Case Citation: G.R. No.

140027

Date: March 18, 2002

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

Respondents: BIENVENIDO VALINDO, Accused-Appellant.

Doctrine:

Antecedent On December 5, 1997, Dr. Manuel C. Aves, the Medico-Legal Officer of

Facts: the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory, Office 3,
Malolos, Bulacan, conducted a physical examination on Jewelyn. His
Medico-Legal Report dated December 5, 1997, indicates that her genital
showed multiple, fresh healed lacerations at 3, 5, 9 and 12 o’clock
positions, with abrasion and congestion at the hymenal wall sustained
recently. He explained that the lacerations in her vagina were caused by
the penetration therein of a male organ or any hard object. When
interviewed, Jewelyn confessed that she was raped by Bienvenido. 

Accused Bievenido Valindo denied having raped Jewelyn in November,

1997. He admitted that he is the live-in partner of Ramona Franco,
Jewelyn’s mother. From November to December 1997, he was in
Talacsan, San Rafael, Bulacan, as he was hired as caretaker by Nardo of
his mango trees. The distance between his work place and Baliuag where
the incident took place is only a 30-minute jeepney ride.

RTC Ruling: Ruled that accused is guilty. 

CA Ruling:

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty (YES)

SC Ruling: We meticulously reviewed the evidence of both the prosecution and the
defense and found that appellant, by force and intimidation, succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Jewelyn. She was telling the truth, as
observed by the trial court. We have consistently held that the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect and
weight on appeal as it is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their behavior and manner of testifying.
"The candid, straightforward and categorical narration by the complainant
bears the earmarks of truth and credibility.
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty
 considering that while the Information alleges that the victim is seven (7)
years old and that she is his stepdaughter, however, such special
qualifying circumstances were not proven by the prosecution. Specifically,
it failed to present the victim’s certificate of live birth. The allegation in the
Information that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant has not been
established. The prosecution failed to prove that appellant and Jewelyn’s
mother were married. Thus, only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed on Appellant.

Case Citation: G.R. 142556

Date: February 5, 2003

Petitioners: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Jesus Perez y Sebunga

Doctrine: Section 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, oral or written, made by

[the] party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was
not, in fact, made.

Antecedent ● On 17 January 1997, Mayia was on her way home when appellant
Facts: approached her and introduced himself to her as “Johnny”. After,
he strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. This caused her to
fall down.
o The appellant lowered his denim pants while removing
Mayia’s underwear. He then inserted his penis inside
Mayia’s vagina. The latter felt pain in her private parts but
was unable to repel her aggressor.
o After, appellant raised his pants and ran away.
o Mayia stood up and sought help by going to the neighbor’s
house. Virginia saw a confused Mayia with blood dripping
from her private parts and thighs. When asked what
happened, Mayia responded with “ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako”
o Later, Sps. Ponesca, Mayia’s parents, brought her to the
hospital for medical examination. She was examined and a
medico-legal certificate was issued.
 ● The Provincial Prosecutor filed an information charging the
appellant with the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the RPC in
relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III RA 7610.
o Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
● During pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the
following facts:
1. Identity of the accused
2. Accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity
3. Victim in this case, Mayia, was born on 23 May 1990 as
evidenced by her birth certificate
4. After the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal
examination and a certificate was issued.

MTC/RTC Found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Ruling: Statutory Rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was only
6 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. He is to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.

CA Ruling: Automatic Review **

Respondent’s Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was
Contention: highly irregular. He pointed out that prosecutor had already identified him
as the man wearing orange shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to
identify her alleged rapist. In addition, he stressed that when Mayia
identified him in open court, she referred to him as “Johnny” and did
not give any description or any identifying mark. Finally, he claims
that he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the arrest
and such should have been done with the usual police line-up.

Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the
appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. – No.

SC Ruling: Leading Questions

● As a rule, leading questions are not allowed but the rules admit of
exceptions such as when the witness is a child of tender years as it
is difficult to state facts without prompting or suggestions.
o Here, the trial court was justified in allowing leading
questions as Mayia was obviously young and unlettered,
making the recall of events difficult if not uncertain.
● Procedural laws give wide latitude to the courts in exercising
 control over the questioning of a child witness. Leadings questions
in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will
further the interests of justice.

Mayia’s identification in open court

● Mayia’s identification in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels
any doubt as to the proper identification of appellant. She was able
to positively identify and point out the appellant as her rapist. The
Court was satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient
identification of her rapist.
● Mayia’s simple, positive, and straightforward recounting on the
witness stand of her experience lends credence to her accusation.
In a number of SC cases, when a woman or child victim says that
she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show
that rape was indeed committed.

Mayia’s Minority
● At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory
disposition of the criminal case. During such, the prosecution
marked in evidence Mayia’s birth certificate and the same was
submitted for evidence. The trial court admitted said evidence
without any objection from the defense.
● According to the rules, facts stipulated and evidence admitter
during pre-trial bind the parties.
● In addition, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. At
the cross examination, she testified that she was 8 years old last
May 23. By deduction, since Mayia was born on 23 May 1990, she
was about 6 years and 7 months old on the day the crime took
place.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I,
finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer the death penalty, 40
and ordering him to pay the victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Case Citation: G.R. No. 138258

Date: January 18, 2002

Petitioners: EDDIE HERRERA, ERNESTO T. TIJING, and CONRADO BOLLOS

Respondents: TEODORA BOLLOS and RICO GO

Doctrine: The trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case.
Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent
could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting
evidence. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard
thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the
premises in question without supporting evidence.

Antecedent Teodora Bollos commenced before the MTC of Bayawan-Basay Civil Case
Facts: No. 993, for forcible entry, solely against Eddie Herrera alleging that the
latter, sometime in 1993, through stealth and strategy and taking
advantage of her absence, entered and occupied her Sugarland.

Petitioner’s Teodora claims to have inherited said parcel, being the only heir, from her
Contention: deceased father, Alfonso Bollos.

Respondent’s Defendant, Eddie Herrera, denied the allegations against him maintaining
Contention: that he entered and occupied not Lot No. 20, as claimed by Teodora, but
Lot No. 21, which is owned by Conrado Bollos, a brother of Teodora’s
father.
Further, Herrera said that his occupation of the property was not through
stealth or strategy but by virtue of a contract of lease executed between
Conrado Bollos, as lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is Tijings
overseer on the land.

MTC Ruling: Plaintiffs failed to make-out a forcible entry case because of lack of
jurisdiction the case is hereby DISMISSED.

RTC Ruling: On Appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 12014, the challenged verdict was reversed:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by plaintiffs-appellants, judgment is hereby
rendered restoring Lot No. 20, GSS-615 to the plaintiffs and ejecting the
defendants from the said parcel of land. Defendants-appellees are
condemned to solidarily pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
 Actual Damages P50,000.00;
Moral Damages P25,000.00
Attorneys Fees - P 5,000.00

Reasonable rental/month from the date of this judgment of P2,000.00 and

to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.

CA Ruling The appealed decision is hereby affirmed, except that the award of

actual and moral damages therein contained are deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Issue: Is the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second amended
complaint impleading a new defendant filed beyond one year from
dispossession alleging a case of forcible entry in the original action?

May the regional trial court award moral and exemplary damages against
defendants in an appeal from a dismissal of the case for forcible entry by
the lower court? 

SC Ruling: We deny the petition.

SC emphasized the basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the
time of its filing, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ complaint, both original and amended,
contains sufficient allegations constituting an action for forcible entry.
It is established that plaintiffs were in peaceful, adverse, continuous
possession of the property until the commission of the act or acts of
dispossession or deprivation by the defendant. Defendant pursuant to an
avaricious intent of enriching himself at the expense of the plaintiffs,
through stealth and strategy, and taking advantage of the absence of the
latter, entered and occupied the property in question and without any legal
justification therefore, fertilized the sugar cane rations growing thereon and
planted the vacant portions with sugar cane.
Thus, we find that the complaint alleged prior physical possession de
facto which the defendants disturbed by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth, against the will or without the consent of the plaintiffs, sufficient
to constitute a cause of action for forcible entry.
On the second issue, the concept of damages in an action for forcible
entry and detainer cases is well defined in several cases. These damages
mean rents or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, or fair rental value of the property. Temperate, actual, moral
and exemplary are neither rents nor reasonable compensation for the use
 and occupation of the premises, nor fair rental value, and are not
recoverable in such cases.
In this case, the municipal trial court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, and the regional trial court reversed the dismissal but rendered
judgment ejecting the defendants from the parcel of land involved, and
condemning them to pay damages and attorneys fees. This is not correct.
In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded to the municipal trial court
for further proceedings. The regional trial court in reversing an appealed
case dismissing the action cannot decree the eviction of the defendants
and award damages. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter
in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must allow the parties to be heard
thereon. Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the
premises in question without supporting evidence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court DENIES the petition. However, the Court
SETS ASIDE the decisions of the Court of Appeals[18 and the Regional
Trial Court. The Court remands the case to the municipal trial court for
further proceedings.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 166259

Date: November 12, 2012

Petitioners: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION

Doctrine: BRION, J.:

The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the nature of land in question
without the requisite hearing

the parties must be given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature
of the property before the court a quo can take judicial notice of the
commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding.

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with

caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
 another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed
with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge
of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.

Antecedent Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered

Facts: owner of a parcel of agricultural land under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares, situated in “Curvada, Caintagan,
Masbate.” HFC voluntarily offered its land to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for coverage under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per
hectare. Pursuant to the rules and regulations governing the CARL, the
government, through the DAR and the LBP, determined an acquirable and
compensable area of 27.5871 hectares, while 1.5095 hectares were
excluded for being hilly and underdeveloped.

Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency with the authority to determine land
valuation and compensation under the CARL, and using the guidelines set
forth in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, fixed the value of
the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation to
HFC.

HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it filed, a petition with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of
just compensation. In its petition, HFC claimed that the just compensation
for the land should be in the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare, considering
its location and productivity, or for an aggregate amount of P725,000.00.

While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for
Determination and Payment of Just Compensation with the RTC, praying
for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus attorney’s fees of ten percent
(10%) of the just compensation. HFC justified the direct filing with the SAC
by what it saw as unreasonable delay or official inaction. HFC claimed that
the DARAB disregarded Section 16 of RA 6657 which mandates that the
“DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.” The LBP meanwhile countered that HFC’s petition was
“premature and lacks a cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.”

Meanwhile, the DARAB issued a Decision affirming the LBP’s valuation.

Petitioner’s The LBP raised the threshold issue of whether the SAC had jurisdiction to
Contention: hear HFC’s complaint because of the pending DARAB proceedings,
 emphasizing that the completion of the administrative proceedings before
the DARAB is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint for the
determination of just compensation before the SAC.

That the SAC committed serious error when it failed to apply the “basic
formula” for determining just compensation, prescribed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994.

Respondent’s pendency of the DARAB proceedings has no bearing on the jurisdiction of

Contention: the SAC since Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the SAC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just
compensation. Second, it argues that jurisprudence allows resort to judicial
intervention without completing administrative remedies when there has
been unreasonable delay or official inaction, as in this case, on the part of
the administrative agency. Third, for the same reason, it contends that it
cannot be charged with forum shopping. Finally, it argues that strict
adherence to the formula prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1994, unduly “ties the hands of the SAC” in the determination of just
compensation.

MTC/RTC the RTC rendered a Judgment fixing the just compensation of the parcel of
Ruling: land owned by plaintiff Honeycomb Farms Corp. at P931,109.20 subject to
the lien for the docket fee of the amount in excess of P725,000.00 as
pleaded for by herein plaintiff in its complaint; Ordering the defendants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an attorney’s fee equivalent to 10% of
the total just compensation.

Both parties appealed to the CA.

CA Ruling: The CA, reversed the RTC Judgment and dismissed HFC’s complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies that Section 16(f) of RA 6657
requires.

On the LBP’s motion for reconsideration (to which a copy of the DARAB
Decision was attached), the CA, in its Amended Decision, proceeded to
decide the case on the merits and recalled its January 28, 2004 Decision.

The CA ruled that in expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to

which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. It noted that in order to arrive at the proper market value, several
factors such as the current value of like properties, their actual or potential
uses and their size, shape and location must be considered. The CA thus
concluded that the valuation made by the RTC was based on the evidence
on record since the latter considered the sketch plan of the property, the
 testimonies of the witnesses and the field reports of both parties. In
addition, the CA also deleted the award of attorney’s fees for lack of factual
and legal basis.

Issue: WON SAC properly acquired jurisdiction over HFC’s complaint for the
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the DARAB
proceedings ? YES

SC Ruling: We find the LBP’s petition meritorious.

The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction over HFC’s complaint for the
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the
DARAB proceedings

The DARAB does not “exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just
compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in
nature.”

Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and

adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction
of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in
the courts.

HFC is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of
multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the
purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not
in one court, then in another.

In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third
element of litis pendentia is lacking. As previously mentioned, the
DARAB’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The
courts, in this case, the SAC, will still have to review with finality the
determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
Thus, it becomes clear that there is no identity between the two cases such
that a judgment by the DARAB, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the case before the SAC.

In the present case, the evil sought to be prevented by the prohibition on

forum shopping, i.e., the possibility of conflicting decisions, is lacking since
the DARAB determination is merely preliminary and is not binding on the
parties; such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
law, in fact, allows the landowner to file a case for the determination of just
compensation with the SAC without the necessity of first filing the same
with the DARAB. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the HFC
cannot be charged with forum shopping.

To determine just compensation, the SAC must take into

consideration the factors prescribed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and is
obliged to apply the DAR formula

The CA, in affirming the SAC’s valuation and disregarding that of the LBP,
briefly held:
In the instant case, the trial court based its valuation of the property at
P32,000.00 per hectare on the evidence submitted by the parties, such as
the sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of witnesses, and the field
investigation reports of both parties. Hence, herein litigants cannot claim
that the valuation made by the court was not based on the evidence on
record.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, a recent

case with substantially the same factual antecedents and the same
respondent company, we categorically ruled that the CA and the RTC
grievously erred when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR,
and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the
land in question.

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.

To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the

factors that have to be taken into consideration to accurately determine just
compensation.

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just

compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the Government to
the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we recognized that the DAR,
as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the agrarian
reform program, already came up with a formula to determine just
compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of
RA 6657.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies

to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of
law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of
the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As
such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in
this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is
declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

As the law now stands, it is clear that the SAC is duty bound to take into
consideration the factors fixed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and apply the
basic formula prescribed and laid down in the pertinent administrative
regulations, in this case, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992,
as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, to
determine just compensation. In the present case, we thus find no difficulty
in concluding that the CA and the RTC, acting as a SAC, seriously erred
when they effectively eschewed the basic formula prescribed by the DAR
regulations and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the
valuation of the land in question.

The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the nature of land in question
without the requisite hearing

Separately from disregarding the basic formula prescribed by the DAR, it

has also not escaped our notice that the SAC also erred in concluding that
the subject land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is commercial in nature,
after taking judicial notice that it is “situated near the commercial district of
Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate.” In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we categorically ruled that the parties
must be given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of
the property before the court a quo can take judicial notice of the
commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding.
 Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case.

in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco [464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004)]: The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution
especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say
that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action.

The present case must be remanded to the court of origin for the
determination of just compensation in accordance Section 17 of RA
6657 and applicable DAR regulations

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Others

Case Citation: SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD. v. CIR

G.R. No. 184398

Date: 25 February 2010

Petitioners: SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD.

Respondents: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Doctrine: Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a previous
case cannot be adopted in a separate case pending before the same
court without the same being offered and identified anew.

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x
x x’. It is an elementary rule in law that documents shall not be
admissible in evidence unless and until the original copies itself are
offered or presented for verification in cases where mere copies are
offered, save for the exceptions provided for by law. Petitioner thus
cannot hide behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its
responsibility of properly complying with the rules of evidence. For
failure of herein petitioner to compare the subject documents with its
originals, the same may not be admitted.

Antecedent PETITIONER, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of

Facts: Singapore, is an online international carrier plying the Singapore-
Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes.

Petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of
P3,983,590.49 in excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid on
its purchases of aviation jet fuel from Petron Corporation from June
to December 2000. Petitioner used as basis BIR Ruling No. 339-92
which declared its Singapore-Cebu-Singapore route is an
international flight by an international carrier and that the petroleum
products purchased by the petitioner should not be subject to excise
taxes under Section 135 of the 1997 NIRC.

Since the BIR took no action in the said claim, Petitioner filed a
petition for review with the CTA.

Petitioner’s It has proven its authority to operate in PH with the admission of its
Contention: Foreign Air Carrier’s Permit (FACP) as Exhibit B

Exhibits P, Q, and R, which it previously filed with the CTA, were

merely flight schedules submitted to the CAB, and were not its
operating permits. It was through inadvertence that only photocopies
of these exhibits were introduced during the hearing.

Despite its failure to present the original copy of its SEC Registration
during the hearings, the CTA should take judicial notice of its SEC
Registration since the same was already offered and admitted in
evidence in similar cases pending before the CTA

Respondent’s The admission in evidence of petitioner’s FACP does not change the
Contention: fact that petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence the original
 copies or certified true copies of Exhibits A, P, Q, and R. Hence,
Petitioner’s failure to prove its authority to operate in PH.

MTC/RTC N/A
Ruling:

CA Ruling: CTA First Division ruled that Petitioner is not entitled to the
exemption for failure to present proof that it was authorized to
operate in the Philippines during the period material to the case due
to the non-admission of some of its exhibits, which were merely
photocopies, including:
● Exhibit A – Petitioner’s Certificate of Registration with the
SEC
● Exhibits P,Q,R – operating permits issued by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB)

CTA En Banc affirmed the First Division’s decision.

Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has substantially proven its authority

to operate in the Philippines

SC Ruling: NO. Petition is denied.

The Supreme Court cited the decision of the CTA En Banc:

"Each and every case is distinct and separate in character and

matter although similar parties may have been involved. Thus, in a
pending case, it is not mandatory upon the courts to take judicial
notice of pieces of evidence which have been offered in other cases
even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same
court. Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in
a previous case cannot be adopted in a separate case pending
before the same court without the same being offered and
identified anew.

The cases cited by petitioner concerned similar parties before the

same court but do not cover the same claim. A court is not
compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered
and admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly
offered or have accordingly complied with the requirements on
the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in
the previous cases cannot be considered in this instant case
without being offered in evidence.
 Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that hearing is necessary before judicial notice may be
taken by the courts.

Furthermore, petitioner admitted that Exhibit ‘A’ have (sic) been

offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases involving the same
subject matter filed before this Court. Thus, petitioner is and should
have been aware of the rules regarding the offering of any
documentary evidence before the same can be admitted in court.

