Case Citation: People v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No.

130784

Date: October 13, 1999

Plaintiff- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

appellee:

Accused- RODRIGO LOTEYRO AGUINALDO

appellant:

Doctrine:
 In reviewing rape cases, the following three principles are followed: First, the prosecution has to
show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that, to an
unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second, unless there are special reasons, the findings of
trial courts, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal. Third, the disposition of rape cases are governed by the following
guidelines: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
 It is true that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
complaining witness provided such testimony is credible, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the course of things.
 When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, conclusions as to physical evidence
must prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestation of truth which rate high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.

Antecedent
Facts: An Information was filed against the appellant, Rodrigo Aguinaldo, accused of raping Jeanette Aguinaldo, his
17-year-old daughter.

Jeanette failed to appear when subpoenaed by the trial court as prosecution’s first witness and the case was
reset to November 20, 1996. On the said date, Jeannette appeared and answered questions relating to her
personal circumstances, i.e., she is a 17-year-old resident of Sta. Cruz, Manila; she graduated from high
school and appellant is her father. She claimed that at 10:00 p.m. of June 24, 1995, something happened
while she was sleeping at home. Asked what happened, Jeannette hedged. The trial judge encouraged her to
answer but she kept silent. She was on the verge of tears. The trial judge inquired if she wanted the appellant
to leave the courtroom. She agreed.

Still, Jeannette stayed silent. The defense counsel de officio moved to dismiss the case. When the trial judge
asked if she wanted to dismiss the case and pardon the appellant, Jeanette still did not respond. Then, the
prosecutor asked whether she had executed a statement to the police to which Jeanette responded positively
and acknowledged her signature on the statement and affirmed its truthfulness. The prosecution adapted the
sworn statement as her direct testimony.

On cross-examination, Jeanette claimed that on the night she was allegedly raped, she slept with her father in
a room upstairs while her brother slept downstairs. Her sister was not around at that time. She confided to
Tita Nelia, a family friend, that her father raped her. However, she could not tell when she revealed the
incident to Tita Nelia.

On redirect examination, when asked by the prosecution of what woke her up on the night she was allegedly
raped she did not answer. She stated that she understood the term "ginahasa" in her sworn statement to be
the Tagalog word for "rape." When asked what appellant did that prompted her to execute a sworn statement
using the term "ginahasa," she did not again respond.

In the interest of justice, the trial court allowed the prosecution to recall Jeannette as a witness. She
recounted that she woke up when she felt the appellant lying down beside her and while placing a blanket
over her he held her breast and touched her private part. She woke up the second time and found her father
licking her face. She asked, "Bakit po, Pa?" Appellant told her to keep quiet, mounted her and held her
shoulder as she pushed him away. He mashed her breast and threatened to kill her. Then he "penetrated" her
with his organ. She said she felt pain as appellant raped her. Her efforts to resist proved futile. Thereafter, the
appellant slept while she cried until morning.

The NBI medico-legal officer Dr. Bernales conducted a physical examination on Jeanette and found there was
no penetration of the complainant's hymen as it was intact and that complainant was physically a virgin. He
explained that the complainant's hymen could not admit a tube with 1.0 cm. diameter, which implied that the
 opening was "too small for a complete previous penetration.

Plaintiff-
appellee
Contention:

Accused- The defense interposed denial.  He denied he was drunk that fateful night because he did not have money
appellant except for the "allowance for the house."
Contention: Appellant's eldest child, Boy (Roy) Aguinaldo testified in his favor.  He opined that she could file an unfounded
rape case against their father because his sister is a "100% liar." 

MTC/RTC
Ruling: Found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to death. 

It held that it was "unthinkable and unnatural" for the complainant to" invent" a story and charge her own
father with rape.

CA Ruling: (N/A automatic review by SC)

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on uncorroborated, doubtful,
unreliable and contradictory statements of the private complainant and despite the testimonial evidence by Dr.
Bernales which is favorable to the accused.

SC Ruling:
Yes. We acquit the appellant. As correctly pointed out by appellant's counsel, the complainant's conduct on
the witness stand did not evince truthfulness. Instead of being straightforward, she hesitated, and even
refused, not only once but twice, to give testimony on the alleged rape. The records show that she failed to
appear in court the first time the case was set for hearing. On the re-scheduled hearing where she was
presented as the first witness, she balked, flatly refused to answer the questions propounded by the
prosecutor as well as the questions of the trial court on the alleged sexual assault  by the appellant. This led
the trial court to strongly admonish and mildly berate her for her uncharacteristic silence on a critical point in
the prosecution's case. Instead of dismissing the case as suggested by the defense, the  trial court
encouraged further the prosecution and hence, complainant was made to affirm her sworn statement that
served as her direct testimony. At the next date for redirect examination, complainant once again refused to
answer the prosecutor's questions notwithstanding the trial court's effort encouraging her to talk. It was only
on December 3, 1996 that complainant broke her silence on the witness stand.  This hesitance of the
complainant to testify on the very meat of her case against appellant certainly evokes disbelief in her sworn
statement. More so because her testimony is a mere parroting of her sworn statement.

The records show, however, that complainant is a city-bred teenage girl who grew up in the Sta. Cruz district
in the heart of Manila, the country's capital where, as in any other city, both progress and decadence exist.
She is a high school graduate and already seventeen (17) years of age at the time the alleged crime was
committed. That she was less than lily white in virtues was testified to by her brother who charged her as a
"100% liar." Such negative testimony from a brother who is naturally expected to throw his support to his own
sister but did not, says much about her character and raises serious doubts as to the truthfulness of her
testimony.

It is true that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness
provided such testimony is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the course of
things. 21 In the case at bar, however, the complainant lacked candor and spontaneity as a witness. Her
demeanor, composure and manner of testifying revealed heavy traces of insincerity and falsehood even to
one who is simply reading the transcripts of her testimony. Thus, complainant alleged in her sworn
statement that she bled after her private part was fully penetrated during the sexual assault, viz:
. . . Hinawakan niya ako sa balikat at pinapatungan, pero itinutulak ko siyang palayo sa
akin, hanggang sa manghina ako at natatakot sa sinasabi niyang papatayin ako.
Hanggang sa naipasok na niya ang titi niya sa puki ko. Nasaktan po ako. Gumalaw-
galaw siya at nilalamas niya ang suso ko. Tapos, tumigil siya at inalis niya ang titi niya at
nahiga na siya uli at natulog. Ako naman ay umiyak hanggang umaga. Noong bigla
akong tumayo, may biglang may tumulo pero hindi ko na tiningnan, pero ang alam ko
dugo dahil hanggang kinabukasan ay may dugo ako . . . .

Her claim in her sworn statement that she bled because of full penetration of her sex organ is belied by the
medical record which revealed that her hymen was "short, thick and intact," that the hymenal orifice could
admit a tube with 1.0 cm. in diameter only with "marked resistance" and that the vaginal walls and rugosities
"cannot be reached by an examining finger." Needless to state, complainant's claim that she bled implies that
 there must have been laceration of her sex organ. 

When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, conclusions as to physical evidence must
prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestation of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that complainant was lying through her teeth
when she swore that appellant's organ penetrated hers and that she felt pain and was bleeding even until the
morning. That material lapse in her testimony destroys her credibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 96-147936 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XVIII, is REVERSED and appellant Rodrigo Aguinaldo y Loteyro is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of rape.

Others N/A

Case Citation: Bank of Commerce v. Heirs of Dela Cruz, G.R. NO. 211519

Date: August 14, 2017

Petitioners: BANK OF COMMERCE

Respondents: HEIRS OF RODOLFO DELA CRUZ

Doctrine: As to formal offer: The function of the formal offer was to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent was presenting the evidence. Such a formal offer would also enable the
opposing parties to examine the evidence and to reasonably object to their admissibility. Accordingly, any
document is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight unless and until admitted by the trial court
as evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered.

As to judicial notice: The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative.

Antecedent  Rodolfo Dela Cruz was the sole owner and proprietor of the Mamertha General
Facts: Merchandising, an entity engaged in sugar trading. He maintained a bank account with
Panasia, in the name of Mamertha.

 (October 1988) Dela Cruz discovered that Panasia allowed his son, Allan, from the said bank
account without his consent. Upon knowledge, he immediately instructed Panasia not to allow
his son to make any withdrawals from the bank account. A letter was even sent stating that Allan
is not authorized to make any withdrawals unless Rodolfo consents. The letter was received by
Panasia’s Branch Manager and Operation Officer.

 Despite the letter, Panasia still allowed Allan to make withdrawals on the bank account. The
unauthorized withdrawals amounted to P56,223,066.07 as evidenced by the Bank’s counter
checks. 

 Rodolfo demanded the restoration of the said amount however Panasia failed to do so. Through
a letter, he made a formal demand from Panasia to pay or re-deposit the said amount but
Panasia still failed to do so, claiming that all transactions were pursuant to existing banking
policies and procedures.

 (August 2000) Rodolfo instituted a suit for collection of sum of money against Panasia.

o In the meantime, the Bank of Commerce demanded from Rodolfo the payment of
P27,150,000.00. This loan payment demanded refers to the loan he obtained From
Panasia and that pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement entered into between
Panasia and Bank of Commerce.
 o Panasia has been acquired by the Bank of Commerce transferring to the latter
the former’s assets and liabilities on bank deposits.

Petitioner’s  Claims that it purchased only selected accounts and liabilities from Panasia. Dela Cruz’s loan
Contention account was among those acquired from Panasia by virtue of the Purchase and Sale Agreement
(BOC): (dated July 27, 2000) and Deed of Assignment (dated September 18, 2000)

 Dela Cruz obtained loans in the principal amount of P16,650,000.00 and P2,850,000.00 from
Panasia secured by Real Estate Mortgage. Dela Cruz executed 6 promissory notes which
became past due and demandable and the former refused to settle his outstanding obligations.  
It filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

Respondent’s  Rodolfo Dela Cruz demanded from the Bank of Commerce to pay the liability of Panasia to him
Contention (Dela and offered to set-off his secured loan obligation with Panasia in the amount of P27,150,000.00
Cruz): by deducting the same from his outstanding claim of P56,223,066.07. He is entitled to
compensation and BOC had no right to foreclose the mortgaged properties since the principal
obligation has been extinguished.

RTC Ruling: The Bank of Commerce and Panasia are jointly and severally liable to Rodolfo. Dela Cruz was able to
establish negligence on the part of Panasia in its fiduciary relationship with him by allowing his son to
withdraw despite lack of authority. 

CA Ruling: Affirmed the judgment of the RTC. The failure of the Bank of Commerce to offer the documents
Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Deed of Assignment was fatal to the petitioner's defense of not
having assumed Panasia's liabilities. RTC’s finding of negligence was correct.

Issue:  Whether the failure of BOC to offer the documents was fatal to its defense of not having
assumed Panasia’s liabilities. (YES)

 Whether the Bank of Commerce is solidarily liable with Panasia for the latter’s negligence. (NO)

SC Ruling: First issue: The failure to offer the documents was fatal.

 Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court commands that "the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered," and that "the purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified." The formal offer of evidence was necessary because the judge was
mandated to rest the findings of facts and the judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial.

 The function of the formal offer was to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes
for which the proponent was presenting the evidence. Such a formal offer would also enable the
opposing parties to examine the evidence and to reasonably object to their admissibility.
Accordingly, any document is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight unless and
until admitted by the trial court as evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered.

