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BHĀVAVIVEKA'S "PRAJÑĀPRADĪPA": A Translation of Chapter One: 'EXAMINATION OF
CAUSAL CONDITIONS' ("PRATYAYA") Part Two

Author(s): WILLIAM L. AMES
Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 2 (JUNE 1994), pp. 93-135
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23446124
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BHÀVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADI'PA
A Translation of Chapter One:

'EXAMINATION OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS' (PRATYAYA)
by
WILLIAM L. AMES
Part Two*
Objection: Now [our] fellow Buddhists1 say:
There are four causal conditions: the cause (hetu); the object of
cognition (àrambana/àlambana); the immediately preceding
([saw] anantara);
As well as the dominant (àdhipateya/adhipati). [MMK 1—2abc]
[The opponent continues:] The Teacher [i.e., the Buddha] has said
in [both] the sütras and the treatises of abhidharma2 [that there are
only these four causal conditions] in [our] own and others' systems
(,gzhung lugs, mata or samaya), as well as [in] the heavens and [on] the
surface of the earth.
There is no fifth causal condition. [MMK 1—2d]
[The opponent continues:] The causal conditions imagined by

another school,3 [namely,] what has arisen before, presence, and
absence, are also included in just these [four].
As to that, the causal condition [which is] the cause (hetu-pratyaya)
[consists of] the five [types of] cause [known as] the simultaneously
arisen (sahabhü), the similar (sabhàga), the conjoined (samprayukta),
the universal (sarvatraga), and [the cause of] maturation (vipàka).4 The
causal condition [which is] the object of cognition (álambana-pratyaya)
[consists of] all dharmas.5 The immediately preceding causal condition
* Part One appeared in Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 209—259 of this journal.
Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 93—135, 1994.

© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
94 WILLIAM L. AMES
(samanantara-pratyaya) consists of [all]

factors (caitta) which have originated, e
mental factors of an Arhat].6 The dom
pratyaya) is the nonobstructing cause (
[We] maintain that [results] originate
conditions], which are different [from
tion, the author of [this] treatise [i.e.,
1—la] that entities do not originate fro
will be in conflict with what [he himse
bàdha).9
Answer: Therefore [Nâgârjuna] says:
The intrinsic nature of entities (bhàva) does not exist in [their]

causal conditions, etc. [MMK 1—3ab]
"Of entities" [means] "of the eye and so on." "Intrinsic nature"
[means] "[its] own self" (rang gi bdag nyid, probably svàtman). "In
[their] causal conditions, etc.," [means] "in semen and blood, etc."10
The use of the word "etc." includes other [alleged causes] also, such as
the totality ( tshogs, probably sàmagrî) [of causes and'conditions], the
Lord, and so on. "Does not exist" is the negation.
Because that [intrinsic nature of the result] does not exist [in them],
from what11 will those causal conditions be different? Even if that
[intrinsic nature] existed, it would not originate from those [causal
conditions different from it], because of the conflict with inference
(anumàna-bâdha) which [we] have stated.12 [Therefore] there will be
no conflict with that [teaching which you have cited].13
Objection: Some14 who arbitrarily15 suppose that the meaning of
our proof is false say: We do not specify that entities just originate
from [anything] other. Rather, we specify that that which originates,
[originates] just from another, but not from itself. Therefore, though
there is a difference [of the result] from [things] which are not [its]
causal conditions (apratyaya), [the result] does not originate [from
them].16
Answer. As to that, if that statement [of yours] is intended to negate
origination from [the result] itself, it proves what [we] maintain. But if
it is intended to show that [previously] unoriginated [entities] originate
from another, even so, there will be the fault that [we can make] the
BHÀVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADI'PA 95
same objection (paryanuyoga)17 [as before]. Therefore th

[logically] possible. But if [that statement of yours,] "[En
just originate from [anything] other," negates the originatio
result] different from that [causal condition], it establishes
example.18
Thus that [half-verse, MMK 1—3ab] has stated [the pro
[results,] such as the eye and so on, do not exist in [thei
conditions, such as semen and blood, etc.; and [it has al
property that the causal conditions of the eye and so on
empty of those [results, the eyè and so on].19
If [entities'] own nature (bdag gi dngos po, svabhàva) d

the nature of another (gzhan gyi dngos po, parabháv
exist. [MMK 1—3cd]
[That is,] if [entities'] own nature does not exist in [the

conditions, etc. "The nature of another" [means] "arising
others."20 "Arising" ('byung ba) [means] "origination" (sk
does not exist in the causal conditions.21 That [half-vers
1—3cd] has stated the meaning to be proved (sádhya-ar
Thus here also, as before, the example is manifest. The
making the result and the causal conditions the subject [
will be two syllogisms:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the ayatañas, the eye and so
originate from causal conditions such as semen and blo
[Reason:] because they do not exist in those [causal cond
[Example:] just as a jar [does not exist in semen and blo
does not originate from them.]
Likewise,
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, causal conditions such as semen and blood
do not produce the áyatanas, the eye and so on,
[Reason:] because they are empty of those [áyatanas],
[Example:] just as a loom and so on [are empty of the áyatanas and so
do not produce them].
Therefore one should understand that the Blessed One declared
that in ultimate reality, entities do not originate from the four causal
conditions, the cause (hetu) and so on. One [also] should understand
that [the Blessed One] declared the [four] causal conditions — the
96 WILLIAM L. AMES
cause, the object of cognition, the i

dominant — in order to teach the c
compassion (anukampà) for persons
doctrines of no cause and [doctrine
spond [to their alleged results].22 Th
with what [we ourselves] accept.23
Alternatively, [MMK 1—3] may be
This [verse] is also to be examined
teach that entities originate from an
Objection: Here,
There are four causal conditions: t

the immediately preceding;
As well as the dominant. [MMK 1—
[We] maintain that those [causal con

causal conditions] which are differe
imagined by other [Buddhist] schoo
etc., are, in fact (laksanena), also in
fore it is stated definitively that,
There is no fifth causal condition
Answer: In ultimate reality, it is n

[causal conditions] are indeed differ
Therefore [Nâgàijuna] says:
The intrinsic nature of entities doe

conditions, etc. [MMK 1—3ab]
"Of entities" [means] "of inner, sub

"Intrinsic nature" [means] "[its] own
etc.," [means,] to begin with, "in [t
conditions." By the word, "etc.," it
common and special causes and con
not exist" means "is nonexistent." W
exist]? Prior to [its own] origination
ultimate reality.
If [entities'] own nature does not e

not exist. [MMK 1—3cd]
BHÂVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADÍPA 97
That very own nature [of entities], which is about to ori

does not [yet] exist. [In that case,] how will [those entit
conditions have the nature of another, [that is,] othern
that otherness simply (eva) does not exist, because the
of [other]ness is absent.29
Objection:30 Bearing in mind the entity which is about t
those causal conditions are different. [That is, they are
virtue of relation [to the entity about to arise].
Objection:32 [The causal conditions are different] bec
possess [the guna] "difference" (paratva).
Answer. If one [thus] designates [difference], that is
tional designation (vyavahâra); and those [causal condit
have the nature of another.33 Therefore one should not be attached to
this [notion]. Though difference exists conventionally, it was shown
previously that in ultimate reality, there is no origination from that.
Objection: The Sâmkhyas34 make a rebuttal: We accept that the
intrinsic nature of an entity does indeed exist in [its] causal conditions
as a subtle nature (cha phra ba'i bdag nyid du),35 and that that is also
made manifest later. Thus even though the result is not manifest, it is
established that the causal conditions are different [from the result].
Therefore that [argument of yours] does no harm [to our position].36
Answer: That is not good, [1] because it is difficult to show the
subtle nature of [things] which are commonly known in the world,
such as jars, etc.,37 and [2] because [we] have already given [our]
answer to [your theory of] manifestation.
Objection: Others among the Sâmkhyas38 say: If [you] prove that a
result does not originate from causal conditions, different [from it],
which are empty of the potentiality for [that] result, [you merely]
establish what is [already] established [for us]. But if [you] say that
origination simply does not exist, [you] have [thereby] accepted the
doctrine of eternality (kútasthaváda).39 Therefore [you will be in]
conflict with [your own] previous position.
Answer. That is not good, because [we] negate origination in every
way.40 [Entities] are also not eternal, because [we] do not accept that
an unoriginated entity exists even conventionally.
Objection: Others41 say: The causal conditions alone do not
produce the result. For [we] maintain that the activity (kriyá) of
origination of [visual] cognition (vijñána) produces that [cognition],
98 WILLIAM L. AMES
[and that that activity of origination] possesses causal con

(pratyayavatï) by means of the causal conditions [which ar
visible form, light, space, and attention (manasikàra). W
say that that [activity possessing causal conditions] also ex
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the activity of origination of
produces its own result,
[Reason:] because it possesses causal conditions,
[Example:] just as the activity of cooking boiled rice posse
causal conditions of a cooking pot, water, rice, fire, and
Therefore [your] previously stated inferences will be in co
[this] subsequent reasoning (uttara-tarka)42 [of ours].
Answer. Therefore [Nàgàijuna] says:
Activity ( kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MM
In ultimate reality, we do not accept the activity of coo

rice, due to which that [inference of ours] would be in con
[your] subsequent reasoning [using] the stated example.
Alternatively,
Activity {kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MM
[This means that] in ultimate reality, the activity of pro

cognition does not possess causal conditions, because the
of an existent or a nonexistent result will be negated late
1—6]. If that [syllogism of yours] is stated in regard to ultim
[then] because the activity is unoriginated, the meaning of
reason is not established. Even if that is stated in general,
[of your reason] is contradictory. [The fact] that the activ
tion of the nature (bdag nyid, âtman) of cognition posse
conditions, is an object of knowledge (shes pa) in superfic
because of necessary connection (avinàbhàva).43
[Buddhapàlita 's commentary:] Here [Buddhapâlita]44 com
Another [opponent] teaches the origination of entities [as
What use do we have (kho bo cag la ci bya) for this [stat
"Entities originate from themselves or from another, etc"
and so on are the causal conditions of the activity of orig
visual cognition, as, for example, a cooking pot and so on
conditions of the activity of cooking.
BHÁVAVIVEKA'S PR A JÑÁ PR A DlPA 99
[Buddhapàlita continues:] In order to negate that, [Nâgâijuna

this:
Activity (kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1—4a]
[This is so] because the activity of producing cognition is not possible

with respect to a cognition which has [already] originated or one
which has not [yet] originated or one which is [in the process of]
originating.45
[Bhàvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, because
both the former and the latter positions are mere assertions.46
Objection: Here [the opponent], having agreed to47 the meaning of
[our] refutation, says: Since activity is unoriginated, an activity which
possesses causal conditions does not exist. Thus the example [in our
previous syllogism] does not exist. Nevertheless, to begin with, activity
exists. Therefore the inference should be stated according to the way
in which positive concomitance (anvaya) exists [between a reason and
a similar example]:48
[Thesis:] The activity of producing cognition produces its own result,
[Reason:] because it is activity,
[Example:] like the activity of cooking boiled rice.
Answer: Here [Nâgârjuna] says:
An activity which does not possess causal conditions does not exist.
[MMK 1—4b]
An isolated (kevala) activity, not characterized by possessing causal

conditions, also does not exist. Because it is like the previous [syllo
gism], there will be that same fault which [we] have just stated.49
[Gunamati's commentary:] Here [Gunamati]50 states the meaning of
the verse differently: Some [take] the position that the activity of
origination is the nature of cognition (vijñána-átma-bhüta).51 To them,
[Nâgâijuna] says this:
Activity (kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1—4a]
[This is so] because the activity of the origination of cognition, like

cognition, does not exist; therefore an affix (pratyaya) with the
meaning of "possession" is also not [logically] possible in [reference to]
the nonexistent.52
100 WILLIAM L. AMES
[Gunamati continues:] Some [take] th

origination of cognition] is not the na
lished by intrinsic nature.53 To them,
Activity which does not possess cau