As regards Exhibit[s] ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’, the original copies of these
documents were not presented for comparison and verification in
violation of Section 3 of Rule 130 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court. The said section specifically provides that ‘when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself x x x’. It is an
elementary rule in law that documents shall not be admissible
in evidence unless and until the original copies itself are
offered or presented for verification in cases where mere copies
are offered, save for the exceptions provided for by law.
Petitioner thus cannot hide behind the veil of judicial notice so
as to evade its responsibility of properly complying with the
rules of evidence. For failure of herein petitioner to compare the
subject documents with its originals, the same may not be
admitted."

Mere identification of the documents and the markings thereof as

exhibits do not confer evidentiary weight on them as said documents
have not been formally offered by petitioner and have been denied
admission in evidence by the CTA.
The documents are not among the matters which the law
mandatorily requires the Court to take judicial notice of, without any
introduction of evidence, as petitioner would have the CTA do.

Neither could it be said that the SEC Registration and operating

permits from the CAB are documents which are of public knowledge,
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
the judges because of their judicial functions, in order to allow the
CTA to take discretionary judicial notice

Others
Case G.R. No. 231989
Citation:

Date: September 4, 2018

Plaintiff- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

appellee:

Accused- ROMY LIM y MIRANDA

appellant:

Doctrine:
● It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three
witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal
drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of

arrest was a remote area;

(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the

seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of
the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;

(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the

punishable acts sought to be apprehended;

(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or

media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile
through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of
being charged with arbitrary detention; or

(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug

operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary

witnesses must be proven.

● Judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures

related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant;
hence, subject to inquest proceedings.

Antecedent
Facts: ● An Information was filed charging Romy Lim with illegal
 possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and in
illegal sale of shabu with his stepson, Eldie Gorres.

(Prosecution Version)

● Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI), a certain

"Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in
Cagayan de Oro City.
● A buy-bust operation was planned.
o IO2 Vincenct Orcales – team leader; 
o IO1 Albert Orellan - arresting officer/back-up/evidence
custodian; and 
o IO1 Nestle Carin - poseur-buyer
o The team prepared P500 peso as buy bust money

● A buy-bust operation was conducted in the house of Romy

● CI knocked at the door. Eldie Gorres came out and invited them
to enter. The CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer.
● Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom
● After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who
then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu
and gave it to IO1 Carin.
● IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money and gave the pre-
arranged signal (missed call) to IO1 Orellan
● The latter and other members rushed to the house, arrested
Lim and Gorres and conducted a full body search on both.
o buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic
box about 3x4 inches in size containing plastic sachet of
white substance was recovered from Lim
o No weapon or illegal drug was seized from Gorres
● IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill and the plastic
box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a
disposable lighter.
o IO1 Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she
bought from Lim.
● While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets.
● Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the
representative from the media and barangay officials, nobody
arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
● IO1 Orellan took possession of the seized items.
● The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA
Regional Office.
● The 2 accused were booked and the drug testing and
laboratory examination of the drug evidence were requested.
● Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the
 confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also,
there was no signature of an elected public official and the
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
media as witnesses
● IO1 Orellan turned over the seized drugs to PSI Caceres for
laboratory examination which confirmed the presence of shabu.
● PSI Caceres marked the sachets of shabu and turned over to
evidence custodian
● The buy bust money was turned over to the fiscal for inquest.

(Defense Version)

● Lim was sleeping

● Gorres watchning television
● The police suddenly and forcefully entered the house and
arrested Gorres and later inquired the whereabouts of Lim who
was sleeping in the bedroom
● The police went to the bedroom and pointed gun at Lim to
which he questioned their actions but was ordered to keep
quiet.
● He was read the miranda rights and both of them were brought
to the PDEA office.
● During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the
assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu
due to his fear of imprisonment

Plaintiff-
appellee
Contention:

Accused- Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing
appellant that the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated in Section
Contention: 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: ● the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession
and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient
evidence linking him as a conspirator
● evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the
feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim.
● As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to
establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to
the seller, and the delivery of the shabu.
● On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral
certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the
integrity and probative value of the seized items.
● For Gorres, the evidence presented were not strong enough to
 support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and
Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the
box contained.
● Chemistry Report indicated that Gorres was "NEGATIVE" of the
presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

CA Ruling: ● CA affirmed the RTC Decision

● prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal
sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented
during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted
● all the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug was
proven
● it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised. The
witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on every link
in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain
from the time the seized items were first discovered until they
were brought for examination and offered in evidence in court

Issue: ● Whether or not there is sufficient evidence showing that the

procedure mandated in Section 21 (1), Article II of RA No. 9165
was followed.
● (Pertaining to judicial notice) Whether or not Judicial Notice was
taken by the Court on the warrantless arrest and seizures
relating to drugs cases

SC Ruling:
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of
the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in
instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers
and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action
of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-
assault. The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box
with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter.
IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought
from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic
sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the
marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu. To ensure
that .they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold
by Lim to 101 Carin and the one that he recovered from his
possession upon body search with both bearing his initial/signature.
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and
representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures
do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses

must be proven. In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of
the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it
was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait
at Lim's house. ORcales admitted that there are times when they do
not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they might
leak the confidential information. We are of the view that these
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply with the law.

Judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures

related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant;
hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1
(A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations
directs:

A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of

noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No.
9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn
statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as
the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for
operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and
(b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears

that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus,
in order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested
docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the
following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing

officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section
21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the

apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated
items.
 3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in
the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must
refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine
the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence,

the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a
commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright
for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112,
Rules of Court.

Romy Lim is acquitted and ordered to be immediately released.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 221732

Date: August 23, 2017

Petitioners: FERNANDO U. JUAN, petitioner

Respondents: ROBERTO U. JUAN (substituted by his son JEFFREY C. JUAN) and

LAUNDROMATIC CORPORATION, respondents

Doctrine: Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take
and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put
differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.

Antecedent PERALTA, J.:

Facts:
● (1994) Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the
name and mark “Lavandera Ko” in his laundry business. The National
Library issued to him a certificate of copyright over said name and mark.
His laundry business expanded with numerous franchise outlets in Metro
Manila and other provinces.

● (1997) Respondent Roberto then formed “Laundromatic Corporation

(Laundromatic)” a corporation to handle the said business, while
“Lavandera Ko” was registered as a business name on 1998 with the
DTI.
 ● However, respondent Roberto discovered that his brother, petitioner
Fernando was able to register the name and mark “Lavandera Ko” with
the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on October 18, 2001, the
registration of which was filed in1995. Thus, respondent Roberto filed a
petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of copyright,
cancellation of trademark and name against petitioner Fernando.

RTC Ruling: Both respondent Roberto and petitioner Fernando are guilty of making
representations & ordered the National Library & the IPO to cancel the
Certificate of Registration issued to respondent and petitioner.

● That neither of the parties has the right to use and enjoy “Lavandera Ko”
because the copyright of “Lavandera Ko,” a song composed in 1942 by
Santiago S. Suarez belongs to the latter.
● That both parties failed to prove how they have created this alleged work
before registering it with the National Library and the Intellectual Property
Office, hence their claim of ownership of the word “Lavandera Ko” is not
conclusive or herein parties are both great pretenders and imitators.

CA Ruling: Dismissed petitioner Fernando’s appeal

Petitioner’s ● That the RTC erred in giving credence to the article of information it
Contention: obtained from the internet stating that the Filipino folk song
“Lavandera Ko” was a composition of Suarez in 1942 rather than
the actual pieces of evidence presented by the parties. As such,
according to petitioner, such information acquired by the RTC is hearsay
because no one was presented to testify on the veracity of such
article.

Issue: WON the RTC’s basis, an article appearing in a website, in ruling that a song
entitled “Lavandera Ko,” can be considered a subject of judicial notice that does
not need further authentication or verification. – NO.

SC Ruling: ● Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may
properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already
known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is
based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing
evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are
not bona fide disputed.

● Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the
taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.—A court shall take judicial

 notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may take judicial

notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.

● The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.

● Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.

o The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to

be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety.

o Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a

reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

● To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he
is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally
or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.
 ● Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may
be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known,
and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person.

● HERE, the article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a
requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court because such
article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or
uncertain. It must be remembered that some articles appearing in the
internet or on websites are easily edited and their sources are
unverifiable, thus, sole reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.

Others: The SC remanded this case to the RTC.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 195908

Date:  August 15 2018

Petitioners: JOSE A. BERNAS AND THE WHARTON RESOURCES GROUP

(PHILIPPINES), INC.

Respondents: THE ESTATE OF FELIPE YU HAN YAT, REPRESENTED BY

HERO T. YU

Doctrine: SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take

judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.

Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the

adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been
 tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.

It is true that the said rule admits of exceptions, namely:

(a) In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience

to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or

(b) when the original record of the former case or any part of it,
is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties,
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.

Antecedent The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 824-A-4,
Facts: covered by TCT No. RT-28758 (30627) PR-9639 (TCT No. 30627),
located at Brgy. Matandang Balara, Quezon City, consisting of
30,000 square meters, more or less, which is part of Lot 824 of the
Piedad Estate containing an area of 147,072 square meters
registered in the name of respondent Felipe Yu Han Yat.

Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots under

Subdivision Plan Psd-13-018013, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands on August 13, 1991, as part of his plan to develop and
convert the subject property. As a consequence, TCT No. 30627
was cancelled and derivative titles, namely TCT Nos. 47294 to
47353 (Yu Han Yat TCTs), were issued in his name.

To finance his plan of developing the subject property, Yu Han Yat

applied for loans with several banks using some of the Yu Han Yat
TCTs as security. However, when the mortgage instruments were
presented for registration, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
refused to record the same on the ground that the Yu Han Yat TCTs
overlapped with the boundaries covered by another title: TCT No.
336663 registered in the name of Esperanza Nava (Nava).
However, in Consulta No. 2038 issued on October 15, 1992, the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the action taken by the
Register of Deeds, and ordered the registration of the mortgage
instruments on Yu Han Yat's TCTs.

Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas (Bernas) and Felomena S.

Mejia (Mejia) claimed ownership over the subject property. They
claim that Nava was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 336663 until she sold parts of the said lot to
Mejia and Gregorio Galarosa (Galarosa). On September 15, 1986,
Mejia executed with Nava a Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption
by virtue of which Mejia acquired the real property covered by TCT
No. 336663, subject to Nava's right to redeem the same. When
Nava failed to redeem the property, Mejia then filed a petition
for consolidation of title under her name. The petition was granted in
a Decision dated June 28, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-90-5211
rendered by Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City.

Since TCT No. 336663 bore the annotation "subject to verification,"

the Register of Deeds of Quezon City referred the matter to the LRA
for consultation. In a Resolution dated March 15, 1991, in LRA
Consulta No. 1890, the LRA upheld the registrability of TCT No.
336663 in the name of Mejia. In LRA Consulta No. 1890, the LRA
reasoned that a court decision is needed to categorically determine
that the titles from which TCT No. 336663 were derived were
spurious before it could order that the encumbrance was not
registrable. Hence, the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption was
annotated on the title of the subject property.

On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton

Resources Group (Philippines), Inc. (Wharton), entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Mejia whereby the latter agreed to
sell to Wharton the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663.
Subsequently, a Deed of Sale was entered into between Mejia and
Wharton conveying to the latter the subject property.

In April 1992, Bernas discovered that there was another title

covering about three hectares which overlapped a portion of the
property registered under TCT No. 336663. This other title, TCT No.
30627, indicated Yu Han Yat as the registered owner pursuant to
subdivision plan Psd-2498 of a parcel of land located in
Bayanbayanan, Marikina.
 On June 24, 1992, Bernas filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu
Han Yat's TCTs, claiming that a Deed of Sale was executed
between himself, for and on behalf of Wharton, and Mejia over the
realty covered by TCT No. 336663 which overlaps portions covered
by Yu Han Yat's TCTs.

On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of

Deeds of Quezon City refused to record the subject mortgages
affecting the Yu Han Yat TCTs. This prompted Yu Han Yat to file
another consulta with the LRA which, in a Resolution dated October
15, 1992, ordered the registration of the mortgage to the properties.

Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for

Quieting of Title before the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-92-13609 against the Estate of Nava (represented by
Antonio N. Crismundo), Galarosa, Mejia, Bernas, and the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of Nava, et al.).

Petitioner’s Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting of Title before the RTC of
Contention: Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-13609 against the
Estate of Nava (represented by Antonio N. Crismundo), Galarosa,
Mejia, Bernas, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of
Nava, et al.).

Respondent’s Mejia then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims and

Contention: claimed, among others that, (a) Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627,
was invalid because it originated from TCT No. 8047, which was
issued on the basis of a spurious subdivision plan, Psd-2498; (b)
Psd-2498 was spurious because it represents to cover a parcel of
land located in Barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, whereas the actual
location of Lot 824 Piedad Estate was in Caloocan City and Quezon
City; and (c) the registrability of Mejia's rights and ownership over
the subject property was sustained by the LRA in LRA Consulta No.
1890.

Bernas also filed an Answer with Application for Injunctive Relief

dated December 10, 1992 to restrain Yu Han Yat from undertaking
development works on the subject property.

MTC/RTC The RTC issued a Decision ruling in favor of the Estate of Nava, et
Ruling: al., and Wharton.
CA Ruling: CA held that it is incorrect to state that TCT No. 30627, is a transfer
from Original Title (sic) No. 8047, when it is clear that it came from
Original Title No. 614, pursuant to Decree No. 6667. It is of judicial
notice that OCT No. 614, embraces many lots involving the Piedad
Estate which are located in Quezon City.

In further ruling in favor of Yu Han Yat, the CA held that TCT No.
336663, or the Nava TCT, was null and void by taking judicial notice
of other cases decided by it, specifically the case of CA-G.R. No.
77666, titled "Heirs of Dominga Sumulong y Roxas, represented by
Wilfredo Sumulong Torres v. Hon. Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 79, Quezon City, et al."

In its Decision, the CA granted Yu Han Yat's appeal and held that:
(a) the petition for quieting of title, and the petition for annulment of
title are essentially the same; and (b) Bernas and Mejia's title was
void as they source their ownership from Dominga Sumulong's title
to the property which had been declared as null and void by the CA
in previous cases. The CA also awarded actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of Yu
Han Yat.

Issue: 1. Whether or not CA can take judicial notice of the boundaries

of the subject title.
2. Whether or not CA can take judicial notice of proceedings
before it.

SC Ruling:
1. Yes, The CA was justified in taking judicial notice when
Quezon City was established. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court states:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court

shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature,
the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
(Emphasis supplied)

The CA correctly held that Quezon City was established only in

1939, upon the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 502, the city's
 charter. Hence, when the survey for Psd-2498 was conducted in
1927, Quezon City did not as yet exist. Further, the property in
question has always been referred to as part of the Piedad Estate.

The CA correctly took judicial notice of the fact that Quezon City
was not yet established at the time the survey for Psd-2498 was
conducted. Therefore, the Court so holds that Yu Han Yat's title,
TCT No. 30627, and Mejia and Bernas' title, TCT No. 336663, cover
the same property.

2. No. Neither of the exceptions exists in this case. The parties

were not informed, much less their consent taken, of the fact
that the CA would take judicial notice of these cases. Thus,
the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the records of CA-
G.R. No. 77666 in the process of adjudicating this case.

Nevertheless, despite this error, the result remains that Yu Han Yat
is the rightful owner of the subject property in light of the Court's
ruling that there is an overlap between the properties covered by the
two TCTs in question, and that the evidence showing Yu Han Yat's
title to be earlier means that Yu Han Yat holds better title.

In view of such ruling, the Court no longer sees the need to tackle
the issue of whether Yu Han Yat's payment of real property taxes
constitutes proof of ownership or superior title over the subject
property.

Others

Case GR No. 170867

Citation:

Date: December 04, 2018

G.R. No. Republic Of The Philippines, Represented By Raphael P.M. Lotilla, Secretary,
170867 Department Of Energy (Doe), Margarito B. Teves, Secretary, Department Of
Finance (Dof), And Romulo L. Neri, Secretary, Department Of Budget And
Management (Dbm), Petitioners, Vs. Provincial Government Of
 Palawan,Represented By Governor Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra, Respondent.

G.R. No. Bishop Pedro Dulay Arigo, Cesar N. Sarino, Dr. Jose Antonio N. Socrates, Prof.
185941 H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Petitioners, Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita, Hon. Energy Secretary Angelo T. Reyes, Hon. Finance Secretary
Margarito B. Teves, Hon. Budget And Management Secretary Rolando D.
Andaya, Jr., Hon. Palawan Governor Joel T. Reyes, Hon. Representative
Antonio C. Alvarez (1st District), Hon. Representative Abraham Mitra
(2nd District), Rafael E. Del Pilar, President And Ceo, Pnoc Exploration
Corporation, Respondents.

Doctrine:

Anteceden The Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project

t Facts: ● The Republic, through the Dept. of Energy, entered into Service Contract No. 38
with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated
(collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum
operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore
northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of
Palawan and 30 kms from the platform.
● The quantity of natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya was sufficient to justify the
pursuit of gas-to-power projects having an aggregate power-generating capacity
of approximately 3,000 megawatts operating at baseload for 20 to 25 years.
● Service Contract No. 38, as clarified by the Memorandum of Clarification between
the same parties dated Dec. 11, 1990, provides for a production sharing scheme
whereby the National Government was entitled to receive an amount equal to
60% of the net proceeds from the sale of petroleum (including natural gas)
produced from petroleum operations while SPEX/OXY, as service contractor, was
entitled to receive an amount equal to 40% of the net proceeds.
● The Contractor was subsequently composed of the consortium of SPEX, Shell
Philippines LLC, Chevron Malampaya LLC and Philippine National Oil Company-
Exploration Corporation (PNOC-EC).

Administrative Order No. 381

● Pres. Fidel V. Ramos issued AO 381 which, in part, stated that the Province of
Palawan was expected to receive about US$2.1B from the estimated US$8.1B
total government share from the project for the 20-year contract period.
● DoE Sec. Francisco L. Viray wrote Palawan Gov. Salvador P. Socrates,
requesting for the deferment of payment of 50% of Palawan's share in the project
for the first 7 years of operations, which it would use to pay for the National Power
Corporation's Take-or-Pay Quantity (TOPQ) obligations under the latter's Gas
Sale and Purchase Agreements with SPEX/OXY.
● On October 16, 2001, the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project was
inaugurated.
Palawan's Claim
● Asserted its claim over 40% of the Nat’l Govt's share in the proceeds of the
project. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction,
it is entitled to said share under Sec 290 of the LGC. The National Government
disputed this, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 kms from
Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and
is within the national territory of the Philippines.
● Negotiations took place with the Govt proposing to give Palawan 20% of said
proceeds after tax. This was unsuccessful. On March 14, 2003, in a letter to the
Secretaries of the DOE, DBM and DOF Palawan Gov. Mario Joel T. Reyes
reiterated his province's demand for the release of its 40% share. Attached to said
letter was a resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan calling off
further negotiations and authorizing Gov. Reyes to engage legal services to
prosecute the province's claim.

