MODULE III: PRESUMPTIONS

1. THE WORDS IN A STATUTE ARE USED PRECISELY AND NOT LOOSELY..........................1

2. VESTED RIGHTS ARE NOT, TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT EXPRESS WORDS OR NECESSARY
IMPLICATION OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION.....................................................................2
3. MENS REA IS GENERALLY REQUIRED FOR A CRIMINAL ACT.........................................4
4. Government if affected by a statute...........................................................................5
5. The jurisdiction of courts is neither enlarged nor decreased.......................................7
6. STATUTES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.....9
7. Territorial Nexus.......................................................................................................10
8. LEGISLATURE KNOWS THE EXISTING LAW AND DOES NOT INTEND TO ALTER IT
EXCEPT BY EXPRESS ENACTMENT.....................................................................................11
9. THE LEGISLATURE DOES NOT COMMIT MISTAKES OR MAKE OMISSIONS..................12
10. Tautology..............................................................................................................14

1. THE WORDS IN A STATUTE ARE USED PRECISELY AND NOT LOOSELY

The general rule is verbis legis non est recedendum—You must not vary the words of a statute
Cases:

a. Mayor, Councillors & Burgesses of the Borough of New Plymouth v. Thranaki

Electric Power Board.

Fact: The respondents commenced the action for a determination of the question of the
validity of certain agree- ments to supply electricity to a certain territory. The validity
depended upon the question whether that territory was an "adjoining district" to the
appellant.

Ratio: The primary and exact meaning of 'adjoining' is 'conterminous'.

Contention: it cannot be disputed that the word is also used in a loos- er sense as meaning
`near' or 'neighboring'.

Application of principle:
There is presumption that words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly
and not loosely and inexactly. Upon those who assert that the rule has been broken, the
burden of establishing their proposition lies heavily.' Meaning, they need to show that
something in the Statute means Near. And they can discharge it only by pointing to
something in the context which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must be
preferred.

b. Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali

Facts: Chinubai (plaintiff-respondent) filed a suit for rendition of accounts and the suit
was decreed. The plaintiff thereafter supplied the deficit court fee and on the date he did
so the decree was prepared and signed.

Contention: When does the limitation period start?

Application of the principle:

Normally under Section 12(2), read with the Explanation, the period between the
pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree cannot be excluded; but in
the present case, it was only after the deposit of the deficit court fee that the decree could
be prepared. And so, the date of the decree would be not the date of the judgement, but
the date of deposit by the plaintiff of the deficit court fee because the decree was not
prepared until the fee was paid.

2. VESTED RIGHTS ARE NOT, TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT EXPRESS WORDS OR

NECESSARY IMPLICATION OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION.

 Nerno potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam - No one can change his
plans to the injury of another. This applies for the legislature as well.
 laws should be construed as prospective and not retrospective, except when they are
expressly made applica- ble to past or pending transactions.
 A statute, gener- ally, is not construed to operate retrospectively and take away a
vested right, except when the cases in which it is to have such retrospective operation
are set out therein.
 Therefore, an intention to forfeit established rights will not be presumed, nor will a
statute having such an effect be carried beyond the purpose plainly indicated by
construc- tion. Thus, a court will not so construe a statute as to deprive per- sons of
their properties and transfer them to others without payment of compensation unless
such a conclusion is ineluctable on account of policy or express words.

Cases:

a. Radha Krishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswami Iyer [Statutory right to appeal]

Facts: There was no statutory right to appeal against the High Court order in the
Income Tax Act, 1918 or Section 66 of the Act of 1922. S.66-A introduced right to
appeal in the 1922 act in the year 1926.

Contention: Whether this new act can be retrospectively be applied?

 Principle applied: While provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of
procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have
retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at
the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of
express enactment or necessary intendment.
**Basically, unless it is explicitly stated, retrospective effect cannot be applicable in
case where existing rights are in question.

b. Inglewood Pulp Co. v. New Brunswick Electric Power Collimissam [right to

compensation]
Facts: Government expropriated the private property belonging to Mr. X for public
use.

