Relearning An Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration

Author(s): Fred W. Riggs

Source: Public Administration Review , Mar., 1965, Vol. 25, No. 1, Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary Issue (Mar., 1965), pp. 70-79
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration

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 Relearning An Old Lesson: The Political
Context of Development Administration
By FRED W. RIGGS
Indiana University
One of the earliest and most notable advo-
cates of administrative reform based on bor-
rowed technology and imported skills was
Woodrow Wilson. In 1887 he published the
famous essay which, in many ways, still stands
as a relevant contribution to our understand-
ing of public administration. His standpoint
in recommending that Americans utilize Eu-
ropean administrative principles is well stated
in the following paragraph:
When we study the administrative systems of France
and Germany, knowing that we are not in search of
political principles, we need not care a peppercorn
for the constitutional or political reasons which French-
men or Germans give for their practices when ex-
plaining them to us. If I see a murderous fellow
sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of
sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable
intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see
a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public
bureau well, I can learn his business methods without
changing one of my republican spots. He may serve
his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I
should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves
his. By keeping this distinction in view,-that is, by
studying administration as a means of putting our own
politics into convenient practice, as a means of making
what is democratically politic towards all administra-
tively possible towards each,-we are on perfectly safe
ground, and can learn without error what foreign sys-
tems have to teach us. We thus devise an adjusting
weight for our comparative method of study. We can
thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments
without fear of getting any of their diseases into our
veins; dissect alien systems without apprehension of
blood-poisoning. 1
I Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 (June, 1887), re-
printed vol. 56, Dec. 1941, pp. 481-506. Citation, p.
504.
70
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> With millions of dollars being spent for tech-
nical assistance programs and research, the author
finds the premises and assumptions underlying
the assistance to be faulty. Drawing on Wilson's
writing to illustrate the political context in which
development administration must function, Pro-
fessor Riggs enters a strong plea for research
funds to support empirical field work on the basic
characteristics of socio-political systems. With
"weaknesses of administrative performance in all
the underdeveloped countries. . . strikingly re-
vealed in every report on economic development
it may well be time to heed Wilson's lesson
that administration can be improved only after
the cultivation of democratic politics.
Wilson's Political Conceptualization
The underlying distinction between politics
and administration which Wilson draws was
crucial to his mode of analysis. Yet this dis-
tinction has been widely misunderstood. Many
have interpreted it as a premise for treating
public administration as a social technology
which could be understood and utilized with-
out regard for political setting. Politics and
administration have been viewed as two
worlds, each subject to independent analysis
and manipulation. As recent writers have
stressed, this bifurcation is unrealistic and has
injured the study of politics as well as admin-
istration, for neither can be understood apart
from the other.
Wilson was well aware of this interdepend-
ence. He never meant to imply that, in con-
stitutional practice, a clear line could be
drawn between political and administrative
organization. Indeed, he states quite ex-
plicitly that "No lines of demarcation, setting
apart administrative from non-administrative
functions, can be run between this and that
department of government without being run
up hill and down dale, over dizzy heights of
distinction and through dense jungles of stat-
 DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 71
utory enactment, hither and thither around
'ifs' and 'buts,' 'whens' and 'howevers,' until
they become altogether lost to the common
eye...."
For Wilson not only were politics and ad-
ministration closely intertwined, but admin-
istrative action was scarcely conceivable except
as the implementation of general policies for-
mulated by political means. "Politics," writes
Wilson, "sets the tasks for administration...."
Politics is the "special province of the states-
man, administration of the technical official."
Administration involves the "detailed and
systematic execution of public laws. Every
particular application of general law is an
act of administration."'
Thus Wilson was under no illusion that
administrative development could take, place
in a political vacuum. The separation of
politics and administration did not mean the
disappearance of politics, but the conduct of
administration in a political context. He did
argue, however, that, in a democratically con-
trolled political system, one could employ
administrative principles developed under
European authoritarianism.
Adaptation, moreover, would be necessary.
Thus he wrote that administrative science had
been developed "by French and German pro-
fessors, and is consequently in all parts
adapted to the needs of a compact state, and
made to fit highly centralized forms of gov-
ernment; whereas, to answer our purposes, it
must be adapted, not to a simple and com-
pact, but to a complex and multiform state,
and made to fit highly decentralized forms of
goverment. If we would employ it, we must
Americanize it, and that not formally, in lan-
guage merely, but radically, in thought, prin-
ciple, and aim as well." 8
Borrowing administrative principles, then
would be permissible for a democracy only
under the constraint of political responsibility.
