BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr.

RICARDO BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, 

Note: The banks involved are Security Bank and Asian Savings Bank.

-prosecutor wanted to prove the crime committed by presenting the check to Marasigan and that it
was encashed.

Ricardo Bangayan, the president of BSB Group filed a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft
against respondent Sally Go (Bangayan’s wife). Sally is employed by BSB as cahier. Petitioner
alleged that Sally deposited to her personal banking account the checks issued by the company’s
customers. Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court for qualified theft.

The court issued subpoena against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank
and Metrobank. Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena addressed to Metrobank claiming
that it was irrelevant to the case. The motion was denied.

Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan
(Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks
were presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks received by
respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank.17 But before
the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress invoking, in addition to
irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.

Issue: WON the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant in this
case.

Ruling: YES.

the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.

In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another with
intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from such act of
execution.36 The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must
have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another.

Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash,
proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks
and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of
respondent for qualified theft.

As to RA 1405: it does not fall within the exception of the law

It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondent’s
Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its
nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible
inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On
this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed
put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent’s supposed bank
account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in
support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They
are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and
reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and
affirm respondent’s objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was,
therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.

FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Petitioner Felipe Navarro allegedly assaulted Ike Lingan inside the Lucena Police Station
and as a consequence of which, the latter suffered cerebral concussion and shock which
directly caused his death. Prior to the assault, Navarro and Lingan had a heated
argument. Unknown to petitioner, Jalbuena- the companion of Lingan at that time- was
able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

Issue: WON the recording is admissible as evidence in view of RA No 4200 which

prohibits wire tapping..

Ruling: Yes.

RA No 4200 provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described: chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication
or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons;
or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that
the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. 30 In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; 31 that the
tape played in court was the one he recorded; 32 and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. chanrobles law library : red

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of
an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred
involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILSON

RAMOS Y CABANATAN, Accused-Appellant.

PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation targeting Ramos. Five sachets containing shabu confiscated,
and thereafter, he was brought to police station. Thereat, the PDEA operatives conducted the
inventory and photography of the seized items in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Jose Ruiz. IO1
Dealagdon then brought the seized items to the PDEA Crime Laboratory where the contents were
confirmed7 to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

RTC held that the prosecution has sufficiently shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items were duly preserved in this case. On Appeal, CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.

Issue: WON the confiscated items are admissible as evidence.

Ruling: NO.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides that the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official xxxxxxx…..

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible.39 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine
and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be
adduced.4 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the
required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations
arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment
they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand
knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-
compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with
the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.4

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible.28 In fact, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 provides, among others, that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.29 In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Ramos.

although it is true that the seized plastic sachets were marked in the presence of Ramos himself and
an elected public official, i.e., Kgd. Ruiz, the same was not done in the presence of any
representative from the DOJ and the media. IO1 Dealagdon admitted this when he testified on direct
and cross-examinations, thus:

43
 

[G.R. No. 188706 : March 17, 2010]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO, APPELLANT.

Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape. the act happened on April 22,
1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City and on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of Rape and to suffer penalty of
Death. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction, but changed the penalty imposed on
Documento from death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Now, in the instant petition, appellant alleged
that the trial court gravely erred in deciding the case without first resolving its territorial jurisdiction
over the crime charged as the prosecution failed to establish that the two (2) counts of rape were
perpetrated in Butuan City.

Issue: WON territorial jurisdiction over the crime must first be established.

Ruling: NO.
Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to establish that the two (2)
counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to specific parts of the records
which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan City" in her testimony, the
incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa Avenue, both in
Butuan City.

The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice by
the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.

Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed because the trial court
did not properly conduct a searching inquiry on the voluntariness and full
comprehension of his plea of guilt.

It is true that the appellate court noted the trial court's failure to conduct the prescribed
"searching inquiry" into the matter of whether or not Documento's plea of guilt was
improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its
disquisition on Documento's plea of guilt is in point.
The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the guidelines set forth by
the High Court. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty
plea.
With the trial court's failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant's guilty plea is
deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.

This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This
course of action is appropriate only when the appellant's guilty plea was the sole basis
for his conviction.

PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA,

VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C.   ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL
1

and ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land. They were issued by Lands Bureau
Survey Authority No. 54 (IV-1). However the approval of the free patent was held in abeyance
because of the existence of several supposed certificates of title thereon of the defendants, namely:
Peltan Development, Inc. — Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992. The TCT under the name of
Peltan was derived from OCT No. 4216 registered in the name of Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria
Juliana Carlos. Later it was discovered that the OCT is fictitious or spurious.

plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed against eleven (11) defendants (herein petitioners) a
complaint captioned for "Cancellation of Titles and Damages".

the trial court dismissed the complaint. Holding that the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interest,
the RTC ruled that they had no cause of action against the defendants. The order was reversed by
CA.