Civil Case No. 3779

● May 7, 2003: the Provincial Government of Palawan filed a petition for declaratory
relief against DoE Sec Perez, Jr., DoF Sec Camacho and DBM Sec Boncodin. It
sought judicial determination of its rights under A.O. No. 381, RA 7611 or the
Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, Sec 290 of RA 7160 or the
LGC and Provincial Ordinance No. 474 (series of 2000). It asked the RTC to
declare that the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir is part of the territorial
jurisdiction of Palawan and that the Palawan was entitled to receive 40% in the
proceeds of the project.
● The Republic maintained that Palawan was not entitled because the Camago-
Malampaya reservoir is outside its territorial jurisdiction. It postulated that
Palawan's territorial jurisdiction is limited to its land area and to the municipal
waters within 15 km from its coastline. It denied being estopped by the acts of
government officials who earlier acknowledged Palawan's share in the proceeds.

The Interim Agreement

● In 2005, DoE Sec Perez, Jr., DBM Sec Relampagos and DoF Sec Amatong, with
authority from Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, executed an Interim Agreement
with the Province of Palawan.
● The agreement provided for the equal sharing between the Nat’l Gov’t and the
Province of Palawan of 40% of (a) the funds already remitted to the Nat’l Gov’t
under Service Contract No. 38 and (b) the funds to be remitted to the Nat’l Gov’t
up the earlier of (i) the effective date of the final and executory judgment on the
petition by a court of competent jurisdiction on Case No. 3779, or (ii) June 30,
2010.
● The parties also agreed that the amount of P600 Million, previously released to
the Province of Palawan under E.O. Nos. 254 and 254-A, would be deducted from
the initial release of the province's 50% share. Furthermore, the release of funds
under the agreement would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the
parties in any legal dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction.
 ● Should Case 3779 be decided with finality in favor of either party, the Interim
Agreement treated the share which the prevailing party has received as financial
assistance to the other.
● The Province of Palawan claims that the National Government failed to fulfill their
commitments under the Interim Agreement and that it has not received its
stipulated share since it was signed.

MTC/RTC The RTC Rulings in Civil Case No. 3779

Ruling: ● Decided in favor of Palawan saying it was "unthinkable" to limit Palawan's
territorial jurisdiction to its landmass and municipal waters considering that the
LGC empowered them to protect the environment, and RA 7611 adopted a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing its natural resources and endangered
environment.
● Applying the principles of decentralization and devolution of powers to LGUs as
recognized in the 1987 Constitution, the State's resources must be shared with
the LGUs if they were expected to deliver basic services to their constituents and
to discharge their functions as agents of the State in enforcing laws, preserving
the integrity of the national territory and protecting the environment.
● The Regalian Doctrine could not be used by the Department Secretaries as a
shield to defeat the Constitutional provision giving LGUs an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth within their
respective areas. The doctrine is subject to this Constitutional limitation and the
40% LGU share set by the Local Government Code.
● Finally, the RTC noted that from 1992 to 1998, Palawan received a total of
P116,343,197.76 from collections derived from the West Linapacan Oil Fields, and
that former FVR issued A.O. No. 381 acknowledging Palawan's claim and share in
the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya project. Thus, by its previous actions
and issuances, the Government legally acknowledged Palawan's claim to the
proceeds and it was "too late in the day for [it] to take a 180-degree turn."

The Provincial Government of Palawan filed a motion to require the Secretaries of the
DoE, DoF and DBM to render a full accounting of actual payments made by SPEX to
the Bureau of Treasury from Oct. 1, 2001 to Dec. 2005, and to freeze and/or place
Palawan's 40% share in an escrow account. The aforesaid Secretaries filed an urgent
manifestation asserting that the motion was premature and should not be heard by
the RTC because the Republic still had 15 days to appeal.

The Provincial Government of Palawan countered that pending finality of the

Decision, there was a need to secure its 40% share over which it had a "vested and
inchoate right."

● The RTC subsequently issued an Order which individually or collectively

DIRECTED within 10 days from receipt of the Order pursuant to a "Freeze Order"
for SoE Lotilla to render a full accounting of the total gross collections derived by
the Nat’s Govt from Jan 2002 to Dec. 2005; for SoF Tevez to submit a full report
 on the actual payments made by Shell Spex from the same period deposited
under Special Account 151 of the Bureau of Treasure, DoF, including dates and
official receipts; for SoDBM NOT to issue not charge allotment release orders,
disbursements and cash allocation against the deposit/account Special Fund 151
corresponding to the 40% LOU share for the period same period pending the
finality of the decision in this case.
● They are also ordered to CEASE and DESIST from USING/DISBURSING the
40% share of the LOU-Palawan, for any other purpose, except in compliance with
the decision of this the Court.
● Furthermore, the Sec. Tevez and/or his subordinate officer Hon. Cruz Treasurer of
the Philippines, to deposit in escrow in the LandBank the fund/deposit to the 40%
disputed LOU share, identified as Special Account 151, and to "freeze" said
account, under pain of CONTEMPT, until finality.
● The RTC held that the motion for full accounting and freezing of Palawan's
claimed 40% share was actually part of the petition for review which sought to
declare the duties of the Government and the rights of Palawan, and that a
resolution would guide this Court as to the actual amount due the local
government since it is not a trier of facts.
● The RTC also noted that the Government's track record in complying with the
Constitutional provisions on local autonomy was not exactly immaculate as
supposedly evidenced by the case of Mandanas where, after sharing with the
Province of Palawan collections from the West Linapacan oil fields from 1992 to
1998, the National Government "turned its back on its legal commitment to the
former." The trial court stressed that the local government of Palawan was merely
preempting any possible dissipation of funds that would render any judgment
favorable to it an empty victory.

G.R. No. 170867

● In 2006, the Republic, represented by SoE Lotilla, SoF Teves and DBM Sec Neri,
challenged the RTC's Decision through a petition for review. In anticipation of the
RTC's denial of its MR, it assailed the Amended Order ad cautelam, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for granting affirmative relief in a special civil
action for declaratory relief.
● On June 6, 2006, the RTC in its order lifted the freezing of the 40% saying: [A]
becoming sense of modesty on the part of this Court, compels it to defer to the
SC’s First Division as the Movants have deviously appealed to the High Court the
very issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration now pending before this
Court.

The Provisional Implementation Agreement

On July 25, 2007, the duly authorized representatives of the Nat’l Gov’t and the
Province of Palawan, with the conformity of the Representatives of the Congressional
Districts of Palawan, agreed on a Provisional Implementation Agreement (PIA) that
allowed 50% of the disputed 40% of the Net Government Share in the proceeds of
Service Contract No. 38 to be utilized for the immediate and effective implementation
of development projects for the people of Palawan.
 EO 683
● Issued by PGMA which authorized the release of funds to the implementing
agencies pursuant to the PIA, without prejudice to any ongoing discussion or the
final judicial resolution of Palawan's claim of territorial jurisdiction over the
Camago-Malampaya area. E.O. No. 683

CA-G.R. SP No. 102247

On Feb. 7, 2008, a petition for certiorari questioning the constitutionality of E.O. No.

683 was filed before the CA by Arigo, et al. as citizens and taxpayers, against Exec.
Sec Ermita, DoE Sec Reyes, DoF Sec Teves, DBM Sec Andaya, Jr., Palawan Gov
Reyes, Rep. Alvarez of the First District of Palawan, Reps. Mitra and Del Pilar, Pres
and CEO, PNOC-EC. The petition also asked the CA to: (1) prohibit respondents from
disbursing funds allocated under E.O.683; (2) direct the Govt to release the 40%
allocation of the Province of Palawan from the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya
project pursuant to the sharing formula under the Constitution and the LGC; and (3)
prohibit the parties to the PIA from implementing the same for being violative of the
aforesaid laws.
● CA required Arigo, et al. to submit, within 5 days from notice: (1) the petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170867, filed before this Court; (2) the
RTC's Decision in Civil Case No. 3779; (3) the MR of said RTC Decision; (4) the
Service Contract No. 38; and (5) the PIA, as required under Section 1, Rule 65, in
relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
● Arigo, et al. asked for additional 10 days to comply with the Resolution, which the
CA granted. They later submitted the required documents except for the copies of
the petition in G.R. No. 170867 and the PIA. They informed the CA that despite a
formal request for said petition, they were unable to secure a copy because they
were not parties to the case. The Third Division's Clerk of Court also informed
them that the records of GR 170867 were unavailable as the case had already
been submitted to the ponente for resolution. Though unable to obtain a copy of
the PIA, they submitted a copy of Service Contract No. 38 which they supposedly
secured from "unofficial sources." Considering the difficulty they allegedly
encountered, they asked the CA to direct DoE Sec Reyes and Ermita to submit a
copy of the petition in G.R. No. 170867 and Service Contract No. 38, respectively.
They also asked the CA to require any of the respondents officials of Palawan to
submit a copy of the PIA to which they were supposed to have been signatories.

CA Arigo et al.'s petition for certiorari was denied due course and dismissed.

Ruling: ● The CA held that the task of submitting relevant documents fell squarely on Arigo,
et al. as petitioners invoking its jurisdiction. It added that Arigo, et al. should have
submitted a certification from the Third Division concerning the unavailability of the
records and that they could have simply secured a copy of the PIA from the
Malacañang Records Office as the official repository of all documents related to
the Executive's functions.
● The CA also held that apart from its procedural defect, the petition was also
 prematurely filed considering that it was anchored on the same essential facts and
circumstances and raised the same issues in GR 170867. The CA likewise noted
that the interim undertaking between the parties to the PIA was contingent on the
final adjudication of GR 170867. Taking judicial notice of on-going efforts of both
legislative and executive departments to arrive at a common position in redefining
the country's baseline in the light of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), the appeals court further explained that ruling on the case
may be tantamount to a collateral adjudication of the archipelagic baseline which
involved a policy issue.

Arigo, et al. asked the CA to reconsider its Resolution and later submitted an original
duplicate of the Resolution of the Third Division which denied their counsel's request
for certified true copies of certain documents since it was not a counsel for any party.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. 185941 (Arigo, et al. petition)

Arigo, et al. filed a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case was ripe for
decision and that the documents required by the CA were not necessary. They assert
anew their constitutional challenge to EO 638, claiming that it was in violation of the
mandated equitable sharing of resources between the National Government and
LGUs.

Consolidation of Cases
On June 23, 2009, the Court in its Resolution consolidated G.R. No. 185941 with G.R.
No. 170867.

Oral Argument
On Sept. 1, 2009 and Nov. 24, 2009, the cases were heard on oral argument. After the
parties presented their respective arguments, the Court heard the opinions of Atty.
Henry Bensurto, Jr. of the DFA and Dean Raul Pangalangan of the University of the
Philippines as amici curiae.

Issue: WON an LGU’s territorial boundary can transcend its land area to include marine
waters -- NO

SC Ruling: Territorial jurisdiction refers to territorial boundaries as defined in the LGU’s

charter
● The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction."
Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's
territorial boundaries.
Under the LGC, a "province" is composed of a cluster of municipalities, or
municipalities and component cities. A "municipality," in turn, is described as a
group of barangays, while a "city" is referred to as consisting of more urbanized
and developed barangays. In the creation of municipalities, cities and barangays,
the LGC uniformly requires that the territorial jurisdiction of these government
units be "properly identified by metes and bounds”.
● The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of
a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless
to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the LGU in requiring that  the land
area must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Clearly, therefore, a local government's territorial jurisdiction cannot extend
beyond the boundaries set by its organic law.

Area as delimited by law and not exercise of jurisdiction as basis of the LGU’s
equitable share
● The Court cannot subscribe to the argument posited by the Palawan that the
national wealth, the proceeds from which the State is mandated to share with the
LGUs, shall be wherever the local government exercises any degree of
jurisdiction.
● An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or
assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are
clearly ultra vires. It may lead to, in the words of the Republic, LGUs "rushing to
exercise its powers and functions in areas rich in natural resources (even if
outside its boundaries) with the intention of seeking a share in the proceeds of its
exploration" - a situation that "would sow conflict not only among the local
government units and the national government but worse, between and among
LGUs."
● There is also merit in the Republic's assertion that Palawan's interpretation of
what constitutes an LGU's territorial jurisdiction may produce absurd
consequences. Indeed, there are natural resources, such as forests and
mountains, which can be found within the LGU's territorial boundaries, but are,
strictly speaking, under national jurisdiction, specifically that of the DENR. To
equate territorial jurisdiction to areas where the LGU exercises jurisdiction means
that these natural resources will have to be excluded from the sharing scheme
although they are geographically within the LGU's territorial limits. The
consequential incongruity of this scenario finds no support either in the language
or in the context of the equitable sharing provisions of the 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code.
● Palawan also argues that its territorial jurisdiction extends to the reservoir
considering that its local police maintains peace and order in the area; crimes
committed within the waters surrounding the province have been prosecuted and
tried in the courts of Palawan; and the provincial government enforces
environmental laws over the same area. The province also cites Sec 468 of the
LGC, which authorizes the Sanggunian Panlalawigan to enact ordinances that
protect the environment, as well as Sec 26 and 27 of the law, which require
consultation with the LGUs concerned and the approval of their
respective sanggunian before the National Government may commence any
 project that will have an environmental impact. The province avers that the
Contractor, in fact, obtained the necessary endorsement from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan before starting its operations.
● The Court notes, however, that the province's claims of maintaining peace and
order in the Camago-Malampaya area and of enforcing environmental laws
therein have not been substantiated by credible proof. The province likewise failed
to adduce evidence of the crimes supposedly committed in the same area or their
prosecution in Palawan's courts.
● The province cites illegal fishing, poaching and illegal entry as the cases tried
before the courts of Palawan. As conceded by the parties, however, the subject
gas reservoir is situated, not in the marine waters, but in the continental shelf. The
Province of Palawan has not established that it has, in fact, exercised jurisdiction
over this submerged land area. The LGU's authority to adopt and implement
measures to protect the environment does not determine the extent of its territorial
jurisdiction.
● In fine, an LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because its
government has exercised a certain degree of authority over it. Territorial
jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates it; it
is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter. Unless clearly expanded by Congress, the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area.

Utilization of natural resources found within the land area as delimited by law is
subject to the 40% share
● The term territorial jurisdiction is evidently synonymous with the term "territory." In
fact, "territorial jurisdiction" is defined as the limits or territory within which
authority may be exercised.
● Under the Local Government Code, particularly the provisions on the creation of
municipalities, cities and provinces, and LGUs in general, territorial jurisdiction is
contextually synonymous with territory and the term "territory" is used to refer to
the land area comprising the LGU.
● The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents
make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision
whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious
meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd
or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest
guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced
or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory
scheme is not to be favored.
● The SC added that the use of the word "territory" in the LGC clearly reflected that
"territory" as therein used had reference only to the mass of land area and
excluded the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Inspired by
this Supreme Court ruling, the Code now uses the words "land area" in lieu
of "territory" to emphasize that the area required of an LGU does not
include the sea for purposes of compliance with the requirements of the
Code for its creation.
Based on the records of the Senate and the Bicameral Conference Committee
on Local Government, however, the Salonga amendment was not considered
anew in subsequent deliberations. Neither did the proposed amendment appear
in the text of the LGC as approved. By Senator Pimentel's account, the Code
deferred to the Court's ruling in Tan which excluded the marginal sea from the
LGU's territory. It can, thus, be concluded that under the Local Government
Code, an LGU's territory does not extend to the municipal waters beyond the
LGU's shoreline.
● The parties all agree that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located in the
continental shelf. If the marginal sea is not included in the LGU's territory, with
more reason should the continental shelf, located miles further, be deemed
excluded therefrom.
● To recapitulate, an LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers to its territorial boundaries or
to its territory. The territory of LGUs, in turn, refers to their land area, unless
expanded by law to include the maritime area. Accordingly, only the utilization of
natural resources found within the land area as delimited by law is subject to the
LGU's equitable share under Sec 290 and 291 of the LGC. This conclusion finds
support in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which cited, as
examples of national wealth the proceeds from which the LGU may share, the
Tiwi Geothermal Plant in Albay, the geothermal plant in Macban, Makiling-
Banahaw area in Laguna, the Maria Cristina area in Central Mindanao, the great
rivers and sources of hydroelectric power in Iligan, in Central Mindanao, the
geothermal resources in the area of Palimpiñon, Municipality of Valencia and
mountainous areas, which are all situated inland. [255] In his 2011 treatise on the
Local Government Code, former Senator Pimentel cited as examples of such
national wealth, the geothermal fields of Tongonan, Leyte and Palinpinon, Negros
Oriental which are both found inland.
● Sec 6 of the Local Government Code empowers Congress to create, divide,
merge and abolish LGUs, and to substantially alter their boundaries, subject to
the plebiscite requirement under Section 10 of the law which reads:
Sec10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the
COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
● Accordingly, unless Congress, with the approval of the political units directly
affected, clearly extends an LGU's territorial boundaries beyond its land area, to
include marine waters, the seabed and the subsoil, it cannot rightfully share in the
proceeds of the utilization of national wealth.

No law clearly granting the Province of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir
● As defined in its organic law, the Province of Palawan is comprised merely of
islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is
 located, was clearly not included in its territory. An island is defined under Art. 121
of the UNCLOS as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which
is above water at high tide." The continental shelf, on the other hand, is defined
in Art. 76 of the same Convention as comprising "the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond (the coastal State's) territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance." Where the continental shelf of the
coastal state extends beyond 200 nm, Article 76 allows the State to claim an
extended continental shelf up to 350 nm from the baselines.
● Under Palawan's charter, therefore, the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is not
located within its territorial boundaries.
● There is also no showing that the criteria for the alteration, as established in Sec.
7 and 461 of the LGC, had been met. The definition, therefore, does not have the
effect of redefining Palawan's territory. In fact, RA 7611 was enacted not for such
purpose but to adopt a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural
resources and endangered environment of the province.
● It is also clear that RA 7611 does not vest any additional jurisdiction on the
Province of Palawan. The PCSD, formed under said law, is composed of both
provincial officials and representatives from national government agencies. It was
also established under the Office of the President. The tasks outlined by R.A. No.
7611, which largely involve policy formulation and coordination, are carried out
not by the province, but by the council.
● Based also on territorial descriptions, the municipalities of Palawan do not include
the continental shelf where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is concededly
located. In fact, with the exception of Kalayaan, which includes the seabed, the
subsoil and the continental margin as part of its demarcated area, the
municipalities are either located within or are comprised of islands. That only
Kalayaan (under PD No. 1596), among the municipalities of Palawan, had land
submerged in water as part of its area or territory, was confirmed by the amicus
curiae, Atty. Bensurto, during the oral arguments.
● Thus, even if the Court were to apply the province's definition of "territorial
jurisdiction" as co-extensive with its exercise of authority, RA 7611 cannot be
considered as conferring territorial jurisdiction over the reservoir to Palawan since
the law did not grant additional power to the province.