For Wilson such responsibility was to be at-
tained largely through the subjection of offi-
cial actions to the controls imposed by a
watchful public opinion, monitored by elected
officials. Thus the experts as civil servants
would be subject to political *direction. For
them, "Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy
2Ibid., pp. 494-5. The definitions are attributed by
Wilson to Bluntschli.
3 Ibid., p. 486.
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of the government they serve will constitute
good behavior. That policy will have no taint
of officialism about it. It will not be the cre-
ation of permanent officials, but of statesmen
whose responsibility to public opinion will
be direct and inevitable." 4
In the context of Wilson's thinking, sev-
eral questions arise which merit careful ex-
amination today. Would he, for example,
have endorsed the deliberate export of admin-
istrative technology, as developed in American
experience, to help buttress the administrative
capabilities of autocratic or authoritarian
regimes? There seems little doubt that Wilson
gave his highest loyalty to democratic gov-
ernment and that he viewed administrative
expertise as justified only by its dedication to
the public welfare. "Administration in the
United States," he wrote, "must be at all
points sensitive to public opinion." Imported
administrative science, in his view, ought to
be thoroughly Americanized. "It must learn
our constitutions by heart; must get the bu-
reaucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale
much free American air." Wilson would never
have endorsed a policy to improve personnel
administration, to strengthen budgeting pro-
cedures or improve organizational communi-
cations as ends in themselves-he would have
regarded them as useful tools, justifiable only
for the political ends they served.
It may be argued that all the countries re-
ceiving American technical assistance are by
no means tyrannies or despotisms. This, how-
ever, does not make them democracies. Per-
haps our habit of lumping together all coun-
tries not within the Soviet orbit as part of the
"Free World" inclines us to a lenient view
of their "democratic" promise. Or perhaps
our tendency to dichotomize political systems
as either monolithic or pluralistic, to classify
as democratic every regime which is not clearly
totalitarian, has obscured the significance of
politically marginal or transitional systems.
The truth is that there are many shades of
gray between the extremes of black and white.
In a developmental framework, there are
different kinds of polities which require iden-
tification. Consequently the impact of pro-
grams designed to improve administrative
technology varies within wide limits depend-
ing upon the type of political system encoun-
'Ibid., p. 500.
 72 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

tered. Wilson had some such idea, and his
reflections on this subject are instructive.
"There may be said to be three periods of
growth," he wrote, "through which govern-
ment has passed in all the most highly devel-
oped of existing systems, and through which
it promises to pass in all the rest."
The first of these periods is that of absolute rulers,
and of an administrative system adapted to absolute
rule; the second is that in which constitutions are
framed to do away with absolute rulers and sub-
stitute popular control, and in which administration
is neglected for these higher concerns; and the third
is that in which the sovereign people undertake to
develop administration under this new constitution
which has brought them into power. 5
In Wilson's system of values, the cultiva-
tion of democratic politics clearly took prior-
ity over the strengthening of administration,
for his schema is as much an idealized image
of how development ought to occur, as an
empirical description of how, historically, it
has taken place. In his essay he regarded the
strengthening of administration for the pur-
poses of absolutism as a nefarious aspect of
early periods of development, to be overcome
only by revolutionary changes in which ad-
ministration was necessarily neglected. For
Wilson, it was only after the victory of de-
mocracy through constitutionally limited gov-
ernment, that it became both justifiable and
possible to improve administration.
While Wilson's framework of stages cannot
be defended on empirical grounds, we must
consider that he wrote in an age when optim-
ism about the universal rise of democratic
institutions prevailed, when notions of social
?Ibid., p. 488. Wilson's idea that the first period of abroad soon convinced the first American
political development involved the emergence of effec- exponents of administrative reform overseas
tive administration under absolute rule was later
paralleled by Friedrich's insistence that the growth
of bureaucracy was a necessary condition for the sub-
sequent development of constitutional government. See and difficult to manipulate than had been
Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and
Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and
America, rev. edn. (Boston: 1950). It should be
observed, however, if absolute rule is accompanied by
the growth of a truly powerful bureaucracy-as was the
case in traditional empires such as those of China,
Egypt, and Byzantium: then the subsequent rise of
constitutional government was prevented. Historically, ing mood was the conference on comparative
democratic constitutional government has arisen only
in countries where the rise of bureaucracy was severely Jersey, during September 1952 by the Public
hampered by the existence of a pluralistic social
structure rooted in a feudal past, where efforts to
superimpose a bureaucratic empire had failed.
evolution were widely accepted, and when
little was known about the non-Western
world. Nevertheless, his ideas are germane to
the value issues underlying present technical
assistance programs in public administration.
