________________

ARC FLASH AND SHOCK HAZARD ANALYSIS

M/s. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited

Dewas, Madhyapradesh

JANUARY 2022
 ________________

Revision
Comments / Nature
S. No. Document Identification
of Changes
No Date

ARC FLASH STUDY/SR/SPIL-

1. DEWAS/21- 00 17.03.2022 Draft Report
22/201

Prepared By Reviewed By Approved By

Mr. R.S.Mohan Kumar Mr. M Hari kiran Mr. A.M.Gopalakrishnan

Deputy Manager – Electrical Safety Manager – Electrical Safety AGM – Electrical Safety
 ________________

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 Cholamandalam MS risk services has carried out the site visit for ARC flash analysis at M/s.
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, Dewas on Janauary 28th to 31th, 2022 in line with IEEE
1584 – 2018 (IEEE guide for performing ARC flash Hazard calculations) recommendations
considering the scenario as plant running on full load with EB supply and separately on DG
supply.
 PPE required are 12 cal/cm2 (Level-A) suit and 40 cal/cm2 (Level-B) suit as per the Appendix-1.
If the calculated Incident energy is above 40 cal/cm2, please de-energize the equipment and
commence LOTO to do any live maintenance.
 The calculated Incident Energy in this report are based on the proposed protection device
setting from Relay Coordination report.

 Based on reported mode of operation, Transformer-3 & 4 feeding PCC-3 & 4 and through tie
feeders of PCC-3 & 4, PCC-1 & 2 are energizing. In this mode of operation, short circuit
adequacy of equipment is not met in all the PCC. MCCB rating installed in PCC are 65kA, but
the 3Ph bolted fault current is 79.581kA.

 Based on reported mode of operation, all the DG Panels and its breakers short circuit rating
are found inadequate.

 For the assessment, the motor loads on every MCC and loads on individual DB have been
considered as a lump load

as described in IEC 60909

 ________________

The following panels are to be considered separately as Level B PPE requirement -

Bus Nominal
Incident Energy During DG Incident Energy During EB
S.No Equipment Voltage
Operation (Cal/cm2) Operation (Cal/cm2)
Name (kV)

CAPACITOR_
1 0.415 12.13 9.86
PANEL-1

CIPRO_HCL_
2 0.415 18.7 0.155846
OUTGOING

ETP_RO_MC
3 0.415 16.99 0.293721
C

ETP_RO_MC
4 0.415 16.78 0.140996
C-1

5 MLTP-A 0.415 33.43 3.54

6 MLTP-B 0.415 27.73 78.62

PCC_PANEL_
7 0.415 17.42 17.73
BUS-3

PLA-
8 2_SUB_PCC- 0.415 15.02 14.56
6
PLA-05_STM-
9 3_SUB_PCC- 0.415 15.89 17.47
2

UTLITY_MCC-
10 0.415 24.17 23.8
10

11 DG PCC 127.65 NE

PCC_PANEL_
12 0.415 127.65 38.68
BUS-1

PCC_PANEL_
13 0.415 42.77 33.72
BUS-2

SRP_SUB_PC
14 0.415 46.78 0.587749
C_A
 ________________

Bus Nominal
Incident Energy During DG Incident Energy During EB
S.No Equipment Voltage
Operation (Cal/cm2) Operation (Cal/cm2)
Name (kV)

33 kV SF6
15 33 NE 22.94
PANEL

33kV
16 CONNECTIO 33 NE 90.16
N-1

Colour Coding:

RED: live Maintenance on those shall not be permitted

Yellow: Higher Energy observed during that particular mode of operation (Labels were taken in

this worst case)

Grey: Not energized in that particular Configuration.

Note:

1. The cells with “FCT Not Determined” in the above list denote “Fault Clearing Time Not
determined”. It means that, the Arc Flash could not be interrupted by any device. This may happen
due to one of the following

a) Non availability of protective devices or

b) Multiple sources are feeding to the fault where the Arc Flash program (ETAP) could not select
the protective device.

It is recommended to consider these panels to be hazardous and perform LOTO before working
on them.

2. The “NE” in the above list means “Not Energized”.

3. Hazard level of “Level-B” means that the Incident energy has exceeded 40cal/cm2. It is
recommended to perform LOTO and work on these panels.

4. Resulting Arcing current is very low for the protection device to interrupt.
 ________________

Thermography on the Panels:

For the purpose of carrying out Thermography safely on panels, the recommended safe action may
be to turn off the power to the said panels just before opening the door for scanning. This is still
acceptable because the said panels assuming to have been working on full load condition until the
said shut-down (or power off with LOTO) will continue to operate at the same temperature for a small
period of time. Any drop-in temperature (because of power off) should be even across all the
phases/points i.e. the hotspot may still be evident upon scanning using an infrared detector/device
after taking power off/shut down.

Any personnel responsible for thermal imaging should be aware of the environment especially with
respect to any openings in the panels and the presence of any rodents or any such a possibility which
may create a hazard upon opening. In such cases it is recommended to refrain from opening the panel
door until all power to the said equipment is cut off.

Arc Flash Labels:

M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited Dewas r is recommended to fix the warning labels provided
in Appendix 3 in the respective panels and to purchase and keep the Personal Protective equipments
(as suggested in the labels) for the use of electricians / electrical engineers during live work when
covers are open.

PPE may not be required if the equipment is turned off and proper specific LOTO procedure (for the
respective equipment) is implemented. The PPE specifications are provided in Appendix-1. Relevant
PPE shall be procured.

Preventing Arc Flash:

More Arc Flash incidents have been because of Human error than system or equipment error. The
IEEE 1584 case studies support this claim (Refer Appendix 11) – 39 out of 49 case studies presented
may be because of Human Error. However, in order to prevent any possibilities of arc flash incidents
due to system or equipment malfunction it is recommended to perform maintenance on a regular
basis in all those areas where there is lot of dust deposits in panels/panel rooms. It is recommended
to clean them more frequently
 ________________

The following Appendix are attached to this report

Appendix 1 PPE Requirements as per NFPA 70E 2021

Appendix 2 A brief explanation of the Arc Flash label provided. It may be used for better
understanding of the components of Arc Flash label.
Appendix 3 Warning Labels
Appendix 4 Short circuit calculation summary (IEC 60909) for all modes of operation
Appendix 5 Arc Flash hazard calculation summary (IEEE 1584) for all modes of operation
Appendix 6 The protective device settings considered are provided
Appendix 7 A simple short circuit calculation method is described
Appendix 8 A sample Arc Flash calculation is provided

Appendix 9 This Appendix may help in deciding the need for selection/use of Arc Flash PPE
during various site specific tasks
Appendix 10 Understanding the Protective device nomenclature used in this report

Appendix 11 Arc Flash case studies from IEEE 1584. 39 out of 49 arc flash incidents have been
caused by Human Error.
Appendix 12 Single line diagrams (SLDs)
Appendix 13 SLD with Short Circuit and ARC Flash Levels

NOTE: The Hazard levels mentioned here in the report are valid for the present system configuration
& connected load recorded in the Appendix (Appendix 5 and 12) of this report. Any change in the
system shall invalidate the analysis.
Note:

Since some of the feeders were in running condition during the time of audit, they could not be opened for the
verification of short circuit protection devices. For such feeders, information has been acquired
 ________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

DESCRIPTION PG. NO.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY …………………………………….... 03

1. INTRODUCTION …………………………………….... 09

2. METHODOLOGY …………………………………….... 15

3. ARC FLASH THEORY …………………………………….... 17

4. M/s. Sun Pharma Limited, Dewas …………………………………….... 22

Appendix 1 - PPE Requirements as per NFPA 70E 2018

Appendix 2 - Understanding the Arc Flash Label

Appendix 3 - Warning / Danger Labels

Appendix 4 - Short circuit Summary

Appendix 5 - Arc flash analysis Summary

Appendix 6 - Protective Device Settings

Appendix 7 – An Easy Short Circuit Calculation Method

Appendix 8 - IEEE 1584-2018 Arc Flash Sample Calculation

Appendix 9 - NFPA 70E Reference table for Arc Flash PPE usage

Appendix 10 – Understanding the Protective device settings nomenclature (used in this report)

Appendix 11 –Arc Flash Case Studies (IEEE 1584)

Appendix 12 - Single Line Diagram Abbreviations

Appendix 13 - Single Line Diagram with Short Circuit and Arc Flash Levels
________________

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION
 ________________

1. INTRODUCTION
GENERAL

Field data collection related to ARC flash analysis was done for M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries
Limited, Dewas by Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Limited. The data collection was done on 28
to 31 January 2022.

M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, Dewas

Mr.Sanju Singh
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd

Mr.Suseendran A
Mr.Prince

Study Coverage

1.1. Installations
Following area Electrical installations were covered during the study:

 HT Yard VCBs
 Transformers
 Main LT Panels (PCC) of Utility
 DG sets
 MCCs and
1.2. Records / Reports / Drawings reviewed
 Data collected at site / Images pertaining to above said system
 Data received through electronic mail for the above said panels
OBJECTIVES OF ARC FLASH AND SHOCK HAZARD ANALYSIS:

Broadly the ARC flash and Shock hazard analysis is conducted with the following objectives:

 To ensure personnel safety against electrical arcs or shocks

 ________________

SCOPE:

A broad outline of the scope of work is given below:

 To perform short circuit study on the electrical system.