 The trial court may consider evidence although it was not formally offered provided that (a) the
same was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (b) the same was incorporated in the
records of the case.

 In this case,  the Purchase and Sale Agreement and Deed of Assignment were not marked as
exhibits, and their contents were not revealed in the records, and in the case of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement, the petitioner did not competently identify it during the trial. Hence, the
general rule applies.

 Without the sale and purchase agreement being admitted into evidence, implicating BOC in the
negligence of Panasia had no factual basis for the simple reason that there was no showing
at all of the petitioner having specifically merged with Panasia and thereby assumed the
 latter's liabilities.

 With the petitioner having specifically denied having merged with Panasia, averring instead that
its purchase had concerned only selected assets and liabilities of Panasia, it became the
burden of dela Cruz to prove the merger with Panasia, and the petitioner's becoming the
surviving corporation. His failure in this respect left his cause of action against the petitioner
unproved.

Second issue: BOC is not solidarily liable with Panasia.

 Despite the gap in the evidence, the RTC held that BOC is solidarily liable with Panasia because
common sense dictates that when BOC took over Panasia, it likewise took over its assets but
also its liabilities.

o The CA erred in not correcting RTC’s unfounded assumption that BOC merged with
Panasia and thereby took over its assets and liabilities, including the latter’s
negligence. Such assumption had neither factual nor legal support in the records.

 Merger was an act that could not be assumed ; its details must be shown, and its effects must
be based on the terms adopted by the parties concerned (through their respective boards of
directors) and approved by the proper government office or agency regulating the merging
parties.

 Judicial notice of the terms of merger and the consequences of merger, which the trial and the
appellate courts took in adjudging the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Panasia, could
not be justified.

 The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.

 Matters of judicial notice have 3 requisites:

o The matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

o It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and

o It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

 Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.

 The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety.

 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken
only of those matters which are commonly known.

 Facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person.

 In this case, the merger of BIC and Panasia was not of common knowledge. The element of
notoriety as a basis for taking judicial notice is lacking. A merger is the union of two or more
existing corporations in which the surviving corporation absorbs the others and continues the
combined business. The merger does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the
constituent corporations, but upon the approval of the articles of merger by the SEC issuing the
certificate of merger.
  Several specific acts whose existence must be shown must be presented before a merger can
be declared:

o Plan of merger;

o Approval of the plan of merger by majority vote of each of the boards of directors of
the concerned corporations at separate meetings;

o the submission of the plan of merger for the approval of the stockholders or members
of each of the corporations at separate corporate meetings duly called for the
purpose; 

o the affirmative vote of 2/3 of the outstanding capital in case of stock corporations, or
2/3 of the members in case of non-stock corporations; 

o the submission of the approved articles of merger executed by each of the constituent
corporations to the SEC; and 

o the issuance of the certificate by the SEC on the approval of the merger.

 In this case, because dela Cruz's allegation of the merger was specifically denied by BOC, the
RTC had absolutely no factual and legal bases to take constructive notice of any of the
foregoing circumstances. It should have required proof of the acquisition of the liability of
Panasia on the part of the petitioner. The complaint against BOC should be dismissed.

Case Citation: Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935

Date: February 6, 2018

Petitioners: Representative Edcel Lagman, et al.

Respondents: Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, et al. 

Doctrine: Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of
the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.

“Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as matters of
fact without need of further evidentiary support.” 

Antecedent On May 23, 2017, Pres. Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 placing the entirety of Mindanao under the
Facts: state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period of sixty (60) days
to address the rebellion mounted by the Maute Group and Abu Sayaff Group. Within 48 hours, the President
submitted a written report to the Congress citing the reasons that impelled him to issue Proc. No. 216. The
Congress then, in separate resolutions, expressed full support in the said proclamation. 

Three petitions then were filed challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. On
July 4, 2017, the Court rendered a decision finding sufficient factual basis for the proclamation and declared
it constitutional. 

On July 16, 2017, the President requested for the extension of the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216 which
the Congress granted and extended Proclamation No. 216 until Dec. 31, 2017. 

After receiving a letter from Defense Sec. Lorenzana and AFP Chief Of Staff General Guerrero which
recommended the further extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus in the whole Mindanao for one (1) year stating compelling reasons (total eradication of DAESH -
inspired group, other like-minded local/foreign terrorist group, armed lawless group and other communist
groups and their coddlers, supports and financiers), Pres. Duterte again asked the Congress to further
extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. 

Acting on the said request, the Congress adopted Resolution No. 4 further extending the period of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.  
Petitioner’s The petitioners' failure to attach the Congress' Joint Resolution approving the extension is not fatal to the
Contention: consolidated petitions. Such failure is justified by the non-availability of the Resolution at the time the petition
was filed. In any case, the Rules on Evidence allow the Court to take judicial notice of the Resolution as an
official act of the legislative.

Respondent’s Petitioners' failure to submit the written Joint Resolution extending the martial law and suspension of the
Contention: privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is fatal since it is indispensable to the Court's exercise of its review
power.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: -

CA Ruling: -

Issue: 1. Whether the petitioner’s failure to attach the Joint Resolution of the Congress in their petitions is fatal
defect which bars the court in reviewing the petitions.  
2. Whether there is a sufficient factual basis in extending the proclamation of martial law in Mindanao. 

SC Ruling: 1. No. Failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is not fatal to the petitions.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of
the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.

"Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as matters of
fact without need of further evidentiary support."
 
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress; thus, this Court can take judicial notice
thereof. The Court also notes that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated
Comment. Hence, the Court see no reason to consider petitioners' failure to submit a certified copy of the
Resolution as a fatal defect that forecloses this Court's review of the petitions.

2. Yes. The two factual bases required under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension were met. 
a. Persistence of rebellion - The President issued Proclamation No. 216 in response to the series of attacks
launched by the Maute Group and other rebel groups in Marawi City. The President reported to the
Congress that these groups had publicly taken up arms for the purpose of removing Mindanao from its
allegiance to the Government and its laws and establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province in Mindanao.
b. Public safety requires the extension – the President cited series of attacks made by the rebel groups in
different parts of Mindanao which showed the magnitude of the atrocities already perpetrated by these rebel
groups reveals their capacity to continue inflicting serious harm and injury, both to life and property. The
sinister plans of attack, as uncovered by the AFP, confirm this real and imminent threat. The manpower and
armaments these groups possess, the continued radicalization and recruitment of new rebels, the financial
and logistical build-up cited by the President, and more importantly, the groups' manifest determination to
overthrow the government through force, violence and terrorism, present a significant danger to public
safety.

Others Worth to note: In the case of Lagman v. Medialdea the Court sustained the constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 216, holding that the President had probable cause to believe that actual rebellion exists, and public
safety required the Proclamation. The Court held:

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the
facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. xx x
Case Citation:  Frilou Construction Inc. v. Aegis Integrated Structure 
G.R. No. 191088

Date:  August 17, 2016

Petitioners:  FRILOU CONSTRUCTION, INC

Respondents:  AEGIS INTEGRATED STRUCTURE CORPORATION

Doctrine:  Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on Manner of Making Allegations in  Pleading contemplates
three (3) modes of specific denial:  1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the
complaint,  the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters which he will  rely upon to support his denial;  
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true  and material and denying
only the remainder;  
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information  sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment in the  complaint, which has the effect of a denial.
Antecedent Respondent Aegis Integrated Structure Corporation filed a suit for a Sum of  Money against petitioner
Facts:  Frilou Construction Inc. 

Respondent’s complaint alleged: 

xx xx 
(2) that petitioner engaged the services of respondent to supply,  fabricate, deliver and erect
the structural steel requirements of  petitioner for an exhibit and building and a residential
building, in  consideration of P5,000,000 and P1,024,306 respectively. 
(4) that the payment of the sum of P6,024,306.00 has long been  overdue 
(5) that respondent made repeated demands for the remaining sum, but petitioner
failed/refused to pay. 

In its Answer, petitioner countered that: 

(2) [Petitioner] likewise ADMITS paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter
being those stated in the Special and Affirmative  Defenses; 
(3) Similarly, [petitioner] also DENIES paragraphs 4 and 5 for being  contrary to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case; 

And as special and affirmative defenses, petitioner stated that: 

5. While [petitioner] does not deny having engaged [the]  services of [respondent] for
the supply and delivery of steel  requirements, such delivery had already been paid in
the  amount of Php4,490,014.32 as of March 2005; 
6. [Respondent] failed to show evidence that indeed  [petitioner] still owes the
balance of P1,534,291.68 as alleged  in the Complaint; 
7. No demand whatsoever was made against herein 

[petitioner] for the alleged balance complained of.

Petitioner’s Petitioner contends that it did not admit liability for the entire amount of the Purchase Orders, but only for
Contention:  the value of the actual deliveries by respondent  hereunder in the amount of P4,490,014.32. Petitioner
asseverates that such  constituted a specific denial when it further set forth the substance of the  matters
upon which it relied to support its denial, respondent had no evidence  that it owed the balance of
P1,534,291.68.

Respondent’s
Contention:
MTC/RTC The trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence sustaining  petitioner's contention
Ruling:  that respondent failed to show evidence of petitioner's  supposed remaining liability for the balance
amount of Pl,534,291.68. 

For the trial court, the admission was qualified in that petitioner had already   paid the amount of
P4,490,014.32 and respondent did not show further  evidence of petitioner's liability for the remaining
balance.

CA Ruling:  The appellate court reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling. The CA ruled that (1) Petitioner's
judicial admission of the existence of the  Purchase Orders worked to establish respondent's claim of the
balance  amount of P1,534,291.68 by a preponderance of evidence; (2) In failing to  specifically deny
respondent's allegation that respondent supplied, delivered and erected the structural steel requirements
of petitioner in the amount of  P6,024,306.00, the latter is deemed to have admitted the same:

Issue:  WON petitioner’s answer constituted a specific denial (NO)

SC Ruling:  Petitioner admitted and failed to specifically deny the material averments in respondent's complaint that
respondent complied with its obligation under the  Purchase Orders for the complete amount of
P6,024,306.00. 

Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on Manner of Making Allegations in   Pleading
contemplates three (3) modes of specific denial:  
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint,  the truth of
which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters which he will  rely upon to support his denial;  
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true  and material
and denying only the remainder;  
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information  sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment in the  complaint, which has the effect of a denial. 

The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make  him disclose the matters
alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends  to disprove at the trial, together with the matter
which he relied upon to  support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table. 

Petitioner did not make a specific denial, but a general one to the effect  that it no longer has any
remaining liability to respondent. Petitioner denied  by stating: “Similarly, [petitioner] also DENIES
paragraphs 4 and 5 for being  contrary to the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.”
 However, petitioner did not state "the facts and circumstances surrounding  the case," the matters which it relies
on to support its denial of its liability in  the amount of P1, 534,291.68. Petitioner only asserted that respondent
failed  to show evidence of its supposed remaining liability. This is not an assertion   of the truth and substance of
the matter. It is merely a statement that as far as 
petitioner is concerned, respondent does not have evidence to prove its  claim. 

Petitioner could have given specifics on why the original contract price of P6,024,306.00 as evidenced by the
Purchase Orders was performed only,  partially, thus prompting petitioner to pay only the amount of
P4,490,014.32. Since respondent alleged its complete performance of its obligation under  the Purchase Orders,
petitioner should have asserted respondent's partial  and incomplete performance, specifying the deliveries that
were not made.

Others  The court also found that petitioner’s affirmative defenses were improper. 