They highlight the political context of devel-
opment administration and suggest the im-
portance of a sound empirical framework,
firmly rooted in comparative analysis.
Administrative Theory and
Technical Assistance
It is ironical that many present day admin-
istrative advisers, thinking themselves well
advanced beyond the pioneer and fragmen-
tary writings of Woodrow Wilson, should have
forgotten or disregarded the import of his
views.- The idea became widely accepted, fol-
lowing World War II, that science and tech-
nology were value neutral, or perhaps better,
that they were inherently beneficial, so that
anyone who utilized them would be bene-
fitted. In this spirit the "Point Four" philos-
ophy gained widespread acceptance. The
fruits of modern science were to be dissemi-
nated to the hungry lands, where the fields
would be made to bloom, the factories to
hum, and government offices to resound with
the stirring buzz of public service efficiently
performed.
It was in this spirit that the advantages of
administrative technology were first offered to
those governments who responded to the
promises of this new "science."
It did not take long for the obvious naivete
of this point of view to become apparent. Ex-
posure to the complex realities of government
that something was wrong-either the new
situations encountered were more complex
imagined, or the doctrines of good public ad-
ministration that had received widespread
credence in the United States were in need
of careful analysis and revision.
One of the first landmarks of this question-
administration, convened in Princeton, New
Administration Clearing House. Some thirty
scholars, administrative advisers, government

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 DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 73
officials, and foundation executives came to-
gether for three days to review current prob-
lems and suggest a variety of concrete actions
which might be taken to deal with them.
According to the conference report, partici-
pants with overseas experience
. .. gave examples of problems that they had con-
fronted about which doctrine and knowledge were
lacking, particularly comparatively. Mention was made
of the proliferation of government corporations for
agricultural, industrial or financial development in
underdeveloped countries, without understanding of
the conditions for their success or the methods of their
control. What were the conditions for success or
failure of various devices of parliamentary govern-
ment? Problems of delegation of authority, of budget-
ary procedures were said to be pressing. 6
The conference emphasized "the primary
importance of the development of CRI-
TERIA OF RELEVANCE of a set of con-
cepts as a frame of reference for the study
of comparative administration." There was
"general agreement," apparently, "that the
administration of a country must be studied
in its setting," that comprehensive collection
of data would not be possible, and that there-
fore some focus and analysis of selected in-
formation would be necessary. Yet the diffi-
culty of finding appropriate criteria was rec-
ognized because existing administrative con-
cepts were largely American, and therefore
would "not always be meaningful in other
countries."7
The most significant fruit of the Princeton
conference was an outline formulated by Wal-
lace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman as a pos-
sible basis for comparative studies of adminis-
trative behavior. The Social Science Research
Council seminar on comparative politics, held
at Northwestern University during the sum-
mer of 1952, had recommended adoption of a
"conceptual scheme for comparative political
studies" and a "check-list for making political
inventories of different countries." Why not
adopt a similar strategy in studying adminis-
tration? The conference briefly reviewed the
Sayre-Kaufman outline and decided that it
would be "a useful step toward the desired
frame of reference."
6 Report of a Conference on Comparative Admin-
istration (New York: Public Administration Clearing
House, 1952 [processed] pp. 19-20).
7 Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 9.
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The Sayre-Kaufman outline, in revised and
expanded form, was subsequently revised by
a working group of the American Political
Science Association, which prepared a research
design for overseas field studies based on this
outline. The aims and point of view of the
research design were stated as follows:
The proposed method consists in comparing public
administration and their respective ecologies in
selected countries. The immediate purpose is to
identify and determine the factors related to differ-
ences and similarities in the administrative systems
studied. Generalized statements that such variations
and likenesses may be attributed to "cultural" or
"historical" causes do not contribute to the long-range
objectives described above. It is more useful to learn
which aspects of the total cultural context are sig-
nificantly related to which features in the administra-
tive systems.
Eventually, a more precise approach will become
possible, namely, building research project around
specific hypotheses. Such hypotheses would tentatively
identify relationships among variables instead of in-
vestigating whether such relationships exist, as the
present method does. But the data needed for formu-
lating even tentative hypotheses are not readily avail-
able now. The character of research in comparative
public administration may be expected to grow pro-
gressively sharper in its focus. At the outset a scheme
for obtaining information in the light of a few broad
assumptions is imperative in order to provide the
basis for the formulation of fruitful specific hypotheses
later on. 8
The Abortive Quest for a
Research Strategy
Although the research design was later en-
dorsed by the American Political Science As-
sociation's Council, subsequent efforts to im-
plement the project were unsuccessful. Mean-
while, the American Political Science Associa-
tion discontinued its support of national com-
mittees, and the Public Administration Clear-
ing House suspended operations in 1955. A
promising chapter in the development of a
"basic" framework for the study of compara-
tive public administration, a framework that
might have immensely strengthened the "prac-
tical" or "applied" technology of develop-
ment administration, came to an abortive end.
