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Knowledge Portfolio | Module 5- Equal Protection of Laws | Atty.M.

Badayos | Consti Law 2 | AY 2021-2022

Module 5
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

INTRODUCTION

1. The equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution can be found in the latter half of Section 1, Article III,
to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

2. Simply, the equal protection clause means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

3. This course shall have two (2) parts, to wit:


✓ Part I Scope of Equality
✓ Part II Valid Classification
PART I: SCOPE OF EQUALITY

4. The scope of equality envisioned under the equal protection clause can be broadly divided into three major
aspects:
(1) Economic equality
(2) Political equality
(3) Social equality

ECONOMIC EQUALITY

5. The economic aspect of the equal protection clause is underscored in some provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
particularly Section 11, Article III; Sections 2(2) and 10 of Article XII; and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article XIII, to
wit:
⚖️Section 11, Article III. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

⚖️Section 2(2), Article XII. The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.

⚖️Section 10, Article XII. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.

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In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

⚖️Section 1, Article XIII. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.

⚖️Section 2, Article XIII. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

⚖️Section 3, Article XIII. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

6. This economic aspect of the equal protection clause under the Constitution has been discussed by the Court in
a long line of cases, including Ichong v. Hernandez and Tan v. Del Rosario.

i. In Ichong v. Hernandez, the Court ruled that the assailed law was absolutely necessary. Why, according to the
Court, was the law absolutely necessary? What was the legislative object underpinning the law?

- The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e.,
to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges.

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ii. Does the fact that a certain law affects private rights and privileges ipso facto mean that this law is
unreasonable?

- No. (Refer to i and iii for the explanation)

iii. What is the test of reasonableness of a law? In line with this test, how did the Court view the questioned law
herein?

- The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional
limitation of reasonableness.

iv. What was the general feeling of the public as regards the presence of alien retailers in the country?

- There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling
and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers
of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost
all kinds of goods.

v. According to the Court, what was the impetus for the legislature’s enactment of the disputed nationalization
law? Did the framers of the Constitution share this view?

- The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due
process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru
the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full
authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their
freedom and liberty.

vi. Was alien participation in the retail trade viewed by the Court as dangerous to the national interest? Was there
actual threat and danger to national economy in this case? Why so?

- Yes. There is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With
ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can
act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination
of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods
or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national
economy and of the complete subservience of national retailers and of the consuming public are not
entirely unfounded.

Nationals, producers and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their mercy. Suppose an article
of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer
them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All
that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering
the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers,

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find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.

They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the
land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of
lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous
bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government.

vii. Was the Court convinced that the disputed law was enacted in the interest of national economic survival and
security and not to prejudice or discriminate aliens? Why so?

- The Court held that that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated,
nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter
of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere.

viii. How did the Court characterize aliens vis-à-vis the equal protection limitation under the Constitution? How
did the Court characterize an alien’s contribution to the national income and wealth?

- The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real and reasonable. All
persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable
and unfounded.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here
is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay is
neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness
and exploiting them.

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An alien never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly
contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being
merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important
function of retail distribution to his hands.

These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the
retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for
a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

ix. In Tan v. Del Rosario, what did the Court say as regards the uniformity of taxation? Is this tantamount to
absolute equality across the board?
- Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and
liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,
(2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well
to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).

- No, it does not tantamount to equality across the board. As long as the same tax is imposed to the
same class then it is considered to be constitutional. In this case, taxes for professionals should
follow the scheme provided by RA 7946.

x. Petitioner Tan herein averred that R.A. No. 7496 violated the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be
“uniform and equitable.” What did the Court say as regards this averment?
- That such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic
Act No. 7496. That means that it was already accepted by the state and public that a certain person
of a class shall be taxed differently from another class.

xi. Why did petitioner Tan assail the above law?


- Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that
taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single
proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations
and partnerships.

xii. Is there any distinction as between the income tax liability of a person who practices his profession alone or
individually and that of one who does it through partnership?

- The fact of the matter is that a general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership
(which is treated as a corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax),
is not itself an income taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is

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tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive
shares of partnership profits.

xiii. All in all, did the Court uphold R.A. No. 7496 as a valid law or invalid law?
- R.A. 7496 is a valid law because the tax scheme targets a class of individuals which are the people
practicing their profession. This is still constitutional because it is still within the definition of an
equitable and uniform taxation scheme.

