Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209195               September 17, 2014

MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209215

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended decision 1 of the Court

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon.

Zaldy B. Docena et al.

The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena)in

issuing the order which granted the People of the Philippines’ motion to

discharge Manuel A. Montero (Montero)as a state witness in Criminal Case No.

39225-MN.

The G.R. No. 209195petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He

prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA’s amended decision insofar as it

ruled that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the

assailed order.
The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition

seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar as it ordered the re-raffle

of the criminal case to another RTC judge for trial on the merits.

The Factual Antecedents

On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ

Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his

participation in the killing ofRuby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose),and naming

petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger

brother),Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert)

alias "Obet," and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his coconspirators. 2

The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel

casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a

cadaver, encased ina drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that

Montero pointed to.3

On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an

Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and

Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.4

Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for the

Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection

Program" pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to

discharge Montero as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both

motions.5

The RTC’s ruling

On March 19, 2010, the RTC’s Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge

Almeyda)denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness. 6

Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the

requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

for the discharge of an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that

Montero was not the most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused.

The judge further ruled that Montero’s statements were not corroborated by the

other evidence on record. The prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to

sustain the possibility of conviction against Jimenez. 7

Montero and the People filed separate motions for reconsideration.

The July 30, 2010 order

On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered

and reversed Judge Almeyda’s order and ruled that the prosecution had

presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with

the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and

unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession that narrated in

detail the manner of the abductionand subsequent murderof Ruby Rose. As the

crime was committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such asMontero,

could give direct evidence identifying the other coconspirators.

Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified tobe discharged as a state

witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by

direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because,

without their orders, the crime would not have been committed. Finally,

Montero has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Jimenez

moved for the reconsideration of Judge Docena’s ruling.8

The December 29, 2010 order

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion

for inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case

on the ground of bias and prejudice. Judge Docena denied the motion in his

order of December 29, 2010.9

The June 29, 2011 order

On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010 order; 2) denying the

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3)

granting Manuel Jimenez III’s alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as

his inclusion in the Information was still pending final determination by the

Office of the President.

Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition for

certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition sought the annulment

of Judge Docena’s orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June 29,

2011. The petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

and a writ of preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its resolutions of

December 8, 2011 and February 6, 2012, respectively.10

The CA’s Decision

On May 22, 2012, the CA’s then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of

Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C.

Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a decision

granting Jimenez’ petition.11

However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversedits

earlier ruling and issued anAmended Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose

Reyes.

The CA’s Amended Decision

The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering

Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had

complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure.12

First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he

ruled that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as no other

direct evidence other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the

determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure is highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in largely relying on the recommendation of

the prosecution to discharge Montero as a state witness. 13

Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most

guilty among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty

than the principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly

factual in nature and it would not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of
discretion on factual issues in the absence of showing that the court had acted

with grave abuse of discretion.14

On Judge Docena’s ‘no inhibition’ order, the CA held that while the case does not

call for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to another sala for trial on

the meritsto avoid any claim of bias and prejudice. 15

The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order

which Jimenez filed against Judge Docena.16

Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA’s order

but these motions were all denied. 17 The denials prompted both parties to file

with this Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.

The Present Petitions

I. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)

Jimenez raises the following errors:

First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1) the

voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of

the prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging

Montero; and 2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because

all the other conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime. 18

Second, contrary to the CA’s ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the

ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119

are complied with.19 Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the

present case. Chua v. CA20 should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of
whom was ordered discharged.21 Fourth, Montero’s testimony cannot be

substantially corroborated in its material points as the prosecution’s own

evidence contradicts his declarations.

These inconsistencies include: Montero’s statement that a "busal" was placed

inside the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by the other prosecution

witness; Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape

wrapped around the head and neck of the recovered cadaver; in Montero’s

sinumpaang salaysay, he stated that Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation using

a "lubid" but the death certificate stated asphyxia by suffocation and not by

strangulation; the identification of the cadaver as Ruby Rose is likewise

questionable as there are differences in the height, and the dental and

odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered cadaver.

Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny;

hence, the immediate discharge of Montero as a state witness is suspicious. 22

Fifth, Montero appears to be the mostguilty. He was the architect who designed

and actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime. 23

Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the

principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal by direct

participation. On the contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal

by direct participation the heavier guilt; without the latter’s execution of the

crime, the principal byinducement cannot be made liable. Even if the principal

by inducement is acquitted, the principal by direct participation can still be held

liable and not vice-versa.24

Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to

conduct a prior hearing.25

Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and

testimony which was submitted to the CA.26

Comment of the People

The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing

as an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge Docena granted the motion

to discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion – an action that was

favorable to him.27

It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero’s

discharge as the trial court received evidence for and against the discharge. In

this light, Judge Docena’s order granting or denying the motion for discharge is

in order, notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing.28

The People also agreed with the CA’s amended ruling that the requirements for

the discharge of anaccused as a state witness were complied with. 29 It added that

the availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution’s possession is

not a ground to disqualify an accused from being a state witness. 30

It further maintained that the alleged contradictions between Montero’s

statements and other prosecution’s evidence are better resolved during trial and

are irrelevant tothe issues in the present case.31

For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the

identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially
corroborated by the presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum

containing a cadaver, the place where it was found, and the cadaver’s apparel. 32

The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination on

June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his

affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements the

murder of Ruby Rose and Jimenez’ participation.33

Reply of Jimenez

Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did

not identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support of the motion for his

discharge.34

According to Jimenez, the notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of

Montero rendered his discharge as a state witness moot and academic. 35

II. G.R. No. 209215(The People’s Petition)

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA’s order

to re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by Section 1, Rule 137 of the

Rules of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition. 36

To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in

the manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition.37

Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to

bias.38 A judge’s non-favorable action against the defense is not also necessarily

indicative of bias and prejudice.39

Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to

disqualify him from hearing the case.40

Comment of Jimenez

The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to

decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. Jimenez enumerated

Judge Docena’s acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:

First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal

requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the

suggestions and information of the prosecutors thereby surrendering his duty to

ensure that the requirements for a discharge are duly complied with.

Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel,

Judge Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus, no reason exists for

him not to similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity brother

and State Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.

Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution’s motion for cancellation of the

September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor would be attending a

legal forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other

prosecution witnesses could be presented. Fourth, Judge Docena has an

uncontrolled temper and unexplainable attitude. In Jimenez’ bail hearing, Judge

Docena immediately shouted at Jimenez’ counsel whenhe made a mistake. 41 The

Issues
 1) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge

Montero as a state witness; and

2) Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case

No. 39225-MN toanother RTC branch for trial on the merits.

THE COURT’S RULING:

G.R. No. 209195

We agree with the CA’s ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his

discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.

The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorariagainst a court which has

jurisdiction over a case will prosper only ifgrave abuse of discretion is clear and

patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible

error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Notably, mere

abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has

defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a

virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is

exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 42

We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites

under Section 17,Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which

provides that:
In the discharge of an accused inorder that he may be a state witness, the

following conditions must be present, namely:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an

offense;

(2) The motion for discharge isfiled by the prosecution before it rests its

case;

(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn

statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the

discharge;

(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and

(5) The trial court is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose

discharge is requested; b) There is no other directevidence available

for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the

testimony of said accused;

c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in

its material points;

d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,

e) Said accused has not atany time been convicted of any offense

involving moral turpitude.

No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5(e). The

parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5(a) to (d) as the issues

before us. We shall discuss these issues separately below.

Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero

We see no merit in Jimenez’s allegation that no absolute necessity exists for

Montero’s testimony.

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged

when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms,

necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise

strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.43 We do not agree with Jimenez that the

Court’s pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al.is inapplicable in the present case

simply because more than two accused are involved in the present case. The

requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on

the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating

conspirators.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez et al., 44 the Court ordered the discharge

of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony is absolutely necessary to

prove conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor

General that considering the circumstances of the case and that the other accused

could not be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the

accused would not come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was allowed to

testify for the State. Specifically, unless accused Roncesvalles was allowed to

testify for the government, there would be no other direct evidence available for

the proper prosecution of the offense charged, particularly on the role of his co-
accused in the preparation and completion of the falsified loan application and

its supporting papers.

Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan, 45 the Court reinstated the ruling

of the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused Ngo Sin from among

the five accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering

the absolutenecessity of his testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had

planned and financed the theft.

In the present case, not one ofthe accused-conspirators, except Montero, was

willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in

her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly

and in accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity

for the testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide directevidence of

the crime.

That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his

discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To

the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its

choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements

have not been complied with.

The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of discretion — the

discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends

on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors." Under

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is

given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired

jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. 46

Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated

We also do not find merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s testimony cannot

be substantially corroborated in its material points and is even contradicted by

the physical evidence of the crime. As the trial court properly found, the

evidence consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver was found; the drum

containing the cadaver which the prosecution successfully identified (and which

even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea

that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel worn by

the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all partly

corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero. 47

With these as bases, Judge Docena’s ruling that Montero’s testimony found

substantial corroboration cannot becharacterized as grave abuse of discretion.

Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero’s statements and the physical

evidence, such as the absence of "busal"in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver; his

failure to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head

down to the neck of the victim; and his declaration that the victim was killed

through strangulation using a rope (lubid).

However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more

material than the inconsistencies pointed outby Jimenez, at least for purposes of

the motion to discharge.

The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and

dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with

during the trial proper.

We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section

17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require

that that the testimony ofthe accused sought to be discharged be substantially

corroborated in its material points, not on all points.

This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge

under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the

start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may

develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the

accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the

formality of a trial.48

Montero is not the most guilty

We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is

not the most guilty.

By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in

terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily

mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the

same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser

orthe least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission

of the offense.49

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free

while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be

penalized.50
Before dwelling on the parties’ substantive arguments, we find it necessary to

first correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.

Contrary to the CA’s findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the

most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in People v. Baharan 51 did

not involve the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state

witness. Instead, the pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a

principal by inducement whose coinducement act was the determining cause for

the commission of the crime.

Thus viewed, Baharan cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that a

principal by inducement is more guilty than the principal by direct participation.

In Chua v. People,52 which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court

declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the

determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not

have been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the

criminal act.

To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the

principal by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the

two accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of

falsification of private documents where the element of "damage" arose through

the principal by inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the

Court to declare that the principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or

properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a

state witness,what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation

to the crime committed.

We cannot also agree with Jimenez’ argument that a principal by direct

participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised

Penal Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by

direct participation has executed the crime.

We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive

criminal law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the

discharge of the particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of an

accused is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity

to one of several accused in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial

experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is

a guaranty that he will testify truthfully.53

On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no

grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena ruled that Montero is

not the most guilty.

We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be

found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most

guilty."54

From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to

discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning,

preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no
direct participation inthe actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope allegedly

assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not indicate that he

had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly

came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose

which was executed by accused Lennard. 55 Montero’s participation was limited

to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was

placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug

boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steelbox containing the

cadaver into the sea.