Nor has the Comparative Administration
Group of the American Society for Public
8 "Research Design for a Pilot Study in Comparative
Public Administration," (hectographed) January 1954.
7 pp. with 4 annexes. p. 3. The Comparative Ad-
ministration Group is making plans to reissue this
document as an Occasional Paper.
74 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Administration, since it became active in 1959,
been able to gain support for fundamental
field research overseas.
Although a fair amount of research relevant
to comparative public administration has been
carried out since 1954, funds have not yet be-
come available for field studies of administra-
tive behavior based specifically on "criteria of
relevance" such as those formulated in the
Sayre-Kaufman outline. There has, of course,
been much monographic field research on
individual countries designed independently
by scholars working in terms of criteria and
hypotheses of their own choosing. Although
these studies have produced a growing stock
of documentation, they have not, generally
speaking, been formulated in categories that
lend themselves to international comparisons,
nor to the validation or refutation of hypo-
theses about administrative behavior and de-
velopment.
Much of this field research has been in
terms of "applied" categories: the effective-
ness of a given tactical approach to the genera-
tion of change, the character and possible
solutions of urgent problems. Most of the
relevant empirical analytic research has been
produced by scholars not centrally concerned
with public administration. Consequently in-
ferences about administrative behavior must
often be derived from studies carried out in
terms of sociology, anthropology, or compara-
tive politics. In this respect the work of the
Social Science Research Council Committee on
Comparative Politics has proven extraordi-
narily fruitful, even though the focus of that
group's research has been on the "input" or
"political" aspects, rather than the "output"
or "administrative" aspects of the govern-
mental systems studied."
It should be added that some of the new
institutes of public administration-such as
those in the Philippines, Turkey and Brazil-
have made signal contributions to the empiri-
cal literature on administrative behavior, but
even here the stress has been laid on descriptive improved conservation methods, systematic
accounts rather than on analytical studies.
9 Such names as David Apter on Africa, Leonard
Binder on Iran, Morroe Berger on Egypt, Joseph
LaPalombara on Italy, Myron Weiner on India, Lucian
Pye on Burma, David Wilson and Walter Vella on
Thailand, Robert Scott on Mexico, come readily to
mind.
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Basic Research as a
Foundation for Practice
Yet would empirical field. work on the basic
characteristics of socio-political systems have
been likely to produce any new knowledge
capable of significantly influencing the con-
duct of technical assistance programs in public
administration? Although the history of sci-
ence demonstrates that a long "culture lag"
often occurs between discovery and applica-
tion, it seems likely that, had basic behavioral
field research overseas been carried out in
comparative administration, it would by now
have turned up new knowledge and generated
fundamental theory with important practical
implications.
The Sayre-Kaufman outline, for example,
would have provided a useful starting point-
despite the limitations noted below. This
outline was based on the following assump-
tions: first, that "administrative systems" can
be regarded as primarily hierarchical struc-
tures of authority and decision making, sec-
ond, that these systems are responsive, in some
measure at least, to control by interested
groups outside the hierarchy, although influ-
ences from within are also recognized; and
third, that such administrative systems have
an impact on affected populations, by pro-
viding services and exercising regulatory
powers backed by coercive sanctions.
This model of an administrative (or gov-
ernmental) system is by no means heterodox;
it underlies, in fact, virtually all technical
assistance programs. In launching a scheme
to improve agricultural productivity, for ex-
ample, it is typically assumed that a hierarchy
of authority and decision making-a ministry
or department of agriculture-exists; that it
is subject to influence, not only by organized
farmers and interest groups, but also by
foreign advisers and training institutions; and
that it can translate its programs-new ferti-
lizers, better seeds, crop and soil controls-
into more productive agricultural practices,
marketing procedures, etc.
The same model, incidentally, also under-
lies the research focus of the SSRC Committee
on Comparative Politics. The "input-output"
framework of analysis presented by Gabriel
Almond explicitly incorporates the second and
third premises of the Sayre-Kaufman outline,
 DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 75
for Almond's "inputs" constitute the group
controls over the hierarchy, and his "outputs"
are the hierarchy's controls over the popula-
tions affected. The first Sayre-Kaufman prem-
ise, although unstated, is implicit in the
Almond scheme, since there must be some
organizational structure of government to be
influenced by the inputs and to execute the
outputs.10 By leaving out explicit reference
to the structure of governmental organization,
however, the Almond model has contributed
to neglect of this fundamental component of
political studies in much current field research.
