ELLIS V RP

-it involves adoption of a filipino child by a foreigner couple.

-court held that they cannot adopt pursuant to art 335 of the civil code.
-but now, because of Inter-Country Adoption act, foreigners are allowed to adopt.

VIVo v CLORIBEL
-a Chinese family came to the Philippines in October 16 1960 as temporary visitor for 3 months. (mother
and two children)
-the father applied for naturalization of these aliens, the same was granted on April 11 1961.(ang petition
pa lng sa application ang na grant, not the naturalization itself)
-later, these visitors were granted (by sec of foreign affairs) an extension of their stay until April 11 1963.
However the Comm. Of Immigration refused to recognized said extension further than June 16, 1962.
-these aliens did not leave the country even after June 16, 1962 and instead filed a petition alleging that
among others that: (1) the extension of the stay of the petitioners (herein respondents) up to 11 April 1963
was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were due for
eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the granting of Uy Pick Tuy's petition for
naturalization, which had not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath of allegiance on 11 April
1963; and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work great injury and injustice to themselves.
-three years had passed without the case being heard.
Issue: won these Chinese nationals became a naturalized Filipino citizen?
Ruling: No.

BOARD of IMMIGRATION v CALLANO

-DFA found out that the signature of Sec. of Foreign Affairs on the documents (cable authorization) of
Beato Go Callano and others were not authentic.
-in consequence thereof, the Department made several declarations and orders without notice and hearing.
-note : beato and his three brothers were given entry as citizen.
-they were ordered to return to the country of which they are nationals.
MOY YA LIM v COMMISSIONER
-Lua Yuen, a Chinese, was permitted to stay in the Philippines for one month (arrival: March 13, 1961).
-Her stay was repeatedly extended and she was allowed to stay until Feb 13, 1962.
-On January 25, 1962 she married Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen.
-the Commissioner confiscated her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation after the
expiration of her authorized stay.

DJUMANTAN v DOMINGO
-Bernard Banez went to Indonesia, and there he converted to Islam and subsequently married Djumantan.
-after he returned to the Philippines. Djumantan and their two children followed and admitted as
temporary visitor.
-later, his wife, Marina discovered the true relationship of Bernard and Djumantan.
-the immigration status of Djumantan changed from temporary to permanent resident.
-upon filing of complaint of the eldest son of Bernard, Djumantan was detained. The latter then move for
the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to filipino citizen.

AZNAR v COMELEC
-Osmena filed his COC for the position of Governor in Cebu Province.
-Aznar filed a disqualification case against Osmena on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen but a US citizen.
-as proof thereof, he submitted a Certificate issued by immigration and deportation commissioner
certifying that private respondent is an American citizen and is a holder of alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence.
Note: Osmena is a dual citizen

TECSON v COMELEC
-FPJ filed a COC for president.
-in his COC, he represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
-Victoriono Fornier filed a petition for FPJ’s disqualification alleging that FPJ misrepresented in his COC
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen. Alleging that, FPJ’s parents were foreigners, his mother
as an American Citizen, and his father a Spanish national.
-and that even if FPJs father is a filipino, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ because the
former is an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Note: his lolo is a Spanish and there was no evidence that he became a filipino citizen at the time of the
Filipinization during the effectivity of the Philippine Bill. In case, the lolo is a filipino citizen, then he
extended his citizenship to his son, the father of FPJ.

CO v ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
-Ong Jr was proclaimed winner as the representative of second district of Samar.
-an election protest was filed against him on the ground that he is not a natural born filipino citizen.
-record shows that his grandfather was from China and later settled in the Philippines. He obtained
certificate of residence from then Spanish administration.
-that Jose Ong, his father (papa ni Ong Jr.), was born in China and was only brought in the Philippines in
1915. He then married a natural-born filipino.
-his father, unsure of his legal status applied for naturalization, and the same was granted.
-Ong Jr. is a natural born filipino citizen.

BENGZON v HRET
-Teodoro was a natural born Filipino citizen.
-On November 5, 1985, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
-also, he became a naturalized US citizen in 1990 in connection with his service in US marine corps.
-in 1994 he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He then run for and was elected as
representative of Pangasinan in 1998.
-Bengson III, his losing opponent, filed a Quo warranto claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of HoR since he is not a natural born-filipino citizen.
-SC ruled that Teodoro Cruz is a natural born filipino citizen.

