Nos. L-21938-39.
 May 29, 1970. Same: Same; Venue; Waiver of improper venue by laches.—It is well settled
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
Judiciary Act of 1948; Courts of First Instance; Jurisdiction over probate
matters defined.—Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph [4]),
Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons—whether they died testate or intestate.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased
persons; Venue; General rule.—The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
Same; Same; Testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.—
In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction. testate proceedings for
the Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for 'the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice ,that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding- shall continue as an intestacy,
Same; Same; Same; Where intestate proceedings had been commenced, the
probate of will should be filed in same court; Reasons.—Where intestate proceedings
before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the probate of the will
should be filed in the same court, either in a separate special  instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special
253
VOL. 33, MAY 29, 1970  253  Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila
Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occ.
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already
pending intestate proceeding. This is especially true where the party seeking the
probate of the will had been informed or had knowledge of the pendency of the
intestate proceedings. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially
if several courts would be involved, which would be the result if the probate of will
were f iled in another court.
in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and.
such waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice of the filing
of the probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to continue for
such time before filing a motion to dismiss the same.
Same; Same; Question of acknowledgment as a natural child of testator may
be presented to probate court.—A party claiming to be an acknowledged natural
child of testator is entitled to intervene in proceedings for the probate of will of
testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as
to be able to submit f or determination the question of his acknowledgment as a
natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate
court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether
or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner,
     Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition
for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court
and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the
orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I')
of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex
'K') of respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-
proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the
same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in
court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these
proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this
Court.
1
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the
deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section
1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to
dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding
proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the
Negros court.  proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court
on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as
G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be
rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second
denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to
approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964
We issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the
original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing
petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of
discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition
for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special
Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter,
he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13,
1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that
the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never
actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein,
filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in
Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be
submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning
petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural
son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to
dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His
motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963,
petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal
for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The
administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under
date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on
July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been filed out of time and
for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on
appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al.,
G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme
Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's
abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on
appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for
mandamus mentioned heretofore.
2
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the
dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special
proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same
year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime
of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time
he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding,
he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this
time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has
not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the
Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in
Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document
submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the
order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's
Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said
proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding
pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the
alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila
Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the
existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or
not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one
hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance
have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died
testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the
special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these
Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city
where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court
erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly
erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona
should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite
with the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was
entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the
Manila Court.
3
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view
that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a
separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the
already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord
with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved.
This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila
Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to
Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already
informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in
Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when
the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special
Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged
will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he
knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was
already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the
estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems
quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No.
6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter
court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider
in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise
was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal
of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of
all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered
that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in
a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge
Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the
contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil
Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies
the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the
authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do
would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings
No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an
independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of
his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination
the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said
court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p.
476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We
are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the
same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful,
it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal
that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for
the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what
has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not
be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still,
would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the
validity of said orders. 
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed
in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as
4
G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
No. L-11848. May 31, 1962.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
IRENE SANTOS, JOSE D. VILLEGAS, Administrator, ADELA SANTOS
GUTIERREZ, movant-appellee, vs. JOSE D. VILLEGAS, and RIZALINA
SANTOSRIVERA, oppositors-appellants.
Intestate Proceedings; Effect of deed of assignment executed by an heir but
subsequently impugned as fraudulent.—Although ASG, one of the heirs in the
present intestate proceeding, executed a deed of assignment it is also a fact that she
allowed the same to be annulled in an action she instituted before the Rizal CFI and
although said heir had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings
and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record nevertheless
fails to show that action therein had been taken by the probate court. Every act
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legates or devises is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an ex-
314
314  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Gutierrez vs. Villegas
change, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). It appearing
that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate
and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance.
Same; Same; Judicial approval of deed of assignment effect on standing of
parties.—Thejudicial approval of the partition on the basis of the alleged deed of
assignment did not have the effect of making the party making the assignment lose
his standing in the proceedings.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City Branch).
Rilloraza, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Perkins & Ponce Enrile for movant-appellee.
     Delgado, Flores & Macapagal for oppositors-appellants.
PAREDES, J.:
On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her
surviving spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased brother,
Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse
filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch, a petition for Letters of Administration
(Sp. Proc. No. 2100), and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition,
he named as intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela
Santos Gutierrez. Under date of January 15, 1955, in the above-mentioned Special
Proceedings, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by
a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", dated January 12,
1955, was presented to the Probate Court, stating among others, the following — 
The undersigned hereby solemnly manifests . . . that all her rights, interests
and participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now belong to her
sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not take part in the
above-entitled proceedings and is not entitled to the service of any
pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or promulgated therein.
In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January 25, 1955,
Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her rights, participation and interest in
the estate of Irene Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud
practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue
influence. Therein, she narrated that sometime in December, 1954, due to stringent
financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the administrator for an advance of
P2,000.00 from the estate. The administrator refused on the ground that it is against
the law, but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering
to help. After Christmas of 1954, the administrator informed Adela that he was able
to secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only
P2,000.00. When Adela expressed surprise over the amount, the administrator
replied that he only wanted to help her get started in business. On January 12, 1955,
Adela was brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of their lawyer, where she
was made to sign a document she could not read. On January 13, 1955, the lawyer
asked Adela to sign another document, which he said was to be presented in Court
5
and explained the contents of the document signed the day before. It was only then
that Adela came to know that said document was a deed of sale.1 When Adela
protested, Villegas told her that the matter could be discussed better in his house in
Malabon. On arriving at Malabon, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of
P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, was probably
more than what she would get in the estate, because the estate is not valuable and had
plenty of debts. Villegas handed to Adela P6,800.00 in cash and a check drawn, by
Rizalina on the Prudential Bank for P3,200.00. Although Adela did not want to
accept the money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she was made to sign
the deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which she
now estimates to be no less than P1,000.000.00. In the same manifestation, Adela
stated that a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Assignment was being
prepared; that she was tendering the full amount of P10,000.00 to Villegas or
Rizalina; that she was placing the above facts within the knowledge of the Court so
that no action be taken giving value to the alleged deed of assignment and in order
that she (Adela) might be notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with
the proceedings. The administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions and/or
objections to the Manifestation, denying the allegations of fraud, undue influence
and the like.
In a motion dated September 7, 1955, filed with the CFI of Pasay, Adela asked the
Court to transfer Special Proceedings No. 2100, to Branch I (Pasig), alleging that the
complaint for the nullity of the Deed of Assignment filed with the Rizal CFI had
been assigned to said Branch I; and that the transfer would save time and effort on
the part of all concerned. The motion was strongly opposed by the administrator who
stated, among others —  assigned all her rights to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera.
That in the final distribution of the estate to the heirs, the share
corresponding to the movant Adela Santos Gutierrez may be ordered
withheld by this Court (if due motion therefor shall have been presented to
this Court) until the validity of the deed of assignment shall have been
resolved by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On September 16, 1955, the motion to transfer was denied.
On February 9, 1956, Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that
the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all copies of
pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the
administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant,
although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly
desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and
participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case. On
March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge Emilio Rilloraza, presiding) promulgated the
following order — 
. . ., the Court is of the opinion that the said motion should be, as it is
hereby, granted and the said administrator and/or his attorneys are hereby
directed to furnish Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, all copies of
the pleadings filed and to be filed in this case, except those mentioned in
said motion within a reasonable time upon notice hereof.
The Clerk of Court should see to it that before receiving for filing by the
administrator or the other legal heir, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and/or their
respective counsel, any pleadings, motion, etc., that copies thereof have
been furnished Adela Santos Gutierrez through counsel.
A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion of
reconsideration, containing arguments and authorities sustaining their respective
theories. On June 2, 1956, vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez, handed down an Order, the
material portions of which follow — 
xxx     xxx     xxx
The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela
Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The
Administrator contends that she has no such right because she had already
Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez bad the right to intervene
herein as one of the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when she
filed her manifestation, accompanied by the Deed of Sale and Assignment,
informing this Court that she had assigned all her rights and interest as such
heir to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, said Adela Santos Gutierrez had
ceased to have any interest in this estate and without such interest, she could
no longer intervene in this proceeding. The assignment, it copy of which is
attached to the record, is in the form of a public deed which is entitled to be
accorded the presumption of validity so that until the same is annulled in the
corresponding action filed by Adela Santos Gutierrez in the Pasig Branch of
this Court, her interest would merely be a contingent one, that is, depending
upon the contingency of a decision declaring such annulment of the deed of
assignment. This contingent interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez is not
sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceedings, unless
otherwise provided by law, the interest required in order that a person may
be a party, must be material and direct, and not indirect or contingent (II
Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We quote the following
from Moran's Rules of Court:
6
 xxx     xxx     xxx
In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be
considered as heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would
succeed in her case for annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, her contingent interest is not sufficient to make
her an interested party in this proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration
filed by the administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12,
1956.1äwphï1.ñët
Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of the
above Order, contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not a leave for
intervention (Rule 13). At most, the rule on transfer of interestpendente lite (Sec. 20,
Rule 3), should be applicable, not that of intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge
Rilloraza, who had already returned from vacation, set aside the order of Judge
Perez, stating —  its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing and distributing
..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2,
1956 should be, as it is hereby set aside.
Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos
Gutierrez, through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed
in this case.
The above Order is now the subject of the instant appeal, the administrator and
Rizalina Santos Rivera assigning three (3) errors allegedly committed by the court a
quo, all of which pose a singular issue, viz., whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still
entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate
proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower court.
The order appealed from being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of an appeal.
Even on this plane alone, the appeal should be dismissed. Of course, appellants cited
the case of Tengco v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8162, Aug. 30, 1955, wherein We
considered the appeal as petition for certiorari. That case, however, has no parallel to
the one now under consideration. It was one for mandamus for the purpose of
compelling the Judge to give due course to an appeal. Considering that in order
for certiorari and mandamus to prosper, allegations to the effect that the court has no
jurisdiction, or it acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of discretion, must
appear, which is not obtaining in the instant case (because it is an ordinary appeal), it
becomes peremptory that the present appeal is not in order.
Moreover, it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an
indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not
inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos on November 11,
1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she
asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending before the Rizal CFI,
Pasig Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the
proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious
argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under
probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment),
that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate
and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Thus, in the
case of Sandoval v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-1723, May 30, 1949, this Court said: ". . .
and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the Court of First Instance of
extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves". But even if the
partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment,
an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.
In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in
ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the
approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in
the courts of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that
probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by
fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued
are pending, but even, as in this case, within a reasonable time thereafter.
(Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, Aug. 22, 1951; Espinosa v.
Barrios. 70 Phil. 311).
We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of intervention, but
solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to
the case. Evidently, the use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and
pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word.
In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking
part in the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the
manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed
the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected.
Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by
which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them;
7
the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending
between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the
protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings
(Judge of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. David, et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939,
cited in Francisco's Rules of Court, Vol. I, Part I, p. 639, emphasis supplied). The
circumstances stated above do not fit the status of Adela in the probate proceedings;
she was not a third person; she was an original party therein.
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are
required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so,
will give appellee her day in court and provide protection to the administrator
himself.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in
conformity with the law and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D. Villegas and
Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances.
G.R. No. 201816. April 8, 2013.*
HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by
NORMAN MESINA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by
THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET AL., respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Causes of Action; Elements of; A complaint states a
cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of
action.—Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said right.
Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties; The
non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action;
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.—Non-joinder
means the “failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or in this case an
indispensable party] into a lawsuit.” An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. As such, this is properly a non-
joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the
complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action. Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation
Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, 450 SCRA 421 (2005), is instructive as regards the proper
course of action on the part of the courts in cases of non-joinder of indispensable
parties, viz.: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as
are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure
to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.
8
 _______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
Same; Same; Verification; That the verification of the complaint does not
include the phrase “or based on authentic records” does not make the verification
defective; Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is
a formal requirement, not jurisdictional; Thus, when circumstances so warrant, “the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.”—That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase “or
based on authentic records” does not make the verification defective. Notably, the
provision used the disjunctive word “or.” The word “or” is a disjunctive article
indicating an alternative. As such, “personal knowledge” and “authentic records”
need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately. Also, verification,
like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not
jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation.
Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, “the court may simply
order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Evangelista Law Office for petitioners.
  Escalon & Escalon Law Office for respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Decision 1 dated April 29,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by
Associate Justices Gabrial T. Ingles and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.
347
VOL. 695, APRIL 8, 2013 347
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
CA-G.R. CV No. 01366 and its Resolution dated April 12, 2012 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts  Rules of Court, which state in part:
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their
lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian)
two parcels of land on installment. The properties may be described as follows:
Parcel 1 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6791-Rem, situated in the Brgy. of
Gungab, Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte. x x x Containing an area of ONE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (1.632) SQUARE METERS x x x.
Parcel 2 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6737-Rem, situated in the Brgy. of
Gungab, Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte. x x x Containing an area of THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY (3,730) SQUARE METERS x x x.2
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs―whose names do not appear on
the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of
them―refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late
parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina
passed away.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots
and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, namely: Norman S.
Mesina (Norman), Victor S. Mesina (Victor), Maria Divina S. Mesina (Maria) and
Lorna Mesina-Barte (Lorna). Thus, on August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact
of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action for quieting of title and
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte against
the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 8.
348
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
Yray (Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case, entitled Heirs of
Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v.
Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray, was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-05-08-20. The allegations of the Complaint on the parties read:
1. Plaintiffs are the HEIRS OF SPS. FAUSTINO S. MESINA and
GENOVEVA S. MESINA, and represented in this instance by NORMAN MESINA
as shown by the Special Power of Attorneys x x x, of legal age, married, Filipino,
and a resident of Poblacion Albuera, Leyte, where he may be served with court
orders, notices, and other processes, while defendants are the HEIRS OF DOMINGO
FIAN, SR., likewise of legal ages, Filipinos, and residents of Poblacion Albuera,
Leyte, and respresented in this instance of THERESA FIAN YRAY, where she may
be served with summons, court orders, notices, and other processes.3
Thereafter, or on September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and that
the case should be dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant.―Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. x x x
9
 Section 2. Parties in interest.―A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. x x x
She claims that the “Heirs of Mesina” could not be considered as a juridical
person or entity authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the “Heirs of
Fian” be made as defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added that
since the names of all the heirs of the late spouses
_______________
3 Id., at p. 50.
349
VOL. 695, APRIL 8, 2013 349
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
Mesina and spouses Fian were not individually named, the complaint is infirmed,
warranting its dismissal.
On November 24, 2005, petitioners filed their Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss.
Ruling of the RTC
Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the RTC, on November 22, 2005, granted
the motion and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Rules of Court is explicit that
only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action. Also, nowhere in the complaint are the Heirs of Fian individually
named. The RTC Order reads:
Anent the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, Theresa Fian Yray through
counsel, finding merit in such motion, the same is granted.
The Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action (Section 1, Rule 3, Revised Rules
of Court). Certainly, the Heirs of Faustino S. Mesina and Genoveva S. Mesina,
represented by Norman Mesina as plaintiffs as well as Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
represented by Theresa Fian Yray as defendants, do not fall within the category as
natural or juridical persons as contemplated by law to institute or defend civil
actions. Said heirs not having been individually named could not be the real parties
in interest. Hence, the complaint states no cause of action.
Accordingly, the case is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.4
On December 27, 2005, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the November
22, 2005 Order of the RTC. The next day, or on December 28, 2005, respondent
Theresa filed her Vehement Opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
_______________
4 Records, p. 76. Penned by Judge Absalon U. Fulache.
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
On February 29, 2006, the RTC issued its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion prayed for must necessary fail.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In affirming the RTC, the CA, on April 29, 2011, rendered its Decision, ruling
that all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been
impleaded in the complaint. The appellate court explained that this failure to implead
the other heirs of the late spouses Fian is a legal obstacle to the trial court’s exercise
of judicial power over the case and any order or judgment that would be rendered is a
nullity in view of the absence of indispensable parties. The CA further held that the
RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for being improperly verified. The CA
disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of [petitioners]
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed November 22, 2005 Order and February
28, 2006 Resolution both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Baybay,
Leyte are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated April 12, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
_______________
5 Id., at p. 98.
6 Rollo, p. 15.
351
VOL. 695, APRIL 8, 2013 351
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
Assignment of Errors
Petitioner now comes before this Court, presenting the following assigned errors,
to wit:
A. THE [CA] ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER AND
RESOLUTION X X X OF RTC, BAYBAY, LEYTE IN DISMISSING
THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES
NO CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. [PETITIONERS] HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE
RULE ON VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING; AND
C. CASES SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON
MERE TECHNICALITIES.7
10
 The Court’s Ruling  11 Pascual v. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 712,
The petition is meritorious.
As regards the issue on failure to state a cause of action, the CA ruled that the
complaint states no cause of action because all the heirs of the spouses Fian are
indispensable parties; hence, they should have been impleaded in the complaint.
The CA, affirming the RTC, held that the dismissal of the complaint is called for
in view of its failure to state a cause of action. The CA reasoned that:
Without the presence of all the heirs of spouses Fian as defendants, the trial court
could not validly render judgment and grant relief to [petitioners]. x x x The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. Hence, the court a quo correctly ordered for the dismissal of the action
on the ground that the
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 28, 32, 34.
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
complaint failed to name or implead all the heirs of the late [spouses Fian].8
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A
complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.9
By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can
be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under any of the
above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but
a non-joinder of an indispensable party.
Non-joinder means the “failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or in
this case an indispensable party] into a lawsuit.”10 An indispensable party, on the
other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of
the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.11
As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable
parties who were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not
a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
_______________
8  Id., at p. 13.
9  See Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, November 24,
2010, 636 SCRA 13, 30.
10 Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (9th ed., 2009).
719; citing Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 166302, July 28, 2005, 464
SCRA 591.
353
VOL. 695, APRIL 8, 2013 353
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc.
v. Tinghil is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the
courts in cases of non-joinder of indispensable parties, viz.:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply
with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.12 x x x (Emphasis Ours.)
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper.
What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to
implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time
from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the
complaint.
Anent the issue on defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Verification.―Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
on authentic records. (Emphasis Ours.)
The alleged defective verification states that:
1. NORMAN S. MESINA, legal age, married, Filipino, and a resident of
Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law,
hereby depose and say that:
_______________
12 G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 421, 433.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
x x x x
2. The allegations herein are true and correct to the best of our
knowledge;13 x x x
Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the phrase “or
based on authentic records,” as indicated under the second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule
7 as afore-quoted, was omitted.
We do not agree.
11
 That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase “or based on As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
authentic records” does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. (Mactan-Cebu International
used the disjunctive word “or.” The word “or” is a disjunctive article indicating Airport Authority vs. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, 641 SCRA 520 [2011])
an alternative.14 As such, “personal knowledge” and “authentic records” need not ――o0o――
concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately. 
Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a
formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not
of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand,
“the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby
be served.”15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
April 29, 2011 Decision and April 12, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01366, and
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 53.
14 Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 525, 551; citing PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging, Inc., G.R. No. 142618, July 12, 2007,
527 SCRA 405, 422.
15 Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA
281, 293.
355
VOL. 695, APRIL 8, 2013 355
Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
the November 22, 2005 Order and February 29, 2006 Resolution of the RTC, Branch
14 in Baybay, Leyte, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. B-05-08-20, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman Mesina is ORDERED to
implead all the Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants in said civil case within
thirty (30) days from notice of finality of this Decision. Failure on the part of
petitioner Mesina to comply with this directive shall result in the dismissal of Civil
Case No. B-05-08-20. Upon compliance by petitioner Mesina with this directive, the
RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte is ORDERED to undertake appropriate steps and
proceedings to expedite adjudication of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.―It is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action; Parties may be added by order of the court on motion
of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just. (Limos vs. Odones, 628 SCRA 288 [2010])