 To carry out arc flash and shock hazard analysis.
 To provide engineering solutions where ever possible to reduce the incident energy level by
changing the relay/breaker settings or to suggest replacement of hardware if economical
 Calculation of the acceptable flash protection boundary & suggest appropriate PPEs to be
worn during live work.
 To provide soft copies of warning and danger labels to be affixed on the panels.

Step: 1 - Collect System Installation Electrical Equipment Data.

Electrical installations shall be covered during the site visit:

 HT Yard VCBs
 Transformers
 Main LT Panels (PCC) of Utility
 DG sets
 MCCs
Collected the data available at site for the installations mentioned above, this is required to develop
a single line diagram and feed the details as provided by M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited
Dewas.

Step: 2 - Determine the Power System’s Modes of Operation

Based on the provided details, we have observed the mode of operation as follows:

Full load of the plant is supplied by EB through its 11kV Grid. DGs supply will cater to load requirements
during EB supply failure.

Step: 3 - Develop the Single line diagram.

Single line diagram (SLD) shall be developed in the ETAP software, based on the site and provided
data.
 ________________

Step: 4 - Short circuit study (As per IEC 60909).

The Bolted Fault current and Arcing Fault current using Short circuit study (As per IEC 60909) module
in the software for the developed Single line diagram. Summary of results for the same are enclosed
in relevant Appendix.

Step: 5 - ARC flash and Shock hazard analysis (as per IEEE 1584 2018)

Incident Energy & Arc Flash Boundary shall be calculated using ARC flash (As per IEEE 1584-2018)
module in the software for the developed Single line diagram. Summary of results for the same are
enclosed in the relevant Appendix.

Engineering mitigating solutions (to reduce the energy level thereby PPE Level) where ever possible
to reduce the incident energy level by changing the relay/breaker settings or replacement of hardware
if economical, shall be recommended.

SOFTWARE USED FOR ANALYSIS:

The studies have been performed using ETAP. This software has the following modules:

 AC Network Analysis
- Short-circuit analysis – IEC 60909 -2016
- ARC Flash – NFPA 70E - 2021 / IEEE 1584 - 2018
To understand the results of the ETAP simulation, it is necessary to understand the following
definitions specific to the software:

 Bus Equipment Name: Indicates the fault location.

 Protective Device Name: The first protective device to trip in each branch feeding the faulted
bus.
 V: Bus voltage at the fault location.
 Bus Bolted Fault: Total symmetrical fault current at the fault location.
 Arcing Fault: Branch fault current passing through the referenced protective device for an
arcing fault at the fault location, referenced to the bus voltage at the fault location.
 Fault Clearing Time: Time for the referenced protective device to trip (clearing curve) at the
arcing fault branch current value.
 ________________

 Arc Flash Boundary: Minimum distance from the arc, within which a second-degree burn
could occur if no protective clothing is worn.
 Working Distance: Closest distance a worker’s body exposed to the arc.
 Incident Energy: Energy released at the specified working distance expressed in cal/cm2 or
J/cm2.
 PPE Class: Minimum clothing class designed to protect a worker from second degree burns.
It should be noted here that the calculation of the arc fault current is based on IEEE 1584-2018 and
the formulae for calculation of the arc fault and the incident energy will be briefly explained in Section
3 of this document.
 ________________

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CMSRS wishes to express its sincere thanks to the entire team of M/s.Sun Pharma Limited for the
cooperation extended in the successful completion of this report.

Disclaimer
This report is for the sole use by the Client for the purpose for which they have claimed it is required to
us. We are not responsible to any other person/party for any decision of such person/party based on
this report. It is hereby notified that reproduction, copying or otherwise quoting of our report or any
part thereof other than the aforementioned purpose, can be done only with our prior permission.
The report cannot be used or relied by the Client for any other purpose or any other third party for any
purpose whatsoever and we will not be liable which the client may incur on this account including in tort
(including but not limited to negligence) arising out of or in connection with this Report. This Report is
not intended to identify all hazards which may exist nor is it intended to be an exhaustive review of all
possible eventualities. The recommendations for risk improvement contained in the report are purely
advisory and the decision and responsibility for implementation rests with the Client.
________________

SECTION 2

METHODOLOGY
 ________________

Defining the scope of the

study

Opening meeting with

M/s.Sun Pharma Limited

Site Visit

Interaction with
employees

Data Collection

Modes of
Modeling the Single Line diagram
operation

Performing the Studies with

various operating modes

Developing Report &

Mitigation Plan

Draft Report
Submission

Submission of
Final Report
________________

SECTION 3

ARC FLASH THEORY

 ________________

1. ARC FLASH THEORY

There is a need to look into the condition of arcing fault current, as for most protection system,
the fault clearance times are based on bolted short circuit. In the event of an arcing fault, the
clearing time might be too slow for personnel safety.

In this report, the approach to the study will be based on IEEE 1584-2018. The primary aim is to
calculate the Incident energy released in an arc fault, the arc flash boundary and recommending
the type of PPE class for personnel safety.

1.1. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are taken from IEEE 1584 and will be used in this report:

 Arc-flash hazard: A dangerous condition associated with the release of energy caused by an
electric arc.
 Arcing fault current: A fault current flowing through electrical arc plasma, also called arc fault
current and arc current.
 Available fault current: The electrical current that can be provided by the serving utility,
facility-owned electrical generating devices and large electric motors, considering the amount
of impedance in the current path.
 Bolted fault current: A short circuit or electrical contact between two conductors at different
potentials in which the impedance or resistance between the conductors is essentially zero.
 Exposed (lived parts): Capable of being inadvertently touched or approached nearer than a
safe distance by a person. It is applied to parts that are not suitably guarded, isolated or
insulated.
 Flash hazard analysis: A method to determine the risk of personal injury as a result of
exposure to incident energy from an electrical arc flash.
 Flash-protection boundary: An approach limit at a distance from live parts those are
uninsulated or exposed within which a person could receive a second-degree burn.
 Incident energy: The amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the
source, generated during an electrical arc event. Incident energy is measured in joules per
centimetre squared.
 Shock hazard: A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused
by contact or approach to live parts.
 ________________

 Working distance: The dimension between the possible arc point and the head and body of
the worker positioned in place to perform the assigned task.

1.2. INTRODUCTION TO ARC FLASH

An arc flash radiates energy that can seriously burn the skin and clothing and can even kill. The
purpose of this study is to determine the adequacy of the existing protection for the selected LV
switchboards. The energy radiated from the electric arc is dependent on the fault levels as well
as the total fault clearance time. The standard provides the basis to calculate the incident energy
and flash protection boundary.

In the IEEE 1584, the theoretical derived model is only applicable for applications where faults
will escalate to three-phase faults. Where this is not applicable, the model will give a conservative
result.

1.3. ARC FLASH CURRENT CALCULATIONS

The formula in IEEE 1584 for the calculation of the arc current for system voltage less than 1000V
is as follows:

Equation 1:

Where:

This will determine the arcing fault current based on the voltages and the fault levels that are
passing through the equipment.
 ________________

1.4. INCIDENT ENERGY CALCULATIONS AND PPE

The incident energy for model within the range as defined in IEEE 1584 is calculated as follows:

Equation 3:

Where,

The incident energy calculation will determine the effect of the arcing three-phase fault on the
protection system. Ideally, the protection should be able to clear the arcing fault within a time
that would not cause a secondary burn at a distance specified (D). The incident energy is
dependent upon the arc fault current as well as the duration of the arcing time.

The incident energy will then be used to determine the type of Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) to be used. The category of PPE will refer to NFPA 70E and are summarised in Appendix -1
 ________________

ARC FLASH SIMULATION

1.5. INPUT DATA

As all the switchgear are enclosed and grounded, the following data will be used in the calculation
of arc flash:

 Ibf: The three-phase fault level, which was internally calculated in the software.
 V: System voltage which will be based on the result of the short circuit value.
 K: Open or boxed configuration. In this study, it will be boxed by selection of switchgear.
 G: Gap between bus bar. The bus-gap is which is taken as per IEEE 1584.
 t: The arcing time is based on the protection plus breaker operating time. It is assumed that
the protection operating time includes CT errors, relay errors etc.
 D: The distance from possible arc point to the person will be based on typical value in IEEE
1584 for low-voltage switchgear. This is approximately the distance for racking the ACB’s.
 x: The distance factor is taken from IEEE 1584.

1.6. THREE-PHASE SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENTS

The analysis of the arc flash energy will be based on the three-phase fault level. Study has been
carried out to determine the fault level on all the 415V boards.