[MMK 1—4b]
[This is so] because [the activity] itself does not exist, since it does not
possess causal conditions.
[Bhâvaviveka's critique:] We reply:54 Since the causal conditions
assist each other, [then] in the next (anantara) moment [after that
mutual assistance], the moment in which an activity which is able to
produce a result comes into being (àtma-làbha), produces the entity
which is about to originate.55 [We Màdhyamikas] do not reject [that
process] conventionally. Thus it is not the case that [the activity of
origination] does not exist [conventionally].56 It is also not the case that
an affix with the meaning of "possession" is not [logically] possible
[conventionally]. Since [in Gunamati's explanation] a mere assertion
refutes an opponent's position which is [also] a mere assertion, that
[explanation] is useless (anartha).
Objection: Other proponents of origination make a rebuttal in a
different way:
[Thesis:] [Causal conditions,] the eye and so on, do indeed produce
visual cognition,
[Reason:] because they possess activity,
[Example:] just as a seed, earth, water, fire, air, etc., produce a sprout.
Therefore [your] previously stated inferences will be in conflict with
[this] subsequent reasoning [of ours].
Answer. Here [Nàgârjuna] says:
[Things] which do not possess activity are not causal conditions.

[MMK 1—4c]
Here origination in ultimate reality has been negated. Therefore

since the activity [of origination] does not exist, causal conditions such
as a seed and so on do not possess that [activity]; but [things] which
do not possess activity cannot be causal conditions. Because those are
not established as causal conditions, [your] example is defective; and
[our inference] will not be in conflict with subsequent reasoning.
BHÀVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADÍPA 101
Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain ( 'bru) and so on do indeed
have [the property of] possessing activity,
[Reason:] because it is accepted that it is so in superficial reality.
[Example:] That which is accepted to be a [certain] way in superficial
reality is also like that in ultimate reality. For example, a hare's
horn does not exist [in superficial reality and so does not exist in
ultimate reality, either].
You also accept that in superficial reality, a seed grain and so on
do possess activity. Therefore since the example [in our previous
syllogism] is established, what [we] maintain is established.
Answer. Here [Nâgâijuna] says:
Do [causal conditions] which possess activity exist or [not]?57

[MMK 1—4d]
[The answer,] "no," is [supplied from] the context.58 Nevertheless, it

is not established that causal conditions possess activity, because even
conventionally, it is not established that a hare's horn possesses
activity.59 Because in ultimate reality, it is also not established that a
hare's horn is nonexistent, it is not the case that the stated fault [in
your syllogism] does not exist.60
Objection: The Sâmkhyas make a rebuttal:
[Thesis:] The nonexistence of a hare's horn is indeed an existent entity,
[First reason:] because [the genitive] "of" is indicated and
[Second reason:] because it is [a substantive] to be qualified (visesya),
[Examples:] like visible form and a blue lotus [respectively].61
Answer. That is not good. [This is so] because [your] examples are
defective, since in ultimate reality, existence and [the fact of] being [a
substantive] to be qualified are not established for either visible form
or a blue lotus.
Objection: [The Sâmkhyas62 reply:] We are not able to show you

that visible form and so on exist; [but] likewise you, too, are similarly
unable to show us that visible form and so on do not exist. Therefore
[our] faults are equal.
Answer. It is not so. Since [they] possess nonorigination just
because of the negation of origination, [we] negate the "entityness" [of
visible form and so on];63 and [we] also do not teach the view, which
102 WILLIAM L. AMES
[we] want to abandon, that [visible for

(abhàva-drsti).64 Therefore [we] have n
of the view of entities and [the view o
not similar to [you] who have fallen in
entities and nonentities. [Then] how do
equal? Precisely (eva) because there is
strates entities or nonentities, just wh
lished, since [we] do not wish to prove
not established.65
Alternatively, [one may explain MMK
should ask the proponents of originati
do not possess activity or do possess ac
of the result. As to that, if they maintai
that causal conditions do not possess ac
of the result], in this case [Nâgàijuna]
[Things] which do not possess activity

[MMK 1—4c]
The rest of the sentence is "which pr

which do not possess activity" are emp
the alleged result.
[Thesis:] Those [causal conditions] whic
do not possess the activity of produci
that [result],
[Reason:] because they are empty of th
[Example:] like causal conditions differ
produce the result].68
That has been shown [already].69
But if [the opponent] says that [the c
activity [prior to the origination of th
says:
[Causal conditions] also do [not] posse
"Not" is [supplied from] the context.

the meaning of an alternative. Here on
causal conditions possess activity becau
even that is not maintained in the case of a result which is not about
BHÂVAVLVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADÍPA 103
to originate (utpàda-abhimukhïbhûta).71 Therefore the m

[your] reason ["because they possess activity"]72 is not est
Objection: The Sautrántikas say: Just at the time when
originates, causal conditions which possess activity assist
[and] thus [we] accept that they are causal conditions.73 T
not the case that the meaning of [our] reason ["because t
activity"] is not established, nor is it the case that there
sequent reasoning [which refutes your syllogism].74
Answer: Here [Nàgàijuna] says:
[A result] originates in dependence on (pratïtya) these;

these are said to be (kila) causal conditions. [MMK 1—
A result originates in dependence on these [things] such

grain and so on. Therefore you, at least (kila), maintain t
[things] such as a seed grain and so on are causal conditi
ultimate reality. The use of the word kila here shows tha
[Nàgàijuna] does not maintain [this]. Therefore [Nâgâijuna
As long as [a result] does not originate, how is it that t

nonconditions (apratyaya)! [MMK 1—5cd]
As long as a result does not originate, how is it that the

such as a seed grain and so on are not also noncondition
meaning of the sentence is that these do not possess [the
being conditions. For example, it is like [the rhetorical qu
long as one does not study, how is it that one is not unle
Objection:75 We do not maintain that the causal conditi
causal conditions prior to the origination of the result. Th
[refutation of yours] does no harm [to our position].
Answer: It is not the case that it does no harm. [This is
here the author of [this] treatise [Nàgàijuna] wishes to sho
[you]76 teach that causal conditions are nonconditions pri
origination of the result, they are also nonconditions at t
the result originates. Why?
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on do no
intrinsic nature of causal conditions at the time when th
originates,
104 WILLIAM L. AMES
[Reason:] because they are indescribab

relation to the sprout],77
[Example:] like those very [things, see
moment.
Objection-. In regard to that [negation in MMK 1—lab,] "Entities

do not originate from themselves or another or both," some78 say:
That [negation] establishes what is [already] established [for us], [Thi
is so] because the two, the result and the cause, are also indescribab
as the same or different. Although they are indescribable [as the sam
as or different from the result], those [causal conditions] do indeed
produce the result.
Answer. By this [last syllogism given by Bhâvaviveka], those
[opponents] are also to be refuted in that [same] way.
Objection: The proponents of origination again make a rebuttal:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions of those [inner
àyatañas] do indeed produce the inner àyatanas,
[Reason:] because they are causal conditions,79
[Similar example:] just as [a sprout's causal conditions,] a seed grain
and so on, produce the sprout.
[Dissimilar example:] That which does not produce [a result] does no
have [the property of] being a causal condition, like a hare's horn.
Answer: Here [we] reply: In this case, if [something] is a causal
condition in ultimate reality, it must be [a causal condition] of either
an existent or a nonexistent [result]; [but] it is not logically possible
(rigs pas mi rung) that it is [a causal condition] of either of those.
Therefore [Nâgàrjuna] says:
Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing (artha), is a

causal condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1—6ab]
This [half-verse] sets forth two theses.

As to that, showing how a causal condition of a nonexistent [thing
is not [logically] possible, [Nâgàrjuna says,]
If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condi

tion? [MMK 1—6c]
Here, of what nonexistent [thing], such as a sky-flower and so on,

should one understand a màlu-creeper80 to be a causal condition? T
BHÀVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADlPA 105
meaning of the sentence is that those [ma/w-creepers]

conditions of any [nonexistent thing such as] a sky-flo
horn. That sets forth a similar example.81
If the result does not exist, the property of the causa
that [its] result does not exist; and the property of the
nonexistence.82 Therefore the inference is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on do
intrinsic nature of causal conditions,
[Reason:] because their result does not exist,
[Example:] just as space (nam mkha') [does not have th
nature of a causal condition] because no [result of it
flower (nam mkha'i me tog) exists.
Likewise,
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on are also not causal
conditions of a sprout,
[Reason:] because [the sprout] does not exist,
[Example:] just as a sky-flower [does not exist and so space is not a
causal condition of it].
Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 1—6c as follows:]
Objection: [We] do not maintain that a [totally] nonexistent [thing]
originates; but [we] do maintain that [a thing] which possesses origina
tion (utpattimat) originates, because it does not exist before [its
origination].83
Answer: To them, [Nàgàrjuna] replies:
If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condi

tion? [MMK 1—6c]
Even if [the nonexistence of which you speak] is the nonexistence

of a jar, a cloth, a grass hut, and so on, having the defining charac
teristic of nonexistence prior to origination [rather than absolute
nonexistence], [nevertheless we still ask,] of what nonexistent [thing]
are a seed grain and so on held to be causal conditions? The meaning
of the sentence is that [they] are not [causal conditions] of anything.84
Therefore, again, one can make that understood [by the following
syllogism:]
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on are not causal
conditions of a sprout,
106 WILLIAM L. AMES
[Reason:] because [the sprout] does not

[Example:] like a jar and so on.
Also, as to the second case [namely, a
existent thing],
If it does exist, what is the use of a
The idea is that even if [the result] do

[Thesis:] One does not maintain even c
and so on are causal conditions for a s
self,
[Reason:] because [that sprout] does not require (bltos pa) an activity
of origination,
[Example:] like that very [sprout when it has already] originated or
[like something] different [which has already originated] such as a
jar and so on.85
Therefore the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last
syllogism, "because they are causal conditions,"] is not established.
Objection: [Some] among the Sâmkhyas86 say: Because that [result]
which exists [already] is made manifest by causal conditions and
because it is made tangible (sthüla) [by them], [therefore] that [state
ment of yours,]
If it does exist, what is the use of a causal condition? [MMK 1—6d]
is not [logically] possible.

