Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Laying the Raven to Rest: A Discussion of Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation
Author(s): John L. Pollock
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 20 (Nov. 22, 1973), pp. 747-754
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025089
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 ~ - t - - - -*
+__- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME LXX, NO. 20, NOVEMBER 22, I973

I
LAYING THE RAVEN TO REST: A DISCUSSION OF HEMPEL
AND THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION
N a landmarkarticle,Carl Hempel1 laid downconditionsof
adequacy for a formalanalysis of instance confirmationand
then produced an analysissatisfyingthose conditions.In this
paper I will show thathis analysisfails to meet an additional condi-
tion which is just as obvious as those he laid down. An examina-
tion of the reasonsfor thisfailurewill lead firstto the rejectionof
all versionsof Hempel's "SatisfactionCriterionof Confirmation"
and then to a new proposal regardingthe paradoxes of confirma-
tion.

What has come to be called "instanceconfirmation" is confirmation

of a general hypothesisby its "positiveinstances."Positiveinstances
are those instanceswhich,upon being amassed,lead to greaterand
greaterconfirmation of the hypothesis.Preciselywhat constitutesa
positive instance is a matterof controversy, and will be discussed
below, but a necessarycondition is that observation of positive
instances support not only the general hypothesisbut also new
instancesof the hypothesis.For example,everyoneagreesthat(Aa &
Bb) is a positiveinstanceof a hypothesisof the form(x) (Ax D Bx).2
Thus, insofaras (Aa & Ba) confirms(x) (Ax D Bx), it mustalso lend
support to the counterfactualconditional "If we were to find an-
otherA, it would also be B." And learningthe truthof more and
more instances of this form should give us greater and greater
confirmation of thehypothesis.
I "Studiesin the Logic of Confirmation,"
Mind, LIV, 213,214 (January,April
1945):1-26,97-121.
2 We restrict
our attentionto hypotheses
thatare "projectible,"
in thesenseof
NelsonGoodman'sFact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge,Mass: Harvard,1955)
and my "The Logic of Projectibility,"Philosophy of Science, xxxIx, 3 (Septem-
ber 1972):302-314.Let me also admitat thispointthatsomeof the conclusions
drawnbeloware at odds withconclusionsdrawnin the latterarticle.

747

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 748 THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

Hempel laid down the followingconditionsof adequacy for any

analysisof confirmation:3
satisfactory
ConsequenceCondition:If p confirms q, and q -> r, thenp con-
firms r.4
ConjunctionCondition:If p confirms bothq and r, thenp confirms
(q & r).
Consistency Condition:If p is logicallyconsistent and p confirms
q, thenp mustbe consistent withq.
InverseEquivalenceCondition:5If p is equivalentto q and p confirms
r,thenq confirms
r.
Numerous philosophershave objected to various of these condi-
tions on differentgrounds,but I find them acceptable. I will not
attemptto defend themhere.
Having laid down his conditionsof adequacy, Hempel proposed
an analysis of confirmationwhich satisfiesthese conditions. His
analysiswas based upon his discoveryof the paradox of the ravens.
He reasoned as follows.We all agree that (Aa & Ba) is a positive
instanceof (x) (Ax D Bx). But then (,-Ac & --Bc) must be a posi-
tive instanceof the contrapositive(x) (t-'Bx D -,Ax). The latteris
equivalent to, and hence entails,(x) (Ax D Bx). Thus, by the conse-
quence condition,anythingconfirming (x) (,-.Bx D -,Ax) must also
confirm(x) (Ax D Bx). Therefore,it seems that (-.Ac & -'Bc) must
also be counted as a positiveinstanceof (x) (Ax D Bx). This seems
paradoxical. For example, if (x) (Ax D Bx) says "All ravens are
black," then we should be able to confirmthis by observingnon-
black nonravens.In particular,if we went to a factorymanufactur-
ing plastic garbage cans and observed that all the cans coming
off the assembly line were green, this would confirmthat all
ravensare black. This is at leastpeculiar.
Rather than reject his formal conclusions,Hempel attempted
to explain away the air of paradox. His explanation was that what
(x) (Ax 2 Bx) says is that everythingin the universeeither is not
an A or is a B. Thus observinganythingthat satisfiesthis disjunc-
tion should confirmthe conditional.This is why(,-.-Ac8c-,Bc)
& must
be counted as a positive instance. However, this proposed ex-
planation leads to the result that we must count some more sen-
tencesas positiveinstancestoo. In particular,(,-..Ad& Bd) becomes
a positiveinstance.Generalizingthisled Hempel to his Satisfaction
3 This listof conditions
is notquite the sameas Hempel'soriginallist,but it
is equivalentto it.
4 I use the arrowto standforlogicalentailment,not thematerialconditional.
6 The nameof thiscondition is takenfromScheffier,
The Anatomyof Inquiry
(NewYork:Knopf,1963).