Section 5(b), Rule 5 of the Rules of Court reads: 

(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the pleading of the  claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him.
The affirmative  defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality,  statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and  any other matter by way of confession
and avoidance. 

Petitioner did not set forth a new matter in its Answer because respondent's  Complaint already categorically
stated in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Complaint that petitioner had only paid for the amount of P4,490,014.32 of
a total indebtedness  of P6,024,306.00. Simply petitioner did not dispute the allegations as regards the  balance.

Case Citation: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. 195876

Date: June 19, 2017

Petitioners: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation 

Respondents: Commissioner of Customs 

Doctrine: Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not
formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. 
Significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done
in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the
latter is done only when the party rests its case. 
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires
to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.

Antecedent
Facts: The Omnibus Motion is anchored primarily on the alleged applicability of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (Chevron) to the case at bar. However, the Court desisted from
applying the doctrine laid down in Chevron considering that the facts and circumstances therein are not in all
fours with those obtaining in the instant case. Thus, Chevron is not a precedent to the case at bar. Unlike in
Chevron, petitioner herein is not guilty of fraud. 
 The facts and circumstances between the jurisprudence relied upon and the pending controversy should not
diverge on material points. But as clearly explained in the assailed December 5, 2016 decision, the main
difference between Chevron and the case at bar lies in the attendance of fraud. 

In Chevron, evidence on record established that Chevron committed fraud in its dealings. On the other hand,
proof that petitioner Pilipinas Shell was just as guilty was clearly wanting. Simply there was no finding of fraud
on the part of petitioner in the case at bar. 

In his dissent, Associate Justice Peralta claims that fraud was committed by the petitioner when it allegedly
deliberately incurred delay in filing its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration to avail of the reduced
tariff duty on oil importations, from ten percent (10%) to three percent (3%), upon the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 8180 (RA 8180), otherwise known as the Oil Deregulation Law. But as exhaustively discussed in
December 5, 2016 decision, the document was never formally offered as evidence before the Court of
Tax Appeals, therefore, bereft of evidentiary value. Worse, it was not even presented during trial and
no witness identified the same.

Resultantly, no scintilla of proof was ever offered in evidence by respondent Commissioner of Customs to
substantiate the claim that Pilipinas Shell acted in fraudulent manner. The allegations of fraud on the part
of Pilipinas Shell is mere conjecture and purely speculative. 

The absence of fraud and its effects on the one-year prescriptive period, and on the due notice
requirement prior to ipso facto abandonment.

As extensively discussed in the assailed Decision, whether or not petitioner Pilipinas Shell defrauded the
public respondent becomes pivotal because of Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(TCC), which reads:
Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free of duty or final
adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of duty
or settlements of duties will, after the expiration of one (1) year, from the date of the final payment
of duties, in the absence of fraud or protest or compliance audit pursuant to the provisions of this
Code, be final and conclusive upon all parties, unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely
tentative.

The attendance of fraud would remove the case from the ambit of the statute of limitations, and would
consequently allow the government to exercise its power to assess and collect duties even beyond the one-
year prescriptive period, rendering it virtually imprescriptible.

In the case at bar, petitioner filed its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) and paid the
import duty of its shipments on May 23, 1996. However, it only received a demand letter from public
respondent on July 27, 2000, or more than 4 years later. By this time, the one-year prescriptive period had
already elapsed. 

In an attempt to remove the instant case from the purview of the provision, Justice Peralta and the respondent
claim that the government is no longer collecting tariff duties. Rather, it is exercising its ownership right over
the shipments, which were allegedly deemed abandoned by petitioner because of the latter’s failure to timely
file the IEIRD.

Issue: WON Pilipinas Shell acted in fraudulent manner for ipso fact abandonment doctrine be applied. (NO)

SC Ruling:
The absence of fraud not only allows the finality of the liquidations, it also calls for the strict observance of the
requirements for the doctrine of ipso facto abandonment to apply. As expressly provided in Sec. 1801(b) of
the TCC, the failure to file the IEIRD within 30 days from entry is not the only requirement for the doctrine
of ipso facto abandonment to apply. The law categorically requires that this be preceded by due notice
demanding compliance.

To recapitulate, the notice in this case was only served upon petitioner four (4) years after it has already filed
its IEIRD. Under this circumstance, the Court cannot rule that due notice was given, for when public
respondent served the notice demanding payment from petitioner, it no longer had the right to do so. By that
time, the prescriptive period for liquidation had already elapsed, and the assessment against petitioner's
shipment had already become final and conclusive. Consequently, Sec. 1801(b) failed to operate in favor of
the government for failure to demand payment for the discrepancy prior to the finality of the liquidation. The
government cannot deem the imported articles as abandoned without due notice.

Public respondent cannot harp on the Chevron ruling to excuse compliance from the due notice requirement
before the imported articles can be deemed abandoned, for to do so would only downplay the Court’s finding
 anent the non-attendance of fraud. 

It becomes abundantly clear that the notice requirement as mandated in CMO 15-94 cannot be excused
unless fraud is established. Fraud being absent on the part of petitioner Pilipinas Shell, the ipso facto
abandonment doctrine cannot operate within the factual milieu of the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES WITH FINALITY the Omnibus Motion (For
Reconsideration and Referral to the Court En banc) dated January 20, 2017 filed by public respondent
Commissioner of Customs for lack of merit.
No further pleadings or motions will be entertained.
Let entry of judgment be issued.

Case Citation: Mercene v. GSIS, G.R. No. 192971

Date: January 10, 2018

Petitioners: Floro Mercene

Respondents: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

Doctrine: Sec. 4, Rule 129. Judicial admissions. – An admission, oral or written, made by the party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made.

GR: A Judicial Admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof.
XPNS:
1. When it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake;
2. When it is shown that imputed admission was not in fact made.

Requisites:
1. May be oral or written (no particular form required)
2. Must be made by a party to the case; and
3. Must be made in the course of the proceedings in the same case.

Antecedent Mercene obtained a loan worth P29,500 from GSIS on January 19, 1965. As security, he executed a real
Facts: estate mortgage over his property in Quezon City. Another loan with GSIS was contracted by Mercene on
May 14, 1968 (after 3 years) and a real estate mortgage was again secured over the same property. 

In 2004, Mercene filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against GSIS. 

Petitioner’s According to him, from 1968-2004 or until the complaint was filed,
Contention: 1. GSIS never exercised its rights as a mortgagee; 
2. the real estate mortgage over his property constituted a cloud on the title; and
3. (3) GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed.

Respondent’s While according to GSIS, 

Contention: 1. the complaint filed by Mercene failed to state a cause of action; and
2. that the prescription does not run against it because GSIS is a government entity

RTC Ruling:
In 2005, the RTC granted Mercene’s complaint and ordered the cancellation of the mortgages annotated on
the title ruling that:

1.  the real estate mortgages annotated on the title constituted a cloud thereto, because the
annotations appeared to be valid but was ineffective and prejudicial to the title;
2. GSIS' right as a mortgagee had prescribed because more than ten (10) years had lapsed from the
time the cause of action had accrued. The RTC stated that prescription ran against GSIS because
it is a juridical person with a separate personality, and with the power to sue and be sued.

Dispositive portion:
 “WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the Real Estate Mortgage dated January 19, 1965, registered on March 24, 1965 and Real
Estate Mortgage dated May 14, 1965 registered on May 15, 1968, both annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 90435 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, registered in the name of plaintiff
Floro Mercene married to Felisa Mercene, to be ineffective.

2) Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the following entries annotated on the subject
title 1) Entry No. 4148/90535: mortgage to GSIS and; 2) Entry No. 4815/90535: mortgage to GSIS.

3) The other claims and counter-claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.”

GSIS appealed to CA.

CA Ruling: In 2015, CA reversed the RTC decision. 

The CA ruled that the trial court erred in declaring that GSIS' right to foreclose the mortgaged properties had
prescribed. It highlighted that Mercene's complaint neither alleged the maturity date of the loans, nor the fact
that a demand for payment was made. 

The CA explained that prescription commences only upon the accrual of the cause of action, and that a
cause of action in a written contract accrues only when there is an actual breach or violation. Thus, the
appellate court surmised that no prescription had set in against GSIS because it has not made a demand to
Mercene.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the Judicial Admission allegedly made by GSIS
SC Ruling:
There was no judicial admission on the part of GSIS with regard to prescription because treating the
obligation as prescribed, was merely a conclusion of law. It would have been different if Mercene's complaint
alleged details necessary to determine when GSIS' right to foreclose arose, i.e., date of maturity and
whether demand was necessary.

The court agrees with Mercene that material averments not specifically denied are deemed admitted.
However, Mercene’s conclusion that GSIS judicially admitted that its right to foreclose had prescribed is
erroneous since there was actually no judicial admission on the part of GSIS with regard to prescription.

It must be remembered that conclusions of fact and law stated in the complaint are not deemed
admitted by the failure to make a specific denial. This is true considering that only ultimate facts must be
alleged in any pleading and only material allegation of facts need to be specifically denied.

A conclusion of law is a legal inference on a question of law made as a result of a factual showing where
no further evidence is required hence, the allegation of prescription in Mercene's complaint is a mere
conclusion of law.

Again, RTC erred in ruling that GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed because the allegations in Mercene's
complaint were insufficient to establish prescription against GSIS. The only information the trial court had
were the dates of the execution of the loan, and the annotation of the mortgages on the title. As explained in
the decisions, prescription of the right to foreclose mortgages is not reckoned from the date of execution of
the contract. Rather, prescription commences from the time the cause of action accrues; in other words,
from the time the obligation becomes due and demandable, or upon demand by the creditor/mortgagor, as
the case may be.

“WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 29 April 2010 Decision and 20 July 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV No. 86615 are AFFIRMED in toto”

Others

Case Citation: G.R. NO. 214406

Date: February 6, 2017

Petitioners: BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES INC

Respondents: TOTAL DISTRIBUTION LOGISTIC SYSTEMS INC

Doctrine: It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not
evidence.

Antecedent  A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against respondent Total
Facts: Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) on April 15, 2002, seeking to recover the sum of
₱36,440,351.79 representing the total value of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables that
 TDLSI has allegedly refused to return to BP Oil.

 According to the allegations in the complaint, the defendant entered into an Agency Agreement
with BP Singapore on September 30, 1997, whereby it was given the right to act as the exclusive
agent of the latter for the sales and distribution of its industrial lubricants in the Philippines. The
agency was for a period of five years from 1997 to 2002. In return, the defendant was supposed
to meet the target sales volume set by BP Singapore for each year of the Agreement. As agreed
in the Supplemental Agreement they executed on January 6, 1998, the defendant was supposed
to deposit the proceeds of the sales it made to a depositary account that the defendant will open
for the purpose. On April 27, 1998, BP Singapore assigned its rights under the Agreement to the
plaintiff effective March 1, 1998.

 When the defendant did not meet its target sales volume for the first year of the Agreement, the
plaintiff informed the defendant that it was going to appoint other distributors to sell the BP's
industrial lubricant products in the Philippines. The defendant did not object to the plan of the
plaintiff but asked for ₱10,000,000.00 as compensation for the expenses. The plaintiff did not
agree to the demand made by the defendant.