It has been difficult to determine, in these
studies, where the inputs are going or where
the outputs come from. Consequently some
crucial problems of political and administra-
tive development have been unnecessarily ob-
scured.
Needed: A New Conceptual
Framework
When premises such as those of the input-
output model are so widely accepted, it might
seem impertinent to question them. Yet if
field research has, in large measure, taken
these assumptions for granted-not as propo-
sitions to be tested, but as premises on which
other propositions may be superimposed and
tested-then perhaps it is now time to recon-
sider some fundamentals.
Enough field work and theorizing has taken
place since 1952, even though based on polit-
ical and sociological rather than administra-
tive theories, to make possible a re-assessment
of the Sayre-Kaufman outline in 1965. Per-
haps a new set of criteria, containing some
explicit hypotheses, can now be formulated as
the basis for a new attempt to launch field
research in different countries, that would
contribute to a basic and testable theory of
comparative and development administration.
Let us begin by questioning the fundamen-
tal premises of the Sayre-Kaufman outline.
Can we, indeed, equate an "administra-
tive system" with hierarchies of decision
making and authority? Can we assume the
existence of controlling groups? Can we sup-
pose that the postulated hierarchic adminis-
trative systems do in fact always control pop-
We cannot, then, define an "administrative
10 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. system" as a hierarchy. We should, rather,
The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton:
University Press, 1960) pp. 17, 26-52.
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ulations to any extent? If the answer to these
questions seems to be "yes," then perhaps a
second order of questioning would examine
the extent to which each of these premises is
true. If the answer is "a little bit" rather than
"a great deal," then does this "quantitative"
difference amount in practice to a "qualita-
tive" difference? Like the old question, a six-
inch nose may be only quantitatively longer
than a one-inch nose-yet to the victim and
the public the difference is traumatically basic.
First, can an "administrative system" be
equated with a hierarchy of decision making
and authority? We tend to find organized
hierarchies in every country with which we
are concerned - the "underdeveloped" or
"non-Western" countries to which technical
assistance is offered. But can these hierarchies
be regarded as "administrative systems"? At
issue here is the basic distinction between a
"concrete" and an "analytic" system. Let us
use the word "bureaucracy" to refer to any
concrete hierarchic system-with the addi-
tional criterion that it serves as formal agent
for some entity, like a state, a municipality, a
corporation, a church, or a tribe. Given this
concrete structure, a bureaucracy, we can then
ask what functions it performs.
At this point let us think of "administra-
tion" as a function, as something not too
different from what Almond calls "rule-
application." In a journal of administration
it is perhaps gratuitous, and would certainly
be inconclusive, to engage in a detailed con-
sideration of the definition of administration.
Yet readers will no doubt agree to a distinc-
tion between the "administrative" and the
"political" function, somewhat like Wilson's,
even though it is widely recognized that, in
practice, officials perform both functions. This
is just the point. Bureaucrats can and do
perform both political and administrative
functions, and they do so in the same con-
crete actions. Thus a decision may serve both
a political, policy-making purpose, and an
administrative, policy-executing purpose. In
other words, an "administrative system" is not
a concrete structure of action but an analytic
aspect of such a system.
define a bureaucracy as a hierarchy and ask
how and to what extent it performs admin-
76 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

istrative functions. To equate a hierarchy is, therefore, a predictable phenomenon in

with an administrative system is, indeed, to
prejudge the crucial issue. The fact of the
matter is-and the available research now
substantiates this position-that in many of
the "underdeveloped" countries, the state
bureaucracies are more political than admin-
istrative in function. This means that the
officials in the governments of these societies
perform roles in which the political (value
allocating) aspects of their actions bulk larger
than the administrative (rule applying)
aspects.
Influencing the Bureaucracy?
This inference reinforces and is closely re-
lated to questions about the second premise.
If groups outside a bureaucracy exercise major
influence in controlling the actions of the
bureaucrats, then the decisions of the bureau-
crats must be largely concerned with the im-
plemention of norms set by the controlling
groups, i.e., with administrative functions.
But if there are no such control groups-or
if the ability of existing groups including
kings, presidents or cabinets, to influence
bureaucratic action is minimal-then the offi-
cials cannot devote themselves primarily to
implementing policies (since they must first
decide what the policies will be). Since they
are unlikely to agree readily about such poli-
cies, most of their time will be spent in power
struggles among themselves, in other words,
in political functions.