POLITICAL EQUALITY

7. The political aspect of the equal protection clause is likewise underscored in some provisions in the 1987
Constitution. Particularly, these are Section 11, Article III; Sec. 10, Article IX-C; and Section 1, Article XIII, to wit:

⚖️Section 11, Article III. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

⚖️Section 10, Article IX-C. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

⚖️Section 1, Article XIII. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and
its increments.

8. The cases of Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, Ceniza v. COMELEC, and UNIDO v. COMELEC delve into the political
aspect of the equal protection clause under the Constitution.

i. In Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, how did the Court, as a rule, view the civil rights of aliens vis-à-vis those of Filipino
citizens? Are they on an equal footing?

- The civil rights of aliens are the same with the civil rights of Filipino citizens.

ii. On the other hand, how did the Court view the political rights of aliens vis-àvis those of Filipino citizens? Are
they on an equal footing? Why?

- The political rights of aliens are not governed by that "due process of law" which governs in dealing with
the civil rights of aliens. For instance, the courts of the United States have decided that in the deportation
of an alien he is not entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by jury being one of the steps in the
"due process of law" in dealing with civil rights.\
- The state has the power to protect the citizens living in its jurisdiction. Political rights of aliens differ
from the political rights of Filipino citizens because the state should have the power to deport or expel
any foreigner who is behaving obnoxiously.

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iii. Was the U.S. government in the Philippine Islands empowered by law to deport aliens whose presence was
found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people? How did the Court
characterize the government’s exercise of deportation or expulsion?

- Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is a government with all the necessary powers
of a government, subject to certain control in the exercise thereof, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
it has impliedly or inherently itself in conformity with the will of the Congress of the United States and the
President thereof, and to this end it may prevent the entrance into or eliminate from its borders all such
aliens whose presence is found to be detrimental or injurious to its public interest, peace, and domestic
tranquility.

- Expulsion is a police measure, having for its object the purging of the State of obnoxious foreigners. It is a
preventive, not a penal process, and it can not be substituted for criminal prosecution and punishment by
judicial procedure. The expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that the executive power may
expel, without appeal, any person whose presence tends to disturb the public peace.

iv. In Ceniza v. COMELEC, what was the kernel of the controversy regarding the voters in Mandaue City? Were
Mandaue City residents allowed to participate in the election of provincial officials of the Province of Cebu?

- The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city that is neither chartered nor highly
urbanized. So, when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities barred from voting in provincial
elections, Ceniza, on behalf of the other DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
members, questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They claimed that the
voting regulations/restrictions being imposed are a violation of the right to suffrage. Furthermore,
petitioners claim that Batas Blg was passed for political and gerrymandering reasons. Sections 51 and 96
of Mandaue City's Charter. Ceniza also claims that Section 3 of BB 885 is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional insofar as it classifies cities, including Cebu City, as highly urbanized as the sole basis
for not allowing its electorate to vote for provincial officials, because such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law, which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and thus such unreasonable classification.

v. In the above case, the petitioners argued that B.P. Blg. 885—inasmuch as it classified cities as highly urbanized
cities as the only basis for not allowing the Mandaue City electorate to vote for provincial officials—was
unconstitutional and amounted to a denial of equal protection of the laws. Were petitioners correct? Why so?

- The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities based on their regular annual
income is significant. A city's revenue would indicate whether or not it is capable of surviving and
developing as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also reveal whether
the city has enough economic or industrial activity to justify its independence from the province in which
it is geographically located. Cities with lower incomes require the provincial government's continued
support, which justifies voter participation in the election of provincial officials in some cases.

vi. How did the Court characterize the independence of a city vis-à-vis its right to participate in provincial affairs?
Is there a resultant loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs?

- The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is for local government units to have complete autonomy.
According to the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, "the State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units in order to ensure their fullest development as self-sufficient
communities." The petitioner's allegation of gerrymandering is without merit, as it lacks both factual

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and legal support. The requirement in the 1973 Constitution that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio be subject to
approval by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a
new requirement. It is prospective in nature and thus has no bearing on the creation of the City of
Mandaue, which was established on June 21, 1969.

vii. How did the Court view the practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials
and denying this privilege to voters in another component city? Is this practice violative of the equal protection
clause? Why?

- The petitioners also claim that voters in Mandaue City are not afforded equal legal protection because
voters in other component cities can vote for provincial officials. The argument is without merit. Allowing
voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials while denying the same privilege to voters in
another component city is a matter of legislative discretion that does not violate the Constitution or the
right of suffrage.

viii. Assuming arguendo that the Court did not view the abovementioned practice as contrary to the equal
protection clause, what, according to the Court, is an example of a correct situation wherein there is a denial of
the equal protection clause?