1.7. RESULTS
 The simulated results based on IEEE 1584 for the selected LV switchboards are shown in
Appendix–7.
 The protection TCC showing the protection operating time at the simulated arc fault is shown
in Appendix-8.
 The Warning / Danger labels for each switchboard are included in Appendix-3 respectively.
 ________________

SECTION 4

M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited

Dewas

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
 ________________

1. M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited Dewas:

Presently the power requirement for the Industry is fed by Madhya Pradesh Poorv
Kshetra Vidyut Company Ltd

For Connection-1, the industry is receiving power by 33kV voltage level from the grid
and the 33kV voltage is stepped down to 0.415kV using 3Nos of 2.5 MVA transformer
and also with the support from 6Nos of Diesel generator in case of power failure from
the grid. The power from the Trafo and DG is delivered to the PCC-1 panel which consist
of three Bus arrangement with two bus section.

Where in Connection-2,33kV voltage is stepped down to 0.415kV using 1Nos of 1.6

MVA transformer and also with the support from 2Nos of Diesel generator in case of
power failure from the grid. The power from the Trafo and DG is delivered to the MLTP
panel which consist of two Bus arrangement with one bus section.

There are 2 modes of operation

The Normal Mode (also called as regular mode) of operation reported is as follows:

A. Grid supplies to the entire load of the facility. No DG operation is required.

The DG Operation mode

B. Generators are supplying to the load requirement, When Grid is off.

 ________________

2. OBSERVATION OF EXISTING SWITCHBOARDS

The arc flash study determines the level of incident energy due to arc faults that could occur
during switching operation of the circuit breaker, isolators, withdrawable trays etc. Too high
incident energy may pose personnel risk which would require either Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) to be worn or mitigation solutions on the switchboards or both.

The arc flash study has been performed under fault conditions (as specified in IEC 60909) to
determine the highest incident energy possible.

In the calculations, it is assumed that the switchboards and protective devices are in reasonably
good condition and they shall work as intended.

The Arc Flash Labels have been generated keeping in view the worst case i.e. highest PPE
requirement in all the modes of operation (Appendix-3).
 ________________

Appendix -1 - THE PPE REQUIREMENTS AS PER NFPA 70E 2018

While using PPE, the following should be considered:

 The higher the PPE, the lesser ability for the personnel to coordinate and make judgment.
 The higher the PPE, lesser would be the personnel’s sense of touch.
 The higher the PPE, the more difficulty for the personnel to work.
 The higher the PPE, the more restricted movement and vision of the personnel.
 PPE may be costly and if sharing is required, then question of personal hygiene has to be
considered.
 ________________

PPE

1 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4 cal/cm2 (see Note 1)

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall
Arc-rated face shield (see Note 2) or arc flash suit hood
Arc-rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat, Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR), Hearing protection (ear canal inserts),
Heavy duty leather gloves (see Note 3), Leather footwear (AN)
2 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 cal/cm2 (see Note 1)
Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall
Arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated face shield (see Note 2) and arc-rated balaclava
Arc-rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN),
Protective Equipment
Hard hat, Safety Glasses or Safety Goggles, Hearing Protection (ear canal Inserts), Heavy
duty leather gloves (see Note 3), Leather footwear
3 Arc-Rated Clothing Selected So That the System Arc Rating Meets the Required
Minimum Arc Rating of 25 cal/cm2 (see Note 1)
Arc-rated coverall
Arc-rated arc flash suit hood
Arc-rated gloves (see Note 1)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat, Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR), Hearing protection (ear canal inserts),
Leather footwear
4 Arc-Rated Clothing Selected So That the System Arc Rating Meets the Required
Minimum Arc Rating of 40 cal/cm2 (see Note 1)
Arc-rated coverall (AR)
Arc-rated arc flash suit hood
Arc-rated gloves (see Note 1)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat, Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR), Hearing protection (ear canal inserts),
Leather footwear

*Table for PPE Selection while using ‘PPE Category Method for Arc Flash Risk
Assessment’AN: as needed (optional). AR: as required. SR: selection required.
 ________________

Notes:

(1) Arc rating is as defined in Article 100 of NFPA 70E-2018

Arc Rating: The value attributed to materials that describes their performance to exposure to an
electrical arc discharge. The arc rating is expressed in cal/cm2 and is derived from the determined
value of the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or energy of break open threshold EBT. Arc Rating
is reported either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value.

(2) Face shields are to have wrap-around guarding to protect not only the face but also the forehead,
ears, and neck, or, alternatively, an arc-rated arc flash suit hood is required to be worn.

(3) If rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors are used, additional leather or arc-rated gloves
are not required. The combination of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors satisfies the
arc flash protection requirement.
 ________________

APPENDIX-2 – UNDERSTANDING THE ARC FLASH LABEL

Following is a sample Arc Flash label:

1
8
2 7

3 9
4
10
5
6
12
11

Legend:

1. Data Related to Arc Flash Calculations as per IEEE 1584

2. PPE level required to wear when performing live work or when covers are open (Level A –
12cal/cm2 Level B – 40cal/cm2)
3. The incident energy calculated as per IEEE 1584 (example attached in Appendix 5) at 45.7 cm
4. The working distance used for calculation as per IEEE 1584 i.e. 45.7 cm. This is the distance
of head and torso of the person (assumed) from the source of arc flash.
5. Arc flash boundary is the distance where second-degree burns (Energy is 1.2 cal/cm2) can
happen on an unprotected person due to Arc Flash.
6. The description of clothing used in the PPE Accessories
7. Shock Protection data (Fixed) as per NFPA 70E. This data varies with voltage level.
8. The voltage level considered for shock protection data (from NFPA 70E).
9. The clear distance for an unqualified person (to stay away) from the equipment/panel.
 ________________

10. The clear distance for a qualified person (to stay away) from the equipment/panel when
he/she has not worn any PPE. No qualified person shall approach or take any conductive
object closer to exposed energized electrical conductors
11. The equipment/panel/DB for which the label is generated. This label has to be pasted on the
said equipment/DB/panel.
12. The protective device selected by ETAP (automatically) for Arc Flash calculation.
________________

APPENDIX-3

WARNING / DANGER LABELS

________________

APPENDIX-4

SHORT CIRCUIT SUMMARY

 ________________

The following legend will be applicable for describing modes of operation-

S.No Mode Description

Transformers are supplying the entire load of the facility. No DG Operation is
1 1 required.
This is the normal mode.
2 2 Generators are supplying to the load requirement, when EB is OFF.
This is DG Mode.
 ________________

Results Mode-1 (With EB)

 ________________

Results Mode-2 (With DG)

 ________________

Nominal Symmetrical RMS Fault Symmetrical RMS Fault

Bus Equipment Name Voltage Current I"k (kA) During Current I"k (kA) During
(kV) DG Operation EB Operation

2F1PLA-05_ST3_SB_PCC-1 0.415 21.14042 19.93558

2_CHB_01 0.415 8.253781 7.870088
4UT_CHB-06 0.415 8.226506 12.97378
30 KVA UPS PANEL 0.415 3.067891 3.054653
30KVA_UPS_PANEL 0.415 3.067891 3.054653
33 kV SF6 PANEL 33 NE 17.99068
33kV CONNECTION-1 33 NE 17.57185
60KVA_UPS_PANEL 0.415 7.566228 7.469008
APFC PANEL 400 kVAR 0.415 25.14345 24.11182
AZIDE MCC-1 0.415 12.03055 11.59636
AZIDE_MCC-2 0.415 11.53355 11.13512
BOILER_MCC-1 0.415 29.30918 24.46368
BRINE_UTLITY_MCC-1 0.415 6.16114 7.587859
BRINE_UTLITY_MCC-2 0.415 5.721819 7.587859
BUS MCC-1&2 0.415 38.33827 30.82465
bus ups 0.415 7.566228 7.469008
CAP PANEL-04 0.415 37.34958 29.70838
CAPACITOR PANEL-02 0.415 88.04836 53.82425
CAPACITOR-4 0.415 13.23635 12.34281
CAPACITOR_PANEL-1 0.415 84.42547 53.264
CAPCITOR PANEL-3 0.415 93.30032 69.65646
CILA_MCC-1 0.415 25.03779 21.69747
CIPRO_HCL_OUTGOING 0.415 6.345895 7.57886
COMP_CHB_3 0.415 6.354844 7.863346
COOLING WATER PUMP
0.415 17.93761 16.10074
PNL
DG PCC 0.415 113.7695 NE
DG_EXH_FAN_MCC 0.415 31.23514 28.22417
EMLDB-1 0.415 23.1542 20.23436
ETP-5 0.415 13.79529 12.76666
ETP_MCC-1 0.415 19.45687 17.417
ETP_MCC-2 0.415 19.45687 17.417
ETP_MCC-3 0.415 19.45687 17.417
ETP_MCC-4 0.415 19.45687 17.417
ETP_RO_EHS_MCC-2 0.415 5.628998 7.314334
ETP_RO_MCC 0.415 6.744355 9.575934
ETP_RO_MCC-1 0.415 6.665612 9.413371
ETP_SUB_PCC-1 0.415 23.69172 20.69894
FIRE_HYDRANE-3 0.415 11.05332 10.70735
HVAC PANEL(CILA) 0.415 19.33786 17.35141
HVAC-MCC-02 0.415 18.9726 17.13006
HVAC_MCC-1 0.415 20.25912 17.96766
 ________________