Contention: Whether Mr. X should receive compensation?

Principle: on a contract for sale and purchase of land it is the practice to require the
purchaser to pay interest on his purchase money from the date he took possession.
Expropriation under the Act in question is not effected for private gain, but for the
good of the public at large, but for all this, the owner is deprived of his property in
this case as much as in the other, and the rule has long been accepted in the
interpretation of statutes that they are no! to be held to deprive individuals of property
without compensation unless tilt intention to do so is made quite clear.
** There is Right to compensation.

c. Ganpat Rai v. Chamber of Commerce

Facts: application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Bench was refused. He,
however, took the matter up on appeal but the Division Bench of the HC said that
appeal was incompetent.

Contention: Whether there exists the right to appeal?

Principle: a right or appeal from an order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench w/o a
certificated vested in a person. The appellant could not be deprived of this right by a
subsequent change in the law, unless the later enactment provides expressly or by
necessary implication for retrospective effect being given.

d. Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhry (*Imp)

In this ruling is imp:
(i) That the legal pursuit of remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but
steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrin- sic unity and are to.be
regarded as one legal proceeding.
 (ii) That the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but a sub- stantive
right.

(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal
then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the
suit.

(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court
accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and
although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced
such right is to be gov- erned by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of
the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its deci- sion
or at the date of the filing of the appeal.

(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if
it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 

IMP Points:
- Majority opinion in cases: - It is an existing right and is triggered at the time of filing
the suit and NOT at the time of filing an appeal.
- Right to appeal is not merely a procedure but a substantive right.
- statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is
manifested.

3. MENS REA IS GENERALLY REQUIRED FOR A CRIMINAL ACT

Elements of mens rea introduced in criminal law because no fault liability should be
distinguished and not punished. 
 Cases:
a. Srinivas Mall Bairoliya v. Emperor  (Defence of India, Act)
Facts: This guy at Bairoliya’s shop was selling over the counter more than the MRP
that was stipulated under the Defence of India, Act.

Contention: Will the employer be held vicariously liable for the fault of employee?
Employer arg: I did not have the mens rea, some employee was doing this. 

Principle: Privy Council held:

“the court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute, either clearly or by
necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a
defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he
has got a guilty mind.”

IMP POINTS:
- Instances which lead to conviction w/o mens rea - minor cases. For major cases, you
should and ought to have the mens rea. W/o mens rea, one cannot be prosecuted. 
- Mens rea is always required unless the statute or necessary implication that it is not
required. 
Master will not be held liable for the acts of the servant.

b. Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P

Fact: Adulteration food is being made and sold. Sarju prasad is the employee, he only
takes it off the shelf and sells it off. Employer is the person who is responsible for
making the product and checking the quality. This whole incident took place before
the coming of Consumers Protection Act. Adulterated Food is a different category -
because it is a public health risk.

Issue: Should the employee be held liable for his employer under the Prevention of
Food Adulteration act, 1954?

Decision: Owner (Employer) is punished w/o mens rea because strict liability. You
had inferior goods @ your shop. You directly go to the jail. Similarly, why should the
employee not be held liable?
“If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea
liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, we fail to appreciate why an agent
or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for con- travention of the same
provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge.” 

Author of the Book disagrees with the decision: To ensure that he takes proper care,
he is punished even w/o the proof of mens rea. But the employee does not store the
food in the shop, only gives it to the customer. Therefore, he would come under the
category of a person who is morally innocent of the blame.

c. Ranjit udeshi v. State of MH

Facts: A guy sells Lady Chatterley's Lover which contains obscene images. How can one
expect to know of every book that he keeps in his store? Who is to judge what is obscene
and what is not? 

SC: principle is if it is expressly excluded it is excluded. 