Now, in the present case, petitioner claims that the CA is wrong in ordering the trial court to proceed
on private respondents' cause of action for the nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is
fake/spurious when the Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No.
112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine and valid.

Issue: WON the court should take judicial notice on GR No. 109490 and in GR No. 112038.

Ruling: Yes.

It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence
in determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions
this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided
by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The said decisions, more importantly, "form part of the legal system,"   and failure of any court to
17

apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.

In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles
vs. CA,   rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of
18

title derived therefrom), the same OCT that the present complaint seeks to nullify for being "fictitious
and spurious." Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed to
consider Margolles vs. CA. This we cannot countenance.

In finding that the complaint stared a cause of action, Public Respondent CA recognized that private
respondent had a valid right over the property in question, based on their actual possession thereof
and their pending application for a free patent thereon. The linchpin of this right, however, is the
validity of OCT No. 4216. In other words, private respondents' right is premised on the allegation that
the title of herein petitioners originated merely from the "fictitious and/or spurious" OCT No. 4216.
Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA, the CA was unable to consider that
the legality of OCT No. 4216. As adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the validity of this title
and the titles derived therefrom by, among others, Petitioner Peltan Corporation. Clearly, private
respondents' possession of the land, and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not
not vest in them a right superior to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed,
private respondents can invoke no right at all against the petitioners. Accordingly, the first element or
a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's right, is not present in the instant case.

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEREIN

REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, MR.
RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND

G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018

SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application6 for original registration of a parcel of land. To prove its claim
that the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, SPPI
presented a certification issued by DENR –CENRO stating that the land is within the alienable and
disposable zone under Project No. 39, Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3601, based on DENR
Administrative Order No. 97-37 (DAO 97-37). SPPI also presented documentary and testimonial
evidence.
MCTC granted SPPI's application for original registration. CA affirmed the MCTC Ruling.
In the present case, petitioner maintains that SPPI failed to prove that the subject land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain since DAO 97-37 was never properly identified in
court, and the MCTC should not have taken judicial notice of the record of other cases even when the
said other cases have been heard or pending in the same court.42

Issue: WON the court may take judicial notice of DAO 97-37 and of the other cases.

Ruling: Yes.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them.43 Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon.

"As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a
matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned
must be given an opportunity to object before the court could take judicial notice of any record
pertaining to other cases pending before it."44

As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable were
established in this case. Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did not object to the
dispensation of the testimony of the DENR legal custodian of official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of
the similar stipulation between him and the same counsel of SPPI in LRC No. N-127 previously
heard and decided by the MCTC,45 and (b) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented
was duly certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as
exhibit.46

However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the Court finds that
SPPI failed to present convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the
nature and duration required by law. Hence, the application for original registration is denied.

JESUS TRINIDAD Y BERSAMIN, PETITIONER, v. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES,

(PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, to apprehend Trinidad who, purportedly,
was involved in illegal drug activities. After the sale have been consummated, Trinidad was arrested.
Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that aside from the present
case, he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, which
arose from the same incident, but was, however, acquitted13 therein for, inter alia, failure of the
prosecution to prove that Trinidad was validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation.
He then formally offered in evidence the said acquittal ruling, which was objected by the public
prosecutor for being immaterial and irrelevant to the present case.
Issue: WON the court may take judicial notice of the acquittal of Trinidad.
Ruling: Yes.

However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the
drugs cases reveals that he was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the
chain of custody rule,42 but also on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of a valid buy-bust operation, thereby rendering Trinidad's  in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest illegal and the subsequent search on him unreasonable.43 Thus, contrary to the courts a
quo's opinions, Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter ground, is
material to this case because the subject firearms and ammunition were simultaneously recovered
from him when he was searched subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust operation.

Here, an examination of the ruling47 in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the
RTC admitted as part of his testimony48 ) confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so
interwoven and interdependent of each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject
firearms and ammunition, were illegally seized in a singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation.
Hence, the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy-bust operation
as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases. To recall, in the drugs cases, the finding of
unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1
Sanoy's testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said
testimony was found to be highly doubtful and incredible.49 This circumstance similarly obtains here
as in fact, the testimonies of both PO1 Nidoy50 and PO1 Sanoy51 in this case essentially just mirror
on all material points the latter's implausible narration in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing,
the Court concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition are also inadmissible in evidence for
being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs cases. Since the
confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged in this case,
Trinidad's acquittal is in order.