Answer: Because their [theory of] manifestation has been rejected
[already] and also because tangibility will have the faults stated for an
existent and a nonexistent [result],87 [therefore] that [argument of
theirs] is worthless.
Objection: The Sautràntikas say: It is true that
Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing, is a causal

condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1—6ab]
Nevertheless, when the result is about to originate (utpáda-abhimukha),

[its] causal conditions attain the nature (àtma-làbha) of being able to
produce the result in dependence on [their own] mutual assistance;
[and we] accept that [those] are causal conditions in ultimate reality.
At that time, it is not the case that the result does not exist, because it
BHÂVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADÍPA 107
is [in the process of] originating (utpadyamàna); but it

that it does exist, because it has not [yet] originated (a
Therefore the proof which [you] have stated does no h
position.
Answer. To that hypothesis (kalpanà), also, [Nàgàijuna replies,]
A causal condition is not [logically] possible for a thing which is

neither nonexistent nor existent.88 [MMK 1—6ab]
The idea is that [this is so] because [a result] which cannot be

described as existent or nonexistent is of neither kind [i.e., neither
existent nor nonexistent] like [something which is also in the process
of originating but which is] different from that [result].89 Here that
which is held to be indescribable as existent or nonexistent is neither
existent nor nonexistent; therefore,
[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, those [alleged
causal conditions such as] the eye and so on, are not causal
conditions of those [alleged results, such as] visual cognition and a
sprout,
[Reason:] because the result of those [alleged causal conditions] cannot
be described as existent or nonexistent,
[Example:] like [a result] different from that [alleged result].
Therefore that [objection of yours] is not an answer [to our arguments].
It is also established that conventionally, an entity which is free
from the intrinsic nature of existence and so on, originates.90
Objection: The proponents of both [existence and nonexistence]91
say: We accept that there are causal conditions of a result which is
[both] existent and nonexistent. Therefore the faults which [you] have
stated do not exist [for our position].
Answer. Because the doctrine of both [existence and nonexistence]
has been rejected by means of the proofs shown in both cases [sepa
rately],92 those [proponents of both] should also not be encouraged
(dbugs mi phyin).
Thus to begin with, having demonstrated the negation of causal
conditions in general, one [now] desires [to show] the form (mam pa)
of the negation of those [causal conditions] individually; therefore the
following is said: First of all, with regard to the causal condition
[which is] the cause (hetu-pratyaya), although here the causal condi
108 WILLIAM L. AMES
tions are similar [in being conditions for

that causal condition which produces [th
held to be the causal condition [in partic
Objection: Well, since the origination o
is dependent on the totality [of causes an
not any one condition alone.
Answer: Because origination has been n
impossibility of that [causal condition w
less, having accepted the definition (ma
of a conventional cause, we will explain h
[supposed] ultimately real cause is a cause
Here the cause is as follows: It is maint
result] which is either existent nor nonex
nonexistent. As to that,
When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existent
nonexistent dharma is brought about, [MMK 1—7ab]
Then in ultimate reality,
How is the cause "that which brings about" (nirvartaka)? [MMK

1—7c]
That [alleged cause] simply does not bring about [the result]. The
idea is that [this is so] [1] because [if the cause brings about an existent
or a nonexistent result,] there will be a conflict with inference since
[the result] exists [already], like [the cause] itself, or since it does not
[yet] exist, like another [result], and [2] because [if the cause brings
about a result which is both existent and nonexistent,] there will be the
faults of both positions.95
Thus because it is not possible that the [supposed] cause is a cause,
that [origination of the result] is also not possible.96 That a [supposed]
cause is a cause is shown by [its] bringing about [the result] to be
produced; but [in ultimate reality,] it does not bring about [a result]
with a nature having the defining characteristic of existence and so on.
Therefore it is established that the origination of the caused from the
cause is conventional, and that the cause is also just like that [i.e., it is
conventional].
Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 1—7 as follows:]
Objection: [Our] fellow Buddhists97 again make a rebutt

[Thesis:] [Causal conditions,] the cause and so on, which
inner àyatañas, do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because the Tathàgata has so taught.
[Example:] That which has been taught by the Tathàgata i
example, that nirvana is peace (sànta).98
[Application:] Likewise, the Blessed One has also taught t
(hetu) is that which brings about [the result]; the object
(iàlambana) is the object of cognition of mind (citta) and
factors (caitta); the immediately preceding (samanantar
condition] is the mind and mental factors which have ju
except for the last [mind and mental factors of an Arha
dominant (adhipati) [causal condition] is [the condition s
something arises when that exists.
[Conclusion:] Thus since the causal conditions, the cause
exist with the intrinsic nature of causal conditions, [our
["because the Tathàgata has so taught"] is established; an
which [we] maintain will not be lost.100
Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because [we] acc
[the four causal conditions are] so in superficial reality an
have [already] answered by stating a fault in [your] examp
Again, one should raise an objection in the form of a qu
(brgal zhing brtag par by a):102 Here what is the intended
your reason? Is it "because the Tathàgata has so taught" as
reality, or because he has [so] taught as ultimate reality?
ficial reality, the meaning is not established for yourselve
ultimate reality, [Nàgàrjuna replies:]
nonexistent dharma is brought about, [MMK 1—7ab]

Then because a causal condition of a result which is existent or
nonexistent or has the nature of both, has been rejected,
How is the cause "that which brings about"? That being so, [a
cause] is not possible.103 [MMK 1—7cd]
The meaning of the sentence is that that is simply not a cause

which brings about [a result]. Therefore because in ultimate reality,
110 WILLIAM L. AMES
[the result] which is to be brought abo

[it] about are not established, [then eith
[in the opponent's last syllogism] is no
meaning is contradictory.104
[Devasarman's commentary-]105 In th
lack of intrinsic nature [in things] sho
method [in which] one does not set up
own].106 In that [Madhyamaka teachin
negation: attachment to the [verbal] ex
is expressed.107 In that connection, att
has been negated by the negation of or
way of negating attachment to the [ve
the following:
nonexistent dharma is brought about,

How is the cause "that which brings about"? That being so, [a
cause] is not possible. [MMK 1—7]
[Devasarman continues:] Here the meaning in brief [is the follow

ing:] It is maintained to be a cause because it brings about [a result];
but that is also not possible for a result which is existent or non
existent or has the nature of both. Thus there is no reason (byed rgyu,
kàrana) for the use of the expression "cause" (hetu).10S Therefore
since it is not [logically] possible that the [supposed] cause is a cause,
that [argument] which [you] have stated, "entities do indeed originate
because [their] cause exists," is not established.109
[Buddhapàlita's commentary.] [Buddhapàlita]110 says: [You, the
opponent,] have stated that in ultimate reality, entities do indeed
originate, because [their] cause exists; [but] since an entity which is
existent or nonexistent or has the nature of both is not brought about,
the defining characteristic of a cause is not possible. Thus the meaning
of [your] reason is not established.111
\Bhâvaviveka's critique:] That [explanation] is not good, because
[we] have [already] answered [it].112
Thus to begin with, it is not [logically] possible that the causal
condition [which is] the cause is [in fact] a causal condition. Now
[Nàgàijuna] will examine how it is also not [logically] possible that the
causal condition [which is] the object of cognition is [in

condition.
It is taught that this dharma which is [without an object of cogni

tion]113 is indeed without an object of cognition. [MMK 1—8ab]
In [that half-verse], "is" (yin pa — san) has the meaning of "being

[such-and-such]" (gyur pa, probably bhüta). A dharma [is so-called]
because it bears its own defining characteristic.114 [The word] "this"
(ayam) indicates [the six cognitions,] visual cognition and so on, which
one has borne in mind (bio la bzhag pa). "Objects of cognition"
(àrambanaJàlambana) are those [objects] which are to be apprehended
(dmigs par bya ba). "Object of cognition" means "object to be grasped
[by a subject]" (gràhya). "[It is taught] that it is indeed without an
object of cognition" [means] "[it is taught] as having no object of
cognition."115
Why do [visual cognition and so on] have no objects of cognition?
Because the origination of those [cognitions] in ultimate reality has
been negated. [This is true not only of cognitions which have already
originated and those which have not yet originated, but also of
cognitions which are in the process of originating, because:]116
[Thesis:] [Cognitions] which are [in the process of] originating also
have no object of cognition,
[Reason:] because they are [in the process of] originating,
[Example:] like visible form.
Therefore, in that way, it is taught that this dharma which is [without
an object of cognition] is indeed without an object of cognition.
[Visual cognition and so on are said to] "have an object of cogni
tion" (sdlambana) in order to set forth the system of conventional
truth.117 When [a cognition] originates by means of some object of
cognition, it originates having the appearance of that [object of
cognition]. Therefore [it is said to] "have an object of cognition;" but it
is not [so called] because of a simultaneous connection, like [the one
between] a wealthy person [and his wealth].118
Therefore [Nâgàrjuna says,]
If a dharma is thus119 without an object of cognition . . . [MMK

1—8c]
112 WILLIAM L. AMES
[This is so] because in ultimate realit

hends [the object] does not exist.
Some120 have imagined that there
nonapprehending [cognition]. Since [
How could an object of cognition e
Here the meaning of the sentence i

simply does not exist. It is like [the
one who commits [a misdeed] of imm
have a realization (abhisamaya) [of t
being so, the meaning of that very r
not established or contradictory.
Objection: Others123 also make [the
[which alleges] that the alternatives
[you have said,] "Visible form has no
is included in the aggregate of matte
the [abhidharma] treatises, too, it is
have no object of cognition? Matter
mind and mental factors have no ob
possible, since [you] accept that stat
"What are the dharmas which have a
as follows: mind and mental factors."12
Answer. That is not [logically] poss
establish [our] example.
Objection: [We] say that the fact th
depending on the elements (bhautik
matter, cognition does have an objec
Answer. Even so, [that is not logic
example [of something which is not
of cognition].126
Objection: The object (artha) of th
factors] is [as follows:] "The object t
(grâhya) is the object of cognition (
Answer: Even if [you] suppose so, [
because [later we] will negate the ob
mental events. [We will do so] becau
BHÁVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADlPA 113
been stated,128 it is not accepted that cognition apprehen

in ultimate reality.
The Blessed One, also, has said [in the Suvikràntavikrà
pariprcchá-sütra\,n9 "Moreover, Suvikràntavikràmin, wh
bodhisattva practices in that way, he does not apprehen
matter. He does not apprehend [anything], up to and inc
possession of enlightenment.130 Why is that? Suvikràntav
dharmas have no object of cognition, because dharmas d
any grasping (grahana) in which they could have an objec
cognition.131
"For, Suvikràntavikràmin, matter is not the [cognition] domain
(,gocara) of matter, up to cognition is also not the [cognitive] domain
(gocara) of cognition.132 Suvikràntavikràmin, because it is not a
[cognitive] domain (agocara), matter does not know (samjànïte), does
not see matter; up to cognition, also, does not know, does not see
cognition. This which is the not knowing, the not seeing of matter,
feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is
the perfection of discernment."133
Thus the causal condition [which is] the object of cognition has also
been examined.134 Now, since the [next] topic is the immediately
preceding causal condition, that will be examined. Here because in
ultimate reality, all dharmas have been negated in every way,135
[Nàgàijuna] has shown that all dharmas are unoriginated. Therefore,
[he says,]
If dharmas are unoriginated, [their] cessation is not possible. [MMK

1—9ab]
This is so [because they are unoriginated, just as the cessation of a

[nonexistent] second head [is not possible].
What follows from that?136
Therefore the immediately preceding is not [logically] possible.