 S.292 IPC → starts with “whether knowingly or unknowingly” does not make
knowledge of obscenity an ingredient of the offence.
 The prosecution need not prove something which the law does not burden it with.
 It is argued that the number of books these days is so large and their contents so varied
that the question whether there is mens rea or not must be based on definite knowledge
of the existence of obscen- ity.
 the difficulty of obtaining legal evidence of the offender's knowledge of the obscen- ity
of the book, etc. has made the liability strict.
 4. GOVERNMENT IF AFFECTED BY A STATUTE

 Crown is not bound by statutes unless states therein.

 However, in India, the rule may be stated as the Government is also bound by a
statute unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. [opposite of the
Crown]

Cases:
a. Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay
(This was the position in V.S: Rice & Oil Mills v. State of A.P(c ))
 Whether the Crown is bound by Sections 222(1) & City of Bombay Municipal Act?
Held:
 The Crown may be bound, as has often been said, 'by necessary implication'. If that is

to say, it is manifest from the very terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the
legislature that the Crown should be bound, then the result is the same as if the Crown
had been expressly, named.
 Every statute must be supposed to be 'for the public good, at least in intention, and
even when, as in the present case, it is apparent that one objects of the legislature is to
promote the welfare and convenience of a large body of the King's subjects by giving
extensive powers to a local authority, it cannot be said, consistently with the decided
cases, that the Crown is necessarily bound by the enactment.
 The apparent purpose of the statute is one element, and may be an important element,
to be considered when an intention to bind the Crown is alleged. If it can be affirmed
that, at the time when the statute was passed and received the royal sanction, it was
apparent from its terms that its beneficent purpose must be wholly frustrated unless
the Crown were bound, then it may be inferred that the Crown has agreed to be
bound. Their Lordships will add when the court is asked to draw this inference, it
must always be remembered that, if it be the intention of the legislature that the
Crown shall be bound, nothing is easier than to say so in plain words.

b.  State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari 

Can the State is liable to be proceeded against under Order 39 Rule 2(3) CPC?
Held: State is bound by the CPC, the scheme of the Code being that subject to any special
provision made in that regard, as respects Governments, it occupies the same position as any
other party to a proceeding before the court.

c. V.S: Rice & Oil Mills v. State of A.P

Govt supplied electricity at certain rate to citizen under Madras Essential Articles Control
and Requistioning (Temporary Power) Act, 1949.
Issue: It was contended that the scheme of the Act was that the power to regulate the
 supply of an essential article which had been conferred on the State, was to be applied in
regard to transactions between citizen:, and citizens and could not be applied to an
essential article which the State itself supplied
Held:
 If, after reading all the relevant provisions of the statute, the court is satisfied that by
necessary implication the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced
against the State, that conclusion must be adopted.
 If there are express terms to that effect, there is, of course, no difficulty in dealing
with this vexed question.
 Where, however, the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the
statute but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute, the same rule
of construction may have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the public good,
and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that
it is serving the public good, it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the
intention of the legislature was to make the relevant pro- visions applicable to the
State.

d. Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta

Facts: State was carrying on trade without obtaining a license as required by Section 218
of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951

Issue: whether the State was exempt from and not bound by the section?

Principle:
 The English rule of construction is - Crown is not bound by statutes unless stated therein.
 This rule of construction was applied only in Madras and Calcutta and not in all parts of
India. Infact, the English rule of construction brought opposite results in Calcutta and
Madras.
 It is, therefore, clear that the said rule of construction was not accepted as a rule of
construction throughout India and even in the Presidency.
 It has been held by this Court that 'laws in force' in Article 372 includes not only
enactments of the Indian legislatures but also the common law of the land which was
being administered by the courts in India. But it is not possible to hold that a mere rule of
construc- tion adopted by English courts, and also by some of the Indian courts, to
ascertain the intention of the legislature was a law in force within the meaning of this
term. This is an essential distinction between a law and a canon of construction, and a
canon of construction is not a rule of law.
 We are not concerned here with the statutory rules of interpretation. Therefore, the rule of
construction is not a 'law in force' within the meaning of Article 372.