The small amount of relevant research done
overseas does suggest that in many countries
today the ability of groups outside the bu-
reaucracy to control the governmental ap-
paratus is very limited."1 Where a group out-
side the bureaucracy does dominate the gov-
ernmental hierarchy, it is typically a political
party in a one-party system. Where a military
group or junta is in control, they cannot be
regarded as a group outside the hierarchy
since, typically, military officers constitutereaucratic
of the hierarchy of authority and decision
making which officially serves the state and
hence belong to the bureaucracy. Military rule
"1 In my essay, "'Bureaucrats and Political Develop-
ment," Joseph LaPalombara, ed. Bureaucracy and
Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1963) pp. 12-167, I offer some arguments
in support of this proposition.
any "bureaucratic polity," i.e., a state in which
the official hierarchy rules and external con-
trol groups are weak or non-existent. This
follows logically since, if the primary func-
tion of bureaucrats becomes political rather
than administrative, struggles for power must
ensue, and in such struggles military officers,
having pre-eminent mastery of the means of
violence, are most likely to win.
Control of Populations?
A bureaucratic polity differs fundamentally
from an authoritarian, one-party state with
respect to the third premise of our model. If
external groups control a bureaucracy, so that
its members devote themselves primarily to
administration, then they can produce services
and impose regulations with relative efficiency
and effectiveness. We would expect, therefore,
that they would secure consent and compli-
ance from the affected populations, not only
because of their administrative competence
but because the policies enforced would com-
mand respect. This would be true in authori-
tarian regimes dominated by a mass move-
ment party as well as in democratic govern-
ments controlled by pluralistic interest groups
and competitive parties. But in a bureaucratic
polity, where control groups are weak and
bureaucrats devote themselves mainly to intra-
bureaucratic "politics," the administrative
efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy
is limited. If so, one would expect that the
populations nominally affected would, in fact,
be little controlled.12
This is the conclusion of field work, where
we discover that agricultural agents cannot
12 An apparent contradiction is suggested by
Wittfogel's work on "Asiatic Empires." Karl A.
Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study
of Total Power (New Haven, Conn.; Yale University
Press, 1957). According to Wittfogel, traditional bu-
part empires were able to exercise total control
over their subject populations. In fact, however, I
believe this view to be exaggerated. Even in the
Chinese empire, which may be taken as an example
of one of the most effective of the "Oriental Des-
potisms," there is considerable evidence that, in fact,
the central government was never able to exercise the
absolute domination that Wittfogel claims. There
were, moreover, powerful groups outside the bu-
reaucracy that restrained and hampered its operations,
notably the imperial family or clan at the top, the
rural gentry and extended family system at the bottom

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 DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 77

get farmers to adopt new practices, that tax modernizing transformations since these un-
and customs regulations cannot be enforced, dermine its own basis of power.
or that "black-marketing" and "bribery" are In the light of such propositions, we might
widespread. Whereas an authoritarian regime evaluate the premises underlying administra-
tends to be oppressive or repressive, a bureau- tive reform and development as now carried
cratic polity tends to be ineffectual. Revolu- on in programs for which millions of dollars
tionary groups can gain ground within the are being spent.14
loosely-held domain of a bureaucratic polity, What effect on administrative performance,
but they have difficulty operating under the for example, can be anticipated as a result of
rule of authoritarianism. training officials in the bureaucracies of un-
derdeveloped countries if the country con-
cerned has a bureaucratic polity? If the train-
Faulty Premises of Development
ing offered is in administrative technology
Administration and managerial principles, how can a trainee
use his new skills if most of his actual work
It should be emphasized that we still have necessarily involves a struggle for influence
not had field research designed specifically to in the bureaucratic arena rather than the
test such hypotheses, although considerable implementation of policy? If the basic incen-
research has been supported on the implicit tives required for effective administration are
assumptions of the input-output model. those provided by political and interest groups
Though we cannot state that these assump- capable of directing, rewarding and punish-
tions are false, there does seem to be con- ing officials for their capability as policy im-
siderable evidence for their limited appli- plementers, and if such groups do not exist,
cability. Certainly the weaknesses of admin- then how will the training of officials encour-
istrative performance in all the under-devel- age the rise to power of political groups?