[MMK 1—9c]
[That is, the immediately preceding causal condition is not possible] in

ultimate reality. Therefore that same [reason] will have [either] an
unestablished meaning or a contradictory meaning.137
114 WILLIAM L. AMES
Alternatively, even if origination is

tionally], one should explain [how the
condition is not possible in ultimate r
preceding [causal condition] is as follo
and mental factors which has [just] ce
immediately preceding causal conditio
events of the next moment]; but
[Thesis:] It is not [logically] possible th
mental factors which has just ceased
the group which is about to originate
[Reason:] because it has [already] ceas
[Examples:] like a cognition which ce
[which has ceased].139
As to that, [Nàgàijuna says,]
Also, if it has ceased, what is the ca
The idea is that it is simply not poss

condition, because what has ceased ca
about to originate. The word "also" (c
[both] negations, [namely,] that [what
preceding causal condition and that i
general.
Objection: When an entity is [in the process of] originating by
virtue of specific (pratiniyata) causes and conditions, that which is [in
the process of] ceasing assists [it] by making room [for it];140 and if it
is not obstructed by past moments other than that, [then the next
moment of mind does originate]. Therefore since it is established that
[the moment of mind which is in the process of ceasing] is an imme
diately preceding causal condition, there is no fault [in our position].
Answer: Immaterial (arüpin) [dharmas] do not exist in a place;141
and the "mental organ" {manas) which has just ceased [and not the
one which is in the process of ceasing], is the [alleged] causal condi
tion. As it is said [in the Abhidharmakosa],
Of the six [types of cognition], that cognition which has just ceased
is the "mental organ" (manas).142 [AK 1—17ab]
Therefore [that] answer [of yours] is not [logically] po

Even if [you] suppose that that which is [in the pro
is a causal condition, some143 say that because [that w
is simultaneous [with that which is originating], it can
immediately preceding causal condition.
[Buddhapâlita's commentary:] [Buddhapàlita]144 com
latter half of the verse,
Therefore the immediately preceding is not [logical

Also, if it has ceased, what is the causal condition
1—9cd]
is also stated in regard to the unoriginated. [That is,] the word "also"
(ca) should be seen here as referring to the unoriginated [result]. Since
a seed which has ceased and a sprout which has not [yet] originated
are both nonexistent, it follows that both the cessation of the seed and
the origination of the sprout would be without cause.145
[Bhâvaviveka's critique:] That is not good. If one accepts that
meaning [for MMK 1—9cd, then the following difficulty will occur:]
Since the cessation of what has ceased has no cause, if one supposes
that [the result] which is about to originate originates from that [cause]
which does not remain [when the result originates], [then] cessation
and origination would both be without cause. But by reversing [that
argument], the stated fault [of causelessness] does not exist. Then,
because it is a prasañga-argument,146 the meaning of a statement with
a reversed [property] to be proved and proving [property] is manifest.
Thus we have the following:147 What has not ceased is a causal
condition,148 because it has a cause. Origination, also, has as its cause
the group of mind and mental factors which have not ceased, because
it has [an existent] cause.149 [But] that, too, is not [logically] possible,
since in the former [statement], the reason is not established.150
[Moreover, it is not logically possible] because the latter [statement]
conflicts with [your own] previous position, since origination from
anything has been negated.151
Thus since that verse, also, has rejected the immediately preceding
causal condition, that same reason will have [either] the fault of an
unestablished meaning or the fault of a contradictory meaning.152
116 WILLIAM L. AMES
Thus the immediately preceding c

examined. Now, since the [next] top
tion, that will be examined. You153 m
when it exists, some [result] arises,
Here, for our position, it has been sh
is no origination. Thus entities have
own154 and are empty of intrinsic n
(mâyâ). Therefore, in this way,
Because there is no existence (sattà

nature . . . [MMK 1—1 Oab]
[That is, because they] have no exist

[The dominant causal condition is u
ultimate reality, but also according
not accepted that a result originates
prddesika) cause exists,155
This [statement,] "When this exists

[MMK 1—1 Ocd]
Therefore that same fault of the re

Objection:156
[Thesis:] Those [causal conditions] do exist [in ultimate reality],
[Reason:] because they are accepted to be so in superficial reality,
[Example:] as it is said that nirvana is peace.157
Answer: The fault of [your] example is as before.158 [The Buddha]
taught that nirvana is peace in order to cause [his followers] to desire
(nye bar 'dun par bya ba'i phyir) that [nirvana], after he had [first]
turned [their] desire away from conditioned (samskrta) [dharmas],
which are faulty due to the defects of impermanence and so on. [This
teaching] also belongs to conventional truth, but that [nirvana] does
not exist in ultimate reality. For the Blessed One, also, having imputed
[various qualities to nirvana] by means of conceptual construction,
praised nirvana with qualities such as "peace" and so on in order to
encourage persons to be trained (vineya-jana) who were interested in
the profound dharma; [but we] accept even [this teaching] as conven
tional truth. In ultimate reality, even nirvana is empty of the intrinsic
natrue of existence and so on. Therefore since [your] example does
not exist, [your] reason is not established; and because

does not exist, the point which [you] maintain is not
Objection: Although [Nâgâijuna] has thus negated [th
causal conditions' property of] being causal conditions,
make a rebuttal [as follows:]
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions whi
the inner áyatañas, the eye and so on, do indeed exi
[Reason:] because their result [i.e., the inner àyatanas]
[Similar example:] just as a seed grain and so on, the
tions which bring about a sprout, [exist because the
originate].
[Dissimilar example:] That which does not exist also h
condition, as with a tortoise-hair coat.
Answer: One must question them as follows: Does th
in your causal conditions, individually or collectively,
(átman) of the result; or does it not [so exist]? The poi
does exist, [our] answer to that position has been mad
If it does exist, what is the use of a causal conditio
But if it does not exist, [our] answer to that has also
If [the result] does not exist, of what would there b

condition? [MMK 1—6c]
Nevertheless, we will explain again. When
That result does not exist in [its alleged] causal cond

vidually or collectively, [MMK 1—1 lab]
Then
How could that which does not exist in causal condit

from causal conditions? [MMK 1—1 led]
The meaning of the sentence is that in ultimate reali

simply does not originate, [because] it does not exist i
conditions. [As one might say,] "How could curds aris
since curds do not exist in them?"
Objection: Even though [sprouts] do not exist [in seed grains], one
observes the origination of [results] such as sprouts and so on from
118 WILLIAM L. AMES
[causes] such as seed grains and so on.

conventional usage (vyavahàra) [and] is
common to [all persons] with spirituall
[Therefore we] maintain that even in ul
âyatanas, the eye and so on, do origin
Answer: Therefore [Nàgàijuna] says,
But if that [result] originates from th

though it does not exist [in them],
Then
Why does the result not also originate from nonconditions

(apratyaya)'} [MMK 1—12cd]
Therefore, since here [the opponent has made] a statement afford

ing an opportunity [for censure],161 it is certain that just as a result
which does not exist [in them] does not originate from nonconditions,
[so a result which does not pre-exist in its causal conditions] also does
not originate from [those] causal conditions. For example, [one could
similarly ask,] "If sound, which is made, is permanent, why is a jar,
which is made, not also permanent?" If one speaks thus, [the follow
ing] meaning will be understood:
[Thesis:] Sound is impermanent,
[Reason:] because it is made,
[Example:] like a jar.
Therefore here [in the case of MMK 1—12,] the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [sprout] originates
from a seed grain and so on which are empty of the sprout.
[Reason:] because the sprout is a result,
[Example:] like curds.162
Therefore it is not the case that the stated fault does not exist.
Objection-.
[Thesis:] One grasps that in ultimate reality, the causal conditions of
internal entities163 do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because [the internal entities] are made of164 those [causal
conditions],
[Example:] as a jar [is made of its cause, clay],
"Because they are made of those" means "because they consist of165
those." [This is so] because "is made of" (-maya) is sa

of" (-*bhüta), as [when one says,] "The jar is made of
Answer. Here [Nàgâijuna] says,
If the result is made of [its] causal conditions, [MM
[That is,] if it consists of [its] causal conditions,
But the causal conditions are not made of themselv

1-13b]
The meaning is that they do not have the intrinsic nature of causal
conditions. [This is so] because "is made of" is said in regard to
"intrinsic nature," as, for example, [one says,] "The heart of a
Bràhmana is made of butter."
[We] have explained previously how causal conditions do not have

the intrinsic nature of causal conditions. Therefore
How could that result, which [originates] from [causal conditions]

which are not made of themselves, be made of [those] causal
conditions? [MMK 1—13cd]
The meaning of the sentence is that in ultimate reality, the result is

not made of [its] causal conditions. For example, [one might ask,] "If
Devarâta was celibate from [his] youth, how could Bharata be his
son?" [If] a jar has originated from a lump of clay emanated (nirmita)
by a magician, which is empty of the intrinsic nature of that [clay],
[then] even conventionally, [that jar] cannot be understood by the wise
as consisting of that [clay].
Therefore it is not made of [its] causal conditions. [MMK 1—14a]
Therefore the result is not made of [its] causal conditions. Hence

[your] example does not exist, because it is deficient in [both the
property] to be proved and the proving property.166 Therefore, as
before, your reason has [either] a meaning which is not established or
else a contradictory meaning.167
Objection: Here others, having agreed to the meaning of [our]
refutation,168 say: [You] have shown that [our] inference does not exist,
because a result is not made of [its] causal conditions. Nevertheless,
since the result does not abandon the intrinsic nature of a result, that
120 WILLIAM L. AMES
[result] has not been negated. Therefo

way.169
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions of the inner áyatanas
do indeed exist,
[Reason:] because [the inner áyatanas] are a result,
[Example:] like a sprout and so on.
Answer. Here [Nàgàijuna] says,
A result which is made of nonconditions does not exist. [MMK

1—14b, cl]
If a result which consists of nonconditions cannot be understood [to

exist] even conventionally, what need is there to speak of ultimate
reality?
Objection: If in ultimate reality, causal conditions are empty of the
intrinsic nature of causal conditions, well then, [you] have accepted
that causal conditions are not empty of the intrinsic nature of non
conditions. Therefore [they] are established [as] nonconditions, so that
what [we] maintain is established.
Answer. That is not good. [By speaking of a] "noncondition,"170 we
have indicated the mere negation of the intrinsic nature of a causal
condition. Because [we] have used a negation with the meaning of a
simple negation,171 [we] do not indicate the intrinsic nature of a
noncondition.
Dividing the text [of MMK 1—14d], it reads "noncondition" and

"how can be ... a condition?"172 The meaning of the sentence is that
nonconditions could not have the intrinsic nature of conditions.
Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 1—14d as follows:] The

origination of an existent or a nonexistent result has [already] been
rejected by the method stated. Therefore,
Because the result does not exist, how can a noncondition be a

condition? [MMK 1—14c2,d]
How can impossible conditions, which do not have the nature of

those [conditions], be conditions?173 The meaning of the sentence is
that they simply are not [causal conditions]. The idea is that [this is so]
because the result of those [causal conditions], which causes that
BHÂVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADI'PA 121
cognition and word [i.e., "causal condition"] to occur, simp

exist.174
Here that [first chapter] has concluded by rejecting the intrinsic

nature and particular characteristics (visesa) of the causal conditions
stated by others, beginning from
There are four causal conditions: the cause; the object of cognition;
the immediately preceding;
As well as the dominant. [MMK 1—2abc]
Here the meaning of the chapter is the teaching of nonorigina

tion.175 Therefore those scriptures such as the following, [which teach
that] dependent origination [is] without origination, are established:176
[From the Ârya-nâgarâja-anavatapta-pariprcchà-sûtra,177]

