Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Contempt of Court

    Uploaded by

    Saméwanhi Bamon Kharduit
    15 views20 pages

    Original Title

    contempt of court

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    15 views20 pages

    Contempt of Court

    Uploaded by

    Saméwanhi Bamon Kharduit

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 20
    be no problems of undisturbed by A ludges Would be ees and angelic journalists would nat influence them. The power to punish for Dt OF court is a safeguard not for Judges as persons bat the function which they exercise moss In recent years, there has been an unprece: i rl oe ay Teo et tesa he Supreme Court is no longer confined to the adjudication of Private dispes between citizens or between the citizen and the State. The failure of the legislature and executive to perform many of their duties has resulted in the higher judiciary having to transgress its traditional role and exercise functions of an administrative and quasi-legislative nature, functions which ought to have been discharged by the democratically elected Tepresentatives of the people and the bureaucracy. In recent years, the judiciary has been looked upon as the last hope for redress against administrative and governmental failure. That the public has itself reposed and reiterated this faith in the judiciary is evident from the continued popularity of public interest litigation on wide-ranging issues from forest conservation and air pollution to corruption in public life. |. Frankfurter, J. of the US Supreme Court in Pennekamp v. Florida, 90 L.Ed 1295: 328 US 331; quoted with approval in In Re, Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343. [65] Scanned with CamScanner 66 Facets of Media Law {Chap, The courts initiative in taking, errant, nexletful and corrypy governments to task and spurring them into action has met with mye, applause, However, the assumption of this new avatar has also thrust the judiciary into the public glare, Intervention into matters which were hither Within the exclusive domain of the executive has exposed judges to publig censure and a demand for accountability, The result of this has been some sharp confrontations between the judiciary and the public (often members of the media), prompting the courts to invoke contempt jurisdiction, How is this demand for accountability justified against ay independent and unelected organ of the government? Judges are fixing school fees, deciding how much water should be released by upstream States to Delhi and what the height of the Narmada dam should be. Having assumed the powers of what ought to be within the exclusive domain of elected and, therefore, accountable representatives, can the courts remain entirely above public censure and accountability? When does public censure against judges or their judgments cease to be within the permissible limits of criticism and stray into the proscribed domain of contempt? Is there no mechanism whereby a citizen can provide proof of misconduct by a judge without being sent to jail for contempt? These are some of the questions which call for debate in the context of the modern role of the judiciary. The celebrated writer, Arundhati Roy invoked the wrath of the Supreme Coun when she responded to a charge of contempt by stating on affidavit before the Supreme Court: In recent months this Court has issued judgments on several major public instance, the closure of polluting industries in Delhi, the conversion of public transport buses from diese! to CNG, and the judgment permitting the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam to proceed. All of these have had far-reaching and often unanticipated impacts. They have materially affected, for better or for worse, the lives and livelihoods of millions of Indian citizens, Whatever the justice or injustice of these judgments, whatever their finer legal points, for the Court to become intolerant of criticism or expressions of dissent would mark the beginning of the end of democracy. An ‘activist’ judiciary, that intervenes in public matters to provide corrective to a corrupt, dysfunctional executive, surely has to be more, not less accountable. To a society that is already convulsed by political bankruptcy, economic distress and religious and cultural intolerance, any form of judicial intolerance will come as a crippling blow, If the judiclary removes itself fromthe public scrutiny and accountability, and severs its links with the society that it was set up to serve in the first place, it would mean that yet another pillar of Indian democracy will crumble. A judicial Scanned with CamScanner 3] Contempt of Court 67 dictatorship is as fearsome a pre any other form of totalitarian ru 8-0 military dictatorship or Contempt: a ‘reasonable restriction’ on free speech The law of contempt is one of the recognis. 19(2) to the freedom of speech 19(1)(a) of the Cons d exceptions under Article and expression guaranteed under Article tution of India.’ Criminal contempt “Criminal contempt’ is defined under Se ed ction 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, : 2(c) ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication, whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which— (#)_scandalises or tends to_scandalise, or_lowers or tends to_lower-the authority of any court; or (i prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs, or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner, The language contained in the section is loosely couched and there is no explanation in respect of what ‘tends to’ scandalise or interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice and how it is different from actually scandalising or interfering with or obstructing the administration of justice. The definition is extremely wide with the result that the jurisdiction can be quite easily invoked. The rationale of criminal contempt The object of contempt jurisdiction is to safeguard the interests of the public which would be adversely affected if the authority of the court is denigrated and public confidence in the administration of justice is weakened.* The object is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputation or criticism. 2. In Re, Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343, para 10, p. 356. 3. Anticle 19(2) reads: “Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause... in relation to contempt of court...” 4. Brahma Prakash Sharma v, State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374; S. Mulgaokar, Re, (1978) 3 SCC 339: 1978 SCC (Cri) 402; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Roshan Lal Aluuja, Re, (1993) Supp (4) SCC 446; Arundhati Roy, Re, (2002) 3 SCC 343, Scanned with CamScanner 0B of Media Law. [Chap, | “Tho public have a vital stake in effective ancl orderly adinistration of Justice, ‘Phe Court has the duty of protecting the interest oF the community in the due administration of justice and, so, ICH entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, bu, fo protect and vindicate the right-of the public $6 that the administration of justice iy not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with wine criticism: The right to x The law of contempt requires the balancing of two vital but often competing democratic values—the right to free speech and the necessity to preserve public confidence in the judicial system, The right of criticism is a vital ingredient of any democratic system and is an integral part of the fundamental right to free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The judiciary, like any other institution docs not enjoy immunity from criticism, ‘The right to criticise judgments been recognised and reiterated on a number of occasions." Indian courts have: quoted with approval the observations of Lord Atkin in Andre Paul Terrence Ambard y. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago: INIo wrong is committed by any s the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. ‘The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune, Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men? nember of the public who The test of erosion of public confidence On the one hand is the democratic right to free speech, expression and criticism; on the other is the necessity to shield the judicial system from indignity. What then, is the dividing line between criticism and contempt? The in India while deciding matters of criminal contempt is the-test of erosion of public confidence. The courts 5. Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, para 42, p. 457. 6. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1953 SC 75; Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 226; Rustom Cowvasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 298; S, Mulgaokar, In Re, (1978) 3 SCC 339; In Re, Roshan Lal Ahuja, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 446: Surya Prakash Khatri v. Madhu Trehan, (2001) 92 DLT 665: Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Assn. (2005) 6 SCC 109. 7. AIR 1936 PC 141, pp. 145-46. Scanned with CamScanner 3 Contempt of Court \ ‘Any personalattack upon a judge in connection with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slander. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or \ judges intg_contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the A administration of justice or the majesty of justice. \ In Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Assn.,!" the Supreme Court \ held that criticism must always be dignified and that motives must never be | attributed: i The judgments of courts are public documents and can be I commented upon, analysed and criticised, but in a dignified manner without attributing motives. Before placing before public, i\ whether on print or electronic media, all concerned have to see whether any such criticism has crossed the limits as aforesaid and if it has then resist every temptation to make it public.'? The-test based on:erosion of pul After all, iti judge would sys d, the greater the gravity Of and.truth. in.the-a ons,the erithé;jolt to public faith in the syste =P ace tat cunonsgondsfaitvere defences | against. the law of contempt in India. In the ci erosion | of public confidence has the effect of acting as a deterrent against genuine complaints made against an individual judge. Ironically, although Article 124(4) of the Constitution provides for the removal of a judge for proved misbehaviour, no one could offer proof of such misbehaviour without 8. Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; Perspective Publications (P) Lid. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221 and C.K. Daphtary v. 0.P. Gupta, (1971) | SCC 626: 1971 SCC (Cri) 286. 9. (1996) 5 SCC 216. 10. Ibid., para 40, p. 247. 1. (2005) 6 SCC 109, 12. bid., para 32, p. 125; see also para 37, p. 126 and para 42, p. 128.

    You might also like