POE-LLAMANZARES v COMELEC
-Grace Poe was a registered foundling adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces.
-she became a US citizen when she married her Fil-American husband.
-in 2004, she went back in the Philippines and decided to settle for good. Later, she applied for
repatriation and took her oath of allegiance to the Phil.
-she also executed an affidavit of renunciation of allegiance to US and renunciation of American
citizenship.
-in 2016, she run for president, she declared in her COC that she is a natural-born filipino citizen.
-Elamparo and Tatad filed a petition to cancel her COC arguing that Grace cannot be considered as a
natural-born filipino because of the fact that she is foundling.

Yu v Republic
-Yu, a Chinese national, filed a petition of naturalization.
-attached to the petition are: Affidavits of Marcelo de la Cruz and Federico G. Santos, who acted as
character witnesses; and Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival.
-The SolGen opposed the petition claiming that the witnesses are not credible and did not testify to Yu’s
good reputation.
-The lower granted the petition.
-SolGen appealed. Yu presented additional proof of his income. He claimed that his income has risen
from 3000 annually to 5,100 in 1960 and 5,200 in 1961.
-Yu failed to prove his lucrative income.

Republic v GO
-Go, a british citizen, filed a petition for naturalization, and the same was granted by the RTC.
-However Republic appealed before the CA the granting of petition on the ground that Go failed to attach
the cert. of arrivals in the Philippines.

BOARD of IMMIGRATION v CALLANO

-DFA found out that the signature of Sec. of Foreign Affairs on the documents (cable authorization) of
Beato Go Callano and others were not authentic.
-in consequence thereof, the Department made several declarations and orders without notice and hearing.
-note : beato and his three brothers were given entry as citizen.
-they were ordered by the Immigration to return to the country of which they are nationals.
-the trial court found that the petitioners are citizens of China. They based their decision on the following
grounds: a.) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the
Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; b.) as petitioners were
recognized by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of
nationality.
Issue: WON petitioners being recognized as children of their alien father lost their filipino citizenship.
Ruling: NO.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by:
a.) naturalization in a foreign country;
b.) express renunciation of citizenship;
c.) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country;
d.) rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country;
e.) cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
f.) declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war;
g.) in the case of a woman by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.
Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by
reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on
the petitioners is renunciation.
But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that petitioners lost their Philippine
citizenship because the law requires an express renunciation which means a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by
direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
Upon their return to the Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained the age of majority, but even as
to him there could not have been renunciation because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate
language that he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after he has attained the age of
majority, he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into this country, which are
clear indicia of his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that the petitioners have not
lost their Philippine citizenship.

AZNAR v COMELEC
-Osmena filed his COC for the position of Governor in Cebu Province.
-Aznar filed a disqualification case against Osmena on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen but a US citizen.
-as proof thereof, he submitted a Certificate issued by immigration and deportation commissioner
certifying that private respondent is an American citizen and is a holder of alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence.
Note: Osmena is a dual citizen

Frivaldo v Comelec (1989)

-Petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon in 1988.
-The league of municipalities filed a petition for the annulment of election and proclamation on the
ground that he is not a filipino citizen, having been naturalized in US on 1983.
-Petitioner admitted the allegation but pleaded that he only sought American citizenship to protect himself
against then president marcos.
- and that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
act of repatriation.

Frivaldo v Comelec (1995)

-petitioner filed COC for Governor.
-Raul Lee, another candidate filed a petition praying for the disqualification of petitioner and the
cancellation of his COC.
-the petition was granted by Comelec. Frivaldo filed MR but the same was acted only after the election.
(May 8, 1995). on may 11, Comelec en banc affirmed the resolution of comelec division.
-Frivaldo won, and Lee came second. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation. The same was
decided in his favor on June 21, 1995.
-Frivaldo filed new petition praying for the annulment of Lee’s proclamation and his own proclamation,
alleging that on June 30, 1995 at 2:00 pm, he took his oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines.
-That the order dated June 21,1995 granting the proclamation of Lee was received by him on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 pm, thus there was no more legal impediment ot his proclamation.

Labo v Comelec
-Ramon Labo run for mayor, and he won. Lardizabal, his losing opponent filed a petition for quo
warranto claiming that Labo was a naturalized Australian citizen, thus he is disqualified to hold office.
-Labo argued: that his marriage with his Australian wife was annulled; and that he sought for the change
of his status from immigrant into returning Filipino citizen.

