The Doctrine of Condonation

The Doctrine of Condonation is of American parentage which connotes two identical

propositions. The first is that a public officer cannot be administratively removed from the public
position he currently holds by reason of misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance committed by
him during the previous term. Wherein the second proposition applies only to elective officials.
It explains that an elective official who has been re-elected cannot be removed administratively
for acts committed during his previous term due to the fact that by re-electing the same person
into the same office, the electorate has been deemed to have condoned or forgiven the acts
during the previous term of the elected official.
Under the Philippine jurisprudence, condonation doctrine applies when an elected public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a previous term if he
is re-elected by the same office by the same electorate.

Brief history

The doctrine has taken shape through its use by the National Relations Board as an
administrative tool for the effectuation of what the Board has believe as its statutory mandate. In
spite of the rare instances in which the doctrine has been applied in the Mid-1950’s, there existed
a fairly definite concept of condonation, its meaning and its stability.

Putatively, the doctrine is invoked by the Board to justify orders to reinstate employees
who have committed acts of misconduct. Through the years, there is a shift in the employers’
condonation of action that has evolved and merited into judicial proceedings.

Pertinent Cases

The Supreme Court held that the Doctrine of Condonation does not extend to appointive
officials. The Court did not extend the settled doctrine of condonation to appointive officials who
were administratively charged along with the re-elected official with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term. Moreover, the court En Banc affirmed the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals finding that the petitioners are
guilty of simple neglect of duty (Atty. Salumbides vs Office of the Ombudsman, GR No.
180917, April 23, 2010).

Precedence in the 1959 case of Pascual, the doctrine of condonation prohibits the
disciplining of elective officials for a wrongful act committed during their immediately
preceding term of office on the theory that re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove them (Pascual vs Hon. Prov.
Board of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-11959, October 31, 1959).

Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the doctrine of condonation cannot to be extended
to reappointed coterminous employees; there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate. “Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil
servants, particularly local government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that
would spawn and breed abuse of the bureaucracy” (Atty. Salumbides vs Office of the
Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010).

In the Malinao case, Malinao filed a case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and
denial of due process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 1994, by a
vote of 5 to 3, the Sanggunian members found Red guilty; the said vote was signed only by
presiding chairman. On September, voting 7 to 2 by the Sangguian, acquitted Red of the charges
against him; this vote was signed by all the members. Petitioner argued that the First Sanggunian
decision had already become final and executory. The court said that the second decision of
acquittal is valid. The court also reiterated that the issue is already moot and academic; the result
of the expiration of Red’s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and
further proceedings are barred by his re-election. The court further explains that the re-election
abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official (Malinao vs
Hon. Reyes, G.R. No. 117618, March 29, 1996).

Under Sec. 66 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, “the penalty of suspension
cannot exceed the unexpired term of the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding
against said official is abated if in the meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a
condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.” The
decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing, in order to render a decision in an administrative
case involving elected local officials, stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision
rendered.

The Supreme Court abandoned the said doctrine, it expounds that there is no legal
authority to sustain the condonation doctrine. “The concept of public office is a public trust and
the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution is plainly consistent with the idea that an elective official’s administrative liability
for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective post”. And that election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, that there is no Constitutional basis nor statutory basis in
the Philippine jurisdiction that could support the argument that any elected official is absolved of
any administrative liability from an offense transpired during a prior term (Morales vs CA, GR
No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the reversal and abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is a
palatable development in Philippines’ jurisprudence. The Highest Court in examining the
condonation doctrine points out that the said doctrine was jurisprudential and decided under the
1935 Constitution.

Parenthetically, I disagree to the statement of the Court in the Pascual case that an
elective official should never be removed from office for acts done prior to his present term. That
if doing so would otherwise deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a person into office, we cannot assumed that they did this with knowledge of
his personal life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct. It
should be borne in mind that the condonation doctrine is rationalized on democratic principles.

Above all, it is an exquisite development that the Supreme Court abandoned the said
doctrine. The system of election in our jurisdiction is faulty that even a convicted official could
run for re-election and might eventually win. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, this kind
of circumstance would not effect anymore.

In layman, if an elected official get re-elected it means that the public is tolerating the
misdeeds of this person. Hence, if an official gets re-elected and the condonation rule applies, it
impliedly absolve the wrongdoings of that person in his previous terms thus, all of the
controversies and anomalies of the said official would be moot and academic.

Consequentially, the concept of public office is a public trust and accountability to the
people at all times. Therefore, it is only proper to remember that each term of an official is
separate from other terms, and that re-election does not operate as a condonation of the officer’s
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him.