March 20, 2017

G.R. No. 198799

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner

vs
AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA, Respondents

BPI filed a Complaint against respondents in connection with the check deposited by the latter in its
savings account. BPI alleged that 30 days after the clearing period, respondents withdrew the
amount. Later, BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust that the check was
dishonored due to “amount altered” as evidenced by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from
Bankers Trust,  and (2) a photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by
8

Bankers Trust  as the original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the
9

government of the United States of America (US government). the RTC ruled in BPI's favor. On
appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling. It held, among others, that BPI failed to prove
the dishonor of the subject check, since: (a) the presentation of a mere photocopy of the subject
check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule;

Issue: WON the photocopy of the subject check is sufficient and admissible.

Ruling: Yes.

while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130  of the Rules of Court states that generally,
40

the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under
inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror."  In order to
41

fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. 
42

In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisites. First, the existence or due
execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-
presentation of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US
government for being an altered check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an
ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly, absent any
proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its
failure to present the original of the subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence
Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was
permissible.
As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its
admissibility or inadmissibility should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving
respondents' obligation towards BPI, namely: (a) Amado's voluntary acts of conforming to BPI's
letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 and executing the promissory note to answer for such
obligation; and (b) the photocopy of the subject check, which presentation was justified as falling
under the afore-discussed exception to the Best Evidence Rule. As such, their probative value
remains.

APRIL 23, 2018

G.R. No. 222861

PO2 JESSIE FLORES y DE LEON, Respondent

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Roderick France was involved in a vehicular accident and he was brought to police station for
investigation. PO2 Flores conducted the investigation and he also confiscated the license of France
and demanded P2,000 as a condition for the return of the license. Sensing that something was not
right, France went to Camp Crame and filed a complaint against PO2 Flores. An entrapment
operation was then conducted. After the marked money was given to PO2 Flores, he was arrested.
RTC found petitioner guilty of simple robbery (extortion). Now in the instant case, petitioner contends
that a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money is inadmissible for not conforming to the basic
rules of admissibility. Hence, he must be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to present the
original pieces of marked money which is the property subject of this criminal offense.

Issue: WON the photocopy of the marked money is inadmissible.

Ruling: NO.

In People v. Tandoy,   the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of
22

the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document
was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.  23

In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox
copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.   in contrast with People
24

v. Dismuke,   where the accused was acquitted partly because of the dubious circumstances
25

surrounding the marked money, the existence of the marked money in the case at bar was never
questioned. It was not disputed that the four (4) pieces of ₱500 bills which were used as marked
money, were produced and thereafter turned over to the police officer for dusting of fluorescent
powder. The serial numbers of these marked money were duly recorded in the memorandum
prepared by the PAOCTF in connection with the entrapment operation, and the same set of ₱500
bills bearing similar serial numbers was reflected in the request for laboratory examination after the
conduct of the entrapment operation. More importantly, these four pieces of ₱500 bills were
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses during the trial. As such, the absence of the original
pieces of the marked money did not militate against the cause of the prosecution.

G.R. No. 170633             October 17, 2007

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

MCC and Ssangyong conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. MCC ordered, through its manager Gregory Chan, 220MT hot rolled stainless steel
from Ssangyo. Ssangyong forwarded to MCC a Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTSO40112 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to
Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature13 of Chan.

Ssangyong requested that the opening of the letter of credit (L/C) be facilitated. However, despite
Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit. Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-233 were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The
invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2)

MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank covering payment of the first pro forma invoice. MCC
requested for a price adjustment of the second pro forma invoice, but Ssangyong rejected the
request and instead demanded for the opening of the second L/C. When Chan failed to reply,
Ssangyong cancelled the sales contract. Ssangyong then filed a civil action for damages due to
breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan.

the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Ssangyong. CA rendered its Decision48 affirming the ruling
of the trial court, and it ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence, although they
were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders

Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such

Ruling: No.

The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes.65 The Rules on Electronic
Evidence66 regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the said Rules.67 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the

functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic
document?

Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document,"

and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of
such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of
both the trial and the appellate courts.

- III -

Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court finds that
respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale.

G.R. No. 84450             February 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GLORIA UMALI

Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery.
To determine the source of marijuana, Pat. Noguerra went to Tiaong Municipal Jail and sought the
help of one Francisco Manalo, a detainee, whose facing several charges. Manalo was able to buy 2
foils of marijuana from Gloria Umali. A search warrant was then issued to search the house of Umali.
The marked money and 16 foils of marijuana were confiscated. Umali was found guilty by the trial
court. In the instant petition, she claimed that witness Manalo is not reputable and trustworthy
because of several charges he is facing.
Issue: WON Manalo is disqualified as witness.
Ruling: NO.

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.
 Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821
of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT
ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to
disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact
that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify
him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he
was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA
718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., 
Bernardo Quidato Jr was charged with the crime of parricide for the death of his father Bernardo Sr.
The prosecution presented, among others, as its witnesses accused-appellant's wife Gina Quidato.