Jacot v Dal
-Jacot was a natural born Philippine citizen who became a naturalized US citizen.
-Later, he sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
-Upon the approval of his request, he took an Oath of Allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles.
-six months later, he ran for Vice-mayor.
-Rogen Dal filed a petition for disqualification arguing that Jacot failed to renounce his US citizenship.

Condon v Comelec
-petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen who later on became a naturalized Australian citizen.
-she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Phil Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to RA 9225 and the same was approved and petitioner took her oath of allegiance.
-also, petitioner filed an unsworn declaration of renunciation of Australian citizenship before department
of immigration and indigenous affairs, which in turn issued an order certifying that she has ceased to be
Australian citizen.
-the petitioner ran for Vice-Mayor and she won. Picar, Pagaduan, and Bautista filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility and sought her disqualification from holding elective
office on the ground that she is a dual citizen.

Maquiling v Comelec
-Arnado is a natural born Philippine citizen who subsequently became a naturalized US citizen.
NOTE: refer to digest ky mubo ra kayo didto.

Arnado v Comelec
Note: continuation sa above case.
-Arnado again filed his COC for mayoralty post.
-Shortly after the decision in Maquiling case declaring that Arnado is disqualified to to run for office, he
executed an affidavit affirming his affidavit of renunciation.
-Arnado won the election.
-Now this petition was filed to disqualify Arnado.

David v Agbay
-Renato is a natural born Philippine citizen who became a naturalized Canadian citizen.
-upon his retirement, he and his wife returned in the Philippines where they purchased a property.
However, portion of the property is a public land and part of the salvage zone.
-On April 2007 David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application with DENR where he indicated that he is
a filipino citizen.
-Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David is a Canadian Citizen, thus he is
disqualified to own a land.
-on October 2007, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 as evidenced by
Identification certificate issued by Consulate General in Toronto.
-DENR rejected the MLA.
Note: wala xa ng take oath.

Mercado v Manzano
-Manzano was born in California of Filipino parents. He run for vice mayor.
-Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor.
-Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano and the same was granted by
Comelec on the ground that he is a dual citizen.
-Manzano filed MR. However, the motion remained pending even after the election.
-Manzano garnered the highest vote. However, his proclamation was suspended pending the
disqualification case.
-later the Comelec en banc reversed the decision.

AASJS Datumanong
-here petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 9225.
Oh Hek How v Republic
-Oh, a Chinese citizen filed a petition for application of naturalization. The same was granted.
-he then filed a motion alleging that he had complied with all the requirements under RA 530 and praying
that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance and be issued a certificate of naturalization. The same
was granted.
- On that same date, petitioner took oath and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The
Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and
filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final
and executory.

KOOKOORITCHIN V SOLICITOR GENERA

-Petitioner is a native born Russian. In 1923, he arrived in Manila after he fled in Russia.
-In 1940, he filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.
-In 1941, He applied for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473.
-he is married to a filipino with whom he has one child.
-he is also working in AL Ammen Transportation company where he is receiving an annual salary of
13,200.

Romualdez-Marcos v Comelec
-Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban city. For several times, she lived in different cities.
-petitioner filed COC for the position of Leyte.
-her opponent, Montejo, filed for disqualification alleging that she did not meet the 1-year constitutional
requirement for residency.
-in her COC, she wrote that she had been a resident of Tolosa for 7 months.
-And so she filed an amended COC changing 7 months to since childhood.

Caasi v Comelec
-Merito Miguel, the elected mayor of Bolinao Panggasinan is a green card holder.
Jao v CA
-sps Ignacio and Andrea Jao died intestate in 1988 and 1989 respectively.
-they were survived by their children Rodolfo and Perico
-Perico instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Quezon city.
Later, he also moved that he be appointed as special administrator.
-Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He avers that the
decedents did not reside in Quezon city; and that their actual residence was in Pampanga; that their
parents only stayed in Rodolfo’s residence in Quezon city for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment
and hospitalization.

Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec
-petitioners are recognize Philippine citizen under RA 9225.
-long before the 2004 election, petitioners sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voter.
However, they were advised that they have yet no right to vote because of their lack of one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the constitution.

POE-LLAMANZARES v COMELEC
-in 2016, she run for president.

-Elamparo and Tatad filed a petition to cancel her COC. In answer to the requested information of "Period
of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when
she returned for good from the U.S.

-Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for
Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that
petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.

Issue: WON petitioner complied with the 10-year residency requirement and reestablished her domicile in
the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes.

There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. 152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-
mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family;
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement
from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12
July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was
purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically
returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

Caballero v Comelec

-Caballero run for mayoralty position.

-Jonathan Nanud, his opponent, filed a petition for cancellation of Caballero’s COC alleging that he made
a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.

-in his answer, Caballero argued that he took an Oath of allegiance to Republic of the Phil prior to the
filing of COC before the Consul General in Toronto Canada.

-and that he became a dual citizen pursuant to RA 9225.

-That he also renounced his Canadian Citizenship and executed affidavit of renunciation.
-that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he
merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back
to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada

-Comelec cancelled Caballero’s COC stating that he failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement uder section 39 of LGC.

Recto v Harden

-Esperanza Harden, an American, engaged the services of Atty Recto to protect her interest over the
conjugal properties pending the divorce suit with her husband filed abroad.

-they agreed that the compensation of Atty Recto is 20% of the conjugal partnership upon liquidation.

-Atty Recto complied with the agreement. however, the sps Harden agreed to settle, without the
knowledge of Atty Recto.

-now, Atty recto wants to collect fees for the services he rendered.

Geluz v CA

-Defendant Geluz is a physician.

-Nita had herself aborted three times by the defendant.

-for the third abortion, the fetus was 2 months old. The husband (Oscar Lazo) of Nita did not know of, nor
gave his consent to the abortion.

-Lazo filed an action for damages based on the last abortion.

Issue: Whether there can be an award of damages for the death of an unborn fetus.

Ruling: No. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for
the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Under the system of our Civil Code, it is a being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an
action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by
its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality. It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right
to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its
loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

Limjoco v Fragrante

-Pedro applied for Cert of Public Convenience (it is a franchise that grants permission to operate certain
public activities)

--however, during the pendency of his application he died.

-Public service Commission allowed the legal representative of the estate to substitute him for the
continuation of the application.

-eventually, PSC issued said certificate to the estate of Fragrante.

-petitioner Limjoco opposes to the substitution and the subsequent issuance of the certificate arguing that
it is in contravention of the Publc service act.

Note: the right that was transmitted in this case, is the right of the decedent to continue the application for
the cert of public convenience. Rights and obligations that are not extinguish upon the death of a person
can be transmitted to his estate. The deceased can be validly represented.

Insular Government v Frank

Tenchavez v Escano

-Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tenchavez were validly married. However, Vicenta continued to live with her
parents in cebu, while Tenchavez went back to work in Manila.

-Vicenta applied for passport wherein she indicated that she was single.

-when it was approved, she went to US and filed a divorce against Pastor Tenchavez which was later
approved.
-Vicenta subsequently married Russel, an American citizen. And she later acquired US citizenship.

-Now Tenchavez filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.

Note: Divorce decree between filipino couple obtained abroad has no force and effect in the Philippines.
And the subsequent marriage by one of the spouses to another is not valid.

Van Dorn v Romillo

-Richard, US citizen and Alice a Filipino were married. Years later the parties got divorce in US. Alice
remarried Theodore Van Dorn.

-Richard filed a suit against Alice, asking among other things, that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of Alice’s business in Manila claiming that it is a conjugal property.

-Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had
no community of property;

-respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;

Issue: WON the divorce obtained by the parties is binding in the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.

Pilapil v Ibay Somera

-Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, Filipino, and Erich Geiling, German national were married.
-Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding.
-Local Court of Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.
-More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
alleging that, while still married Imelda had an affair with William Chia and Jesus Chua.

Issue: WON Geiling had legal standing to sue Imelda.

Ruling: NO.
- In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
- Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of status
of persons.
- The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
- Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
- Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Quita v CA
-Fe Quita and Arturo Padan both Filipinos were married in the Philippines.
-After the relationship turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute divorce.
-Fe remarried twice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now claiming her right over the estate of the
deceased spouse.
-Also, Blandina Dandan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo is also claiming right over the
estate.

Issue: WON Fe is entitled to the estate.

Ruling: Case remanded to the lower court.
The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with
the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."   It
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maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the
trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court
must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.

When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.   Significantly,
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the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother
to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual
issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issue #2: WON Blandina may inherit.

Ruling: No.

She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 
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