That which originates by causal conditions is unoriginated.
There is no origination of that by intrinsic nature.
That which is dependent on causal conditions is called "empty."
He who knows emptiness is heedful (apramatta)}1*
Likewise, [from the Àrya-laûkàvatàra-sûtra,179]
One for whom nothing originates and nothing ceases,
[And] who sees that the world is isolated (vivikta): for him, existence
and nonexistence do not exist. [Lañkávatára 3—14 = 10—196]
Likewise, [from the Àrya-sarvabuddha-visayàvatára-jñánáloká

lamkára-sütra,lS0]
The Tathàgata always has the property of nonorigination;

All dharmas are like the Sugata.181
Likewise, [from that same sütra,182]

Therefore, Mañjusri, in this way also, you should understand the
following: That [phrase,] "nonorigination and noncessation," is a term
for the Tathàgata.183
Likewise, [from the Àrya-brahma-pariprcchá-sütra,184]
Where all craving (trsnà) ceases, that is nonorigination. That which
is nonorigination is enlightenment (bodhi). The world is attached to
origination, [but] here the arising of a Buddha does not exist, and
nirvana also does not exist.185
122 WILLIAM L. AMES
Likewise, [from that same sütra,186]
Although those who thoroughly co

aggregates do not originate and d
Act {car) in the world, they do do d
The first chapter, "Examination of

Prajñápradlpa, a commentary on [N
composed by àcàrya Bhavyakara/Bh
concluded].
NOTES TO TRANSLATION OF PR A
CHAPTER ONE, PART TWO
1 "All the àrâvakas, the Sautrântikas and Vaibhâsikas, etc.," according to Avaloki
tavrata. See Ava P180a—5,6; D156b—1,2.
2 See AK 2—6led,62. See also the discussion of the doctrine of four pratyayas and
six hetus and its sources in Lamotte (1980), pp. 2163 ff.
3 This other school is the "Àrya-Sthaviras," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava
P180b—7, D157a—1. The three causal conditions listed correspond to three of the
twenty-four paccayas of the Theravâda school. "What has arisen before" (mdun na
skyes pa) corresponds to purejáta. (Note that mdun na means "before" in the sense of
"in front." The Pâli abhidhamma takes pure in purejáta to mean "previously.")
"Presence" (yod pa) corresponds to atthi, and "absence" (med pa) to natthi. See, e.g.,
Nyanatiloka (1938), pp. 117—26.
It is interesting that Bhàvaviveka and Avalokitavrata had at least some knowledge
of the Sthaviravàdin abhidharma. From Nâgâtjuna on, Màdhyamikas used the
Sarvâstivâdin abhidharma almost exclusively.
4 On these five types of hetu, as well as the sixth, the nonobstructing cause (kárana
hetu), see AK 2—49 to 55b and Lamotte (1980), pp. 2163 ff.
5 All dharmas may be objects of cognition and thus be álambana-pratyayas of the
corresponding cognition. See AK 2—62c.
6 In genera], the mind and mental factors of one moment are samanantara-pratyayas
of the mind and mental factors of the next moment. See AK 2—62ab.
7 Every dharma is a nonobstructing cause of every conditioned (samskrta) dharma,
with the exception of itself. This simply means that no dharma obstructs the
origination of any dharma which does, in fact, originate. See AK 2—50a, with bhàsya.
8 See Ava P183b-2,3; D159a-7.
9 Nâgârjuna, as a Buddhist, accepts the teachings of the Buddha; but in negating
origination from another, he has rejected the teaching of the four causal conditions.
See Ava P184a-1,2,3; D159b-4,5.
10 According to ancient Indian physiology, the father's semen and the mother's blood
produce the physical embryo, into which the reincarnated consciousness enters. Thus
semen and blood are causal conditions of the sense organs such as the eye.
11 su'i, literally, "of whom," probably corresponding to kasya. The

makes it clear that the idea is the following: Since the result does
causal conditions, the causal conditions cannot be said to be "diffe
the result. See Ava P184b—1,2,3; D160a— 3,4,5.
12 See Ava P184b—4 to 7, D160a—5,6,7. The reference is to the
against origination from something different.
13 See Ava P184b-7, D160a-7 to 160b-l.
14 Fellow Buddhists, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P185a—3, D160b—3,4.
15 tshod dpags su. Goldstein (1975), s.v., gives "estimation, guess" for tshod dpag(s).
The "proof" (sàdhana) referred to is the Mâdhyamika's argument against origination
from another. See Ava P185a—4,5; D160b—4,5.
16 The opponent here holds that entities originate not from any causal conditions
which are different from them, but only from causal conditions of similar (rigs mthun
pa) kind. See Ava P185a—2,3; D160b—3.
17 paryanuyoga usually refers to "a question raised in objection." Here Avalokitavrata
glosses it by quoting Bhâvaviveka's previous pair of syllogisms against origination
from another. See Ava P185b—7 to 186a—2, D161a—5,6,7.
18 In his previous pair of syllogisms, Bhâvaviveka used a jar as an example of
something which is different from the causal conditions of the inner âyatanas and so
does not originate from them. He used threads as an example of things which are
different from the inner âyatanas and so are not their causal conditions. The
opponent's assertion that things do not originate from dissimilar (rigs mi mthun pa)
causal conditions merely confirms Bhâvaviveka's examples. See Ava PI86a—2 to 5,
D161b—1,2,3.
19 Avalokitavrata glosses "property" (chos, dharma) as "property of the subject
[which proves the thesis]" (phyogs kyi chos, paksa-dharma). See Ava PI86a—7 to
186b—1, D161b—3,4,5; and compare the next syllogisms.
20 gzhan gyi dngos po ni gzhan las 'byung ba'o, perhaps parabhàvah parebhyah
sambhavah.
21 According to Avalokitavrata, if the result does not exist at the stage when the
causal conditions exist, then the causal conditions cannot be termed "other." That
is, they do not have "the nature of another." Something can be "other" or "different"
only in relation to a thing different from it. In the absence of the result, the
causal conditions are not designated as "other than the result;" and thus the result
cannot be said to originate from another. See Ava P186b—2 to 8, D161b—6 to
162a—3.
22 rgyu mi mthun pa, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "Nârâyana, the Lord, etc." See
Ava P188a—1, D163a-2.
23 The Mâdhyamika accepts the Buddha's teaching about the four causal conditions
as conventional truth. He negates origination from the causal conditions in ultimate
reality. Hence there is no conflict. See Ava P188b—7 to 189a—2, D163b—4 to 7.
24 The Vaibhàsikas and Sautràntikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava PI 89a—4,
D164a—1.
25 According to Avalokitavrata, inner entities are the six inner âyatanas, that is, the
six sense organs. Subtle (cha phra ba, probably sûksma) entities are atoms, and gross
(rags pa, sthiila) entities are visible objects. See Ava PI 89b—5,6; D163a—7 to
163b—1.
124 WILLIAM L. AMES
26 byed rgyu, kàrana, a near-synonym of rgy

rkyen, pratyaya, "condition." See Ava P190a—
27 "Others" are glossed by Avalokitavrata as "
etc." See Ava ibid.
28 "About to originate" translates skye bar 'dod pa, probably utpitsu, literally,
"desirous of originating."
29 See note 21 and Ava P190a—7 to 190b—3, D164b—7 to 165a—3. Avalokitavrata
glosses nimicta as kàrana and hetu.
30 Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to the Abhidharmikas. They hold that
although the result does not pre-exist in its causal conditions, one bears in mind the
result which is about to arise. Then, in relation to that [mental image of the result], the
causal conditions become "other." See Ava P190b—3,4,5; D165a—3,4,5 and
PI90b—7 to 191a—1, D165a-6 to 165b-l. Compare LVP AK III, p. 79.
31 "Bearing in mind" translates bio la rnam par bzhag nas, glossed as snying la bzhag
ste. (See references to Ava in the previous note.) "About to originate" again translates
skye bar 'dod pa. (See note 28.)
32 According to Avalokitavrata, the Vaisesikas say that even when the result does not
yet exist, the causal conditions are different because they possess the guna of
"difference" or "otherness." On the Vaisesika guna s and paratva in particular, see
note 119 to the translation of chapter one, part one, and note 165 to the translation
of chapter two (forthcoming). See Ava P190b—5, D165a—5 and P191a—2 to 191b—
1, D165b—1 to 6.
33 In the first case, the causal conditions are different only in relation to (a mental image
of] a result which is about to arise. In the second case, according to Avalokitavrata, the
causal conditions are different [from the result] because they [also] possess the quality
(guna) of "self" (bdag nyid, átman). This is not one of the twenty-four Vaisesika
gunas, being, in fact, a dravya. The idea may be that the guna of paratva does not
apply to the causal conditions themselves.
Avalokitavrata explains that the causal conditions do not have the nature of
another (gzhan gyi dngos po nyid, parabhàvatàJtva) because their "otherness" or
"difference" is created by relation or dependence (apeksâ), but it does not exist by
intrinsic nature. Intrinsic nature, like the heat of fire, is not relative to or dependent
on anything. Since the "otherness" of the causal conditions is relational, it is a mere
conventional designation. See Ava P191b—2 to 6, D165b—7 to 166a—3.
34 Those of the Sàmkhyas who are proponents of manifestation (vyakti), according to
Avalokitavrata. See Ava P192a—6, D166b—1, and note 187 to the translation of
chapter one, part one.
35 Avalokitavrata has the Sàmkhyas give the example of the way in which the future
roots, trunk, and branches of a tree pre-exist in its seed. See Ava P192a—7,8;
D166b—2,3.
36 Contrary to what the Màdhyamika has said, the result does indeed exist at the
same time as its causal conditions, albeit in a subtle state. Thus the Mâdhyamika's
argument against ultimately real difference fails in the case of the Sàmkhya. See Ava
PI 92a—5 to 192b—3, D166a—7 to 166b-4.
37 One cannot show even conventionally that a jar with a subtle nature exists at the
stage of the clay. See Ava P192b—4,5,6; D166b—5,6.
38 According to Avalokitavrata, the first sentence is spoken by proponents of
BHÁVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADIPA 125
potentiality (saktivâdin), while the remaining two sentences are spo

of unchangeability (kùtasthavàdin). See Ava P192b—7 ff., D166b—7
39 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that although entities e
originate. See Ava P193a—4,5; D167a—3,4. Presumably, in this view
all eternity. They need never have come into existence because the
when they did not exist.
40 In ultimate reality, we negate origination without qualification a
causal conditions are supposed to be empty of potentiality or not.
7,8; D167a—5,6.
41 According to Avalokitavrata, these are again the Vaibhàsikas and
who, unable to establish origination by mere scripture, resort to a
argument. See Ava P193b—3,4; D167b—1.
42 That is, Bhavaviveka's syllogisms against origination from somet
be in conflict with or be annulled by (bádh) the syllogism just state
See Ava P194a-8 to 194b-4, D168a-2,3,4.
43 The Màdhyamika does accept that in superficial reality, the activity possesses
causal conditions. Nevertheless, it is contradictory for the opponent to attempt to
prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only in superficial
reality. The last sentence means that the fact that the activity of origination of cogni
tion possesses causal conditions is an object of knowledge only in superficial reality,
never in ultimate reality. Also, superficial reality is invariably characterized by the fact
that the activity of origination of cognition possesses causal conditions. See Ava
P195b—4 to 196a—5, D169a-1 to 7.
44 Literally, "another;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P196a—8 ff., D169b—
2 ff.
45 This is a highly abridged version of Buddhapâlita's commentary. See Saito (1984)