According to Gina Quidato she overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get
money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen
asleep before 10:00 p.m.  Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground
3

that the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.   The judge, acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said
4

testimony only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

Issue: WON Gina is disqualified to be a witness against Bernardo Jr..

Ruling: Yes.

With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant
having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the
court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from
testifying when it involves other parties or accused.   Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the
14

murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This
testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of
taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital
disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even
to law students.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and
Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment
unfavorable to accused-appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellant's defense, to put it mildly, is
dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his
father's house on the strength of the latter's verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches
of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the
authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the incident, and the nine-day
lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as the culprits, all suggest a
complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no matter how strong, should not
sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the
defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance
essential to the guilt of the accused.   This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
15

In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo
and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their
extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of
hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm
the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay.   The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
10

admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to
hear him testify and cross-examine him. 11

G.R. No. L-22948             March 17, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendant-appellant.

Dr. Sityar performed a surgical operation upon defendant’s wife and they continued to visit the clinic
for the dressing of the wounds. In one occasion, defendant went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar to talked
about the settlement of the account for the professional services claimed by the latter. According to
the prosecutor, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the
deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. Dr. Sityar died within a few minutes.

The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted
murder. The finding was in consideration of a written letter to the defendant by his wife which was
seized by the police in searching his effect on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two
days before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant
contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and
therefore not admissible in evidence.
Issue: WON the letter is a privileged communication.
Ruling: Yes.

The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter
was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was
therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated
his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is
not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or
assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence
violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there
can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.

The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is
admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the
further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by
his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is
contained in an unanswered letter.

[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]

NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D.

VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and
JUAN SIM, Respondents.
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other. private
respondent filed a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner
has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia. private
respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as their witness Dr Lydia
Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Petitioner’s counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Issue: WON the testimony of Dr. Acampado is privileged.
Ruling: No.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:

"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.

2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory

maintenance of the relation between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."
15

In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the
facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions
propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third
party
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of
the privilege:
jgc:chanrobles.com

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by
Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 — which
is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained
from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.
G.R. No. 204700               November 24, 2014

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.

OBEN, Petitioners,
vs.
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., 

The respondent was ordered by the court to produce the Loan Sale Agreement and Purchase
Agreement (LSPA) including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may
inspect or photocopy the same. Respondent filed this motion for reconsideration contending among
others that (2) the LSPA is a privileged/confidential bank document;  
22

Issue: WON the LSPA is privileged document.

Ruling: No

The LSPA is not privileged

and confidential in nature

Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a
trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of
the foregoing categories.

This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: "(a) editors may not be
compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for
whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank
deposits"  (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and
62

intelligence information;  and (f) criminal matters.  Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of
63 64

these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel
disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.

At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged
document.  Respondent did not present any law or regulation that considers bank documents such
1âwphi1

as the LSPA as classified information. Its contention that the Special Purpose Vehicle Act  only
65

requires the creditor-bank to give notice to the debtor of the transfer of his or her account to a
special purpose vehicle, and that the assignee-special purpose vehicle has no obligation to disclose
other financial documents related to the sale, is untenable. The Special Purpose Vehicle Act does
not explicitly declare these financial documents as privileged matters. Further, as discussed,
petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to the true consideration of the assignment, precisely
because the same law in relation to Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its debt by
reimbursing the assignee-special purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter paid for the
assignment.

An assignment of a credit "produce[s] no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public
instrument[.]"  It strains reason why the LSPA, which by law must be a public instrument to be
66

binding against third persons such as petitioners-debtors, is privileged and confidential.

G.R. No. L-18343             September 30, 1965

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, in his capacity as President of

the Philippine National Bank, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR, Special Prosecutors of the Dept. of
Justice, defendants-appellees.

defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the
bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its
records, the plaintiff bank invoked Republic Act No. 1405
the defendants on the other hand cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019) in support of their claim of authority.

Issue: whether a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is
under investigation for unexplained wealth.

Ruling: Yes.

With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits
confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank
deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following
instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order
of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where
the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar
to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases
cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public
trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

G.R. No. 118375             October 3, 2003

CELESTINA T. NAGUIAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA QUEAÑO

Queaño applied with Naguiat for a loan and the same was granted. Naguait issued 2 checks in favor
of Queano. To secure the loan, Queaño executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Queaño
issued to Naguiat a promissory note. Queaño also issued a Security Bank and Trust Company
5 

check and payable to the order of Naguiat.