Nominal Symmetrical RMS Fault Symmetrical RMS Fault

Bus Equipment Name Voltage Current I"k (kA) During Current I"k (kA) During
(kV) DG Operation EB Operation

HVAC_MCC-2(IMI) 0.415 7.737041 7.398155

HVAC_MCC_PANL 0.415 17.58691 15.8995
HVAC_PANEL(PLA-5) 0.415 25.22655 24.19169
IC_1F1_FIRE_HYD_SYS -2 0.415 10.94646 10.33209
IC_1F2_MM_WAREHOUSE 0.415 6.250593 8.679218
MCC-01(IMI MCC1) 0.415 22.84985 19.93192
MCC-1A 0.415 19.35362 17.36578
MCC-01A 0.415 18.92816 16.95868
MCC-02 0.415 25.06901 21.60561
MCC-02 (IMI) 0.415 8.967417 8.493909
MCC-03 0.415 9.372404 8.874261
MCC-03B 0.415 10.53171 9.895532
MCC-5_FIRE HYD 0.415 15.42799 31.24323
MCC-AC-3 0.415 18.14006 16.58719
MEE MCC-2 0.415 13.69699 12.6823
MEE SUB PCC 0.415 14.3898 13.2682
MEE-MCC-1 0.415 14.05263 12.98511
MLDB PANEL 0.415 16.17397 15.49173
MLDB PLA-1_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 13.54014 24.36388
MLDB PLA-7 SU PCC-4 0.415 14.7227 14.06877
MLDB(IMI LDB) 0.415 23.06733 20.15657
MLDB-1 PCC_PANEL 0.415 31.64982 26.21552
MLDB_CILA 0.415 23.11077 20.19547
MLP 0.415 21.36426 19.19931
MLTP-A 0.415 17.36735 41.61531
MLTP-B 0.415 14.21987 41.61531
MPDB PANEL 0.415 15.26724 14.55337
MPP PANEL-01 0.415 16.47393 15.78162
PCC_PANEL_BUS-1 0.415 113.7695 80.48181
PCC_PANEL_BUS-2 0.415 113.7695 63.43394
PCC_PANEL_BUS-3 0.415 113.7695 62.30567
PLA-1_MCC-1 0.415 6.826951 8.292678
PLA-1_MCC-2 0.415 8.825606 14.66354
PLA-1_MCC-3 0.415 6.7331 8.136869
PLA-1_MCC-4 0.415 6.158227 7.270391
PLA-1_MCC-5 0.415 6.158227 7.270391
PLA-1_MCC-6 0.415 6.493713 7.806227
PLA-1_MCC-8 0.415 6.209185 7.39137
PLA-1_MCC-9 0.415 4.743443 5.467877
PLA-1_MCC-10 0.415 10.97043 16.9427
PLA-1_MCC-11 0.415 9.264444 12.86625
PLA-1_SUB_PCC-1B 0.415 6.973332 8.525309
PLA-1_SUB_PCC-1_A 0.415 9.048576 15.34331
PLA-1_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 13.54014 24.36388
PLA-02_MCC-1 0.415 22.68502 19.7438
 ________________

Nominal Symmetrical RMS Fault Symmetrical RMS Fault

Bus Equipment Name Voltage Current I"k (kA) During Current I"k (kA) During
(kV) DG Operation EB Operation

PLA-02_MCC-02 0.415 21.77235 19.05502

PLA-02_MCC-3 0.415 7.281022 7.022913
PLA-02_MCC-5 0.415 17.3297 15.59009
PLA-02_SUB_PCC-01 0.415 24.76103 21.28115
PLA-02_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 19.28803 17.24002
PLA-02_SUB_PCC-3 0.415 7.754406 7.459497
PLA-02_SUB_PCC-4 0.415 19.144 17.02925
PLA-2_SUB_PCC-5 0.415 9.62322 9.328607
PLA-2_SUB_PCC-6 0.415 5.256863 5.128679
PLA-05_APT_MCC-01 0.415 23.04235 20.04455
PLA-05_STM-3_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 27.45716 26.22239
PLA-5_UTY SUB PCC-1 A 0.415 30.66294 25.56109
PLA-5_UTY SUB PCC-1 B 0.415 33.68295 28.44858
PLA-6_MCC 0.415 8.13304 7.740213
PLA-7_MCC-1 0.415 17.51693 16.57789
PLA-7_MCC-2 0.415 17.19592 16.30272
PLA-7_MCC-3 0.415 18.54037 17.4837
PLA-7_MCC-4 0.415 15.83176 15.06035
PLA-7_MCC-5 0.415 17.25946 16.36337
PLA-7_MCC-6 0.415 15.08855 14.41084
PLA-07_SUB_PCC-01 0.415 18.39079 17.41584
PLA-07_SUB_PCC-02 0.415 21.52127 20.10327
PLA-07_SUB_PCC-03 0.415 45.04431 38.91135
PLA-07_SUB_PCC-04 0.415 17.80319 16.83452
PLA-07_SU_MLDB-1 0.415 5.10549 4.962453
PLA-8 SUB PCC 0.415 15.25407 14.54734
PLA-8_MCC-1 0.415 13.78321 13.21759
PLA-8_MCC-2 0.415 14.86276 14.19513
PLANT-3 MLDB 0.415 23.11077 20.19547
PROCESS_MCC-2_STM_1&2
0.415 21.06422 20.34778
API
PROCES_MCC_PANEL 0.415 19.10185 18.12595
QC_MCC 0.415 5.899113 7.751875
QC_UPS_PANEL 0.415 5.490531 7.021353
SBT_MEE_MCC-1 0.415 11.87456 11.12183
SRP_MCC-1 0.415 14.27602 15.43216
SRP_MCC-2 0.415 15.34807 16.35005
SRP_MCC-3 0.415 15.10415 16.60519
SRP_MCC-4 0.415 15.43286 17.22117
SRP_MCC-5 0.415 13.64291 14.35974
SRP_MCC-6 0.415 15.10415 16.60519
SRP_MCC-7 0.415 15.34807 16.35005
SRP_MCC-8 0.415 15.34807 16.35005
SRP_SUB_PCC_A 0.415 16.09406 18.11282
SRP_SUB_PCC_B 0.415 16.09406 17.41917
 ________________

Nominal Symmetrical RMS Fault Symmetrical RMS Fault

Bus Equipment Name Voltage Current I"k (kA) During Current I"k (kA) During
(kV) DG Operation EB Operation

STPH MCC BLOWER 0.415 31.3782 28.35886

TARNE CHILLER-1 0.415 30.27984 25.8982
TARNE CHILLER-3 0.415 31.4657 28.71797
TARNE CHILLER-4 0.415 32.09724 29.2303
TOYUMA MCC-1 0.415 37.63413 30.37602
TOYUMA MCC-3 0.415 36.30015 29.51602
TOYUMA MCC-4 0.415 33.61708 27.74539
TOYUMA_MCC-2 0.415 34.68557 28.45716
TOYUMA_SUB_PCC 0.415 38.33827 30.82465
UPS_10 kVA 0.415 6.250593 8.679218
UPS_SUB-DB 0.415 5.199414 6.551487
UTILITY_MCC-3 0.415 110.7776 78.97211
UTLITY MCC-1 0.415 23.88951 23.05022
UTLITY MCC-2 0.415 19.56838 19.01354
UTLITY_MCC-1 0.415 82.82099 52.86182
UTLITY_MCC-2 0.415 73.06689 58.03701
UTLITY_MCC-4 0.415 95.95947 57.63908
UTLITY_MCC-5 0.415 32.15071 26.679
UTLITY_MCC-6 0.415 71.45567 56.88597
UTLITY_MCC-8 0.415 53.09611 45.07249
UTLITY_MCC-9 0.415 32.95234 27.59714
UTLITY_MCC-10 0.415 8.245671 8.153281
VLC_DRYER_MCC 0.415 9.697196 13.84171
VLC_MCC-1 0.415 18.61963 16.73452
VLC_MCC-2 0.415 15.89899 14.51678
VLC_MCC-3 0.415 13.87609 12.81994
VOLTAS_BRIN_CHILLER_PA
0.415 17.20932 15.80949
NEL
WAREHOUSE_MCC 0.415 6.923551 6.823908
WAREHOUSE_MCC-1 0.415 6.923551 6.823908
WAREHOUSE_MCC-2 0.415 6.833269 8.704627
WTP_MCC 0.415 25.82044 22.19007
________________

APPENDIX-5

ARC FLASH SUMMARY

 ________________

The following legend will be applicable for describing modes of operation-

S.No Mode Description

Transformers are supplying the entire load of the facility. No DG Operation is
1 1 required.
This is the normal mode.
2 2 Generators are supplying to the load requirement, when EB is OFF.
This is DG Mode.
 ________________

Arc Flash Results

Results Mode-1 (With EB)

 ________________

Arc Flash Results

Results Mode-2 (With DG)