At any rate, the discharge of anaccused to be utilized as a state witness because

he does not appear to bethe most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely

depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the

commission of the crime. The appellate courts do not interfere in the

discretionary judgment ofthe trial court on this factual issue except when grave

abuse ofdiscretion intervenes.56

In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena

did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Montero is not the most

guilty.

The discharge of Montero as a state witness was procedurally sound

We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack

of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero asa state witness. Jimenez did not

raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This

denial, of course, was favorable toJimenez. If he found no reason to complain

then, why should we entertain his hearingrelated complaint now?

The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the

proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition

to the motion; filing a reply to the People’s comment; submitting his

memorandum of authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and

filing a consolidated opposition on the People’s and Montero’s motion for

reconsideration of Judge Almeyda’s order.57

In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena

for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge. In

People v. CA and Pring,58 the Court ruled that with both litigants able to present

their sides,the lack of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine the

court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed for the discharge

ofan accused as a state witness have been satisfied. Contrary to Jimenez’

argument, the Pringruling is applicable in the present case. In Pring, the sworn

statements of the accused sought to be discharged (Nonilo Arile), together with

the prosecution’s other evidence, were already in the possession of the court and

had been challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo

Arile and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the propriety of the

trial court’s resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without

conducting a hearing pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119 ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

With Jimenez’ active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge

as outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pringshould squarely apply.

Montero’s Notice of Withdrawal of Consent is not material in the resolution of

the present case

We find no merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s submission of his notice

of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated February 26, 2013

rendered the present case moot, since the Court cannot consider this document

in this petition.

It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA’s

decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena

in granting the motion to discharge.

Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice

of withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or presence of grave abuse

of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the

proper venue for the determination of the value of the notice.

This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already

testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested

and affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he

not only narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez’

participation in the murder.

With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation,

which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given

in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a

court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her

mind.59

In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly

belongs to the trial court.

Interplay between the judge and prosecutor in the motion to discharge an

accused to become a state witness

As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the

trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state

witness.This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the

statement that the trial court judge must rely in large part on the prosecution’s

suggestion in the resolution of a motion to discharge.

In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo 60 in ruling that the trial court

must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by

the prosecuting officer, thus:

A trial judge cannot be expected orrequired to inform himself with absolute

certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed

in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the

commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or

possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely

inlarge part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the

prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the

testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested"; asto the availability or

non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the

accused is "most guilty," and the like.

We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the

wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber stamp" of the prosecution,

in the manner that Jimenez now argues.

In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether

the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications

to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality

a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the

administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the

prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.61

Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring 62 that in requiring a hearing in support of the

discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for

or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s tangible and

concrete basis – independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions – in

granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that

actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented their

sides on the merits of the motion.1âwphi1

We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quartoshould not apply to the

present case, since the principles laid down in that case similarly operate in the

present case, specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the

discharge of the accused as a state witness.

G.R. No. 209215

We find the People’s petition meritorious.

We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when

it ordered the inhibition ofJudge Docena. Additionally, we do not find Jimenez’

arguments sufficiently persuasive.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited

discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition

must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is

likewise not enough ground for their inhibition, especially when the charge is

without basis.63

It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a

schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the

parties. A judge, too, is not expected to automatically inhibit himself from acting

in a case involving a member of his fraternity, such as Jimenez in the present

case.64

In the absence of clear and convincing evidenceto prove the charge of bias and

prejudice, a judge’s ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand. 65

In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the

judge acted or conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of arbitrariness

or prejudice soas to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial

judge must possess.Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge

acted with prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his

functions cannot overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the

merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. 66

In the present case, Jimenez’ allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the

CA finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this Court, that Judge Docena

did not gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We

support this conclusion as the cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing is

not clearly indicative of bias and prejudice.

On the allegation that Judge Docena's uncontrollable temper and unexplainable

attitude should be considered as a factor, we note that the allegations and

perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to

show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the

floodgates to abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal

interest in the proceedings, and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source,

the Court would uphold the presumption that a magistrate shall impartially

decide the merits of a case.67

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA's

amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it found no grave abuse

of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting the People's motion to

discharge Montero as a state witness.

We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended

decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge

Docena's denial of the motion for inhibition was proper.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C.

Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1767 dated August 27; 2014.
1
 The Decision's original 3
 Id. at 166 and 177.
ponente, Justice Agnes Reyes-
Carpio, denied the OSG's
4
 Supra note 2.
motion for reconsideration,
which denial was concurred in
5
 Id.
by Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-
Padilla. The ponencia of the
6
 Id.
Amended Decision, Justice 7
 Id.
Jose Reyes, dissented
prompting the designation of 8
 Id. at 82.
two additional members, Hon.
Associate Justices Celia C. 9
 Id.
Librea-Leagogo and Melchor
Quirino C. Sadang, chosen by 10
 Id.
raffie, to form a special
division of five. With the 11
 Id. at 84.
concurrence of Justices
Leagogo and Sadang with 12
 Id. at 86-87.
Justice Jose Reyes, a majority
was reached and after 13
 Id. at 88-90.
consultation, Justice Jose Reyes
was chosen to become the
14
 Id. at 90-92
ponente; rollo, pp. 86, 95 of
G.R. No. 209195.
15
 Id. at 93.

2
 Id. at 81.
16
 Id.
  Id. at 41-46.
17
 Tan v. Spouses Antazo, 644
42

SCRA 337, 342 (2011).

 Id. at 7-15.
18

 Supra note 20 at 853.

43

 Id. at 11.
19

 216 Phil. 102, 108 (1984).

44

 329 Phil. 841 (1996).

20

 204 Phil 277, 281-282 (1983).

45

 Rollo, p. 12-15 of G.R. No.

21

209195.  Quarto v. Marcelo et al., 658

46

SCRA 580, 602 (2011).

 Id. at 15-20.
22

 Rollo, p. 171 of G.R. No.

47

 Id. at 20-28.
23
209195.

 Id. at 28-32.
24
 Supranote 20 at 850.
48

 Id. at 33-35.
25
 People v. Ocimar et al., 212
49

SCRA 646, 655 (1992).

 Id. at 35-36.
26

 Id.
50

 Id. at 313-315.
27

 639 SCRA
51
157, 176-177
 Id.
28
(2011).

 Id. at 307-309.
29
 Supranote 20, at 843, 856.
52

 Id. at 315
30
 People
53
v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,341 Phil.
 Id. at 325-326.
31
503, 524 (1997).
 Id at 322-324.
32
 People v. de la Cruz et al.,
54

578 Phil. 314, 328 (2008).

 Id. at 328-331.
33

 Rollo, p. 88 of G.R. No.

55
 Id. at 344-345.
34
209215.
 Id. at 346-347.
35
 People v. Sison, 371 Phil 713,
56

724 (1999).
 Rollo,p.
36
24 of G.R. No.
209215.
 Supranote 58 at 312.
57

 Id. at 25.
37
 223 SCRA 479, 488 (1993).
58

 Id. at 26.
38
 People v. Nardo, 405 Phil.
59

826, 843. (2001).

 Id. at 28.
39

 Supranote 49, at 603.

60
 Id. at 30.
40

 Id. at 602-603.
61
 Jimenez’
41
Comment,
unnumbered pages.
 Supranote 61, at 487-488.
62
  Gochan et al. v. Gochan et
63
 Id.
65

al.,446 Phil. 433, 447 (2003).

 Id.
66

 Kilosbayan Foundation et al.

64

v. Janolo, Jr. et al., 625 SCRA  Supra note 66, at 448.

67

684, 699.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108000 June 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CHIEF INSPECTOR JOSE T.
PRING, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Alexander A. Padilla for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

On October 23, 1992, herein public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
28933, entitled "Chief Inspector Jose T. Pring v. Honorable Apolinario B. Santos
as Judge of RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 67 and People of the Philippines,
et al.," annulled and set aside the Order of the lower court granting the
prosecution's motion to discharge accused Nonilo Arile to turn state witness.
Subject decision of October 23, 1992 held that:

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, prior to the discharge of accused Nonilo Arile on

September 8, 1992, there was no hearing by the court on the motion
to discharge. Records of the proceedings of the trial court on
September 4, 1992, as reflected in the order of the same date, merely
show that the motion to discharge was deemed submitted for
resolution, without any hearing thereon. . . .

The People of the Philippines, thru the instant petition now assails the
abovestated Decision, claiming the respondent appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in annulling and setting aside the discharge of accused
Nonilo Arile from the information in order to allow him to testify as state witness
in the hearing for admission to bail of private respondent Jose Pring and the trial
in Criminal Case No. 94159 before the lower court.

Criminal Case No. 94159 is entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nonilo Arile,
Jaime Serrano, Edmund Divinagracia, Jose Pring, Timoteo Zarcal, Reynaldo
Fernandez, Danilo Fernandez, Eddie Chang, Jose Sy and John Does." In said case,
private respondent herein, Jose Pring was among those charged with violation of
Article 267 (kidnapping for Ransom) of the Revised Penal Code, in an
information filed on August 21, 1992 with the lower court.

Subsequent to the filing of the information, private respondent Jose Pring

submitted his petition for bail, its hearing scheduled on August 31, 1992 and
September 2, 1992 at 2:00 P.M.

On August 28, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Nonilo
Arile to be a state witness, with notice of hearing on September 4, 1992 at 8:30
A.M.

Another motion for issuance of bail, with notice of hearing on September 4, 1992
at 8:30 A.M. was filed on August 31, 1992 by private respondent Jose Pring thru
his counsel.

On the schedule hearing of the petition for bail on August 31, 1992, private
respondent Jose Pring failed to appear although his lawyers did. Upon joint
motion by the prosecution and defense, the arraignment, pre-trial conference and
hearing on the petition for bail were re-set at 2:00 P.M. of September 4, 1992.

On September 1, 1992, the prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail
and asked to defer the hearing thereof until the resolution of the trial court of the
motion to discharge accused Nonilo Arile, whose testimony is allegedly
necessary to establish that the evidence of evidence of guilt against private
respondent Jose Pring is strong.

On September 4, 1992, counsels of private respondent Jose Pring filed his

opposition to the motion to discharge accused Nonilo Arile. At 2:00 P.M. of the
same day, Criminal Case No. 94159 was called for arraignment, pre-trial and
petition for bail, but only accused Nonilo Arile appeared. Thus, the trial court
issued the following order:

WHEREFORE, in view of the absence of the other accused, let

arraignment and pre-trial conference be reset on September 10,11,17,
18, 24 and 25, 1992, all at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The motion to
discharge accused Nonilo Arile to be state witness is hereby
considered submitted for resolution.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Having submitted for resolution the motion to discharge, thru the Order of
September 4, 1992, the trial court September 8, 1992 issued an Order granting
said motion. In discharging accused Nonilo Arile to be state witness, the trial
court ratiocinated:

Upon a careful examination of the Sworn Statement made by the

accused Nonilo Arile and the other evidence of the prosecution
including other Sworn Statements of Jaime Serrano, accused
Edmund Divinagracia, witness Rogelino A. Morales (driver of the
kidnapped victim) Chin Yi Tsou (father of the victim), this Court is
satisfied that the averment of the Government in its Motion to
Discharge Accused Arile are borne out and fully supported by the
facts and relevant evidence.