Upon presentment on its maturity date, the Security Bank check was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. Naguit demanded the payment of the loan. Queaño told Naguiat that she did not receive the
proceeds of the loan, adding that the checks were retained by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was
Naguiat’s agent. 7

Queaño filed the case seeking the annulment of the mortgage deed. RTC rendered judgment,
declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage null and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

In the present petition, Naguiat claims that being a notarial instrument or public document, the
mortgage deed enjoys the presumption that the recitals therein are true. Naguiat also questions the
admissibility of various representations and pronouncements of Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the
non-binding effect of the admissions of third persons. 11

Issue: WON the presentations and pronouncement of Ruenbenfeldt is inadmissible following the res
inter alia acta alteri nocere non debet rule.
Ruling: no.

the presumption of truthfulness of the recitals in a public document was defeated by the clear and
convincing evidence in this case that pointed to the absence of consideration. This Court has held
18 

that the presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized documents is rebuttable, yielding as it

does to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as in this case.
19

Suffice to say, however, the existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt
is supported by ample evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Ruebenfeldt was
not a stranger or an unauthorized person. Naguiat instructed Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queaño
the checks she issued or indorsed to Queaño, pending delivery by the latter of additional collateral.
Ruebenfeldt served as agent of Naguiat on the loan application of Queaño’s friend, Marilou
Farralese, and it was in connection with that transaction that Queaño came to know Naguiat. It was
23 

also Ruebenfeldt who accompanied Queaño in her meeting with Naguiat and on that occasion, on
her own and without Queaño asking for it, Reubenfeldt actually drew a check for the sum of
₱220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover for Queaño’s alleged liability to Naguiat under the loan
agreement. 24

G.R. No. 123545               October 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ "MADELO," JIM MERCENE y BUSAR @ "EMI," CARLITO
DECENA y PARDELA, and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, and JOHN DOES, accused,
RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ "MADELO" and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC

Rodelo Palijon, Carlos Decena, and Jim Mercene ransacked the house of Spouses Gonzalo and
1  2 

Mellorequina Reyes. Spouses Reyes were hospitalized and in critical condition. Mr Gonzalo died.
Decena and Mercene entered a plea of Guilty and they were indicted of homicide. The trial then
proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon and Myra Pria. Mercene testified that
Palijon and Pria are also co-conspirators in the commission of the crime. RTC found Palijon and Pria
guilty. Now in this petition, Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial
court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their
testimonies could not be taken against him under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet as formulated in Sections 28 and 30, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
38  39 
Issue: WON the testimony of Mercene may be given credence.
Ruling: Yes.

There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the malefactors of the crime, their actions
impliedly showed a unity of purpose to attain their illicit ends. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
40 

adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the
conspiracy once it has materialized. 41

In ruling upon Palijon’s arguments, we must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity
to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial
43 

acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was
44 

given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating
his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter. 45

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all

surnamed, GEVERO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land acquired by corporation from Luis Lancero. Such
sale is annotated at the back of the OCT covering the mother lot in the name of Teodorica Babangha
and her children. Heirs of Babangha executed an extrajudicial-settlement and partition of the estate
of Babangha wherein it included the lot acquired by DelCor. Private respondent now seeks to quite
the title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Babangha. RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the corporation. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was affirmed. In the instant petition,
petitioners contends that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed
the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation"

Issue: WON the act of Lancero wil bind the Corporation.

Ruling: No.
it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the
maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court
"where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that
the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner
thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del
Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or
acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land
having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed

UYGUANGCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents.

Graciano, claiming to be an illegitimate son of deceased Apolinario Uyguanco filed a complaint for
partition against all the petitioners alleging that he was left out in the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of his father. Graciano presented an admission from Apolinario showing that he was the
illegitimate son, but none of the documents mentioned in Article 278. These are "the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing."

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the first
paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code
except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he insists that he has
nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is
now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Issue: WON the admission document presented by Graciano is admissible to establish his claim of
filiation.

Ruling: Yes.

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
"any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his
alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of
his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
illegitimate filiation.
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", 

Paragsa was found by the lower court guilty of the crime of rape. The evidence for the prosecution
consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita
Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who examined the offended party. Appellant admits having
sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. Mirasol did not bother to rebut the testimony of the
appellant and his witnesses to the fact that they were sweethearts; and that they had had two
previous sexual communications.
Issue: WON the silence of Mirasol is an admission that they were sweethearts.
Ruling: Yes.

Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the
appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts;
and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which
happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept
together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned
from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party
can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the
statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to
some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an
answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference
to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the
present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses
may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

G.R. Nos. 92961-64 September 1, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BENJAMIN C. MAGPAYO, accused-appellant.

Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible
Abduction with Rape.
The victims are Lilibeth Bobis, 10 y.o (was rape and robbery), Jacquiline Yutuc Jaime, then 8 years
old (robbery with hold-up), then 11-year old Mara N. Chico and her brother Daniel, then 8 y.o
(forcible abduction with rape). In all instances, the appellant approached the victims on the premise
of asking them whether they are involved in a theft. After, victims are brought to a secluded area
wherein the appellant committed the crime charged.
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the
offenses charged

On appeal, appellant assails the application of the doctrine of res inter alios acta (Sec. 34, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Evidence) allegedly because the similarity of the acts involved (i.e.,
molestation) was not sufficiently established.

Issue: WON doctrine of res inter alios acta applies in this case.

Ruling: No.

As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal
case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not
competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that
he committed the crime charged in the complaint or information.

An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime, and it
is usually competent to prove the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the commission of the
crime on trial.

In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case No. 6443 (Forcible Abduction with
Rape) committed by appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on November 20, 1987, not as
evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, the said appellant also committed a similar
act of rape (and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth Bobis (Criminal Case No. 6436).
These offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though
jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only to
show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.

As aptly noted by the trial court:

It is to be observed that in all the above-entitled cases, the modus operandi of the offender is that of
approaching young girls of not more than twelve years of age, and taking advantage of their
innocence, imputed to them the commission of a crime and brought them to an isolated place where
the offenses charged were committed.

G.R. No. 134128      September 28, 2001

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO DE LAS ERAS y ZAFRA, alias GERRY, accused-appellant.

Gerome Diola saw accused Gerardo de las Eras (also known as "Gerry") within the vicinity of the
house of Ursula Calimbo (then seventy-three years old).4 Gerome knew accused de las Eras since
childhood. They had a short conversation, then parted ways. Shortly after that chance meeting,
Gerome learned that Ursula Calimbo had been struck to death.5
Hilaria Calimbo Binatero, daughter of Ursula, testified that she lived next door to her mother, their
houses separated only by a fence. In the evening of February 17, 1992, she was cooking in her
house when she heard her mother cry for help, "Ellen, tabangin ko (Ellen, please help me)."6 She
rushed to her mother and found her bloodied near the main door. She asked her what happened and
who was responsible for her condition. Her mother replied, "Gerry."7

Luisito Redulla testified that he rushed to the scene of the crime when he heard Ellen (Hilaria
Binatero) cry for help. He went to the victim and asked what happened to her and who was
responsible, and she answered "Gerry, the son of Pepe and Corning struck her (gibunalan
siya)."9 Incidentally, accused Gerardo de las Eras' parents are Felipe, nicknamed Pepe, and
Cornelia Zafra de las Eras.10
Ursula was rushed to the hospital, but after one hour, she died.
Court finds accused Gerardo de las Eras, alias Gerry, GUILTY of murder.
Issue: WON the court may rely on the dying declaration of Ursula.
Ruling: Yes.

The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to her death constitutes evidence of the
highest order25 of the cause of her death and of the identity of the assailant. Under the Revised
Rules on Evidence,26 a dying declaration is admissible provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the statement concerns the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at
the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the
declarant would have been competent as a witness had he survived; and (4) the declaration was
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the
victim.27 When asked by her daughter Hilaria Binatero28 and policeman Luisito Redulla,29 the victim
pointed to accused-appellant Gerry de las Eras as her assailant. This qualifies as a dying
declaration.30

Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot overturn the positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the assailant, more so when there are material inconsistencies in the testimony of the
accused denying his participation in the crime. In this case, accused-appellant gave different
responses as to his whereabouts when the crime was committed.

G.R. No. 129053            January 25, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PO3 AKIB NORRUDIN, accused-appellant.

Surigao City PNP station received a radio communication requesting police officers to proceed to
Casa Blanca in connection with a shooting incident which had just occurred therein. The victim was
Vidal Avila Jr. PO3 Deguino proceeded to Casa Blanca to investigate. Later, Deguino proceeded to
the hospital to ask some questions to Avila. Sensing that Avila was dying, Deguino asked, "Do you
recognize the person who shot you?" After Deguino repeated the question three times, Avila, Jr.
replied yes. Deguino then asked: "Kinsa man? (Who) Who, a policeman?" Avila, Jr. said yes again.
Deguino asked the latter a third question: "Was it Akib?" Deguino had to repeat the question several
times before Avila finally said yes.
the RTC promulgated its Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder

In his appeal brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of
murder based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. He argues that the alleged dying
declaration is inadmissible because it was not reduced into writing. The victim's alleged declaration
was testified to only by PO3 Deguino, and such testimony was not corroborated by any other
witness. Accused-appellant further states that even assuming that the victim's dying declaration is
admissible on that score, the trial court should not have admitted the same because the prosecution
failed to establish that at the time the victim told Deguino who killed him, he was conscious that he
was at the brink of death. Citing People vs. Lanza and People vs. Elizaga, the accused-appellant
53  54 

argues that such element must be proven for the dying declaration to be admissible in

Issue: WON the responses uttered by Avila, Jr. shortly before his death identifying accused-
appellant as the one who shot him satisfies the requisites of a dying declaration, thus admissible.