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

2F1PLA-05_ST3_SB_PCC-1 0.415 2.72 2.55

2_CHB_01 0.415 1.82 1.92

4UT_CHB-06 0.415 0.117956 0.199235

30 KVA UPS PANEL 0.415 0.886133 0.880875

30KVA_UPS_PANEL 0.415 0.886133 0.880875

33 kV SF6 PANEL 33 NE 22.94

33kV CONNECTION-1 33 NE 90.16

60KVA_UPS_PANEL 0.415 0.951569 0.935113

APFC PANEL 400 kVAR 0.415 1.94 1.85

AZIDE MCC-1 0.415 1.51 1.45

AZIDE_MCC-2 0.415 0.176882 0.169978

BOILER_MCC-1 0.415 1.4 1.17

BRINE_UTLITY_MCC-1 0.415 0.691543 0.896531

BRINE_UTLITY_MCC-2 0.415 0.182027 0.249149

BUS MCC-1&2 0.415 1.15 0.953998

bus ups 0.415 0.951569 0.935113

CAP PANEL-04 0.415 4.54 3.73

CAPACITOR PANEL-02 0.415 4.39 3.55

CAPACITOR-4 0.415 0.210487 0.19352

CAPACITOR_PANEL-1 0.415 12.13 9.86

CAPCITOR PANEL-3 0.415 7.17 6.47

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

CILA_MCC-1 0.415 9.22 7.93

CIPRO_HCL_OUTGOING 0.415 18.7 0.155846

COMP_CHB_3 0.415 0.059204 0.076988

COOLING WATER PUMP PNL 0.415 0.511302 0.459023

DG PCC 0.415 127.65 NE

DG_EXH_FAN_MCC 0.415 0.49159 0.448477

EMLDB-1 0.415 0.327998 0.294955

ETP-5 0.415 2.32 2.11

ETP_MCC-1 0.415 0.644234 0.575273

ETP_MCC-2 0.415 1.89 1.67

ETP_MCC-3 0.415 0.301212 0.266663

ETP_MCC-4 0.415 0.394933 0.360448

ETP_RO_EHS_MCC-2 0.415 0.078947 0.108266

ETP_RO_MCC 0.415 16.99 0.293721

ETP_RO_MCC-1 0.415 16.78 0.140996

ETP_SUB_PCC-1 0.415 3.05 2.64

FIRE_HYDRANE-3 0.415 0.373428 0.417645

HVAC PANEL(CILA) 0.415 4.4 3.89

HVAC-MCC-02 0.415 0.310624 0.276083

HVAC_MCC-1 0.415 0.330369 0.289392

HVAC_MCC-2(IMI) 0.415 0.138743 0.13227

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

HVAC_MCC_PANL 0.415 1.7 1.52

HVAC_PANEL(PLA-5) 0.415 5.45 5.21

IC_1F1_FIRE_HYD_SYS -2 0.415 0.347496 0.331127

IC_1F2_MM_WAREHOUSE 0.415 0.716108 1.06

MCC-01(IMI MCC1) 0.415 8.53 7.37

MCC-1A 0.415 0.314236 0.277957

MCC-01A 0.415 0.310252 0.274069

MCC-02 0.415 8.68 7.97

MCC-02 (IMI) 0.415 0.179334 0.169605

MCC-03 0.415 0.582262 0.605969

MCC-03B 0.415 0.556176 0.582977

MCC-5_FIRE HYD 0.415 0.224973 0.474952

MCC-AC-3 0.415 1.75 1.58

MEE MCC-2 0.415 0.217301 0.198619

MEE SUB PCC 0.415 0.229021 0.208435

MEE-MCC-1 0.415 0.223247 0.203628

MLDB PANEL 0.415 2.09 1.99

MLDB PLA-1_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 0.198281 0.38192

MLDB PLA-7 SU PCC-4 0.415 0.236974 0.225215

MLDB(IMI LDB) 0.415 0.481854 0.430683

MLDB-1 PCC_PANEL 0.415 2.97 2.49

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

MLDB_CILA 0.415 0.455538 0.40724

MLP 0.415 2.06 1.83

MLTP-A 0.415 33.43 3.54

MLTP-B 0.415 27.73 78.62

MPDB PANEL 0.415 0.24525 0.232581

MPP PANEL-01 0.415 2.14 2.04

PCC_PANEL_BUS-1 0.415 127.65 38.68

PCC_PANEL_BUS-2 0.415 42.77 33.72

PCC_PANEL_BUS-3 0.415 17.42 17.73

PLA-1_MCC-1 0.415 11.2 0.180722

PLA-1_MCC-2 0.415 0.123607 0.219894

PLA-1_MCC-3 0.415 0.062915 0.080189

PLA-1_MCC-4 0.415 0.057493 0.071312

PLA-1_MCC-5 0.415 0.83576 0.159298

PLA-1_MCC-6 0.415 0.688536 0.169943

PLA-1_MCC-8 0.415 0.054761 0.06732

PLA-1_MCC-9 0.415 0.132545 0.159168

PLA-1_MCC-10 0.415 0.201458 0.268165

PLA-1_MCC-11 0.415 0.134948 0.201853

PLA-1_SUB_PCC-1B 0.415 11.43 0.185549

PLA-1_SUB_PCC-1_A 0.415 0.131537 0.240999

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

PLA-1_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 0.198281 0.38192

PLA-02_MCC-1 0.415 5.15 4.45

PLA-02_MCC-02 0.415 0.529906 0.459711

PLA-02_MCC-3 0.415 0.100369 0.096418

PLA-02_MCC-5 0.415 0.468815 0.416547

PLA-02_SUB_PCC-01 0.415 7.99 6.84

PLA-02_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 4.38 3.86

PLA-02_SUB_PCC-3 0.415 9.47 9.92

PLA-02_SUB_PCC-4 0.415 4.35 3.83

PLA-2_SUB_PCC-5 0.415 0.324316 0.313741

PLA-2_SUB_PCC-6 0.415 15.02 14.56

PLA-05_APT_MCC-01 0.415 2.98 2.57

PLA-05_STM-3_SUB_PCC-2 0.415 15.89 17.47

PLA-5_UTY SUB PCC-1 A 0.415 7.22 6.62

PLA-5_UTY SUB PCC-1 B 0.415 7.21 6.15

PLA-6_MCC 0.415 0.12204 0.115137

PLA-7_MCC-1 0.415 0.283007 0.266518

PLA-7_MCC-2 0.415 0.27831 0.262473

PLA-7_MCC-3 0.415 0.299279 0.280986

PLA-7_MCC-4 0.415 0.246784 0.233725

PLA-7_MCC-5 0.415 3.9 3.68

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

PLA-7_MCC-6 0.415 0.242962 0.230772

PLA-07_SUB_PCC-01 0.415 4.13 3.89

PLA-07_SUB_PCC-02 0.415 4.97 4.71

PLA-07_SUB_PCC-03 0.415 5.17 4.66

PLA-07_SUB_PCC-04 0.415 2.3 2.16

PLA-07_SU_MLDB-1 0.415 0.156081 0.152161

PLA-8 SUB PCC 0.415 1.95 1.85

PLA-8_MCC-1 0.415 0.440267 0.419777

PLA-8_MCC-2 0.415 0.474726 0.450929

PLANT-3 MLDB 0.415 0.482746 0.431564

PROCESS_MCC-2_STM_1&2 API 0.415 0.383237 0.369846

PROCES_MCC_PANEL 0.415 2.45 2.32

QC_MCC 0.415 0.081717 0.112516

QC_UPS_PANEL 0.415 0.074364 0.099365

SBT_MEE_MCC-1 0.415 0.172997 0.159864

SRP_MCC-1 0.415 0.209558 0.242479

SRP_MCC-2 0.415 0.20383 0.232513

SRP_MCC-3 0.415 0.220729 0.260408

SRP_MCC-4 0.415 0.224657 0.2691

SRP_MCC-5 0.415 0.20238 0.22732

SRP_MCC-6 0.415 0.220729 0.260408

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

SRP_MCC-7 0.415 0.561607 0.515856

SRP_MCC-8 0.415 0.561607 0.515856

SRP_SUB_PCC_A 0.415 46.78 0.587749

SRP_SUB_PCC_B 0.415 0.514843 0.54845

STPH MCC BLOWER 0.415 0.492624 0.449504

TARNE CHILLER-1 0.415 2.84 2.43

TARNE CHILLER-3 0.415 2.45 2.25

TARNE CHILLER-4 0.415 3.98 3.66

TOYUMA MCC-1 0.415 1.14 0.942239

TOYUMA MCC-3 0.415 0.553604 0.459691

TOYUMA MCC-4 0.415 0.499804 0.418889

TOYUMA_MCC-2 0.415 0.512308 0.428196

TOYUMA_SUB_PCC 0.415 5.19 4.29

UPS_10 kVA 0.415 0.089513 0.132451

UPS_SUB-DB 0.415 0.0457 0.060803

UTILITY_MCC-3 0.415 8.55 7.61

UTLITY MCC-1 0.415 5.13 4.96

UTLITY MCC-2 0.415 0.424323 0.409802

UTLITY_MCC-1 0.415 2.86 2.32

UTLITY_MCC-2 0.415 11.53 10.42

UTLITY_MCC-4 0.415 0.902227 0.734155

 ________________

Incident Energy Incident Energy

Nominal Voltage
Bus Equipment Name During DG During EB Operation
(kV)
Operation (Cal/cm2) (Cal/cm2)