Estoppel does not lie against the Republic

● Fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Thus, neither the DoE's letter to the
Province of Palawan nor President Ramos' AO 381, which acknowledged
Palawan's share in the Camago-Malampaya project, will place the Republic in
estoppel as they had been based on a mistaken assumption of the LGU's
entitlement to said allocation. Erroneous application and enforcement of the law
by public officers do not preclude subsequent corrective application of the statute.
 The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf
● Dean Pangalangan posited that since the Constitution has incorporated into
Philippine law the concepts of the UNCLOS, including the concept of the
continental shelf, Palawan’s “area” could be construed as including its own
continental shelf. The Province of Palawan and Arigo, et al. accordingly assert
that Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan’s continental shelf. The
Court is unconvinced. The Republic was correct in arguing that the concept of
continental shelf under the UNCLOS does not, by the doctrine of transformation,
automatically apply to the LGUs.
● It must be stressed that the provisions under the UNCLOS are specific in
declaring the rights and duties of a state, not a LGU. The UNCLOS confirms the
sovereign rights of the States over the continental shelf and the maritime zones.
The UNCLOS did not confer any rights to the States' local government units.
● It is emphasized that the foregoing indubitably established that under the express
terms of the UNCLOS, the rights and duties over the maritime zones and
continental shelf pertain to the State. No provision was set forth to even suggest
any reference to a local government unit. Simply put, the UNCLOS did not
obligate the States to grant to, much less automatically vest upon, their respective
LGUs territorial jurisdiction over the different maritime zones and the continental
shelf.

Conrary to the Republic’s submission, the LGU’s share under the Constitution
cannot be denied on the basis of the archipelagic and regalian doctrines
● There is no debate that the natural resources in the Camago-Malampaya
reservoir belong to the State. Palawan's claim is anchored not on ownership of
the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Sec. 7, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution and Sec 290 of the LGC, that allows LGUs to share in the proceeds
of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their respective
areas. To deny the LGU's share on the basis of the State's ownership of all
natural resources is to render Sec 7 of Art X nugatory for in such case, it will not
be possible for any LGU to benefit from the utilization of national wealth.

Constitutional challenge to EO 683

● The challenge to the constitutionality issue brought by Arigo, et al., is premised on
the alleged violation of Sec 7, Art X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec 289 and 290
of the LGC, which is the basic issue submitted for resolution by the Republic and
the Province of Palawan in G.R. No. 170867.
● Considering its ruling in GR. 170867, the Court resolves to deny the Arigo
petition, without need of passing upon the procedural issues therein raised. The
same ruling also renders it unnecessary to rule upon the propriety of the
Amended Order dated January 16, 2006, which the Republic raised ad
cautelam in G.R. No. 170867.

Others:
Case G.R. No. 104235
Citation:

Date: November 18, 1993

Petitioners: SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA

Respondents HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.

:

Doctrine: Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Antecedent ● Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
Facts: purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of TransWorld
Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. All 3
tickets represented confirmed reservations. (Cesar and Zuthira’s ticket were
both with 75% discount. Liana’s was a full-fare ticket.)

● While in New York, they received notice of the reconfirmation of their

reservations for said flight. On June 6, however, petitioners checked in at
10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had
checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the
flight.

● Liana appeared as #13 on the waitlist, while the spouses were listed as #34.
Only the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight, including
Cesar. Those who held full-fare tickets were given priority among the wait-
listed passengers. (It was later on when Cesar discovered that he was
holding his daughter’s ticket.)

● In the next TWA flight, Mrs. Zalamea and Liane could not be accommodated
because it was also fully booked. They were constrained to book another
flight and purchased 2 tickets from American Airlines at a cost of $918.00.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based
on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.

RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of the petitioners. TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract
of carriage with petitioners and the breach was "characterized by bad faith."

CA Ruling: Ruled in favor of TWA. Moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad
faith.
● Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common
 and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines.
● There was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-
eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given
priority over discounted tickets.

Issue: Whether there was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA. (YES)

SC Ruling: There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow
petitioners to board the flight despite the confirmed tickets. It cannot be
disputed.

● The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never

been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.

● Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy

attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

● TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
CA's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

● Even assuming that the US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, it is not
applicable in this case in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline.
○ Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, Philippine
law shall apply.

● Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to

bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of
 having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would
show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat at the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an
award of moral damages. (Alitalia Airlines v. CA)

Case G.R. No. 224405

Citation:

Date: July 23, 2018

Petitioners: STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI

Respondents REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

:

Doctrine: Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.

Antecedent Petitioner Juego-Sakai and Toshiro Sakai got married in Japan on August 11,
Facts: 2000. After two (2) years, both agreed to obtain a divorce decree in said country.
Thereafter, Juego-Sakai filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte.

MTC/RTC The RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as
Ruling: valid and effective under Philippine Laws.

CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. However, the CA amended its decision
and recalled and set aside its previous decision ruling that the second of the
following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The CA held that since the divorce was obtained upon the agreement of both
parties, and the petitioner being a Filipino, the second requisite under Art. 26 of the
Family Code was not met. Hence, the divorce decree cannot be recognized in the
Philippines.

In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of

the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.
Petitioner’s Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as
contention: Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more
practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great
disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the
mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the application of
Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino
spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds application.

As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that the reason why she
was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of
Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact
that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same
for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the
Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic
missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor
process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the
legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.

Respondent’ -
s contention:

Issue: 1. Whether the CA erred in not recognizing the divorce decree due to the non-
compliance in the second requisite of Art. 26 of the FC when the petitioner
consented to the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband.

2. Whether the CA erred in holding that there is no substantial compliance with

requirement on the submission of the authenticated copies of the Civil Code of
Japan relative to divorce as required by the Rules.

SC Ruling: 1. Yes. In Republic v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino
spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." The
Court observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the
true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly
 rules that even though petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan,
and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to
benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

2. However, the Court cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our
courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and
again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Others

Case Citation: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Sero

G.R. No. 174672

Date: April 16, 2008

Petitioners: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

Respondents: Heirs Of Marcelina L. Sero

Doctrine: While a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a complaint, it

cannot disregard statutes and decisions material and relevant to the
proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to
dismiss, every court must take judicial notice of decisions the
Supreme Court has rendered as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of
 the Rules of Court.

Antecedent Facts: On July 6, 1999, respondents, through their attorney-in-fact Anecito

Invento, filed a complaint against several defendants for recovery of
ownership and declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs), four of which are registered in the names of the
petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and
the Republic.

They alleged that the subject properties were owned by their

predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the Original Certificates of Title
were lost during the Second World War and that the mother of
defendants pretended to be "Isabel Limbaga" and fraudulently
succeeded in reconstituting the titles over the subject properties to
her name and in selling some of them.

The subject properties were later acquired by the Civil Aeronautics

Administration (CAA) through expropriation proceedings for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. Subsequently
however, the Lahug airport was ordered closed, and all its functions
and operations were transferred to petitioner MCIAA.

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint and by way of
special and
affirmative defenses moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
Likewise, defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor
Arcinas and Marilyn Dueñas filed their separate motions to dismiss.

Respondent’s Respondents argue that the properties which were expropriated in

Contention: connection with the operation of the Lahug Airport should be
reconveyed to the real owners considering that the purpose for which
the properties were expropriated is no longer relevant in view of the
closure of the Lahug Airport.

MTC/RTC Ruling: RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the respondents
had no
cause of action, and that the action was barred by prescription and
laches.

CA Ruling: The CA reversed and held that the determination of whether

respondents have a right to recover the ownership of the subject
properties, or whether their action is barred by prescription or laches
requires evidentiary proof which can be threshed out, not in a motion
to dismiss, but in a full-blown trial.

Issue: WON respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner (NO)
SC Ruling: A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other. Its elements are the following: (1) the legal
right of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in
the complaint. Thus, in the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint must be considered.

However, while a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a

complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and decisions material and
relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In
resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take judicial notice of
decisions this Court has rendered as provided by Section 1 of Rule
129 of the Rules of Court

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. -- A court shall

take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals failed to

consider the decision of this Court in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport v. Court of Appeals, rendered on November 27, 2000, which
settled the issue of whether the properties expropriated under Civil
Case No. R- 1881 will be reconveyed to the original owners if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the
property was to be used other than the expansion or improvement of
the Lahug airport.

In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in Civil
Case No. R-1881 were clear and unequivocal. It granted title over the
expropriated land to the Republic of the Philippines in fee simple
without any condition that it would be returned to the owners or that
the owners had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for
which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property
was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.

Had the appellate court considered the import of the ruling in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals, it would have found
that respondents can invoke no right against the petitioner since the
 subject lands were acquired by the State in fee simple. Thus, the first
element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's legal right, is not present
in the instant case.

Others

Case G.R. No. L-46585

Citation:

Date: February 8, 1988

Petitioners: DR. ANGELA V. GINSON

Respondents MUNICIPALITY OF MURCIA AND MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF

: MURCIA AND HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine:
It is true that abolition of office neither means removal nor separation
from office and is not covered by the protection of the security of
tenure clause of the Constitution.  This principle, however, carries
with it a caveat: That the abolition is done in good faith. Good faith,
regrettably, is wanting in this case. The respondents' measures
subsequent to the petitioner's dismissal are, rather, indicative of bad
faith.

Antecedent On February 16, 1968, or 44 days after defendant Mayor Baldomero

Facts: de la Rama assumed office as the Municipal Mayor of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, he wrote a letter to plaintiff terminating her
services as Municipal Dentist of Murcia, Negros Occidental effective
February 18, 1968. (Exh. "B"). Said letter was received by the plaintiff
on February 16, 1968. Said letter reads as follows:

Please be informed that effective February 16, 1968,

your service is hereby terminated, due to lack of funds.

(SGD.) BALDOMERO DE LA RAMA

Municipal Mayor

Plaintiff, prior and up to the time she was dismissed, had been
continuously, faithfully and efficiently performing her duties as
Municipal Dentist of the Municipality of Murcia since August 1, 1964,
and was receiving a salary of P200.00 per month. On the very day
she was discharged, plaintiff immediately went to the defendant
 Municipal Mayor Baldomero de la Rama and pleaded that she be
reinstated to the service on the ground that her tenure of office is
covered by Civil Service Law and that she cannot be removed or
suspended except for cause, but defendant de la Rama blatantly
refused to reinstate her. Instead she was told and challenged to go to
Court and to file a case against him and the Municipality

MTC/RTC
Ruling: The trial court held for the petitioner and directed the private
respondents to reinstate her in office and to pay back salaries and
attorney's fees. 

CA Ruling: Found that the respondent municipality's financial condition arising

from an alleged overdraft incurred during the year, warranted the
dismissal, held the same to be justified, and rendered a reversal

Issue: Whether or not the respondent municipality's state of finances

justifies the challenged dismissal.

SC Ruling:
Sustain the trial court and hold for the petitioner.

The Court is convinced that the respondent municipality was

financially capable of continued support to the petitioner in office.
There is evidence, to begin with, that at the time the petitioner was
discharged, the Murcia treasury had existing funds to cover her
salary for the month of February, 1968, and for the succeeding
months as well, until June, 1968.  As of February, 1968 therefore, the
Municipality of Murcia had no justifiable reason to plead insolvency.
At that time, it had no excuse to effect the questioned dismissal.

There is likewise evidence that for the fiscal year 1968-1969, the
respondent municipality approved an annual budget of P270,000.00,
more than double its budget of Pl54,910.00 for the fiscal year 1967-
1968, or an increase of P115,090.00. We agree with the lower court
that if the respondent municipality were truly in dire financial straits,
"the natural tendency is that there will be a decrease in the
appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year. 

As found furthermore by this trial court, the respondent municipality

had, in the same period, approved salary increases to some thirty-
one employees.  This, again, negates its claims of bankruptcy.

There is evidence, finally, that the Municipality of Murcia had

extended new items and appointments to a total of six employees at
 the time the petitioner was removed from the office. 

These actuations, in our opinion, are inconsistent with pretexts of

insolvency.

In the premises, we reject the municipality's reliance on its alleged

overdraft of P50,000.00 that allegedly led to the dismissal now
assailed. We likewise dismiss its contention that the petitioner was
not removed from her position but that the termination of her services
was the inevitable consequence of the abolition of her item as
municipal dentist.

The existence of the alleged P50,000,00-deficit was never sufficiently

proven.

In sum, we declare the pretended abolition of the dentist's clinic of the

Municipality of Murcia to be in fact a flimsy excuse to justify the
dismissal of the petitioner, contrary to security of tenure protection of
the Constitution, and is hence, null and void.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision appealed

from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby
entered, ordering the private respondents, the Municipality of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, and the Municipal Mayor of Murcia, to:

1. REINSTATE the petitioner as municipal dentist of the

Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental, or to any
position for which she is qualified pursuant to the Civil
Service Law and other rules;

2. PAY unto her back pay equivalent to five (5) years

based on her latest salary scale. Costs against the
private respondents. This Decision is IMMIDIATELY
EXECUTORY.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 195003

Date: June 7, 2017

Petitioners: CITY OF BATANGAS, represented by Hon. Severina Vilma Abaya, 1

in her capacity as City Mayor of Batangas
Respondents: PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and SHELL
PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V.

Doctrine:

Antecedent
Facts: ● The Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract
No. 38 (SC 38) with Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX)
● SPEX was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum
sources in North Western Palawan.
● SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source
of natural gas in the Malampaya field off the shores of
Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya Project.
● The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-
kilometer offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from
Malampaya field to Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's
Tabangao Refinery.
● The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas enacted the
Assailed Ordinance which requires heavy industries operating
along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial
jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to
facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial
facilities.
● PSPC's Tabangao Refinery was one of the heavy industries
subject by the ordinance
● PSPC filed against Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a Petition for Declaration of Nullity (PSPC Petition)
before the RTC praying that the Assailed Ordinance be
declared null and void.
● JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation (JG Summit) and First
Gas Power Corporation (First Gas) filed similar petitions.

Petitioner’s ● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained

Contention: that they have the power to enact the Assailed Ordinance
pursuant to the general welfare clause under the LGC
● The rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to stop PSPC and
other industries similarly situated from relying "too much" on
ground water as coolants for their machineries, and
alternatively promote the use of seawater for such purpose,
considering that fresh ground water is a "perishable
commodity.”
● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod countered
that the "regulation or prohibition" on the use of ground water is
merely incidental to the main purpose of the Assailed
 Ordinance, which is to compel heavy industries such as PSPC
to construct desalination plants.
● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod took
exception to PSPC's allegations and asserted that the Assailed
Ordinance had been published in Dyaryo Veritas, a newspaper
of general circulation in the area.
● Moreover, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod
claimed that a joint public hearing on the Assailed Ordinance
had in fact been conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, where PSPC was duly
represented
● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod argued that
the requirement of referral of ordinances to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan applies only to tax and other revenue measures.
● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod averred that
since PSPC and SPEX, along with other concerned heavy
industries, essentially question the former' s authority to
regulate and prohibit the use of fresh ground water, they should
have first referred their grievances to NWRB by filing a
complaint for adjudication on the threatened revocation of their
existing water permits.
● The testimonies, according to Batangas City and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, serve as sufficient factual bases for
the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance, as "there could be no
higher degree of evidence than the actual experience of the
inhabitants in the area.”

Respondent’s ● PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an

Contention: invalid exercise of police power as it failed to meet the
substantive requirements for validity.
● PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes the
Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and encroaches
upon the power of the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) to regulate and control the Philippines' water
resources.
● Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to
sufficiently show the factual or technical basis for its
enactment.
● In this connection, PSPC alleged that the Assailed Ordinance
unduly singles out heavy industries, and holds them solely
accountable for the loss of water and destruction of aquifers
without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property rights
without due process of law.
● On the procedural aspect, PSPC contended that the Assailed
Ordinance was not posted or published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, nor were public
 hearings or consultations involving concerned parties
conducted thereon.
● Moreover, there are no records showing that the Assailed
Ordinance, as approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
was forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Batangas after it was approved by the city
mayor, as required by Section 56 of the Local Government
Code (LGC).

RTC Ruling:
RTC declared the ordinance INVALID, in its entirety for want of
necessity and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating
the due process clause of the Constitution.

RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to consult

the NWRB before enacting the Assailed Ordinance, thereby
encroaching upon its authority

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC’s decision

Issue: Whether or not the assailed ordinance is void or being ultra vires, for
being contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the
existence of factual basis for its enactment.

SC Ruling:
YES. The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being
contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the
existence of factual basis for its enactment.

Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and
void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies
with the other substantive requirements for a valid ordinance.

The measure of the substantive validity of an ordinance is the

underlying factual basis for which it was enacted. Hence, without
factual basis, an ordinance will necessarily fail the substantive test for
validity. Batangas City's failure to prove the existence of factual basis
to justify the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance had already been
passed upon by the lower courts.

The Court quotes, with approval, the Joint Decision of the CA Fourth
Division:

“To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must be

a shown reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent to
the means adopted by the law to attain it. In this case, as seen in the
 "whereas clause," the purpose of the ordinance is to protect the
environment and prevent ecological imbalance, especially the
drying up of the aquifers of Batangas City. In effect, the drying up of
aquifers is being blamed on the establishments and industries such
as petitioners-appellees here. It would have been acceptable had
there been a specific study or findings that the local government
conducted (sic) and not just its reliance on the complaints of
some constituents who merely made its conclusion that the
drying up of wells or its salination was due to the "heavy
industries"' use of groundwater.

In addition, if appellants were convinced that those industries

adversely affect the environment and specifically the water resource
in Batangas City, there would be no exemptions, as provided in
Section 5 of the Ordinance, as it would negate the purpose of the
Jaw.

It thus becomes apparent that the ordinance was come up with in

an arbitrary manner, if not based purely on emotive or flawed
premises. There was no scientific standard or any acceptable
standard at all that the ordinance was based on. x x x”

The presumption of validity ascribed to an ordinance prevails only in

the absence of some factual foundation of record sufficient to
overthrow the assailed issuance. In this case, the presumption of
validity ascribed to the Assailed Ordinance had been overturned
by documentary and testimonial evidence showing that no
substantial diminution in the supply of ground water in the
Tabangao Malitam watershed had occurred in the last three (3)
decades, and that no threat of depletion of ground water
resources in said watershed existed.

Others The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and
again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned LGU to
enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance
(i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(ii) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(iii) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
(v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(vi) must not be unreasonable

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the

 health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.

The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization,

exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water
resources.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 188720

Date: February 23, 2016

Petitioners: QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC.

Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by SECRETARY JESLI A.