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 LAYING THE RAVEN TO REST 749

Criterionof Confirmation.This result,however,seems even more

paradoxical than what it was intended to explain. It is simply
preposterousto suppose that we can confirmthat all ravens are
black by findingexamples of nonravensthat are black. Thus, in
attemptingto explain one paradoxical result,Hempel was led to
embraceanothereven more paradoxical result.
This intuition of paradox can be given substance by showing
that,if we add one additional seeminglyobvious conditionof ade-
quacy to Hempel's previousconditions,no concept of confirmation
can both satisfyall these conditions and embody Hempel's con-
clusions regardingpositive instances.Amassing positive instances
is supposed to give us more and moreconfirmation of (x) (Ax D Bx).
Characteristically,in confirmingsuch a hypothesis,there will be
manythingswe will know to be A's withoutknowingwhetherthey
are B's. For example, if we are confirmingthat all ravens have
kidneys,we maycut open lotsof ravens,but we are going to know of
lots more ravens that we haven't examined. More generally,we
may know that some thingsare non-A'swithoutknowingwhether
they are B's, that some thingsare B's without knowing whether
they are A's, and that some thingsare non-B's without knowing
whetherthey are A's. None of this should detract from the con-
firmationof (x) (Ax D Bx) by its positiveinstances.So let us adopt
the additional adequacy condition:

Conditionof InstanceConjunction:If p is a positiveinstanceof

(x) (Ax D Bx), and 'b', 'c', 'd', and 'e' are individualconstants
not
occurring in p, then(p & Ab & --Ac & Bd & --Be) mustconfirm
(x) (AxD Bx).
If we now assume Hempel's conclusionsregardingpositiveinstances
and assume that all five conditionsof adequacy are satisfied,we
can derivea contradition.Accordingto Hempel, (,--Ca & ,--Da) is a
positiveinstanceof both (x) (Cx D Dx) and (x) (Cx D -Dx). Hence,
by the condition of instance conjunction,(,--,Ca8& ,Da 8c Cb &
,,Cc & Dd & ,De) must confirmboth of these generalizations.
Then, by the conjunction condition, it must confirmtheir con-
junction. But their conjunctionentails (x) ,-Cx; so, by the conse-
quence condition,this must also be confirmedby (--Ca & --,Da &
Cb & --,Cc& Dd & -De). But the lattercontainsa counterinstance
for (x) -Cx, and so certainlydoes not confirmit. Putting this in
termsof the conditionsof adequacy, (,,Ca &c -,Da &cCb 8c -,Cc &
Dd &c ..De) is logically inconsistentwith (x) - Cx, and, hence, its
confirmationis ruled out by the consistencycondition. Thus

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750 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Hempel's proposals regardingpositive instances are incompatible

withthe conditionsof adequacy.
In order to avoid this contradiction,we must deny that (,,Ca &
,,Da) is a positive instance of both (x) (Cx D Dx) and (x) (Cx D
-,Dx). Or, equivalently,we must agree that one of (,-Ac & .-Bc)
and (,,Ad & Bd) is not a positive instance of (x) (Ax D Bx). Al-
though both of these purported positive instancesseem suspect,
the latteris the more suspect.We were led to count it as a positive
instanceonly in tryingto explain why (,.Ac & -.Bc) is a positive
instance.And we have a seeminglystrongargumentfor counting
the latter as a positive instance.Consequently,I think it must be
denied that (,,Ad & Bd) is a positiveinstanceof (x) (Ax D Bx).