- The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities based on their regular annual
income is significant. A city's revenue would indicate whether or not it is capable of surviving and
developing as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also reveal whether
the city has enough economic or industrial activity to justify its independence from the province in which
it is geographically located. Cities with lower incomes require continued support from the provincial
government, which justifies voter participation in provincial elections in some cases.

ix. In UNIDO v. COMELEC, why did the Court deny the request of the opposition for equal airtime and media
coverage for the Plaza Miranda rally as that given to former President Marcos? What was the Court’s reasoning
therefor?

- A plebiscite will be held to vote on amendments to the Philippine Constitution of 1973. The United
Democratic Opposition is a political party that campaigns for "No" votes. President-PM Marcos, on the
other hand, will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes through his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo"
radio-television program. As a result, UNIDO requested that COMELEC direct the television/radio
facilities to give them the same prime time as Marcos throughout the country in accordance with the
equal opportunity clause. The request, as well as the subsequent appeals, were denied by COMELEC.

x. In the above case, how did the Court characterize the President or Prime Minister of the Philippines?

- The Supreme Court ruled that UNIDO had not been denied due process. They were not denied equal
protection either. The Supreme Court believes that when Marcos held his 'pulong-pulong,' or
consultation with the people, on March 12, 1981, he did so as President/Prime Minister of the
Philippines, not as the leader of any political party. According to the Constitution, the "Prime Minister
and Cabinet shall be responsible." . . for the government's program and shall establish national policy
guidelines'. When the head of state is also the president of the ruling political party, it does not
necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when interacting with the governed.
- Certain privileges are granted to the president that the opposition may not have. Furthermore, because
TV and radio stations are not parties to this case, the SC cannot compel them to give UNIDO free air time.
UNIDO must seek contracts with these TV and radio stations on their own dime.

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xi. Was the Court of the opinion that the administration was duty-bound to generously grant the opposition the
means to wage its campaign against the administration? Why so?

- The president bears the sacred responsibility of protecting and defending the security of all people, the
stability of the government, and the integrity of the national territory, not only for the term for which he
was elected, but for all times. He considers it justified by the circumstances to present to them a plan of
government that includes the modification of the existing structure of government as well as the
concomitant allocation of governmental powers, and it is not only his right but his duty to take the people
directly into his confidence and impart to them, to the best of his ability and by all available adequate
means, the reasons for this and the corollary benefits to their welfare. The opposition has an unassailable
right to make every effort to thwart his goal. However, this is far from implying that it is the
administration's responsibility to generously provide them with the means to wage their campaign
against it. Other political parties are in a similar situation as the petitioner. To grant the petitioner's
request, it must necessarily follow that such other parties be granted as well.

SOCIAL EQUALITY

9. The social aspect of the equal protection clause—much like the foregoing aspects—is also underscored in
Section 1, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

⚖️Section 1, Article XIII. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and
its increments.

PART II: VALID CLASSIFICATION

10. The concept of valid classification has been explained by the Court in the case of Tiu v. Court of Appeals,
wherein it ruled in this wise:

“The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same
class.”

11. Hence, the Court, in City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, enumerated the four (4) requisites for a valid
classification, to wit:

i. It must be based on substantial distinctions;


ii. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
iii. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
iv. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

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IT MUST BE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS; IT MUST BE GERMANE TO THE PURPOSES OF THE


LAW

12. The substantial distinctions pertained to in the first requisite—that it must be based on substantial
distinctions—are substantial distinctions which make for real and substantial differences.10

13. On the other hand, the second requisite—that it must be germane to the purposes of the law—means that
these real and substantial differences must have a reasonable relation to the very subject of the particular
legislation.

14. The cases of Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies v. POEA, JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, and International Schools
Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, tackle this requisite of valid classification vis-à-vis employees and
workers.

i. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, how did the Court view Filipino female domestic
workers? Are they a class by themselves? If they are, what makes them a class by themselves?
- Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers” but it does nit thereby make an
undue dicrimination between sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the law” under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights all men and women. It admits classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rests on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confine to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
- The court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action.

ii. Was the Court of the view then that the classification made in favor of female domestic workers rested on
substantial distinctions?
- The Court is satisfied that the classification made - the preference for female workers - rests on
substantial distinctions.

iii. Can the same thing be said for male workers? Why so?
- The same thing cannot be said for male workers. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament that of our female workers.

iv. Was the Court of the view that the classification made in favor of female domestic workers germane to the
purpose behind the assailed measure? How so?