LAPUS

Doctrine:
In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test and those of the foregoing items referred to in
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the Administrative
Code of 1987 requires the filing of three (3) certified true copies of every
rule adopted by administrative agencies with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, which generally becomes effective 15 days after
filing such rule/s.

Antecedent
Facts: June 1, 2009 - DEPED, through Secretary Jesli Lapus, issued Department
Order No. 54, Series of 2009, entitled Revised Guidelines Governing PTAs
at the School Level.

This sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No.
23, s. 2003 and was issued in response to increasing reports of
malpractices by officers/members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to: (1)
officers absconding with contributions and membership fees; (2) non-
disclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial
statements; and (3) misuse of funds.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition: that respondent DEPED’s
D.O. No. 54, S. of 2009 be nullified for being unconstitutional. Also, a prayer
for a TRO/WPI is asked in the interim.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed this Petition in the belief that
D.O.’s provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs,
effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and
PTCAs and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process,
 as well as other existing laws.

Issue: Whether the Department of Education acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Department Order No.
54, Series of 2009; or

Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public

consultations were (supposedly) held before its adoption, and/or as it was
not published by the Department of Education

SC Ruling:
Both NO.

Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power
and pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher
associations is mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural
lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.
In Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA:
“With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is
called the "power of subordinate legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.”
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to
promulgate rules. As noted in Gerochi v. DOE and ABAKADA GURO Party
List v. Purisima:
“Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
 policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.”
Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the
non-publication, by the Department of Education itself, of the assailed
Department Order. However, this does not invalidate the Department Order.
In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test and those of the foregoing items referred to in
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the Administrative
Code of 1987 requires the filing of three (3) certified true copies of every
rule adopted by administrative agencies with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, which generally becomes effective 15 days after
filing such rule/s.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 207342

Date: November 7, 2017

Petitioners: GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Respondents: JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ

Doctrine:
Worthy to remind in this regard is that the power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by the courts of the Philippines with caution, and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in the negative.

Antecedent
Facts: In 1991, respondent-appellant Juan Antonio Muñoz, as Head of the
Treasury Department of the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP; now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), was instructed by its Governor to raise
US$700M in order to fund the buyback of Philippine debts and the purchase
of zero-coupon US Treasury Bonds.

To this end, respondent-appellant recommended that the amount be

obtained through gold loans/swaps. for which, seven (7) contracts of about
One Hundred Million US Dollars (US$ 100M)each were to be awarded to
certain accredited parties.

Two (2) of these contracts were granted to Mocatta, London. These in turn
were rolled over as they matured, hence, totaling five (5) gold loan/swap
 agreements in Mocatta, London's favor.

Mr. Ho CHI was the Chief Executive of Standard Chartered Bank - The
Mocatta Group (Hong Kong) ("MHK). MHK was a branch of the Mocatta
Group in London ("Mocatta London") which was a division of the Standard
Chartered Bank.

Mr. CHI approached Philip WILSON, the then Chief Dealer of Mocatta
(London), indicating that to get business it would be necessary for Mocatta
(London) to pay rebates to an unnamed group of people at CBP. WILSON
told CHI that that was wrong in principle. CHI, however, approached Keith
SMITH, the then Managing Director of Mocatta (London), who approved the
payments.

Between February 1992 to March 1993, there were a series of "gold swaps"
and gold backed loans between CBP and Mocatta (London) through MHK in
Hong Kong.

As a result, Mocatta (London) paid out rebates of US$1,703,304.87 to an

account ("the Sundry Creditors Account") held with MHK for onward
transmission by MHK to destinatinns as instructed by CHI.

In addition to the gold swaps and the gold backed loans referred to above,
there were option agreements to buy gold at a fixed price created between
CBP and MHK.

As a result, MHK paid more than $4M into the sundry creditors account,
ostensibly for CBP, as premiums for this options. CHI operated an account
at Mocatta Hong Kong, called the MHK No. 3 Account, purportediy on
behalf of CBP, for trading in gold.

Profits from the trading were accrued to the amount of US$1,625,000. This
US$1,625,000 was transferred to the Sundry Creditors Account.

None of the above payments were known to CBP and none of them ever
reached CBP. Funds from this Sundry Creditors Account were subsequently
disbursed to the benefit of CHi and MUÑOZ personally.

These agreements are the subject of ten (10) criminal cases filed against
respondent-appellant in Hong Kong - i.e., three (3) counts of accepting an
advantage as an agent, contrary to Section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud,
contrary to the common law of HKSAR.

Issue: W/N THE CRIME OF ACCEPTING AN ADVANTAGE AS AN AGENT

COMPLIED WITH THE DOUBLE CRIMINALITY RULE – NO
SC Ruling:
A perusal of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has
lifted from the dissenting opinion the arguments it now advances to support
its insistence that Munoz must also be extradited for the crime of accepting
an advantage as an agent. In the last paragraph of the motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner cites the ruling supposedly handed down by
the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR in the case of B v. The
Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption to the
effect that the term agent in Section 9 of the HK.SAR' s Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance (POBO) also covered public servants in another
jurisdiction.4 On the basis of such supposed ruling, the petitioner prays that
the exclusion of the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent be
reversed; and that the Court should hold Muñoz to be extraditable also for
such crime.

The petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. To grant it would be to take

judicial notice of the ruling in B v. The Commissioner of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption. Like all other courts in this jurisdiction,
however, the Court is not at liberty to take judicial notice of the ruling without
contravening our own rules on evidence under which foreign judgments and
laws are not considered as matters of a public or notorious nature that
proved themselves.

Verily, foreign judgments and laws, if relevant, have to be duly alleged and
competently proved like any other disputed fact. Noveras v.
Noveras5explains why:

x x x Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to

give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

xxxx

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a

sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the
authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
 copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or

record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.1âwphi1 The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.6

Worthy to remind in this regard is that the power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by the courts of the Philippines with caution, and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in the negative.

Others

Case G.R. No. 226587

Citation:

Date: November 21, 2018

Petitioners: DONABELLE V. GONZALES-SALDANA

Respondent SPOUSES GORDON R. NIAMATALI AND AMY V. NIAMATALI

s:

Doctrine:

Antecedent Spouses Niamatali then residing at United States of America made

Facts: known to petitioner Gonzales- Saldana (Saldana) their intention to
acquire real properties in Metro Manila, later they asked Saldana to
participate in the public auction on their behalf for a certain property in
Las Piñas City; they remitted US$60,000.00Php or 3,000,000.00Php
to Saldana’s bank account.

Later, Saldana transmitted TCTs covering properties located in Manila

and Paranaque contrary to the directive to purchase the Las Piñas
property. Saldana explained that the public auction for the Las Piñas
property did not push through due to a third party claim.

On July 2002 when Spouses Niamatali’s return to PH they informed

Saldana that they were no longer interested in acquiring the Las Piñas
 property and asked for the return of the 3,000,000.00Php which
Saldana aceeded. Saldana even issued an acknowledgement receipt
of 3,000,000.00Php and promised to return the said amount on or
before September 2002. Despite several demands Saldana never
returned the subject amount thus Spouses Niamatali filed a case for
collection of sum of money, moral damages and attorney’s fees
against Saldana.

Petitioner’s 1. Petitioner argues that the allegations in her Answer are not
Contention: admissions, but are actually defenses to show that the
complaint states no cause of action
2. No interest was due because she did not enter into a contract
of loan with respondent-spouses and there was no agreement
for the payment of interest

Respondent’ Saldana should return the amount of P3,000,000.00 considering that

s since 2002, she has not informed them of the status of the property in
Contention: Las Piñas; that a complaint for recovery of money is proper even if the
contract between the parties is not a contract of loan; and that legal
interest must be imposed on the amount due from petitioner because
she already incurred in delay.

RTC Ruling: The complaint is dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to present

preponderance of evidence to support the allegations.

The uncertified photocopies of the bank transfer, showing the

remittance of P3,000,000.00 to Saldana’s account, were inadmissible
as respondent-spouses failed to prove the loss of the original thereof
It noted that respondent Amy Niamatali even testified that she could
have secured the original copy from her bank, but she neglected to do
so. As regards the acknowledgment receipt or promissory note
allegedly executed by petitioner, the trial court adjudged that it was
also inadmissible because it was a private document executed without
the intervention of a notary public and no witness was presented to
prove that petitioner signed the document.

CA Ruling: Granted, reversed RTC decision. Saldana is ordered to pay Spouses

Niamatali the amount of 3 Million pesos with interest at 6% per annum
from default until finality of this decision.

The respondent spouses need not prove the fact that they sent money
to petitioner because the latter's admission that the amount of
P3,000,000.00 was transmitted to her, having been made in her
Answer, could be treated as a judicial admission. Saldana was legally
 bound to return the P3,000,000.00 which she received from
respondent-spouses considering that the purchase of the Las Piñas
property did not materialize.

Issue: 1) Whether the statements in petitioner's Answer could be considered

judicial admissions;
2) Whether petitioner should return the P3,000,000.00 she received
from respondent spouses for the purchase of the Las Piñas property;
and
3) Whether petitioner is liable for the payment of interest on the
amount due.

SC Ruling: Petition is denied, the CA decision is affirmed with modification as to

interest to instead start earn at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing of the complaint until the decision becomes final.

1. Statements in the Answer constitute judicial admissions which

bind petitioner.

A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which
dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact
admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent

with what was pleaded.

Here, Saldana does not even deny that she received P3,000,000.00
from respondent-spouses. To resolve the controversy between the
parties, the issue simply boils down to whether Saldana received
P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses and as can be gleaned from
her Answer, Saldana admitted such fact. She failed to prove that the
admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. Her arguments, therefore, are mere desperate
attempts to escape liability.

2. There is an implied agency between petitioner and respondent-

spouses.

By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some

service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another,
with the consent or authority of the latter. Agency may be express, or
implied from the acts of the principal. A contract of agency may be
inferred from all the dealings between petitioner and respondent-
spouses. The question of whether an agency has been created is
ordinarily a question which may be established in the same way as
any other fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence.

Here, Spouses Niamatali communicated with Saldana to purchase a

property in metro manila. Saldana thus, searched and found the
subject Las Piñas property, and also received P3,000,000.00 from
spouses Niamatali to finalize the transaction. Thus, it is beyond
dispute that an implied agency existed between petitioner and
respondent-spouses for the purpose of purchasing the Las Piñas
property.

Saldana however acted beyond the scope of her authority when she
proceeded to purchase the substitute properties in Manila and
Paranaque. It was only after the sale that petitioner informed
respondent-spouses that she already settled for the Manila and
Parañaque properties, worth more than P3,000,000.00 in valuation.
Thus, even though petitioner may have been motivated by good
intentions and by a sincere belief that the purchase of the Manila and
Parañaque properties would benefit respondent-spouses, it cannot be
gainsaid that she acted outside the scope of the authority given to her,
i.e., to purchase the Las Piñas property. Hence, petitioner's failure to
fulfill her obligation entitles respondent-spouses to the return of the
P3,000,000.00 which they remitted to her account.

3. Petitioner is liable for the payment of compensatory interest.

The kinds of interest that may be imposed in a judgment are the
monetary interest and the compensatory interest.

Collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is

prohibited by law. There are instances in which an interest may be
imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or written,
regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states
that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be
imposed as indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of
interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the Civil Code
provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent on this
point.

The two instances apply only to compensatory interest. Clearly and

contrary to petitioner's assertion, the interest imposed by the CA is not
monetary interest because aside from the fact that there is no use or
forbearance of money involved in this case, the subject interest was
not one which was agreed upon by the parties in writing. As a form of
 damages, compensatory interest is due only if the obligor is proven to
have failed to comply with his obligation.

Here,Saldana’s principal obligation was to purchase the Las Piñas

property for respondent-spouses. The obligation to return the money
is a consequence of her failure to comply with her principal obligation.

The breach thereof entitles respondent-spouses to the payment of

interest at the rate of 6% per annum, which, as pronounced in Eastern
Shipping Lines and subsequently reiterated in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames, is the rate of interest applicable in transactions involving the
payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from the
breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general.

The payment of interest should be reckoned from the date of filing of

the Complaint or on March 6, 2006.

Others
Case Citation: G.R. No. 207001

Date: June 07, 2017

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: RICHARD F. TRIPOLI and ROMULO IMPAS

Doctrine:
1. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to
strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165
does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the
items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be.
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of

said law, particularly" the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will
not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.1âwphi1 Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must
be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight accorded
to it by the courts

2. The presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded

as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-
dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in
court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through
his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to
law enforcement. .

Antecedent
Facts: on January 26, 2003, a team of policemen from the Criminal
Investigation and Intelligence Branch . (CIIB), Cebu City Police
Office, were briefed regarding a buy-bust operation to be conducted
against Tripoli. P02 John Pempee Arriola (P02 Arriola) and the
informant were designated as poseur-buyers and given two pieces
of one hundred peso bills. The buy-bust money was placed in a
package together with the "bodol" money and its serial numbers
recorded in the police blotter.

P02 Arriola and the informant proceeded inside the Jollibee, Mango
Avenue Branch to meet with Tripoli while the rest of the team
stayed outside. SPO 1 Roel Del Socorro (SPO 1 Del Socorro)
received a text message from P02 Arriola informing him that the
transaction was moved to the Queensland Motel. P02 Arriola, the
informant, and Tripoli went to Queensland Motel and checked in at
room 315 while SPO 1 Del Socorro and P02 Bezaleel Olmedo (P02
Olmedo) stayed outside the motel.

At around 8:00 p.m., P02 Arriola informed SPOl Del Socorro thru
text message that Tripoli will be going out of the motel to get the
shabu and will return before 1:00 a.m. When Tripoli left, SPO 1 Del
Socorro and P02 Olmedo entered room 315 to join P02 Arriola and
the informant.

Shortly before 1:00 a.m., they heard a knock on the door. SPOl Del
Socorro and P02 Olmedo hid inside the bathroom leaving the door
slightly open so they could see who would enter the room and
easily hear the conversation. SPOl Del Socorro and P02 Olmedo
saw Tripoli enter the room with Impas. Impas handed the two plastic
packets of shabu to P02 Arriola, who gave "bodol" money to Tripoli.
SPO 1 Del Socorro and P02 Olmedo went out of the bathroom and
immediately arrested the two accused after a short scuffle. The
marked buy-bust money and "bodol" money were recovered from
Tripoli. They were apprised of their constitutional rights and were
brought to CIIB office at Camp Sotero Cabahug.

The two plastic packets were turned over to P03 Filomena

Mendaros (P03 Mendaros), who marked both with the initials of the
accused-appellants (RT/Rl-BB-1 and RT/RI-BB-2). The Chief of
CIIB Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Calope Albotra, Jr. requested
the PNP crime laboratory to conduct an examination of the contents
of the two plastic packets· for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. P02 Dhonel Salazar (P02 Salazar)
delivered the request and confiscated two plastic packets to the
PNP crime laboratory which were received by P03 Rias. P/Inspector
Patriana conducted a laboratory examination and issued Chemistry
Report No .. D-139-2003 stating that the two plastic packets marked
RT/Rl-BB-1 · and RT/Rl-BB-2 contained a total weight of 5.64
grams of white crystalline substance which tested positive for
 methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Petitioner’s The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the
Contention: presentation of the informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of
drug cases and that what is important is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value· of the seized drugs

Respondent’s Tripoli filed this appeal before Us, reiterating his arguments that his
Contention: guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
informant was not presented in court; the corpus delicti and the
chain of custody was not duly established; the presumption of
innocence prevails Over the presumption of regular performance of
official duties; the chemistry report does not prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt; and the accused-
appellant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: The RTC found merit in the prosecution's witnesses' testimonies. It
also noted that though the prosecution failed to present the "bodol"
money,. it held that "delivery", which is one of the acts punishable in
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, is present in the instant case. It
disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds both

accused RICHARD TRIPOLI Y FALCON and ROMULO IMPAS Y
BALCONAN, GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. Each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a FINE of ₱500,000.00.

The two plastic packs found to be positive for the presence of

methamphetamine hydrochloride are ordered confiscated and shall
be destroyed in accordance with law.

CA Ruling: The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellants. It ruled

that the failure to mark the two pieces of one hundred peso bills as
buy-bust money and the "bodol" money, and its non-presentation in
court, are not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. It likewise ruled
that the failure to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory, photographed the evidence seized, and
immediately marked the seized items does not automatically impair
the integrity of the chain of custody. It ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove that the chain of custody of the seized prohibited
drugs remained intact from the time the drugs were recovered until
they were submitted to the crime laboratory for testing and then to
the court.
Issue: 1. WON there is a need for the informant to be presented in
Court.
2. WON the corpus delicti and the chain of custody was duly
established.

SC Ruling:
We find no merit in the appeal.

The essential elements for illegal sale of shabu are as follows: (a)
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
consummate the illegal transaction. These elements are present in
this case.

Accused-appellants' argument that the failure to present the

informant is fatal to the prosecution's cause fails to impress.
There is no need to present the informant/poseur-buyer/police
asset.

First, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as

indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing
accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for
security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from
the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the
confidentiality of the informant's identity is protected in deference to
his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the
testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in ·
obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his
security be disregarded.

Second, the identities of the accused-appellants were also

confirmed by SP02 Del Socorro and P02 Olmedo. While the Court
sanctions an acquittal for failure to present the informant, it does so
when the police officers involved had no personal knowledge of the
transaction. Here, the witnesses were inside the hotel room where
the sale had transpired. Although they were in the bathroom when
the accused-appellants entered the room, they left the door ajar so
that they could hear and see what was happening. There was,
therefore, no need for the presentation of the informant since the
other witnesses presented had personal knowledge of the
transaction as well.

With regard to the accused-appellants' argument that Section

21 of RA. 9165 was ignored, We find that the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 were substantially complied with.

The chain of custody requirement ensures the preservation of the

integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items such that doubts
as to the identity of the evidence are eliminated. "To be admissible,
the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered
in evidence."

As the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of

both offenses, its identity and integrity must definitely be shown to
have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the
illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution, either by accident or otherwise.

This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale,

the fact that the substance [possessed or illegally sold], in the first
instance, is the very substance adduced in court must likewise be
established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that
required sustaining a conviction. Thus, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused
up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus
dellcti. The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary
doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not
altogether removed."

In this case, accused-appellants point to the police officers' failure to

mark the evidence at the crime scene, lack of inventory and
photographs as affecting the integrity of the chain of custody.
However, such failure does not, by itself, void the arrest of the
accused-appellants or impair the integrity of the chain of custody.