II
Although we have seen that Hempel's analysis is wrong,we have
not reallyseen whyit is wrong.The basic idea was verypersuasive.
In order to understandthe source of the errorwe must go back to
the paradox of the ravens.We had an argumentto the effectthat
(,-Ac & -.Bc) must be considereda positive instanceof (x) (Ax D
Bx), and we were led to explain thisby maintainingthat what the
generalizationsays is that everythingis either non-A or B, and
hence anything satisfyingthis disjunction should confirm the
generalization.It now seems to me that the errorlies in supposing
that the generalizationthat is confirmedin instance confirmation
is properlysymbolizedusing a material conditional. We have al-
ready seen that, in instance confirmation,each instance is sup-
posed to support others. More precisely,(Aa & Ba) confirmsthe
counterfactual"If we were to encounteranotherA, it would be B."
This has often been put by saying that we confirmlaws, not ac-
cidentalgeneralizations.If we were convincedthat (x) (Ax D Bx), if
true, would be true only coincidentally,then we would not take
the addition of positive instances to our evidence as confirming
the generalization.We take the addition of positive instances to
add to the confirmationof (x) (Ax D Bx) only insofar as it also
supportsother instances,and hence confirmsthe generalizedcoun-
terfactual"Any A would be a B." Let us symbolizethisby '(x) (Ax
> Bx)'. The accumulation of positive instances confirmsthis
counterfactual,and it confirms the materialconditionalonlyderiva-
tively,because it is entailed by the counterfactual.Herein lies the
errorin Hempel's argument.The generalizationthat is confirmed
in instance confirmationdoes not simply say that everythingis
either a non-A or a B, and hence there is no reason to think it

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 LAYING THE RAVENTO REST 751

should be confirmedby everythingthat satisfiesthis disjunction.

The generalizationthatis mostdirectlyconfirmedby its positivein-
stancesis counterfactual,and hence strongerthan this disjunction.
Having broughtcounterfactuals into the picture,we are treading
on notoriouslyslipperyground. I will make no attempthere to
explain or clarifythe counterfactualsinvolved. I can only hope
that our rather fuzzy intuitions regarding counterfactualswill
prove equal to the task of understandingat least those features
of counterfactuals which are necessaryforthe presentdiscussion.
By maintainingthatwhat is confirmedin instanceconfirmation is
the generalized counterfactual(x) (Ax Z> Bx), I have explained
why (,-,Ad & Bd) should not be regarded as a positive instance.
Can we perhaps go all the way and dissolve the paradox of the
ravensaltogetherbymaintainingthat(,,Ac & -. Bc) is not a positive
instanceeither?To do this it would sufficeif contrapositionfailed
for the counterfactualsinvolved. Contrapositioncertainlydoes not
hold forcounterfactuals in general.For example,from"Even if the
Indians were to hold a rain dance, it would not rain," we cannot
conclude "If it were to rain, the Indians would not have held a
rain dance." However, for the rather special counterfactualsin-
volved in statinglaws, contrapositiondoes seem to hold. For ex-
ample, if it is truethat any raven would be black, thenit is equally
true that any nonblack thing would be a nonraven. Thus I am
afraid that the appeal to counterfactualsdoes not absolve us of
having to include (.-'Ac & -.Bc) as a positive instanceof the gen-
eralization.We still have a paradox.
III
Why then does it seem paradoxical to count (,..-Ac& ~-Bc) as a
positive instance of (x) (Ax => Bx)? As Hempel observed,if we
change examples this no longer seems so paradoxical. Consider
"All good conductorsof electricityare good conductorsof heat."
It is not in the least paradoxical to suppose we can confirmthis
by findingsubstances that are not good conductorsof heat and
ascertainingthat theyare not good conductorsof electricityeither.
Furthermore,if we shiftthe settinga bit, it is not paradoxical to
suppose we can confirmthat all ravensare black by observingnon-
black nonravens.Suppose we are somehow provided with a cata-
logue of everythingin the universe,listing certain of their im-
portant attributes.If we go through the catalogue picking out
nonblack thingsand thencheckingthat theyare not ravens,it cer-
tainlyseems that we could confirmthat all ravensare black.
Then why is it paradoxical to suppose we can confirmthat all

