the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC,
is considered null and void. Any decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.14
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its
counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has
jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering
petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees,15 the Court ruled that the
provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39
of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from "all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds," cannot operate to exempt it from the payment
of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the
1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.
Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any
of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of
legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily
fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for
the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court's independence − fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and
authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,
including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule
141 have two basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance
for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare
the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore
do not only constitute a vital source of the Court's
financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by
Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm
for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy
and erodes its independence.
Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion,16 where the Court held
that:
xxxx
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,17 the Court, in
interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion regarding awards of
claims not specified in the pleading, held that the same
refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading should be specified. While it is true that the
determination of certain damages as exemplary or
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of
the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of
which the court may make a proper determination, and
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket
fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to
the amount thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1

Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by

Fernando from the CMTC did not arise after the filing
of the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun
Insurance  finds no application in the present case.

Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's

counterclaim, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no need to
discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision and the Resolution, dated December 17,
2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.