 On August 19, 1999, the defendant through its lawyer, wrote the plaintiff a letter where it
demanded that it be paid damages in the amount of ₱40,000,000.00 and announced that it was
withholding remittance of the sales until it was paid by the plaintiff. On September 1, 1999, the
plaintiff wrote the defendant back to give notice that it was terminating the Agreement unless the
defendant rectified the breaches it committed within a period of 30 days. The plaintiff also
demanded that the defendant pay the plaintiff its outstanding obligations and return the unsold
stock in its possession.

 On July 9, 2001, the law firm of Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako sent the defendant a
formal demand letter for the payment of the total amount of ₱36,440,351.79 representing the
total amount of the collections, receivables and stocks that defendant should have returned to
the plaintiff as of May 31, 2001. The amount was based on a summary of account prepared by
Ms. Aurora B. Osanna, plaintiffs Business Development Supervisor.

 On April 15, 2002, the plaintiff filed the instant complaint for collection against the defendant. The
defendant initially filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground for [sic] lack of cause of
action because of the existence of an arbitration agreement, as well as a previously filed
arbitration proceeding between the parties. This Court denied the defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for lack of merit in its Order dated February 21, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
defendant was likewise denied by this Court on April 30, 2003. The Defendant went up to the
Court of Appeals to question the denial of its Motion to Dismiss via a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

 On June 9, 2003, the Defendant filed its Answer Ad Cautelam with Compulsory Counterclaim Ad
Cautelam.

 In its answer, the defendant alleged that it was appointed as the exclusive agent of the plaintiff to
sell BP brand industrial lubricants in the Philippines. The agency was to last for five years from
signing of the Agreement, or until September 29, 2001. As the exclusive agent of BP products,
the defendant was tasked to promote, market, distribute and sell the BP products supplied the
plaintiff.

Petitioner’s  Exhibit “J” qualifies as an actionable document whose authenticity and due execution were
Contention (BP deemed admitted by TDLSI from its failure to specifically deny the same under oath. 
Oil):

 It insists that it has met the quantum of proof required by law.

Respondent’s  Reiterates the ruling of the CA that Exhibit "J" is not an actionable document and cannot be
Contention considered a judicial admission on its part.
(TDLSI):

RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of the petitioner. It granted the claim of the plaintiff and directing the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of:
 (1) Thirty-Six Million Nine Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Nine Pesos and Thirteen
Centavos (₱36,943,829.13) for the value of the stocks and the moneys received and retained by the
defendant in its possession pursuant to the Agreement with legal interest computed at 6% per annum from
July 19, 2001 up to the finality of this decision and at 12% per annum from finality of this decision up to the
date of payment.

(2) Attorney's fees in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,500,000.00) and costs
of suit amounting to Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (₱439,840.00).

CA Ruling: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and found in favor of the respondent. CA ruled that
the admission made by respondent in Exhibit "J ," that it was withholding moneys, receivables and stocks
respectively valued at ₱27,261,305.75, ₱8,767,656.26 and ₱1,155,000.00 from petitioner, has no
evidentiary weight, thus, petitioner was not able to preponderantly establish its claim.

Issue:  WON the evidence presented will prove that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the
defendant (YES)

SC Ruling: The aforesaid evidence presented was to the mind of the Court contain pertinent facts and such evidence
will prove that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant.

 The record shows that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that will preponderantly
establish its claim against the defendant. Among the evidence presented which might prove the
claim or right to relief of the plaintiff against the defendant include (I) the purchase orders of
TDLSI's third party customers; (2) original approved copies of the requests for approval sent by
TDLSI to BP Oil from May 21, 1998 to August 14, 1999; (3)TDLSI invoices covering the products
subject of the purchase orders and requests for approval; and (4) The sales invoices issued by
BP Oil to TDLSI to its customers.

 As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, TDLSI cannot premise its demurrer on any supposed
lack of proof of delivery by BP Oil of certain moneys and receivables. The allegations in the
complaint, as well as the evidence presented by BP Oil, establish that generated as they were by
the sales made by TDLSI, the moneys and receivables have always been in TDLSI's
possession, and it is the obligation of the latter to deliver them to BP Oil.

 The Court cannot just dismiss the case on the ground that upon the facts and law presented by
the plaintiff it was not able to show a right to relief when in fact the evidence presented,
testimonial and documentary, show otherwise and its claim appears to be meritorious.

 It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is
not evidence. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence is given on either side. The RTC's denial of TDLSI's Demurrer to Evidence shows and
proves that petitioner had indeed laid a prima facie case in support of its claim. Having been
ruled that petitioner's claim is meritorious, the burden of proof, therefore, was shifted to TDLSI to
controvert petitioner's prima facie case.

 To the mind of the court, the evidence presented by the plaintiff, unrebutted by any evidence on
the part of the defendant and even aided by the admissions made by the defendant in its letter
dated April 30, 2001 to the plaintiff (Exhibit "J"), proves that the plaintiff has a cause of action for
the payment of the amount of Thirty-Six Million Nine Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Eight
Hundred Twenty-Nine Pesos and Thirteen Centavos (₱36,943,829.13) for the value of the stocks
and the moneys received and retained by the defendant in its possession pursuant to the
Agreement with legal interest computed at 6% per annum from July 19, 2001, when formal
demand (Exhibit "L") was made by the plaintiff for the liquidated amount of ₱36,943,829.13, up
to the finality of this decision up to the date of payment thereof.

Upon close analysis, therefore, this Court is inclined to believe the findings of the RTC that petitioner was
able to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence and that respondent failed to disprove petitioner's
claim. As such, the CA gravely erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 202206

Date: March 5, 2018

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: TENG MONER y ADAM

Doctrine:  The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently espoused the time-honored doctrine that where the
issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless
the consideration of certain facsts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked,
might affect the result of the case.

 It has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations
of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they
erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

 In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Antecedent  Police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force
Facts: (SAIDSOTF) had arrested a certain Joel Taudil for possession of illegal drugs. Upon investigation,
they gathered from Taudil that the source of the illegal drugs was Teng Moner (herein accused-
appellant) who hails from Tandang Sora, Quezon City. As per this information, Police Chief
Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a tear that would conduct a buy-bust operation for the
apprehension of accused-appellant. At the target area, PO2 Panopio and Taudil went to accused-
appellant's house. Taudil introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to accused-appellant and told him
that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio asked for the price of five (5) grams
of shabu.

 Accused-appellant replied that the same would cost him P8,000.00 and asked him if he has the
money. When PO2 Panopio confirmed that he has the money with him, accused-appellant asked
them to wait and he went inside the house. 

 When he returned after a few minutes, he handed a plastic sachet containing a substance
suspected as shabu to PO2 Panopio who in turn gave him the marked and boodle money.
Accused-appellant was about to count the money when PO2 Panopio gave the pre-arranged
signal to his team and introduced himself as a police officer. Accused-appellant resisted arrest and
ran inside the house but PO2 Panopio was able to catch up with him. The other members of the
team proceeded inside the house and they saw the other accused gathered around a table re-
packing shabu. PO3 Lirio confiscated the items from them and placed the same inside a plastic
bag.

 After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded to the Las Piñas
City Police Station. The items confiscated from them were turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3
Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the police operatives, accused-appellant and his
co-accused.

 PO3 Dalagdagan prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The specimens
were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The specimens yielded positive to the
test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Petitioner’s
Contention:

Respondent’s Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof to sustain his conviction for the
Contention: charge of sale of dangerous drugs. He highlights the fact that the prosecution failed to present in court the
informant who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu. He also stresses that the buy-bust operation was
conducted without proper coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Likewise, he
derides the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most
importantly, he underscores the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the statutorily mandated
 procedure for the handling and custody of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him.

MTC/RTC The trial court found appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Ruling: Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the same judgment, Moner and his co-accused were
acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11, Article II (possession of dangerous drugs) of the same statute
which was the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983.

CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of RTC 

Issue: WON prosecution failed to prove an unbroken chain of custody in consonance with the requirements of law

SC Ruling: NO. For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential
elements must be proven:

(1) that the transaction or sale took place;

(2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and

(3) that the buyer and seller were identified.

A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the aforementioned elements were established by the
prosecution. The illegal drugs and the marked money were presented and identified in court. More
importantly, Police Officer (PO2) Joachim Panopio (PO2 Panopio), who acted as poseur-buyer, positively
identified Moner as the seller of the shabu to him for a consideration of P8,000.00.

To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same material
seized from him or that, at the very least, a dangerous drug was actually taken from his possession, we have
adopted the chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has expressly defined chain of
custody involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court or destruction.
Such record of movements and custody or seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made
in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly states:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/tear, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

We have consistently ruled that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 will not
necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict
compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required   if there is a clear showing that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs being offered in court
as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item recovered in the buy-bust operation.

To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long as there exist justifiable
grounds which prevented those tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming to the said directive. The
 preceding discussion clearly show that the apprehending officers in this case did not totally disregard
prescribed procedure but, instead, demonstrated substantial compliance with what was required. It was
likewise explained that the divergence in procedure outside their area of responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 is AFFIRMED.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 212003

Date: February 28, 2018

Petitioners: PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION (FORMERLY SULPICIO LINES, INC.),

Respondents: HEIDI PELAYO, Respondent.

Doctrine:

Antecedent Philippine Span Asia Carriers Corporation (SPAN) discovered anomalies in its Davao branch ; members of
Facts: its management team went to Davao to investigate ; the investigation involved Heidi Pelayo considering that,
as accounting clerk, her main duties were "to receive statements and billings for processing of payments,
prepare vouchers and checks for the approval and signature of the Branch Manager, and release the checks
for cash payment"; the investigation in Davao could not be completed for lack of time; Pelayo was made to
come to SPAN’s Cebu main office - all expense paid - for the continuation of the investigation; in Cebu,
Pelayo was again interviewed;Pelayo walked out in the midst of this interview.

Pelayo upon her return to Davao City got admitted to a hospital because of depression and nervous
breakdowns, she later claimed that she was being coerced to admit complicity with Tan and Sobiaco who
were signatories of the subject checks in the anomalous transactions. She eventually filed for leave of
absence and ultimately stopped reporting for work. 

SPAN then called her, sent her a memorandum requiring a written explanation from her about the double
disbursements, payments of ghost purchases and issuances of checks with amounts bigger than stated in
its vouchers. SPAN also sought assistance from the National Bureau of Investigation which asked Pelayo to
appear. Instead of responding, Pelayo filed a complaint for constructive dismissal.

Petitioner’s
Contention:

Respondent’s
Contention:

Labor Arbiter SPAN constructively dismissed Pelayo, noting that her participation in the ncovered anomalies was “far-
Ruling: fetched.” Also Alex Te (Te) the employee authorized by SPAN to act in its behalf in prosecuting Tan and
Sobiaco hardly mentioned Pelayo.

NLRC Ruling: The LA decision is reversed. The matter of disciplining employees was a management prerogative and did
not necessarily amount to harassment. 

CA Ruling: The NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the LA decision. And denied SPAN’s motion for
reconsideration hence, a petition for certiorari under rule 45 to the Supreme Court by SPAN.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission in ruling that respondent Heidi Pelayo's involvement in the investigation
conducted by petitioner did not amount to constructive dismissal.

SC Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. the assailed CA decision is reversed, set
aside and the NRLC decision reinstated.

1. Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment. 
2. This Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
 circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements
3. There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his
part except to resign from such employment. Yet, "[n]ot every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty,
or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal.
4. Pelayo’s allegation that she was constructively dismissed had no objective proof. Her recollection
is riddled with impressions, unsupported by independently verifiable facts. These impressions are
subjective products of nuanced perception, personal interpretation, and ingrained belief that
cannot be appreciated as evidencing "the truth respecting a matter of fact.” While her subsequent
hospitalization proves that she was stressed, it does not prove that she was stressed specifically
because she was cornered into admitting wrongdoing. 
5. Pelayo’s frustration and worries in themselves do not translate to SPAN’s malice. Pelayo’s
physical response may have been acute, but this, by itself, can only speak of her temperament
and physiology. It would be fallacious to view this physical response as proof of what her
interviewers actually told her or did to her.
6. Indeed, it was possible that respondent was harassed. But possibility is not proof. Judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings demand proof. Respondent's narrative is rich with melodramatic
undertones of how she suffered a nervous breakdown, but is short of prudent, verifiable proof. In
the absence of proof, it would be a miscarriage of justice to sustain a party-litigant's allegation.
7. Labor Arbiter Larida's reliance on Te's affidavit is misplaced. That affidavit was prepared to
facilitate the criminal prosecution of Tan, the branch manager, and Sobiaco, the cashier. It
naturally emphasized Tan's and Sobiaco's functions, and would hardly mention Pelayo because it
did not have to discuss her. 
8. The Court in Mandapat v. Add Force Personnel Services has been so frank as to view an
employee's preemption of investigation as a badge of guilt.

What is certain is that there were several anomalies in petitioner's Davao branch. It made sense for
petitioner to investigate these anomalies. It also made sense for respondent to be involved in the
investigation. 

Employees cannot tie employers' hands, incapacitating them, and preemptively defeating investigations with
laments of how the travails of their involvement in such investigations translates to their employers'
fabrication of an inhospitable employment atmosphere so that an employee is left with no recourse but to
resign.

Others In the case of termination of employment for offenses and misdeeds by employees, i.e., for just causes
under Article 282 of the Labor Code,51 employers are required to adhere to the so-called "two-notice rule”
which must consider :
 
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for
their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the
notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the
notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should
specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art.
282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge
against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented
against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to
defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover,
this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable
settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a
written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees
have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment.55 (Citation omitted)
The two-notice rule applies at that stage when an employer has previously determined that there are
probable grounds for dismissing a specific employee. The first notice implies that the employer already has a
cause for termination. The employee then responds to the cause against him or her. The two-notice rule
does not apply to anterior, preparatory investigations precipitated by the initial discovery of wrongdoing. At
this stage, an employer has yet to identify a specific employee as a suspect. These preparatory
investigations logically lead to disciplinary proceedings against the specific employee suspected of
 wrongdoing, but are not yet part of the actual disciplinary proceedings against that erring employee. While
the Labor Code specifically prescribes the two-notice rule as the manner by which an employer must
proceed against an employee specifically charged with wrongdoing, it leaves to the employer's discretion the
manner by which it shall proceed in initially investigating offenses that have been uncovered, and whose
probable perpetrators have yet to be pinpointed.

Case G.R. No. 157870 [NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No.
Citation:  158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)]

Date:  November 03, 2008

Petitioners:  SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

Respondents:  DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
Doctrine: In SJS, the Philippine Supreme Court found the mandatory testing requirement for of icers and
employees of public and private of ices reasonable and valid. Reasonableness is the touchstone of the
validity of a government search or intrusion. Whether a search at issue complies with the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. Authorities have agreed that the right to
privacy yields to certain rights of the public and defers to police power. Also, for a law touching on the
privacy rights of employees to be valid, there must be well-defined limits to properly guide authorities. 

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects.” The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug
use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. 

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But
while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression. 

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the
constitutionality of governmental search. 

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. 

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the

view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. 

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited

drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of the people,
particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as
victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students
in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may
even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to
be promoted and protected. 

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the

mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165
for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard
that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable,
an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," has failed
to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs.
1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. 

To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal
drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. Taking into account the foregoing
factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the
search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. 

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable

on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself
for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is
not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36
expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and
tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo
drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school
rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the
testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be
observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established. 

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and
Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how
often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
Antecedent  In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
Facts:  party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches
is also breached by said provisions. 

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows: 

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing: 

x x x x 

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x; 

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
 Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; 

x x x x 

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty
of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test; 

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Petitioner’s  SJS seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Contention: (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm.

Respondent’s  Respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
Contention: violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.2

MTC/RTC Not indicated nor discussed in the case.

Ruling:

CA Ruling:  Not indicated nor discussed in the case.

Issue:  Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

SC Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT
the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.

Others

Case Citation: Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029 

Date: April 24, 2018 

Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG 

Respondents: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo

Doctrine:
Recognition of divorce decree - Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of
divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 

The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. 

Presumptive evidentiary value of foreign judgment - Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.

Judicial notice of foreign laws - It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. 

Antecedent
Facts: On January 10, 2012, Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, due to a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. 

The Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City set the case for an initial hearing on April 25, 2012. During the
initial hearing, Manalo’s counsel marked the documentary evidence such as the: a) Trial court’s order; b)
Affidavit of Publication; c) Issues of the Northern Journal as compliance for the jurisdictional requirements. 

The OSG, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan, entered its appearance and filed a
Manifestation and Motion questioning the caption of the Manalo’s petition, contending that the proper action
should be for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, based on the allegations of the petition. 

In response to this, respondent Manalo moved to admit an amended petition. In the amended petition, she
stated among others that she was previously married to Yoshino Minoro,  the fact of the divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011, rendered by the Japanese Court, and that the petition is principally for the purpose
of causing the cancellation of the entry of marriage between the petitioner and the Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. 

Manalo testified in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan, she offered the following documents
which were admitted: 

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-
12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification
of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.

Petitioner’s The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Respondent Manalo. 
Contention:

Respondent’s Respondent Manalo claims that the petition is principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of the
Contention: entry of marriage between the petitioner and the Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the divorce decree should not be recognized
in accordance with Article 15 of the Civil Code. It held that the Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the
right to file for a divorce, regardless of where they live and regardless of the nationality of the person they are
 married to unless they are naturalized as citizens of another country. 

CA Ruling: The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce since the divorce decree obtained makes the Japanese national
no longer married to Manalo, capacitating the former to remarry. It likewise held that the fact that it was
Manalo who filed for divorce was inconsequential, it cited Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., where the marriage
between a foreigner and Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed by the latter. 

Issue: Whether or not the presentation of the divorce decree alone may result in the recognition of such decree in
the Philippine courts and the enforcement thereof. 

SC Ruling:
No. Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.

The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. 

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a)accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 

In the case at bar, Manalo was able to submit the following: 

1. Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 

2. The Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Decree of Divorce; and 
3. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. 

Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact.

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a
written act of the foreign court.

In the case at bar, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as
well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and
family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART.
 The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.

Others Article 26, Family Code 

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise the have capacity to remarry underPhilippine law.

Right to privacy (Written in book of Peralta)  

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encouragesFilipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinosmarrying foreign nationals or
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support what he
intends to prove.

Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong, that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns, that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, and that the law has been obeyed.

It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because
he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit.

Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more for bearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages. 

And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In
one case, it wassaid:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not andcannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt toregulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and wouldraise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows
marriedcouples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together orlive apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such asconvenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.

Presumption of good faith 

Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e ., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by
other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts, that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, that acquiescence
resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, and that
the law has been obeyed.

It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because
he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit.

Case G.R. No. 181881

Citation:

Date: 18 October 2011

Petitioners: BRICCIO “Ricky” A. POLLO

Respondent CHAIRPERSON  KARINA     CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR  IV  RACQUEL  DE  GUZMAN 

s: BUENSALIDA,  DIRECTOR   IV   LYDIA   A.   CASTILLO,   DIRECTOR   III ENGELBERT  ANTHONY                          
D  UNITE AND THE  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

Doctrine:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right to  privacy  has  been  accorded  recognition  as  a 
facet  of  the  right protected   by   the guarantee   against   unreasonable   search   and seizure under Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Right  to  Privacy;  The  Civil  Service  Commission  (CSC)  had implemented  a  policy  that  put  its 
employees  on  notice  that  they have no expectation of  privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive
on the office computers, and that the CSC  may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means.

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Antecedent Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-
Facts: in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division(PALD) under the “ Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na ”program of the CSC. 

On January 3, 2007, at around 2:30 p.m., An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil
Service Commission Chairperson alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with
pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with a background in information
technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
[CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and
the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished the task. It was found that
most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or
letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a
Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice. 

Respondent’ Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he  is the person referred to in the anonymous letter complaint which
s had no attachments to it because he is not a lawyer and neither is he “lawyering” for people with cases in the
Contention: CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files on his computer, and subsequently asked him to submit his comment which violated his right
against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer one while he
was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007, in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends, and some associates and that he is
not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to
privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though
government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Receipt (MR) are ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for
personal purposes.

As to the anonymous letter, the petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the
requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent are
thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

Petitioner’s
Contention: On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.070382 finding a prima facie case against the petitioner
and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he
 elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of theURACC, the petitioner was likewise
placed under 90 days of preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner
received a copy of resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.071420, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A.
Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of Republic Act6713. He has meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation
of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations.”

CA Ruling: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo to
nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 and penalized him with dismissal.

By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The held that: (1)
petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-
finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a
prima facie
case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioner's computer and later
confiscating the same. Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC
computer policy declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and
(3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSC's act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by theCA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to avail the right to privacy over his computer and electronic files as a
government employee.

SC Ruling:
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates, and even unknown
people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.

The court made an analysis on the landmark case of OConnor v. Ortega and the United States v. Simmons,
laying the principle of balancing the right to privacy by an employee against searches made by the employer,
who in this case is also the government. According to the Court, OConnor emphasized that "a probable cause
requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The
delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for the probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency work, and ultimately to the
public interest."

Care must therefore be made in ensuring a standard of reasonableness. There must be reasonable grounds
present before the exception may be applied such as suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-
related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file is.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor
the use of the computer resources using both automated or by human means.An Office Memorandum No. 10,
S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provided for such. This implied, therefore, that on-the-spot
 inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business
purposes.

The search of petitioners' computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies
in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
"lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an
employee's office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

In the remedial law perspective, this case must also be contrasted from Anonymous Letter-Complaint against
Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (571 SCRA 361) because the latter
involves the inspection of a personal computer from which a government employee may expect reasonable
privacy with his communications. Petitioners' computer is government property and the use of which the CSC
has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Therefore, any evidence found on petitioner's computer is admissible
against him.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 231989

Date: September 4, 2018

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: ROMY LIM y MIRANDA

Doctrine: It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the 3 witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph
of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as: (1) their attendance was impossible
because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person(s) acting for
and in their behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Art. 125 of the RPC prove futile through no fault of the arresting
officers; (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the low enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.

Antecedent Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain “Romy” has been engaged in the sale of
Facts: prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, CDO, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were directed by the
Regional Director to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1
Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.
When the team arrived in the target area at around 10:00 PM, IO1 Carin and the C1 alighted from the vehicle
near the house of “Romy”, while IO1 Orellan and the other team members positioned themselves in the area
to observe. Upon reaching the house, IO1 Carin and the C1 encountered Gorres who invited them inside, Lim
was sitting on the sofa watching TV. When the C1 introduced IO1 Carin as a buyer, Lim nodded and told
Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took 1 sachet of
shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin, who in turn paid him with the ₱500 buy-bust money. After examining the
sachet, IO1 Carin made a signal and the team immediately rushed to Lim’s house. IO1 Orellan declared that
they were PDEA agent and informed Lim and Gorres of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. Thereafter,
IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both of them. The team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA
Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. Likewise, he made the Inventory Receipt
of the confiscated items, however, it was not assigned by Lim and Gorres. There also no signature of an
elected public official and the representatives of the DOJ and the media as witnesses.