 Next question was: whether this Court should adopt the rule of construction accepted by
the Privy Council in interpreting statutes vis-à-vis the Crown  Decided: NO!
Held: the said rule of construction is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the
 doctrine of equality. There is, no justification for this Court to accept the English canon
of construction, for it brings about diverse results and conflicting decisions. On the other
hand, the normal construction, namely, that the general Act applies to citizens as well as
to State unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its
operation, steers clear of all the said anomalies.
5. THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS IS NEITHER ENLARGED NOR DECREASED.

a. Mary Board. V. William Board

The Legislature of Alberta in 1907 passed a Supreme Court Act establishing a Supreme Court
of Alberta as a Supreme Court of civil and criminal jurisdiction in and for that Province.
Section 9 of the Act confers on the Supreme Court all the capacity given by Divorce Acts to
judges of other courts in England to act as the court established by those Acts.

Issue: whether the court had jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, including divorce?

Held:
 The right to divorce had been introduced into the substantive law of the province,
before the setting up of a Supreme and Superior Court of Record in Alberta. This
means, there is a special law in place, that is the Province (one) that enforces these
rights.
 In absence of any explicit and valid legislative declaration, the court was bound to
entertain and to give effect to proceedings for making that right operative. If the right
exists, the presumption is that there is a court which can enforce it.
 However, if no other mode of enforcing it is prescribed, that alone is sufficient to
give jurisdiction to the King’s Court of Justice.
 In order to oust jurisdiction it is necessary, in the absence of a special law excluding
it altogether, to plead that jurisdiction exists in some other court.
 When you have to take away or create jurisdiction, you need to have a special law.

b. Ujjam Bai v. state of UP

An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which was intra vires
and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction could not be challenged on the ground
that it was passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification
issued thereunder.

 Jurisdiction means authority to decide.

 Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its
jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion, whether it is wrong in law or in fact.
The question whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood
of the facts, but upon their nature (of the legal question), and it is determinable 'at
the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the enquiry'. 
  An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body, cannot in
general, be impeached otherwise that on appeal unless the erroneous determination
relates to a matter which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles
govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of
administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies
are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their
jurisdiction; and provided that they ket:1,-) within those limits, their decisions must be
accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal.

c. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (*IMP) [module p. 112]

Assessment under Madhya Bharat sales tax Act were Ultra vires herefore, for art order a
refund of the tax collected. Section 17 of the Act provided that assessment made shall not be
called in no question in any court.
SC laid down 7 points holding that the suit was not barred:
(I have shortened some points, to read full thing – refer p. 112 of the module)
I. If under a Statute, a special tribunal that is created of special purpose, and have
ousted the jurisdiction of civil court, then tribunal is the final. Tribunal has
replaced the civil court. Except if the provisions of that Statute , does not exclude

those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied
with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principle of judicial procedure.

II. When express bar on civil court jurisdiction. Need to go through the powers of the
Tribunal (special one) and see if the tribunal has the same power of the court (ex.
Civil court) whose jurisdiction the tribunal has ousted. 

III. Challenge to the provision of the alleged act could be challenged in the higher
court. Not before high court, not before the special tribunal.

IV. When there is a challenge of unconstitutionality of certain provision, the suit

deemed open.

V. Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in
excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies.

VI. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality
are for the decision of the authorities a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the
authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the
particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined
because it is a relevant enquiry.

VII. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court be inferred unless the conditions
 above set down apply.