oped countries are strikingly revealed in every If such control groups do exist, however,
report on economic development and modern- and if policies are clearly set so that the chief
ization.'3
bottleneck to administrative development is
If the underlying premises of the conven- the lack of officials possessing the required
tional model are faulty, then the causes of knowledge and skills, then training is obvi-
these administrative difficulties become im- ously a useful and essential means of coping
mediately apparent. Poor administration with the problem. But do we, in fact, know
necessarily characterizes any "modernizing" that such a situation prevails in the countries
bureaucratic polity where the bureaucracy is we are trying to help?
more political than administrative in func- Technical assistance efforts have sometimes
tion, where external control groups are weak, been directed to administrative reorganization,
and where governmental influence over the to the creation of Organization and Methods
population is limited. Until the fundamental offices, to the reshuffling of agencies to reduce
political framework changes, one can scarcely overlapping functions, to decentralize author-
expect basic improvements in administration
to take place in such polities. A traditional 14 A description of the rising scale and scope of
empire can, no doubt, carry out decisions af- technical assistance programs in public administration,
as financed by the United States, the United Nations
fecting particular individuals with reasonable
and the Ford Foundation, is given by Ralph Braibanti
dispatch, but it cannot readily formulate and in "Transnational Inducement of Administrative Re-
enforce general policies, nor can it carry out form: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues," (CAG
Occasional Paper, mimeographed and unpublished,
1964) 133 pp. A description of -the underlying premises
13 I presented evidence for the universality of cer- of these aid programs is provided by David S. Brown
tain characteristic administrative failures in developing in "Concepts and Strategies of Public Administration
countries in "Public Administration: A Neglected Fac- Technical Assistance: 1945-1963," (CAG Occasional
tor in Economic Development." Annals, vol. 305 (May Paper, mimeographed unpublished, 1964) 76 pp. The
1956), pp. 70-80. More recently Albert Waterston has most recent and comprehensive study of these activities
made a similar and more comprehensive analysis, is Edward W. Weidner, Technical Assistance in Public
based on recent data, but with identical results, in Administration Overseas: The Case for Development
"Administrative Obstacles to Planning," 1 Economia Administration (Chicago: Public Administration
Latinoamericana, 308-350. (July 1964). Service, 1964) 247 pp.

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78 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

ity, or to create new staff agencies. Such re- unique, the necessary procedure is to learn
forms are no doubt highly effective where they everything one can about an area. Those
facilitate the performance of administrative who go to work in a given area must immerse
functions by a bureaucracy that is under con- themselves in detail, acquiring all the data
trol, whose members are primarily concerned they can obtain. They master its languages,
with policy execution. But if a bureaucracy is its history, and its cultural particularities.
primarily engaged in intra-bureaucratic poli- No doubt anyone working in a strange
tics and lacks a sense of direction, then reor- situation should learn to communicate effec-
ganization tends to strengthen some contend- tively with those who live there, and area
ers at the expense of others. It may have no knowledge, including language, provides the
real effect on administrative performance. essential means for improved communication.
A crude analogy may illustrate the point. However, if the administrative problems con-
Suppose that a ship has lost its rudder but fronted are those typical of a bureaucratic
that the engineer seeking to rectify the situa- polity, then no amount of area knowledge is
tion is unaware of this fact. He concentrates likely to suggest to an intervener from abroad
on building up engine-power, forcing the help- how one might go about transforming the
less ship to go around in circles more rapidly political system. Such transformations require
than before, still unable to reach its destina- changes in established cultural patterns. If
tion. Yet if the steering functions were ade- one seeks to introduce fundamental modern-
quately performed, an increase in speed might ization without affecting culture, then one is
well be regarded as most useful. attempting the impossible. In this sense, cul-
When technical advisers become discour- tural traits do not "explain" anything. One
aged with efforts to train counterparts and would want to know why a trait existed and
secure improvement by reorganization, they what effect it might have on a proposed
sometimes seek by direct consultation and "do- change. If the forces which perpetuate a
it-yourself" methods to push a recipient bu- given culture trait are also the forces which
reaucracy into more effective administration. impede political and administrative develop-
Such an approach occurs most frequently in ment, it would be important to know this.
a bureaucratic polity where there are no effec- But such knowledge is a product of theories
tive local groups capable of providing direc- of change as applied to cultural data. Descrip-
tion to bureaucratic action. Under these cir- tions of a cultural, historical or governmental
cumstances, the external advisers become sur- system do not provide a framework for action
rogate "groups" impelling a local bureaucracy unless linked to a theory that explains inter-
along some policy course. But a policy can relationships between variables, thereby help-
be effective only so long as the external group ing one to understand the reasons for existing
remains actively involved. Let the group cultural phenomena, and the conditions un-
withdraw from the scene, and the system re- der which they may be changed.