Petitioner’s
Contention:

Respondent’s
Contention:
RTC Ruling: The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack
of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.

CA Ruling: CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not Romy Lim is guilty of violating R.A. 9165

SC Ruling: Accordingly, accused appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is acquitted on reasonable doubt and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the 3 witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph
of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as: (1) their attendance was impossible
because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person(s) acting for
and in their behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Art. 125 of the RPC prove futile through no fault of the arresting
officers; (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the low enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.

Others

Case Citation: People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498

Date: January 11, 2018

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

Respondents: Enrique Reyes

Doctrine: 1. After having owned the crime, the burden of proof has been shifted to accused-appellant to
establish self-defense. He, therefore, cannot simply protest that the prosecution's evidence is
weak. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence because even if weak, the prosecution's
evidence cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted to the killing. His failure
to adduce clear and convincing evidence of self-defense will accordingly result in his conviction.
2. It is settled that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself.

Antecedent
Facts:

Prosecution’s Based on the testimonies of its three eyewitnesses, namely, Eliseo de Castro (Eliseo), Apolonio Gaza, Jr.
Contention: (Apolonio) and Rolando Quintos (Rolando), the prosecution sought to prove that around 7:00 in the
morning of August 13, 1990, Eliseo and several others were in the basketball court along Francisco Street,
Tondo, Manila, in front of Danilo's house, while Rolando was cleaning his truck parked in the same
basketball court. Eliseo and Rolando saw accused-appellant fire his Armalite rifle upwards while his
nephews, Rey Buenaflor, a certain Al and Bernie, picked up the empty slugs. Danilo was then walking
towards his house after tending to his fighting cock, and was three steps away from his residence when
accused-appellant suddenly fired at him from behind, causing him to fall on the ground. Accused-appellant
then approached Danilo. Hearing the gunshots from his house prompted Apolonio to go to nearby
Francisco Street where he saw Danilo's body on the ground, bathing in blood, while accused-appellant,
who was wearing only a pair of camouflage pants and holding an Armalite rifle in his right hand, stood in
front of Danilo. Accused-appellant took the .38 caliber firearm tucked in Danilo's waist, and fired the same
upwards thrice. Afterwards, he placed the gun on Danilo's right hand and turned the latter's body on a lying
position. Out of fear, Eliseo and the others hid behind Rolando's truck, and when the firing stopped, they
tried to get Danilo's body. Accused-appellant, however, fired his Armalite upwards, saying "walang kukuha
nito," and then walked to his house. When the policemen later arrived, they went into accused-appellant's
house. The policemen, together with accused-appellant, subsequently boarded the mobile car.6
Accused- SELF-DEFENSE.
Appellant’s
Contention:
According to accused-appellant, he was on his way home in the morning of August 13, 1990, after
preparing his son's wake, when he was met by Adelardo who informed him that he had overheard Danilo
and four other men talking on board an owner-type jeep parked along Velasquez Street, Tondo, Manila.
One of them remarked "ltumba na natin iyan puede na kahit anong mangyari," to which Danilo
replied "Hagisan ng granada kahit sa bahay." Fearing for his family's safety, accused-appellant prepared
his Armalite rifle and called for assistance from the Police Station 1, Theft and Robbery Section, and the
SWAT. After a while, someone outside the house shouted that there were policemen in civilian clothes.
Hearing this, accused-appellant stood from a rocking chair, got his Armalite rifle and told Gary and his
other companions not to leave the house. Accused-appellant then proceeded towards Francisco Street
going to Velasquez Street, thinking that the police he called had arrived. At that time, Celia, who was on
her way to accused-appellant's house, saw a man holding a gun approaching accused-appellant from
behind. When Celia shouted "Ricky," accused-appellant turned towards Celia and saw Danilo holding a
gun in the act of shooting him. Accused-appellant drew and fired his Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo who fell on
the ground. He took Danilo's gun for his safety. He was about to lift Danilo to bring him to the hospital,
when he heard gunfire and the cocking of a gun from a container van parked nearby. Fearful of a possible
ambush, he fired Danilo's .38 caliber revolver as well as his Armalite rifle at the direction of the container
van, taking cover behind a ten-wheeler truck parked on the street until the police patrol car arrived. He
proceeded to his house through the backdoor. When he heard Ellano call his name, he surrendered
himself as well as his Armalite rifle and Danilo's gun. 

MTC/RTC Ruling: The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected accused-
appellant's claim of self-defense, finding no clear and convincing proof that Danilo had assaulted him or
posed an imminent threat to him. The RTC held that the killing was attended by treachery because
accused-appellant fired at Danilo suddenly and without giving him the chance to run or defend himself The
trial court likewise appreciated the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, holding that accused-
appellant had sufficient time to contemplate his actions while sitting in his rocking chair before emerging
from his house armed with a rifle, ready to kill.

CA Ruling: On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC's finding that the killing was not done in self-defense in the absence
of unlawful aggression. However, finding no sufficient evidence that would establish the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the appellate court downgraded accused-appellant's
conviction from murder to homicide.

Issue: Whether or not there is self-defense

SC Ruling: No.
1. No unlawful aggression.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person.26 The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is whether the victim's aggression placed in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. The danger must not be an imagined
or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the confluence of these elements of unlawful aggression must be
established by the accused, to wit: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack
or assault must be actual, or at least imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Tested against the foregoing criteria, the Court finds the element of unlawful aggression to be wanting in
this case. As the CA succinctly held:

There is nothing in the records which would clearly and convincingly prove Enrique's claim that his life was
in danger when he saw Danilo. Enrique claimed that when Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo who
was about to shoot him. However, based on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only approaching Enrique while
holding a gun. Celia did· hot witness any positive act showing the actual and material unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim. Even P/Insp. Gary, whom Enrique presented as an alleged eyewitness, only
testified that he saw a man carrying a small firearm approaching Enrique and when the latter turned to his
right, a volley of gunshots followed. Evidently, the records of this case are -bereft of any indication of
unlawful aggression that would justify a finding of self-defense.
2. Prosecution’s eyewitnesses have established that Danilo was on his way home after tending to
his fighting cock, and was three steps away from his house, when accused-appellant suddenly
fired his Armalite at him

Accused-appellant harps on the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. He

points to the supposed disparity between Rolando's testimony that accused-appellant got Danilo's gun
from his waist and Apolonio's account that accused-appellant took it from the right side of Danilo's chest.
 Accused-appellant likewise impugns Rolando's testimony that accused-appellant shot Danilo six times,
which allegedly conflicts with the three gunshot wounds indicated in the medico-legal report.40

However, after having owned the crime, the burden of proof has been shifted to accused-appellant to
establish self-defense. He, therefore, cannot simply protest that the prosecution's evidence is weak. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence because even if weak, the prosecution's evidence cannot be
disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted to the killing. His failure to adduce clear and convincing
evidence of self-defense will accordingly result in his conviction.
3. Accused-appellant contends that the "looming" death threat from Manuel's group, owing to his
exposure of the latter's alleged illegal activities, became real and evident when his nephew,
Adelardo, overheard Danilo's plan to kill him. Thus, he submits that Danilo's remarks were "more
than enough to show the imminent and real danger" to his life.51

The jurisprudential standards for a finding of unlawful aggression clearly negate accused-appellant's
argument. Granting they were true, neither the "looming" threat perceived by accused-appellant nor the
remarks overheard by his nephew satisfies the requirement of an actual, menacing, sudden and
unexpected danger to accused-appellant's life. To constitute imminent unlawful aggression, the attack must
be at the point of happening and must not be imaginary or consist in a mere threatening attitude.
4. Another factor that militates against accused-appellant's defense lies in the incredulous aspects
of his version of the incident.

It is settled that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Accordingly, the test to determine the value or credibility of
a witness' testimony is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with
the experience of mankind.
5. Evident premeditation was not appreciated. 
6. Treachery was appreciated. 
7. Voluntary surrender was appreciated.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 10, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05671
is MODIFIED in· that accused-appellant is held guilty of murder and sentenced to a penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Furthermore, accused-appellant shall pay civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages, each in the amount of ₱100,000.00, as well as temperate damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00. The civil indemnity and all damages payable by accused-appellant are subject
to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 238889

Date: October 03, 2018

Petitioners: ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR.

Respondents: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine:
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the
other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason
from circumstantial evidence."

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial
evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There
is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a
matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference
 is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

Antecedent Police officers of the Regional Investigation Detective Division (RIDM) were tasked to conduct surveillance
Facts: in [redacted] Lodge in Cebu City based on reports that alleged trafficking in persons and sexual
exploitation were being committed at the said place. 

On the first occasion the entrapping police officers pretended to be customers interested in availing of
sexual services. Marlyn Buhisan entertained them with Antonio Planteras (owner) in the reception booth of
the XXX Lodge. Thereafter, the girls were lined up in front of the police officers. Buhisan told them that the
room rates were P40.00 for the first hour and P50.00 every succeeding hour. After being informed of this,
the police officers and girls left for drinks outside.

On the second occasion, the police officers were approached by Marichu Tawi and offered girls for
P300.00 each (marked money). The girls were then asked to proceed to their respective rooms. Buhisan
arrived thereafter. After giving the signal of a “missed call” to the rest of the team, and upon their arrival,
the officers announced that they were police officers and arrested Buhisan, Tawi, Planteras and his wife,
Christina. 

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City convicted Buhisan and Tawi for qualified trafficking under Republic
Act (R.A. No. 9208) while Planteras was convicted for knowingly allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208.

After denial of their motion for reconsideration, Buhisan, Tawi and Planteras appealed their convictions to
the Court of Appeals which denied their appeal. Planteras elevated his case to the Supreme Court via
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner’s During trial, petitioner testified that he is the registered owner of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April
Contention: 28, 2009, around 9 o'clock in the evening, while he was watching television at the Lodge, three (3) males
and three (3) females went inside the same Lodge. Petitioner denied hearing the conversation that took
place among the 6 persons and claimed that his attention was fixed on the television show. After a few
minutes, petitioner noticed one of the women go down the stairs and then went back with another girl.
Thereafter, policemen arrived, searched the area, and arrested him and his wife, Christina. Petitioner
insisted that he does not know Buhisan and Tawi.

Buhisan testified that she was merely a helper at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009,
petitioner called her to assist four (4) guests who were accompanied by Tawi. After Buhisan was able to
prepare their rooms, she was requested by one of the guests to find for them girls. for hire which she
refused to do. Buhisan also claimed that she declined the said request despite a promise of payment.
However, according to Buhisan, petitioner instructed her to collect the payment from the four (4) guests
which she complied. The customers gave her P200.00, but they immediately took the payment back from
her and was then immediately handcuffed and arrested. Buhisan further testified that she knows AAA and
the other girls in the Lodge that night, because they frequently brought their customers to the New Perlito's
Lodge.

Tawi, during her testimony, admitted that she was a sex worker and that she knows AAA and Buhisan
because they were engaged in the same activity. According to Tawi, on April 28, 2009, upon the request of
PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, she and Buhisan introduced some girls to them. Tawi even offered her
services in order to earn money for herself, however on that same night, they were arrested by the police
officers.