6. STATUTES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH

INTERNATIONAL LAW

 Every statute is to be so interpreted as not to be inconsistent with well-established

rules of international law, except when a contrary intention is expressed clearly
 But if there is inconsistency, the municipal law prevails.
 Ex. neither comity nor any rule of international law can be invoked to prevent a
sovereign State from protecting its revenue laws from abuse by foreigner
Cases:
a. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.
interpret ,1 statute so as
It is only in cases of doubt or ambiguity that the courts would
not to make it inconsistent with the comity of nations or established ules of international
law; but if the language of the statute is clear. it must be followed notwithstanding the
conflict between the municipal law and international law may result.
b. ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla

whether a habeas corpus petition would lie during an Emergency?

Dissent- Khanna J.: -
 If two constructions of the municipal law are possible, courts should lean in favour of
adopting such construction as would make the provision of the municipal law to be in
harmony with the international law or treaty obligations.
 Every statute, according to this rule, is interpreted so far as its language permits so as
not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or the established rules of
international law and the court would avoid a construction which would give rise to
such inconsistency unless compelled to adopt it by plain and unambiguous language.
 But if the language of the statute is clear it must be followed notwithstanding the
conflict between municipal and international laws which results.
 A rule of municipal law which ostensibly seems to conflict with the law of nations
must, therefore, if possible, always be so interpreted as to avoid such conflict. This
rule about the construction of municipal law holds good when construing the
provisions of the Constitution.
 The rules of international law are not to be considered as part of English law if they
conflict with an Act of Parliament.
c. Bhitn Singhji v. Union of India 
Krishna Iyer J.
'Reading down meanings of words with loose lexical amplitude permissible as part of the
judicial process. To sustain a law by interpretation is the rule. To be trigger happy in shooting
at sight every suspect law is judicial legicide, Courts can and must interpret words and read
their meanings so that public good is promoted and power misuse 1,- interdicted.'
 APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS – 2 SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT.

A. INCORPORATION
In Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin
Krishna Iyer, J. held that the Indian Constitution has adopted the Transformation theory.
That is, international law has to undergo transformation by means of law enacted by
Parliament so that it can form part of the law of the land.
B. TRANSFORMATION
In People’s Union Liberties v. UOI Kuldip
Singh, J. observed that nation laws have to construed in conformity with the customary
principle of international law.

7. TERRITORIAL NEXUS 
 The power of a country allows it to legislate for its own subjects all over the world, and
for foreigners within its jurisdiction, but no further.
 Power to make laws would not include a power to make such laws as might be broken by
anyone with impunity.
 a sovereign legislature may pass a law having extra-territorial operation and though it
cannot be directly enforced, it would be invalid and the courts must enforce it with the
available machinery.
 legislation of a State is primarily territorial and the general rule extra territorium jus
dicenti impune non paretur.  One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory is not
obeyed with impunity

Cases:
a. Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar
Where there was sufficient territorial nexus between the person sought to be proceeded
against under a law, and the State which enacted the law, the law is not strictly speaking
extra-territorial and is not ultra vires on the ground that such person is not residing within
the enacting State.
b. S.K. Sahgal v. Maharaj Kishore Khanna 
The decree under the U.P Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, of the Special Judge was
transferred to a court outside U.P for execution.

Held: Merely because a court outside U.P. is applying a statute of 'U.P. would not
amount to giving extra-territorial operation to the statute when the statute was being
applied to one of its legitimate objects.

c. State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi

 The doctrine of territorial connection or nexus is applicable to income tax
legislation, sales tax legislation and also legislation imposing a tax on gambling.
  Sufficiency of the territorial connection involve, consideration of two elements:
(i) connection must be realnot illusory
(ii) liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to the connection.

d. Anant Prasad v. State of A.P. 

A public trust was in registered in Andhra Pradesh but some its endowed prop were in
MP. It was necessary for the purpose of management of the Prop in MP that the trust had
to be registered in MP.

Held:
The registration of the trust in Madhya Pradesh cannot be a bar against the enforcement of the
Hyderabad Endowments Rgulations 1940, The registration would not exclude the jurisdiction
of the AP State to legislate with respect to the trust which was undoubtedly situated in AP.