The case of People v. Cardenas states the same:

We held thus in Zalameda v. People of the Philippines:

Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly

comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not
necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be. utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, we see
substantial compliance by the police with the required procedure on
the custody and control of the confiscated items, thus showing that
the integrity of the seized evidence was not compromised. We refer
particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to
the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to
the test results obtained, under a situation where no objection to
admissibility was ever raised by the defense. All these, to the
unprejudiced mind, show that the evidence seized were the same
evidence tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court.
In People v. Del Monte, we explained:

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said

law, particularly" the making of the inventory and the photographing
of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence.1âwphi1 Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to
be inadmissible there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight accorded to it by the
courts.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule

that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or
probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, the prosecution effectively established that the chain of

custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time of seizure,
marking, submission to the laboratory for testing, and presentation
in court remained intact. P02 Arriola was the one who received the
two packets of shabu from Impas. After their arrest and when the
team brought the accused-appellants to the police station, the two
packets were given to P03 Mendaros who marked them. P02
Salazar then delivered the laboratory request and the two packets
of shabu to the crime laboratory which was received by P03 Rias. P
/Inspector Patriana conducted the testing of the two packets, and
the same were presented and identified in court. Clearly, the
prosecution was able to substantially comply with the rules, showing
by records and testimony, the whereabouts of the seized items from
 the time of its seizure.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision

dated March 28, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00979, which affirmed the March 31,
2008 Decision of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. CB-65243, convicting accused-appellants Richard F.
Tripoli and Romulo B. Impas for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED.

Others

Case Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016

Citation:

Date: April 29, 2014

Petitioner: Lito Corpuz

Respondent: People of the Philippines

Doctrine: Admissibility of evidence; timely objection - The established

doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived.

The credibility of the witness; appreciation by the trial court -

Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this
Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had
the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.

Antecedent ● Sometime in 1990, private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and

facts: petitioner Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City. The private complainant was then engaged in
the business of lending money to casino players.
 ● Upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for
sale, the petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991, at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on a
commission basis.

● Danilo agreed and turned over the following items:

a) An 18k diamond ring for men
b) A woman’s bracelet
c) One (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet
With an aggregate value of P98,000.

● They both agreed that the Lito shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, return the same items, within a period of
60 days. The period expired without the petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the piecesof jewelry. Later
when they met, Lito promised to pay Danilo the value of the
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

● An information for the crime of estafa was filed against Lito.

Danilo entered a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts,
presented the lone testimony of DaniloTangcoy. On the other
hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of the
petitioner:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting

agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base
employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with a private complainant. However, he
admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in
1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He
claimed that the same receipt was then dated may 2,
1991 and used as evidence against him for the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.

Petitioner’s The petitioner assigned the following errors on the decision of the
contention: Court of Appeals: (Relevant issues) - Arguments before the SC

1) The CA erred in confirming the admission and appreciation by

the lower court of prosecution evidence, including its exhibits,
which are mere machine copies, as this violates the “Best
 Evidence Rule”
2) The CA erred in affirming the lower court’s finding that the
prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt,
although --
a) The private complainant testiied on two (2) versions of
the incident.
b) The version of the petitioner is more straightforward and
logical, consistent with human experience.
c) The equipoise rule was not appreciated in and applied to
this case.
d) Penal statutes are strictly construed against the state.

Respondent’ The OSG, representing the People of the Philippines, argue that:
s 1) The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner
contention: failed to object to their admissibility.
2) The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently
established the designation of the offense and the acts
complained of.
3) The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the
crime charged.

RTC’s The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Ruling: crime charged.

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code; there being no
offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable; accordingly, the accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of four (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium
period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the
amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of
suit.

CA’s Ruling: The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, but with modification on the
imposable prison term. It ruled that herein petitioner shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for
each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the admission of the prosecution evidence is
incorrect on the ground that the evidence presented were
merely photocopies, violating the best evidence rule.
2) Whether or not the prosecution’s case was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

SC’s Ruling: The court finds the petition devoid of any merit.

Admissibility of Prosecution Evidence

The records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of

the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified
upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed
out that the petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having
signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.

Credibility of Prosecution Witness

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is

questioned by the petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the
rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had
the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the
CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by
the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.

Others: Other Arguments of Petitioner

The CA erred in affirming the trial court;s finding that the

criminal information for estafa was not fatally defective although
the same did not charge the offnese under Article 315(1)(b) of
the RPC

● Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner,

the formally defective Informationfiled against him. He
contends that the Information does not contain the period when
the piecesof jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the
date when the crime occurred was differentfrom the one
testified to by private complainant.

The argument is untenable. It is true that the gravamen of the crime

of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. ThenSection 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name ofthe offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
theplace wherein the offense was committed.

In the case at bar, a reading of the subject information shows

compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the
commission of the offense was stated as “ on or about the fifth
(5th) day of July,1991” is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's
cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense.

Aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is
not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information
ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date
within which the accused-appellant should have delivered the
proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified
upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with
the rules.
 ● Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a
demand by the offended party on the offender was not proved.

The argument is untenable. The elements of estafa with abuse of

confidence are as follows:
(a) That money, goods, or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same;

(b)That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or

property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another, and
(d) That there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.

In his testimony, the private complainant narrated how he was able to

locate the petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave
the pieces of jewelry and asked the petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.

Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
“demand” need not even be used to show thatit has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution

was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. The
private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
a commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991, with
an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if
unsold. There was misappropriation when the petitioner failed to remit
the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place,
failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed
period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice
of the latter.

Case G.R. No. 230221

Citation:

Date: April 10, 2019

Petitioners: EDGAR GAYON y FERRERAS,

Respondents
:

Doctrine: Findings of Fact; It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts
are generally accorded great weight; except when it appears on
the record that the trial court may have overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or
circumstance which if considered, would have altered the result.

Settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be proved

with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is,
beyond reasonable doubt

Unlawful aggression refers to “an actual physical assault, or at

least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.”
Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-
defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

Antecedent Accused-appellant Edgar and Rodolfo Gayon (Rodolfo)

Facts: were charged with the crime of Murder -stab one Leonora Givera
both accused-appellant Edgar and Rodolfo pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.

Respondent’ The version of the prosecution as summarized by the CA is as

s follows:
Contention:
The evidence of the prosecution indicated that on July19, 2004 at
around 9:40 in the evening, Leyden Gayon[(Leyden)] was in their
house in Sulangan, Matnog, Her husband is the first cousin of
[Rodolfo] while Leyden testified that while she was in their house
having a conversation with Leonora Givera [(Leonora)], Leyden
saw accused-appellant [Edgar] entered their house. According to
the People’s witness, [accused-appellant Edgar] sat on the lap of
Leonora and suddenly stabbed Leonora several times. She even
saw accused-appellant’s knife embedded on Leonora’s right
shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged Leonora inside the house.
 Leyden claimed that Leonora uttered to her that she was dying
and Leyden likewise heard accused-appellant [Edgar] told his
father [Rodolfo] “ Papay we have no more problem because I
killed your sister”

Petitioner’s [T]hat on July 19, 2004 at about 9:40 in the evening[,] [Rodolfo]
Contention: was in their house along the road in Sulangan, Matnog,
Sorsogon. He claimed he was not present at the time of the
killing. That he was just informed by his wife and daughter about
the incident that his son [accused-appellant Edgar] had killed
Leonora Givera, the following morning. His wife and daughter-in-
law had a previous altercation about their chickens. He did not
know of any reason why [he was implicated in the case]. For his
part, accused-appellant [Edgar] alleged that on July 19, 2004, he
arrived home from work but his family was not there. [He] went
back on the road where a certain Toti told him that his family was
not home because they had a quarrel with Leonora at Leyden’s
house, where they were drinking gin. Thereafter, [accused-
appellant Edgar asked Leonora what [his] wife did which caused
their frequent quarrel. [However,] x x x Leonora pointed a knife at
him and said that his wife kept on fighting back. Leonora then
stood with the knife still pointing at accused-appellant [Edgar], who
tried to resist the instrument. During the
struggle, accused-appellant [Edgar] allegedly saw Leyden’s
husband approaching with something to hit him, so he
pushed Leonora inside Leyden’s house. Accused-appellant

[Edgar] testified that he did not notice if the knife caused any
injury. Thus, he left and went back on the road to look for his

family.

MTC/RTC the RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo.

Ruling:

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the eyewitness,

Leyden Gayon (Leyden), who identified accused-appellant Edgar
as the one who stabbed Leonora several times on the right
shoulder as corroborated by the medical finding of Dr. Rosanna
Galeria.

CA Ruling: the CA affirmed the RTC

with modifications. The CA found that all the elements of Murder
 were

established by the prosecution through the testimony

of the eyewitness and corroborated by the results of
the post
mortem examination of the victim.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in

affirming accused-appellant Edgar’s conviction for Murder.

SC Ruling: It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally
accorded great weight; except when it appears on the record that
the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if
considered, would have altered the result.

After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, the Court affirms
the conviction of accused-appellant Edgar But for the crime of
Homicide, instead of Murder, as the Qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation were not present in the killing
of the victim Leonora.

However, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold

that treachery is present. For treachery to exist there must be a
showing that the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing
the act without risk to the aggressor.

Thus, in People v. Caliao), the Court found the accused therein

guilty of Homicide only, not Murder, because there was no
showing that the accused made any preparation to kill the victim
in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or
make it impossible or difficult for the victim to retaliate or defend
himself. The Court also ruled that “when aid was easily available
to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that
there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including the
victim’s family, no treachery could be appreciated because if the
accused indeed consciously adopted means to insure the
facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or
time.”
 Moreover, the testimony of the eyewitness confirmed that
Leonora was attacked at the place familiar to her and in the
presence of other people who are related to the victim. Under
these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree with the
courts

a quo that accused-appellant Edgar deliberately chose a particular

mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the
criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer. To reiterate, the victim was
with people who could have helped her repel the attack.

As regards accused-appellant Edgar’s claim of self- defense, he

has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person resorting to self-defense.

that accused-apellant Edgar failed to discharge his burden. His

uncorroborated and self-serving claim that it was Leonora who
pointed a knife at him pales in comparison to and loses prob to
the positive testimony of Leyden, who identified accused-appellant
Edgar as the one who entered her house and stabbed the victim.
Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the nature and number of
wounds suffered by the victim “logically indicated that the assault
was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined part of the
accused-appellant.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court

DECLARES accused-appellant Edgar Gayon y
Ferreras GUILTY

Others ELEMENTS OF EVIDENT PREMIDITATION

There is evident premeditation when the following elements

concur: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3)
the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
Case G.R. No. 178925
Citation:

Date: June 1, 2011

Petitioners: MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON

ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS

Responden ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.,

ts: and THE SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 163

Doctrine: A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party

in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses
with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It
may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 39

During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of

the Order dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such
admission to the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the
circumstances under which the admission was made. In construing an
admission, the court should consider the purpose for which the
admission is used and the surrounding circumstances and
statements.40 Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the
admission, they relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order which
was presented by petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the presumption
that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the
regular performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and
unfair to respondents if they would be prevented from proving that the
Order is in fact spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case
No. 10 before the RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City.

Antecedent Estrella Ybiernas owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros

Facts: Occidental covered by a TCT. She executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of her heirs, one of them is Dionisio
Ybiernas.

On June 30, 1989, Bacolod RTC issued an Order in Cadastral Case

No. 10, directing the registration and annotation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
said RTC Order were annotated on the title. [Neither the defendants
nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the mentioned judicial
proceedings before the RTC.]

Respondents Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed

with the Pasig RTC a Complaint for sum of money and damages
against Estrella and three other individuals. Upon respondents’ motion,
the Pasig RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of
attachment and levied the subject property. When Estrella’s heirs
learned about the levy, Dionisio filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim,
asserting the transfer of ownership to them.

The Pasig RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of
respondents, and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay.

In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs.

Petitioners filed with the Bacolod RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title
and Damages, claiming that the levy was invalid because the property
is not owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig RTC case. They
averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute
Sale on the TCT serves as notice to the whole world that the property is
no longer owned by Estrella.

Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The Bacolod RTC

initially denied the motion. Upon petitioners’ MR, the Bacolod RTC
granted the motion for summary judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

The levy on attachment made by herein defendant Sheriff of RTC..

Pasig City on said TCT.. issued by the RD of the Province of Negros
Occidental, covering the Subject Property, is hereby DECLARED
INVALID; and, consequently, [the] Entry .. on the same TCT .. is hereby
CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.

While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a

motion for new trial,18 claiming that they have discovered on May
9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No. 10 did not exist and the April 28,
1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the motion were the
affidavit19 of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in
Bacolod City in behalf of the law office representing respondents, and
the following certifications:

a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso M.

Villanueva, Jr., Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City,
 stating that: "no cadastral case involving Lot 713-C-1-B, Psd-
220027, Talisay Cadastre, was filed with this office sometime on
30 June 1989 and raffled to Branch 47 of this court which was
then presided by Judge Enrique T. Jocson." 20

b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Atty. Mehafee G.

Sideno, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 47,
stating that: "as per records of this court, no Cadastral Case No.
10, LRC, GLRO Rec. 97, Lot No. 713-C-1-B, Psd 220027, filed
by Dionisio Ybiernas was filed and docketed in this office." 21

c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella M.

Domingo, OIC Archives Division of the National Archives Office,
stating that: "no copy is on file with this Office of a DEED OF
SALE allegedly executed by and among ESTRELLA MAPA
VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO YBIERNAS, VICENTE M.
YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL YBIERNAS and MARIA CORAZON
ANGELES, ratified on April 28, 1988 before INDALECIO P.
ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo City and
acknowledged as Doc. No. 437; Page No. 89; Book No. VI;
Series of 1988."

Plaintiff’s In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the

Contention existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of
: the Order dated June 30, 1989. They maintain that respondents cannot
admit the existence of an order and yet deny the existence of the
proceedings from which the order emanates. Respondents’ judicial
admission that the court Order existed necessarily carried with it the
admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order was issued
likewise existed. Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by their
judicial admission and they cannot be allowed to present evidence to
contradict the same.

Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of

evidence have no probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications
are self-serving and inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did
not even indicate the period when they occupied their positions and
state whether they had the authority to issue such certifications and
whether they had personal knowledge of the documents archived
during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According to
petitioners, the certifications cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of the Order dated June 30, 1989. At most,
the certifications would simply show that the records of Cadastral Case
No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence, they would have
no bearing on the result of the case.
 Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden
of proving that the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented
comply with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. They
contend that respondents could have discovered and presented in
court the certifications during trial had they exercised reasonable
diligence.

Defendant’ Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the
s grant of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they
Contention discovered the evidence after the trial court rendered its judgment on
December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have discovered and produced
:
the evidence during the trial with reasonable diligence; and (3) the
evidence was material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and was of such weight that, if admitted, would probably
change the judgment. On the second requisite, respondents explained
that they could not have discovered the evidence with reasonable
diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC
Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of
a court order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of
regularity. On the third requisite, respondents pointed out that, if the
nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10 and the invalidity of the Order
dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by the newly
discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably be
dismissed, as respondents’ levy would be declared superior to
petitioners’ claim.

MTC/RTC
Ruling:

CA Ruling: The CA granted the motion for new trial.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED

IN FAILING TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN
IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ADMITTED FACTS.

SC Ruling: Petitioners’ arguments are untenable.

On the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting

evidence that would disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10,
we likewise sustain the CA.

A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party

in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses
with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It
 may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 39

During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of

the Order dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such
admission to the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the
circumstances under which the admission was made. In construing an
admission, the court should consider the purpose for which the
admission is used and the surrounding circumstances and
statements.40 Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the
admission, they relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order which
was presented by petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the presumption
that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the
regular performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and
unfair to respondents if they would be prevented from proving that the
Order is in fact spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case
No. 10 before the RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City.

Others

Case Citation: G.R. No. 180016

Date: April 29, 2014

Petitioners: Lito Corpuz

Respondents: People of the Philippines

Doctrine:
An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.

Antecedent ● Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy

Facts: pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same
 and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the
same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
● The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything
to Tangcoy.
● When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that
he will pay, but to no avail.
● Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of
confidence against Corpuz.

Petitioner’s a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for

Contention: being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry
should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different
from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

Respondent’s In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the

Contention: contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.

RTC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating

circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty

of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS
 of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to
indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed

Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P),
Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The
rest of the decision stands.

Issue: 1. WON the exhibits presented by the prosecution are inadmissible

for being mere machine copies.
2. WON the Information is defective for failing to state the period
when the jewelry was supposed to be returned and the date of the
commission of the crime was different as compared to that testified
by the complainant.

SC Ruling:
1. No. The records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA
also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence,
such objection shall be considered as waived.

2. No. Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner,

the formally defective Information filed against him. He contends
that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the
crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in
the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true
that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
 owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of
the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective.

Others The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the

statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a
reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was
stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not
likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11
of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from
the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential
element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution
to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within
which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or
returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy,
hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.
Case Citation: G.R. No. 204160 

Date:   September 22, 2014

Petitioners: SPOUSES MICHELLE M. NOYNAY and NOEL S. NOYNAY,

Respondents: CITIHOMES BUILDER AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Doctrine: Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties
who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a
party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must
assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the

fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.

Antecedent
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
wherein petitioners assail the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

Citihomes and spouses Noynay executed a contract to sell covering

the sale of a house and lot in Bulacan. Thereafter, Citihomes
executed a Deed of Assignment of Claims and Accounts in favor of
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), which gave effect to the
purchasing of UCPB accounts including that of the spouses
Noynay. Then, Citihomes assigned its rights, titles, and participation
in various contracts to sell with its buyers to UCPB.
However, the respondent alleged that the petitioners started to
default in their payment and thus declared them delinquent and
cancelled their contract considering that the latter were not able to
pay nine months of agreed amortizations. Citihomes then sent a
 demand letter to the spouses asking them to vacate the property
due to failure of making payment. Spouses Noynay did not heed the
demand thus Citihomes filed with the MTCC a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the former.

Petitioner’s Spouses Noynay insist that by virtue of the assignment of rights

Contention: which Citihomes executed in favor of UCPB, Citihomes did not have
a cause of action against them because it no longer had an interest
over the subject property. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the
monthly installments amounting to three years were already paid, by
reason of which, Section 3(b) of the Maceda Law should apply. This
means that for the cancellation to be effective, the cash surrender
value should have been paid first to them by Citihomes; and that
because no payment was made, it follows that no valid cancellation
could also be effected. This allegedly strengthened their right to the
possession of the property even to this day.

Respondent’s Citihomes counters that it has the right to ask for the eviction of the
Contention: petitioners in its capacity as the registered owner despite the
assignment of rights it made to UCPB. It believes that because
Spouses Noynay failed to pay at least two (2) years of installments,
the cancellation became effective upon the expiration of the 30-day
period following the receipt of the notice of delinquency and
cancellation notice and without the need for the payment of the cash
surrender value under Section 3(b) of the Maceda Law.