The court, thus, found that the conditions for discharge as required under Sec. 9,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure have been satisfied.

Private respondent Jose Pring assailed the order of discharge, filing a special civil
action for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

In the hearing conducted by the appellate court on September 22, 1992, counsels
of private respondent Jose Pring emphatically stressed the trial court's failure to
comply with the required hearing in support of the discharge as mandated in
Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, as amended.
On October 23, 1992, the Court of Appeal rendered the questioned Decision
ruling that "before effecting the discharge the court should require the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of the proposed
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge." Finding that the lower court
immediately resolved the motion to discharge without a hearing thereon, the
Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of discharge dated September
8, 1992.

Hence, the filing of the present petition by the prosecution. Comment by private
respondent Jose Pring was filed on February 1, 1993. Prior to said comment, the
lower court issued an Order of January 21, 1993, which among others considered
the petition for bail of private respondent Pring submitted for resolution with or
without the opposition filed by the prosecution. This prompted the prosecution
to file with this Court an Urgent Motion For the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Resolution of the Petition. The prosecution, in
praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, sought to enjoin the
trial court from hearing private respondent Jose Pring's motion for bail, pending
resolution before this Court, of the petition on whether the annulment of the
Order of discharge by the appellate court is proper. The state, argued the
prosecution, shall have no leg to stand on in opposing the release on bail of
private respondent Jose Pring, without the testimony of accused Arile, that will
show the evidence of guilt against private respondent Jose Pring is strong.

Thus, on March 30, 1993, the temporary restraining order was issued by this
Court En Banc, ordering Judge Apolinario Santos to cease and desists from
resolving or granting the motion for bail of private respondent Pring in Criminal
Case No. 94159 until the present petition is resolved.

The petition raises a single issue: can the trial court without conducting a hearing
pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, resolve the prosecution's Motion to Discharge Nonilo Arile where the
records show that the latter's sworn statement together with the prosecution's
other evidence were already in the possession of the court and had been
challenged by private respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile
and in his Petition for Bail?
Favoring an affirmative ruling thereon is the State, represented by the Solicitor
General arguing that evidence of the prosecution consisting of (a) sworn
statement of proposed witness Nonilo Arile; (b) resolution of the investigating
prosecutors; (c) affidavits of Rogelio Morales, driver of the kidnapped Chinese
children; (d) affidavits of accused Jaime Serrano and Edmund Divinagracia have
all been submitted before the trial court to form part of the records of the case
and thus, made available for the scrutiny of private respondent Jose Pring who
controverted in detail the statements of proposed witness Nonilo Arile, both in
his Opposition to the Motion to Discharge and Petition For Bail. It is the Solicitor
General's theory that this submission of evidence to prove that the conditions for
discharge as required by law exist, amounts to the presentation thereof in upon
court and the opportunity to rebut the same, well afforded to private respondent
Jose Pring assuredly satisfies due process requirement contemplated by law in
mandating a hearing. Under these circumstances, concludes counsel for the State,
at no instance was there ever a violation of said provision of law; rather, the
requirement of holding an actual hearing in support of the discharge was
substantially complied with.

Strongly opposed to such proposition is private respondent Jose Pring,

advocating strict adherence to the letter of the law. In his Comment, he
emphatically stressed that Nonilo Arile's exclusion from the information is not
valid, since it is based on an Order Discharge, the issuance of which is fatally
flawed for failure of the trial court to conduct a hearing in support of his
discharge.

To further obtain the dismissal of the petition, private respondent contends that
the State's filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is improper, where upon
analysis of the single issue raised in the petition, the only inquiry it presents
before this Court is one of law. Under our laws on procedure, claims private
respondent, a decision of the Court of Appeals involving a pure question of law
may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by a petition for review
on certiorari  under Rule 45 and not under Rule 65.

The elevation of this case to the Supreme Court thru a special civil action
for certiorari is deemed legally permissible. Settled is the rule that:
 Certiorari  may be availed of where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from
the injurious effects of the judgment complained of, or in order to
avoid further litigation.1

In Jaca v. Lumber Company2 cited in Lansang, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,3 it was held

that:

That availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute

sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is
the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

In the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Order of
Discharge of accused Nonilo Arile effectively crippled the prosecution's bid to
oppose private respondent's applicant for bail. It was the intention of the
prosecution, had not the Order of Discharge been annulled, to utilize the
testimony of Nonilo Arile to show that evidence of guilty against private
respondent Jose Pring is strong. But since the prosecution has been warned by
the trial court that it will soon decide the petition for bail of private respondent
Jose Pring, with or without the intended opposition to be filed by the
prosecution, the latter was left without choice and was thus compelled under
justified circumstances to file a special civil action for certiorari  to  annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, such action filed being an extraordinary and
speedy remedy. The prosecution, which is in immediate need of the
reinstatement of the Order of Discharge resorted to this remedy not as a
substitute for appeal but as the proper remedy that can with dispatch address its
predicament.

On the basis of the foregoing, there is no procedural impediment barring this

Court from entertaining the instant petition and resolving the issue before us.
Prior to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Section 9, Rule 119
provided that:

Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the

prosecution. — When two or more persons are charged with the
commission of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time
before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one or more
of them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they
may be witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the
court:

(a) There is absolute necessity of the testimony of the defendant

whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
defendant;

(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially

corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;

(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, Section 9, Rule 119 of the 985 Rule on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, now provides that:

Sec. 9. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more

persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent
so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:
 (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated

in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically

form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of
the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

The present rule thus amends the old rule by categorically requiring a hearing
where the prosecution shall present the sworn statement of the proposed witness
and its other evidence for the purpose of proving to the satisfaction of the court
that the conditions for discharge as above-enumerated exist. The rationale
behind this amendment is to avoid a repetition of the case of Flores v.
Sandiganbayan4 where the Supreme Court set aside the Order of Discharge of the
Sandiganbayan because said court merely relied on the information furnished by
the fiscal in forming its conclusion of whether the conditions for discharge have
been met.5 The Supreme Court in Flores (supra) said that since it is the Court's
exclusive responsibility to discharge an accused from the information, it must see
to it that:

. . . the requisites prescribed by the rules exist, particularly the

requisite that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
defendant whose discharge is requested. Under this requisite, the
fiscal must show that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
 the defendant whose discharge he seeks, in order to be witness for
the prosecution. This requirement is aimed to curtail miscarriage of
justice, before too common, through the abuse of the power to ask
for the discharge of one or more defendants. Absolute necessity of
the testimony of the defendant, whose discharge is requested must
now be shown if the discharge is to be allowed, and the power to
determine the necessity is lodged upon the court. . . .

Thus, the term "hearing in support of the discharge" as contemplated by said law
refers to a proceeding, separate from the trial itself, where the prosecution
presents its evidence proving the existence of the conditions for discharge and
the sworn statement of the proposed witness. Necessarily, it does not foreclose;
rather, it affords an opportunity for the defense to enter its opposition against the
motion to discharge. All of this is intended to aid the court in fulfilling its
mandated duty of determining the propriety or impropriety of the sought-after
discharge. In requiring therefore, a "hearing in support of the discharge," the
essential objective of the law is for the court to receive or possess evidence for or
against the discharge which will serve as tangible and concrete basis,
independent of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions, in granting or denying
the motion for discharge.

Hence, in resolving the issue in this petition, the proper question we should
address is: Was there a failure to observe the spirit and intent of Sec. 9, Rule 119
in the case at bar? We rule in the negative. The prosecution has submitted the
sworn statement of accused Nonilo Arile and its evidence showing that the
conditions for discharge have been met. Neither can it be denied that the defense
was able to oppose the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile. With both litigants able
to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to
undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed
under Section 9, Rule 119 were satisfied. Having received evidence for and
against the discharge, the Court avoided a repetition of the case of Flores v.
Sandiganbayan (Supra).

Nor was there a violation of due process as private respondent Jose Pring insists.
As held in the case of Juanita Yap Say and William Lim v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,  et al.6

. . . "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court.

Where a party was given the opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, there can be denial of procedural due
process. "Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process."

We reiterate: private respondent Jose Pring has filed his opposition to the
motion to discharge Nonilo Arile and even discussed the material points of
the latter's testimony in his petition for bail. His assertion then that there
was a denial of due process for failure to conduct a hearing in support of
the discharge is unfounded and not substantiated after a perusal of the
records of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. 28933 rendered on October 23, 1992 is SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Order of Discharge of Nonilo Arile issued by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 94159 on September 8, 1992 is thus REINSTATED. The
temporary restraining order of March 30, 1993 issued by the Court En Banc is
hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Presco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, December 10, 1990, 192
SCRA 232 citing De la Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 63612, January 31, 1985,
134 SCRA 417; Balagtas Realty Corp. v. Romillo, G.R. Nos. L-48376-
85, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 415; Lobete v. Sundiam, G.R. No. L-
38278, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 95; Velasco v. Segundo, G.R. No.
58187, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 573.

2 No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 107, 129.

3 G.R. No. 76028, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 230, 235.

4 G.R. No. L-63677, August 12, 1983, 124 SCRA 109.

5 Pamaran, Manuel R., "The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

Annotated," 1991 ed., pp. 400-401.

6 G.R. No. L-73451, March 28, 1988, 159 SCRA 325.

826 Phil. 368

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ROGER
DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, RAYMOND DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS,
JAYSON MIRANDA Y NACPIL, ROLANDO TALBAN Y MENDOZA,
AND JOEL JACINTO Y CELESTINO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

For consideration is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to nullify the May 27,
2016 Decision[1] and January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139255. The challenged rulings affirmed the January 10, 2014
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 215 in Quezon City directing that
the testimony of the deceased state witness Alfred Mendiola (Mendiola) be stricken
off the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.

The Facts

On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao,
Quezon City by a group of men later pinpointed as the respondents herein.
Evangelista's charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija.

In connection with the incident, Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan (Parulan)

voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and executed
extrajudicial confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez
(Dominguez Brothers) as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing
before the Quezon City RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the
respondents for Carnapping with Homicide under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6539,[3] otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-11-168431. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13 th day of January 2011, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, and other persons who are at large and whose identities
and whereabouts are still to be determined, conspiring and confederating together
and helping each other, with intent to gain and to kill and by means of violence
against and intimidation of person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take and carry away one (1) charcoal gray Toyota Land Cruiser model
2009 with Plate No. NAI-316, Engine No. 1VD-0049539 and Chassis No.
JTMHV05J804031334, worth Php3,400,000.00, Philippine Currency, then driven by
VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VELARO and registered in the name of Future Trade
International, Inc. but already sold to Arsenio Evangelista per Deed of Sale dated
December 13, 2010, to the damage and prejudice of the owner.