8. LEGISLATURE KNOWS THE EXISTING LAW AND DOES NOT INTEND TO

ALTER IT EXCEPT BY EXPRESS ENACTMENT

The law presumes that the Act did not intend to make any alteration; for if Parliament had
that design, they would, have expressed it in the Act.
Further, the legislature must not be taken to intend any alteration in the law beyond what it
explicitly declares in express terms or by unmistakable implication.
Cases:

a. Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar

Facts: There was a gift of shares by a registered deed in favour of the appellant, hot the
formalities prescribed by the Companies Act, 1913, were not com- plied with. The High
Court held that the gift was incomplete and failed.
It is true that the relevant Provision- of the Transfer of Property Act and the Companies Act
must have interpreted harmoniously. But, this certainly does not mean that a provision of one
Act could be nullified by any provision of the other Act. It means that the provisions of the
two Acts should be read consistently with each other so far as it t- reasonably possible to do

so. This could be best achieved here by examining the by examining the objects and the
subject-matter of each enactment and by viewing each relevant provision as a limb of an limb
of an integrated whole meant to serve their underlying purposes. In this way, their separable
sphere of operation will be clarified so as to avoid possibilities of conflict between them or
any unnecessary overflow of what really appertains to one field into another.

b. Middleton v. Texas & Light Co.

There is a strong presumption that a legislature under- stands and correctly appreciates the
needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience
and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds

c. Sakal Deep Sahai v. Union of India'

The question appears to us to be no longer open for consideration afresh by us, or, at any rate,
it is not advisable to review the authorities of this court, after such a lapse of time when,
despite the view taken by this Court that Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 1908 was
applicable to such cases, the Limitation Act of 1963 had been passed repeating the law,
contained in Articles 102 and 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908 in identical terms without
any modification.
Principle:
The legislature must be presumed to be cognizant of the view of the court that a claim of
the nature before us, for arrears of salary falls within the purview of Article 102 of the
Limitation Act of 1908. If Parliament, which is deemed to be aware of the declarations by
the law by the court, did not alter the law, it must be deemed to have accepted the
interpretation of this court even though the correctness of it may be open to doubt. If
doubts had arisen, it was for the legislature to clear these doubts. When a provision of the
statute is interpreted by the Supreme Court and the statute is re-enacted with the identical
provisions then the presumption is that the legislature accepted the interpretation put upon
the provisions by the Supreme Court.
d. State of Gujarat v. Zinabhai Ranchhodji Darjil
In the matter of interpretation of enactments which are in force in a particular State this Court
generally attaches a good deal of value to the views of the High Court of that State,
particularly when they have been fully considered by it, because, that court is expected to be
sufficiently conversant with the provisions or the various local enactments.

9. THE LEGISLATURE DOES NOT COMMIT MISTAKES OR MAKE OMISSIONS

 Words may be modified or varied when their import is doubtful or obscure

 If, however, the expression does not include the complete thought of the legislature, or if
the words are equally susceptible of several meanings, we are to seek in other part of the
same statute, or in other statutes, certainly in those in pari materia with this or that one of
the several possible meanings whichto be put upon the words.
 In interpreting a statute, to meet the obvious intention of the legislature, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the
sentences, but that is allowed only where the court is coerced to do so to avoid some
serious injustice or to prevent a statute from being reduced to nullity, or for any other
similar reason.
 Clerical or printing errors can be corrected by the court so also an accidental omission in
a Schedule.
 As a rule, it is not permissible to the court to supply omissions in a statute. But if the
words of a statute are so obscure or ambiguous that it is impossible to put a grammatical
 construction on them, while the intention is clear, it is permissible, in order to give effect
to the statute and to avoid the manifest absurdity or injustice, to supply omitted words or
expressions
 Obvious omissions can be made up by suitable interpretation, but the court cannot
otherwise supply supposed deficiencies, for then the court, instead of declaring the law,
would be making laws.