UTLITY_MCC-5 0.415 0.501202 0.420431

UTLITY_MCC-6 0.415 11.45 10.32

UTLITY_MCC-8 0.415 1.07 0.962474

UTLITY_MCC-9 0.415 7.14 6.03

UTLITY_MCC-10 0.415 24.17 23.8

VLC_DRYER_MCC 0.415 0.093391 0.143531

VLC_MCC-1 0.415 0.294066 0.261187

VLC_MCC-2 0.415 0.250571 0.225872

VLC_MCC-3 0.415 0.204661 0.186414

VOLTAS_BRIN_CHILLER_PANEL 0.415 1.66 1.5

WAREHOUSE_MCC 0.415 0.099083 0.100637

WAREHOUSE_MCC-1 0.415 0.099083 0.100637

WAREHOUSE_MCC-2 0.415 0.089153 0.118793

WTP_MCC 0.415 0.768574 0.843644

________________

APPENDIX-6

Relay/Release Settings
 ________________

APPENDIX-7 – AN EASY SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATION METHOD

The short circuit analysis is performed (by the ETAP software) as per IEC 60909. An easy to do method
which yields results which are acceptable for power system design/commissioning decisions is
presented below -
MVA Method to calculate Short circuit currents:
Basically, the MVA method is a modification of the Ohmic method in which the impedance of a circuit
is the sum of the impedances of the various components of the circuit. Since, by definition, admittance
is the reciprocal of impedance, it follows that the reciprocal of the system admittance is the sum of
the reciprocals of the admittances of the components. Also, by definition, the admittance of a circuit
or component is the maximum current or KVA at unit voltage which would flow through the circuit or
component to a short circuit or fault when supplied from a source of infinite capacity.

The following formulae are used in this method-

Also consider the following formulae:

 ________________

The Impedance diagram and its corresponding MVA representation:

Component 1, the system, is normally given a short circuit MVA rating. So, one merely writes down
500, which is its system short circuit MVA. Sometimes, if the system MVA is not available, but its
voltage and impedance are given, the short circuit MVA can be calculated with the application of

Next, for component 2 i.e. transformer, use

The short circuit MVA of the transformer is equal to its own MVA base divided by its own per unit
impedance. (Use reactance X with the MVA method.)

Next, for component 3 i.e. motor, again use

The short circuit MVA contribution of the motor is equal to its own MVA base divided by its own per
unit impedance. (Use reactance X with the MVA method.)
 ________________

Now, let us examine the MVA diagram. If a short circuit is taken at point F, there will be a series flow
of MVA1 and MVA2, and their combination will be in parallel with MVA3. The question now is: how
do you combine the MVA values in series and in parallel? The answer is again simple arithmetic

From above, it can easily be recognized that series MVA combinations are exactly as resistances
computed in parallel. Parallel MVA combinations are exactly as resistances computed in series.
The MVASC at point F then can be calculated as follows:

The term with the asterisk is the new MVA1 value which is the result of combining MVA1 and MVA2.
After the operation, the new MVA, which is 250 MVA, replaces the old MVA1 and MVA2. This scheme
of replacing old quantities with new quantities relates to computer data memory storage system.
At this point the short circuit MVA is solved. To find the current value, only the voltage value is
required. For example, if the voltage is 13.8 kV, the current ISC is

An example below:
 ________________

The 69kV cable here is 3.87 ohms. The MVASC for the cable can be calculated by

This way any network can be reduced into short circuit MVA and the fault at any point can be found.
This is a simple method to solve any type of network for finding short circuit level. However, it must
be noted that this method may become very cumbersome for complex networks when solved by hand.
A computer program is always preferable for such computations.
 ________________

APPENDIX-8 – IEEE 1584 Sample Calculation

The short circuit analysis is performed (by the ETAP software) as per IEC 60909.

From the short circuit analysis report (Appendix-4), the following panel is considered for this example.

PCC_PANEL_BUS-1 0.415 Switchgear 32 70.19 70.19 31.67

The 3 phase bolted fault current is

Ibf = 70.19

From the equations of IEEE 1584, the arcing current is calculated from:

Where:

This will determine the arcing fault current based on the voltages and the fault levels that are
passing through the equipment.
 ________________

The arcing current is

Iarc at 600 V = 30.5kA

Final Arcing Current

Iarc Final= 31.36 kA

Where Height1 is the adjusted height used to find the equivalent box size, the equivalent
enclosure size value is:

Incident Energy:
 ________________

Here, T=0.685 s (Time taken by breaker to clear the fault)

E = 37.97 Cal/cm2

ARC Flash Protection boundary is given by-

AFB= 5.256 mtrs

The time (t) here is the time taken by the protective device to clear the fault is 0.5 S. If the Fault
Clearing time is above 2 Seconds, the arc flash module will take 2 seconds for fault clearing
time. It is because of the human reaction time stated by NFPA 70E-2021 and IEEE 1584-2018

From the Time current curve above, it can be said that the release can clear the arc fault (23.39kA)
in 0.5S ; Here E= 47.40 Cal/cm2, t=0.5 S ; DB=3.727 metres is the Arc Flash Boundary.
 ________________

APPENDIX-9 – NFPA 70E REFERENCE TABLE FOR ARC FLASH PPE USAGE
________________
 ________________

APPENDIX-10 – UNDERSTANDING THE PROTECTIVE DEVICE NOMENCLATURE

WL II 3200S ETU 27B release. The following is a sample image of the above device.

Device nameplate i.e. WL

II 3200S

Release Model
ETU 27B
 APPENDIX-11 – ARC FLASH CASE STUDIES (IEEE 1584)