That during the commission of the said offense, or by reason thereof, the said
accused, in conspiracy with one another and with intent to kill, carefully planned
the execution of their acts and with the attendant circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and by means of
fire, attack (sic) and assaulted VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VALERO (sic) by shooting
him on the head, mutilated his body, and set the same on fire thereby inflicting
upon him fatal injuries which were the proximate cause of his untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the late VENSON EVANGELISTA Y
VELARO.

Accused and their other unidentified cohorts committed the above attendant
circumstances in the killing of their victim because they deliberately planned the
commission of the offense consciously adopting the means and methods of attack
done suddenly and unexpectedly, taking advantage of their numbers and strength
to ensure its commission without risk to themselves arising from the defense which
the victim might make, accompanied by fraud, deceit, disguise, cruelty and by
abuse of superior strength by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Of the respondents, Rolando Taiban (Taiban) and Joel Jacinto (Jacinto) remained at
large. Only the Dominguez brothers and Miranda were apprehended. And during
arraignment on April 11, 2011, the three arrested respondents pleaded not guilty to
the offense.

On June 27, 2011, a hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion [5] that
Mendiola be discharged as an accused to become a state witness. On the said date,
Mendiola gave his testimony and was cross examined by the counsel for the
defense. Nevertheless, the defense manifested that the cross-examination was
limited only to the incident of discharge, and that their party reserved the right to a
more lengthy cross examination during the prosecution's presentation of the
evidence in chief.

On September 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 215, before which Criminal Case No. Q-
11-168431 is pending, issued an Order granting the motion to discharge Mendiola
as an accused to become a state witness. The Order further states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the motion to
discharge accused ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS from the Information to become a
state witness.

Accordingly, his testimonies given on June 27, July 8 and July 11, 2011 and all the
evidence adduced in support of the discharge hereby form part of the trial of this
case.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[6]
Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola was found dead on May 6, 2012.
The RTC then required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
whether or not Mendiola's testimony during the discharge proceeding should be
admitted as part of the prosecution's evidence in chief despite his failure to testify
during the trial proper prior to his death.[7]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 10, 2014, the RTC issued the assailed Order directing that the
testimony of Mendiola be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No.Q-11-168431.
The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the testimony of ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS given on June 27,
2011 for purposes of his discharge as a state witness is HEREBY ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF THE RECORD of this case. With respect to the documents and
other evidence authenticated by Mendiola as a discharge witness, this Court will
rule upon their admissibility when the same are formally offered in evidence.

SO ORDERED.[8]
According to the trial court, Mendiola's testimony on June 27, 2011 was offered
only for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a
state witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense
counsel limited his questions during cross-examination to only those matters
relating to Mendiola's qualifications to become a state witness and expressly
reserved the right to continue the cross-examination during trial proper. As
ratiocinated by the RTC:
There is no question that when Mendiola was cross-examined, such cross-
examination was limited by the purpose of the hearing, that is, whether the court
would be satisfied of the absolute necessity of his testimony; that "there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution"; that his "testimony could be
substantially corroborated in its material points"; that he "does not appear to be
the most guilty"; and he "has not been convicted, at any time, of any offense
involving moral turpitude". In short, these are the purposes for the discharge
hearings.[9] x x x
The trial court likewise cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, [10] noting
that there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular witness
during trial proper to secure his acquittal. Non-compliance with this requirement,
according to the RTC, amounted to the deprivation of respondents of their
constitutional right to due process, and of their right to confront the witnesses
against them.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule
65, but the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court. It thus dismissed the petition in its assailed May 27, 2016 Decision in
the following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Orders dated 10 January 2014 and 1 December 2014 issued by public respondent
Judge Wildredo L. Maynigo in Criminal case no. Q-11-168431, pending before
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration therefrom through its January
18, 2017 Resolution. Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issue

The primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the testimony of
Mendiola should be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.

Petitioner posits that the right afforded to an accused to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him is not an absolute right. Hence, when
respondents failed to avail themselves of the constitutional guarantee when
Mendiola gave his testimony on June 27, 2011, they have effectively forfeited their
right thereto.

The Court directed respondents to file their respective comments within fifteen (15)
days from notice. Respondent Jayson Miranda y Nacpil, in his Comment, [12] argues
that the testimony of Mendiola was offered in the discharge proceeding for the
limited purpose of qualifying the latter as a state witness, and Section 18, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court requires for the state witness to be presented again during
trial proper. Failure of the prosecution to again offer the testimony of the state
witness, as part of their evidence-in-chief, unlawfully deprived the respondents of
the opportunity to conduct a full and exhaustive cross-examination. For even
though Mendiola was cross-examined during the discharge proceedings,
respondents nevertheless intimated to the trial court that they were reserving the
right to propound further questions when Mendiola is again to take the witness
stand. Miranda adds that the respondents are just as without fault that Mendiola
died without completing his testimony.

Miranda adds that at the time Mendiola testified during the discharge proceedings,
his co-respondents Rolando M. Taiban (Taiban) and Joel C. Jacinto (Jacinto) were
not yet arrested. Thus, to allow the testimony of Mendiola to remain on record
would be tantamount to a denial of their right to cross-examine the witness against
them.

On the other hand, it appears that Atty. Oscar Raro, the counsel of record for
respondent Roger Dominguez, failed to inform this Court that he has changed his
office address. Service upon counsel was therefore not actually effected.
Nevertheless, We have held time and again that notices to counsel should properly
be sent to his or her address of record in the absence of due notice to the court of a
change of address. Thus, respondent Roger Dominguez is deemed to have received
the order to comment by fiction of law and has, consequently, waived his right to
counter the allegations in the petition after fifteen (15) days from the date of his
constructive receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Atty. Jose M. Cruz, who represents
Raymond Dominguez, has likewise not filed a Comment in behalf of his client
herein. The Court resolves, however, to dispense with the same.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically
render his testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible

Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two or more persons
are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused
to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part

of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis added)
The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge
proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the
accused as a state witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already
concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired
during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal
Case No. Q-11-168431 and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.

Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be.
The contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his
possession of all the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications,
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness.
The argument of incompleteness even contradicts respondent Miranda's own
position since he does not contest here the RTC's Order granting Mendiola's motion
to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his testimony following his demise.

Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it
mandatory that the state witness be presented during trial proper and that,
otherwise, his failure to do so would render his testimony inadmissible. On this
point, Miranda, the RTC and the CA are mistaken in their interpretation of the rule,
which pertinently provides:
Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. - The order indicated
in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and
shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused
fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge. (emphasis added)
While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the
presentation of evidence in chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and
separability that the validity of the discharge proceeding should remain untouched
despite the non-presentation of Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the
provision requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies
as a state witness. However, non-compliance therewith would only prevent the
order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of any penalty
to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions
of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to
impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance
with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating against
the claim of inadmissibility.

To qualify as a state witness, the respondent must testify on the details of

the commission of the crime

That the testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him
as a state witness does not automatically render his statements as to the specifics
on the commission of the offense inadmissible. To recall, one of the requirements
under Section 17, Rule 119 is to establish that the erstwhile respondent does not
appear to be the most guilty among him and his cohorts. Thus, it is quite
understandable that, during the discharge proceeding, Mendiola narrated in graphic
detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the extent of the participation of each
of the accused, to wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, are you the same Alfred Mendiola[,] one of the persons being
indicted in this instant crime of Carnapping with Homicide?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Do you know the other accused in this case, Mr. Witness, namely, I will
enumerate[:] Roger Dominguez, Raymond Dominguez, Jayson Miranda[,] alias Soy,
Rolando Talban[,] a.k.a. Eduardo Fernandez[,] a.k.a. Rolly and one named alias
Joel?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Why do you know them, Mr. Witness?

A: I've been with them[,] with the group that I joined which is carnapping.

Q: In the said carnapping group that you mentioned, Mr. Witness, what is your
role?
A: I served as the buyer or as poseur buyer of the vehicle that we were supposed
to buy but actually we will carnap.

Q: What about the other named accused, No. 1 Roger and No. 2 Raymond, what
are their roles?
A: We treat them as our leader because they are the ones planning the operations,
they are the ones funding the operation, they are the ones providing us the money
every time we have the operation.

x x x x

Court: What was your last statement? Can you repeat[?]

A: They are the ones who [are] also giving us our salary or payment for ever[y]
successful operation.

Q: What about Jayson Miranda[,] alias Soy, what is his role in your group?
A: I came to know Jayson Miranda as the right hand of Roger Dominguez and he
serve[d] as my driver for four times wherein I was involved in carnapping.

Q: What about this Joel, what is his role, Mr. Witness?

A: Joel [was] introduced to me and will also be my companion who will pose as a
mechanic and will directly assist us if ever we are successful in test driving the said
vehicle.

x x x x

Q: What about Rolly or Rolando Taiban[,] also known as Eduardo Fernandez y

Lopez, what is his role in your group?
A: I was only introduced once to Rolly and I also know him as a member of the
group and he was assigned to help us on a certain operation.

x x x x

Q: Now Mr. Witness, you previously mentioned that you are a member of a group
headed by Dominguez brothers. How did your group operate or what was your
modus operandi?
A: The first time I met Roger Dominguez[,] he was able to tell me that theirs
system of carnapping is by poking. But after that[,] he narrated some more
regarding other systems of carnapping.

Q: And what are these other systems that were given to you or were relayed to
you?
A: One strategy is they will look for sellers of vehicles through newspapers,
magazines and internet then they will get the contact numbers of the person selling
the vehicle.

Q: And what did they do with the contact numbers given to them by the owners of
the vehicles?
A: Once contacted[,] they will schedule a meeting place of the poseur buyer and
the seller.

Q: And what else are the modus operandi of your group?

A: And if the seller agrees on the road test[,] that is the time the group of the
poseur buyer will poke and carnap the said vehicle.
Q: You continuously mentioned about, pagtutok, can you elaborate that, what, do
you mean [by] pagtutok?
A: In my experience[,] every time we are successful in convincing a seller[,] it will
be Joel who in the middle of the road testing will draw his gun and poke it to the
seller.

x x x x

Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned about this Toyota Land Cruiser, let's go to that,
when for the first time did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: The first time I heard them talking about this Toyota Land Cruiser was January
12 during night time.

Q: What year?
A: 2011, ma'am.

Q: And what did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: We were in Greenville Subdivision over dinner with Roger Dominguez, Ann,
Katrina Paula then Raymond Dominguez[,] together with Rolly[,] arrived.

Q: Who was the one who mentioned this Land Cruiser?

A: According to them[,] since it was night time when they say the vehicle[,] the
owner did not agree for them to road test the said vehicle.

Q: What else did Raymond Dominguez tell you?

A: After that when the owner did not agree for the road test[,] they went to a
gasoline station in Quezon City.

x x x x

Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: When Raymond Dominguez arrived[,] he gave me a number and asked me to
contact that said number claiming the owner was selling a Toyota Land Cruiser.

Q: How did Raymond Dominguez give to you that number, how?

A: From his cell phone[, ] he jotted down the number on a piece of paper[,] he
gave it to me and asked me to call it if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale.

Q: Upon receiving the instructions of Raymond Dominguez[,] what did you do with
that number?
A: Before I dialed the number[,] I asked him what to tell the owner in case he
answers the call.

Q: What did Raymond Dominguez tell you?