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752 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ravens are black by going to a garbage-canfactoryand checking

that the cans are all green as theycome out? I thinkthe answeris
that observationof greengarbage cans reallydoes not confirmthat
all ravensare black. More precisely,although"c is a nonblacknon-
raven" confirms"All ravens are black," "c is a green garbage can"
does not,despite the factthat it entails "c is a nonblack nonraven."
Let me explain why.
Inductive confirmationis defeasible.That is, we can have two
statementsp and q such that p confirmsq, but when we conjoin
another statementr, (p & r) does not confirmq. Such an r is a
defeater.For example, although (Aa & Ba) confirms(x) (Ax =>
Bx), the conjunction [(Aa & Ba) & (Ab & .-iBb)] does not. The
addition of a counterexampleto the evidencedefeatsthe confirma-
tion.
There is more thanone kind of defeaterforinstanceconfirmation.
Counterexamplesdefeat the confirmationtruth-functionally, by en-
tailingthe falsityof thegeneralization.But anotherkind of defeater
leaves open whetherthe generalizationis true and instead attacks
the fairnessof the sample.6For example,suppose we have examined
a class r of objects all of which are A's, and found them all to be
B's. This is supposed to confirm(x) (Ax -> Bx). But suppose it is
thennoticed that everything in r is C, althoughnot all A's are C's,
and prob (Bx/Ax & Cx) > prob (Bx/Ax & ~-.Cx) (the probability-
prior to knowingthat everythingin r is C-of an arbitraryobject
being B given thatit is both A and C is greaterthan the probability
given that it is A and not C).7 This means that the inductivesam-
ple is unfairlyprejudiced in favor of the generalization.If the
sample is just a little biased, this may not completelydefeat the
confirmation,but it at least diminishes the degree of confirma-
tion.We mightsay thatwhat we have here are "diminishers"rather
than defeaters.For example, suppose we are examining cars with
the objective of establishingthat no car can go fasterthan one
hundred miles an hour. Suppose this is true of every car in our
GIn the terminology of my"The Structure of EpistemicJustification," Ameri-
can PhilosophicalQuarterly, Monograph4 (1970): 62-78,theseare typeI and
type1I defeaters, respectively.
7 To avoid trivializing this,we mustput some restrictions on C. If thereis
someattributeF thateverything in r possessesbut not all A's possess,thenwe
could define'Cx' to be 'Fx & Bx'. And we can alwaysfindsuch an F. For
example,we mightlet 'Fx' be 'x e r. Clearly,this should not defeatthe con-
firmation (if it did, all confirmationwould be defeated).It seemsthat the re-
striction
we needon C is: thewayin whichwe knowthat(x) (xer D Cx) doesnot
presupposeour firstknowingthat(x) (xer D Bx). A morepreciseformulation of
thisrestriction mustawait a satisfactoryanalysisof knowing,whichI am not
nowpreparedto give.

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 LAYING THE RAVEN TO REST 753

