Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter 04 - Corporate Governance Overview
Chapter 04 - Corporate Governance Overview
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CHAPTER 4
OVERVIEW of CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
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Contents
4.1. Theory of governance
4.1.1. Company ownership and control
4.1.2. Definition, purpose, objectives & key concepts of
corporate governance
4.1.3. Operational areas affected by issues in corporate
governance
4.1.4. Internal and External corporate governance
stakeholders
4.1.5. Agency theory and key concepts of agency theory
4.1.6. Principal-agent relationships and corporate
governance
4.1.7. Transaction cost theory
4.1.8. Stakeholder theory
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Contents
4.2. Development of corporate governance
4.2.1 Influences on corporate
4.2.2. Development of corporate governance codes
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4.1. Theory of governance
4.1.1. Company ownership and control
SHAREHOLDERS DIRECTORS
DELEGATION
OF CONTROL
COMPANY
OWNERSHIP CONTROL
OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES
≠
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
4.1.2. Definition, purpose, objectives & key concepts of
corporate governance
• Objectives: ?
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Differences between Management and
Governance
• Management is concerned with running
business operation of a company
• >> routine decisions and administrative
work related to the daily operations of
the organization
• Governance is about giving the lead to
the company and monitoring and
controlling management decisions >>
oversight and decision-making related
to strategic direction, financial planning,
and bylaws- the set of core policies that
outline the organization's purpose,
values, and structure.
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Question 1:
What makes a good company?
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
4.1.2. Definition, purpose, objectives & key concepts of
corporate governance (cont.)
- Fairness: refers to the principle at all stakeholders should
receive fair treatment from the director.
- Openness/Transparency: means ‘not hiding anything’.
Intentions should be clear, and information should not be
withheld from individuals who ought to have a right to
receive it.
- Independence: freedom from the influence of someone
else. A principle of good CG is that a substantial number of
directors of a company should be independent, which means
that they are able to make judgment and give options that
11 are in the best interest of the company, without bias.
4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
4.1.2. Definition, purpose, objectives & key concepts of corporate
governance (cont.)
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Question 2:
Key concepts-Fred’s case
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Key concepts-Fred’s case (cont.)
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
4.1.3. Operational areas affected by issues in corporate governance
DUTIES AND
FUNCTIONS
COMPOSITION
REPORTING
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
4.1.4. Internal and External corporate governance
stakeholders
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Financial stakeholders Interest stakeholder
E.G. SHAREHOLDERS
AGENT
ON BEHALF OF
E.G. DIRECTORS
TO PERFORM
TASK
SEPERATION OF GOALS
22 AGENCY PROBLEMS
4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Agency theory & Corporate Governance
Key concepts
• Agent: An agent is employed by a principal to carry task
on their behalf.
• Agency: refers to the relationship between a principal and
their agent.
• Agency cost: are incurred by principles in monitoring
agency behavior because of a lack of trust in a good faith
of agents
• Accountable: by accepting to undertake a task on their
behalf, an agent becomes accountable to the principal by
whom they are employed. The agent is accountable to
23 that principle.
4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Agency theory & Corporate Governance
Key concepts
• Fiduciary responsibility: Directors (agents) have a
fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders (principal) of
their organization.
• Stakeholders: are any person or group that can have
affect or be affected by the policies or activities of an
organization.
• Agent objectives (such as a desire for high salary, large
bonus and status for director) will differ from the
principal’s objectives (wealth maximization for
shareholders)
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Agency costs
Sources:
Uncertainty cost
Opportunity cost
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
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4.1. Theory of governance (cont.)
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Development of corporate governance
USA:
CG rules have developed from relative little to the complex
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Main drivers:
Active management
Increasing shareholder activism from institutional investors.
Enron, Arthur Andersen and Worldcom:
The collapses of Enron and Worldcom encouraged the US
government to take action to restore public confidence and
trust in large company.
Close relationships between auditors and clients: Enron
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4.1. Theory of governance
(cont.)
Development of corporate governance codes
UK
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Q&A
Thank you!
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