A: I was asked to ask the owner if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale and if
yes[,] then I should schedule a meeting.

x x x x

Q: During the telephone conversation with as you mentioned with Boy

Evangelista[,] what did you talk about?
A: He said that it's still available, it [is] still for sale.

Q: So what was your response, Mr. Witness?

A: I asked him where and when can I see the vehicle.

Q: What did Mr. Evangelista tell you?

A: He answered within the day, the vehicle is available.
Q: Mr. Witness, while you were talking to Mr. Boy Evangelista over the phone,
where [we]re Raymond, Roger, Jayson Miranda and the rest of the accused, where
were they?
A: In the sala of the house in Greenville Subdivision, ma'am.

x x x x

Q: How did you end your transaction or your telephone conversation with Mr. Boy
Evangelista?
A: When I asked the person on the other line if I can see the vehicle within the
day[,] Raymond signaled me to schedule a meeting around three to four that
afternoon.

x x x x

Q: x x x After you were able to set up a meeting with Mr. Boy Evangelista over the
telephone regarding the Land Cruiser, what happened thereafter?
A: He texted me the address where I can meet him.

Q: What were these instructions?

A: The first thing he told me was that he will be the first to leave the subdivision
onboard a white Expedition and that he instructed me to act as a poseur buyer and
to test drive the said vehicle since I will be giving it as a gift.

Q: What else did Raymond tell you?

A: He also told me that I will be with Jayson who will act as the driver of Pajero
which we will use in going to that place. And Joel was also with us to act as
merchant and Rolly will act as a back up for us in case the owner will agree to a
road test.

Q: While Raymond was giving all these instructions to you, who were present at
that time?
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann, Napoleon Salamat, Rolly, Jayson Miranda alias Soy.

x x x x

Q: So when Raymond was giving you all these instructions and these persons
[we]re present, we [sic] first go to Roger[,] what was his reaction, what was his
reply?
A: Roger told me "Hoy Bakla, kung hindi mo mapapapayag na i-road test yang
sasakyan na iyan wag mong pilitin ha."

x x x x

Q: So when Roger Dominguez made his statement[,] what happened thereafter?

A: Raymond answered[,] "[s]ige kung hindi mo kaya ako na ang bahala, pero hindi
ako aalis sa area na iyon na hindi ko tangay ang Toyota Land Cruiser".

Q: With all these statements, Mr. Witness, what happened thereafter?

A: Rolly just interrupted, "Boss, kung saka-sakaling mapapapayag natin ang may-
ari ng Toyota Land Cruiser na ipa-road test at kung sino man ang sasama itumba
na natin dahil baka makilala pa niyan pag pinakita ng QCPD yung picture gallery ng
mga carnappers dahil galing [sic] na tayo diyan noong gabing 'yon January 13."

x x x x

Q: So after you were already specifically assigned of [sic] your roles in the
carnapping of the Land Cruiser as well as to how to execute and realize this, how
did you go about this plan?
A: Raymond was the first one who left the subdivision onboard the said Ford
Expedition.

Q: Would you recall what time was that?

A: Around 1:00 o'clock or past 1:00 o'clock.

Q: Of what date?
A: January 13, 2011.

Q: How about you, Mr. Witness, and the rest of the group[,] what time did you
leave the apartment?
A: After Raymond left[,] we prepared and we left the subdivision at around 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon onboard a green Pajero together with Jayson and Rolly.

Q: You mentioned that you were onboard this Pajero together with Jayson and
Rolly, but previously in your statement you said that Joel was also given a role by
Raymond Dominguez, so where was this Joel at that time?
A: We fetched Joel at SM, San Fernando, he alighted from [a] gray van before he
transferred to our vehicle.

Q: How about Roger[,] how come he did not come with your group?
A: Roger, Napoleon Salamat and Ann were left in the apartment but we were told
[to] give updates to them if we were able to convince the seller.

Q: You previously mentioned that you left the apartment at around 2:00 o'clock
onboard a green Pajero bound to Cubao, Quezon City, what time did you arrive at
that area?
A: Past 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when we arrived at the area.

Q: What was this area again, Mr. Witness?

A: No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City.

Q: So upon arriving at No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City[,] what
happened?
A: While we were at the front of the said residence[,] Jayson received a call from
Raymond.

x x x x

Q: So when you asked Jayson about the instructions, what did Jayson tell you?
A: According to him[,] he was instructed by Raymond to go around on the place
and look for a wider street wherein we can test drive the said vehicle.

Q: So what did you do with the instructions of Raymond Dominguez relayed to

Jayson?
A: We went around the said area.

x x x x

Q: So after complying or following the instructions of Raymond of going around the

area and looking for wider roads[,] what happened next?
A: We went back at the front of the house.

Q: Why did you go back in front of the house?

A: We were waiting for the go signal from Raymond for me to go down and check
the vehicle.

Q: What is this go signal, Mr. Witness?

A: He texted go.
Q: When you say nagtext siya, whom are you referring to?
A: Raymond Dominguez, ma'am.

x x x x

Q: Upon these instructions[,] what did you do?

A: Joel and I alighted and Jayson, Rolly parked the vehicle.

Q: So upon alighting from this green Pajero together with Joel[,] what did you do?
A: After that[,] we pressed the door bell of the said house and then a small man,
who appeared to be the boy, open[ed] the gate for us.

Q: What did you tell this boy?

A: I immediately asked him the person of Boy Evangelista.

x x x x

Q: So what happened thereafter when you were ushered inside the area?
A: This boy, the small one, called someone a person with a long hair.

Q: Would you know who this person is?

A: No, ma'am, he just introduced himself as the son of Boy Evangelista and was
tasked to talk with me.

x x x x

Q: Okay, Mr. Witness, when you came face to face with this person whom you
described as one tall person with fair complexion and with long hair, what did you
talk about?
A: I asked him if the Land Cruiser I was looking at in the garage was still for sale.

Q: What was his reply?

A: He said yes.

Q: So what was your counter reply?

A: I asked how much. x x x

[Q]: And how did you reply to such price quotation of 3.4 Million[?]
[A]: I asked if it is still negotiable. x x x

Q: While you were talking with this fair complexion, tall and long hair, where was
Joel?
A: He was just checking the said vehicle, the tires and the engine.

Q: After talking about the price, what else did you talk about regarding this vehicle?
A: Joel approached us and said the vehicle was okay and the long hair said if I buy
it then it is as if I bought a brand new.

x x x x

Q: After you were assured by this person with long hair and that it was
recommended to[o] by your mechanic Joel, what was your decision then about the
vehicle?
A: I asked the long hair if we could roadtest the vehicle that he was selling.

Q: And what was his reply?

A: He said that they don't agree with road testing especially the father.
Q: And what was your response?
A: So on my part posting as a buyer[,] I answered in a sarcastic way, "[a]no ba
naman kayong nagbebenta ng sasakyan na ganyan 3.4 Million is 3.4 Million tapos
hindi nyo papayagang i-road test, maglalabas ako ng pera."

Q: And can you tell us what was the reaction of this person whom you were talking
to when you made the sarcastic words?
A: I noticed that he was irritated by my remark and he ordered the boy, the small
one, to get the key, cellphone and his wallet.

x x x x

Q: And when this person whom you described boarded the vehicle, what were you
doing then?
A: I was still at the garage and he was the one who signal us to board on said
vehicle and he said "let's go".

Q: And where did you position yourself?

A: I positioned myself at the back of the driver.

Q: How about Joel?

A: At the right passenger seat, ma'am, beside the driver.

Q: Upon boarding this vehicle, you, Joel, and this person that you described[,]
where did you go?
A: We went around the said area but the green Pajero was following us wherein
Rolly and Jayson Miranda alias Soy were there.

Q: Why do you say that this Pajero was following you then?
A: I know that they were following us because Rolly even uttered a joke
"[s]inusundan yata tayo ng father mo ah, ayan yung Pajerong green".

Q: Why did Joel made that statement as far as you know?

A: That's a part of our strategy because the long hair might be the person to notice
that someone is following us.

x x x x

Q: So after circling the road as you mentioned[,] what happened next?

A: When Joel noticed that we were near the house of the owner[,] he immediately
pulled out his gun and poked it to the person and asking [sic] to give him the
vehicle.

Q: And what did this long hair do with that threat of Joel?
A: The long hair was able to stop the vehicle probably a house away from their
house.

Q: And what was the reaction of this person whom you said was poked by a gun?
A: He raised his gun and said "[m]aawa na po kayo sa akin[,] may pamilya po
ako."

x x x x

Q: And at that time, where was Joel and Rolly whom you previously said was
following the Land Cruiser?
A: Joel remained at the vehicle poking his gun while Rolly suddenly alighted from
the Pajero and boarded the Land Cruiser and sat on the driver seat and pushed the
long hair at the back portion of the said vehicle.
Q: After Rolly boarded the Land Cruiser and pushed this person with long hair at
the back[,] what happened next?
A: Rolly went inside the vehicle through the driver side and after pushing the long
hair, he also followed him, so we were all at the back, me the long hair and Rolly.

Q: While you were inside the vehicle[,] what were you doing at the time? A: While I
was seated at the back of the driver seat I was texting Roger and informing him
that the vehicle and the owner were already taken. And Rolly was trying to put up
packaging tape on the eyes and mouth of the long hair and also his hands were tied
behind his back with the packaging tape. After he was tied with packaging tape[,]
he was asked to lie facing down at the back and he was covered with a blanket
which he took from his back pack.

x x x x

Q: Now Mr. Witness, while Rolly was doing this to the long hair whom you just
described[,] what was Joel doing?
A: Joel was the one driving the Land Cruiser away from the area.

x x x x

COURT. How about you[,] what were you doing then when Rolly was putting a
packaging tape to the long hair?
A: I was sending text messages to Roger that we were able to take the vehicle.

x x x x

Q: Now, from Cubao, Quezon City, where did you go, where did you proceed then?
A: After we passed through the NLEX, what happened was the green Pajero was
ahead of us and we were following it and the Expedition was following us.

Q: In that period of time that you were traveling[,] what happened inside the Land
Cruiser while you were with this long hair, Joel and Rolly, what happened?
A: Rolly took the wallet of the long hair and gave it to me and the cellphone was
handed to Joel, the necklace, bracelet and the money were taken by Rolly.

Q: You said that this wallet was handed to you by Rolly, what did you do with the
wallet?
A: I opened the wallet and it contained Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) case
[sic], Driver's License and that is where I saw that the name of the long hair was
Venson Evangelista...

Q: From NLEX[,] where did you go thereafter?

A: Joel called someone, I don't know who among the Dominguez brothers he was
talking to, but he was given instruction that we should proceed to a safe house in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.

x x x x

Q: So what time did you arrive at [sic] Mabalacat, Pampanga?

A: Past 5:00, ma'am.

Q: Upon reaching that safe house[,] what happened there?

A: When we arrived there[,] Roger Dominguez was standing at the gate of the safe
house and a green Lancer car was parked there.

x x x x

Q: What happened to the safe house after you arrived and when you saw Roger
and Ann?
A: When I saw Roger and his girlfriend Ann, I alighted from the Land Cruiser.

x x x x

Q: What about Venson Evangelista, the long hair, where was he?
A: He was still with Rolly lying face down inside the vehicle.

x x x x

Q: So when you approached Roger Dominguez, what happened then?