13.21-15.5. Compare also PSP 79.1 ff.
46 That is, both the opponent's position and Buddhapâlita's subsequent refutation are
mere assertions.
47 sgro btags nas. This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava
P198a—1,2,3; D170b-4,5,6.
48 See Ava P198a—6,7; D171a—1,2.
49 If the cooking pot and the other causal conditions do not exist, the activity of
cooking rice does not exist. As for the opponent's syllogism, its example is defective
just as before, because the Màdhyamika does not accept that the activity of cooking
rice exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P198b—4 to 7, D171a—5,6,7.
50 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P198b—8 to 199a—1,
D171b—1,2. Gunamati was a teacher of Sthiramati. (See Frauwallner (1961), pp.
136—7.) As we have seen, Sthiramati criticizes the Prajñápradipa in his own
commentary on the MMK. See note 114 to the translation of chapter one, part one.
51 The idea seems to be that the activity of origination of cognition is not different
from cognition itself, and that that activity occurs whenever the right causal conditions
are present. See Ava P199a—2 to 6, D171b—2 to 5.
52 Since, according to the opponent, the activity of origination of cognition is the
same as cognition itself, then as long as cognition has not originated, the activity of
origination also does not exist. But a nonexistent activity cannot "possess" causal
conditions. That is, the possessive suffix -vati in pratyayavati cannot refer to activity.
126 WILLIAM L. AMES
That rkyen, pratyaya, is used here in a gramm

and from Avalokitavrata's subcommentary.
5,6,7.
53 The activity of origination is different from cognition. That activity does not
possess causal conditions but instead is established by intrinsic nature. The activity of
origination produces cognition. See Ava P199b—2,3,4; D172a—1,2.
54 Literally, "some say." Identified by Avalokitavrata as Bhàvaviveka himself. See Ava
PI 99b—7,8; D172a-5.
55 The various causal conditions "assist each other," as, for example, in the produc
tion of visual cognition, the eye assists visible form by seeing it and visible form
assists the eye by being present in front of it. Then, in the next moment after that
"mutual assistance," that which is able to produce the result is the moment in which
the activity comes into being. That activity produces the entity which is about to
originate, e.g., visual cognition. See Ava P200a—2 to 200b—4, D172a—6 to 172b—7,
especially P200b-1,2; D172b-5.
56 See Ava P200a—2 to 200b—4, D172a—6 to 172b—7. Bhàvaviveka says that the
Màdhyamika does accept that on the conventional level, the activity of origination
produces the result. Gunamati has incorrectly negated this process both in ultimate
reality and in superficial reality.
57 bya ba Idan nam 'on te na, kriyàvantas ca santy uta. This translation follows
Avalokitavrata's explanation in Ava P202b—7, D174b—4,5. The understanding of this
pâda depends on how one interprets uta. It may indicate emphasis, a double question
(kim . . . uta ...), or an alternative (uta va). See the discussion in Saito (1984),
translation, pp. 224—6 n. 16.
58 According to Avalokitavrata, the negation na in MMK 1—4c carries over and
supplies a negative answer to the question posed by MMK 1—4d. See Ava P202b—8
to 203a—2, D174b—5,6.
In fact, Bhàvaviveka gives no indication of how he understands uta. Despite
Avalokitavrata's explanation, it might be simpler to suppose that Bhàvaviveka
understands uta as emphasis, with na from MMK 1—4c supplying the negation. Thus
MMK 1—4d would be "And [causal conditions] which possess activity do not exist."
59 The example in the opponent's syllogism, a hare's horn, does not possess the
property to be proved, possessing activity. Thus the syllogism is faulty. See Ava
P203a—2,3,4; D174b-6 to 175a-l.
60 The conceptual constructions of existence and nonexistence do not apply to
ultimate reality. If origination exists, there will be a concept of nonexistence in
relation to it; but in ultimate reality, all entities are unoriginated. Thus the example in
the opponent's last syllogism ("a nonexistent hare's horn") does not really possess the
proving property, either; and the syllogism fails completely. Since the opponent's last
syllogism was stated in a effort to refute the Màdhyamika's criticism of the syllogism
before that, the criticism stands. See Ava P203a—4 to 203b—3, D175a—1 to 6.
61 According to Avalokitavrata, the Sàmkhyas hold that even though no hare's horn
is perceived, the three gunas are still present in their unmanifest state. In the
Sâmkhya's syllogism, the example "visible form" (rüpa) corresponds to the first
reason. Just as the whiteness or roundness of [genitive] a visible form is an existent
entity, so the nonexistence of a hare's horn is an existent entity. The term "blue lotus"
may be qualified by various adjectives and so is a substance which possesses qualities.
The same applies to a hare's horn. See Ava P203b—8 to 204a—7, D175b—2 to
176a—1.
62 Identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P204b—3,4; D176a—4,

63 By negating origination, we merely negate the "entityness" (d
tà/tva) imagined by others; but we do not establish "nonentitynes
nyid, abhàva-tàJtvà). See Ava P204b—7 to 205a—5, D175a—7 to
words, the Màdhyamikas deny that there are entities (bhàva) with
there are nonentities (abhàva).
64 The view of nonentities involves attachment (abhinivesa) to [th
entities. See Ava P205b— 1, D176—7 to 177a—1.
65 If the Sàmkhya negates the view of nonentities, this (along wit
view of entities) establishes what the Mâdhyamika maintains. But
holds that there are entities and nonentities, his own position is
Ava P206a—8 to 206b-2, D177b-5,6,7.
66 The Sautràntikas and Vaibhàsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P206b—4,
D178a—1.
67 This phrase modifies "causal conditions." See Ava P207a—3, D178a—6,7.
68 For Avalokitavrata's explanation of this syllogism, see Ava P207a—6 to 207b—1,
D178b—2,3,4.
69 This refers to Bhàvaviveka's first two syllogisms against origination from another
(or MMK 1—la), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P207b—1,2,3; D178b—4,5.
70 As before, the negation na in MMK 1—4c carries over to 4d.
71 Because one observes that in superficial reality, a result is produced, one infers
that its causal conditions possess activity. But as long as the result is not about to
arise, there is no reason to maintain that its causal conditions have activity. See Ava
P207b—7 to 208a—3, D179a-2 to 5.
72 See the opponent's syllogism immediately before the first occurrence of MMK
1—4c. See also Ava P208a—3 to 7, D179a—5,6,7.
73 The Sautràntikas hold that causal conditions possess activity only at the time when
the result originates. Thus they do not fall into the error of claiming that the causal
conditions are active before that time. See Ava P208b—1,2,3; D179b—1,2,3.
74 Again, see the opponent's argument immediately before the first occurrence of
MMK 1—4c.
75 The Sautràntikas again. See Ava P209b—2, D179a—7.
76 See Ava P209b-7,8; D180b-5.
77 The seed, etc., and the sprout are obviously not identical; but since the sprout
originates from the seed, etc., they are not different, either. See Ava P210a—5 to
210b—1, D181a—2 to 5.
78 Some who [attempt to] establish origination. See Ava P210b—4, D181a—7.
79 The opponent's idea is that although the causal conditions cannot be shown to
possess activity, they are nonetheless causal conditions; and therefore they produce
the result. See Ava P211b—1 to 5, D182a—2 to 5.
80 maluta seems to be a variant of, or mistake for, màlu(tâ). See Edgerton (1953),
s.v. màlutà.
81 Just as a má/u-creeper is not a causal condition of nonexistent sky-flowers, so a
seed is not a causal condition of a sprout which does not [yet] exist. This is so
because something is designated as a causal condition only when one observes its
result. See Ava P212b—1 to 7, D182b—7 to 183a—5.
82 The properties (dharma) referred to here are the proving properties (sâdhana
dharma) in the next two syllogisms.
83 The opponent's idea is that one must distinguish between the absolute non
128 WILLIAM L. AMES
existence of sky-flowers and so on, which neve

existence of sprouts, etc., which do not exist pr
after they originate. See Ava P213b—4 to 8,
84 A seed is not considered to be a causal cond
seems to be that when a seed exists, one has no
condition of a sprout. Only later, when the see
favorable conditions, can one say the seed was
the seed's quality of being a causal condition of
Compare Ava P214a—5 to 214b—6, D183a—
85 This seems to mean that a result which som
no need of origination or of causal conditions,
originated does not need to originate again. C
D185a—5,6,7.
86 Those Sâmkhyas who are proponents of potentiality (sakti) or manifestation
(vyakti), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P215b—5, D185b—4.
87 If the causal conditions produce a tangibility which does not exist already, one has
the case of a nonexistent result (MMK 1—6c). If they produce a tangibility which
does exist already, one has the case of an existent result (MMK 1—6d). See Ava
P216a—2 to 6, D185b-7 to 186a-3.
88 The context indicates that Bhàvaviveka interprets MMK 1— 6ab in this way here.
89 On this sentence and the following syllogism, see Ava P217b—1 to 219a—1,
D187a—6 to 188a—7. A sprout which is in the process of originating and a jar which
is in the process of originating are both indescribable as existent or nonexistent. The
idea seems to be that there is no way to distinguish two things, both of which cannot
be described as existent or nonexistent. Thus one can no more say that a seed is a
causal condition of a sprout which is in the process of originating than one can say
that a seed is a causal condition of a jar which is in the process of originating.
90 Conventionally, entities which cannot be described as existent or nonexistent do
indeed originate from their assembled causes and conditions; but not in ultimate
reality. See Ava P219a—5,6; D188b—3,4.
This passage is probably one reason why Bhàvaviveka is classified as a Sautràntika
(Svàtantrika)-Màdhyamika in the Tibetan tradition. Here he affirms the Sautrântika
position on the conventional level, while denying that it holds true in ultimate reality.
91 mam pa gnyis su smra ba dag, glossed by Avalokitavrata as gcer bur rgyu ba dag,
that is, the Jains. (On the term gcer bur rgyu ba dag, see note 142 to the translation of
chapter one, part one.) They hold that a result which is both [already] existent and not
[yet] existent originates. For example, a gold ring is not perceptible as such in
unworked gold; but the gold of which the ring will be made already exists. See Ava
P219a—7 to 219b—6, D188b-5 to 189a-3.
92 Insofar as the result pre-exists in the cause, it will be subject to the arguments
against the origination of a pre-existent result. Insofar as it does not pre-exist, it will
be subject to the arguments against the origination of a nonexistent result. See Ava
P219b—7 to 220a—8, D189a-3 to 189b-3.
93 A seed, the four elements, etc., are all causal conditions for producing a sprout;
but the sprout actually originates only from the seed. Thus the seed is the causal
condition (pratyaya) which is the sprout's primary cause (hetu). See Ava P220b—7 to
221a—1, D 190a—2,3.
94 In ultimate reality, there is no origination and thus, in particular, no origination
from a single causal condition which is the cause. Nevertheless, th