12

G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013.*
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON, petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in
behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Under Section
1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be
filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death: Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied). The term “resides” connotes ex vi
termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is
construed as meaning residence and not
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
707
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 707
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Void Marriage; In a void marriage,
it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. —
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling
in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), applicable four-square to the case at
hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages,
to wit: [C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.709
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 709
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Section 2 of
Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person; An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor.—Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus: Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
13
decedent; (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The
name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no defect in
the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. An “interested
party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Heinrich V. Garena for petitioners.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Josefina
Guevarra Salonga and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring. CA Rollo, pp. 94-106.
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City
are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law
wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-
Quiazon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
P2,100,000.00.
_______________
2 Id., at p. 105.
3 Special Proceeding No. M-3957. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-9.
4 Id., at p. 10.
711
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 711
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and
not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratrix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 40-44.
6 Id., at p. 11.
7 Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
8 Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. CA Rollo, pp. 33-38.
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
14
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this
Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS
AND THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION
_______________
9 Id., at p. 38.
10 Id., at pp. 94-106.
11 Id., at pp. 118-119.
713
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 713
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH
THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS[;]
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY
MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE[;] [AND]
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished
from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and
“residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute uses
the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence”
and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” 15 In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning.18 As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
_______________
13 Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670, 29
November 1976, 74 SCRA 189, 199.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
15
 17 Id.
18 Jao v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 160, 170; 382 SCRA 407, 417 (2002).
19 Id.
715
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 715
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the
estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records
that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the
entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they
insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents
thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac
with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of
the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
_______________
20 Quiazon v. Garcia, Civil Case No. Q-43712. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-240.
21 Golden (Iloilo) Delta Sales Corporation v. Pre-Stress International
Corporation, G.R. No. 176768, 12 January 2009, 576 SCRA 23, 35; Seaoil
Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No.
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred
in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling
in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court,
in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may
_______________
164326, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 394; Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas
Construction, G.R. No. 172595, 10 April 2008, 551 SCRA 97, 106.
22 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637,
656-657 citing Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122, 134 (2000).
23 Id.
24 Id., at p. 673; p. 134.
717
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 717
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory
heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we
now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating
priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the
National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
_______________
25 Id.
16
 26 New Civil Code. Art. 961.  In default of the testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in
the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988.  In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus,
the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National
Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia
and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise
has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
_______________
27 Old Civil Code. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2)  The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
719
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 719
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who 
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court or Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on
her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the
debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
17
 Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.  necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of
_______________
28 Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199; 371 SCRA 711, 719 (2001).
29 New Civil Code. Art. 961.  In default of the testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in
the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988.  In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
721
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 721
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.
Notes.—In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent
and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow
them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent. (Montañer vs. Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial
District, Marawi City, 576 SCRA 746 [2009])
The appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory or preliminary
order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate
proceeding. (Manungas vs. Loreto, 655 SCRA 734 [2011])
——o0o——  appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441 [2005])
——o0o——
 