A: He told me that Ann will bring me to SM San Fernando and to wait for his text or
call if ever he will fetch me.

x x x x

Q: So when you were given instructions by Roger[, ] what did you do thereafter?
A: When I was approaching the Lancer where Ann was there[,] Roger whistled at
me.

Q: So when Roger whistled at you[,] what did you do?

A: I approached the brothers.

Q: And when you approached[,] what happened?

A: He ordered me to place used tires and a gallon of gasoline at the green Pajero.

x x x x

Q: And what vehicle did they use in fetching you at SM San Fernando?
A: The Land Cruiser we used before I was brought to SM San Fernando.

x x x x

Q: Would you know who is the owner of the vehicle, the Land Cruiser?
A: That was the vehicle that we took on that day from the long hair.

x x x x

Q: After you were fetched by Roger and Ann using that Land Cruiser[,] where did
you go?
A: We went to Kapalangan, Calumpit, Bulacan.

x x x x

Q: Upon arriving at the Greenville Subdivision[,] what did you observe?

A: We were the only ones who were there. After we alighted from the vehicle[,]
Roger immediately replaced the plate number of the vehicle with the plate number
we took from the person when we were at the Kalapangan.

x x x x

Q: Now we go back, Mr. Witness, to this long hair. Would you know, Mr. Witness,
as to what happened to the gagged and hog-tied long hair after you last saw him
hours earlier stay inside the Land Cruiser before you left for SM?
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann and I were having dinner already, Roger Dominguez
received a call from Jayson and the reason why I know it came from Soy [is]
because Roger answered "Soy".

Q: And what did you hear?

A: I heard that Roger Dominguez was asking Soy "[s]igurado kang patay na,
sigurado kang sunog na, sigurado kang hindi na makikita yan?"

x x x x

Q: So when Jayson Miranda informed you what is his present to you[,] what was
his response?
A: I asked him "kanino yan" and he said it's with the long hair and when I asked
him the whereabouts[,] he said "patay na, sunog na".

Q: What did he tell you as to how Venson Evangelista was killed? x x x

A: He narrated it, he said that he was first shot and his body was inserted inside
two used tires after that they poured gasoline and he was burned in a rice field
somewhere in Nueva Ecija.[13]
We cannot subscribe to Miranda's postulation that the above narration is
extraneous to the purpose of qualifying Mendiola as a state witness. On the
contrary, they were essential in establishing that he is not the main perpetrator of
the murder of Venson Evangelista, rendering him eligible as a state witness under
Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, even assuming arguendo that the foregoing details are not germane
to the purpose for which the testimony of Mendiola was offered, it was nevertheless
incumbent upon respondents to have timely objected against the line of questioning
for irrelevance. As prescribed by Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a

witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent.
Noteworthy is that Miranda never raised in his Comment that he and his co-
respondents have timely raised an objection when Mendiola delved into the
particulars of the crime in his testimony. They are, thus, precluded from belatedly
questioning the relevance of the said details.

Respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola

What is more, embedded in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court is the
guideline for perpetuating the testimony of a deceased witness during criminal
trial, viz:

RULE 115
Rights of Accused

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:

x x x x

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (emphasis
added)
Verily, the sole condition imposed for the utilization of the testimony of a deceased
witness is that the opposing party had the opportunity to cross-examine the same.
In this regard, respondents lament that they were deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine Mendiola upon his passing prior to being presented as a witness
during trial proper. Hence, they argue that Mendiola's testimony ought to be
stricken off the records.

We are not persuaded.

One of the most basic rights of an accused person under our justice system is the
right to confront the witnesses against him face to face. [14] Subsumed under this
right of confrontation is the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution. And as the Court has elucidated in People v. Seneris (Seneris),[15] the
right, though fundamental, may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the same. As the case instructs:
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to
cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principles underlying
the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross examine an opposing witness but failed to take
advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where a party has
had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and
the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received
or allowed to remain in the record. (emphasis added, citations omitted)
Here, respondents have to realize that their option to not ask for a continuance and
reserve the right to continue with their line of questioning for trial proper instead
carried inherent risks, including their present predicament. Respondents ought to
have been aware that their decision would pave the way not only for the
termination of the discharge proceedings, but also for the eventual application of
the last paragraph of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court should the RTC
resolve to discharge Mendiola as a state witness, as it in fact did. The assumption of
the risk, to Our mind, amounted to a waiver of any objection as to the admissibility
of Mendiola's testimony during the discharge hearing.

Furthermore, Seneris elucidates that the testimony of the deceased prosecution

witness shall not be expunged from the records if the defense was able to conduct a
rigorous and extensive cross-examination prior to the witness' demise. As held:
Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent
of the deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject
matter of his direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential
elements of the crime of parricide, and what remained for further cross-
examination is the matter of price or reward allegedly paid by private respondent
for the commission of the crime, which is merely an aggravating circumstance and
does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely inadmissible the
testimony of the state witness who died through no fault of any of the
parties before his cross-examination could be finished. (emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the records disclose that Mendiola was cross examined at length
for his testimony by the counsels of Miranda and the Dominguez brothers. More,
such cross-examination already covered the details of the commission of the
offense, to wit:
ATTY. PEREZ for JAYSON MIRANDA

Q: You admitted in your Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 20, 2011 that before
the alleged carnapping and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista, you called Mr. Boy
Evangelista over the cellphone, did you recall saying this, Mr. Witness? x x x
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, it is a fact that you arranged in [sic] meeting with the Evangelistas before
the alleged carjacking and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: And when Venson Evangelista told you that the Land Cruiser is still available,
you asked him if you could road test the vehicle, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And is it not a fact, that Mr. Venson Evangelista initially refused to have the
vehicle road tested, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this is now the point, Mr. Witness, when you uttered the following remarks:
"3.4 million yang sasakyang binibenta mo, hindi mo ipaparoad test", do you recall
saying that?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: If not for your remark, the remark which I have said a while ago, Venson
Evangelista would not have agreed to the road test?
A: That was the reason why I went there and it was my job to convince the owner
to have the vehicle road tested so, I have to do my part, sir.

xxxx

Q: It was when you are about to go back to the residence of Mr. Venson
Evangelista, it was at that point when Joel allegedly poked his gun against a [sic]
person of Mr. Venson Evangelista, do you recall saying this?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, after allegedly seizing the vehicle and the person of Mr. Venson Evangelista,
you proceeded to Mabida, Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: During the 50-minute travel, never did it occur to you to object to the alleged
plan to kill Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: When I first saw that the victim was being half-tied [sic] and placed packaging
tape on his mouth and hands and eyes, I was not able to say a word because as far
as I know, I was hired only to sell total wrecked, flooded and carnapped vehicles
and I never thought that I would be part of the group that would kill, sir.

ATTY. OSCAR RARO for the Dominguez Brothers

Q: Now what time did you arrive at Sgt. Catolos Street, 3:00 o'clock?
A: Around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: And how long did it take you to convince Venson to road test the vehicle?
A: 10 to 20 minutes, sir.

Q: And after that you went around that place, twice and then you proceeded to
NLEX?
A: After convincing him, we directly go out to road test the vehicle twice and go
around the area of Sgt. Catolos Street in Cubao then after which we stopped near
their house then we proceeded directly to NLEX[,] sir.

xxxx
Q: What time did you arrive at Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Almost 6:00 in the evening, sir.

xxxx

Q: You stated on page 17 of the transcript of stenographic notes on June 27, 2011
that the Dominguez brothers are the ones planning the operation and funding it,
you stated that?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: But aside from your statement, do you have any other proof or witness that can
corroborate this?
A: Probably what I can say is that the things that I saw, I had experienced and the
orders that I have received from them, that's the reason why I am saying that they
are the ones funding and planning all these things because all the orders that I
followed came from the two (2) brothers, sir.

xxxx

Q: And you also stated and I was fascinated by this story on your direct that before
you leave for SM, you were ask[ed] to find used tires and a gallon of gasoline and
load it at the green pajero while at Mabalacat?
A: I did not say that I was asked to look for used tires because there are so many
scattered tires in that safe house. I was just asked to pick up used tires and get one
(1) gallon of gasoline and bring them inside the green pajero, sir.

Q: How many people were there at the time you were ask[ed] to bring these tires
to the green pajero?
A: Me, Raymond Dominguez and Roger Dominguez were there. Ann was inside the
gray lancer. Inside the land cruiser were Joel, Rolly and the long hair who was
covered with a blanket and Jayson Miranda was inside the pajero while I was
loading the said items, sir.

COURT: But you were the only one who loaded the two (2) used tires and a gallon
of gasoline inside the vehicle?
A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: Without anybody helped [sic] you?

A: Yes, your Honor.[16]
Respondents' reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross examine
Mendiola did not diminish the sufficiency of the opportunity that they were given to
confront the adverse witnesses. Notwithstanding the said reservation, Mendiola's
testimonies and admissions as regards the particulars of the crime already formed
part of the records of the case when the RTC granted his motion to be declared a
state witness. Respondents' constitutional rights were not violated since the fair
hearing envisaged by criminal due process had been complied with when the
counsels for the respondents conducted a rigorous and exhaustive cross-
examination of the deceased witness during the discharge hearing.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May
27, 2016 Decision and January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139255 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of
Alfred Mendiola in Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 215 in Quezon City is hereby REINSTATED. With respect to the
documents and other evidence authenticated by Mendiola during the discharge
proceeding, the RTC shall rule upon their admissibility when the same are formally
offered in evidence.
SO ORDERED
Bersamin, Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

March 7, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on February 19, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of
which was received by this Office on March 7, 2018 at 2:04 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.

[2]
 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredy L. Maynigo.

[3]
 Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of
the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping.

[4]
 Rollo, pp. 130-131.

[5]
 Dated March 18, 2011.

[6]
 Rollo, p. 177.

[7]
 Order dated March 31, 2013; id. at 205.

[8]
 Id. at 230.

[9]
 Id. at 227.

[10]
 Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. - The order indicated in
the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and
shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge.

[11]
 Rollo, p. 62.

[12]
 Id. at 331-337.

[13]
 Id. at 27-40.
[14]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

[15]
 No. L-48883, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 92.

[16]
 Rollo, pp. 41-44.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, ARTEMIO AVERION, LANDRITO
“DING” PERADILLAS AND LUIS CORCOLON, ACCUSED.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ AND ARTEMIO AVERION, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

What is before this Court is an appeal from the decision of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 160, Pasig City, [1] finding accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y
Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder committed against Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa, and
sentencing each of the accused, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused

Antonio Sanchez, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas, Luis Corcolon, and
Artemio Averion GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER punishable under ART. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the
victims each the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Nelson Peñalosa
and Rickson Peñalosa, P50,000.00 as actual damages and moral
damages of P 50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and
to pay the costs."

"SO ORDERED.

"City of Pasig.

"December 27, 1996.