- The classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. It is the avowed objective of
Department Order No. 1 to enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers. The court held
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

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v. Did Department Order No. 1 impose an absolute ban on overseas employment?

- No. Absolute ban on overseas employment would have been unreasonable and arbitrary because not all
of them are similarly circumstanced.What the constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person
or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

vi. In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, did the Court find substantial distinctions as
between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers?

- There was a substantial distinction between land-based and sea-based Filipino workers.

vii. What were these dissimilarities or distinctions, if any?

- The dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino workers, in terms of, among other things,
work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic and spiritual
activities.

viii. In JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, to whom was the assailed DOLE Order
applicable?

- The Court upheld the classification of the ground that the DOLE Order applies to all performing artists
and entertainers destined for jobs abroad.

ix. Why was the assailed DOLE Order applicable only to this particular category of workers? What was the Court’s
reasoning therefor?

- As they are prone to exploitation and abuse being beyond the physical reach of government regulatory
agencies.

x. In International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, how did the Court rule as regards the disparity
in the salaries paid to foreign-hired and local-hired teachers?

- The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.

xi. Was the above disparity justified by any reasonable distinction? Why so?

- There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.

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15. On the other hand, the cases of Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 and Garcia v.
Drilon pertain to valid classification vis-à-vis the government.

i. In Biraogo v. PTC of 2010, what was the clear mandate of the envisioned PTC under Executive Order No. 1?
Which administration was to be subjected to the PTC’s investigation?

- The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only.

ii. How did the Court view the intent of the Executive Order and the PTC?

- The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Executive Order No. 1
chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only.

iii. How did the Court view the Arroyo administration vis-à-vis other past administrations? Did they all belong to
a single class, or was the Arroyo administration a class of its own?

- It must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.

v. Ultimately, how did the Court rule as regards the validity of Executive Order No. 1? Was it violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution?

- Executive Order No. 1 was declared unconstitutional as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

vi. In Garcia v. Drilon, what was the assailed legislation? What was this law all about?

- Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes"
that took effect on March 27, 2004.

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners. The law provides for protection orders
from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the
duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of
VAWC or requests for assistance.

vii. Did the Court find substantial distinctions justifying the law? If the Court did, what were these substantial
distinctions? Briefly explain each.

- R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender
bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the

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law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences… is the essence of true
equality."

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women- violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men
otherwise known as "gender-based violence". VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women
to retain power.

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"victims of violence. Female violence comprised more
than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed
by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.

C. Gender bias and prejudices- From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes.

viii. Was the Court of the opinion that the classification was germane to the purpose of the assailed law? Why so?

- The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children. The State values the dignity of women and children
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and
its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children
in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments
of which the Philippines is a party.

ix. In justifying that the classification was germane to the purpose of the law, the Court invoked two conventions
ratified by the Philippines. What were these conventions? What were the primary mandates of these
conventions?

- In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.

Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6,
2003. This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. It is, thus, bound by
said Conventions and their respective protocols.

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NOT LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY

16. The third requisite—that it must not be limited to existing conditions only—has been discussed by the Court
in the cases of People v. Cayat and Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City.

i. In People v. Cayat, what particular law was assailed? What did this particular law prohibit?

- Act. No. 1639. The prohibition is "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors”.

ii. In this case, did the Court uphold the validity of the law? Why did it uphold the validity of the law?

- Yes. The court upholds the validity of the law because of the Equal Protection Clause. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

iii. Was the Court of the opinion that the law’s application was not limited to existing conditions only? Why so?
- The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended
to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for
appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process
and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.

iv. In Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, what was the assailed Ordinance? What was the purpose or
gist of this Ordinance?

- Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964. Payments for this tax were made under protest by the Ormoc Sugar
Company.

v. Under the Ordinance, what exactly was taxed? What, according to the Court, would be the corollary effect if a
new sugar company aside from Ormoc Sugar Company would be established in the city vis-à-vis taxability and
the Ordinance?

- Taxing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc
City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America
and other foreign countries.

vi. Was the Court of the opinion that the Ordinance was applicable to future conditions or not? Why so?