Ruling: Yes.

Although Avila, Jr. did not expressly state that he was dying when he made the declaration, the
circumstances surrounding such declaration show that the same was uttered by him under the
consciousness of impending death. It has been held in a number of cases that even if a declarant
did not make a statement that he was on the brink of death, a dying declaration may be admissible if
there are circumstances from which it may be inferred with certainty that such was his state of
mind. Thus, the Court in People vs. Tañeza and People vs. Serrano held that the fact that the
65  66  67 

victim died shortly after making a declaration as to the identity of his killer, gives rise to the inference
that the victim knew that he was dying at the time such declaration was made.

A dying declaration made in the form of answers to questions put by the person to whom the
declaration is made is admissible in court, and may be proved by the testimony of the witness who
68 

heard the same or to whom it was made.

In addition to the dying declaration of the victim, there are several circumstances which, taken
together, indubitably point to the guilt of accused-appellant: (1) accused-appellant was present at
Casa Blanca in the early morning of July, 8, 1995, the date and approximate time of the murder; (2) 71 

accused-appellant and his girlfriend Maritess were arguing near the gate of Casa Blanca at the time
Avila, Jr. was leaving the restaurant; (3) as Avila, Jr. was turning to the right side of the gate of Casa
72 

Blanca to Narciso St., a lone gunshot was fired, and at that time the accused-appellant was only a
few meters away from the victim; (4) shortly after the gunshot was heard, accused-appellant's
73 

girlfriend Maritess went back inside Casa Blanca told both Dorothy Rivera and Kit Aguilar that
accused-appellant had fired a warning shot and asked them not to tell anyone about it; (5) accused-
74 

appellant had in his possession a .38 revolver issued to him by the Philippine National Police
(PNP); (6) accused-appellant's right hand as well as the aforementioned revolver tested positive for
75 

gunpowder residue as found by the forensic analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory; and (7) shortly
76 

after Avila, Jr. was shot, he confided to witness Ramil Llorado that he was shot by a policeman. 77
G.R. No. 152364               April 15, 2010

ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D.

SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her
husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN,
PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO
AGUSTIN, Respondents.

petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint4 for partition. plaintiffs and the defendants
are the descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land.
Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of land be titled in
the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so OCT in the name of Basilisa Santos was
obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that
Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner.

That during the lifetime of Basilisa, plaintiff Alejandra sister of Basilisa told her that it would
erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa’s children, but Basilisa
Santos-Agustin replied not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing
and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot. An affidavit allegedly executed by
Basilisa wherein she wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject
property with her siblings was presented.

Issue: WON the affidavit may be considered as declaration against interest, thus it is admissible in
evidence.
Ruling: No.
petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the
disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be

petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not
a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.1avvphi1

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against
interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness.15 Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.16 In the
present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the
latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be
considered as an admission against interest.

A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of land
denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676.17 On this basis, it
cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn statement is the
same property claimed by petitioners.
Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, the question that arises is whether the
subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being disputed in the present case,
can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its genuineness and due
execution.

The Court rules in the negative.

r, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the due execution of the subject sworn
statement of Basilisa would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court. It is
not the function of this Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event. Settled is the rule that question
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC, the RTC
and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public document having in its favor the

January 21, 2019

G.R. No. 231459

HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR, AS REPRESENTED BY AUREO[[*]] FABILLAR, Petitioners

vs.
MIGUEL M. PALLER, FLORENTINA P. ABAYAN, AND DEMETRIA P. SAGALES,

The subject property was originally owned by Marcelino Paller, upon his death, the property was
orally partitioned by his children Ambrosio, Isidra, and Ignacia. The estate of Ambrosio was
mortgaged by his daughter, Demetria. The property was later redeemed by Demetria, however she
discovered that the Custodios took possession of the same.

In their Answer,  the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino. They
13

further averred that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino. To support respondents' claim that
Ambrosio is a child of Marcelino and Susana Paller, they presented a copy of Ambrosio's baptismal
certificate  indicating that his father was Marcelino;  however, his mother was reflected therein as
15 16

"Talampona Duevo"  (Talampona).

17

Issue: WON the baptismal certificate is sufficient to establish the legitimate filiation of Ambrosio.

Ruling: NO.