accept the various kinds of causes and conditions on the conventio
done so, they must explain how what is conventionally designated
a cause in ultimate reality. See Ava P221a—3 to 221b—4, D190a—
95 This "unpacking" of Bhàvaviveka's highly elliptical argument fo
tavrata's explanation. See Ava P222a—2 to 5, D191a—1 to 4. Bhàv
is probably due to the fact that he is simply repeating arguments a
connection with MMK 1—6.
96 It is not possible that what is conventionally designated as a causal condition which
is the cause, is a cause in ultimate reality. Therefore the origination of the result is
also not possible. See Ava P222a— 5,6; D191a—4.
97 The Sautràntikas and the Vaibhâsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava
P223a—2, D191b—5,6.
98 The Sanskrit of the thesis, reason, and example of this syllogism is quoted by
Candrakirti. See PSP 31.1—3.
In the Derge edition of the Bstan 'gyur, a textual peculiarity occurs at this point in
Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. At D192a—5, following 'di la dper na de bzhin and
immediately before yang brgal zhing brtag . .. , an omission occurs. The omitted
passage is inserted later in D. At D193a—2, immediately following gang gi phyir bdag
gis, the insertion begins with de bzhin gshegs pas . . . The insertion continues to
D193b—5, where it ends with . . . zhes bya ba'i tshig, just before phrag dog gis . . .
The passage misplaced in D occurs in P at its proper place, beginning at P223b—2
and ending at P224b— 1. Thus the passage misplaced in D is almost, but not quite, the
length of one two-sided folio in P. Presumably, this reflects the length of the folios of
the text from which D was compiled. A folio was apparently placed out of order
during the compilation of D, before the woodblocks were carved.
A similarly misplaced passage occurred earlier in P (not D). See note 119 to the
translation of chapter one, part one.
99 See note 6.
100 That is, the thesis of the syllogism will not fail to be established. See Ava
P223b—7 to 224a—2, D193a-5,6,7.
101 According to Avalokitavrata, this alludes to the opponent's syllogism preceding
MMK 1—4d and Bhàvaviveka's refutation of it. See Ava P224a—5 to 224b—1,
D 193b—2 to 5.
102 The text from "Here what is the . . ." up to, but not including, Devasarman's
commentary is quoted in Sanskrit by Candrakirti (with a variant). See PSP 31.4—10.
103 The Tibetan appears to read MMK 1—7d as evam sati na yujyate, instead of
PSP's evam sati hi yujyate. See PSP 83 n. 2.
104 If the reason is asserted of ultimate reality, it is not established. If it is asserted of
superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a thesis about ultimate reality
using a reason which holds only in superficial reality. See Ava P225a—5,6,7; D192b—
6,7.
105 Literally, "others say." Identified as âcàrya Devasarman by Avalokitavrata; see
Ava P225a—7,8; D193a—1. Avalokitavrata adds that Bhâvaviveka is quoting from
Devasarman's commentary on the MMK, called dkar po 'char ba (Suklàbhyudayal).
[This work has not survived.) He explains that Bhâvaviveka does not criticize
Buddhapàlita's commentary out of jealously, but because it is incorrect. Likewise, he
does not quote Devasarman's commentary out of partiality (rjes su chags pa), but
130 WILLIAM L. AMES
because it is faultless. See Ava P225a—8 to 225b—2, D193a—1,2 and 193b—5,6.

(On the insertion in D, see note 98.)
Bhâvaviveka will also quote part of Devas'arman's commentary on MMK 3—2. See
note 35 to the translation of chapter three (Ames (1986), pp. 138—139).
106 Avalokitavrata explains that to "set up a doctrine" (gzhung) is to establish one's
own doctrine (siddhânta), independently of any refutation of others' doctrines. The
Mâdhyamika, on the other hand, just refutes others' doctrines without establishing any
doctrine of his own, since he merely negates the entities conceptually constructed by
others. In the Mâdhyamikas' doctrine, what is to be shown is the mere negation of the
intrinsic nature of all entities conceptually constructed by others; but it has been
shown (read bstan pa yin with Ava D194a—3; P225b—8 has bstan pa ma yin) that
the Mâdhyamikas do not accept any dharma in ultimate reality. See Ava P225b—3 to
8, D 193b—7 to 194a—3.
107 Avalokitavrata explains "[verbal] expression" (brjod pa, probably abhidhàna) as
"words," and "what is to be expressed" (brjod par bya ba, probably abhidheya) as "the
meaning of the words." See Ava P226a—1, D194a—4.
108 That is, no result is produced, so there is no reason to speak of a cause. See Ava
P226b—3,4; D194b-4,5.
109 This refers to an argument given by an opponent in Devasarman's commentary.
See Ava P226b-5 to 8, D194b-6 to 195a-l.
110 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P226b—8 to 227a—1,
D195a—1,2.
111 This is a highly condensed paraphrase of Buddhapàlita's argument. For Buddha
pàlita's commentary on MMK 1—7, see Saito 19.9—20.7.
112 According to Avalokitavrata, Buddhapâlita again fails to give reasons and
examples, that is, formal syllogisms. See Ava P227a—7 to 227b—2, D195a—6 to
195b—1.
113 In MMK 1—8a, the Tibetan has yin pa (the copula) for san, rather than yod pa
(verb of existence). This follows Bhâvaviveka and Avalokitavrata's explanation of the
verse. For the phrase in square brackets, see Ava P227b—8, D195b—5,6 and
P228a—5,6; D196a-2,3.
114 Or "because it bears a specific characteristic" (svalaksanadhàranât). This is the
standard definition/etymology of dharma.
115 dmigs pa med pa kho nar zhes bya ba ni | dmigs pa med pa nyid du'o || ; perhaps
anârambana evety anàllambana-tvena/tayà. Avalokitavrata adds that cognitions have
no objects of cognition "in ultimate reality." See Ava P228a— 5,6; D 196a—2,3.
116 See Ava P228a-8 to 228b-2, D196a-4,5,6.
117 According to Avalokitavrata, the teaching in the Abhidharma that the six
cognitions do have objects of cognition refers to conventional truth, not to ultimate
truth. See Ava P229a-2,3,4; D196-5,6.
118 Since all dharmas are momentary, the object of cognition has already ceased when
the cognition occurs; but the cognition originates having the aspect (rnam pa, àkàra)
of the object of cognition. Thus since the cognition and its object do not exist at the
same time, it is not strictly correct, even conventionally, that the cognition "has an
object of cognition." This statement is true only through imputation. See Ava P229a—
5,6,7; D 196b—7 to 197a-2.
BHÂVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁPRADI'PA 131
119 "Thus" translates de Itar. The Sanskrit of PSP has atha (PSP
of PP may have read tathânârambane for athànàrambane.
120 Some proponents of origination, according to Avalokitavrat
D 197a—4.
121 On the five misdeeds which invariably result in the next rebirth's taking place in
hell, see AK 4-96,97.
122 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the reason, "because the Tathàgata has
so taught," in the syllogism stated by the opponent toward the end of Bhâvaviveka's
commentary on MMK 1—7. If the opponent asserts that the causal condition which is
the object of cognition is taught as ultimate reality, that is not so; and the reason is
unestablished. If he asserts that it is taught as conventional reality, it is contradictory
to adduce a reason which is true only conventionally in order to prove a thesis about
ultimate reality. See Ava P229b—6,7,8; D197a—7 to 197b—2.
123 Other Abhidharmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P229b—8,
D197b—2.
124 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the example in Bhâvaviveka's last

syllogism, concerning cognitions which are in the process of originating. See Ava
P229b—8 to 230a—3, D197b-2,3,4.
125 Compare AK 1—34ab. The opponent argues that the same Abhidharma texts
which establish the example in Bhâvaviveka's syllogism also contradict the thesis of
that syllogism. As a Buddhist, Bhâvaviveka must accept both statements. See Ava
P230a—6 to 230b—2, D197b-7 to 198a-3.
126 The opponent cannot use the mental factors as an example, because their having
an object of cognition can be refuted in the same way. See Ava P230b—5 to 231a—3,
D198a—5 to 198b-2.
127 See Ava P231a-6,7,8; D198b-4,5,6.
128 The method of the perfection of discernment, according to Avalokitavrata. See
Ava P231a—8 to 231b-l, D198b-7.
129 Identified by Avalokitavrata by its alternative title of Sàrdhadvisàhasrikà Ârya
prajñápáramitá. See Ava P231b—2, D199a—1.
130 byang chub dang Idan pa, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "omniscience" (sarvàkâra
jñata). See Ava P231b—5, D199a—3,4.
131 TTiis paragraph is a highly condensed version of a passage found in Hikata
(1958), pp. 94-5.
132 According to Avalokitavrata, because the aggregates are unoriginated, form does
not apprehend form, and so on up to cognition does not apprehend cognition. See
Ava P231b—7,8; D199a-5,6.
133 This paragraph is a somewhat condensed version of a passage in Hikata (1958),
p. 29. Compare the fuller quotation of the same passage at the end of chapter three.
134 We have investigated how that which is conventionally designated as "the causal
condition [which is] the object of cognition" cannot be a causal condition in ultimate
reality. See Ava P232a—4, D199b—2.
135 That is, the origination of dharmas from self, other, both, or no cause has been
negated. See Ava P232a—7, D199b—4,5.
136 des cir 'gyur zhe na. See note 95 to the translation of chapter one, part one.
137 See note 122.
132 WILLIAM L. AMES
138 See Ava P232b-6,7; D200a-3,4.

139 Matter is not considered to be an immediately preceding causal condition of mind
and mental events. Rather, the idea is that the mind can originate only from an
immediately preceding moment of mind, though it may also be influenced by other
causal conditions.
140 If the previous moment has not ceased, the future moment does not originate. See
Ava P233b—6, D201a-2.
141 Since mind and mental factors do not occupy space, there is no question of
"making room" for them. See Ava P234a—3,4,5; D201a—6 to 201b—1.
142 In the case of visual cognition (caksur-vijñána), the corresponding sense organ
(.indriya) is the eye (caksuh) and the corresponding sense objects (visaya) are visible
forms (rupa). The same threefold structure of cognition, organ, and object holds for
the remaining four physical senses. In order to maintain the same pattern in the case
of mental cognition (mano-vijñána), the corresponding sense organ is taken to be the
moment of cognition (which may be of any one of the six types) which has just
ceased. This "mental sense organ" is called the manas, which simply means "mind."
See AK l-17cd.
In the Abhidharmakosa-bhàsya, Vasubandhu says that the last moment of m

an Arhat is not an immediately preceding causal condition (since no next mom
mind occurs), but it is nevertheless manas. See LVP AK I, pp. 32—3 and LV
p. 305.
143 Bhàvaviveka and some other Màdhyamikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava
P234b—1, D201b—3,4.
144 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P234b—4 ff., D202a—
6 ff.
145 This is a condensed paraphrase of Buddhapàlita's commentary. See Saito 22.13—