Supreme Court (Planteras):

According to petitioner, there is no evidence that he was engaged in the trafficking of women or that his
acts would amount to the promotion of the trafficking of women. He further argues that to be convicted of
the charge against him, the offender must not just be conscious of the fact that he or she is leasing the
premises but that this consciousness must extend to being aware that such acts promote the trafficking in
persons. Petitioner also claims that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove the presence of
criminal intent and cannot be said to have successfully overthrown the constitutional presumption of
innocence that he enjoyed. In addition, he avers that the case against him is not a case against "trafficking
in persons" within the meaning and intent of the law.

Respondent’s The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit and PO2 Almohallas. The prosecution also
Contention: presented the testimony of AAA to corroborate the testimonies of the said police officers.

AAA, who was then 17 years old, testified that, in February 2009, while looking for her sister at the vicinity
of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, she met Buhisan who inquired whether she wanted money in exchange for her
sexual services to customers. AAA agreed and, thereafter. Buhisan would find customers for her. Upon
instructions of Buhisan, the latter would bring the customers to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge where the illicit
activity will be consummated. AAA further narrated that she is familiar with Tawi, who was also a prostitute.
Tawi, according to AAA, on previous occasions, also acted as a pimp for her. Each customer would pay
Php300.00 for AAA's services. Of the said rate, she receives only Php200.00, while the remainder is kept
 by either Buhisan or Tawi as their commission.

Regarding petitioner, AAA said that he and his wife owned the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge and that the spouses
received payments for room charges and sold condoms at the hotel. AAA further testified that on one
occasion, after providing service to a customer, petitioner offered her to another customer.

MTC/RTC Ruling:
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
their respective charges, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039, the Court finds accused MARLYN BUHISAN and MARICHU TAWI
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment.
Each accused is also ordered to pay fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (PhP2,000,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038, the Court finds accused ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knowingly allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used for the purpose
of promoting trafficking in persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences him to a
prison term of Fifteen (15) Years and to pay [a] fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PhP500,000.00).

The bail bond posted by accused Antonio Planteras, Jr. is hereby cancelled. Let a warrant of arrest
forthwith issue against accused Antonio Planteras, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeals are DENIED. The Joint Decision dated 10 November
2014, and the Order dated 17 April 2015, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-86038 and CBU-86039, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Issue: Whether petitioner can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence for
violation of R.A. 9208.

SC Ruling:
Yes.

The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact
inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the
evidence.

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the
other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason
from circumstantial evidence."

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial
evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There
is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a
matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference
is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to
sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established by
circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an
unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a

qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."

In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on the one hand, and the poseur
customers (police), on the other, for the use of the girls for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right
in the presence of Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he
could have easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did nothing about it only means that he
acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to do.

Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is accused-appellant
Planteras' own act of pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by
AAA on the stand. This circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras
knows AAA and her trade. With accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent
proposal was taking place among PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants
Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself, accused-appellant Planteras' feigned
ignorance of the real nature of the transaction taxes credulity too much.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May
18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the
Decision dated April 24, 2017 and the Resolution March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 02077 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ORDERED to PAY AAA
the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Others Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, reads as follows:

Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts, which promote or facilitate
trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:

(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.

xxx
 Under the above provisions of the law, in order for one to be convicted of the offense of promoting
trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly lease or sublease, or allow to be used any house,
building or establishment, and (b) such use of the house, building or establishment is for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208,
thus:

(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of
threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 147196

Date: June 04, 2004

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: EDGAR DUMADAG y CAGADAS

Doctrine:  Findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, as well
as its conclusions on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.

 It is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove with clear and
convincing evidence not only that he was some place else when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.

 As long as it is positive, clear and credible, the testimony of a single prosecution witness on which
judgment of conviction is anchored, is sufficient. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a
prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses
but by the quality of their testimonies.

Antecedent The appellant was charged with murder in an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Facts: Malaybalay, the accusatory portion of which is herein quoted:
That on or about the 24th day of June 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Impalutao, Municipality
of Impasugong, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery, armed with a sharp
bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab
FERNANDO PRUDENTE, inflicting upon the latter a mortal stab wound which caused the
instantaneous death of FERNANDO PRUDENTE, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs
of FERNANDO PRUDENTE in such amount as may be allowed by law2

Petitioner’s June 24, 1999 was the feast of St. John. Fernando "Ondo" Prudente, with his friends, including Marlyn
Contention: Meliston, agreed to meet at the Gantungan swimming pool in Impalutao, Impasugong, Bukidnon, to
Evidence of celebrate the occasion. At about 5:00 p.m., Ondo and his friends headed back home. By then, there was
Prosec heavy downpour. They decided to take shelter at the store of a certain Mr. Salvaña. Jovy Baylin, who had
just come from the house of his sister, Enecita Abacajin, approximately one hundred (100) kilometers away,
was also in the store.Two men, one of whom was the appellant, were having some drinks. 6 When they saw
Ondo, the appellant and his friend offered him a drink of Tanduay. 7 Ondo, declined, saying "Bay, I am not
drinking now."8 Thereafter, Ondo left. The appellant was peeved. He rose from his seat and followed Ondo.
The appellant then took hold of Ondo’s right shoulder, took out a stainless knife and stabbed the latter on
the breast.9 The appellant left the scene, walking towards the direction of the lower area of Cagayan de
Oro.10 Jovy Baylin, who was about five meters from the scene of the crime, was stunned, and was unable to
do anything.11 Ondo’s companions saw the stabbing and immediately flagged down a vehicle. 
Mortally wounded, Ondo ran towards the vehicle and fell inside it. 12 Ondo’s companions brought him to the
Bethel Baptist Hospital, Inc., in Malaybalay City, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 13 Dr. Leslie
Joan M. Arcadio signed Ondo’s death certificate and indicated that the cause of death was  "stab wound,
right chest."
Respondent’s The appellant denied the charge. He testified that in the afternoon of June 23, 1999, he was at Vista Villa,
Contention & Sumilao, Bukidnon,16 looking for some way to get money. He saw Richard Masicampo, Sr., the owner of a
Evidence of  2.5 hectare riceland in the same sitio and borrowed money from him.17 The latter agreed, but required the
Appellant appellant to cut the grass in his riceland the next day. 
On the aforesaid date, the appellant, along with Richard, cut grass in the ricefield. At around 11:00 a.m.,
they stopped and had lunch in Richard’s house. 18 Because it rained the whole afternoon, they were unable
to go back to the ricefield. They stayed in the house and had drinks. 19 After consuming five (5) bottles of
"fighter wine," the appellant fell asleep. At 5:30 p.m., he woke up and went home. He returned the next day
to finish the job.

He contends that prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He
asserts that although his defense of alibi is weak, he should be acquitted because the evidence of the
prosecution is also weak.

He also contends that, assuming that he is guilty of the crime charged, he can only be convicted of homicide
because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
He avers that he could not have deliberately and consciously adopted a plan to kill the victim because they
never knew each other. 

MTC/RTC Edgar Dumadag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder qualified by treachery.
Ruling: Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of
his victim Fernando Prudente the sum of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00

CA Ruling: NA

Issue: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
OF MURDER AND IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI
BECAUSE IN THE WORDS OF THE TRIAL COURT "ALIBI IS ONE OF THE WEAKEST
DEFENSE AND EASY TO CONCOCT.

2. Whether or not Dumagdag committed the crime murder.

SC Ruling: 1. The RTC did not erred.

Time and again, we have consistently ruled that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties, as well as its conclusions on its findings, are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the
conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witnesses as they testify.In this case, the trial court gave
credence and probative weight to the testimony of Jovy Baylin. After a careful review of the records of this
case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the trial court’s findings that the appellant stabbed the victim.
As long as it is positive, clear and credible, the testimony of a single prosecution witness on which judgment
of conviction is anchored, is sufficient. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a prerequisite to the
conviction of the accused. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies.
The trial court found Baylin to be a credible witness
The appellant’s alibi is weak. It is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove
with clear and convincing evidence not only that he was some place else when the crime was committed,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed.

The appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime,
considering his claim that he was only a few kilometers away when the stabbing occurred.

2. In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on the suddenness of the attack on the unarmed
and unsuspecting victim to justify treachery. As a general rule, a sudden attack by the assailant,
whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by
him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not
apply if the attack was not preconceived but merely triggered by infuriation of the appellant on an
act made by the victim.41 In the present case, it is apparent that the attack was not preconceived.
It was triggered by the appellant’s anger because of the victim’s refusal to have a drink with the
appellant and his companions. 
For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellant can only be convicted of homicide.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The appellant Edgar Dumadag y Cagadas is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8)
months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The appellant
 is ORDERED to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as civil indemnity and Twenty-Five Thousand
(₱25,000) as temperate damages to the heirs of the victim. The award of moral damages is deleted.

Others  Two conditions must concur for treachery to be present, viz.: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (2)
the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery cannot be
appreciated if it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assailant did not make
any preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible
or difficult for the victim to defend himself. The prosecution must prove that the killing was
premeditated or that the assailant chose a method of attack directly and specially to facilitate and
insure the killing without risk to himself. The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

Case Citation: GR No. 234825

Date: 5 September 2018

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Respondents: YYY, Accused-Appellant.

Doctrine:
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:

For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden

Antecedent
Facts:
 2 separate cases, both wherein YYY raped AAA
 First incident, she was fifteen (15) years old. AAA resided in XXX, Cagayan with her parents and
seven (7) other siblings. Sometime in March 1993, YYY hit her head with a broom and she lost
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her body, particularly her
hands and vagina. AAA saw YYY seated in the veranda.
 Second incident, this allegedly happened on November 14, 2001 at nighttime while AAA was
sleeping. She claimed that when she woke up the next morning, she was naked and that YYY was
seated at the veranda. AAA felt pain in her vagina. In both instances YYY allegedly threatened to
kill AAA, her mother, and her siblings if she would report the incidents.

Petitioner’s Evidence: 
Contention:
Prosecution presented private complainant AAA, her elder sister BBB, and Dr. Mila F. Lingan-Simangan  (Dr.
Lingan-Simangan)

 AAA narrated her experience *in the facts*

 The doctor discovered healed hymenal lacerations at the 4 and 7 o'clock positions, which could
mean that the sexual abuse happened at least a month or two months before the examination, or
even more than two or ten years before
  BBB testified that upon learning of the sexual abuses committed by YYY in 2002, BBB confronted
her sister and the latter related to her what their father did

Respondent’s He vehemently denied the allegations against him. He testified that during the entire month of March 1993,
Contention: he was living in XXX, Cagayan and never left the place. Likewise, on November 14, 2001, he was at his
house in Cagayan, together with his children because his wife was in Manila.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: In favor of AAA , both cases. 

CA Ruling: The March 1993 case was affirmed , while the November 2001 case was acquitted.

November 14, 2001 incident, the CA acquitted YYY of the crime charged because AAA 's testimony on the
alleged second rape did not satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Based on AAA's
testimony, the CA observed there was no admissible evidence to show that YYY inserted his penis into
AAA's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the victim's genital or anal orifice. 

The CA emphasized that AAA merely stated she was raped but failed to testify on the facts and
circumstances that would lead the court to conclude that there was rape. It determined that the testimony of
AAA with respect to the second rape was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how
the said rape was committed.

YYY appealed for the March 1993 case

Issue: Whether there the court erred due to: 

 DOUBTFUL IDENTITY OF THE ACTUAL CULPRIT.

 PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

SC Ruling:
NO. Court finds that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of YYY for the
crime of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 10648. (March 1993) 

While AAA did not provide a direct testimony on the details of the actual incident of rape because she was
unconscious at the time of the dastardly act, the prosecution established the circumstantial evidence proving
that YYY had sexual intercourse with his own daughter against the latter's will.

Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.18 

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the requirements of
circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction, viz.:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
 (a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To summarize, there are several circumstantial evidence that establish that YYY raped his own
daughter AAA:

1. YYY hit her on the head to make her lose consciousness;

2. While unconscious, YYY raped her; thus, AAA's vagina was in pain when she
woke up;

3. YYY threatened AAA not to report the incident; otherwise, he would kill her and
her family;

4. When she woke up, AAA positively identified YYY as the perpetrator because of
his height and voice; and

5. The medico-legal report corroborate that AAA had healed hymenal lacerations at
the 4 & 7 o'clock positions and her vagina admits a tip of a finger easily, which
indicate repeated sexual intercourse. It was also established that AAA could have
been raped more than ten (10) years before the examination, which covers the
March 1993 incident.

The combination of all these pieces of circumstantial evidence prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime of
qualified rape. The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA, who was merely fifteen (15) years old at
the time of the rape incident, should be given full force and credence

On the other hand, YYY merely presented the defense of denial and alibi. 

Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the
child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 35

Here, YYY failed to present any evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at the house of AAA,
when the rape incident happened, and also at XXX, Cagayan. Hence, his defense of alibi must also fail.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 31, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 07664 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Others RAPE

Court’s guide in Rape Cases:

1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be
innocent; 

(2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and 

(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 15

The elements of Rape under Article 266-A(l)(a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B(l) of the
RPC if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. 17
 DELAY IN REPORTING

The Court finds that the delay in reporting the incident does not weaken AAA's testimony since YYY
threatened to kill her, and because YYY had moral ascendancy over AAA as he was her father . Delay in
revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of
belief.29 This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh
glare of public scrutiny.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 215341

Date: November 28, 2016

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: MARLON MANSON y RESULTAY

Doctrine:  Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden.

 Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of
the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the requirements of circumstantial evidence that
is sufficient for conviction.

 The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

 The credibility of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide
such question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. Verily, absent any evidence that it was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, the
lower court’s assessment is entitled to great weight, if not conclusive or binding on the Court.

 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that
each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence. (Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84 [2014])

Antecedent
Facts: This case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Marlon Manson was accused of raping AAA, a girl aged eight (8). 

Petitioner’s AAA testified that she was born on April 24, 1998. On the afternoon of December 10, 2006, AAA’s mother
version: sent her on an errand in order to buy Milo at a store. On her way back home, she met Manson near a vacant
lot. He asked AAA to help him look for eggs in the grassy place. Once there, Manson suddenly strangled her
from the back, rendering her unconscious. When she woke up, she found herself near the spring at the lower
portion of the grassy place. She felt pain in her genitals and in her neck. Later, she discovered that her
genitals were bleeding. Due to the pain, AAA crawled her way home, leaving bruises on her palms and
knees. When she reached her house at around 6:00 p.m., her mother, BBB, saw that AAA’s face and neck
were bluish. When asked what happened to her, AAA answered, “Pangga (Manson’s nickname) strangled
me.” BBB likewise noticed that AAA’s pants were drenched. When she checked and pulled her pants down,
she was shocked to see that her daughter’s genitals were bleeding profusely. BBB then changed AAA’s
clothes and they proceeded to the Benguet General Hospital. At the hospital, the medical staff had to stitch
AAA’s genitalia as she suffered a one (1)-inch laceration. AAA likewise suffered hematoma in her neck and
was bleeding in the eye area.
Respondent’s For his defense, Manson denied that he raped AAA. He alleged that on the afternoon of December 10, 2006,
version: he had a drinking session with his 2 uncles in their house in Lower Fairview, Baguio City. When they finished
at around 5:00 p.m., he accompanied one of his uncles to wait for a ride. While waiting, they consumed a
bottle of Red Horse beer. Then he hailed a taxi for his uncle and proceeded to walk back home where he
went straight to bed. On December 11, 2006, at about 1:00 p.m., he was in La Trinidad, Benguet selling fish
when two (2) police officers approached and invited him to go with them. They then brought him to a room of
a child at the Benguet General Hospital. The police officers then told the child to point at him. He also learned
that he was being accused of raping said child and the officers were forcing him to admit to the accusation.
Further, he pointed out that Pangga did not only pertain to him but to all of them in their household since they
were all Pangasinenses.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: On September 29, 2010, the RTC found Manson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape as
defined under Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 8353 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P14,439.25 as actual damages.

Manson appealed before the CA.

CA Ruling: On October 13, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as to the amount of damages
where the amount of P30,000.00 was also awarded to AAA as exemplary damages in addition to the actual,
moral and civil damages already awarded by the Family Court.

Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SC Ruling: The Court dismisses the appeal for lack of merit.

From the testimony of the very young complainant, the prosecution was
able to firmly establish the elements of the crime of statutory rape. Statutory rape is committed when (1) the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of her,
regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or
consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only pertinent concern is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge indeed took place.

At bar, AAA’s birth certificate would show that she was merely eight (8) years old when she was violated.
While the second element, that Manson had carnal knowledge of AAA, was evidenced by the testimony of
the victim herself. The medical report likewise clearly shows that AAA suffered a fourth (4th)-degree
laceration in her anogenital area which could have been caused by a blunt object, usually the male sexual
organ. It has been held that when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge, and that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
Here, the examining physician found that the laceration was about 1 1/2 inches deep, which even reached
AAA’s anal area. 

It is settled that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally left unseen and very often, only
the victim is left to testify for herself. However, the accused may still be proven as the culprit despite the
absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.

The evidence adduced against Manson constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair and reasonable
conclusion that he was indeed the perpetrator of the crime. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. This was satisfactorily established in the case at bar. 

While Manson claims that it was not only him who was called Pangga, AAA, in addition to referring to him as
Pangga, likewise pointed at him as the culprit when she was in the hospital just a day after the incident.
There is therefore no cogent reason to reverse the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility, as affirmed
by the CA. When it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court on such matter will not be
disturbed unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility of the witnesses is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard them and
observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Verily, absent any evidence that
it was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, the lower court’s assessment is entitled to great weight,
if not conclusive or binding on the Court. Lastly, where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS with
MODIFICATION the Decision dated October 13, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H. C. No.
05340 finding accused-appellant Marlon Manson y Resultay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
8353. The Court sentences Manson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of
P14,439.25 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and another
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Others The award of exemplary damages was increased from PhP50,000.00 to PhP75,000.00 based on recent
jurisprudence.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 215341

Date: November 28, 2016

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: MARLON MANSON y RESULTAY

Doctrine:  Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden.

 Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of
the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the requirements of circumstantial evidence that
is sufficient for conviction.

 The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

 The credibility of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide
such question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. Verily, absent any evidence that it was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, the
lower court’s assessment is entitled to great weight, if not conclusive or binding on the Court.

 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that
each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence. (Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84 [2014])

Antecedent
Facts: This case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Marlon Manson was accused of raping AAA, a girl aged eight (8). 

Petitioner’s AAA testified that she was born on April 24, 1998. On the afternoon of December 10, 2006, AAA’s mother
version: sent her on an errand in order to buy Milo at a store. On her way back home, she met Manson near a vacant
lot. He asked AAA to help him look for eggs in the grassy place. Once there, Manson suddenly strangled her
from the back, rendering her unconscious. When she woke up, she found herself near the spring at the lower
portion of the grassy place. She felt pain in her genitals and in her neck. Later, she discovered that her
genitals were bleeding. Due to the pain, AAA crawled her way home, leaving bruises on her palms and
knees. When she reached her house at around 6:00 p.m., her mother, BBB, saw that AAA’s face and neck
were bluish. When asked what happened to her, AAA answered, “Pangga (Manson’s nickname) strangled
me.” BBB likewise noticed that AAA’s pants were drenched. When she checked and pulled her pants down,
she was shocked to see that her daughter’s genitals were bleeding profusely. BBB then changed AAA’s
clothes and they proceeded to the Benguet General Hospital. At the hospital, the medical staff had to stitch
AAA’s genitalia as she suffered a one (1)-inch laceration. AAA likewise suffered hematoma in her neck and
 was bleeding in the eye area.

Respondent’s For his defense, Manson denied that he raped AAA. He alleged that on the afternoon of December 10, 2006,
version: he had a drinking session with his 2 uncles in their house in Lower Fairview, Baguio City. When they finished
at around 5:00 p.m., he accompanied one of his uncles to wait for a ride. While waiting, they consumed a
bottle of Red Horse beer. Then he hailed a taxi for his uncle and proceeded to walk back home where he
went straight to bed. On December 11, 2006, at about 1:00 p.m., he was in La Trinidad, Benguet selling fish
when two (2) police officers approached and invited him to go with them. They then brought him to a room of
a child at the Benguet General Hospital. The police officers then told the child to point at him. He also learned
that he was being accused of raping said child and the officers were forcing him to admit to the accusation.
Further, he pointed out that Pangga did not only pertain to him but to all of them in their household since they
were all Pangasinenses.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: On September 29, 2010, the RTC found Manson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape as
defined under Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 8353 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P14,439.25 as actual damages.

Manson appealed before the CA.

CA Ruling: On October 13, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as to the amount of damages
where the amount of P30,000.00 was also awarded to AAA as exemplary damages in addition to the actual,
moral and civil damages already awarded by the Family Court.

Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SC Ruling: The Court dismisses the appeal for lack of merit.

From the testimony of the very young complainant, the prosecution was
able to firmly establish the elements of the crime of statutory rape. Statutory rape is committed when (1) the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of her,
regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or
consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only pertinent concern is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge indeed took place.

At bar, AAA’s birth certificate would show that she was merely eight (8) years old when she was violated.
While the second element, that Manson had carnal knowledge of AAA, was evidenced by the testimony of
the victim herself. The medical report likewise clearly shows that AAA suffered a fourth (4th)-degree
laceration in her anogenital area which could have been caused by a blunt object, usually the male sexual
organ. It has been held that when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge, and that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
Here, the examining physician found that the laceration was about 1 1/2 inches deep, which even reached
AAA’s anal area. 

It is settled that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally left unseen and very often, only
the victim is left to testify for herself. However, the accused may still be proven as the culprit despite the
absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.

The evidence adduced against Manson constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair and reasonable
conclusion that he was indeed the perpetrator of the crime. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. This was satisfactorily established in the case at bar. 

While Manson claims that it was not only him who was called Pangga, AAA, in addition to referring to him as
Pangga, likewise pointed at him as the culprit when she was in the hospital just a day after the incident.
There is therefore no cogent reason to reverse the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility, as affirmed
by the CA. When it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court on such matter will not be
disturbed unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility of the witnesses is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard them and
observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Verily, absent any evidence that
it was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, the lower court’s assessment is entitled to great weight,
if not conclusive or binding on the Court. Lastly, where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and
 their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS with
MODIFICATION the Decision dated October 13, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H. C. No.
05340 finding accused-appellant Marlon Manson y Resultay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
8353. The Court sentences Manson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of
P14,439.25 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and another
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Others The award of exemplary damages was increased from PhP50,000.00 to PhP75,000.00 based on recent
jurisprudence.