G.R. No. 164108. May 8, 2009.*
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
Wills and Succession; Settlement of Estates; Intervention; Notwithstanding
Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim—the definition
of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.—
It is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that
“[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.” We can readily
conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
465
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 465
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Actions for tort or quasi-delict, being as they are
civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.—Had the claims of petitioners against
Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have
filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be
issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published
by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions
for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil
Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already pending review before this
Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Same; Same; Same; While there is no general right on the part of a creditor or
any person interested in the estate to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they
may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to
protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by
which such interests can be protected—it is under this standard that we assess the
three prayers sought by petitioners.—In the same manner that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right
to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead
provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of
the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
18
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them; Nonetheless, in
the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
“interested parties, petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice.
—Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the
rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather
than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which
the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved. Nonetheless, in the instances
that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested
parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec.
10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account
of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment and to render an account
of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or
of administration, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is
not the party entitled to do so.—Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule467
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 467
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not
doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party
entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 2, Rule 82 is silent as to who may seek with
the court the removal of the administrator, the Court does not doubt that a creditor,
even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.—Concerning
complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is
to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate
relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Andres H. Hagad, Daniel H. Hagad, Victor Cabalusa & Ralph A.
Sarmiento for petitioners.
  Dominador R. Santiago for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000.
He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. 1 At the time of his
death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the
plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch
21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the
value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, “net of liabilities.”3 On 2 August
2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator
of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate,
Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. 6 Private respondent stated that the
19
amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil
Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 45.
2 Id., at p. 13.
3 Id., at p. 56.
4 Id., at pp. 67-69.
5 Id., at pp. 76-85A.
6 Id., at p. 85-A.
469
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 469
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC
acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that
the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate. 10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in
her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted
thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
_______________
7  Id.  The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
8  Id., at p. 87.
9  Id., at p. 101-104.
10 Id., at pp. 121-125.
11 Id., at pp. 132-133.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 12 dismissing
the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the
claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts
erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of
their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of
the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished “copies of all
processes and orders issued” by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same. 15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by the adminis-
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 45-52. Decision penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino
of the Sixteenth Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
and Magdangal M. De Leon.
13 More particularly, the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons. See Rules 73 to 91, Revised Rules of Court.
14 See Rollo, p. 103.
15 Id., at p. 124.
471
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 471
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
trator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals
on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
x x x” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently
20
held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings
under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72
further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as
set forth under Rule 19 does not
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 124-125.
17 Batama Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al. v. Hon.
Rosal, etc., et al., 149 Phil. 514, 519; 42 SCRA 408, 412 (1971).
18 See Section 1(a), Rule 72, Rules of Court.
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had
sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their
recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no
right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to
intervene is not one of those reliefs.
 To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let
us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle “any interested
persons” or “any persons interested in the estate” to participate in varying capacities
in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us,
namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of “any person interested”
to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration”; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and
“to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate”; (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
which allows a “person interested in the estate” to petition for the allowance of a
will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of
the deceased “to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or
interest therein”; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and
place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account “to persons
interested”; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice “to
the persons interested” before it may
473
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 473
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of
the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in the
estate” to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under
the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after
granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do
not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No.
11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at
the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in
the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to
enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they
be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
_______________
19 See Rules of Court, Rule 86, Secs. 1 & 3.
20 See Aguas v. Llemos, et al., 116 Phil. 112; 5 SCRA 959 (1962); Leung Ben v.
O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194 (1918).
21 88 Phil. 477 (1951).
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it
does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial
court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
21
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-
administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the
intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the
trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil
case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that
the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial
court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.
“If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the
property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court
does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its
existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be
branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
_______________
22 G.R. No. L-3342, 18 April 1951.
475
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 475
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
      Appellants’ claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the
closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action
for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that “action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator.” What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any
step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which
declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These
rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can
be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x” 23 (Emphasis
supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to
an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of
the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: “[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect
that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.”24
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 480-481.
24 Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501, 503 (1953); citing 2 Moran, 432, 1952
revised edition, citing the case of Intestate Estate of the DeceasedLee Liong,
Dinglasan, et al. v. Ang Chia, et al., G.R. No. L-3342, April 18, 1951.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also “any person interested” or “persons
interested in the estate” various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action
for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time
judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect
of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances
when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while
there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect
their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by
the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief
for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account
would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.477
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 477
22
 Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings.
We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle
petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then
anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the
right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may
be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court
processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less
contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings,
and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition
of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized
by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern
of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado
v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same
petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the
records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from
them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that “the records of
every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection
of any interested person x x x.” The Court ruled that petitioners were “interested
persons” entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
“Petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for,
as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
_______________
25 G.R. No. 163155, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 282.
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate. They are in fact “interested persons” under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court x x x”26
 Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the
rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather
than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which
the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require
notice to any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be
entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of
Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec.
1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of
the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her
submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for
the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax ap-
_______________
26 Id., at p. 301.
479
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 479
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
praisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the
fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto,
with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person
whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims
against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the
proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section
2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the
removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one,
would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in
the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and
23
the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Acting Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro ** 
and Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.” (Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 541 [1996])
The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the
part of the Regional Trial Court and non-appealable, though it may be subject of
certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. (Jamero vs. Melicor, 459 SCRA 113 [2005])
——o0o——
 
G.R. No. 187879. July 5, 2010.*
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E.
OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. RENATO M.
OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, respondents.
Probate Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Administrators; When appointed,
a special administrator is not regarded as an agent or representative of the
parties suggesting the appointment.—A special administrator is an officer of the
court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best
interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of
the parties suggesting the appointment. The prin-
_______________
** Additional member per Special Order No. 843.
* SECOND DIVISION.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
cipal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for
the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; Same; It has long been settled that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators—the probate court may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at
its discretion.—While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin
to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of
fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As
long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The
appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Administrator’s Bond; The administration bond is for the benefit
of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or
special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent
upon, him.—Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of
the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and
24
pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year
and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an
inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule,
the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the
decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
561
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 561
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly
account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the
same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them. Verily, the administration bond is for
the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether
regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations
incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary
expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability
to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Ramon C. Casano for petitioners.
  Precioso R. Perlas for respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
This petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 and the
Resolution3dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated March 13, 20084 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. No. B-3089;
while the Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 12-33.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Josefina
Guevara-Salonga and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring; id., at pp. 34-51.
3 Id., at pp. 52-53.
4 Id., at pp. 54-55.
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
The Antecedents
Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda
Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the
surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on
January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo
(Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs
of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19,
1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several
properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no
debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners
initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled “In Re: Intestate Proceedings of
the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M.
Ocampo,” in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-
3089.5The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents
and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate
of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share
consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the
estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for
the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It,
likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and
award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7,
2004,6 contending that the petition was de-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 35-36.
6 Id., at p. 36.
563
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 563
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
fective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding.
They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same
being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the
settlement of his parents’ estate. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that
they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima.
In an Order dated March 4, 2005,7 the RTC denied respondents’ opposition to the
settlement proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also
clarified that the judicial settlement referred only to the properties of Vicente and
Maxima.
25
 Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated
October 11, 2005,8 respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as special
joint administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without posting a bond.
In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,9 petitioners argued that, since April
2002, they had been deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that
the appointment of respondents as special joint administrators would further cause
injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of
administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to
respondents and Dalisay.
In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December
5, 2005,10 petitioners nominated the Biñan Rural Bank to serve as special
administrator pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of the letters of
administration.
_______________
7  Id., at pp. 36-37.
8  Id., at p. 37.
9  Id.
10 Id.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
In its June 15, 2006 Order,11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special
joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a
bond of P200,000.00 each.12
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006 13 of the
Order, insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as
administrator of the estate, considering that she even failed to take care of her
husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended that
petitioners’ prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as special administrator was already
deemed abandoned upon their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank to act as special
administrator of the estate.
In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, 14respondents asserted
their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of
Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents
and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo.
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a
Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006,15praying that
the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate
of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from the time they took
over the collection of the income of the estate.
_______________
11 Id.
12 As admitted by respondents in their Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction; id.,
at p. 86.
13 Id., at p. 38.
14 Id.
15 Id.
565
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 565
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15,
2007,16 claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and
render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was
still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Order appointing
Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato.
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of
Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took
into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and
Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even manifested in open court
their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate.
On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ appointment as joint
special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render
Account of the Estate,17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special
administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets
of the estate.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’
Bond18 on May 22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special
administrators without the need to file an administrators’ bond due to their difficulty
in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since petitioners manifested in
open court that they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as special co-
administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared
from incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also
assured the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special
administrators under pain of contempt should they
_______________
16 Id., at p. 39.
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 40.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office.
In an Order dated June 29, 2007,19 the RTC directed the parties to submit their
respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners’ Motion
26
for Inventory and to Render Account, and respondents’ Motion for Exemption to File
Administrators’ Bond.
Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition,20stating that they have
already filed a comment on petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to Render
Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance the
resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for Exemption to
File Administrators’ Bond.
On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order
appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to
Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition
or Appointment of Regular Administrator. 21 Petitioners contended that the special
administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the
properties of the estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any
litigation necessitating the representation of special administrators. Petitioners,
likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special
administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them.
Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for
P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for
P1,500,000.00, and respondents’ alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the
estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were
not yet paid.
_______________
19 Id.
20 Id., at pp. 40-41.
21 Id., at pp. 56-63.
567
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 567
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment22 on March 10, 2008, to which,
in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment23 on March 17, 2008.
In its Order dated March 13, 2008,24 the RTC granted petitioners’ Motion,
revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special
administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the
posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special
administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an
income statement of the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular
administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, and
directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the
subject estate. The RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after
Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari25under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
(a) declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite
lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the office because they
were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond; (b)
appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and
Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses,
were the next of kin; and (c) declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust,
despite lack of hearing and evidence against them.
Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application for
temporary restraining order and/or
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 71-75.
23 Id., at pp. 76-80.
24 Id., at pp. 54-55.
25 Id., at pp. 81-107.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
writ of preliminary injunction,26 reiterating their arguments in their Motion for the
revocation of respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators. Respondents
filed their Reply.27
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the
petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their
motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to
assume as such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before
respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special
administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the
estate and an income statement thereon.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.28 The CA,
however, denied it. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave
abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 13,
2008.
Our Ruling
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents’
estate under the Rules of Court provide—
“Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator.—When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions
_______________
27
 26 Id., at pp. 108-132.
27 Id., at pp. 142-145.
28 Id., at pp. 146-155.
569
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 569
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.29
Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court
orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.30
Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions.—
Before an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court
directs, conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other
person for him;
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the
will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any
time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and
from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same,
or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court;
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within
one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court;
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.31
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator.—A special administrator before
entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court
directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and
_______________
29 Rule 80.
30 Id.
31 Rule 81.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will
truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will
deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them.”32
 
Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as
administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate
court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending the
determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be
issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused
undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and
Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to
post an administrator’s bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account the
arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the
office of a special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment
when petitioners nominated Biñan Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on
February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay’s appointment and substituted her with Erlinda.
 A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision
and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to
its smooth administration and speedy settlement.33 When appointed, he or she is not
regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the
appointment.34The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator
is to preserve
_______________
32 Id.
33 Co v. Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 225, 229.
34 Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934,
November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 757; Valarao v. Pascual, 441 Phil. 226, 238;
392 SCRA 695, 707 (2002).
571
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 571
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it
for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.35
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators.36 The probate court may appoint
or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in
the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues
of fitness or unfitness37 and the application of the order of preference under Section 6
of Rule 78,38 as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain.
28
As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.39 The appointment or removal of special administrators, being
discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.40
_______________
35 Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 528, 537.
36 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at p. 228; Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., supra, at p.
536; Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, supra note 34, at p.
760; Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532; 18 SCRA 898, 902
(1966); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948).
37 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at p. 228; Rivera v. Hon. Santos, et al., 124
Phil. 1557, 1561; 18 SCRA 870, 875 (1966).
38 Infra.
39 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at p. 228; Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil.
785, 800; 74 SCRA 189, 202 (1976).
40 Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., supra note 35, at p. 536; Jamero v. Melicor, 498 Phil.
158, 165-166; 459 SCRA 113, 121 (2005).
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators, and
for failing to first resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’
Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators’ bond is a pre-requisite to
respondents’ entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office.
This Court disagrees.
It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for
Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for their
exemption to post bond should they be assigned as joint special administrators.
However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15, 2006
Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining them
to post bond in the amount of P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated
when the RTC rendered its February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with
Erlinda as special administratrix.
Undeterred by the RTC’s resolve to require them to post their respective
administrators’ bonds, respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File
Administrators’ Bond on May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to the best interest
of the estate of their deceased parents and all the heirs to spare the estate from
incurring the unnecessary expense of paying for their bond premiums since they
could not raise the money themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only after
petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate on
April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued that they could not enter into their duties
and responsibilities as special administrators in light of the pendency of their motion
for exemption. In other words, they could not yet submit an inventory and render an
account of the income of the estate since they had not yet posted their bonds.
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special
administrators for failing to post their administra-
573
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 573
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
tors’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them,
tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a
denial of respondents’ plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did
so.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties
and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the
debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any
other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within
three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is
conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s estate
requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when
required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or
regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as
it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed
in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to
safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be
considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being
included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the
office of administration.41
_______________
41 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 397, 409;
328 SCRA 666, 677 (2000); Moran Sison v. Teodoro, 100 Phil. 1055, 1058
(1957); Sulit v. Santos, 56 Phil. 626, 630 (1932).
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
Hence, the RTC revoked respondents’ designation as joint special administrators,
especially considering that respondents never denied that they have been in
possession, charge, and actual administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima
since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption of Melinda as regular
administratrix. In fact, respondents also admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and
29
sincerity to observe transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash
Distribution42 for the period covering April 2002 to June 2006, 43 where they
indicated that Renato had received P4,241,676.00, Erlinda P4,164,526.96, and
petitioners P2,486,656.60, and that the estate had advanced P2,700,000.00 for the
hospital and funeral expenses of Leonardo.44 The latter cash advance was questioned
by petitioners in their motion for revocation of special administration on account of
the demand letter45 dated June 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical Center
addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital bills in the
amount of P2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably, respondents had already
been distributing the incomes or fruits generated from the properties of the
decedents’ estate, yet they still failed to post their respective administrators’ bonds
despite collection of the advances from their supposed shares. This state of affairs
continued even after a considerable lapse of time from the appointment of Renato as
a special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from February 16, 2007
when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix.
What is more, respondents’ insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed
by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated
_______________
42 Annex “N” to the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
43 Per respondents’ Petition for Certiorari before the CA; Rollo, p. 96.
44 Per petitioners’ Comment to the petition before the CA; id., at p. 114.
45 Id., at pp. 64-65.
575
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 575
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
January 12, 200446 discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between
respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the
representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita
Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property situated in
Biñan, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed
stipulated for a payment of P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract, and the
balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) month from the receipt of title of
the vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease between the
vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no
longer obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a
purported Deed of Absolute Sale47 over the same realty between respondents, and
including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors, and the same spouses, as
vendees, for a purchase price of only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute
Sale already had the signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners
claimed that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while
respondents said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount
of P500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the execution of this Deed
of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not
have been distant from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar
Community Tax Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts.
Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special
administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal
principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 66-67.
47 Id., at pp. 68-70.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its
confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto.48
On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular
administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the
following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state—
“Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.—No
person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
xxxx
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a)  To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b)  If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
_______________
48 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at pp. 228-229.
30
 577
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 577
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
(c)  If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.”
Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the
following provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent—
“Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences
of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.—When a petition for
letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to
the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to
have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration.—Any interested person may,
by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency
of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the
contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to
himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue.—At the hearing of the petition,
it must first be shown that notice has been given as herein-above required, and
thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their respective
allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there is no
competent and  Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna,
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the party
best entitled thereto.”
Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to
Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the
motion for the termination of the special administration. Although there was a
hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was canceled and reset to
February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties’ counsels. The February 8, 2008
hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation
of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion
dated February 29, 2008,49reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment
of Melinda as regular administrator and for the revocation of the special
administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their
Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the
prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not
specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and
legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to by
respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not
threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above
mentioned Rules.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate
of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs,
we take into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March
13, 2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by
virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and
that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated
_______________
49 Rollo, p. 41.
579
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 579
Ocampo vs. Ocampo
April 15, 2008.50 These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as
administratrix of the decedents’ estate, but her appointment should be converted into
one of special administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration.
Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due
from Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then
proceed with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.The Decision dated
December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M.
Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda
Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated
instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrator’s bond
she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings
for the appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with
judicial partition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
31
 [No. 30289. March 26, 1929]
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner and appellant, vs.APOLINARIO GONZALES
and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents and appelleants.

1. 1.PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS ;

REMOVAL.—The appointment' of a special administrator in a probate
case lies in the sound discretion of the court, and he may be removed
without reference to section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

1. 2.WILLS; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE; THUMB-MARKS.—In executing

her last will and testament, the testatrix placed her thumb-mark between
her given name and surname, written by another person. It was not
mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-
mark, but the form of the signature was sufficiently described and
explained in the last clause of the body of the will. Held,that the signature
was valid.

APPEAL from various orders of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Quintero, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Sumulong, Lavides & Hilado for petitioner-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes for opponent-appellant Gonzales.
Ramon Diokno for opponent-appellant Ona.

OSTRAND, J.:

On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de

Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November,
1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through
her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the
deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On
April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made
several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession. 

On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver
to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the
property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de
Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in
her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de
Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and

32
Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground
that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.  attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an
order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All
of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office
of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order
probating the will.  of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881:1
Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her
counsel is that a special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of
the causes stated in section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can
only apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special
administrator is quite different from that of regular administrator. The appointment
of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the
function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and
cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the
appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his
removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its
discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the
present possessor of the property pending the final determination of the validity of
the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.  subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the
The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in
question was not executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. That section reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass
any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be
written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him,
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the
name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the
the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the
body of the will. 
The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the case
An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages.
The name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand
margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will. About in the center
of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name
she placed her thumb-mark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-
hand margin and at the end of the will. 
On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it
was essential to the validity of the will that the person writing the name of
the maker of the will also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment, it
had been held by this court that where a testator is unable to write and his
name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of the
will is concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator
signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912), 21 Phil., 461). But his
Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment introduced into the
law the following sentence: 'The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This
requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance.
There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the
situation. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the
proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by
the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written
signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put
upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum
or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting.
A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made
by the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117).
The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the
center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will. 
33
The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are
sufficiently refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with
the attestation clause, both of which are written in the Tagalog dialect. These clauses
read as follows:
Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang
naglalaman ng aking huling tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng
aking pangalan, ipinamanhik ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na
isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng
kanang daliri kong hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon
ng kasulatang ito, at ito's ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at ng
tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng
Nobiembre ng 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na
dahon na pinirmahan sa harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni
Severina Gonzales sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6) na
dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o
testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa
wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng tinurang
testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat
isa sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng
taong 1920.
Gonzales at the end and on the margins of each of the six (6) sheets and was
declared to contain the last will and testament of Severina Gonzales, was
signed by us as witnesses at the end and on the margins of each sheet in the
presence and at the request of said testatrix, and each of us signed in the
presence of all and each of us, this 23rd day of November of the year 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD 
JUAN SUMULONG 
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed
by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the
presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and
explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the
attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite
meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of
the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent;
it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document. 
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact
that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the
attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed
without costs. So ordered.

(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD 

JUAN SUMULONG 
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD

The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:

In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and
because of the fact that I cannot sign my name, I request my niece Serapia
de Gala to write my name, and above this I placed my right thumb-mark at
the end of this will and to each of the six pages of this document, and this
was done at my direction and in the presence of three attesting witnesses,
this 23rd of November, 1920.

(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES

We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was
signed in our presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina

34

[No. L-15388. January 31, 1961]
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner and appellee, vs.IDONAH SLADE
PERKINS, oppositor and appellant.
1. 1.WILLS AND TESTAMENTS; EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS; POWER TO
SELL NOT LIMITED TO PERISHABLE PROPERTY.—Since Sec. 2,
Rule 81, Rules of Court specifically provides that "the special
administrator may sell such perishable and other property as the court
orders sold," the power of the special administrator to sell is clearly not
limited to "perishable" property.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SALE MADE PRIOR TO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP PREMATURE.—While the law empowers the special
administrator to sell certain personal property belonging to the estate, yet
until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold heard
and decided, and the conjugal part
________________
3
 99 Phil., 369; 47 Off. Gaz., 4079.
1000
1000  PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED  compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to
Anderson vs. Perkins
1. nership liquidated, or at least, an agreement be reached with appellant as to
which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being
sold to preserve their value the sale would be premature.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Cañizares, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ponce Enrile, Siquion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo for the special
administrator.
     J. D. Quirino and Lázaro A. Marquez for the oppositor and appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of
the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties
left by the deceased.
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a
petition presented by Dora Perkins Anderson for the probate of the supposed last will
and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28,
1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of
P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora
Perkins Anderson also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce
Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an
order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting
of a bond in the amount of P50,600. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins,
surviving spouse of the deceased, entered an opposition to the probate of the will
presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956, the special
administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets. 
1001
VOL. 110, JANUARY 31, 1961  1001 
Anderson vs. Perkins
which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur
Perkins at the time of his death.
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator
submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some
charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the
deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were
allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further
deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition.
When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required the
administration to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in
the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal
properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a
check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to
enumerate.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale.
Reasons for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold
were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that
unauthorized removals of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved
the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor
Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said
35
order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of
the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2, Rules of Court; (2) that said order was
issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty
sought to be sold represented the lifetime sav-
1002
1002  PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED  proper care and storage measures in either or both of the two residential houses (in
Anderson vs. Perkins
ings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing
unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the
inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed;
and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial
part of the personal estate.
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for
reconsideration. Whereupon oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This
argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically
provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold" which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is
not limited to "perishable" property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (sec.
2, Rule 81; De Gala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil., 104; Collins vs. Henry, 118 S. E. 729,
155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko vs. Smith's Estate, 244 M. W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is
not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
perishable property (Gao vs.Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 1092, 66
Mont. 488). It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to
preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81,
also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold".
There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous
opposition presented thereto by the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large  GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Pio D.
1003
VOL. 110, JANUARY 31. 1961  1003  VEYRA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL
Anderson vs. Perkins
portion of the personal properties in question, either because they were conjugal
property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own exclusive, personal
property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for
and judicially approved, no proceedings had as yet been taken, or even started, to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositorappellant from the mass of
the estate .supposedly left by the deceased, or to liquidate the conjugal partnership
property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore, the issue of the
ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal
partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with appellant as to
which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to
preserve their value, the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the
items sought to be sold—pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner were, electrical
appliances, various gadgets, and Books—can easily be protected and preserved with
Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme
urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and
objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial
portion of the personal estate in question.
The special administrator claims in his brief that the oppositor-appellant should
have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her
refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear
that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the
inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later
her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the
court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were
not well-founded; the 
1004
1004  PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 
De Balanga vs. Court of Appeals
records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds
of her opposition.
Wherefore, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs
against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petitioner-appellee Dora
Perkins Anderson.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Order set aside.
No. L-20735. August 14, 1965.
LIWANAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE
AGREGADO, respondents.
Remedial law; Civil actions; When denial of motion to dismiss, even if
erroneous, is reviewable by appeal; Case at bar.—The denial of a motion to
dismiss, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by
appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits where the alleged ground for
dismissal, such as absence of a cause of action, does not affect the lower court’s
jurisdiction to hear the case.
36
 Same; Special civil actions; Settlement of estate of deceased
persons; Mortgagee may bring action for foreclosure against special administrator.
—The theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against the
special admin-
_______________
6
 See Aquino v. Securities, 89 Phil. 532.
923
VOL. 14, AUGUST 14, 1965  923  In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
istrator of the estate of a deceased person has already been rejected by this
Court in Liwanag v. Hon. Reyes, L-19159, Sept. 29, 1964 where the Supreme Court
held that the “the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find
the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where
the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny
the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.”
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     C. M. Baltazar & A. P. Narvasa for petitioner.
     Manuel P. Calanog for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D.
Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. On January 9, 1962 respondent Manuel
Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case No.
50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in
his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime. On July 18, 1962, here
petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special
administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated
August 1, 1962, respondent, Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the
motion, whereupon petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R of the Court of
Appeals against respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by writ
of certiorariand enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No. 50897. Upon
petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction
directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the trial of that case, until
further orders. However, subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of
preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by
petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of
Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased,"
and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special
administratrix.
respondent's jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of
petitioner's motion to the same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ
of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover,
the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against the special
administrator of the estate of a deceased person has already been rejected by this
Court. In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19159 (September 29, 1964),
involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio D. Liwanag,
a similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage and an identical
motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as follows: 
The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor
holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his
security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security
by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged
property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and
(3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the
ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the
mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having
filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as
special administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise,
creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running
against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is
37
 delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present action on this technical
ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be
delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be
defeated.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
ANNOTATION  B. According to Revised Administrative Code.—Section 2195 of the Revised
ABSENCE
1. I.Absence defined.
It refers to the disappearance of a person from his domicile, his whereabouts being
unknown, and he did not leave an administrator of his property. (Art. 381, Civil
Code.)
1. II.Absence, how declared.
A. According to Civil Code.—Two years having elapsed without any news about the
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee has
left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be
declared (Art. 384, CC). The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until
six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Art.
386, ibid.). After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives,  immediate exercise of the powers of his office. (Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of
926
926  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  In the case of Zeta vs. Macato, April 28, 1959, the meanings of “absence” as to
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The
absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
(Art. 390, ibid.)
The purpose of the presumption stated in Article 390 (ordinary absence), and its
natural consequent effects are: First, if the person absent has been unheard from for
seven years or more, and it is not known whether he is still alive or not, then he is
presumed dead for all purposes except that of succession. This means that his
property will not be distributed among his heirs till after a lapse of three more year;
hence a total of ten years. Second, the rule is different in case the person who
disappeared was, on his disappearance, more than seventy-five years old, in which
case five years is sufficient for all purposes, including that of succession. The reason
is his age, which really does not make his remaining years of life seem long.
Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot
become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within
which an appeal be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to petitioner. (Petition for the
Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461)
Administrative Code considers “absence” on the same level as “suspension” and
other forms of temporary disability.
If a municipal mayor is suspended—as in the case of Laxamana vs. Baltazar (L-
5955)—obviously he is disabled temporarily; he cannot act as mayor or exercise the
powers 
927
VOL. 14, AUGUST 14, 1965  927 
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
and prerogatives of his office while under suspension. The “absence” that would
authorize the vice-mayor to act as acting mayor should, therefore, be construed in the
same manner; it should be such absence as would disable the mayor from exercising
the powers and prerogatives of his office. (Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of
Carigara, Leyte, 2 SCRA 103.)
While the ordinary meaning of “absence” is the state of being away or not
present, an officer’s absence is not such as to warrant the placing temporarily of
another in his place unless said officer is absent on occasion demanding the
Carigara, Leyte, supra.)
entitle the vice-mayor to act as mayor are: First, mere physical absence of the mayor
from the municipality is not such absence as to authorize the vicemayor to assume
the powers and duties of the mayor; and second, to entitle the vice-mayor to act as
mayor in the latter’s absence, the regular incumbent must be away from the
municipality in such manner as he was unable to discharge the duties of the office.
Under the legal provisions authorizing a municipal or city vice-mayor to
discharge the duties of the mayor in the “absence” of the latter, said term must be
reasonably construed, and so construed means “effective” absence. By “effective”
absence is meant one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time
being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. (Paredes vs. Antillon,3
SCRA 662, 665) Considering that the mayor left the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines for Japan to remain there at least for a number of days, one cannot but
conclude that, he was “effectively” absent, for it would be preposterous to claim that
any municipal or city official of the Philippines may lawfully continue to exercise or
discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives of his office even while in a foreign
38
country. That he was there on official business or with the approval of a superior
officer is quite immaterial. (Paredes vs. Antillon, supra, at 665-666)  about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in
928
928  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  property, his absence may be declared. (Art. 384, ibid.)
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
Section 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the council
“shall be presided by the mayor and no one else” applies only if the mayor were
present at the session and was prevented from presiding therein, but not where he
absented himself therefrom, (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042, 1049.)
Ordinarily, the enumeration of section 7 of Republic Act 2264 as to the proper
official who should perform the duties of mayor in case of his temporary incapacity
would be interpreted as exclusive, following the general principle of inclusio unius,
est exclusio alterius, but there are cogent reasons to disregard this rule since to adopt
it would cause inconvenience, hardship, and injury to the public interest, as it would
place in the hands of the mayor, vice-mayor, and the councilor receiving the highest
number of votes an instrument to defeat the law investing the legislative power in the
municipal council by simply boycotting the regular sessions of the council.
(Javellana vs. Tayo, supra,at 1050.)
1. III.Kinds of absence.
1. 1.Ordinary absence.—In ordinary absence, the time of death is, according
to European rule, presumed on the last day of the period; whereas, the
American rule does not state any such date.
2. 2.Qualified or extraordinary.—In the case of qualified or extraordinary
absence, the death is presumed to have occurred at the beginning of the
period (because of the danger of death). (Judge Advocate General vs.
Gonzales, 48 O.G. 5329.)
1. IV.Periods or stages of absence.
1. 1.Provisional absence.—When a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer
his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or
a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be
necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar
circumstances the power conferred by the absence expired. (Art. 381, CC.)
929
VOL. 14, AUGUST 14, 1965  929  B. Absence of accused on the day of trial.—Where the failure of the accused to
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
1. 2.Declaration of absence.—Two years having elapsed without any news
case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
2. 3.Presumption of death.—After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession. (See Arts. 390 and
391, ibid.)
1. V.Who may ask for the declaration of absence.
1. 1.The spouse present;
2. 2.The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the
same;
3. 3.The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; and
4. 4.Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right
subordinated to the condition of his death. (Art. 385, Civil Code.)
All these people are presumptive heirs or have interests in the property of the
absentee conditioned upon his death. Hence, they are given the right to ask for a
declaration of the latter’s absence.
1. VI.Word “absence” applied to following cases.
A. Absence of accused from scene of crime.—Even conceding that the accused had
been seen with the deceased at 8:00 p.m. of the day of the crime, the incriminating
value of that circumstance is destroyed by the interval that elapsed between the
encounter and the death of the deceased. The examining physician, taking into
account the medical date, placed the hour of death at some twelve to fourteen hours
prior to the autopsy made in the afternoon of August 15, i.e., around night of August
14. No one saw the accused after 8:00 p.m. of that night, and the evidence therefore
leaves a gap of four hours during which the whereabouts of the appellant or of the
deceased are not known. This interval is wide enough to admit the possibility of the
accused having separated from the deceased and of the latter having died at the hands
of per-
930
930  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
sons unknown. (People vs. Fraga, L-12005, Aug. 31, 1960.)
appear at the trial was not motivated by a desire to disobey wilfully the court’s order
or to disregard or despise its authority, but was due to unavoidable circumstances
arising from his desire to pursue certain legal remedies with a view to getting what
39
he considered a more impartial judge to hear his case, his absence on the day of the
trial of the criminal case is not punishable for contempt. (People vs. Rivera, 91 Phil.
354, 357.)
C. Absence of conspiracy.—Where the attack on the deceased is not the result of
conspiracy or of a preconceived plan hatched by the accused, their liability can only
be considered in the light of their individual participation and not of a common
criminal design. (People vs. Cutura, 4 SCRA 663, 668.)
The fact that the deceased and defendant struggled for the possession of the
latter’s knife before the former leaped from the house to escape followed by the latter
negates the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery. (People vs.
Canitan and Causi, 8 SCRA 358, 364.)
The absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses
for the prosecution strongly tends ta sustain the conclusion that no such improper
motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. (U.S. vs.
Pajarillo, 19 Phil. 288, cited in People vs. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201, and People vs.
Imam Sawah, 5 SCRA 385.)
Absence of malice is of the essence of the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence. Hence, it cannot mitigate the liability arising therefrom. (Catuiza vs.
People,13, SCRA 538, 543.)
D. Absence of medical examination.—Medical examination is not an
indispensable element in the prosecution for the crime of rape, because it all depends
upon the evidence offered and as long as such evidence convinces the  record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of citizenship
931
VOL. 14, AUGUST 14, 1965  931  passed upon. (Lee vs. Republic, 13 SCRA 700, 703.)
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
court, a conviction thereof is proper. (People vs. Belandres,85 Phil. 874; People vs.
Suarez, 40 O.G. 28; People vs. Selfaison, 1 SCRA 235, 242; People vs. Orteza, 6
SCRA 109, 113.)
E. Absence of cause of action which does not affect jurisdiction.—Inasmuch as
the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to
hear the case, it follows that the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the same,
even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after
the rendition of judgment on the merits. (Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, supra at
918)
Moreover, the absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction
of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived.
Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial
court, not an appellate court. (Medina vs. Orozco, 18 SCRA 1168.)
F. Absence of disqualification.—The absence of the disqualifications provided by
law is part and parcel of the case for naturalization, and petitioner has the burden of
proving such absence affirmatively, in addition to his possession of the positive
qualifications required by the statute. (Yap vs. Republic, 4 SCRA 670, 675.)
Needless to state, it is incumbent upon a petitioner for naturalization to prove
affirmatively by his own testimony and that of at least two credible witnesses, not
only that he possesses all the qualifications required under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473, but also that he does not possess any of the
disqualifications provided under section 4 of the same Act. (Kho Eng Pee vs.
Republic, 5 SCRA 609, 612.)
The answer of the witness to the effect that petitioner is not in any way
disqualified “because he possesses all the qualifications to become a Filipino” does
not prove affirmatively that petitioner does not possess any of the disqualifications.
To possess the qualifications is one thing and it is another not to possess any of the
disqualifications. (Kho Eng Pee vs. Republic, supra at 612) 
932
932  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
The petition for naturalization must contain an averment that the petitioner has
complied with the requirements of section 5 of Commonwealth Act 473, which
refers to the filing of a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year
prior to the filing of the petition. The absence of such averment in the petition is
fatal, and the declaration of intention is so essential in cases of naturalization that its
incorporation in the petition itself has become jurisdictional. (Sy Ang Hoc vs.
Republic, 1 SCRA 886, 889-890.)
However, the absence of opposition does not preclude the scanning of the whole
to persons not fully qualified therefor. The applicant’s complaint of unfairness could
have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not previously
G. Absence of provincial governor.—Although Section 5 of Republic Act 2264
makes the provincial governor the presiding officer of the provincial board, it does
not make his presence indispensable for the valid transaction of business, for it not
only considers the presence of three members (out of the entire membership of five)
sufficient to constitute a quorum for that purpose, but also anticipates a case when
the governor is absent, in which case the vote of a majority of the members present
shall constitute a binding act of the board. The designation of the governor as
presiding officer is obviously meant to apply to meetings where he is present, as the
logic of the situation dictates, he being the executive and highest officer in
attendance. (Castillo vs. Villarama, L-24649, Sept. 18, 1965.) (Note: As regards
mayor, see par. II-B, annotation.)
H. Absence of due presentment of cross-checks, liability of drawer.—The drawer
in drawing the check engaged that on due presentment, the check would be paid, and
that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. Wherefore, in
the absence of due presentment the 
933
VOL. 14, AUGUST 14, 1965  933 
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
drawer did not become liable. (Chan Wan vs. Tan Kim, L-15380, Sept. 30, 1960.)
40
 In case of payment of surcharge and interest by a taxpayer outside the required by statute. (12 Am. Jur. sec. 11, p. 396.) (People vs. Gagui, 2 SCRA 752,
Philippines, he being in the United States, the Supreme Court said: This pretense is 754.)
clearly devoid of merit. The assessment notices were sent to the address given by However, where the absence of a counsel from the trial was due to his own fault,
him in his income tax return, and receipt thereof was acknowledged by his he should not be heard to complain that he was deprived of his day in court. In the
representative in the Philippines. Moreover, defendant was in the Philippines when case at bar, the counsel’s excuse for his absence at the trial was alleged lack of
the deficiency assessment notice was issued, and his absence did not render the transportation facilities in his place of residence when torrential rain poured down in
requisite payments impossible.” (Republic vs. Lewin, 7 SCRA 965, 967.) his locality during the date of the trial. The lower court did not deem this as a
I. Absence of acknowledging parent.—Counsel for petitioner believes that sufficiently valid explanation because it observed that despite such torrential rain,
Article 133 of the Civil Code may be substantially complied with by merely having counsel for plaintiff who was then a resident of a usually inundated area, somehow
the court approve an acknowledgment previously made in a notarial document. But made it to the court. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s ruling can hardly be
the danger of such a procedure when applied to this case may easily be conceived. considered as an abuse of its discretion. (Republic vs. Gonzales, 13 SCRA 633, 640.)
According to counsel, the acknowledging parent is “reputedly rich and may have —ATTY. PLARIDEL C. JOSE.
properties left in the Philippines.” But it is not known where he is. At least, neither
he nor any of his legal successors, if he is already dead, has been cited to appear. ———o0o———
With no assurance that the instrument of acknowledgment sought to be approved is
genuine or has not been illegally obtained and with no adverse party present to
impugn its validity, it would be possible, through the procedure advocated by
counsel, for an impostor to become heir to a fortune in the absence of its owner. (In
re Lorenza Vda. de Balagtas, 83 Phil. 450, 452-453.)
J. Absence of contract with union for hiring of laborers.—At the start of the
redrying season of 1957, the petitioner had no contract with the respondent union
concerning the hiring of laborers. The recruitment of new personnel had nothing to
do with the season of 1956, at the end of which those who worked during that season
were duly separated. Petitioner was free to establish a system of priorities for that
purpose and adherence to that system would not constitute unfair labor practice
against those 
934
934  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals
who were not hired so as to entitle them to back wages not only for 1957 but even up
to 1959. (Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc. vs. La Union United Workers Asso., 18
SCRA 521, 527.)
In case of absence without prior permission, the Supreme Court held: “The
requirement that an employee must obtain previous permission before absence is
made, is reasonable,” its purpose being undoubtedly to enable the management to
make the necessary adjustments in order that the work may not be paralyzed.
(Operators, Inc. vs. National Labor Union, L-15073, May 26, 1960.)
K. Absence of attorney to appear for trial.—The unexcused absence of an
attorney from the court when a case in which he was attorney of record for one of the
parties was called for trial is not a contempt occurring in the presence or view of the
court, so as to be summarily punishable, but contempt therein, if any occurred, away
from, and out of, the presence of the court, and he is not subject to discipline and
punishment, other than by a charge being first made against him substantially as