Following are the case studies detailed in IEEE 1584

S.no Setting Electric Equipment Activity Event Apparel Outcome Assessment

system
1. Commercial 600/347 V XFMR 1500 kVA, Electrician Arc flash occurred in Hard hat Safety Third degree burns Human
site— 1998 ac 12.47 kV— installing a 400 A the panel directly in glasses to 28% of the Error
600/347 V fuse in a panel front of the employee's body.
Grounding module. Switch employee. Significant loss of
Secondary ground had been opened sight, hearing, and
Fault relay to isolate the fuse smell.
protected mount Primary fuse
operated.
Primary fuse
protected
2. Industrial site, Unit Unit feeder Electrician was An arc flash HV gloves No injury. Human
power substation circuits circuit testing on occurred when the Safety glasses Error
distribution— deenergized feeder feeder circuits
1994 circuits. were reenergized
at main substation
while electrician
was connecting
test lead to fuse
holder.
3. Laboratory— 480 V ac 480 V ac electric Connecting While moving the Unknown The electrician had Human
1997 panel MCC temporary lighting cover, it contacted burns to his face Error
and heat circuits the C-phase of the and hands.
from an MCC to a bus bar causing an
480 V electrical arc flash.
panel in another
room. Electrician
was removing the
 upper bus bar
cover that shields
the line side
connections in the
panel.
4. Industrial site, 13.8 kV ac HV switch Electrician was Debris or other T-shirt Second and third Human
outdoor using a paint material fell and degree burns to the Error
substation— brush to clean contacted the right arm and left
1998 inside the energized C-phase hand.
switchgear cabinet knife blades
in close proximity creating an arc
to energized flash.
equipment.
5. Industrial 480 V ac MCC Electrician removed While reinserting Unknown Second degree Human
site—1998 the door operating screws into the burns. Error
mechanism from a spare breaker
spare circuit mounting plate, a
breaker and was screw penetrated
reinstalling the a line side
spare breaker to the conductor causing
mounting plate. a 480 V, three-
phase arc flash.
6. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V bus bar One electrician The Allen wrench Unknown Burns to the hands Human
site—1992 was holding a slipped and of both electricians. Error
ground lead in contacted the 480
place while the V bus.
other was
tightening the lug
with a "taped"
Allen wrench near
a 480 V bus
shielded with an
insulation blanket.
7. Utility 2400 V ac, Motor starting Operator racked The 700 HP motor Hard hat No injuries. Human
generation three- circuit breaker the breaker "in" was accelerating Leather gloves Error
plant phase, (1950's vintage) with it in the and the breaker Safety glasses
ungrounded, closed position, being backed out as well as
2400 V ac feeder
delta- and then started caused a System
bus had no main
connected to rack it out. significant arc
overcurrent imperfect.
flash to occur.
protection of its
own of any kind. The arcing fault Human
continued until an should
Interlock that
overcurrent relay have taken
prevented breaker
operated a breaker care
from being
on the primary side
"racked in" while
of the 13.8 kV-2.4
closed was
kV transformer
missing.
Breaker was in the
"closed" position.
Breaker feeds a
700 HP motor.
8. Utility, 13.2 kV ac 13 k V vacuum Electrician was The wrench Cotton T-shirt The burning T-shirt Human
outdoor circuit breaker reaching with a bridged C and B caused second and Error
substation— combination phases causing a third degree burns
200A fused
2000 wrench for a stinger phase-to-phase arc to 60% of the
dropouts between
conductor bolt of C- flash. upper torso.
the breaker bus and
phase on the
the main bus The fuse dropouts
energized breaker
cleared the fault in
Maximum fault from a step ladder.
27 cycles.
currents: 8 kA
phase- to-ground
6 kA phase-to-
phase
9. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V MCC main The circuit tested Electrician started Unknown The electrician Human
site—1997 breaker deenergized the to connect line suffered arc-flash Error
day before side leads to the burns from this
Placed lock and tag
accident. On MCC main breaker incident.
to isolate the MCC
second workday, when an arc flash
main breaker
electrician occurred.
Unisolated feed assumed (no test)
existed to breaker circuit was still
that was out- of- deenergized.
service when work
began
10. Utility 480 V ac MCC Racking in breaker. An electrical Unknown Burns to both Equipment
generation connector touched wrists. malfunction
plant—1997 a brace bar as the
breaker was
racked in and the
phase was
grounded causing
an arc flash.
11. Utility 480 V ac 480 V feeder board Racking in a Standing to the Unknown Serious burns to Equipment
generation reconditioned left of the hand. Design
plant—1995 480 V breaker replacement compartment, the issue
(reconditioned) breaker, but was electrician closed
unable to close the breaker with
the door due to just his hand in
incompatible front of the
components compartment. The
(incorrect part). breaker
malfunctioned
causing an arc
flash.
12. Utility Precipitato 480 V ac breaker Trouble shooting When placing the Unknown Second and third Human
generation r power for a ground meter probes degree burns to both Error
plant—1994 substation indicator light across A and B hands.
problem. phase buses the
Inserted volt meter shorted
ohmmeter lead into causing an arc
the 1200 V ac socket flash, which
of the meter. migrated to the
panel above the
work area and
caused a phase-to-
phase arc in panel.
13. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V ac, 200 A Turning breakers on The beaker Unknown Burn to right hand. Human
site— 1994 panel and off to locate shorted causing an Error
equipment feeds in arc flash between
machine shop. phases.
14. Utility 440 V ac 440 V ac, molded Electrician was When cutting the Unknown Serious burns to Human
generation frame breaker removing a 440 V leads to the 440 V both hands. Error
plant—1992 ac breaker, which ac breaker, an arc
Distribution board
had been out of flash occurred.
service since 1982.
15. Utility Less than Motor rotation Performing a When the power Unknown Corneal burn to both Human
generation 600 V ac indicator phase sequence was applied to the eyes. Error
plant—1991 check on a new bus, the motor
bus and was using rotation indicator
a motor rotation shorted causing an
indicator issued by arc flash.
the tool room and
not the phase
sequence
indicator.
16. Utility 480 V ac 480 V ac breaker Was placing The closed breaker Unknown Burn to shoulder. Equipment
generation Feeder board breaker in cubicle, caused an arc malfunction
plant—1990 the breaker was flash.
closed and did not
open due to
mechanical failure.
17. Utility Outdoor 4160 V ac Testing to When the Unknown Burns to both hands. Equipment
transmission substation conductors determine if the electrician placed malfunction
—1990 conductors were the Simspon 260 m
energized to the probe on one phase
transformer bank. and the other probe
on the second
phase the meter
shorted causing an
arc flash.
18. Utility 480 V ac Panel board 480 V Two electricians A fault occurred Unknown Second and third Human
generation ac breaker were taking that caused an arc degree burns to Error
plant—1989 current readings in flash in the both employees'
the breaker breaker faces.
compartment with compartment.
a clamp-on type
ammeter on the
motor phase
conductor from
the breaker.
19. Utility 161 kV ac Plant switchyard Two electricians While moving Non-flame Two employees Human
generation Disconnect switch were inspecting bucket to a new resistant winter had second and Error
plant—1988 lightning arrestors position, there was clothing third degree burns
and disconnect an arc flash from an from the arc flash
switch insulators energized 161 kV Hard hat and burning
from a non- switch to the clothing. One
Safety glasses
insulated aerial lift bucket. employee died
bucket.
 from burn injury
complications.
20. Utility 480 V ac 480 V ac breaker Electrician was When the studs Hard hat Safety Second degree Human
generation board testing for voltage were contacted, glasses burns to hands and Error
plant—1988 on the 480 V ac an arc flash first degree burns
breaker studs with occurred in the to face and
an HV probe. breaker forearms.
compartment.
21. Industrial 2400 V ac 2400 V ac breaker Opening a Electrician opened a Cotton clothing Electrician had Human
site— 1986 board that feeds a breaker. 2400 V breaker second and third Error
1250 HP pump under load. degree burns from
the arc flash and
burning clothing to
70% of body.
Second electrician
had first and
second degree
burns to hands
from rescue
efforts.
22. Utility, 13 kV ac Energized 13 kV Lineman was in an The electrician Unknown Both the lineman Human
transmission substation bus insulated aerial lift caused an arc flash and superintendent Error
—1970 maneuvering an between the died from injuries
13 kV potential
energized bucket and the from their burning
transformer
"stinger" during substation steel clothing.
the installation of setting fire to the
a potential lineman's shirt.
transformer with The assistant
help of an superintendent
electrician using a climbed onto the
"hot stick" from a structure to aid
ladder. the injured. When
he touched the
 bucket a second
arc flash occurred
setting his clothing
on fire.
23. Utility, 13.8 kV ac 13.8 kV oil-filled Periodic inspection The employees Unknown The electrician was Equipment
transmission circuit breaker of the condenser attempted to close able to exit the malfunction
—1967 (OCB) had been the 13.8 kV OCB room with his
performed with causing an arc clothing on fire.
13 kV synchronous
the circuit flash. The arc flash The operator did
condenser
deenergized. The caused the OCB to not get out of the
circuit was explode throwing room. Both died of
reenergized and a flaming oil burn injuries.
substation control throughout the
alarm went off. room.
The operator and
electrician went to
the switch house
breaker room to
investigate.
24. Utility, 46 kV ac 46 kV gang Completed testing B "When the Polyester/cotto Second and third Equipment
transmission operated three- and C phases. employee applied n shirt degree burns on malfunction
—1981 phase switch Conducting the test probe to two- thirds of the
resistance test on the insulator, an upper torso.
46 kV OCB
the A- phase OCB arc flash occurred Polyester melted
insulator using a because the A- on his skin.
"micrometer." phase of the 46 kV
gang operated
switch did not
open when the
circuit was
cleared.
25. Utility, 46 kV ac 46 kV transmission Lineman was The lineman's Unknown Lineman had burns Human
transmission line switch dead- ending a head contracted over two-thirds of Error
—1973 structure, wood conductor on a the energized 46 his body, which
poles switch structure kV switch above resulted in his
working from a him causing him to death.
46 kV switch
ladder. fall.
26. Utility 161 kV ac Double circuit 161 Lineman was Dripping paint Unknown Lineman was blown Human
transmission kV steel painting a steel from the bucket to off the tower, but Error
—1984 transmission transmission tower the 161 kV had on a "safety"
tower with energized energized jumper which prevented his
jumpers above and caused an arc- fall. He received first
161 kV jumper
below the tower flash explosion. degree burns to his
Zinc based paint
arm where he was forearms
working.
27. Utility 161 kV ac 161 kV OCB The OCB was The electrician Unknown Electrician had third Human
transmission cleared on the line contacted the degree burns to his Error
substation— OCB phase side, but not the energized OCB arms and a fractured
1969 bushing on bus bus side. The bushing on the bus skull.
side electrician climbed side of the breaker