"(s/t) MARIANO M. UMALI

"Judge"[2]

On March 1, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, an information for double murder against
accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas
and Artemio Averion, the accusatory portion of which reads:

"That on or about April 13, 1991, at about 7:45 p.m.

more or less, in Barangay Curba, Municipality of Calauan,
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, and with the use of
 a motor vehicle, at night time, all the accused then being
armed and committed in consideration of a price, reward
or promise and of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot with the use of
automatic weapons inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
upon Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa which caused
their instantaneous deaths to the damage and prejudice
of their heirs and relatives.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]

On March 16, 1994, the case was raffled to Branch 34, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba, Laguna.[4] On March 17, 1994, the court ordered the arrest of accused
Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon and Ding Peradillas. On the same date, Artemio
Averion voluntarily surrendered to the court, which ordered Averion's transfer to
the provincial jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. [5]

Thereafter, the trial court committed the accused to the custody of proper
authorities.[6]

Upon arraignment on April 10, 1995, all the accused pleaded not guilty. [7] The trial
of the case thereby ensued. On December 27, 1996, the trial court convicted all the
accused of the complex crime of double murder, as charged, the dispositive portion
of which is set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion.

On February 27, 1997, all the accused, except Ding Peradillas, were present for the
promulgation of the decision. Peradillas was a member of the Philippine National
Police and was under the custody of his superiors. The trial court ordered his
custodian to explain accused's non-appearance. On March 14, 1997, P/C Supt.
Roberto L. Calinisan, Chief, PNP-PACC Task Force Habagat, denied any knowledge
of the murder case against Peradillas. Hence, Peradillas was not suspended from
the service pending trial. However, at the time that Peradillas was to be presented
to the court for the promulgation of the decision, he had disappeared and could not
be located by his custodian.[8] The promulgation of the decision as to him was in
absentia. Peradillas and Corcolon did not appeal from the decision.

Accused Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion filed their respective appeals to
this Court.

The facts are as follows:

On April 13, 1991, at around 10:00 in the morning, state witness Vivencio
Malabanan, team leader of a group of policemen, went to the Bishop Compound in
Calauan, Laguna, as part of the security force of mayor Antonio L. Sanchez. After a
while, accused Ding Peradillas arrived and asked for mayor Sanchez. Peradillas
informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a birthday party that night at Dr.
Virvilio Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna, near the abode of Peradillas.
Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez of Nelson Peñalosa's presence thereat. Dr.
Velecina was a political opponent of mayor Sanchez for the mayoralty seat of
Calauan, Laguna. Mayor Sanchez then replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin
lang ninyo ang trabaho," and left the premises. Peradillas immediately called
Corcolon and Averion and relayed the message - "Ayos na ang paguusap at
humanap na lang ng sasakyan."  All the accused, including Malabanan, understood it
as an order to kill Nelson Peñalosa, one of the political leaders of Dr. Velecina. [9]

Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-

way radios and a vehicle for the operation. At around 2:30 in the afternoon,
Malabanan and the three accused went their separate ways and agreed to meet at
mayor Sanchez' house at 6:00 in the evening. Malabanan returned to his
detachment area at Dayap, proceeded to the municipal hall, then went home where
Peradillas fetched him at 6:00 p.m. They proceeded to mayor Sanchez' house
where they met Averion and Corcolon, with the car and two-way radios. [10]

At around 7:00 in the evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car
and went to Marpori Poultry Farm in Barangay Lanot, near Dr. Velecina's house.
Peradillas alighted and walked towards his own house, near Dr. Velecina's house, to
check whether Nelson Peñalosa was at the party.

Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed the occupants of the car
that Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. Accused Averion
immediately drove the car to the front of Peradillas' house and the latter hopped in
the car's back seat. Corcolon sat in the front seat beside him; witness Malabanan
sat at the left side of the backseat and Peradillas stayed at the right side of the
back seat. The group pursued Peñalosa's jeep. When the accused's car was passing
Victoria Farms, located about 100 meters from Peñalosa compound, Corcolon
ordered Averion to overtake Peñalosa's jeep. As the car overtook the jeep,
Peradillas and Corcolon fired at Peñalosa's jeep, using M-16 and baby armalite
rifles, executed in automatic firing mode. There were three bursts of gunfire. Based
on the sketch prepared by Malabanan, illustrating the relative position of their car
and Nelson's jeep at the time of the shooting, the assailants were at the left side of
the jeep.[11]

Rickson Peñalosa, son of Nelson Peñalosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however,
continued running in a zigzag position until it overturned in front of Irais Farm.
After the shooting, the accused proceeded to the house of mayor Sanchez in Bai,
Laguna, and reported to mayor Sanchez that Peñalosa was already dead. [12]

Together with his superior SPO4 Lanorio and photographer Romeo Alcantara,
policeman Daniel Escares went to the crime scene. There, he saw the body of
Nelson Peñalosa slumped at the driver seat of the owner-type jeep. They recovered
the body of Rickson Peñalosa slumped on a grassy place not far from where they
found Nelson Peñalosa. After all the evidence and photographs were taken, they
brought the cadavers to Funeraria Señerez. Daniel Escares submitted his
investigation report of the incident to the Provincial Director, Laguna PNP
Command.[13]

Dr. Ruben B. Escueta, Rural Health Physician, Rural Health Unit, Calauan, Laguna,
conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa. Nelson
Peñalosa suffered massive intra-cranial hemorrhage and died of cranial injury due
to gunshot wounds. Rickson Peñalosa died of massive intra thoracic hemorrhage
due to gunshot wounds.[14] Dr. Escueta, as a defense witness, testified that based
on the points of entrance and exit of the wounds sustained by the Peñalosas, it was
not possible for the assailants to be at the left side of the victims. [15] It contradicted
Malabanan's testimony that they were at the left side of the victims when the
shooting took place. He further stated that based on the wounds inflicted on the
victims, the assailants were either in a sitting or squatting position when they shot
the victims. Some of the wounds indicated an upward trajectory of the bullets.

On September 15, 1993, Janet P. Cortez, PNP ballistician, completed the ballistic
tests conducted on the twelve (12) empty shells found at the crime scene and the
M-16 baby armalite surrendered by Corcolon. [16] She concluded that the 12 empty
shells were fired using three (3) different firearms, one of which was the M-16 baby
armalite.[17]

On August 18, 1995, Adelina Peñalosa, common law wife of Nelson Peñalosa and
mother of Rickson, testified that the whole family was in mourning and could not
eat after what happened.[18] She testified that the family incurred P250,000.00 for
funeral expenses, but failed to present the appropriate receipts. She also stated
that Nelson Peñalosa was earning one (1) million pesos per annum from his
businesses. However, no income tax return or other proofs were shown to
substantiate the statement.[19]

The accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial.

Luis Corcolon stated that he spent the whole day of April 13, 1991, until 8:30 in the
evening, supervising the poultry farm of his employers, Edgardo Tanchico and
Orlando Dizon. He denied that he was in the company of Averion and Peradillas that
day, and that he participated in the Peñalosa killings. He denied that he was ever
assigned as a security guard of mayor Sanchez. He claimed that the murder
charges were concocted against them for his refusal to testify against mayor
Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta case. He alleged that he was maltreated, tortured,
electrocuted and forced to implicate mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-
slayings. He denied that he owned the M-16 baby armalite used in killing the
Peñalosas.[20]

Detention prisoner George Medialdea corroborated Corcolon's statement that they

were implicated in the Peñalosa killing for their refusal to testify against mayor
Sanchez. He claimed that Malabanan confessed to him that the latter had killed the
Peñalosas, but with the aid of CAFGU men and not herein accused. He averred that
Corcolon and Averion were wrongfully implicated in the murder charges in
deference to the wishes of the investigators. [21] Zoilo Ama, another detention
prisoner, claimed that Malabanan confessed that he killed the Peñalosas, but did
not mention the involvement of Corcolon, Averion and mayor Sanchez. [22]

Accused Artemio Averion, a godson of mayor Sanchez, denied that he was involved
in the Peñalosa slayings. On April 13, 1991, he claimed that he was in Lucena City,
attending to his ailing father. He stayed there until April 15, 1991. He maintained
that he was wrongfully implicated in the Peñalosa killings for his refusal to testify
against mayor Sanchez regarding the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-slayings. Malabanan
asked for his forgiveness for falsely incriminating them in the Peñalosa case. [23]

Jesus Versoza, PNP Officer, Camp Crame, denied the allegations of Medialdea and
Averion that they were tortured and forced to testify against mayor Sanchez. [24]
Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez stated that on April 12, 1991, he went to Anilao,
Batangas, with his family. Around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 13, 1991, his family
went to Tagaytay City and stayed overnight at Taal Vista Lodge. Around 10:00 in
the morning of April 14, 1991, they went home to Calauan, Laguna. After reaching
his abode in Calauan around 12:00 noon, mayor Sanchez learned of the ambush-
slayings of the Peñalosas. He immediately ordered an investigation of the case. He
denied any involvement in the killing of the victims. [25]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution's evidence clearly and convincingly
established the participation of the four (4) accused in killing the Peñalosas.
Malabanan gave a sincere, frank and trustworthy account of the circumstances
surrounding the killing. Furthermore, the trial court explained the discrepancies
between Malabanan's recollection of how the victims were shot and Dr. Escuesta's
conclusion on what transpired based on the injuries sustained by the victims.

The trial court stated that the doctor's conclusion was based on the assumption that
the victims were in a sitting position inside the jeep. However, it was possible that
after the first burst of gunfire, the victims were hit and fell. During the second burst
of gunfire, the victims were lying down or in a crouching position. Thus, the entry-
exit points of the bullets did not entirely correspond to Malabanan's account, which
was based on the assumption that the victims did not change their positions during
the shooting incident.

The trial court ruled that the accused conspired in committing the crime. Treachery
was present, thereby qualifying the crime to murder. It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, nighttime and use of motor vehicle.

The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder
punishable under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, at the time of the
commission of the offense on April 13, 1991, there was a constitutional proscription
on the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, each of the accused was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, and to pay damages to the heirs of the victims, as earlier
quoted.

Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion jointly appealed from the
decision to the Supreme Court.

In their sole assignment of error, accused mayor Sanchez and Averion contended
that the trial court failed to recognize the material inconsistencies between
Malabanan's testimony and the physical and scientific evidence presented before it.
They pointed out the following inconsistencies, to wit:

1. Malabanan testified that a) when they fired at the victims, they were about
the same elevation;[26] b) they used two (2) guns in killing the vicitms; [27] c)
they were at the left side of the victims when the shooting incident occurred.
[28]
 However, Dr. Escueta's autopsy report revealed that: 1) the assailants
were at a lower elevation; 2) three (3) kinds of guns were used; and 3)
based on the injuries, assailants were on the right side of the victims.

2. Malabanan's affidavit "Exhibit V" made on August 16, 1993, and sworn to on
August 17, 1993, bears two (2) signatures of the affiant Malabanan and
dated September 15, 1993. However, during cross-examination, Malabanan
 stated that he executed and signed the affidavit on one occasion only, August
15, 1993.

3. Aurelio Centeno testified in the case of Gomez-Sarmenta slayings that

Malabanan only responded to the report that Peñalosa had been killed. He
averred that contrary to Malabanan's report, the latter was not at the crime
scene.