- Applicable to future conditions as well because the taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage
of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to OrmocSugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

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MUST APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SAME CLASS

17. The fourth and final requisite—that it must apply to all members of the same class— was the crux of the
controversy in the cases of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, Coconut Oil
Refiners Association v. Torres, and Chavez v. PCGG.

i. In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, what was the assailed law? What certain privileges did this law
withdraw?

- Sec. 35 RA 7354. It measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

ii. Was the withdrawal applied to all branches of government, or was this only limited to a certain branch? If the
answer is the latter, what branch was this?

- No, only certain branches and that is the judicial branch.

iii. How did the Court view the withdrawal of such privileges vis-à-vis the requisite that the classification must
apply equally to all members of the same class? Was there compliance with such requisite? Why so?

- The court sustained R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that
it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, the court annul Section 35 of
the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of
the equal protection of the laws." The court then arrives at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. “While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves
be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that
we are prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot even debate with our detractors. We can only decide the
cases before us as the law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to
be right”.

iv. In Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, what was the act of the mayor which was assailed?

- The mayor manifested partiality and evident bad faith in exercising his administrative and official
functions by refusing to issue a mayor’s permit and acting favorably on the application of BCCI to operate
a night fair.

v. Was the mayor herein justified in doing the act? Were the subjects concerned in the act he committed
differently situated or similarly situated?
- In this case, for the failure to present that BCCI was not similarly situated, the latter was already
presumed. The subjects concerned in the mayor’s action were similarly situated.

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vi. In Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, what was the particular Executive Order that was assailed
by the petitioners? How did they justify their argument against this Executive Order?

- The assailed was Executive Order No. 97-A which the petitioners argued to be violative of their right to
equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec.1, Article III of the Constitution. They asserted that the
private respondents are not different from the retail establishments located outside of the zone, the
products sold being essentially the same. The only difference between the respondents and any retail
establishments located outside of the zone is the variety and source of their products, and that they
import their items tax-free to the prejudice of the retailers and manufacturers located outside of the zone.
Thus, they claimed that EO No. 97-A was discriminatory in applying the RA No. 7227 within a secured
area of the Subic Special Economic Zone, not including those that are located outside of the zone, but
regardless, are still considered within the economic zone.

vii. Was the Court of the opinion that the classification in the above case equally applied to all retailers within the
“secured area” of the Subic Special Economic Zone? Why so?

- The Court opined of the substantial difference between the big investors within the “secured area” and
the present business operators outside the area. The business activities outside the “secured area” are
not likely to have any impact in turning the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the
Philippine economy. Ergo, this notion made it unreasonable to extend benefits and incentives to them as
accorded in R.A 7227. According to the Court, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities that
are within the “secured area” to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise or smuggling. Thus, it is
well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long
as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional
clause. And also, anyone, including the petitioners, can still and always avail the same benefits by
channeling their resources or business operations into the free port zone of the “secured area”.

viii. Ultimately, how did the Court rule as regards the validity of the assailed Executive Order?

- As mentioned in the answer for item vii, the Court ruled that equal-protection guarantee does not require
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories,
there is no violation of the constitutional clause. All the four requisites for a reasonable classification are
present in EO No. 97-A, namely:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinction.
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
- These reasonable classifications being present in the said executive order make it unreasonable to
invalidate the constitutional clause.

ix. In Chavez v. PCGG, how did the Court rule as regards PCGG’s exercise of the power to grant tax exemption?
Could PCGG wield this power?

- The Court ruled that PCGG’s exercise of the power to grant tax exemption is a clear violation of the
constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and in the local
legislative bodies, as provided in Sec. 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution.

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x. Assuming arguendo that Congress enacted a law exempting the Marcoses from paying property taxes, would
this be a valid exercise of the power to grant tax exemption? Why so?

- No, such law will definitely not be a valid exercise of the power to grant tax exemption because it will not
surely pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax
exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and equitable.”

xi. In the above question, if such exercise would be invalid, what rules of law or principles of law would be violated
by such exercise?

- As mentioned above, it would violate the constitutional rule “taxation shall be uniform and equitable.”

xii. In the above case, there were certain compromise agreements executed between PCGG and the Marcoses to
the effect that all government claims against the Marcoses are waived. How did the Court rule on these
agreements? Were they violative of the equal protection clause?

- The Court ruled that this stipulation or agreements executed between PCGG and the Marcoses is contrary
to the law. It is provided by Article 1171 of the Civil Code that “Any waiver of an action for future fraud
is void.” This is obviously violative of the equal protection clause because it violates the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It protects the Marcoses from the reach of the law, and
sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability.

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