a. Mohd. Bahadoor Khan v. Collector of Bareilly

It impossible that any court can add to the statute that which the legislature has not done.
This limitation is enacted in plain and absolute term. The legislature has not thought fit to
extend the period which it has pre- scribed to persons under disability. When such
enlargements have been intended, they are found in the Acts containing the limitation.
This Act contains no such saving and introducing would mean that court is legislating and
not interpreting the statute.
b. Indian Immigration Trust Board of Natal v. Govindasamy
Under Section 118 immigrant" mean and include all Indians introduced from India into
Natal and those descendants of Indians resident in Natal.
Contention: whether the word "immigrant" in the expression "every male statute adult
immigrant" included the descendants of immigrants?
Held: When the interpretation clause in a statute says that such and such all expression
shall include so and so, a court in construing a statute is bound to the give effect to the
direction unless it can be shown that the context of the particular passage where the
expression is used shows clearly that the meaning is not in this place to be given effect to,
or unless there can be alleged some general reasons of weight why the the interpretation
clause is to be denied its application.
It was also held that the argument that it was unlikely that the legislature would wish to
provide for medical attendance when the number of such descendants was large and their
social position did not require it, should be addressed to the legislature; because change
of circumstances cannot have weight in the interpretation by a court.

c. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India

 Section 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It mentions the
words “to any person for any purpose.” & meaning of industry - "industry" means any
business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture.
 The dissenting judge, Mr Justice Tulzarpurkar held that the act was ultra vires because
s.23 used the phrase “to any person for any purpose.”
 This limitation on the wide words of Section 23(1) is a matter of semantics and
reading down meanings of words with loose lexical amplitude is permissible as part
of the judicial process. The wide definition-of "industry" or the use of general words
like "any person" and "any purpose" cannot free the whole clause from the inarticulate
major premise that only a public purpose to sub-serve the common good and filling

the bill of Article 39(b) and (c) will be permissible. Even a private industry may be
 for a national need and may serve common good. The touchstone is public purpose,
community good and like criteria. If the particular act of allotment is mala fide or
beyond the statutory and consituational parameters such exercise will be a casualty in
court and will be struck down. The power of judicial review to strike at excess or
mala fide is always there.
 Applying “public purpose” to interpret “any purpose” is not permissible.
 The doctrine of reading down does not apply when the provision explicitly clear and
unambiguous and there is no room for more than one construction.

d. Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha v. Govt. of A.P

'A legislation proceeding upon an erroneous assumption of the existing law without directly
amending or declaring the law is ineffective to change the law.' A mere erroneous assumption
exhibited in a statute as to the state of the existing law is ineffective to express an 'intention to
change the law; if, by such a statute, the idea is to change the law, it will be said that 'the
legislature has plainly misfired'. The 'legislation founded on a mistaken or erroneous
assumption has not the effect of making the law which the legislature had erroneously
assumed to be so'. The court will disregard such a belief or assumption and also the provision
inserted in that belief or assumption.
e. Banwari Dass
The Golden Rule permits addition of words to remove an absurdity or injustice; but the casus
omissus rule does not allow any such addition even in the case of injustice or absurdity,
because as recrimination is not allowed the petitioner who may be guilty of corrupt practices
may be declared elected if the respondents election is set aside. According to me nothing
should be added except in the case of typographical errors. If the provision interpreted
according to Mischief Rule appears absurd the court may point out the absurdity and leave it
to the legislature to correct it. There is no absurdity the court should give their words their
natural meaning that is, give the words a meaning which fits the context and removes the
mischief i.e. follow the rule in Heydon case.

10. TAUTOLOGY
(a) A statute ought to be so construed that if it can be prevented no clause, sentence or word
is rendered be superfluous, void or insignificant.
(b) To reject words as un-meaningful is permissible only when an absurdity would follow by
retaining the words and giving effect to them.