sample. This would confirmthe generalization.But if we notice

(1) that all cars in the sample have small engines, (2) that not
all cars have small engines,and (3) that the probabilityof a car's
having a top speed less than one hundred miles an hour is greater
if the car has a small engine than if it has a large engine, this
significantly weakens the degree of confirmation.If the prejudice
(i.e., the disparityin probabilities) is sufficiently
great, this may
completelydestroythe confirmation.But notice that the generali-
zation might still turn out to be true even though it cannot
be confirmed by appealing to thissample.
Analogously,if our sample consistsof a class of non-B's that are
non-A's,but we find(1) that everythingin r is D, (2) that not all
non-B's are D, and (3) that prob (,-'Ax/l--.,Bx& Dx) > prob (Q--Ax/
,,Bx & -,Dx), this again constitutesa diminisher.In general,our
sample r will be the union of a positivesample r1 (a set of A's that
are B's) and a negativesample r2 (a set of non-B'sthat are non-A's).
We can diminishtheconfirmation providedby thesample by having
a diminisherfor eitherr1 or r2. However,in order to completely
defeatsuch a mixed sample by attackingits fairness,we mustdefeat
both partsseparately.If one part is unfairlyprejudiced in favorof
the generalization,but the other is not, the entire sample still
confirmsthe generalization.
Although these diminishersdo not usually destroythe confirma-
tion altogether,and hence do not constitutedefeaters,thereis one
case in which theydo constitutedefeaters.This is the case in which
prob (Bx/Ax 8cCx) = 1 > prob (Bx/Ax &g -Cx). For example, sup-
pose we are attemptingto confirmthat all wooden chairsare made
of oak. To collect our sample we visit a furniturefactorymanu-
facturingwooden chairs. The sample bears out our hypothesis.
But thenwe discoverthat thisfactorymanufacturesonly oak furni-
ture,and we know that this is not true of all factoriesmanufactur-
ing wooden chairs.This would make the sample completelyuseless,
and hence defeat the confirmation.The reason the confirmation
would be defeatedseems to be the following.If we let C be "was
manufacturedin a factoryproducing only oak furniture,"then a
chair'shavingthisattributeentailsthatit is made of oak, and hence
prob (Bx/Ax & Cx) = 1. This means that the chairs we examined
couldn't have been anythingbut oak because of the way we chose
our sample; hence the generalizationcouldn't have been false of
the sample. For this reason,therewas no chance of the sample not
bearing out the generalization.The generalizationran no risk in
thiscase, and hence that the sample did bear it out in no way con-

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754 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

firmsthe generalization.So in this case we have a genuine defeater

ratherthanjust a diminisher.
Now let us apply this to the ravens. Suppose our sample con-
sists of green plastic garbage cans. The probability of being a
nonraven given that somethingis a green plastic garbage can is
1. Thus, our sample of nonblack nonravensis totallyprejudiced
against findingany ravens in it. There was never any chance of
findingany ravens in it, so we have a fair-sampledefeater.This is
why, intuitively,we would not regard this sample as confirming
either that all ravens are black or that all nonblack things are
nonravens.Thus we resolvetheparadox of theravens.
On the other hand, if we pick our sample of nonblack things
randomlyfrom a catalogue of all the thingsin the universe,we
will not automaticallyprejudice our sample against ravens, and
for this reason we feel no reluctance about taking it to confirm
thatall ravensare black.
Also, we are now in a position to explain the often-voicedintui-
tion that the reason it is harderto confirmthatall ravensare black
by looking at nonblack thingsthan it is by looking at ravens,is
that the proportionof nonblack thingsin the universeis so much
greaterthan the proportionof ravens. Because there are so many
more nonblack things,unless we pick our sample very selectively
(e.g.,, choose only birds), it is very likely that we will find that
everythingin our sample has some attributeD which entails that
it is not a raven. For example, picking thingsat random,we are
quite apt to end up with only inanimateobjects,because most ob-
jects are inanimate,and a sample of nonblack inanimate objects
cannotconfirmthatall ravensare black.
IV
In conclusion,I thinkthereare reallytwo"paradoxesof theravens."
The original paradox concernedhow observationof nonblack non-
ravens can confirmthat all ravens are black. This paradox is
resolved by appealing to fair-sampledefeaters.Hempel, however,
compounded the paradox by giving an incorrectexplanation of it,
which then led him to maintain that observationof black non-
ravens also confirmsthat all ravens are black. The latteris simply
wrong, and arises out of supposing that the generalizationsthat
are confirmedinductively are properly symbolized by material
conditionals.
JOHN L. POLLOCK
Universityof Rochester

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