23.10. Compare PSP 86.1 ff., especially 86.9,10.
The idea seems to be that if the cause has already ceased before the result
originates, then the cessation of the cause cannot be caused by the appearance of the
result. Likewise, the result would originate without a cause, since the cause no longer
exists when the result appears.
146 See note 102 to the translation of chapter one, part one.
147 ... mngon pas cir 'gyur zhe na. Literally, "what comes about by the manifestation
[of that reversed statement]?"
148 PNDC have 'gags (PN: 'gag) pa ni rkyen ma yin te, "what has ceased is not a
causal condition." Ava P236a—1 agrees with DC when it quotes the text, and Ava
D202b—7 agrees with PN, but Avalokitavrata's explanation of the text implies ma
'gags pa ni rkyen yin te. (See Ava P235b—7 to 236a—3, D202b—6 to 203a—2.) The
latter reading also fits the context better, so I have translated it here.
149 Thus the causal condition and the result would both have a cause. See Ava
P236a—2,3; D203a-1,2.
150 If the seed has not ceased, the sprout does not originate. See Ava P236a—5,
D203a—3.
151 To say that a result originates from a cause which has not ceased contradicts the
total negation of origination in MMK 1—1. See Ava P236a—5,6,7; D203a—3,4,5.
152 See note 122.
153 The Sautrântikas and Vaibhàsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P236b—
8, D203b—4,5.
BHÂVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑÁ PR A DIP A 133
154 rang gi bdag nyid ma thob, perhaps alabdhasvàtman, literally, "hav

their own selves," glossed by Avalokitavrata as "have not attained a se
[as] their own intrinsic nature." See Ava P237a—3,4; D203b—6,7.
155 A sprout does not originate from a seed if other necessary condit
See Ava P237b-1,2; D204a-4,5.
156 Ascribed to "fellow Buddhists" by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P237b—5, D204b—1.
157 The Mádhyamika accepts that in superficial reality, nirvana is peace; but it is also
peace in ultimate reality. Likewise, the causal conditions, which the Mádhyamika
accepts in superficial reality, also exist in ultimate reality. See P237b—8 to 238a—2,
D204b—3,4,5. Compare the opponent's syllogisms following MMK 1—4c and 1—7c.
158 Avalokitavrata cites a Prajnàpàramitâ Sütra to show that even nirvâna does not
exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P238a—3 to 6, D204b—5,6,7.
159 Other Buddhists, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P239b—4, D206a—3.
160 des cir 'gyur. See note 95 to the translation of chapter one, part one.
161 glags yodpa'i tshig. See note 102 to chapter one, part one and Ava P242a—2 to
6, D208a—2 to 5. Here the point is that if the opponent says that a sprout arises
from a seed in which it does not pre-exist, he leaves himself open to the reply that
one might as well say that a sprout arises from a pebble, in which it likewise does not
pre-exist.
162 Since curds are a result, they do not originate from seed grains, etc., which are
empty of those curds. See Ava P243a—2,3; D208b—6.
163 That is, the inner âyatanas, the eye and so on. See Ava P243a—6,7; D209a—2
and P243bl,2; D209a-4.
164 Here byung ba, "arisen, come forth, come about," translates -maya, "made of,
consisting of." See MMK 1—13.
165 gyur pa, probably -bhiita, "being or being like, consisting of," etc.
166 That is, the example in the opponent's last syllogism, "a jar," lacks the property to
be proved (namely, that its causal conditions exist in ultimate reality) and the proving
property (namely, that it is made of its causal conditions). See Ava P245a—5,6;
D210b—3,4.
167 See note 122 and Ava P245a-7 to 245b-l, D210b-4,5,6.
168 See note 47 and Ava P245b-1,2; D210b-6,7.
169 That is, since the intrinsic nature of the result still exists, the opponent can prove
the existence of the result's causal conditions in some other way. See Ava P245b—5,
D211a—2.
170 Note that Ava P246b—8, D212a—1 have rkyen ma yin pa zhes smras pa gang yi
pa ni for PNDC rkyen ma yin te zhes bya ba ni.
171 Avalokitavrata explains that in this Madhyamaka-sástra, the negation ma yin
(a/an- or na) should be understood in all contexts as a simple negation (prasajya
pratisedha). See Ava P247a—3 ff., D212a—3 ff.
172 In PSP, the Sanskrit text of MMK 1—14d is pratyayàpratyayàh kutah. Bhàvavivek
evidently read pratyayo 'pratyayah kutah. See Kajiyama (1964), p. 127 n. *.
"Dividing the text" translates sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas nas, probably
yogavibhàgam krtvà. yoga-vibhàga, literally "rule-division," is a method of interpretin
grammatical rules, especially Pânini's sütras. One divides a single rule into two in
order to explain the formation of certain words which would otherwise be ungram
matical. See Abhyankar (1961), yoga-vibhàga, s.v.
173 "Impossible" translates 'thad pa med pa, probably anupapanna. Avalokitavrata
134 WILLIAM L. AMES
explains that the nature of a causal condition is

reality, there is no result, there can be no caus
to 248b—4, D213a—1 to 7.
174 The origination of a result causes one to th
and to use the word, "causal condition." See A
5.
175 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence is a response to the question, "What is

the result of that investigation by reasoning?" See Ava P249b—2, D214a—4.
176 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence is a response to the question, "What
good quality (guna) is attained through teaching nonorigination?" Avalokitavrata goes
on to say that the scriptures referred to are, first, those that teach that even in
superficial reality, entities which dependently originate merely appear to originate, like
phantoms (màyà-purusa); but they do not originate by intrinsic nature. Secondly, the
scriptures referred to are those that teach that in ultimate reality, entities do not
originate from themselves, from another, from both, or from no cause. See Ava
P249b—3 to 8, D214a—6 to 214b-2.
Avalokitavrata introduces the following sütra quotations by citing the objection,
"The negation of causal conditions and the proof of nonorigination ... have been
established by a mere limited (prádesika) treatise of desiccated logic (suska-tarka)."
Avalokitavrata replies, "They will also be established by reliable (àpta) scriptural
sources." See Ava P249b—8 to 250a—2, D214b—2 and also P251b—3,4,5;
D215b—7 to 216a—2.
Avalokitavrata seems to be saying that scripture (àgama) and reasoning (yukti) ar

mutually dependent and that each needs to be supported by the other. Thus scriptu
doctrines are proved through logical investigation; but, on the other hand, scripture
establishes the relevance of these investigations to spiritual life.
177 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P250a— 2, D214b—2,3. The Sanskrit of t
verse is quoted four times in PSP; see PSP 239.10—14, etc.
178 Avalokitavrata explains that afflictions (klesa) will not arise for one who sees th
sense objects are like an illusion. See Ava P250a—7,8; D214b—6 to 215a—1.
179 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P250b—1, D215a—1. The Sanskrit of th
verse (which differs slightly from the Tibetan) is found in Nanjio (1923), pp. 147,
290. The term vivikta is used in Mahàyàna sütras as a synonym of sünya, "empty."
180 See Ava P250b—3,4; D215a—3. Sanskrit in PSP 449.5,6; see also de Jong
(1978), p. 237.
181 Sugata, "Well-gone," is another epithet of the Buddha. Avalokitavrata explains t
all dharmas are like the Sugata in that they have the intrinsic nature of nonoriginat
(or, an intrinsic nature without origination: skye ba med pa'i ngo bo nyid, anutpàda
svabhàva). See Ava P250b—6, D215a—4,5.
182 See Ava P250b-6,7; D215a-5.
183 Specifically, it indicates the Tathágata's dharmakáya, according to Avalokitavrata.
See Ava P251a—2, D215a—7.
184 See Ava P251a—2, D215b—1. Avalokitavrata apparently means the Àrya
brahma-visesacintà-pariprcchâ-sûtra, since he identifies the Buddha's interlocutor as
Brahmavisesacintà (loe. cit., following line).
185 Avalokitavrata explains that the abandonment of all afflictions (klesa) is attained
by one who understands nonorigination. One should not fear nonorigination;
nonorigination itself is enlightenment. The world does not attain enlightenment,
because it is attached to origination. A Buddha does not have the co

arising of a Buddha or of final nirvâna (parinirvàna). See Ava P2
D215b—2 to 5.
186 Identified by Kajiyama; see Kajiyama (1964), p. 128 n. ******. Cited by
Avalokitavrata only as "other sutràntas " see Ava P251a—8, D215b—5.
187 Avalokitavrata comments that although they act in this world, they are not stained
by the sufferings of samsára; and for as long as samsara continues, they benefit beings.
See Ava P251b-2, D215b-6.
188 On the various names of "Bhâvaviveka," see de La Vallée Poussin (1932—3),
pp. 60—1; Gokhale (1958), pp. 165—6 n. 1; Iida (1980), pp. 5—6; and Ruegg (1981),
p. 60 n. 183.
921 lbl3 164-170

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BHĀVAVIVEKA'S "PRAJÑĀPRADĪPA": A Translation of Chapter One: 'EXAMINATION OF

CAUSAL CONDITIONS' ("PRATYAYA") Part Two

A Translation of Chapter One:

Objection: Now [our] fellow Buddhists1 say:

There is no fifth causal condition. [MMK 1—2d]

[The opponent continues:] The causal conditions imagined by

Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 93—135, 1994.

(samanantara-pratyaya) consists of [all]

The intrinsic nature of entities (bhàva) does not exist in [their]

same objection (paryanuyoga)17 [as before]. Therefore th

If [entities'] own nature (bdag gi dngos po, svabhàva) d

[That is,] if [entities'] own nature does not exist in [the

cause, the object of cognition, the i

There are four causal conditions: t

[We] maintain that those [causal con

There is no fifth causal condition

Answer: In ultimate reality, it is n

The intrinsic nature of entities doe

"Of entities" [means] "of inner, sub

If [entities'] own nature does not e

That very own nature [of entities], which is about to ori

[and that that activity of origination] possesses causal con

Activity ( kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MM

In ultimate reality, we do not accept the activity of coo

Activity {kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MM

[This means that] in ultimate reality, the activity of pro

[Buddhapàlita continues:] In order to negate that, [Nâgâijuna

Activity (kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1—4a]

[This is so] because the activity of producing cognition is not possible

An isolated (kevala) activity, not characterized by possessing causal

Activity (kriyà) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1—4a]

[This is so] because the activity of the origination of cognition, like

[Gunamati continues:] Some [take] th

Activity which does not possess cau

[Things] which do not possess activity are not causal conditions.

Here origination in ultimate reality has been negated. Therefore

Do [causal conditions] which possess activity exist or [not]?57

[The answer,] "no," is [supplied from] the context.58 Nevertheless, it

Objection: [The Sâmkhyas62 reply:] We are not able to show you

[we] want to abandon, that [visible for

[Things] which do not possess activity

The rest of the sentence is "which pr

[Causal conditions] also do [not] posse

"Not" is [supplied from] the context.

to originate (utpàda-abhimukhïbhûta).71 Therefore the m

[A result] originates in dependence on (pratïtya) these;

A result originates in dependence on these [things] such

As long as [a result] does not originate, how is it that t

As long as a result does not originate, how is it that the

[Reason:] because they are indescribab

Objection-. In regard to that [negation in MMK 1—lab,] "Entities

Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing (artha), is a

This [half-verse] sets forth two theses.

If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condi

Here, of what nonexistent [thing], such as a sky-flower and so on,

meaning of the sentence is that those [ma/w-creepers]

If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condi

Even if [the nonexistence of which you speak] is the nonexistence

[Reason:] because [the sprout] does not

If it does exist, what is the use of a

The idea is that even if [the result] do

If it does exist, what is the use of a causal condition? [MMK 1—6d]

is not [logically] possible.