Cases:
a. Ghanshyamdas v. CSP
The appellant, a registered dealer, furnished for the year 1949-50, a return of his turnover for
the first quarter but failed to do so for the other 3 quarters. In 1954 notice was issued to him
to furnish the returns.
App contention: It was a case of "escaped turnover" under Section 11.-A and as the
assessment was not made. Within three years as required by the section, the assessment of his
turnover was barred by limitation.
Resp contention: In case of a registered dealer, there was a statutory obligation to make a
return and, therefore, the proceedings of assessment had to be deemed to be pending from the
date an assessee was bound to make his return and since the proceedings had to be deemed to
be pending there was no scope for invoicing Section 11-A of the Act.
Decision:
Court went with Respondent’s contention.
 Under Section 10(1) the Commissioner need not issue a notice to a registered dealer
for furnishing the relevant returns but a statutory obligation is imposed on such a
dealer to do so by such dates and to such authority as may be prescribed.
 The sub-section (2) is in two parts, the first part speaks of a dealer who may be
required by the Commissioner by notice to furnish returns; and the second part of a
registered dealer who shall furnish the returns by such prescribed dates and the sub-
section says that both of them shall furnish the returns.
 If the 'dealer' in the first part includes a registered dealer, the mention of 'every
registered dealer' in the second part will become redundant for a registered dealer is
included in the expression 'dealer'.
 A construction which would attribute redundancy to a legislature shall not be accepted
except for compel- ling reasons. This redundancy disappears if the expression 'dealer'
in the first part excludes a registered dealer mentioned in the second part.

b. Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar

The appellant, who was less than twenty-one years of age, was convicted for the offence
under Section 326 read with Section 149, an offence punishable with imprisonment for life,
and was sentenced to three years. On the question whether he could claim the benefit of the
Probation of Offenders act, 1958.

Decision:
A plain reading of Section 6 of the Act makes it manifest that it deals with persons under
twenty-one years of age who are found guilty of having committed an offence punishable
with imprisonment, but not with imprisonment for life. As imprisonment for life can also
be awarded for the offence under Section 326 read with Section 149, a person that is found
guilty of such an offence would not be entitled to claim the benefit of s.6. To hold otherwise
would have the effect of ignoring the words “but not with imprisonment for life”' and
treating them to be otiose. Such a construction is plainly not permissible.

c. Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam

The Appellent, a member of the Judicial Service, after attaining the age of 5o years served
notice on the Government under F.R. (Fundamental Rule) 56(c) that he proposed to
voluntarily retire from service with effect from 2 nd Aug, 1976. The Government accorded
permission and the High Court agreed with the Government. But on 28 July 1976 the Govt.
countermanded its earlier permission and the HC also gave him a posting; and, thereafter,
threatened him with disciplinary action in case he did not join his post.
The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the administrative order of the High Court on the
judicial side. On appeal to the Supreme Court the Respondent-State sought to support the
order of the High Court on the basis that Rule 119 of the Defence and Internal Security of
India Rules, 1971 is superimposed on F.R. 56(c) and, therefore, it was impermissible in law
for a Government servant to voluntarily retire without written permission from the
Government.
Court held:
It is a cardinal rule of construction that no words should be considered redundant or surplus
in interpreting the provisions of a statute or a rule. Explanation 2 does not say an express or
implied term of employment, but refers to 'an express or implied term of his contract of
employment'. If the language in Explanation 2 were different, namely, an express or implied
term of employment, instead of 'contract of employment', the position would have been
different. Explanation 2 in Rule 119, albeit, a penal rule takes care to use the words 'contract
of employment' and necessarily excludes the two categories of employment, namely, the one
under the Central Government and the other under the State Government. Explanation 2 only
takes in its sweep the third category of employment where the relationship between the
employer and the employee is one governed by a contract of employment. Since F.R. 56 is a
statutory condition of service, which operates in law, without reference to a contract of
employment, there is nothing inconsistent between Rule 119 and F.R. 56.