In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172  of the Family
50

Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules).  Article 175  of the same Code also allows
51 52

illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to
prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation.  Because the putative
53

parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary
value if taken in isolation;  while it may be considered a public document, "it can only serve as
54

evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child's paternity."  As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to
55

resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying
only on a canonical record. 56

In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof related to
the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with Marcelino, whether as a
legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the burden of proof is on
respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is Ambrosio's father,  and not for
57

petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal certificate is neither conclusive proof of
filiation /parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person
58

baptized.  Consequently, while petitioners have admitted that Marcelino's heirs had partitioned
59

Marcelino's properties among them,  the Court finds respondents' evidence to be inadequate to
60

prove the claimed filiation with the property owner, Marcelino, as to entitle Ambrosio and his
successors-in-interest, herein respondents, to share in the properties left by Marcelino. However, it
is well to point out that the portion of the property supposedly inherited by Ambrosio from Marcelino
involved only a one (1)-hectare portion of the subject land.

FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.

Monina claims to be the illegitimate child of Francisco and because of the express refusal of
the latter to recognize her, she filed a case for judicial declaration of her illegitimate status
and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Monina presented 11 witnesses including
herself. She also presented various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives,
namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly
attesting to MONINA's filiation.

Issue: WON the notes and letters of Francisco’s relatives is admissible in evidence in
accordance with Section 42, Rule 130 (formerly section 40)

Ruling: NO.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article
172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
 (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her
relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:

1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;

2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct
which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:

[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de
Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her
with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of
appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings and
calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls,
having appellant spend her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his
Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) . . .

3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly,   spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.36
35

As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's
relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively,
allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in
issue,  as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule
40

130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no
showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the
relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the
documents in question.  As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section
41

40, however, this requires further elaboration.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the
first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents
in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and
the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is
whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the
like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits,"

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision,
in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as
"family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of
its belief as to the pedigree of a person.  These have been described as objects "openly
42

exhibited and well known to the family,"  or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be
43

regarded as giving a family tradition."  Other examples of these objects which are regarded
44

as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on

tombstones,  monuments or coffin plates.
45 46

Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as

discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may
these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation,47 it having been observed that:

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. . . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. 48

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim
that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, Accused-Appellant.

Anecito Estibal was charged with rape. He pleaded not guilty. His wife and the victim, his child
disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. one of the prosecution’s witness is PO3 Cobardo,
she narrated that during her investigation of AAA and BBB, they were both crying; that without being
asked leading questions and without being coached by her mother, AAA, 13 years old revealed in
detail how the accused-appellant abused her for several years and how he raped her that morning.
the RTC considered the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3
Cobardoas part of the res gestae, and convicted the accused-appellant.
Issue: WON the declarations made by the victim may be considered as part of res gestae thus,
admissible in evidence.
Ruling: NO.
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have
been "voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of
the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules." Res gestae, one of eleven (11) exceptions to the
hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:

Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.

The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility of a given statement as part of
res gestae, to wit:

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res gestae,is that it be made
under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he
had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an
account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question
or its immediate attending circum[s]tances.  (Citations omitted)
33

There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. 34

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a
number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the
place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. x x x.  (Citations
36

omitted and italics in the original)

In this case, there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the declarations which
AAA made to the barangay tanodand later that night to the police. Her statements werein fact a re-
telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however, her
story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve,
exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her
declarations to the authorities precisely because she was seeking their help to punish the accused-
appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestaenarrations, even as it
is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was
already being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to determine if there
was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.

The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanodand the
police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by
then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed
wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of
her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under
the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.

G.R. No. 184603               August 2, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROMEO LABAGALA y ABIGONIA, ALVIN LABAGALA y JUAT, and RICHARD ALLAN ALEJO y
SIGASIG, Accused,
ROMEO LABAGALA y ABIGONIA, ALVIN LABAGALA y JUAT, Accused-Appellants.

Romeo Labagala, Alvin Labagala and Richard Allan Alejo were charged of the crime of robbery with
homicide. The prosecution presented Raul, the son of the victim, wherein he testified that while they
were on the way to the hospital, his mother told him that two malefactors entered their store and she
was able to hit one of them with a bottle on the head. Estrilita was declared dead on arrival. The
three accused were apprehended in the check-point and when they are brought to the police station,
a witness testified that the three accused were the persons who committed the robbery.
Issue: WON the dying declaration of Estrilita may form part of the res gestae.
Ruling: Yes.

As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying
declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.32

All the above requisites are present in this case. At the time she narrated how the malefactors
robbed and stabbed her, Estrelita was conscious and lying on the lap of her son, with gaping
wounds on her chest.

The victim's statements also form part of the res gestae. For the admission of evidence as part of
the res gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, (b)
the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive,
and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances.33

Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are
present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying declaration and at the
same time as part of the res gestae.34

Having given credence to the dying declaration of the victim and the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution, we find there is no doubt that accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.