MTC/RTC MTCC dismissed the complaint. It considered the annotation in the

Ruling: certificate of title, which was dated prior to the filing of the complaint,
which showed that Citihomes had executed the Assignment favor of
UCPB, as having the legal effect of divesting Citihomes of its
interest and right over the subject property. As far as the MTCC was
concerned, Citihomes did not have a cause of action against
Spouses Noynay.

RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MTCC. The RTC

explained that the assignment was limited only to the installment
accounts receivables due from Spouses Noynay and did not include
the transfer of title or ownership over the property. It pointed out that
Citihomes remained as the registered owner of the subject property,
and so it had the right to ask for the eviction of Spouses Noynay. As
to the issue of who had the better right of possession, the RTC
ordered that the records be remanded to the MTCC for the proper
determination.

CA Ruling: affirmed the conclusion of the RTC that Citihomes still had the right
and interest over the property in its capacity as the registered
 owner. Moreover, the issue on who, between the parties had a
better possessory right over the property, was resolved in favor of
Citihomes.

CA primarily recognized the relevance of Republic Act (R.A.)No.

6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act
(Maceda Law), in determining the limits of the right to possess of
Spouses Noynay in their capacity as defaulting buyers in a realty
installment scheme. Under the said law, the cancellation of a
contract would only follow if the requirements set forth therein had
been complied with, particularly the giving of a "notice of
delinquency and cancellation of the contract" to the defaulting party
and,in some cases, the payment to the buyer of the cash surrender
value if at least two years of installments had been paid. The CA
noted that Spouses Noynay failed to complete the minimum two (2)
years of installment, despite the allegation that three (3) years of
amortizations had already been paid. As an effect, the CA
pronounced that the termination of the contract was validly effected
by the expiration of the 30-day period from the time the notice of
cancellation was received by Spouses Noynay. From that moment,
the CA treated Spouses Noynay to have lost the right to possess
the property. In addition, the CA made Spouses Noynay liable for
the payment of monthly rentals from the time their possession
became illegal.

 CA denied their motion for reconsideration.

Issue: 1. Whether Citihomes has a cause of action for ejectment

against Spouses Noynay.
2. Whether or not the MACEDA Law is applicable in the case?

SC Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court agreed with the MTCC. The determination
of whether the Citihomes had a right to ask for the eviction of
spouses Noynay entirely depends on the review of the
Assignment of Claims and Accounts it executed in favor of
UCPB. The decision of the MTCC had factual and legal bases.
What Citihomes did was an assignment or transfer of all
contractual rights arising from various contracts to sell, including
the subject contract to sell, with all the rights, obligations and
benefits appurtenant thereto in favor of UCPB. By virtue of the
assignment, it was clear that Citihomes had ceased to have any
right to cancel the contract to sell with the petitioners and
without this right, it undoubtedly had no cause of action against
the spouses Noynay. Furthermore, because the contract to sell
 was not validly terminated or rescinded, the spouses Noynay
had the better right of possession over the property. Thus, the
petition was granted and the decision of the MTCC was
reinstated.
2. Yes, By its admission that Spouses Noynay had been paying
the amortizations for three (3) years, there is no reason to doubt
Spouses Noynay's compliance with the minimum requirement of
two years payment of amortization, entitling them to the
payment of the cash surrender value provided for by law and by
the contract to sell. To reiterate, Section 3(b) of the Maceda
Law requires that for an actual cancellation to take place, the
notice of cancellation by notarial act and the full payment of the
cash surrender value must be first received by the buyer.
Clearly, no payment of the cash surrender value was made to
Spouses Noynay. Necessarily, no cancellation of the contract to
selI could be considered as validly effected. Without the valid
cancellation of the contract, there is no basis to treat the
possession of the property by Spouses Noynay as illegal.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Similar to pre-trial admissions in a pre-trial order in
ordinary civil cases, the contents of the record of a preliminary
conference control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. A contrary
ruling would render useless the proceedings during the
preliminary conference and would, in fact, be antithetical to the
very purpose of a preliminary conference, which is, among
others, to allow the parties to admit and stipulate on a given set
of facts and to simplify the issues involved.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties
who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a
party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must
assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the

fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
 subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.

Here, Spouses Noynay proposed for stipulation the factual

allegation that they had been paying Citihomes the monthly
amortization of the property for more than three (3) years and
only stopped payment by January 8, 2008. In the Preliminary
Conference Order,25 dated January 28, 2010, the MTCC noted
the said factas admitted, to wit:
The defendants proposed the following matters for stipulations:
1. That the defendants had already paid the plaintiff the total
amount of Php 633,000.00 – Not Admitted
2. That the defendants have beenpaying the plaintiff the
monthly amortization of the property for more than three
years and only stopped payment by January 8, 2008 –
Admitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 16, 2012
Decision and October 15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 26, 2010
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court for Cities is REINSTATED.

Others Section 3(b) of the Maceda Law requires that for an actual
cancellation to take place, the notice of cancellation by notarial act
and the full payment of the cash surrender value must be first
received by the buyer.

Cause of action has been defined as an act or omission by which a

party violates a right of another.

 A plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case which seeks recovery of the

property must prove one’s legal right to evict the defendant, a
correlative obligation on the part of such defendant to respect the
plaintiff’s right to evict, and the defendant’s act or omission in the
form of refusal to vacate upon demand when his possession
ultimately becomes illegal.

 Well-established is the rule that the assignee is deemed

subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the
seller/assignor.

Case G.R. No. 149576

Citation:

Date: August 8, 2006

Petitioners: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land

Registration Authority, Petitioner,

Responden KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

ts:

Doctrine:
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the other person. 9 By
adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission
of the party embracing or espousing it.

Antecedent There was a construction by respondent Kenrick Development

Facts: Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land
located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996.
As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters
of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership
over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the
name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had
no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title,.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against
respondent and Alfonso Concepcion
On December 1996, Respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of
those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent’s former counsel. He
testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in
his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on to declare respondent in
default,  predicated on its failure to file a valid answer
Petitioner’s The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer
Contention: was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the
answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,  it was a mere scrap of paper and
produced no legal effect.

Responden ● While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that
t’s the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be
Contention: considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that
the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor
specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important
thing was that the answer bore a signature.
● The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment
as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This
was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may
concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she
was not known beforehand.
● Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never
disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for
respondent subsequent to its filing.

MTC/RTC
Ruling: The trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion.

It found respondent’s answer to be sham and false and intended to

defeat the purpose of the rules.

CA Ruling: Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.

It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be

unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The
appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the
answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer
by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the
answer may have had

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which
declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes,
it did.

SC Ruling: A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify

another’s statement. 7 Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another,
evidence of those statements is admissible against him. 8 This is the
essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or

action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. 9 By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.

Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by

another;  10
b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;  11
c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;  12
d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by
another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the
other make  13 or
e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.  14

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and

built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its
former counsel’s statements.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as

its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission constituted a judicial
admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is

signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is
clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one
that is signed.

Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He

may not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has

read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. 16 Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
 signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work

involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading
to another lawyer 17 but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos

entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was likewise void.

The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and
of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was
properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains

that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned
pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by
the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001

decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February
19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.

Others

Topic Matters need not be proved

Case G.R. Nos. 146710-15 (356 SCRA 108)
Citation:

Date: April 3, 2001

Short Title Estrada vs. Desierto

Petitioner: JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

Respondents ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON

: GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.

Doctrine: ✔ Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in

whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.
There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not all hearsay evidence,
however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to
their relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.

✔ Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in

whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.
There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years,
a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts
due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity

✔ An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or

action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person
had made.” To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick,
“this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common
sense.”

✔ The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 concerning a co-
 partner’s or agent’s admissions.

✔ Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an are binding on the

principal–agency relationship. Jones very well explains the
reasons for the rule, viz.: “What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So,
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his
principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of
any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and
connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or
transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the
old writers, dum fervent opus is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.”

✔ The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently

relevant statements. These are relevant statements independent
of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes:
(1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2)
those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in
the issue.
o The second class includes a. Statement of a person
showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will, and other emotions; b.
Statements of a person which show his physical condition,
as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from
which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of
another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad
faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identify
the date, place and person in question; and e. Statements
showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
✔ Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not make bonafide dispute the contents of the document
and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production – Best Evidence Rule.
✔ A party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered
instrument may not object that it was not properly identified
before it was admitted in evidence – rule on authentication of
private writings.

Antecedent In the 1998 elections, Estrada was elected President while Arroyo
Facts: was elected Vice-President.
Later, Estrada was accused of receiving jueteng money from
Singson and other corruption charges. With this, the House of Rep
wanted to impeach Estrada. Impeachment trial then commenced. A
 few days later, thousands of demonstrators marched to the EDSA
Shrine for another people power revolution. Several government
officials withdrew their support to the Estrada administration.
Thereafter, negotiations for the transfer of power commenced at
Malacanang. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to Arroyo
as President.
Estrada then filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office until after the term of Estrada as
President is over and only if legally warranted.

Estrada filed another petition for Quo Warranto praying for judgment
confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office and declaring Arroyo to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President
only in an acting capacity.

The facts show that Estrada did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace on the
afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of Arroyo.

Petitioner’s Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among

contention: others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts
of the events and occurrences to conclude that he has resigned.

Also, the petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments to the

alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged
that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the petitioner’s state of
mind on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence.

Issues: (1) Applying the totality test, whether petitioner has resigned as
President. (YES)
(2) Whether the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the rule
on res inter alios acta. (NO)
(3) Whether the rules on authentication of private writing and
evidence were violated. (NO)
(4) Whether petitioner’s due process rights to a fair trial have been
prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. (NO)

SC Ruling: (1) Applying the totality test, whether petitioner has resigned as
President. (YES)

In our Decision, we used the totality test to conclude that

petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed prior,
contemporaneous, and posterior events to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts that are
well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior
events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to
resign, x x x. All these prior events are facts which are within
judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news
accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers
reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible
evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these
facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled
out any of these facts as false.

We now come to some events of January 20, 2001,

contemporaneous to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. We used
the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to
distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them.
Every day, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, civil law cases
involving last wills and testaments, commercial cases involving
contracts, and other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the
use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule.
Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the
Court from the facts narrated in the Diary, but that does not make the
Diary inadmissible as evidence.

We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to

examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all-important press release of
the petitioner containing his final statement, which was issued after
the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing
its content, we ruled that petitioner’s issuance of the press
release and his abandonment of Malacañang Palace confirmed
his resignation. These are overt acts which leave, no doubt to
the Court that the petitioner has resigned.

To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The
Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar.
Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the
Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the
said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.
The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6,
2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the
Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al.,
dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary
were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of
private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In
fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on
February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on February 6, 2001.
It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez
in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to
contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence
is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in
part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than
the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three
reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3)
absence of the oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay
evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity.

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further

determine whether the hearsay evidence is exempted from the rules
of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of
exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and
the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” It has long
been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay.

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which

can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a
snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate;
his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised
by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would
leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by
Monday and “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I don’t want any more of this—it’s too painful. I’m tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name,
then I will go.” We noted that days before, petitioner had
repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the
growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the
meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the
doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s
reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person. Jones explains that the “basis
for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from
the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the
other person had made.” To use the blunt language of Mueller and
Kirkpatrick, “this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but
common sense.” In the Angara Diary, the options of the
petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew
its support from him as President and commander-in-chief.
Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of “dignified
exit or resignation.” Petitioner did not object to the suggested option
but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence
on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission
by him.

(2) Whether the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the
rule on res inter alios acta. (NO)

The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect

his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to
resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which
we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are
admissible and the rule on hearsay does not cover them. This has
long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioner’s
attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.

The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court, viz.: “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.”

Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of
Rule 130 concerning a co-partner’s or agent’s admissions.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the

petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by
the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he
abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara
Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli,
ikaw pa rin.” (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the
only one I’ve listened to. And now at the end, you still are.).” The
petitioner made this statement of full trust after Secretary Angara
briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this
trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already
leave Malacañang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001,
at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: “Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I
have to leave now?).” Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.
Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to
discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after he
relinquishes the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that
Secretary Angara always briefed petitioner on the progress of their
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and on behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath
as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary

Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well
explains the reasons for the rule, viz.: “What is done, by agent, is
done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So,
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his
principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any
act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and
connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or
transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old
writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and
admissible in evidence against such principal.”

Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover

independently relevant statements. These are relevant statements
independent of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2)
classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts
in issue. The second class includes the following:

a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his

mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will, and other
emotions;

b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as

illness and the like;

c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be

made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge,
belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
 d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in
question; and e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a
witness.

Indeed, the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of the
Angary Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate
the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states
that: “Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does
not make bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no
other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

(3) Whether the rules on authentication of private writing and

evidence were violated. (NO)

Petitioner’s contention is without merit. Regarding the Best Evidence

Rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as
follows:

“Sec. 2. Documentary evidence.—Documents as evidence

consist of writings or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, or other modes of written expressions
offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. The original document must be produced;

exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot

be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control

of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or

other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document.—(a) The original of a

 document is one of the contents of which are the subject of
inquiry.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at

or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repealed in the regular course of

business, one being copied from another at or near the time
of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals.”

Indeed, the Court relied not upon the original, but only a copy of the
Angara Diary published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Regarding the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court

provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz.:

“Sec. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;

or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that

which it is claimed to be.”

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states

that: “A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the
document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its
admission. However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of
a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly
identified before it was admitted in evidence.

Petitioner cites the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro, which frowned

on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge
Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper
account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos. However, there is a significant difference
between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case,
Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis
of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution “the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or
on oral argument. . . (this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary
due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
faith and partiality.” In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had
an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary
when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply
Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum
dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental Memorandum
dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due
process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had “been given
an opportunity to inspect” the Angara Diary but did not object to its
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in
an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as
evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.

(4) Whether petitioner’s due process rights to a fair trial have

been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. (NO)

Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him

but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators
from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we
held before and we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed
to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the
members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to
loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even
identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. As suggested by
the petitioner, we cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the
rule of res ipsa loquitur. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e.,
prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to
the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members
has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our
case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
of an accused to a fair trial. The cases are not wanting where an
accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity. For this
reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to
conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice
on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea.
It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.
Others ✔ The doctrine of separation of powers constitutes an
insuperable bar against the Supreme Court’s interposition of its
power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress
rejecting the former president’s claim that he is still the President,
albeit on leave and that his successor is merely an acting
President.

✔ There is nothing in Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution

that states that Congress’s declaration of the President’s
inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President
assumes the presidency.

✔ Section 3(7) of Article XI of the Constitution conveys two

uncomplicated ideas. First, it tells us that judgment in
impeachment cases has a limited reach, i.e., it cannot extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines. Second, it tells us the
consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in
impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the
party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial
and punishment according to law.

✔ Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2)

before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.

✔ Not every invocation of an accused’s right to speedy trial is

meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an
accused’s right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked
loosely. Unjustified postponements that prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time offend the accused's right to speedy
trial.

✔ An impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a

mockery of the impeachment process.

✔ By resigning from the presidency, the former president more than

consented to the termination of the impeachment case against
him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment
proceedings.

✔ The framers’ intent is clear that the president’s immunity from

suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
 ✔ Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present
a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation—it is
not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule.

Case Citation: G.R. No. 201193

Date: June 10, 2019

Petitioners: TRANQUILINO AGBAYANI

Respondents: LUPA REALTY HOLDING CORPORATION

Doctrine:
The admission by Nonito's counsel during the pre-trial proceedings
before the RTC that there was no sale between Tranquilino and Nonito
qualifies as a judicial admission because the statement is a deliberate,
clear, unequivocal statement of a party's attorney during judicial
proceedings in open court about a concrete or essential fact within
that party's peculiar knowledge.

Antecedent
Facts:  The property subject of the instant case was originally registered
under OCT No. P-46041 in the name of x x x Tranquilino Agbayani
(Tranquilino)
 Tranquilino, who was by then already residing in America, filed
a Complaint for Reivindicacion, Cancellation of Title and
Document with Damages against Lupa Realty Holding Corporation
(Lupa Realty), through his brother, Kennedy Agbayani, and his
nephew, Vernold Malapira (Vernold).
 The Complaint alleged that, [Vernold] went to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Sta. Ana, Cagayan to pay the real estate
taxes on the subject property, but was told that Lupa Realty was
already the new owner thereof and that the tax declaration had
already been transferred to its name. 
 Tranquilino denied having executed said Deed of Absolute Sale,
insisting that his signature thereon must be a forgery because he
was in America on 29 October 1997.
 [he] prayed for the cancellation of Lupa Realty's TCT No. T-
109129 and the reinstatement of OCT No. P-46041 in his name,
plus damages.
Petitioner’s -
Contention:

Respondent’s  In its Answer, Lupa Realty countered that contrary to the allegation

Contention: of Tranquilino that he never sold the subject property, he sold the
same to his brother, Nonito Agbayani (Nonito). I
 n turn, Nonito sold the subject property to Moriel Urdas (Moriel)
 According to Lupa Realty, it acquired the subject property not from
Tranquilino but from Moriel by way of a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale
. 

RTC Ruling
Ruled in favor or PETITIONER

CA Ruling
REVERSED the decision of the RTC

The CA ruled that Tranquilino failed to discharge his burden to present

clear and convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption of regularity
in the execution on January 21, 1992 of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (1992 DAS) in favor of his brother Nonito

Issue:
Whether or not the judicial admission made by Nonito’s counsel is
valid? 🡪 YES

SC Ruling:
As to the 1992 DAS, Tranquilino argues that the unqualified admission
made during the pre-trial proceedings in the RTC by Nonito, through his
counsel on record, Atty. Frederick Aquino, that there was no such
sale between Tranquilino and Nonito is a judicial admission that it is
spurious, which dispenses with the need to present proof of the matter of
fact already admitted.48 The Pre-Trial Order dated April 22, 2003 states:
"Atty. Aquino denied that Tranquilino Agbayani executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Nonito Agbayani. According to Atty. Aquino
there was no such sale."4

American jurisprudence sets the following parameters on judicial

admissions:

A judicial admission is a formal statement, either by party or his or her

attorney, in course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact
from field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or
a party's attorney during judicial proceedings.

Judicial admissions are used as a substitute for legal evidence at trial.

Admissions made in the course of judicial proceedings or judicial
admissions waive or dispense with, the production of evidence, and the
actual proof of facts by conceding for the purpose of litigation that the
proposition of the fact alleged by the opponent is true. x x x

A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a

party about a concrete fact within that party's peculiar knowledge, not a
matter of law. x x x In order to constitute a judicial admission, the
statement must be one of fact, not opinion. To be a judicial admission, a
statement must be contrary to an essential fact or defense asserted by
the person giving the testimony; it must be deliberate, clear and
unequivocal x x x. 