41

G.R. No. 166520. March 14, 2008.*
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO “JAKE” TAN and GERALDINE TAN,
REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY,
ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY
ROMUALDO LIM, respondents.
Probate Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Administrators; The order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator provision does not apply to
the selection of a special administrator.—The order of preference petitioners speak
of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC.
6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such
creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select. However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-
quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to
the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of 
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
529
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 529
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Not being
appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals.—Not being appealable, the only remedy against the
appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess
or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal, while, on the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.—Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma
is indeed better suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo,
who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardo’s estate,
the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and
would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in
which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals could not have
reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
42
 Same; Same; Same; The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person
fully authorized to administer it for the 530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
benefit of creditors and heirs.—If petitioners really desire to avail themselves
of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so
that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a
regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment
of a special administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified
only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves
behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will,
as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass
into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors
and heirs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Capahi Law Office for petitioners.
  Escalon Law Office for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Order2 dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP.
PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby
it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late
Gerardo Tan.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Elvi
John S. Asuncion and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-26.
2 Issued by public respondent Executive Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr.
Records, p. 130.
531
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 531
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October
2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed
with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12.
Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the
Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator,
asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession and charge of
Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the
appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that
none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since
they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does
not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner
Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate
since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed
commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix,
to wit:
“b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the
fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the
bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days
from receipt hereof;
b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the
proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is
presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the
decedent;532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required
to submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash
at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of her
administration and other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the
sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing
with the court as above-required.”3
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private
respondents’ Urgent Ex parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma
another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance
has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an
Order4 appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of
which states:
“Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator
is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special
Administrator and shall immediately take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
43
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.”5
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special
administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.
On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity
as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
_______________
3 Id., at p. 82.
4 Id., at pp. 112-113.
5 Id., at p. 113.
6 Id., at p. 130.
533
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 533
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s
right to be appointed as special administratrix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to
enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners’
Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No. 4014-0.”7
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’
PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.8
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 26.
8 Id., at p. 15.
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution 9denying the Petition on the
ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition
on the Court of Appeals and proof of such service, failure to properly verify the
Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary
(SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,
however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution10 reinstating the Petition.
Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the administration of
the estate since they are allegedly the
legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that
generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is
preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or
their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo
“Jake” Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a long time and continue to
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 110-111.
10 Id., at p. 135.
11 Petitioners state in their Memorandum:
Petitioner Vilma Tan is Gerardo’s biological daughter; Jake and
Geraldine Tan, together with their late brother Christopher, are petitioner
Vilma Tan’s biological children who were adopted by Gerardo Tan via
adoption proceedings docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1386 at the Regional Trial
Court Branch VII, Tacloban City, Leyte.
The late Christopher Tan died on October 28, 1994, when he was only
seventeen (17) years old. He was single when he died, he had no children and
did not leave a last will and testament. For this reason, his interests in the
estate of the late Gerardo Tan are represented by his biological mother, herein
Petitioner Vilma Tan. (Rollo, p. 176.)
535
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 535
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in the Philippines, having
long established residence abroad.
Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the
administratrix of the estate since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and is thus
“well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate (which essentially
consists of agricultural landholdings).”12
As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave
44
Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, free to enter Gerardo’s estate and
proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of petitioners.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
“SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.”
_______________
12 Id., at p. 8.
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision
does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. 13 The preference under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment
of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.14
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing
less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.15
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s
appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly
considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s
estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
_______________
13 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1953); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil.
407, 410 (1948); Heirs of Belinda Dalhlia Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No.
162934, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 757.
14 Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532; 18 SCRA 898, 902 (1966).
15 Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA
411, 416; Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA
164, 174.
537
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 537
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
“Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner,
directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to
deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money and cash at hand or deposited
in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five days from receipt of the
directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same account
the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She
was likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the
cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The
directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago.
On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent  ex parte motion to resolve
pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days to comply with the directive
of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the
benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The
actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the requirement of a special
administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of
Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.”16(Emphases supplied.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited
for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually
appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s
appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and would certainly
not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
_______________
16 Records, p. 113.
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
45
lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere
error of judgment in a Certioraripetition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that
their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to
serve as the special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare
assertions, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure
of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a
considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same
cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the
person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that
Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardo’s
estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed
next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they
should already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end
the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or
administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition
at bar) occasioned by any cause.18 The principal object of the ap-
_______________
17 Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 477; 289 SCRA 624, 642 (1998).
18 Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of special administrator.—When there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of ad-
539
VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 539
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
pointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into
the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs.19
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the
appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of
petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner.
It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special
administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her
defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit
the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the
RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an
accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This
defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-
compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have
simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the
court’s orders.
Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is
no longer any need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the
appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or TRO.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court
_______________
ministration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
19 De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. L-48585, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 938,
945.
540
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr.
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying
reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D.
Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—The probate court is not vested with the power to order the special
administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity
of the regular administrator’s appointment. (Silverio, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 304
SCRA 541 [1999])
The court before which a petition for letters of administration is not precluded
from receiving evidence on a person’s filiation—its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. (Guy
vs. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 [2006])
——o0o——
46
 G.R. No. 221684. July 30, 2018.*
 
MARIA T. CALMA, petitioner, vs. MARILU C. TURLA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Special Administrators; Settled is the
rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of 
_______________

** Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11,
2018.
*** Designated additional member per January 17, 2018 Raffle vice J. Jardeleza
who recused due to prior action as Solicitor General.
**** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11,
2018.
*  SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
517
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 517
Calma vs. Turla
regular administrators.—Settled is the rule that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the
judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his

47
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principles.
Same; Evidence; Deoxyribonucleic Acid Evidence; Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-
11-5-SC, Rule on Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence, provides that the grant of
DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into
evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result
thereof.—Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that
the grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic
admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be
obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with
the Rules on Evidence. Therefore, we do not find the DNA test results as a valid
ground for the revocation of respondent’s appointment as Special Administratrix and
her removal as such. Respondent’s removal was not grounded on reason, justice and
legal principle.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Law Office of Jose Mangaser Caringal for petitioner.
 