on the breaker to causing an arc
attach temporary flash that blew
safety grounds. him off the
breaker.
28. Mine site— 995 V ac 1 kV ac breaker Replacing a 480 V While moving the Unknown Electrician had Human
2000 panel. ac breaker panel panel, it contacted serious burns to Error and
with a 1 kV ac the line side both hands and Equipment
breaker panel. connections which face. malfunction
With new panel were energized at
installed, the 7200 995 V causing an
V ac transformer arc flash.
was reenergized.
At first the AMR-
type ground check
 circuit prevented
the new panel
from energizing.
The electrician
started removing
the 1.0 kV panel
when the ground
check circuit
shorted and
energized the
panel.
29. Industrial site, 35.4 kV ac Substation main Employee was The employee Unknown Employee had Human
substation— 34.5 kv overhead installing an HV reached out and burns on his face, Error
1996 switch support cable support contacted the bus hands, waist, and
column bracket on the insulator causing upper back. He also
support column. an arc flash. had electrical
Cable support Supervisor was internal burn
bracket holding the bracket injuries. He died
in place while from these injuries.
34.5 kv bus
employee stood on
substation bus
fiberglass step
insulator
ladder. This
operation was next
to an energized 34.5
kV bus.
30. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V secondary Three employees While installing Non-fire One employee was Equipment
site— 1994 circuit breakers were reinstalling the second resistant engulfed in flames malfunction
480 V breakers breaker, an arc clothing and died from burn
480 V power
into an energized flash occurred. The injuries. The other
distribution panel
distribution panel cause of the arc two had serious burn
Below-pier in an electrical was excessive injuries.
electrical vault vault. The crew moisture in the
glass fiber
 installed one reinforced
breaker. polyester (GFRP)
molded insulating
material between
the 480 V phases
during breaker
installation.
31. Industrial 2.3 kV ac MCC An electrical Worker thought a Eye and face The worker had Human
site— 1992 250 V multimeter worker (nine set of fuses was low protection first, second, and Error
2.3 kV fuses months voltage (could not third degree burns
Electrical
experience) and a read fuse label). He over 30% of his
hazard safety
Journeyman touched the meter body.
shoes
electrician were probes to fuses
performing which were
operation checks energized at 2.3 kV
on MCC. causing an arc flash.
Compartment
heater found
inoperative.
Journeyman went
to get single-line
drawing.
32. Mine site— 480 V ac MCC The main breaker in Supervisor opened Non-flame The supervisor's Human
1997 the MCC would not the panel door to resistant clothing ignited Error
480 V main circuit reset. The electrical take readings on clothing and he had second
breaker supervisor had all the main breaker degree burns over
the 480 V load shut with a multimeter. 75% of his body.
480 V feeder
down and then shut The probe He died the
circuit breaker
off all the breakers simultaneously following day. Two
in the MCC. He tried touched the other supervisor
again to reset the energized terminal who were assisting
main breaker. and a grounded to trouble shoot
nut that was used the MCC received
 to mount the arc- flash burns to
breaker in the the face, arms, and
MCC (the breaker hands.
was improperly
mounted). This
caused an arc flash
to occur.
33. Industrial 2.4 kV ac 2.4 kV draw-out, An electrician When the meter Unknown The electrician Human
site— 1987 fused-contactor taking reading with probe contacted sustained massive Error
assembly in a a multimeter. The the 2.4 kV fused- burn injuries and
motor starter meter operating contactor, it subsequently died.
range was set at 500 exploded causing a There was no
V ac. The fused- three-phase arc evidence of
contactor was flash in the electrical shock.
energized at 2.4 kV. assembly.
34. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V ac main Moving a no. 6 AWG The electrician Unknown The electrician Human
site— 1994 breaker ground wire in a 480 allowed the ground sustained third Error
V cabinet. wire to contact an degree burns to
energized phase lug neck, arms, and
of the main breaker torso.
resulting in a three-
phase arc flash.
35. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V frame type Employee was The button came Safety glasses. Employee sustained Human
site— 1998 KC breaker with trouble shooting apart and the HV switching second degree burns Error
solid state trip unit the "trip" button linkage dropped gloves. to his arms and face.
on the breaker. down into the
The button was energized bus bar
stuck behind the initiating an arc
panel it normally flash.
stuck through and
was located just
below the hole. He
opened the cubicle
 door, squatted
down, and
attempted to
realign the button.
36. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V circuit The system was As the employee Unknown One employee Human
site— 1995 breaker not deenergized. started to nearest breaker Error
Two employees reset/work on the sustained burns
Air conditioner approached the breaker, an arc flash over 87% of his
unit breaker panel occurred which body. The second
board which caused a second arc employee
13.2 kV-480 V already had its flash at the block sustained burns
transformer fed cover and door connection at the over 50% of his
directly to the removed. One switchgear. body and later
breaker employee either died.
reset the breaker
or started to
remove it.
37. Industrial 12 kV ac 12 kV circuit Electrician was An arc flash Unknown The electrician Human
site— 1993 breaker Circuit working inside the occurred on the suffered third Error
breaker cubicle energized 12 kV exposed phases of degree burns to his
breaker cubicle the supply side of face, body, and
without insulating the breaker. arms.
barriers. He was
working on the
breaker controls.
38. Industrial 480 V ac 480 V circuit Electrician was When he touched Unknown The electrician's Human
site— 1991 breaker replacing a 480 V the breaker shirt ignited and he Error
breaker serving a terminals to suffered deep
Rotary switch to wind turbine. He discharge stored burns to his face
wind turbine turned a rotary energy, an arc and arms.
switch to what he flash occurred
thought was the because of the
open position to
 isolate the backfeed from a
breaker. transformer.
39. Industrial 600 V ac 600 V circuit Electrician was Something caused Unknown Electrician was Equipment
site— 1991 breaker measuring voltage an arc flash in the burned over 60% malfunction
on the load side of breaker. of his body and
a 125 A, 600 V died.
breaker.
40. Utility 4160 V ac 4160 V circuit Three employees When the breaker Unknown One electrician Human
generation breaker were going to contacts were suffered second Error
plant—1985 remove a 4160 V opened, an arc and third degree
breaker. They flash occurred. burns. The other
went to the wrong two suffered burns
breaker, which to their face and
was energized. hands. All were
hospitalized.
41. Industrial 6.9 kV ac 6.9 kV transformer Three employees He then opened Unknown Employees no. 1, 2, Equipment
site— 1984 bank were in the OCB the OCB, which and 3 were in the malfunction
building to inspect caused an arc flash building when the
6.9 kV OCB
equipment, and the building arc flash occurred.
change the OCB ignited. All suffered burns,
oil, and clean but employee no. 1
transformer died from the
bushings. Number injuries.
1 employee was
isolating the
equipment. He
removed the load
from the
secondary side of
the transformer,
then used an
ammeter to
measure current
 to the
transformer, which
showed no load.
42. Industrial 2.3 kV ac 2300 V, 1000 Hp Electrician had The no-load switch Safety glasses PPE prevented Human
site— 1998 motor swapped the motor arc flashed phase- burn injury. Error
leads at the to-phase because Fire resistant
Temporary contactor to change grounds were not pants and shirt
protective grounds the rotation of the removed. Hot gases
Arc flash suit
motor. Then, pushed the door
including hood
operator was to open where
return motor to operator was
service. He closed standing.
the no-load switch.
43. Utility 4160 V ac 4 kV ac breaker. Electrician was to An electrical arc The employee Employee handling Human
generation install a safety flash occurred from handling ground: first and Error
plant—2002 Temporary ground on the load the energized ground: FR second degree
protective safety side copper stabs breaker stab to the switching burns to neck and
grounds. of the 4 kV grounded safety jacket, safety face (3% total
breaker. ground. The fault glasses, leather body).
Electricians two migrated into a gloves, and
Employee on left:
and three were three- phase arcing hard hat
first and second
assisting by fault.
Employee on degree burns to his
holding the
left side of arm (3% total
breaker's arc
cubicle: 100% body).
shield to expose
cotton shirt,
the stabs. While Employee on right:
safety glasses,
attempting to second and third
leather gloves,
attach the first degree burns to
hard hat
ground, he arm and upper
approached the Employee on body (13% total
high-side, right side of body).
energized, stabs of cubicle: 65/35
polyester/
 the breaker with cotton shirt,
the safety ground. safety glasses,
leather gloves,
and hard hat
44. Utility 13.8 kV ac 13.8 kV Employee was to As he started to Unknown Employee had Human
generation disconnect attach grounds to attach the ground second and third Error
plant—1985 the generator side on the deenergized degree burns to
Temporary safety of the disconnect bus, the ladder hand, arm, and
grounds from a step-ladder. tipped causing the face.
ground conductor
Step-ladder
to contact the
energized side of
the disconnect. An
electrical arc flash
occurred.
45. Utility 480 V ac 480 V breaker .Employee was An electrical arc Unknown Employee was Human
generation "racking-in" the flash occurred. burned on the arm. Error
plant—1991 480 V breaker with
it in the "closed"
position.
46. Utility Unknown Compensator The employee An electrical arc Unknown Employees clothing Equipment
generation Disconnect switch switched a flash occurred in ignited and malfunction
plant—1948 ventilating fan the compensator, burned. He had
switch to start the and it blew up. over 50% total
fan. body burns and
died.
47. Utility 13 kV 13 kV substation The employee was The employee Unknown Burns caused death Human
transmission bus removing contacted the C- of the employee. Error
—1963 temporary phase bus with his
jumpers on a 13 kV body causing an
line. arc flash to occur.
48. Utility 13 kV 13 kV bus A hydraulic press An electrical arc Unknown The employee was Human
transmission was being moved flash occurred. burned. Error
—1968 and it fell into a 13
kV energized bus.
49. Utility 4160 V ac 4 kV breaker. The employee was An electrical arc Polyester/cotto 80% of his shirt Human
generation racking the flash occurred n shirt. burned away. He Error
plant—2002 breaker and it when the received third
would not employee's hand degree burns to his
completely rack-in, contacted the A- right hand, arm,
lacking about an phase shunt which and right shoulder
inch. The was energized. and second degree
employee burns to face,
removed the arc neck, left arm, and
shield from the hand.
breaker to observe
the shutter levers.
He reached in to
check whether the
levers were "free."
 APPENDIX-12

SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

Single line Diagram Legend

S.no Symbol Description

1 OG Outgoing Circuit breaker or fuse

2 IC Incoming circuit breaker or fuse

3 C- Cable connected or cable coming from

4 R- Relay

5 -BC- Bus coupler

6 Open Circuit Breaker or Fuse is in Disconnected/Open/Racked out state