The two accused further averred that the material inconsistencies between
Malabanan's testimony and the autopsy and laboratory findings and conclusions
seriously affect his credibility. They stressed that Malabanan has sufficient motive
to implicate mayor Sanchez and Corcolon in the Peñalosa killings due to threats of
mayor Sanchez. They alleged that although generally alibi is considered a weak
defense, there are times when it is worthy of credence, such as in this case.

The Solicitor General supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecution
adequately established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Malabanan positively identified the accused as the perpetrators. He testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. The defense failed to
satisfactorily show that Malabanan had an ill motive to testify falsely against the
accused. The alleged threat to Malabanan's life was not adequately established or
sufficient for him to falsely implicate the accused. As regards the supposed
inconsistencies between Malabanan's account of the event vis á  vis the autopsy and
ballistic reports, the Solicitor General pointed out that both vehicles were running at
the time of the ambush. It was a matter of instinct for the victims to shift positions
as they were fired upon. Thus, contrary to Dr. Escueta's conclusion, it was not
impossible that the victims were hit from the right side of their bodies, even if
assailants were physically situated at the victims' left side. Hence, the apparent
inconsistencies do not affect witness Malabanan's credibility.

After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we agree with the trial court that
the prosecution adequately established accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Malabanan gave a detailed account of the planning, preparation and the shooting
incident. He narrated the participation of each of the accused, to wit: (1) the order
given by mayor Sanchez to execute Peñalosa; (2) Averion's acquisition of a vehicle
and two-way radios to be used for the operation and in driving the car; (3)
Peradillas' act of relaying the information that Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving
the Velecina compound; 4) the way they pursued the victims; and 5) Corcolon and
Peradillas' act of firing and killing the Peñalosas.

The accused concentrated mainly on the seeming contradiction between the

narration of Malabanan on how the victims were shot, and the physician's report on
the location of injuries sustained by them.

However, as the Solicitor General stated, both vehicles were running at the time of
the shootout. It was unlikely that the victims drove in a straight line parallel to that
of the assailants. In fact, Malabanan testified that while being fired at, Peñalosa's
jeepney was running in zigzag manner. [29] It was a natural reaction for Peñalosa to
evade the assailants as much as possible and to try to dodge the bullets.
Furthermore, the assailants fired the guns in automatic firing mode. Thus, the
bullets burst out in different directions simultaneously. Hence, it was not impossible
for the victims to be hit in different parts of the body.

"This Court has held time and again that any minor lapses in the testimony of a
witness tend to buttress, rather than weaken, his or her credibility, since they show
that he or she was neither coached nor were his or her answers contrived.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with
perfect or total recall."[30]

Furthermore, the fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness
does not affect the verdict of conviction. Criminals are convicted, not on the
number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even
one witness, who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a
shadow of doubt.[31] What witness can be more credible than someone who was in
the planning, preparation and execution of the crime.

The inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of Malabanan is too minor to
affect his credibility. At any rate, we have held that affidavits are generally
subordinate in importance to open court declarations. Affidavits are not complete
reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally
prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the
same have been read to him.[32]

Accused-appellants raised that Malabanan's delay in reporting the involvement of

the accused in the crime casts doubt on his credibility. However, jurisprudence
teaches us that delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does
not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where such witness
gives a sufficient explanation for the delay. [33] It was natural for Malabanan to keep
silent during that time for, aside from being a co-conspirator, mayor Sanchez was a
powerful opponent.

Consequently, we find that accused-appellants' defenses of alibi and denial are

bereft of merit. The defenses of alibi and denial are worthless in the face of positive
testimony of a witness showing the involvement of each of the accused.

However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single
complex crime of double murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for the more
serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed.

The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic
firing mode constitutes a single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are
considered as complex crimes. We rule in the negative.

In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that "several shots from a Thompson sub-
machine, in view of its special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused
by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each
burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-
machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them."[34] In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard
three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used by accused Corcolon and
Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting
from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two
counts of murder committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa,
instead of the complex crime of double murder.

Evidently, treachery was present in the execution of the crimes. The attack against
the victims, who were unarmed, was sudden, catching them unaware and giving
them no opportunity to defend themselves. [35] The presence of treachery qualifies
the crimes to murder.

Conspiracy is likewise adequately established. Notwithstanding the fact that mayor

Sanchez was not at the crime scene, we are convinced that he was not only a co-
conspirator, he was the mastermind of the ambush slayings or the principal by
inducement.[36] Malabanan testified that Nelson Peñalosa was killed upon order of
mayor Sanchez. After the commission of the crime, the assailants reported to
mayor Sanchez. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators
actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that the participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to
indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim.
Conspiracy renders appellants liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. [37]

The trial court properly appreciated the existence of evident premeditation. The
prosecution clearly showed the presence of the following requisites: a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused had clung to their determination; and c) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
consequences of their acts. [38] As early as 10:00 in the morning, the accused had
conspired to kill Nelson Peñalosa. They even looked for two-way radios and a
vehicle to be used for the operation. Indeed, sufficient time had lapsed to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of their actions.

Accused specifically used a motor vehicle to execute the crime. Thus, the
aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle must be appreciated.

However, we cannot appreciate the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime;

while the crime was committed at night, the prosecution failed to show that the
malefactors specifically sought this circumstance to facilitate the criminal design.
[39]
 The fact that the crime happened at 7:00 in the evening does not indicate that
accused made use of the darkness to conceal the crime and their identities.

At the time of the commission of the crime on April 13, 1991, the penalty for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances,
the accused should be sentenced to the death penalty for each murder. However, in
view of the constitutional proscription of the death penalty at that time, each of the
accused is sentenced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding the civil liability of the accused, the trial court ordered the accused to
pay the heirs of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa each, the sum of P100,000.00,
P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The P50,000.00 award as actual damages should be deemed as indemnity for the
untimely demise of the victims. We have held that only expenses supported by
receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the
death of the victims may be allowed. [40] No proof was presented to sustain the
award of actual damages.

Similarly, we can not award damages for loss of earning capacity. All that was
presented in evidence was the testimony of the common law wife, Adelina
Peñalosa, that Nelson earned P1,000,000.00 a year. We have held that "for lost
income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average
income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is not enough." [41]

Considering the attendance of aggravating circumstances, we sustain the award of

exemplary damages of P30,000.00, per victim, in accordance with Article 2230 of
the Civil Code.[42]

As regards moral damages, we affirm the P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of

Rickson Peñalosa. [43] His mother, Adelina Peñalosa, testified to the suffering caused
by his death.[44] We also sustain the award of moral damages to the heirs of Nelson
Peñalosa. His common law wife testified to the mental anguish suffered by the
family due to Nelson's death.[45] Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
However, the common law wife is not entitled to share in the award of moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 160, Pasig City, and finds accused-appellants Antonio L. Sanchez and
Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder, and
sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and each
to pay jointly and severally the respective heirs of victims Nelson and Rickson
Peñalosa, as follows:

1) Indemnity for death - P 50,000.00

2) Moral damages - 50,000.00

3) Exemplary damages - 30,000.00

Total P130,000.00

With costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]  [7] 
In Crim. Case No. 107789-H, Ibid., pp. 196-199.
presided over by Judge Mariano M.
[8] 
Umali, rendered on December 27, Original Record, pp. 530-531.
1996, Rollo, pp. 37-66.
[9] 
TSN, June 20, 1995, pp. 8-12, 39-
[2] 
Original Record, pp. 488-517. 41, 62, 65.

[3]  [10] 
Original Record, p. 1. Ibid., pp. 13-14, 41-46.

[4]  [11] 
Presided over by Judge Francisco M. Ibid., pp. 17-20, 29-35.
Guerrero. On March 28, 1994, the
[12] 
prosecution filed a request for change Ibid., pp. 21-23.
of venue with the Supreme Court. On
[13] 
May 16, 1994, accused filed with the Exhibit AA.
Executive Judge, Calamba, Laguna, a
[14] 
petition for re-raffle, in view of the Exhibit B, p. 5 and Exhibit H,
impending retirement of Judge pp.13-14.
Guerrero. The case was raffled to the
[15] 
sala of Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez, TSN, March 18, 1996, pp. 4-95.
Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna. On
[16] 
February 28, 1995, the Supreme Exhibit Q.
Court granted the request for change
[17] 
of venue and transferred the case to TSN, May 23, 1995, pp. 5-140.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig
[18] 
City, presided over by Judge Harriet TSN, August 18, 1995, p. 21.
O. Demetriou. On March 14, 1995,
[19] 
Judge Demetriou voluntarily inhibited TSN, August 18, 1995, pp. 17-20.
herself from trying the case. The case
[20] 
eventually was raffled to Branch 160, TSN, October 24, 1995, pp. 11-60.
Pasig City, presided over by Judge
[21] 
Mariano M. Umali. TSN, October 27, 1995, pp. 4-51.

[5]  [22] 
Original Record, p. 148. TSN, November 14, 1995, pp. 5-
27.
[6] 
Antonio Sanchez and Luis Corcolon
[23] 
were placed under the custody of PNP Ibid., pp. 28-54.
Custodial Group, Camp Crame,
[24] 
Quezon City; Artemio Averion was TSN, September 17, 1996, pp. 4-
placed under the custody of the 50.
Provincial Warden, Provincial Jail, Sta.
[25] 
Cruz, Laguna; Ding Peradillas was TSN, March 18, 1991, pp. 98-117.
placed under the custody of P/Sr.
[26] 
Supt. Panfilo M. Lacson, PACC Task TSN, June 20, 1995, pp. 21, 73.
Force, Habagat Headquarters, Camp
[27] 
Crame, Quezon City. Ibid., pp. 155, Ibid., pp. 71, 76.
156, 162.
[28] 
Ibid., Exhibit U, pp. 48-50.
[29]  [37]
TSN, June 20, 1995, p. 73.
[30] 
People v. Henry Benito, G.R. No.
128072, February 19, 1999.
[31] 
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 288
SCRA 171, 178 (1998).
[32] 
People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296,
302-303 (1998).
[33] 
People v. Pallorca, 288 SCRA 151,
164-165 (1998).
[34] 
184 SCRA 254, 263 (1990), citing
L. B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code,
pp. 559-560, Book I, 1971 Revised
Ed.
[35] 
People v. Silveriano Botona, G.R.
No. 115693, March 17, 1999.
[36] 
Cf. People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115
(1997).
 
People v. Cara, 283 SCRA 96, 107
(1997).
[38] 
People v. Romulo Gutierrez, Jr., G.
R. No. 116281, February 8, 1999.
[39] 
People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158,
178 (1998).
[40] 
People v. Cesar Sanchez, G.R.
118423, June 16, 1999.
[41] 
People v. Mario Villanueva, G.R.
No. 122746, January 29, 1999.
[42] 
People vs. Alfonso Badon, G.R. No.
126143, June 10, 1999.
[43] 
People v. Mariano Verde, G.R. No.
119077, February 10, 1999.
[44] 
TSN, August 18, 1995, p. 21.
[45] 
Ibid.