 
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calma vs. Turla
PERALTA, J.:
 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated November
27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 131032.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 12, 2009, respondent Marilu C. Turla filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, Quezon City a Petition2 for Letters of Administration
alleging, among others, that her father, Mariano C. Turla, died 3 intestate on February
5, 2009, leaving real properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, bank
deposits and other personal properties, all with an estimated value of P3,000,000.00;
that she is the sole legal heir entitled to inherit and succeed to the estate of her
deceased father who did not leave any other descendant or other heir entitled to the
estate as his wife, Rufina de Castro, had predeceased him; and that she is entitled to
be issued letters of administration. She presented her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed
and registered by the deceased himself with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
As the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to
it and set the petition for hearing. On April 21, 2009, the Letter of Special
Administration5 was issued to respondent.
_______________
1  Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, with Associate Justices Marlene
Gonzales-Sison and Pedro B. Corales, concurring; Rollo, pp. 29-45.
2  Docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-09-64479; CA Rollo, pp. 38-41.
3  Certificate of Death, id., at p. 42.
4  Id., at p. 43.
5  Id., at p. 46; RTC, Branch 222.
 
 
519
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 519
Calma vs. Turla
Petitioner Maria Turla Calma,6 claiming to be the surviving youngest half-sister
of Mariano as he was her mother’s illegitimate son before her marriage to her father,
filed an Opposition7 to the petition for administration and alleged that respondent is
not a daughter of Mariano; that the information recited in her two birth certificates
are false, the truth being that Mariano and his wife Rufina did not have any child.
She argued that she is entitled to the administration of the estate of her half-brother
and nominated Norma Bernardino, who has been managing the business and other
financial affairs of the decedent, to take charge of the management and preservation
of the estate pending its distribution to the heirs.
Respondent filed her Reply8 stating that her filiation had been conclusively
proven by her record of birth which was duly authenticated by the Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office (NSO), and only the late Mariano or his wife
had the right to impugn her legitimacy; that petitioner had no right to oppose her
appointment as Special Administratrix of Mariano’s estate since the former is not the
latter’s heir; that in her capacity as the Special Administratrix of Mariano’s estate,
she had filed several cases against Norma and her husband; and thus, Norma is not
qualified to act as an administratrix because she has an interest antagonistic to the
estate.
Spouses Robert and Norma Bernardino filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene as Oppositors which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated June 2,
2010.
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Recall Order9 appointing respondent as Special
Administratrix on the ground that she has been collecting rentals from the properties
of the decedent 
_______________
6  Respondent claims that petitioner had already died on March 28, 2016; Rollo,
p. 103.
7  CA Rollo, pp. 47-49.
8  Id., at pp. 89-93.
9  Id., at pp. 74-75.
 
520
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
48
 Calma vs. Turla
for her personal gain and that she has been filing malicious suits against the Spouses
Bernardino. Respondent filed her Opposition10 thereto stating, among others, that she
has all the right to be appointed as Special Administratrix since she is the legitimate
daughter of the deceased Mariano and that she is able to protect and preserve the
estate from Norma, the one being recommended by petitioner.
Petitioner filed an undated Rejoinder claiming that the case filed against Norma
before the RTC Makati, Branch 59, related to two promissory notes where the payee
was Mariano Turla ITF: Norma C. Bernardino, hence, a trust account was created
which did not belong to the estate of the deceased. Respondent filed her Reply to
Rejoinder contending that in case Norma is appointed as Regular Administrator of
the estate, she will succeed in taking all the assets of the estate for her own use and
benefit.
On June 29, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Order DNA Testing as
respondent’s blood relation to Mariano is in issue. Respondent opposed the same on
the ground that petitioner lacked the legal right or personality to request for a DNA
test as she has no legal interest in the matter in litigation.
On May 12, 2010, respondent filed her initial Accounting11 of the funds that have
come to her possession.
In an Order dated June 25, 2010, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for an
order for DNA testing,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above incidents are disposed in
the following manner.
x x x x
_______________
10  Id., at pp. 76-78.
11  Id., at pp. 94-96.
12  Rollo, p. 54. (CA’s Decision dated June 29, 2011 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
115847)
 
 
521
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 521
Calma vs. Turla
(4) The motion for DNA testing filed by the oppositor is GRANTED,
and accordingly, the parties are directed to make arrangements for DNA
testing and analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Marilu
Turla, upon consultation and coordination with laboratories and experts on
the field of DNA analysis at the expense of oppositor.13
 
Petitioner filed a motion to remove respondent as Special Administratrix on
grounds that she had incurred expenses mostly legal without proper receipts which
cannot be returned if the same is disallowed since it is not guaranteed that she will be
declared as one of the heirs. Respondent opposed the same arguing that the grounds
raised in the motion are not sufficient for her removal and are highly speculative; that
she has made an honest and truthful accounting for the approval of the intestate
court; and that the said motion was filed for the purpose of stopping her from
prosecuting the various actions she had filed against the Bernardino spouses to
recover properties belonging to the estate.
On August 28, 2012, the RTC received the Report of Dr. Maria Corazon A. de
Ungria, Head of the DNA Analysis Laboratory, UP Natural Sciences Research
Institute (NSRI), on the DNA test on the blood samples from Rufina’s alleged
siblings and respondent, with the following conclusion:
Based on the results of mitochondrial DNA analysis there is no
possibility that Mr. Ireneo S. de Castro and Ms. Basilia de Castro Maningas
are maternal relatives of Ms. Marilu de Castro Turla.14
 
On September 11, 2012, the RTC issued an Order, 15 the decretal portion of which
reads:
_______________
13  Id., at p. 55.
14  Id., at p. 75.
15  Id., at pp. 71-76; Per Judge Charito B. Gonzales; RTC, Branch 80.
 
 
522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calma vs. Turla
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Remove Marilu Turla
as Special Administratrix filed by oppositor Maria Calma Turla is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, petitioner Marilu C. Turla is REMOVED as
Special Administratrix in this case. Petitioner is hereby ordered to submit an
inventory of all the assets of the deceased that came into her possession and
knowledge and for her to render an accounting thereof within thirty (30) days
from receipt hereof.
In the meantime, let Letters of Special Administration issue in favor of
Norma Bernardino who is hereby APPOINTED as Special Administratrix of
the estate of the deceased Mariano C. Turla, effective upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and the taking of
the corresponding Oath of Office.
Petitioner Marilu Turla is hereby ordered to turn-over possession of all
the assets of the deceased Mariano Turla which came into her possession to
Norma Bernardino within thirty (30) days from the time the latter formally
takes her Oath of Office.
SO ORDERED.16
 
49
 In finding merit to petitioner’s motion to remove respondent as Special
Administratix, the RTC ruled that while respondent’s birth certificate stated her
father to be Mariano and her mother to be Rufina, the DNA test results conclusively
showed that she is not Rufina’s daughter.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order17 dated May 9,
2013.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. After the submission of
the parties’ respective pleadings, the case was submitted for decision.
On November 27, 2015, the CA issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
_______________
16  Id., at p. 76.
17  Id., at pp. 77-79. Per Judge Alexander S. Balut, RTC, Branch 76.
 
 
523
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 523
Calma vs. Turla
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
[Order] dated September 11, 2012 issued by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
80, [and] the Order dated May 9, 2013 issued by Branch 76 of the same court,
in Special Proceedings No. Q-09-64479, are ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.18
 
Hence this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that respondent had petitioned the RTC to be appointed as
Special Administratrix of the intestate estate of Mariano on the basis of her birth
certificate showing that she is the daughter of Rufina, wife of Mariano; that in 1994,
however, Mariano executed an affidavit of adjudication for the extrajudicial
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina wherein he stated that “being her
surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other heir
entitled in her estate”; that while respondent’s birth certificate states her father to be
Mariano Turla and her mother Rufina de Castro, the DNA results conclusively
showed that she is not Rufina’s daughter, so her own birth certificate stating Rufina
as her mother was fraudulent. She avers that she had put in issue the blood
relationship of the respondent with the deceased Mariano.
Petitioner also argues that respondent had violated her duties as Special
Administratrix as the latter failed to submit an inventory and to render an accounting
thereof, hence there was a good reason for the RTC to remove her. Moreover, she
failed to comply with the Order to submit inventory and render accounting and to
turn over possession to the new administrator; and that the appointment of Norma
Bernardino as the new Special Administratrix is in accordance with the rules.
_______________
18  Id., at pp. 43-44.
 
 
524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calma vs. Turla
We find no merit in the petition.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators.19 Courts may appoint or remove specialadministrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As
long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not
interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to
make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice
and legal principles.20
We agree with the CA when it found that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing respondent as Special Administratrix of the estate of Mariano
Turla on the basis of the DNA result showing that she is not maternally related to
Rufina, Mariano’s wife.
Respondent had filed with the RTC a Petition for Letter of Administration in the
matter of the intestate estate of the late Mariano Turla. Petitioner filed her opposition
thereto based on the ground that respondent is not the daughter of the deceased
Mariano Turla; that the spouses Mariano and
_______________
19  Co v. Rosario, 576 Phil. 223, 225; 553 SCRA 225, 228 (2008), citing Heirs
of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 511 Phil. 371, 383; 474 SCRA
747, 760 (2005), citing Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948); see Rivera v.
Santos, 124 Phil. 1557, 1561; 18 SCRA 870, 874 (1966), in which the Court ruled
that the selection of a special administrator is left to the sound discretion of the court,
and that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, does not obtain; see
also Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 735, 737 (1957), in which the Court declared that
the appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory proceedings
incidental to the main case and lie in the sound discretion of the court.
20  Co v. Rosario, id., at p. 226; p. 228, citing Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
165 Phil. 785, 800; 74 SCRA 189, 202 (1976).
 