Judicial admissions are evidence against the party who made them, and
are considered conclusive and binding as to the party making the judicial
admission. A judicial admission bars the admitting party from disputing it.
xxx

A judicial admission of fact may carry with it an admission of other facts

necessarily implied from it. 

xxxx

Judicial admissions may occur at any point during the litigation process.
An admission in open court is a judicial admission. x x x 52

The admission by Nonito's counsel during the pre-trial proceedings

before the RTC that there was no sale between Tranquilino and Nonito
qualifies as a judicial admission because the statement is a deliberate,
clear, unequivocal statement of a party's attorney during judicial
proceedings in open court about a concrete or essential fact within
that party's peculiar knowledge. Since such statement is a judicial
admission, it does not require proof according to Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 

Moreover, there was no palpable mistake on the part of Nonito's counsel

in making the admission because in the offer of Nonito's testimony on
December 2, 2008, he stated that "the land was the property in suit was
never sold to him [Nonito] by his brother Tranquilino Agbayani." 53 That is
 not all. The admission by Nonito himself, on cross-examination by
Tranquilino's counsel, that Tranquilino was in the United States at the
time of the purported transaction54 supports the statement of the counsel
of Nonito that there was no sale between Tranquilino and Nonito. 

Since there is judicial admission that there was no sale of the subject
land between Tranquilino and Nonito, affirmed anew during oral
testimony by Nonito himself, then there is no question that the 1992 DAS
is void. The three requisites of a simulated contract are existent. There is
a deliberate declaration that Tranquilino sold the subject land to Nonito,
which is contrary to their will because there was no sale between them.
The agreement appears on its face to be a valid act. The purpose is to
deceive third persons into believing that there was such a sale between
them. 

Consequently, the CA committed egregious error when it made the

finding that the 1992 DAS is valid. Given that Tranquilino did not sell the
subject land to Nonito, it could not have been sold by Nonito to Moriel
and Moriel could not, in turn, have sold it to Lupa Realty.

Case G.R. No. 217611

Citation:

Date: March 27, 2019

Petitioners: ROGELIO LOGROSA, PETITIONER,

Respondents  SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES ABUNDIO,

: JR. AND ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA AND
ARLENE ANG, AND SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., AND
WELHELMINA BARUIZ, RESPONDENTS..

Doctrine:

Antecedent -Petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the respondents
Facts: are co-owners of 8 parcels of lands which has a TCT that indicates
that petitioners and respondents are co-owners of the subject
properties.

-Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject

properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales, sold the subject properties
 collectively to him and other respondents. The records show that a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties,
bearing the signatures of Gonzales, Logrosa, and respondents
Cleofe, Nelson, Bonifacio, and Abundio.

-Respondent Sps. Azares contended that it may be true that

petitioner Logrosa’s name appeared in the titles of the properties
aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa’s claim that
he is a co-owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its
acquisition, maintenance, and taxes.

Respondent’
s Contention:

Petitioner’s
Contention:

RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of respondents. There is no co-ownership that exists

between petitioner and respondents.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC’s ruling. There is insufficiency of evidence confirming

petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner of the subject properties.

Issue: W/N Logrosa is a co-owner? (Yes, there was a judicial admission on

the part of Azares.

SC Ruling: The testimony of respondent Cesar Azares actually lends credence

to petitioner Logrosa's claim that respondent Cesar really intended
to designate the former, together with the other respondents, as co-
owners of the subject properties.

During the trial, when he was asked why he did not require petitioner
Logrosa and the other parties to execute a document acknowledging
his status as sole owner of the subject properties, respondent Cesar
explained that there was no need to do so because "we previously
agreed x x x with each other that whatever they would decide to till
the land in that particular area that would be given to them. x x x I
have my intention to give that house constructed to them then, I will
give that particular land to them."

With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents

Sps. Azares that there was indeed an intention on their part to make
petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents as co-owners of the
 subject properties, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's view that
there is insufficiency of evidence confirming petitioner Logrosa's
status as co-owner of the subject properties.

As a parting note, while it is true that the Court has previously held
that the mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the registrant may only
be a trustee, to controvert the legal presumption brought about by
the execution and issuance of public documents pointing to the
existence of co-ownership, the opposing party must carry and satisfy
the burden of proving with clear, convincing and persuasive
evidence to repudiate the co-ownership. In this case, the Court finds
that respondents Sps. Azares failed to fulfill such burden.

Case Citation: G.R. Np. 237428

Date: June 19, 2018

Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines, represented by SolGen Calida

Respondents: Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

Doctrine: ● CJ Bersamin’s Separate Opinion (Peralta mostly cited

Bersamin’s opinion)
o Role of presumption is to relieve the party enjoying the same
of the evidential burden to prove the proposition that he
contends for and to shift the burden of evidence to the
adverse party.
o In general, presumptions are resorted to for either reasons:
▪ Enable the courts to determine the party who should
discharge the burden of proof and burden of evidence
▪ Necessity and convenience
o To prevent miscarriage or denial of justice, or to serve a
public need, presumption may be resorted to.

Antecedent ● For 20 years, respondents served as a member of the UP College

Facts: of Law Faculty, initially as a temporary faculty member, and
thereafter, as permanent member until her resignation in 2006. As a
regular member, she was paid by the month by UP.
● While employed in UP, she concurrently worked as legal counsel of
the Republic in 2 international arbitrations (PIATCO Cases).
 o UP Human Resources Development Office (HRDO) certified
that there was no record on respondent’s file of any
permission to engage in limited practice of profession. In
addition, out of her 20 years employment, only 9 SALN were
on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached her 10th SALN, which she supposedly sourced from
the filing cabinets or drawers of UP.
o The ombudsman also had no record of any SALN filed by
Sereno. The JBC certified to the existence of only 1 SALN.
In sum, 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
● In 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. In 2012, the
position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and JBC directed the
applicants to submit documents including “all previous SALNs up to
December 2011” for those from private sector.
o In addition, JBC said that applicants with incomplete or out of
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.
● In a letter, Sereno informed JBC that since she resigned from UP
and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from
the private sector and submitted only 3 SALNs or her SALNS from
time she became an AJ. In addition, she added that considering
that most of her government records are more than 15 years old, it
is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files and
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her
favor.
o Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to
have “complete requirements” and on August 2012, Sereno
was appointed Chief Justice.
● 5 years after, Atty. Gadon filed an impeachment complaint against
Sereno alleging that the latter failed to make truthful declaration in
her SALNs.
o The House of Rep heard the case for determination of
probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta was not
made aware of Sereno’s incomplete SALNs. In addition,
pieces of jewelry were not declared in her 1990 SALN but
declared in prior years’ SALND. There was also failure on
the part of her husband to sign one SALN and execution of
1998 SALN only in 2003.
● On Feb 2018, Atty. Mallari wrote to the OSG requesting that the
latter initiate a quo warranto proceedings against Sereno.
o Capistrano, Sen. De Lim, Sen. Trillanes, et al. intervened.
o Sereno filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Catro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the
impeachment hearing before the House of Rep.
Petitioner’s ● Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which
Contention: is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary
under Sec. 7(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution. Because of her failure
to fulfill JBC requirement of filing complete SALNs, her integrity
remains unproven.
● Failure to submit, which is a legal obligation, should have
disqualified her from being a candidate. Therefore, she has no right
to hold the office.
● In addition, good faith cannot be considered as defense since RA
3019 and RA 6713 are special laws and are governed by the
concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Respondent’s ● Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to
Contention: file her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the
presumption that her appointment to office was regular.
o OSG failed to overcome the presumption crated by the
certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges.
o Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided
by the JBC and the President.
● The fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference
that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should
give an inference to a patter of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ - It is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
arguments possessed the integrity required by the constitution; rather, the
onus of determining WON she qualified for the post fell upon the
JBC.
- Submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement. What
is required is the imprimatur of the JBC.
- Qualifications such as citizenship, age, and experience are
enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence,
integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.

Issue: - Whether or not the Court should grant the motion for the
inhibition of Sereno against 5 justices.
- Whether or not the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory
requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
- If yes, whether or not Sereno failed to file her SALNs mandated
by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing
rules and regulations.

SC Ruling: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to inhibit in the case.
● It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion
as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a
party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does
not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression.
● Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those
justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given
that the members are to testify only on matters within their personal
knowledge.
o Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.
o There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma or bias or partiality.
o Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations,
or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the
answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in
the proceedings before the house.
● Insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of
President Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be
struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the public.
● The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the
sovereign Filipino People who ordained and promulgated the
Constitution. It is inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who
has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG
shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the
present quo warranto action.
● As a collegial body, the SC adjudicates without fear or favor. The
best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with
the magistrate sought to be disqualified.

The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement

● Sec. 17, Art. XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required
by RA 3019 and RA 6713.
o Failure to comply with the law is a violation of law a “prima
facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in
the dismissal from service of the public officer” It is a clear
breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
 employees.
o The filing of SALN is so important for purposes of
transparency and accountability that failure to comply with
such requirement may result not only in dismissal from public
service but also criminal liability.
● Sec. 11 RA 6713 provides that non-compliance with this
requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it
may also result in disqualification to hold public office.
● Because the CJ is a public officer, she is constitutionally and
statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all his
assets and liabilities.
o Accdg. To Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one
case, those who accept public office do so cum onere, or
with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens
and obligations, together with its benefits.
o They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to
perform all the duties of their office.
o The public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties. While every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the judiciary.
● A public officials’ non-compliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity. it is not a mere trivial or
formal requirement.
o The contention that mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s
integrity does not pursuance considering that RA 6713 and
RA 3019 are malum prohibitum. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of the act defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines WON the
provision has been violated.
o Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law and Code of Judicial Conduct.
● In Sereno’s 20 years of government service, only 11 SALNs have
been filed. She could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or
nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or evidence
for no clear reason at all.
● The Dobalada case cannot be applied because in the said case,
there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of
court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as repository agency.
 o Here, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the
records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly
received by the Ombudsman as repository agency. The
existence of the SALNs and fact of filing were neither
established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence
nor by mere inference.
o Ombudsman statement is categorical: “based on records on
file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years
1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This
leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file
her SALN.
● With that, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof
and it became incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding
is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon
the respondent.
● Further, being on leave, as contended by Sereno, does not exempt
her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation
from government service.
o The fact that she did not receive any pay for the periods she
was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” in order to be exempted
from SALN laws.
● The clearance and certification of UP HRDO cannot be taken in
favor of Sereno.
o The time when Sereno was a UP Professor, officials of the
office of the president or ombudsman had not yet
established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs
filed by employees of State Colleges and Universities.
o The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance
order came about only in 2006 from the CSC. As such, UP
HRDO could not have been expected to perform its duty of
issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not
yet in existence at that time.
o In addition, clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The
import of such is limited only to clearing Sereno of her
academic and administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities from administrative charges as of
the date of her resignation.
● Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with
complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC
confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement.
o Her inclusion does not negate nor supply her with the
requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified
at the outset.
 o JBC cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible
because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit
was addressed by the body. Her inclusion does not estop the
Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications.
o No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of
the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded
upon an innocent mistake.
● Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would
likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious
intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
o The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003;
2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years
when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases,
2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross
amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious
increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in
her first five months as Associate Justice.
o It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also
committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity.
● The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to
have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Portion:
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY
of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared

vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action

from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
 transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill
motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Bersamin’s Judicial Admission

Concurring The respondent cited the testimony I gave on January 15, 2018 during
Opinion the inquiry to determine probable cause against her conducted by the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives alluding to her
as a dictator, and expressing a personal resentment over her manner of
leadership that violated the collegial nature of the Supreme Court. She
recalled that I also testified therein that 1 had resented the withdrawal
of the "privilege" previously enjoyed by the Members of the Supreme
Court to recommend nominees to vacant positions in the judiciary; and
that I was also among the Members of the Supreme Court who "wore a
touch of red as the so-called "Red Monday" protest on 12 March 2018
was ongoing." She insisted that my remarks were not mere
innocuous ones but were expressions of my personal animosity
towards her.

I vehemently deny the respondent's unwarranted and unfair

imputations of bias against and animosity towards her.

My appearance at the inquiry conducted by the Committee on Justice

was upon the invitation of the House of Representatives. I appeared
thereat only out of deference to the House of Representatives
whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment
complaint filed against the respondent could not be doubted. I
harbored no ill will or malice towards her in appearing at the
inquiry because my doing so had been priorly approved by the
Court En Banc.

The queries posed to me by some of the Members of the Committee on

Justice were varied but I faithfully observed the parameters prescribed
by the Court for the purpose.

I deny alluding to the respondent as a "dictator." My answers in this

regard were grossly taken out of context by her. In answering the
question of Cong. Rodante Marcoleta on the loss of collegiality in the
Supreme Court under the respondent as the Chief Justice, I forthrightly
stated: "Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag-function kung isa
ay diktador." My statement was clearly hypothetical about what the
Court would become if any of its Members, including her as the Chief
Justice, was to act dictatorially. In point of law and fact, my answer to
the question of Cong. Marcoleta was very cogent and neutral, and
devoid of any bias against or animosity towards her.
The true and actual context of my answer was actually easily apparent
from what I said immediately thereafter, to wit: "Kaila[ng]an po Iabat ng
15 members, maliit na samahan iyan, kaniya-kaniyang hoses, kaniya
kaniyang boto. Kaya nagkaroon diyan ng possibility of a majority and a
minority." I was thereby dutifully explaining the democratic regime being
adhered to by the Court in conducting its institutional affairs, including
its deliberations and other actions. How could such answer be
misunderstood in the sad light she complained about?

It is true that I further commented in relation to the same query of Cong.

Marcoleta that I had been offended by the respondent's attitude of
ignoring collegiality in the Court. My comment ran as follows:

Now, sa premise ng ano niyo, you summed up very well what

transpired here. The testimonies that were given. If that is the
premise, my answer is, definitely, nawala na po, nabura na po
iyong batas ng samahan na sinasabi niyo. Hindi ko po
puwedeng itanggi na ako po ay offended by those kinds of
attitude on the part of a leader who would deprive her
colleagues, primus inter pares lang po siya eh. Hindi naman siya
po reyna na titingnan, titingalain at susundin. That's all I can say,
Sir.

Yet, equating my feeling offended to harboring a personal

resentment towards the respondent's "manner of leadership" reflected
too much presumptuousness on her part. Among mature individuals, of
which she and I were presumed to be, feeling offended and personally
resenting were not the same. In the context of the functioning of the
Court, they were widely different because all its Members have then
and now exhibited the highest degree of professionalism in our official
and personal dealings with each other. A particular colleague's acts or
actuations could at times be offensive to another but such
offensiveness never became the cause of personal resentment towards
the latter. We always easily moved on. This high degree
professionalism is a fact of daily life in the Court. As far as I am
concerned, therefore, I, despite having felt offended by her
attitudes as Chief Justice, still have the professional objectivity
and detachment necessary to deal with the issues embroiling her
under the petition for quo warranto.

Presumption
● A presumption is an inference on the existence of a fact not actually
known, and arises from its usual connection with another that is
known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course
of human affairs ordinarily takes. 
 ● Role of presumption is to relieve the party enjoying the same of the
evidential burden to prove the proposition that he contends for and
to shift the burden of evidence to the adverse party.
● In general, presumptions are resorted to for either reasons:
o Enable the courts to determine the party who should
discharge the burden of proof and burden of evidence
o Necessity and convenience
● To prevent miscarriage or denial of justice, or to serve a public
need, presumption may be resorted to.

Case G.R. No. 108028

Citation:

Date: July 30, 1996

Petitioners People of the Philippines

:
ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI, SONNY P. BERNABE,
ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA,
ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T.
CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (herein known as
private complainants) 

Responde Christina M Hernandez

nts:

Doctrine:

Anteceden Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal
t Facts: recruitment committed in large scale in violating of Article 38 (a) and (b) in
relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code.

Private complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December 12,
1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of the
Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet
the appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai,
appellant asserted that her company recruited workers for placement abroad
and asked private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in
Taipeh. Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per
month salary, they applied.
 Appellant required private complainants to pay placement and passport fees
in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three
installments. Receipts were issued and signed by one Liza Mendoza. After
having received the entire amount from the witnesses, appellant assured
them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh before the end of
December, 1988.

Contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were unable to

leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money but to no
avail. Appellant's unfulfilled promise of employment and her refusal to return
the money that had been paid by way of placement and passport fees,
triggered the filing of the complaint.

Responde Defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose testimony
nt’s consisted mainly in denying the charges against her. She claimed that she
Contention never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them.
:
She likewise denied having received money from anyone and asserted that
she did not know any Liza Mendoza who is the alleged treasure of Philippine-
Thai.
Appellant maintained that although she had an office in Ermita Building, the
said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was
engaged in the logging business. However, when questioned further,
appellant admitted being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in a
nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she did not
participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that
Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business.
Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular
witness if presented in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission
of the facts themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated on
between the prosecution and defense counsel at the hearing on June 6,
1990 was "merely that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the
POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers" ,Thus:
Prosecutor
. . . Before we call on our first witness, we propose some
stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing
Branch of the POEA — that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic)
licensed nor authorized by the Department of Labor to recruit
workers abroad.
Court
Would you agree?
Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor. 
She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial
 admission of the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather a
mere admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. This
being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present
evidence of such fact.

MTC/RTC CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Ruling: illegal recruitment, committed in large scale.

(The defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over the
positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.)

CA Ruling: N/A

Issue: 1. Whether stipulation of facts entered by the prosecution and defense

counsel is a judicial admission binding his client.

2. Whether the court is authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases are still pending.

3.Whether denials of accused may be considered as evidence.

SC Ruling: 1.In the light of recent changes in rules on criminal procedure, the prohibition
against criminal cases no longer holds true. Stipulation of facts in criminal
cases is now expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective
of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters
that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of fact should be allowed not
only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of
court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been
allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions,
hence, binding upon the parties.

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel

during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained
in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court.
It is a general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who
represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the
defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the
mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such
mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. No cogent reason
exists to make such exception in this case.

It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court,
agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of
mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts
was also in conformity of defense's theory of the case.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by
prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
2. It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the
fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience
to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the
records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of
the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated, .
The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above
exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced
evidence on the matter when she testified in open court as follows:
Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where (sic)
were you at the NBI when Mrs. Cinco inquired
from you about placement abroad?
A: I was just invited by the personnel of the NBI
and I was not allowed to go home.
Q: Whey were you invited by the NBI?
A: They told me that there was a complaint
against me.
Q: Complaint about what?
A: The same case.
Q: You mean illegal recruitment also?
A: Yes, sir.
Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice
of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against her, the error
would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction
was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case filed
against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the
overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
3. Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

That she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense
her appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile
attempt at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when
weighed against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the
appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.
WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale is hereby AFFIRMED.