verts to its previous condition as a direction- Since most of the country studies which
less bureaucratic polity. So long as an ex- have been written so far tend to be rooted
ternal group focuses its attention on bureau- in the "area" approach, regardless of academic
cratic instruments of action rather than on discipline, the resulting data has taken, in
generating the political fountainheads of mo- large part, the form of compilations of in-
tivation and policy, good administration can formation about a given country or village
scarcely be institutionalized. or city or local institution. Such data may
be organized in terms of a systematic outline
The Area Approach of 'some kind, which provides "criteria of
relevance," but they have seldom been sys-
A word, finally, might be said about the tematically related to propositions relating
"area"l approach. Implicit in this approach variables to each other so as to give effective
is the assumption that some unique charac- knowledge of how social, political, and ad-
teristic of each country-its ethnic, cultural, ministrative systems change. Such knowledge
historical, religious, linguistic, or racial back- can be derived only from systematic compara-
ground-blocks administrative development. tive analysis.
Since, in this view, each area is distinctively Since the Comparative Administration

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 DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 79

Group of the American Society for Public
Administration obtained its grant from the
Ford Foundation in 1962, its attention has
been focused primarily on the generation of
relevant theory of this type.15 After consider-
ably study and widespread consultation, the
Comparative Administration Group prepared
a comprehensive report on basic needs in
development administration.16 Top priority
was given in this report to the urgent need for
a program of fundamental field research over-
seas to test the growing accumulation of
theories and hypotheses.
Relearning Wilson's Lesson
It seems paradoxical that, with millions of
dollars being spent for action programs and
research, both resting on untested implicit
assumptions, financial support for research
on these fundamental premises has been very
difficult to obtain. It is often argued that
research of this sort is too "theoretical," too
remote from urgent policy considerations, too
academic, even "ivory-tower" in character.
The truth is that such research, at least if its
implications are understood, would be re-
garded as too dangerous, as too threatening to
an establishment which has built large super-
structures on premises which cannot, at this
late date, be reexamined.
Returning to the wisdom of Woodrow Wil-
son it should be noted that he might have
responded differently to the current situation.
If it were pointed out to him that the export
of administrative technology from the Ameri-
can democracy to authoritarian regimes
abroad would lead to strengthening the mili-
tary and technical capabilities of these re-
gimes, in the same way that the import of
administrative "know-how" from European
15 A listing of the papers issued so far by the CAG,
and growing out of its summer seminars, is contained
in the CAG Newsletter, op. cit. pp. 29-32. Attention is
called particularly to the essay by Dwight Waldo,
Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Prob-
lems and Promise (Washington: ASPA, 1964) Special
Series, No. 2.
16 Development Administration, Report by a Special
Committee (CAG Occasional Paper, 1964) mimeo-
graphed 84 pp.
monarchies to the American republic had en-
hanced our organizational strength in Wil-
son's time, then Wilson would probably have
strongly questioned the wisdom of this export
policy. He might well have recommended
that we concentrate first on encouraging politi-
cal development, in the sense of promoting
democratic reform as a prelude to adminis-
trative reorganization.
However, if it had been indicated to Wilson
that the key problem in many "underdevel-
oped" countries was not authoritarianism-
even as a first stage of development-but
rather the inability of well-established govern-
ments to separate politics and administration
(the characteristic situation in a contempo-
rary bureaucratic polity) then Wilson might
have urged us to study how such separation
might be achieved. But the separation of
politics and administration is surely not to be
achieved merely by adopting a constitutional
charter or by issuing a declaration that a
government bureaucracy will, henceforth be
regarded as an "administrative," not a "politi-
cal," system. Rather, it can be achieved only
as new social and political institutions arise
capable of beating the state bureaucracy at
its own game by subjecting it to effective
control. This can be done more easily if a
bureaucracy is politically weak than if it is
politically strong.
If these points could be sustained, Wilson
might well have concluded that efforts to im-
prove administration by working with the
officials in a bureaucratic polity were more
likely to prevent the separation of politics and
administration than to encourage it. He
might, accordingly, have opposed such pro-
grams and urged instead that attention be
given to intensive study of the political ecol-
ogy of administration as a necessary prerequi-
site to the formulation of effective technical
assistance and a realistic foreign policy con-
cerned with developmental goals.
Wilson was quite aware of the political
context of administrative reform and of de-
velopment administration. We seem to have
forgotten this crucial consideration, but per-
haps the time has now come when we will-
and indeed must-relearn this old lesson.

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