50
 525
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 525
Calma vs. Turla
Rufina Turla did not have any child; that she had not been legally adopted and no
right arise from a falsified birth certificate. In respondent’s Opposition to petitioner’s
motion to recall order appointing her as Special Administratrix, she claimed that she
has the right to be appointed as such since she is the legitimate child of the late
Mariano, hence, respondent’s blood relationship with the decedent had been put in
issue. Subsequently, petitioner asked for a DNA test on respondent which the RTC
granted as follows:
x x x Amidst the protestation of the petitioner (herein respondent) against
the DNA analysis, the Court finds it prudent to allow the conduct of the
DNA testing considering its definitive result will decisively lay to rest the
issue of filiation of the petitioner with the deceased Mariano Turla for
purposes of determining the issues on the other hand in this proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the said deceased and persons to whom the
same should be distributed. The filiation issue will secure a legal right
associated with paternity such as support or even inheritance as in the present
case. The presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive and consequently may
be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. To reject the conduct of the same
and result that may be obtained therefrom is to deny progress in proceedings
of this case.21
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above incidents are disposed in
the following manner:
x x x x
(4) The motion for DNA testing filed by the oppositor is GRANTED,
and accordingly, the parties are directed to make arrangements for DNA
testing and analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of
petitioner Marilu Turla, upon consultation
_______________
21  Rollo, p. 54. (CA’s Decision dated June 29, 2011 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
115847). (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calma vs. Turla
and coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis,
at the expense of the oppositor.22
 
Clearly, the DNA test was ordered to prove respondent’s paternity, but
surprisingly, the test was conducted with the alleged siblings of Rufina, which
showed that respondent is not related to Rufina. While respondent was shown to be
not blood related to Rufina, however, the DNA result did not at all prove that she is
not a daughter of Mariano, as petitioner claims and which the RTC’s order of DNA
testing wanted to establish. Notably, petitioner alleges that she is Mariano’s half-
sister, but it baffles us why she was not the one who underwent the DNA testing
when such procedure could satisfactorily prove her contention that respondent is not
Mariano’s daughter.
Moreover, Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides
that the grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic
admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be
obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with
the Rules on Evidence. Therefore, we do not find the DNA test results as a valid
ground for the revocation of respondent’s appointment as Special Administratrix and
her removal as such. Respondent’s removal was not grounded on reason, justice and
legal principle. We find apropos the CA’s disquisition in this wise:
The estate to be administered is that of decedent Mariano Turla, hence, it
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Respondent Judge to remove
petitioner on the ground that she is not related to Rufina Turla. True, that she
claims to be the daughter of the Spouses Mariano Turla and Rufina Turla.
However, a finding that she is not the daughter of Rufina Turla does not
automatically mean that she is not the daughter of Mariano Turla as well,
especially since in the two ver-
_______________
22  Id., at p. 55.
 
 
527
VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 527
Calma vs. Turla
sions of her birth certificate, it was Mariano Turla who reported her birth and
who signed the same as the father of the child.
x x x the DNA Test results used as a basis by the Respondent Judge in
removing petitioner was not, at the very least, presented and offered as
evidence. The rule is that after the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be
incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results
in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA
results upon presentation shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with
Sections 7 and 8 of the Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC). At
that point when the RTC used it as basis for the removal of petitioner, the
DNA Test Result is not yet considered evidence, depriving petitioner the
opportunity to contest the same. In its Order dated May 9, 2013, the RTC
backtracked a little and stated that the DNA Test Result was merely
persuasively considered in the resolution of the issue. A perusal of the Order
51
 dated September 11, 2012 shows otherwise because it was evidently the only test result may not be sufficient to exculpate the accused, particularly when there is
basis considered by the RTC in its ruling. As we already determined, the sufficient evidence proving his guilt. (People vs. Cabigquez, 631 SCRA 652 [2010])
DNA Test Result is not even material and relevant evidence in this case. _______________
Petitioner’s filiation with Rufina Turla is not material in the resolution of the
right of petitioner to the estate of Mariano Turla and/or to administer the ** Designated Senior Associate Justice per Section 12, R.A. No. 296, The
same, whether as a regular or as a special administratrix.23 Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
   
Mariano’s execution of an affidavit of adjudication in 1994 for the extrajudicial  
settlement of the intestate estate of his late wife Rufina stating among others, “that 529
she did not leave any descendant,” would not also prove that respondent is not a VOL. 874, JULY 30, 2018 529
daughter of Mariano whose estate is under consideration.
Petitioner argues that respondent had violated her duties as the court-appointed Calma vs. Turla
Special Administratrix. While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
We do not agree. administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by
_______________ the directives of equity, justice and legal principles; There is no logical reason to
appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the
23  Id., at pp. 41-42. (CA’s Decision dated November 27, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. deceased, and to do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. (Manungas
No. 131032). (Citations omitted) vs. Loreto, 655 SCRA 734 [2011])
   
  ——o0o——
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calma vs. Turla
Records show that respondent had submitted with the RTC an accounting of the
funds that had come to her possession during the initial year of her administration.
While she was directed by the RTC to submit an inventory of all the assets of the
deceased that came into her possession and knowledge and for her to render an
accounting thereof, such directive was only embodied in the RTC’s Order dated
September 11, 2012 removing her as Special Administratrix which she assailed by
filing a petition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed the same and now the
subject of the instant petition.
Considering the above discussion, we find no need to discuss the issue of
whether the appointment of Norma Bernardino as the new Special Administratrix is
in accordance with the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 27,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 131032 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio** (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—A positive Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) match is unnecessary when
the totality of the evidence presented before the court points to no other possible
conclusion, i.e., the accused raped the private offended party — a positive DNA
match may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA

52

G.R. No. 193161.  August 22, 2011.*
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, petitioner, vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO
and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO, respondents.
Probate Proceedings; Special Administrators; The appointment of a special
administrator is an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant
of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.—In Philippine
Business Bank v. Chua, 634 SCRA 635 (2010), the Court stated what an
interlocutory order is: Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case,
and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order
may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually
be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. The Court has considered an
appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the
main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.
In Ocampo v. Ocampo, 623 SCRA 559 (2010), the Court succinctly held, “The
appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.”
Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; A petition for certiorari will lie
without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.—As properly noted by petitioner,
the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is required before a decision may
be appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there
must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Thus, petitioner argues that respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of
the Order
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
735
VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 735
Manungas vs. Loreto
dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule,
however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores, 614 SCRA 270
(2010): We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is
available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are several
exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a
motion for reconsideration, to wit: x x x x i. where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.
Probate Proceedings; Special Administrators; Jurisprudence teaches us that
the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court.—
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean
that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate
of Manungas. Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special
administrator lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A.
Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005), it was stated that: It is well
settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be
appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity.
Same; Same; While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a
special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles; There is no logical
reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to
the deceased, and to do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.—
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of
the estate, such discretion must be exercised
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manungas vs. Loreto
with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to
preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules: Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such
special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
53
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. Given this duty on the part of the
special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint
someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs.
Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion
and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person
who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so
would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Apolinario B. Veruasa for petitioner.
  Joel D. Bancale for respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the
April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 22-36. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson and concurred
in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Michael P. Elbinias.
737
VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 737
Manungas vs. Loreto
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN,
entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D.
Salcedo, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado
Salinas (Manungas). The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated
November 4, 20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City,
Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado
Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent
Florencia Avila Parreño (Parreño) as the special administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas
(Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children.
Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino
Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March
31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she
was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory
heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas
whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas. 5Meanwhile,
Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980,
renouncing her rights over the separate prop-
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 50-51.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 113-114. Penned by Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.
4 Rollo, p. 23.
5 Id.
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manungas vs. Loreto
erty of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final
Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas
distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the
surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the
niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of
her incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96
against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their
answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary
period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary
judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the
premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was
appealed by the spouses Salinas to the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in
toto the Decision of the MTC.8 On appeal to this Court, defendants’ petition was
denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final on April
20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas)
in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he,
being an illegitimate son of Florentino
_______________
6 Id., at p. 24.
54
 7 Id., at p. 25. Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated
8 Id., at p. 25. Parreño as the special administrator of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
9 Id., at pp. 25-26. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
739 dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreño as
VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 739 special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and
denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreño [is] hereby declared NULL
Manungas vs. Loreto
and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public Respondent Judge of
Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition was opposed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse
Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not SO ORDERED.”14
a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May
Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having 15, 200915 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision Hence, We have this petition.
issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the The Issues
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño is hereby
Diosdado raises the following issues:
appointed as Special Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de
_______________
Manungas. The Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the
13 Id., at p. 29.
amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
14 Id., at p. 35.
SO ORDERED.”11
15 Id., at pp. 37-46.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
741
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 12 In his motion, Diosdado argued that
Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 741
virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Manungas vs. Loreto
Engracia Manungas’ death, concluding that her appointment as special administrator  
was without basis. He added that Parreño was not fit to become a special “The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be
administrator having already been fined by the court for failing to render a timely a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.16
accounting of Engracia Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration grossly
reasoned that Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, violated the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it becomes
while he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. immutable and unalterable.17
_______________ The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment
10 Id., at p. 26. of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the
11 Id., at p. 28. appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator.18
12 Id. The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors’ petition that
740 is flawed.”19
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Court’s Ruling
Manungas vs. Loreto
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the
The petition must be denied.
revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of
The RTC Order dated November 4, 
Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.13
2002 is an interlocutory order
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the
assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the

55
 Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be 21 G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 559, 571.
the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreño should have appealed the RTC Order dated 743
November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 743
45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002
Manungas vs. Loreto
became final and executory, Parreño having failed to file the petition within the
reglementary period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even by this  
Court. However, Diosdado’s position as- No appeal may be taken from:
_______________ xxxx
16 Id., at p. 4. (c) An interlocutory order;
17 Id., at p. 6. xxxx
18 Id. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
19 Id., at p. 9. aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”
742 Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the petition well within
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the prescribed period under this rule.
Manungas vs. Loreto There was no necessity to file a
sumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a final order instead of an motion for reconsideration
interlocutory order. As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a petition
order is: for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other plain, speedy and
“Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration,
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues that
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of the Order dated November 4,
other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”, e.g., an order 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores:22
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order “We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies
may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy,
be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.” and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is
interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are several
administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,21 the Court exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a
succinctly held, “The appointment or removal of special administrators, being motion for reconsideration, to wit:
discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition _______________
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.” 22 G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 270, 277-278.
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is 744
clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal 744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper remedy is
Manungas vs. Loreto
the filing of a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41
states:  
“Section 1. Subject of appeal. xxxx
 An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be involved.” (Emphasis supplied.)
appealable. The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the
_______________ issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals
20 G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 635, 648. that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a motion for
reconsideration.
56
 In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition
for certiorari despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in
several instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November
4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion  24 G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760.
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
“After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner
and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner. In the case
of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral
relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas
inherits the latter’s property by operation of law;
_______________
23 Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161838, April
7, 2010, 617 SCRA 491, 502.
745
VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 745
Manungas vs. Loreto
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia Parreño
as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is
ordered set aside.”
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel,24it was stated that:
“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well
as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator
under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the
selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who
shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee
must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity.” (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
“While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds
_______________
746
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manungas vs. Loreto
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first
pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the
order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without
grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles,
interference by higher courts is unwarranted.”25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by
the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss
to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a
regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
“Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.”
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be
prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its
eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would
not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While
the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no
logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
_______________
25 Supra note 21.
747
VOL. 655, AUGUST 22, 2011 747
Manungas vs. Loreto
 
57
 Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated May 15, 2002 of the RTC is
Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreño is REINSTATED as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate: administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas.
“In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila SO ORDERED.
Parreño as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Sereno,** JJ., concur.
contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and Note.—When appointed, a special administrator is not regarded as an agent or
so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand, representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 623
Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and SCRA 559 [2010])
who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate ——o0o——
of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise
administration of the decedent’s estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court
revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as special administrator
constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court
exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was
already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the
proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final
Distribution.27 With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an
heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in
preserv-
_______________
26 Rollo, p. 35.
27 Id., at p. 24.
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manungas vs. Loreto
ing its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4,
2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial
court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is necessarily
reinstated and Parreño’s appointment as special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CA’s April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as
null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No.

58